Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South AsiaRegional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia

Sharad JoshiSharad JoshiMonterey Institute of International StudiesMonterey Institute of International Studies

November 13, 2009November 13, 2009


IntroductionWhy is this such a crucial issue?

Nuclear weapons on both sides + deep rooted conflict Prospect of horizontal proliferation Nuclear weapons Terrorist groups

Rationale for nuclear weapons Security threat perceptions

India vis-à-vis Pakistan and ChinaPakistan vis-à-vis India

Nationalistic, domestic, scientific-bureaucratic reasons

Jammu & Kashmir

Stability/Instability ParadoxStability/Instability Paradox Strategic stabilityStrategic stability

Increased violence at sub-strategic levelIncreased violence at sub-strategic level Strategic instabilityStrategic instability

Increased violence at sub-strategic levelIncreased violence at sub-strategic level Helps link non-state violence and nuclear postures in Helps link non-state violence and nuclear postures in

South AsiaSouth Asia



CurrentlyCurrently Nuclear weapons deployed by bothNuclear weapons deployed by both Deterrence posture (stable/unstable?)Deterrence posture (stable/unstable?) Periodic crises situations (e.g. 2001/02) involved nuclear Periodic crises situations (e.g. 2001/02) involved nuclear

threatsthreats

Nonproliferation regime positionsNonproliferation regime positions Both India and Pakistan outside Nuclear Nonproliferation Both India and Pakistan outside Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)Debate in India over CTBTDebate in India over CTBT

Varied positions on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Varied positions on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)(FMCT)Pakistan’s problems with FMCTPakistan’s problems with FMCT

Expansion of specific capabilitiesExpansion of specific capabilities Continued production of fissile materialContinued production of fissile material Continued development of more lethal delivery systemsContinued development of more lethal delivery systems

Introduction of cruise missiles, longer-range ballistic missiles, Introduction of cruise missiles, longer-range ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missilessubmarine launched ballistic missiles

Consideration of missile defense systemsConsideration of missile defense systems



Capabilities and StrategiesCapabilities and Strategies IndiaIndia

Tests in 1974, 1998Tests in 1974, 1998 Estimated 40-50 nuclear devicesEstimated 40-50 nuclear devices Ballistic missile capability – Prithvi, Agni I&IIBallistic missile capability – Prithvi, Agni I&II Acquisition of cruise missiles (BrahMos)Acquisition of cruise missiles (BrahMos) Deterrence strategy Deterrence strategy

No first use doctrine No first use doctrine

Prithvi (India)


Capabilities and StrategiesCapabilities and Strategies IndiaIndia

Quest for ‘credible minimum deterrent’Quest for ‘credible minimum deterrent’Agni III long range ballistic missileAgni III long range ballistic missileSubmarine launch capability soughtSubmarine launch capability sought

Nuclear submarine (INS Arihant) Nuclear submarine (INS Arihant) launched in July 2009launched in July 2009

Approval for Agni-VApproval for Agni-V Restricted increase in range-5,000 kmRestricted increase in range-5,000 km

Testing of missile defense systemsTesting of missile defense systems

Launch of Sagarika/K-15, Feb. ‘08

Agni-III test, May ‘08


CapabilitiesCapabilities Pakistan Pakistan

Tests in 1998 Tests in 1998 Refusal to adopt a no-first use policyRefusal to adopt a no-first use policy

Put forward a “No War pact”Put forward a “No War pact” Credible minimum doctrineCredible minimum doctrine Estimated material for 50-110Estimated material for 50-110

nuclear devices.nuclear devices. Missile capability covers most of Missile capability covers most of

India – Ghauri, ShaheenIndia – Ghauri, ShaheenDevelopment of cruise missiles – Babur Development of cruise missiles – Babur nuclear delivery role nuclear delivery role

F-16 deal with U.S. F-16 deal with U.S.

November 16, 2006 photo showingthen Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz infront of the Ghauri V (Hatf)missile just before it was test fired.


