MIDDLE EAST

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HEADO'JARTEPv) ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EA^T

AMERICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

JANUARY-MARC

-A­MIDDLE EAST

REVIEW NO2

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST

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Contents

Forwarct to Tunis. Section I. With the VHIth Army to Mareth Page 5

Section II. Tunisian Encounter 23 Section III. The Pincers Begin to Close 40 Tables Showing Scale of Effort 51 Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean 55

Malta's Contribution 61 Rescued at Sea in a Storm 72 Madagascar Sideshow 75 The Other Side of the Picture 82 Fighter Recce — The Formation of 285 Wing ... 90 Filming Under Fire 95 Night Operations by Bostons 100 The Enemy's Last Days in Tripoli 105 From the 540s ... 110 Acknowledgment 113 Maps — Eastern Battle Area, 1st January - 31st March, 1943 4

Western Battle Area, November, 1942 Marcb, 1943 22 Malta, Sicily and the Toe of Italy 62 Madagascar 76

^ ^ ^ Review is Secret (= American Confidential). It 'is intended for, theJxSBmation of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security app^0j0K^oy the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within these limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of 8.A.A.O., H.Q., B.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of. its contents to be communicated to anyone out­side the Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc­tion of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised person obtaining possession of a copy should immediatelyforward it in a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Foreword

IS umber Two of the R.A.F. Middle East Review covers the first quarter of 1943, during which Tripoli was captured, the enemy was forced out of the Mareth line, and the pincers of the British, American and Allied forces began to close on the enemy in Tunis from the west, south, and east.

Certain changes in the operational control of the air forces engaged ivere therefore inevitable. Mediterranean Air Command was established as a combined American and R.A.F. Operational Headquarters to co-ordinate all air force effort. The Twelfth U.S.A.F. and the R.A.F. Eastern Air Command, which were operating from the Algerian side, were combined into the North-west African Air Forces, including the North-west African' Tactical Air Force, the North-west African Strategical Air Force, and the North-west African Coastal Air Force. In February, following their entf-f into Tunisia, the Western Desert Air Force and part of the Ninth U.S.A.F?, entered under the operational control of the N.A.A.F., while Air Head quart? ers, Egypt, changed its name to Air Headquarters, Air Defences, Eastern Mediterranean, responsible for fighter defence over Tripolitania, Cyrenaica,. Egypt and the Levant, the coast line and convoys, from Tripoli (Trip.) to Tripoli .(Lev.). R.A.F. Headquarters, Malta, also changed to Malta Air Command under the operational control of Mediterranean Air Command.

The scope of the R.A.F. Middle East Review is not confined merely to reporting the activities of formations and units controlled by H.Q., R.A.F.. M.E. Its task is to present, as far as possible, a clear story of operations in the Middle East theatre as a whole. The historical narrative section, therefore, includes the work of the Dominions, Allied, and Royal Naval Air Squadrons which are working with, or as part of, the Royal Air Force. It is, however, obviously impracticable to designate the nationality of every aircfaft or squadron employed in mixed formations, but it is intended, in future numbers of the "Review", to cover, from time to time, the operations of each Dominion and Allied Air Force separately, if desired, over the period of their employment in the Middle East.

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Forward To Tunis!

Daring the early days of November, 1942, it became evident that the "Battle for Egypt" had been won by the VUIth Army. From June to October the Axis threat to the Delta had been ever-present although progressively diminished; the next month, Rommel's battered remnants mere in full flight westwards.

The R.A.F.s part in stemming the enemy's advance into Egypt, aiding the VIIlth Army's break-through at El Alamein and attacking the Axis columns in their retreat across Cyrenaica has already been recorded in the previous number of the R.A.F. Middle East Review.

The war in Africa then entered a new phase. Menaced from the west by the Allied troops who had landed in North-west Africa and having no hope of hailing the VI11th Army advancing from the east, the. Axis f< rces at length took to I heir Tunisian strongholds, determined to keep a fooling on the southern shores of the Mediterranean as long as possible.

The story is now told of the air operations during the. first three months of 19'iS, ivhich were of paramount importance in the process of squeezing the enemy out of Africa. The account is divided into three sections; the first two deal separately with the operations of the Western Desert Air Force and the North-west African Air Forces up to the end of the halt at Mareth, and the third section gives a composite picture of the air activity during the attack on- the Mareth Line and the advance of the Allies in the northern and central sectors of the Tunisian battlefield.

