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Realities ofRevolutionary Violence

in Southeast AsiaChallenges and Responses

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Realities of Revolutionary Violence: Grinterin Southeast Asia

Challenges and Responses

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Re&port No. AU-ARI-CP-90-1

Realities of RevolutionaryViolence in Southeast Asia

Challenges and Responses

DR LAWRENcP E. GRI4TERProfessor of Asian Studies

Aft-power Research Institute

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 1990

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Introduction

THE SUBREGION of East Asia known as from its intrinsic importance (althoughSoutheast Asia, sometimes labeled the the region now has nearly 425 millionBalkanst of East Asia, is a collection of people, the equivalent of Latin America).

linguistic, sociocultural, and political en- Southeast Asia contains the Strait oftitles. Vast differences exist between the Malacca-arguably the most important10 countries in Southeast Asia, and the maritime choke point in all EastAsia. andarea has no single cultural or political the key transit point between the Pacificlegacy comparable to the Chinese (or and Indian oceans. Not surprisingly, theI'Sinic') legacy in Northeast Asia. China's United States and the Soviet Union haveculture and social structure penetrated invested money and prestige into militaryboth Vietnam (thoroughly) and Thailand facilities in the area. For example, the(to some extent), but the rest of Southeast United States has facilities at Subic BayAsia-which saw an Intermingling of Naval Base and Clark Air Base in thelocal, Indian. Moslem, Christian, and Philippines, and the Soviets have instal-European influences-was never lations at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang indominated by a single tradition or society. Vietnam, which they took over in the lateConsequently. numerous minorities and 1970s. Of course, China, the largestother groups in these countries have country in East Asia, demonstrates itstended toremainoutsidethemainstream historic and intrinsic interest inof social, political, and economic life. Southeast Asia's problems by playing aFurthermore, secession movements and continuing role in the region. According-political violence have been used as ly, some of the low-intensity conflicts inmeans of rectifying grievances. In the Southeast Asia are of particular interestcurrent terminology of the United States to Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.government, the more recent episodes of Indonesia, Southeast Asia's geopoliti-these revolutionary, violent patterns are cal and demographic heavyweight withcalled low-i nt ens it con ts. Revolution- 45 percent of the region's population, hasary political violence has recently oc-curred, or is occurring, in eight Southeast experienced severe political instability inAsian countries, Singapore and Brme trthe past. The Philippines, critical to USare the exceptions. These conflicts have strategic Interests in the region, has neverexhibited a wide range of ethnic, political, been without a guerrilla problem sinceideological, and socioeconomic dynamics World War II. And Cambodia. recentlyas well as complex patterns of external seeing an end to overt Vietnameseinvolvement, military occupation, nevertheless finds

Southeast Asia and its conflicts have no comparable end to the violent political

drawn the attention of outside powers like factionalism among Khmer groups. This

the United States, the Soviet Union, and investigation compares and contrastsChina. American and Soviet interests in these three countries' experience withSoutheast Asia have tended to derive and response to revolutionary politicalmore from the subregion's location than violence:

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Indonesin-President Suharto leads a quasi- The Historical Recordauthoritarian regime braced by the armed forces.whose major element is the army. The lattercame to power as a result of destroying an at- THE HISTORICAL record of politicaltempted Communist coup 25 years ago. Suhartoseeks to smother incipient revolutionary out-breaks and other destabilizing tendencies with and Cambodia is well documented. Instrong preemptory security actions and policies the Indonesian islands, the Portuguese,of economic redistribution. Dutch, and British confronted repeated

The Philippines-With some indirect support by native uprisings. In the fourteenth andmembers of the Soviet bloc, 23.000 to 25.000 fifteenth centuries, the islands includedCommunist insurgents of the New People's Army independent agrarian and tradingare part of a guerrilla and political warfare cam- societies that were hierarchicallypaign against the Manila government. UnderPresident Corazon Aqulno. the government has governed and dominated by theresponded with a mixed carrot-and-stick ap- Javanese. Malays, and Moluccans.proach. These people held the trade of the ar-