Source: CNS Source: Dept. of Atomic Energy, Government of India


Capabilities and StrategiesCapabilities and Strategies Pakistan Pakistan

Concern over security of nuclear weaponsConcern over security of nuclear weapons

Both countriesBoth countries:: Development of cruise missilesDevelopment of cruise missiles

Pakistan – Babur, Ra’ad (nuclear capable)Pakistan – Babur, Ra’ad (nuclear capable) India – BrahMos, Nirbhay India – BrahMos, Nirbhay

Implications for military strategy Implications for military strategy How do cruise missiles fit into broader thinkingHow do cruise missiles fit into broader thinking

on security and deterrence issues in South Asia? on security and deterrence issues in South Asia?

Babur cruise missile (Pakistan)

BrahMos cruise missile (India)


Capabilities and StrategiesCapabilities and Strategies Missile defenseMissile defense

Two tests by India in 2006/2007Two tests by India in 2006/2007 Quest for cruise missile defenseQuest for cruise missile defense

Nuclear Confidence Building MeasuresNuclear Confidence Building MeasuresMissile test notificationMissile test notification

no cruise missilesno cruise missiles

Agreement for reducing risk of Agreement for reducing risk of nuclear accidentsnuclear accidents

Exchange of nuclear facilities listsExchange of nuclear facilities lists

India’s Endo-atmosphericinterceptor test, Dec. 2007


U.S.-India Nuclear AgreementU.S.-India Nuclear Agreement Current situationCurrent situation

IAEA safeguards agreement IAEA safeguards agreement approved in August 2008; approved in August 2008; signed in March 2009signed in March 2009

NSG approval in September 2008NSG approval in September 2008Nuclear Deal with France – Sept. 30, 2008Nuclear Deal with France – Sept. 30, 2008

U.S. Congressional approval for U.S. Congressional approval for bilateral pact in October 2008bilateral pact in October 2008

Benefits for IndiaBenefits for India Nuclear technology, materials from external suppliersNuclear technology, materials from external suppliers Domestic sources of uranium can be diverted to militaryDomestic sources of uranium can be diverted to military Enhanced energy supplyEnhanced energy supply De facto approval of nuclear statusDe facto approval of nuclear status

IAEA Board of Governorsmeeting in Vienna on August 1,2008, to consider the Indiansafeguards agreement.


U.S.-India Nuclear AgreementU.S.-India Nuclear Agreement U.S. goalsU.S. goals

Strategic partnership with IndiaStrategic partnership with India Some regulation of India’s nuclear facilities Some regulation of India’s nuclear facilities Business incentives for U.S. nuclear industryBusiness incentives for U.S. nuclear industry Will lessen India’s dependence on fossil fuelsWill lessen India’s dependence on fossil fuels Unstated objective: Building India as a regionalUnstated objective: Building India as a regional

counterweight to China counterweight to China


U.S.-India Nuclear AgreementU.S.-India Nuclear Agreement Negative ConsequencesNegative Consequences

Breaks the nonproliferation regimeBreaks the nonproliferation regime Bad precedentBad precedent More difficult to stop DPRK and IranMore difficult to stop DPRK and Iran

Pakistan’s quest for similar agreement Pakistan’s quest for similar agreement China’s proposed nuclear assistance to PakistanChina’s proposed nuclear assistance to PakistanAllows India to produce more fissile materialAllows India to produce more fissile material

Could actually stabilize India’s nuclear capabilities?Could actually stabilize India’s nuclear capabilities? Indian argumentIndian argument

India needs to be part of nuclear energy trade India needs to be part of nuclear energy trade Regime ineffective anywayRegime ineffective anyway


Proliferation Proliferation FromFrom South Asia South Asia A.Q. Khan networkA.Q. Khan network

Evolution from an import role to an export role alsoEvolution from an import role to an export role also

Lingering questions Lingering questions Has the network (or similar networks) been rounded up?Has the network (or similar networks) been rounded up?Pakistan political and military establishment involved?Pakistan political and military establishment involved?

Important implicationsImportant implicationsWhat all was transferred? What all was transferred?