The operations of Malta-based aircraft against Tunisian targets are not included in this account, as the activity of the Malta Force during the time that the island changed from a Mediterranean outpost to an offensive base for attacks on Tunisia and Italy is dealt with separately in the "Review".

SECTION I. WITH THE VIII ARMY TO MARETH

AT THE CLOE OF 1942, Rommel's forces had in oru-i" to hinder their occupation by the Western completed their withdrawal to the Buerat de- Desert Air Force. fences. In the final stages of this withdrawal The abandoning of Sirte by the enemy's 15th no serious attempts were made to check the Armoured Division without offering any resist-VHIth Army's advance by rearguard actions, al- ance and the withdrawal from Wadi Chebir, the though some delay was imposed by the thorough natural first line of defence of the Buerat posi­mining of roads and the rigging of booby traps. tion, before pressure was exerted by our land In addition, the landing grounds at Sirte and forces, indicated that the enemy had by no means garnet were ploughed up and strewn with mines recuperated sufficiently to make a determined

stand. Rommel's fighting strength was still de­pleted and, in particular, the Italian part of it consisted mainly of untried formations: the Ger­man tank strength was put at 70 to.80 and that of the Italians at something under 30. The enemy's deficiencies at this stage were in equip­ment and fuel even more than in man-power. His transport losses had been severe, his tank strength was low, and for artillery he was mainly dependent on new Italian divisions, supplemented by guns gleaned from the back areas which were mostly of obsolescent types. It was clear that reinforcements of tanks and guns were essential before he could give battle to our armour. An even more immediate need was petrol. Units had been chronically short for two months and the withdrawal across Cyrenaica had been made possible only by the stringent rationing and con­servation of fuel.

The Opposing Air Forces

At the beginning of 1943, the enemy's Tripoli­tanian-based air forces were estimated to consist of 155 German aircraft, of which all but 25 were ME.109s, and 310 Italian aircraft, which includ­ed 110 MC.200S and 202s and 100 CR.42s. Here again, the shortage of fuel limited offensive action. In the Mediterranean area, in general, however, the Axis air forces were still formidable as numerous squadrons of all types, were located in southern Italy and the adjacent islands, and Tunisia, Crete and the Dodecanese.

The moving up of the Allied squadrons con­tinued to keep pace with the advancing VHIth Army. An R.A.F. airfield reconnaissance party and an R.E. constructional unit moved westwards with our forward troops and ensured that aban­doned landing grounds were repaired at top speed. In addition, sappers of the VHIth Army cleared airfields of mines and their skill and courage in this dangerous activity prevented any ap­preciable time-lag between the abandonment of the landing grounds by the enemy and their oc­cupation by the Allied air forces. When the delay in putting into commission landing grounds which had been ploughed and mined was likely to be considerable, initiative was shown in the speedy construction of new landing grounds. Thus, when Tamet landing ground was found to be un­serviceable in the last days of December, 1942, three landing grounds at Hamraiet (about 30 miles S.W. of Sirte) were prepared for the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons. At times, also, the speed of the enemy's retreat seemed likely to place his troops out of range of our fighter force. On these occasions, air transport, which had already been used to facilitate the R.A.F.'s movement across Cyrenaica, was again employed for the transference of personnel and equipment to landing grounds within close range of the retreating enemy forces. On 17th January, for example, the Kittyhawk squadrons of No. 239 Wing hopped from Hamraiet to Sedada, a distance of 100 miles, and operations continued without a pause. Throughout the advance, also,

the R.A.F. Regiment protected squadrons on the move and were responsible for the safety of land­ing grounds.

At the opening of 1943, Rear A.H.Q., Western Desert, was located at Benina and the Advanced H.Q. at Marble Arch; by the second week in January, however, the rear and advanced sections had moved up to Nofilia and Tamet, respectively.

Early in January No. 244 Wing consisting of four Spitfire squadrons and No. 239 Wing of four Kittyhawk squadrons were operating from the Hamraiet landing grounds; the reconnais­sance squadrons of Spitfires, Hurricanes and Baltimores were up in the Tamet area; there was a rear force of Kittyhawk and Hurricane squadrons at Belandah and Jedabya, respective­ly; and No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing of two Boston and one Baltimore squadrons was based at Solluch with advanced landing grounds at Gzina. It is worthy of note that at this time, apart from the three light bomber squadrons, six of the eighteen fighter and reconnaissance squadrons were S.A.A.F. unit§.