Conbodj--A Viet namese-installed, Soviet- chipelago largely in their own hands while

backed, minority Communist regime has also experiencing the deepeningimpact of

gradually gained a degree of legitimacy and con- Islamic missionaries. The story of Java's,trol. At the same time, a splintered Khmer rests- Sumatra's. and the Outer Island's fall totance coalition headed by Prince Norodom European colonialism is a tableau ofSihanouk has s;ought-unsuccessfully to date- politics, warfare, and trade as the Dutchto force a power-sharing arrangement with the and British gradually gained control ofPhnom Penh government, the islands' strategic corners. Eventual-

ly, the Dutch-through sheer endurance,In Indonesia. US policy monitors have ability, and luck-bested the British and

little ability to influence the internal then set about relentlessly and ruthlesslysecurity practices of the Suharto regime acquiring an absolute monopoly over theand its security forces as they deal with a spice trade. The islanders fought backvariety of potentially destabilizing chal- with swords, arrows, and what firearmslenges. In the Philippines, a country they could collect. The natives' last at-recovering from dictatorship but dis- tempt to oust the Dutch produced thetorted by economic stagnation and politi- great Java War of 1825-30, which ac-cal fragility, US policy supports the efforts counted for 200,000 Indonesian deaths.of Aquino's reformist government to quell In the twentieth century, the Communistinternal violence, including the Coin- Party of Indonesia (Pi), originating frommunist and Muslim insurgencies. In a Dutch Marxist import, eventually be-Cambodia, scene of the most complex came the largest Communist party out-political violence in Southeast Asia, US side of China and sought power bypolicy originally sided with the Associa- violence on three occasions, only to betion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ripped to shreds each time. The lastand China in keeping the pressure on episode in 1965-66 accounted for up toHanoi but Is now showing more flexibility 300,000 deaths. Since then. Indonesiain encouraging a Hun Sen/Sihanouk ac- has been quiet on the surface.commodation. This paper compaies the In the Philippines, native unrest andJakarta. Manila, and Phnom Penh warfare repeatedly challenged Spanish-governments' responses to the violence later, American-authorities. But theeach has encountered and contrasts his- underlying composition of Philippinetorical factors, strategies, and outcomes society was very different from that ofto discern what has worked and not Java. When Spain encountered theworked in the peculiar sociocul- Philippine islands, they had no centraltural/economic environments of In- government, no national identity, and nodonesia, the Philippines. and Cambodia. notion of a historical past. They were

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simply a collection of islands and villages mese. When the Thai retaliated and

whose basic social unit was the baran- sacked Angkor Thorn in 1353, Khmer

gay. a small kinship group. Barangcuys power collapsed, and they abandoned

also fought with each other. Ferdinand their revered kingdom. With the end of

discovered the Philippines in 1521. but Kambuja, Cambodians began their long

Spain needed 50 years and four military struggle for survival, broken only by 80

expeditions to bring the non-Muslim por- years of French protection. After World

tions of the northern and central islands War II, Cambodia fell into an intensifying

under nominal control. The Muslim internal fratricide which was to see Prince

domains to the south, especially in Min- Sihanouk ultimately lose power to Lon

danao and Sulu, were never conquered by Nol. who n turn lost to Pol Pot's Khmer

the Spanish. Finally. in the 1880s and Rouge and their hideous genocide. The1890s, native revolutionary agitation Vietnamese invasion of late 1978 put a

began to boil on a national scale. It was temporary end to Khmeranarchybut cost

to culminate in Emilio Aguinaldo's fac- the Khmers their independence. Only

tion-ridden war of independence at the now do we see the end of formal Viet-

turn of the century. Acquiring the Philip- namese military occupation while at-

pines from Spain, US authorities finally tempts to find a political compromise

broke Aguinaldo's challenge but not until among Khmer factions still founder.

