Regional Experiences with Air Cargo Regulatory Requirements & ICAO’s

Focus on Air Cargo Security

Ross LockieRegional Officer

Aviation Security & Facilitation

ICAO’s Regulatory Framework

▪ Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention Aviation Security Manual(Doc 8973, Restricted)

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• Amendment 12 - July 2011• Amendment 13 –July 2013• Amendment 14 - Nov 2014• Amendment 15 – Aug 2017• Amendment 16 – Nov 2018

• Legally binding

• 10th

Edition – Oct 2017

• Detailed guidance on implementation

Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS)

88.07

82.2186.67

71.3068.68 64.78

57.05

63.50

84.0481.49

87.57

68.04 66.8562.78

48.36

60.44

0

20

40

60

80

100

CE-1: PrimaryAviationSecurity

Legislation

CE-2: AviationSecurity

Programmesand Regulations

CE-3: StateAppropriateAuthority for

AviationSecurity and itsResponsibilities

CE-4: PersonnelQualificationsand Training

CE-5: Provisionof Technical

Guidance, Toolsand Security-

criticalInformation

CE-6:Certification

and ApprovalObligations

CE-7: QualityControl

Obligations

CE-8: Resolutionof SecurityConcerns

% E

ffec

tiv

e Im

ple

men

tati

on

Global and APAC Regional Average Effective Implementation of Critical Elements

Global Average EI of CEs: 72.78 % APAC Average EI of CEs: 69.95 %

What is Air Cargo?

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Ensuring air cargo security : two options

▪ 100% screening (Standard 4.6.1)

▪ Secure supply chain - from point of origin/point of screening until loaded onto an aircraft (Standard 4.6.2)

Screening is the application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo or mail

Even with 100% screening, cargo must still be protected from the point of screening until loading on to an aircraft.

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Screening challenges

▪ Nature

▪ Volume

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Large, complex

Dangerous

Easily damaged

100 % screening – selecting most appropriate method

▪ Manual search

▪ X-ray

▪ Neutron scanners

▪ Metal detection

▪ Explosive trace detection

▪ Explosives detection dogs

Standard 4.6.10

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Too dense for effective x-ray

High metal content, metal detectors unsuitable

Secure Supply Chain

▪ Reduces pressure on airport screening facilities

▪ Can avoid issues with screening

▪ Raises awareness of security issues

– But a chain may be complex and is only as strong as its weakest link

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Links in the Chain

▪ Regulated Agent (RA)

▪ Known Consignor (KC)

▪ Account Consignor (AC)*

▪ Transport companies

▪ Aircraft operators

*Account Consignors will be phased out

by 30 June 2021

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27th meeting of ICAO AVSEC Panel (2016), agreed that entities such asaccount consignors which implement security controls for air cargo butare not approved by the State’s Appropriate Authority for aviationsecurity, should be phased out over a five-year period, by 30 June 2021,with a mid-term review of progress.

Supported by ICAO’s Committee on Unlawful Interference and approvedby the ICAO Council. This decision reflected the common interpretation ofprovisions included in Amendment 13 to Annex 17 – Security of theChicago Convention. The decision was confirmed by State Letter AS 8/2-16/85.

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Extracts from the ICAO Security Manual - Doc 8973

13.4.4.1 An account consignor is a consignor who originatescargo or mail for its own account for carriage on all cargo aircraftonly and who applies procedures that meet common securityrules and standards set by the appropriate authority sufficient toallow carriage of its cargo and mail only on all-cargo aircraft (tobe phased out by June 2021)

13.4.3.1 A known consignor is a consignor who originates cargoand/or mail for its own account and whose procedures meetcommon security rules and standards set by the appropriateauthority sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on anyaircraft

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To be or not to be….?

▪ A secure supply chain including RAs and KCs

provides an alternative to 100% screening which

addresses the problem of hard to screen freight and

may allow the cargo to move more quickly and efficiently while

providing assurance of high security standards to regulators and other operators.

▪ But it requires commitment from all involved. It is not a legal requirement for any ICAO Member State.

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Annex 17 Standard 4.6.2USAP-CMA PQ 7.065 If the State has established a regulated agent and/or a known consignor regime, has the State

implemented a process for the approval of regulated agents and/or known consignors?

31.25

18.1820.00

60.00

20.00

30.00

16.67

0.00

12.5

18.18

0.00 0.00

20.00 20.00

33.33

14.29

56.25

63.64

80.00

40.00

60.00

50.00 50.00

85.71

0

20

40

60

80

100

Global APAC ESAF EUR/NAT MID NACC SAM WACAF

Satisfactory % Not satisfactory % Not applicable %

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Standard 4.6.3 PQ 7.110 Are measures for the protection of cargo and mail from

unauthorized interference, from the point screening or other security controls are applied,

until departure of the aircraft consistently and effectively implemented?

What is the Role of the State?

▪ Establish regulatory framework – National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) (Standard 3.1.1)

▪ Conduct national threat assessment (Standard 3.1.3)

▪ Outline roles and responsibilities (Standard 3.1.4)

▪ Monitor implementation (Standard 3.4.4)

▪ Define RA/KC approval processes (Standard 4.6.2)

▪ Set requirements for high risk cargo (Standard 4.6.4)

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Considerations for Amendment 17 of Annex 17

A number of proposals being examined including, but not limited to;

▪ Increased requirements for background checks for staff entering SRAs and staff performing security functions

▪ Strengthening of requirement for screening of non-passengers (staff) prior to entry to SRAs

▪ Specific requirement for non-passengers to be screened prior to entry toany areas where secure cargo or in-flight supplies are held (including at anyoff-airport sites that may not be designated as SRAs

▪ Revised definition of high-risk cargo and mail

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Main objective

“Enhancing global civil aviation security”

Priorities framework

5 key priority outcomes, 32 actions & 94 tasks

Measuring progress

At the global, regional and national levels

Aspirational targets

80% States > 65% EI by 202090% States > 80% by 2023

100% States > 90% by 2030

GASePFramework

Global Aviation Security Plan (GAseP)

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1. Enhance risk awareness and response. (8 actions)

2. Develop security culture and human capability. (6 actions)

3. Improve technological resources and foster innovation. (7 actions)

4. Improve oversight and quality assurance. (5 actions)

5. Increase cooperation and support. (6 actions)

Five Key Priority Outcomes

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▪ By 2020 80% of States reach above 65% EI

▪ By 2023 90% of States reach above 80% EI

▪ By 2030 100% of States reach above 90% EI

By Council Decision (212/7) on 10 November 2017

Aspirational Targets

ICAO Resources

▪ Aviation Security Manual including:

– Air cargo secure supply chain process chart

– Air cargo acceptance form - security

– RA/KC approval process model

– Detailed security requirements for RAs/KCs

– RA/KC security programme template

– Model Consignment Security Declaration

▪ Air cargo training courses

▪ Basic guide - Moving Air Cargo Globally (jointly with WCO)

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Preloading Advance Cargo Information

▪ Cargo PLACI pilot projects (USA, EU, Canada) in progress, exploiting possibilities of WCO’s SAFE Framework of Standards

▪ Unlikely to be mandatory for AvSec

▪ An additional layer of security, on top of screening/secure supply chain

▪ Aiming for harmonised standards, avoidance of

duplication

Thank you for your attention

Ross Lockie

Regional Officer, Aviation Security and Facilitation

Asia and Pacific

rlockie@icao.int

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