As part of the Western Desert~"Air Force, also, certain fighter and bomber squadrons of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. were well up in the forward area. No. 57 Fighter Group, which included three Warhawk squadrons, was operating from Tamet and No. 12 Bombardment Group of four Mitchell squadrons was based at Gambut, with advanced landing ground at Magrun.

A Wellington striking force, operating under No. 205 Group, was located at Baheira. Although formidable, it was no longer of such magnitude as during the "Battle for Egypt/' because as suitable targets thinned out on the mainland a number of Wellington squadrons had been trans­ferred to Malta, in order to attack shipping and enemy bases in Tunisia and southern Italy.

In the rear of the Western Desert Air Force, A.H.Q., Egypt, controlled a rear force of fighter squadrons, based at Benina, and retained respon­sibility for the air defence of Egypt and coastal shipping; the change of nomenclature of this formation to A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Me­diterranean and its increased commitments are mentioned on page 20. No. 201 (Naval Co­operation) Group continued to direct the opera­tions of squadrons responsible for sea reconnais­sance, strikes against enemy vessels and anti­submarine patrols. As at this stage of the battle the protection of our extended supply line was all-important, it cannot be over-emphasised that Middle East Naval co-operation units in January, 1943, covered the shipping lanes from Syria west­wards to Sirte.

In addition to the American squadrons operat­ing with the Western Desert Air Force, No. 9 U.S. Bomber Command had several heavy bomber groups located in the Suez Canal zone, with advanced bases at Gambut.

In Malta, never had the R.A.F. been so power­ful. At the beginning of 1$43, nearly twenty squadrons of such diverse types as Wellingtons, Beauforts, Mosquitoes, Baltimores, Albacores,

Sappers of the VllltJi Army cleared airfields of mines, and prevented any appreciable time lag between the abandonment of landing grounds by the

enemy and their occupation by the Allied Air Forces.

Swordfish, Spitfires and Beaufighters were based on the island. For many months the world had known that Malta could "take it"; it now be­came more and more evident that the island was in a position to "give it."

January, 1943, accordingly, found the Allied air forces in the Middle East well placed to play a full part in the land battle on the VHIth Army's front, protect the vast extent of territory already won, safeguard the v m t h Army's line of supply and strike at enemy shipping and bases.

The Enemy at Buerat 1943 opened with Rommel's forces withdrawn

to the Buerat defences. It was clear, however, that reinforcements to the Tunisian-based Axis forces held priority over the reinforcing of the retreating army then located in Tripolitania, and the halt at Buerat was intended simply to delay the Vlllth Army's advance as long as possible and not in order to make a stand. As early as 3rd January, in fact, the process of withdrawing the non-mobile units from Buerat was already

in process and it was evident that the Agheila programme was about to be repeated.

In the first half of January, while the Vlllth Army was engaged in constant patrolling in order to probe the enemy's defences and re­grouping preparatory to another advance, the Western Desert Air Force carried out daily re­connaissances, maintained offensive patrols, and limited the enemy's air activity by attacks on his advanced landing grounds. Attacks were also made on road junctions, traffic, and enemy vehicle concentrations.

During the first week in January, our air activity over the forward area was slight, due primarily to adverse weather conditions and partly to the fact that the R.A.F. fighter force was settling in on the new Hamraiet landing grounds. Twice during the week, ME.109s made bombing and 9traffing attacks on these advanced landing grounds, and on the second occasion, 7th January, Spitfires of No. 92 Squadron shot down one of the enemy raiders, probably destroyed another and damaged a third. One Spitfire was destroyed, but the pilot was saved.

The next week, our air operations in Tripoli­tania were on a progressively increased scale. From 8th to 14th January inclusive, R.A.F. iighter3 carried out 350 sorties on offensive pa­trols, and during the latter part of the week U.S. Warhawks of No. 57 Fighter Group also took a full share in this activity. Combats with the enemy aircraft, however, were few and arose principally from our interception of fighters and fighter-bombers attacking our forward positions and landing grounds. Thus, on 8th January, Spitfires and Kittyhawks intercepted three for­mations of ME. 109s which were attempting to attack the Hamraiet landing grounds and, after forcing many of the enemy fighter-bombers to jettison their bombs, shot down one ME.109, pro­bably destroyed two and damaged two more. In other combats on the same day, Spitfires of No. 1 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 92 Squadron shot down two MC.202s and one ME.109 and probably destroyed two MC.202s for the loss of one Spitfire. On 11th January, enemy air­craft attacking our positions in the Bir Zedan and Tamet areas were intercepted and our fight­ers shot down three MC.202s and one ME. 109, probably destroyed one ME.109 and damaged three other aircraft. Four additional aircraft were seen to crash, presumably through anti­aircraft fire. The next day, 12th January, Spit­fires of Nos. 1 S.A.A.F. and 145 Squadrons inter­cepted an attack by twelve ME.202s, escorted by seven ME.109s, on Tamet landing ground; four MC.202s and one ME.109 were shot down and anothef~ME.109 was probably destroyed. Our losses were two Spitfires, but both pilots were saved.