death had claimed 100,000 Filipinos Thus, under President Suharto's

(most killed by disease) and 4,200 government, Indonesia is largely freeAmericans. Subsequent fighting after from organized political violence. But theWorld War HI against the Huk guerrillas Philippines, led by the reformist govem-

claimed tens of thousands more lives, as ment of President Aquino is riven withhas Manila's continuing campaign political violence. And Cambodia showsagainst the seemingly never-ending no fundamental compromise among its

Marxist and Muslim insurgencies. warring factions, despite suffering 2 mil-

Cambodia and the Khmer population lion deaths out of its population of 7

also have experienced violence almost million. What explains the very different

continuously, both internally and exter- capacities of these governments to con-nally. The oldest major civilization in trol political violence?Southeast Asia. the Khmers dominated

the Mekong River Basin by the first cen-tury A.D. With their distinctive, In-

dianized culture and warlike attitudes, Some Hypothesesthe Khmers expanded their territorialcontrol. They eventually dominated por- A COMBINATION of two key factors ex-tions of present-day Thailand and the plains this question: (1) differences in thenorthern Malay peninsula but continued three societies' socioeconomic cohesion

paying tribute to China. In the eighth and tolerance of authority and (2) con-century, weakened by civil wars, the trasts in the legitimacy and effectivenessKhmers succumbed to conquest by a of the three governments' responses. in

Javanese invasion. Throwing off the for- brief, Philippine society is more frag-eigners in the ninth century, the Khmers mented. more mobile, and less compliantreunified, an act that brought on their than Indonesian society, especially that

golden age of "Kambuja" (or "Angkor"), of Java. And Cambodian society haswhich was to last until the middle of the been so traumatized and flattened that

fifteenth century. At Angkor's cultural both the cohesion and administrative-zenith, the Khmers also went to war with economic skills needed to effect a

all the surrounding peoples-Chains. recovery are almost completely absent.

Vietnamese. Lao. Thai, and even the Bur- By contrast, the Javanese are comfort-

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able with hierarchy and authority, and cal Left and the Right, the rich and thethey also have great economic skills, poor. And Cambodia has been unable toMoreover, the Philippine government's control its own destiny, split as it isrecent responses to political violence have among four warring political factions thatbeen inconsistent, poorly organized, un- reflect the entire ideological spectrum asdisciplined, and underfunded, compared well as their dependence on and conflictto the Indonesian government's respon- with Vietnam and Thailand/ASEAN.ses. And Phnom Penh's response has Government legitimacy is seriously chal-been almost totally dependent on the lenged in the Philippines and Cambodia.presence and security system of the Viet- It is not in Indonesia.namese army inside Cambodia. Jakarta,however, approaches Indonesia's internal A final consideration involves the threesecurity problems with a clear willingness countries' very different emergence toto subordinate group and individual political independence. Ater the Dutchrights to the larger nationalism of left Indonesia In the late 1940s. the In-"Greater Indonesia." Only the Khmer donesian armed forces went through aRouge in Cambodia show that kind of very tough sorting out of leadership anddetermination, although they have none loyalties during the pacification opera-

of the economic skills and obviously lack tions against resistant ethnic and politi-

any of the social compassion of the cal groups. As a result, the army in

Javanese. Filipinos, with more particular became the custodian of In-

democratic values but little social donesian nationalism. The Philippines

cohesion, have been reluctant to force had nothing comparable to this In its

internal compliance. Cambodia. now post-World War II emergence from US

split among four political factions, faces tutelage. The transition wassmooth, and

a future of renewed civil war. Finally. the Filipinos did not have to fight

Manila's and Phnom Penh's responses Washington for independence. Cam-

are reactions to their revolutionary chal- bodians have never had a cohesive

lenges, while Jakarta's are preemptory government on the Right or a compas-

and more comprehensive in nature. The sionate government on the Left since

Indonesians have a doctrine of counter- World War If. Prince Sihanouk-the ul-

revolutionary warfare. The Filipinos do timate political acrobat, although a

not. and Cambodian authorities have veteran nationalist-was, nevertheless,

simply done what the Vietnamese told not able to keep Cambodia independent.