Introduction of more stringent export controls by Introduction of more stringent export controls by Pakistan Pakistan


CountryCountry Transfers or negotiations for transfersTransfers or negotiations for transfers PeriodPeriod In exchange forIn exchange for

IranIran 1.1. Agreement on training scientists, transfer of P1 Agreement on training scientists, transfer of P1 centrifuge and enrichment plant diagrams, P1 centrifuge and enrichment plant diagrams, P1 machine componentsmachine components

2.2. Diagrams of P1, P2 centrifuges, 500 used Diagrams of P1, P2 centrifuges, 500 used centrifuges; manual related to fabrication of nuclear centrifuges; manual related to fabrication of nuclear weapons componentsweapons components

19871987

1994-95, 1994-95, possibly possibly till 2003till 2003

Possible agreements on oil Possible agreements on oil supplies, conventional supplies, conventional weaponry, political support, weaponry, political support, and cash. and cash.

LibyaLibya 1.1. 20 L1 centrifuges; components for 200 other 20 L1 centrifuges; components for 200 other centrifugescentrifuges

2.2. L2 centrifuges; 1.7 tons UF6L2 centrifuges; 1.7 tons UF6

3.3. Nuclear weapon design manuals, blueprintsNuclear weapon design manuals, blueprints

4.4. L2 centrifuge componentsL2 centrifuge components

19971997

20002000

2001-022001-02

20022002

CashCash

North North KoreaKorea

1.1. Transfers of P1 centrifuges and technology and Transfers of P1 centrifuges and technology and possible P-2 centrifugespossible P-2 centrifuges

2.2. Training of personnelTraining of personnel

1994-951994-95

Possibly Possibly till 2002till 2002

In exchange for missile In exchange for missile components at a later stage components at a later stage (earlier missiles had been (earlier missiles had been procured from NK for cash)procured from NK for cash)

IraqIraq 1.1. Offers from Khan to help establish enrichment Offers from Khan to help establish enrichment program and provide nuclear weapon designs program and provide nuclear weapon designs

19911991

Export side of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network


Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear weaponsSecurity of Pakistan’s Nuclear weaponsGrowing Pakistani nuclear arsenal + expansion of Growing Pakistani nuclear arsenal + expansion of

delivery systemsdelivery systemsPolitical instability and violence Political instability and violence Implications for security of nuclear Implications for security of nuclear

weapons and materials. weapons and materials. E.g., meetings in 2001 between Pakistani E.g., meetings in 2001 between Pakistani

scientists and Al Qaeda leadershipscientists and Al Qaeda leadership

Technological hurdle towards a workable nuclear Technological hurdle towards a workable nuclear device, i.e., intent does not necessarily equal capabilitydevice, i.e., intent does not necessarily equal capability

But, dirty bomb possibleBut, dirty bomb possible Psychological effect of nuclear materials usePsychological effect of nuclear materials use

Source: McClatchy

Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear WeaponsSecurity of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Source: The New York Times


Striking at ungoverned spaces Striking at ungoverned spaces and weak statesand weak statesIncreasing attacks in vicinityIncreasing attacks in vicinityof nuclear facilitiesof nuclear facilitiesInstances of kidnapping of Instances of kidnapping of nuclear personnelnuclear personnel

Unclear about motivationsUnclear about motivationsSignifies potential inadvertent Signifies potential inadvertent or deliberate access to nuclearor deliberate access to nuclearpersonnel and facilitiespersonnel and facilities

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South AsiaRegional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia ConclusionsConclusions

Expansion of nuclear capabilities and changes in Indian Expansion of nuclear capabilities and changes in Indian position in nonproliferation systemposition in nonproliferation system

South Asian proliferation also has to be seen in context of South Asian proliferation also has to be seen in context of Asia-Pacific power dynamics, especially the rivalry between Asia-Pacific power dynamics, especially the rivalry between China and the U.S. China and the U.S.

India-Pakistan nuclear stalemate leading to changes in India-Pakistan nuclear stalemate leading to changes in conventional strategies? – e.g., BrahMos conventional strategies? – e.g., BrahMos

Importance of Confidence Building Measures in other areas Importance of Confidence Building Measures in other areas of contention, e.g., Siachen glacier. Can facilitate Nuclear of contention, e.g., Siachen glacier. Can facilitate Nuclear CBMs.CBMs.

Security of nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist and Security of nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist and proliferation networks remains a key problem.proliferation networks remains a key problem.

Regional Nuclear Challenges: South Asia

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