Offensive patrols reached their peak for the first half of January on the 14th, the day before the Vlllth Army resumed its attack. 79 Spitfire and 73 Kittyhawk sorties were carried out over the enemy's forward positions, and in the

of combats with enemy fighters one ME.109 was destroyed, two were probably destroyed and three damaged without loss to our aircraft. It was evident that the Vlllth Army could continue to count on the Allied squadrons ruling the air over the battlefield.

Activity prior to Vlllth Army's Advance Adverse weather conditions prohibited bomb­

ing operations in Tripolitania during the first week in January, but with the slight improve­ment in the weather in the following week our bombers and fighter-bombers operated whenever practicable.

At this time, it was evident that the bulk of Rommel's supplies was coming overland from Tunisia as after 2nd January no more merchant shipping arrived at Tripoli and no lighter traffic had been observed at Misurata since the third week in December. The constant attacks by N.W. African-based aircraft on the enemy's rail and road communication in the southern sector of the Tunisian battlefield are dealt with in Section 2.

In order to spread confusion on the enemy's supply route and hinder his troop movements westwards, on the night 8/9th January, five R.A.F. Liberators bombed road junctions in the Tripoli area, nine Wellingtons bombed and ma­chine-gunned Misurata and roads in the vicinity, and night-flying Hurricanes straffed the road between Zliten and Horns. Two nights later, four Liberators and three Wellingtons again bombed the road junctions at Tripoli and 22 Wellingtons attacked Horns and the coastal road. On the ll/12th January and the following two nights, Liberators continued their bombing of the Tripoli road junctions and attacked supply dumps in that area. Meanwhile, Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron straffed traffic on the coastal road, particularly between Garibaldi and Castelverde, and extended this activity to the tracks leading to Tauorga and Bir Dufan.

The bombing of the enemy's positions and vehicle concentrations recommenced on 9th January. On that day, 36 Kittyhawk-bombers made two successful attacks on dispersed enemy transport in the vicinity of Wadi Zemzem, south­west of Gheddahia. Attacks at this time in the Gheddahia area were important as the enemy had armour and vehicles stretched out from Gheddahia to Ngem in order to guard his open southern flank. The following day, 10th January, the Kittyhawk-bombers continued their attacks by the bombing of a hundred dug-in vehicles in Wadi Raml, south of Gheddahia.

There were now large transport concentrations in the Gheddahia area, so on the night 13/14th January attacks on these targets were made by sixteen Wellingtons, aided by flare-dropping Albaoores, and the attacks were renewed the next day by Allied light bombers in the face of determined fighter opposition.

On several occasions, also, camps in the rear defences at Tauorga, twenty-five

seventeen Baltimores, escorted by Kittyhawks formation was attacked by 20 G^rmaHn'd Italian

Attacks in the Gheddahia area were important, as the enemy had armour and vehicles stretched out from Gheddahia to Bu Ngem in order to guard his

open southern flank.

fighters, of which fl damaged. Our losses, however, were greater— one Baltimore, four Kittyhawks and two U.S. Warhawks failing to return.

In order to limit enemy air activity on the eve of the VHIth Army's advance, attacks were made on landing grounds behind the Buerat line. On the night 13/14th January, seventeen Bostons bomb­ed Bir Dufan north landing ground, and the fol­lowing day 35 Kittyhawks straffed the landing ground at Churgia. Bir Dufan landing grounds were also attacked, on a larger scale, on 14th January, by formations of R.A.F. and S.A.A.P. Bostons and Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells, strong­ly escorted by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. On that day the enemy made strenuous attempts to save these important advanced landing grounds from devastation by determined fighter opposi­tion. In combats which were fought over the area six ME.109s were shot down, six probably destroyed and seven ME. 109s and two MC.202s damaged. Our losses were heavy—eleven fighters failed to return—but the attacks had fulfilled their purpose. The next day, few enemy "fighters were sighted and all avoided combat.