them to do. In short, there was no crucible of nation-al, armed emergence to statehood in the

In a sense, the Indonesian regime of Philippines, and Cambodia--caught be-General Suharto had advantageous cards tween stronger forces and countries-hasdealt to it following the nightmare of the eviscerated itself in searching for thatattempted Communist coup in 1965. A statehood.shocked, compliant Moslem society-al-ready devastated by the Incendiarypolicies of Sukarno-did not want to see Findingsatheistic, Communist-Inspired radi-calism succeed. Indonesians are willingto tolerate intrusive-even dictatorial- INDONESIA'S social cohesion, tolerancegovernment involvement in their lives if it of authority, and legitimacy and loyalty ofpreserves order and provides minimal its armed forces contrast the social frag-levels of welfare. But the Philippines, led mentatlon and political fracture of thesince February 1986 by a fragile armed forces in the Philippines and Cam-democratic government. remains split be- bodla. These differences mean thattween Catholicism and Islam, the politi- responding effectively to revolutionary

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political and social challenges has been society-remains fragmented and mobile,possible for the Jakarta regime but much without a sufficient national consensus.more difficult for the Manila and Phnom This means that although the govern-Penh governments. Again. the historical ment and armed forces have problemsexperience is revealing, getting their act together, so do the insur-

In the twentieth century, Dutch gents! The result is a continuing, still

authorities-and later the Indonesian modest-scale, shifting insurgency chal-army-ruthlessly and determinedly put lenge matched by an often lackluster

down Communist-instigated, revolution- government response, without clear

ary violence on three dramatic occasions, strategic direction on either side.

In the first two instances (1926 and Like the Philippine society, Cambodia

1948). the chaos within the Communist also demonstrates severe social andleadership and the party's premature political fractures. The Khmer people-

ideological fervor played into government pacific in manners and countenance but

hands. The PKI also misjudged the often warlike and gratuitously revengeful

society's readiness to rebel. In the third when they see the chance to retaliate-

instance (1964-66). the PKI was much have been caught in the jaws of a Viet-

better organized and could call on over 2 namese-Thai vise for centuries. They

million cadres and sympathizers. Never- have also suffered from their own

theless, the situation was "saved,- if that mistrust and violence. When the Second

is the appropriate word for the holocaust World War collapsed French authority in

which followed, by a combined Cambodia, a variety of armed groups,

army/societal reaction. The army went gangs, and other elements roamed the

after the PKI's leadership, while Muslim countryside. Khmer Communist

citizens went after Communist sym- revolutionaries surfaced under Viet-

pathizers in a frightening "holy war" that namese Communist tutelage in 1950-51

merged religious fanaticism with but soon fractured into a murderous

Javanese and Sumatran social com- spectrum of Marxist-Leninists.

pliance and authoritarianism. Socialists. and Nationalists. At the same

In the Philippines, by contrast, time, French, then Chinese, assistance

American firepower and mobility extin- was pitted against pro-Vietnamese fac-guished Aguinaldo's faction-ridden In- tions. which later also received Soviet

surgencv at the turn of the century. A assistance. While Prince Sihanouk tem-

half-century later, however. Ramon porized, and In the 1960s and early 1970s

Magsaysay's reforms, leadership, and sought to steer through the factionalism

legitimacy defeated the Huks, who-like with his own highly personalized style of

Aguinaldo's forces-were ideologically rule, In 1966-67 the Khmer Rouge

splintered. The current Communist in- declared their guerrilla war against him.

surgency against the Manilan govern- When Hanoi sought to bring the Khmer

ment, while showing factionalized rebel Rouge leadership back under its control.

leadership, is not being combated by a Pol Pot's faction liquidated large numbers

government leader or reform strategy of pro-Hanoi Khmer revolutionaries.

comparable to Magsaysay and his pro- Once In power in April 1975, he then

gram. Nor are the guerrillas being con- ordered genocide against all internal op-

fronted by Philippine armed forces position and traditional classes. Hanoi's

capable of applying sufficient, cohesive, handpicked client regime in Phnom Penh,

and steady pressure. Finally. Philippine now led by Hun Sen and braced for 11society-in comparison to Indonesian years by the Vietnamese ar-my (50.000 of

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whom were killed or died of wounds) has Southeast Asia, counterrevolutionary for-

not been able to defeat Cambodia's guer- mulas seldom transfer from one country

rilla resistance or pacify the country. to another. The Soviets found that out inAfghanistan, and South Africa discoveredit in Namibia.