The Vlllth Army Attacks

At 07.15 hours L.T., 15th January, the Vlllth Army resumed its offensive. During the first day of our attack, stiff resistance was offered by the predominantly German forces holding the Buerat line itself and our armour was held up by the 15th Armoured Division along the Ghed­dahia - Bu Ngem track, on the enemy's southern flank. Proof, however, that the fighting repre­sented a delaying action only was provided by the fact that the enemy's 21st Armoured Division had departed westwards two days before the Vlllth Army's attack and accordingly there was now no mobile reserve with which Rommel could counter-attack. It appeared that this division had left its tanks behind for absorption by the 15th Armoured Division before leaving to join Von Arnim's forces in Tunisia.

On the first day of the Vlllth Army's attack, no suitable targets were located for our light bombers, but 24 Kittyhawks and 36 U.S. War-hawks made bombing and straffing attacks on groups of vehicles north of Gheddahia. Through­out the day, also, offensive patrols were main­tained over the battle area by 97 Spitfires, 22 Kittyhawks and 35 U.S. Warhawks. Enemy fighters, however, avoided combat and one for­mation of fighter-bombers jettisoned its loads on sighting Spitfires and fled.

Meanwhile, reconnaissances of the enemy's positions at Buerat and of the roads and tracks to the south and west were made by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 1437 Flight respect­ively, and our land and air forces thus had a clear picture of the enemy's dispositions and movements.

The Enemy Withdraws During the night, 15/16th January, the enemy

evacuated Buerat and the covering forces

sposed along the Gheddahia-Bu Ngem track withdrew to the west of Wadi Zemzem.

The withdrawals were not allowed to proceed unhampered as during the night Bostons, Bal­timores and Albacores bombed vehicles on the Gheddahia-Sedada track and the main road near Misurata, and No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes straf­fed traffic between Gheddahia and Horns.

The next day, our infantry advanced in the Bir <Scefa area and our armour, with infantry support, moved across Wadi Zemzem to Sedada. Meanwhile, our light armoured forces pushed round the south, passed through Faschia, and engaged the enemy in the area beyond.

Offensive patrols over the forward area were carried out the entire day by 104 Spitfires sup­ported by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. There were, however, only two combats with enemy fighters, as a result of which Spitfires probably destroyed one ME. 109 and damaged two others without loss to themselves..

In support of our advancing land forces, also, 47 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks made three bombing attacks on enemy transport in the Se­dada area, inflicting damage on vehicles and straffing troops.

The enemy made a further withdrawal during the night of 16/17th January and by morning was clear of Wadi Sofeggin. The retreating enemy columns provided excellent targets during the night for the R.A.F. bombers and, in particular, transport on the coastal road from Misurata to Castelverde and on the Bir Dufan-Misurata track was bombed by nineteen Welling-tons, 24 Bostons and six Baltimores. The high­light of the night's activity was the setting on fire of a petrol tanker, the flames of which spread to other vehicle 5.

In addition to the bombing of transport, dis­persed aircraft on the Bir Dufan landing ground were attacked by twelve of the light bombers, and night flying Hurricanes helped in this activ­ity and also attacked gun positions at Tauorga.

Our land forces on 17th January pressed hard on the heels of the retreating enemy, the infantry on our right flank making particularly good pro­gress along the main road.

During the morning, the fighter-bomber force concentrated their attacks agamst the Bir Dufan landing ground and transport in the vicinity. By noon, however, this landing ground had been evacuated and the fighter-bomber effort was then directed against enemy vehicles in the Beni UUd area where opposition was being encountered by our advancing armoured units.

During the day, No. 239 Wing of Kittyhawks was moved up from Hamraiet to a newly cons­tructed landing ground near Sedada and conse­quently on the following day the fighter-bombers were able to attack enemy columns withdrawing up the Tarhuna track towards Tripoli.

Enemy Airfields Attacked

As the__Axis forces retreated westwards, the irces struck hard at the enemy's land­

ing grounds in the Tripoli area and those aero the border in Tunisia.