Philippine officials know how to quell

Implications for Policy the insurgency of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines/New People's Army. That

IT SHOULD BE obvious that no outside is, planning documents of the Armed For-country can do much to affect the ces of the Philippines reveal much atten-violence or its causes in the Philippines tion to causes and dilemmas, andand Cambodia. US advisors to the Philip- internal security specialists andpine government cannot impress upon operators from Thailand, Indonesia,Filipino authorities "lessons" from other Malaysia, and other countries have heldsuccessful counterrevolutionary opera- seminars and consultations in Manila.tions unless the Filipinos are Interested From the secretary of national defensein them and can apply them to their own down. Philippine officials have plenty ofsituation. Vietnamese cadres have ex- information about other governments'perienced similar frustrations in Cam- doctrines and strategies in combatingbodia. For example. Phnom Penh's revolutionary political warfare. The prob-regular armed forces of about 35,000 men lem in the Philippines is not lack of goodhave only grudgingly taken up the intentions or brainpower. Rather, thesecurity roles that Hanoi has relin- problem is societal and structural: it isquished. Moreover, the Phnom Penh the political. cultural, and socioeconomicarmy's poor competence and high deser- distortions of the Philippine society which

tion rates, as well as some units' coin- constrain an effective response and per-promise with the Sihanoukists, leave petuate the violence. Central Luzon, forHanoi with a shaky client in Cambodia. example, has been in periodic revoltOn the other hand, one should recall that against Manila for a century. The MuslimGeneral Suharto. the Indonesian army, south has been in a state of unrest sinceand the Muslim extremists of Java and the sixteenth century. And areas of theSumatra destroyed the largest Coin- Visayan islands show some of the worstmunist party in the world outside of income distortions in Southeast Asia.China with no direct help whatsoever Until a Manila government launches afrom the outside. The Java power elite comprehensive reform program along the

brooks no internal challenges. lines of Magsaysay's, with multifacetedIn short, revolutionary political and reinforcing political and economic

violence turns out to be culturally appeals, much of the rural Philippinesspecific, nationally bounded, and deeply will be in unrest or revolt. Finally, as theaffected and constrained by the peculiar December 1989 coup attemptsociopolitical dynamics of the country in demonstrates, the Philippine armed for-which it is occurring. Exporting -volu- ces have not come under sufficient na-tionary violence or trying to push revolu- tional ideological control. Nor have theytionary ideology and instability across received sufficient resources to be able toborders often fails. Lenin found this out bring cohesive pressure against the Con-in Western Europe after 1919, as did munist guerrillas or replace the"Che" Guevara in Latin America after dangerous vigilante groups which, in the1962, and Hanoi when it went to war with gap. provide local "security."Cambodia's "fraternal" Marxists in 1978. In Cambodia, the levels of violenceThe same tends to be true of counterin- have been low for the past three years.surgency lessons and advice: within and Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces

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have sought to "harden" the borders Lampung province, ostensibly to breakagainst a return of the Kiuner Rouge by up an Islamic "extremist" group followinglaying millions of mines and booby traps. the murder of an army territorial officer.But the potential for a new civil war is However, reliable though nonofficial ex-heightened in the aftermath of the break- planations of the unrest and violence indown of the Paris talks. Unfortunately, the area-perhaps 100 people died in theno fundamental compromise among the fighting-indicate a tangled story ofwarring Khmers is on the horizon. Hun forced land clearing, disputed communal

Sen's Phnom Penh government has ownership, loss of coffee and cocoa farm-shown more resilience and staying power ing rights, corruption, and some ideologi-than was expected, but the opposition cal agitaton. After the attack, Gen Triresistance (the Opposition Coalition Sutrisno, army chief of staff, went so far

Government for Democratic Kampuchea) as to paint the rioters as "lefa-wing oralso has shown a remarkable ability to right-wing extremists or a combination ofendure. Still composed of a triad (now both." Whatever the portrayal or theevidently becoming a dyad, as many of reality at Lampung, the incident shows

Son Sann's rightest forces move over to that harsh and preemptive tactics stillSihanouk's Moulinakao, the resistance Is characterize the Indonesian govern-

based on Sihanouk's diplomatic agility ment's generally uncompromising at-(and about 12.000 troops loyal to him). It titude toward social disturbances.also relies on the grim, battle-hardened, In the Philippines, though, PresidentChinese-armed, and fanatically led Aquino returned to Manila from EmperorKhmer Rouge, who control about 35.000 Hirohito's February 1989 funeral in

troops operating out of Thai border base Japan just in tme to find coup rumorscamps. Finally, while external powers spoiling celebrations that marked thehave pushed Hanoi and the four Cam- third anniversary of the "people power"bodian factions toward the peace table, uprising which had tossed out Presidentall players are hedging their bets: (1) Ferdinand Marcos. Speaking to theHanoi pulls its regular units out of Cam- cadets of the Philippine Military Academybodia but leaves behind a quasi-military at Baguio-who 18 months earlier hadsecurity system: (2) the Soviets push for openly supported Col Gregorto Honasan's

a settlement as they deliver thousands of attempted coup d'etat-Mrs Aquino ad-tons of fresh ammunition and equip- dressed the government's enemies onment-including tanks, armored person- both sides of the political spectrum:nel carriers, and helicopters-to Hun To the enemies of freedom, the armed opponentsSen's government; (3) the Thai govern- of our government on the Left and Right. I ad-ment, led by a prime minister who dress these words: Let us all sit down and try topromotes trade with Cambodia and Viet- settle our differences by talk. And if we cannot,

nam, makes no move to disrupt Khmer by all means, let us do so by arms.

Rouge base camps; and (4) China-whose Then, in December 1989 came theaid to the Khmer Rouge allows Pol Pot's sixth and most serious coup attemptforces to stockpile up to five years' worth against the Aquino government. After a

of amnmunition, fuel, and weapons--slg- week in which the presidential palace,nals no willingness to cut off the Khmer armed forces headquarters, and Manila'sRouge. Thus, no light appears, to date, financial district were all attacked, mostat the end of the Cambodian tunnel. mutineers did not surrender but simply

Recent developments In Indonesia, the returned to their barracks. Thus, Presi-Philippines, and Cambodia Illustrate the dent Aquino presides over a faction-rid-

differences and dilemmas perfectly. On 7 den politcal system without adequateFebruary 1989, Indonesian army units national consensus and an armed forcesassaulted a south Sumatran village in neither capable nor trustworthy enough

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to bring order. She is now heavily de- countries spring from internalpendent upon, indeed hostage to. the socioeconomic problems and dilemmas.political vicissitudes of the armed forces. In each of the three countries, we see how

Finally, Cambodia continues in its societal and cultural characteristics havestruggle for survival which began almost aided or complicated each government's600 years ago when the Khmer kingdom attempts to cope with violent challenges.of Angkor was sacked by invading armies. President Suharto's "New Order" is aGiven the sorry history of Cambodia as a deliberate effort to distance his regime-kind of punching bag between Thailand including its stability and developmentand Vietnam. the Khmers often have had policies-from Sukarno's deliberate dis-to cast their lot with whichever outside order. Working in favor of the Suhartopower offered the best temporary protec- government is the Javanese habit oftion. Nevertheless, Cambodians-not obedience. In the Philippines, Presidentforeigners-have done the most damage Aquino's "New Democracy" clearly con-to Cambodia. In early 1990, with the trasts to Marcos's "Constitutionalmost recent foreign occupation ended in Authoritarianism." but it also reflects thethe wake of the Paris peace conference, Filipinos' individualism, mobility, resis-the warring Khmer political factions have tance to order, and resistance to nationalnot yet brought peace to their tortured consensus. The attempted coup inland. December 1989 shows how the anarchy

continues to affect the armed forces. And

in Cambodia, political factionalism and

Conclusion political violence have brought thecountry to the brink of renewed civil war.

T S BIn sum, the best-laid plans of gov-doHESE BRIEF comparisons of In- ernments for countering politicaldonesia, the Philippines, and Cambodia violence-their doctrine, strategy, andshow that the origins of revolutionary tactics-make little progress unless theyviolence in these countries are fun- address theactual underlying causes anddamentally internal. Indeed, the roots of dynamics of the violence.

political violence in most Southeast Asian

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CADRE PAPER

Previous CADRE Papers

Any of the previous editions of CADRE Papers listed below can be ordered inreasonable quantities by writing AUCADRE/PTP, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532,or by calling AUTOVON 875-2773/6452 (Mr Hipps).

"Operational Art and Aircraft Runway Requirements." Lt Col Price T.Bingham, USAF. Public release. The author examines the importance of airbases to the exercise of operational art and shows why aircraft runway require-ments are the key to the availability and operability of air bases during acampaign. In a review of World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia, ColonelBingham shows how important air base availability and operability have been tothe effectiveness of fighter/attack aircraft. Looking to the future, the threat posedby the Soviets promises to make air base availability and operability even moreimportant to success. (AU-ARI-CP-89-4)

* "Defending against a Space Blockade." Maj Tom Blow, USAF. Publicrelease. An exploration of the strategic implications of space-based weaponsbeyond those generally discussed in the Strategic Defense Initiative debate.(AU-ARI-CP-89-3)

* "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art." IA Col PriceT. Bingham, USAF. Public release. Colonel Bingham reviews campaigns in WorldWar II, Korea, and Vietnam to show that air interdiction's effectiveness dependedon whether it forced the enemy to choose between experiencing unacceptablelosses from air attack or moving too slowly for his ground forces to succeed.(AU-ARI-CP-89-2)

• "Studying Soviet Low-intensity Conflicts." Dr Stephen Blank. Publicrelease. This paper is a brief discussion of Soviet political and military strategyapplied in low-intensity conflict environments, with lessons for American LICplanners. (AU-ARI-CP-89- 1)

e "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Military Dilemmas andDoctrinal Proposals." Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF. Public release. The authorprovides a reasoned, balanced, and very basic look at low-intensity conflict froma military point of view. (AU-ARI-CP-88-1)

" "Countering Terrorism in the Late 1980s and the 1990s: Future Threatsand Opportunities for the United States." Dr Stephen Sloan. Public release.Brief overview of the terrorist threat, the types of terrorist groups, and thealternatives for countering terrorism. (This paper is a revision of a presentationmade on 4 April 1987 at the program-titled Threats and Opportunities Facingthe United States in the 1990s-that was held under the auspices of theConsortium for the Study of Intelligence, National Strategy Information Center,Washington, D.C.) (AU-ARI-CP-87-5)

e "The Changing Western Alliance in the South Pacific." Wing Comdr BrianL. Kavanagh. RAAF. Public release. Examines the Western alliance, its history

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and objectives, and the issues confronting it. The author analyzes currentpolicies of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) and thesenations' perceptions of the ANZUS Treaty. A blueprint for change is suggested.(This paper was originally a research report submitted to the Air War Collegefaculty in fulfillment of the research requirement for Wing Commander Kavanaghof the Royal Australian Air Force.) (AU-ARI-CP-87-4)

* "Aerial Refueling: The Need for a Multipoint, Dual-System Capability." MajMarck R. Cobb, USAF. Public release. Investigates the possibility of usingmultipoint, probe, and drogue refueling to alleviate tanker shortfall and toincrease the effectiveness of tactical fighter operations. (AU-ARI-CP-87-3)

* -Air Power and the Defeat of a Warsaw Pact Offensive: Taking a DifferentApproach to Air Interdiction in NATO." Lt Col Price T. Bingham. USAF. Publicrelease. A penetrating look at the present US Air Force approach to air interdic-tion in NATO, its flaws, and its weaknesses. An alternate approach, the use ofthe family of air scatterable mines (FASCM) integrated with the intelligentmaneuver of NATO land forces for an air interdiction campaign, is presented alongwith a look at the problems to be overcome before the US Air Force could effectivelyuse FASCM for air interdiction. (AU-ARI-CP-87-2)

* "The Swords of Armageddon: A Discussion of the Strategic Mystique." MajG. E. Myers, USAF. Public release. This discussion attempts to dispel thecontinuing mystique linking strategic bombardment with nuclear holocaust. Itaddresses the relevance of individual strategic actions to large, small, nuclear,and nonnuclear wars and of our bombers and intercontinental missiles as viableforce options in a variety of scenarios. (AU-ARI-CP-87- 1)

* "Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure." Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF.Public release. Illustrates how US air power was not prepared for the conflict inVietnam because of its emphasis on strategic bombardment and how the war'soutcome may not have been any different even if the military had been allowedto carry out its desired intensive bombing campaign. (AU-ARI-CP-86-3)

* "Policy and Strategy Foundations for Low-Intensity Warfare." Jerome W.Klingaman. Public release. Addresses the need for establishing a policyframework on the internal dynamics of revolution to serve as a foundation fordeveloping defense strategies, doctrines, and force structures for this type ofwarfare. (This paper was originally presented on 21 June 1986 to an internationalforum on Low-intensity Warfare in Paris, France.) (AU-ARI-CP-86-2)

* "Nuclear Winter: Asymmetrical Problems and Unilateral Solutions." Lt ColFred J. Reule, USAF. Public release. Through analysis of the asymmetries ofnuclear winter, this study uncovers the nature of the problem we face andexplains why joint efforts to solve it are in the best interests of both superpowers.(AU-ARI-CP-86- 1)

* "Study War Once More: Teaching Vietnam at Air University." MaJ SuzanneBudd Gehri, USAF. Public release. A penetrating look at how Air University'sprofessional officer schools teach the lessons from the Vietnam War and a

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CADRE PAPER

comparison of their approach to those employed by civilian institutions of higherlearning. (AU-ARI-CP-85-7)

* "Project Control: Creative Strategic Thinking at Air University." Lt Col DavidJ. Dean, USAF. Public release. A unique review of a little-known strategicresearch project conducted at Air University during the early 1950s. (AU-ARI-CP-85-6)

0 "A Possible Fallback Counteroffensive Option in a European War." DrRichard B. Remnek. Public release. A new look at the European situation anda new proposal for countering a possible Soviet attack. (AU-ARI-CP-85-5)

o "Some Observations on Islamic Revolution." Dr Lewis B. Ware. Publicrelease. A knowledgeable look at Islamic fundamentalist revolutions, their roots.and their implications. (AU-ARI-CP-85-4)

* "Military Art and the American Tradition: The Vietnam Paradox Revisited."Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF. Public release. Brief examination of the Americanstrategy in Vietnam and traditional American military views about the art ofwarfare. (AU-ARI-CP-85-3)

* "Marlborough's Ghost: Eighteenth-Century Warfare in the Nuclear Age." LCol Dennis M. Drew, USAF. Public release. An essay examining the similaritiesbetween limited warfare in the eighteenth century and the age of nuclearweapons. (AU-ARI-CP-85-2)

* "Airpower in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience." Lt Col DavidJ. Dean, USAF. Public release. A brief examination of the concept of "air control"as practiced by the RAF in the Middle East between the two world wars.(AU-ARI-CP-85-1)

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