On 17th January, our reconnaissance aircraft reported the presence of nearly 200 aircraft at the Castel Benito airfield, twenty miles south of Tripoli. There had always been a considerable force located at this important airfield but it was now augmented by the squadrons withdrawn from the enemy's advanced landing grounds. Accord­ingly, that night, the airfield was attacked by a bomber force consisting of three R.A.F. Libera­tors, 20 Wellingtons, 26 Bostons and one Baltimore. • Wide-spread damage was inflicted and thirty fires were caused, several of which were accom­panied by explosions. The airfield was attacked again on the night of 18/19th January by 34 Bos­tons and Baltimores and on the following night by eight Wellingtons. On both occasions' many fires were started among dispersed aircraft and some caused by the medium bombers were visible for fifty miles. Meanwhile, attacks were also delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft.

On 21st January, 87 Kittyhawks and U.S. War-hawks made the last attack on Castel Benito aerodrome. Several aircraft were destroyed and damaged, including JU.52s, and the ploughing up of the landing grounds, which was in progress, was hindered by the destruction of three ploughs. The Kittyhawks were attacked by German and Italian fighters, of which one MC. 202 was shot down and one ME.109 probably destroyed; our losses were two Kittyhawks.

As the Axis air forces withdrew to landing grounds further west, the Western Desert Air Force extended its attacks across the Tunisian border, beginning on 22nd January a series of fighter-bomber and bomber attacks on the Ben Gardane and Medenine landing grounds. These attacks were of great value in limiting the enemy's fighter and fighter-bomber effort imme­diately iaef ore and after our capture of Tripoli.

Attacks on Enemy Transport

Throughout 18th January, enemy columns re­treating up the Tarhuna track in the direction of Tripoli were attacked by our fighter-bombers which made eight attacks, comprising over 100 sorties. The attacks were continued during the night by sixteen Wellingtons which bombed trans­port south of Tripoli, particularly in the Gardane area, and a few Bostons operated around Tar­huna.

The next day, 19th January, Kittyhawk-bom­bers maintained pressure on the retreating enemy columns near Tarhuna, but low cloud hampered operations and "moderate" targets only were located. The Axis air forces made a special ef­fort to check the VHIth Army's advance, but their attemps were unavailing; one formation of ME.109S, in fact, actually aided our operations by bombing and machine-gunning their own troops, presumably due to poor visibility.

No respite was given to the enemy's retreating columns during the night. A strong force of S.A.A.F. Bostons arid Baltimores and U.S. Mit-

Us bombed and machine-gunned transport, vehicles on the .coascal- road bejweefi 'Cristefoeifle and Tripoli . and .jnjand in the Tarhujna ar.ea. Meanwhile, No£*73 Squadron^HuFricartes straffe^ traffic moving from Tripoli westwards to Zuara, encampments and petrol dumps south of Castel Benito, and the railway goods yard at Sabratha, 40 miles west of Tripoli.

During the morning 20th January, Tarhuna was occupied by our land forces and enemy rear-guards were engaged near Horns and north-west of Tarhuna.

Support was given to our troops in the Horns area by fighter-bomber attacks on gun positions and enemy rearguards near Cussabat, thirty miles south-west of Horns, and retreating columns con­verging on Tripoli were also bombed throughout the day. In all, nearly 100 sorties were flown by Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers, which were strongly escorted by Spitfires, Kitty-hawks and U.S. Warhawks. In an engagement with ME.109s, the American fighters probably destroyed one enemy aircraft and damaged two others at the cost of one Warhawk destroyed.

For the next three nights and days the forward enemy columns retiring along the coastal road westwards from Tripoli were continuously attack­ed by the Western Desert Air Force. The night attacks were carried out by strong forces of light bombers and night-flying Hurricanes and the day attacks by fighter-bombers.

On the nights 20/21st, 21/22nd and 22/23rd January, 94 effective sorties were carried out by S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and nine U.S. Mitchells on transport vehicles withdrawing along the main road between Tripoli and Ben Gardane. The attacks on the night of 22/23rd January in­cluded machine-gunning and were particularly effective; several fires were caused, and in addi­tion to the havoc wrought among enemy vehicles, hits were scored on an A.A. position and on the Zuara jetty.

In day attacks on retreating enemy vehicles, from 21st to 23rd January inclusive, the Allied fighter-bombers carried out 260 effective sorties. Typical of these attacks was the effort of 22nd January. During that day, 58 Kittyhawks and 45 U.S. Warhawks, escorted by Spitfires, attack­ed closely-packed columns withdrawing into Tu­nisia, between Zuara and Ben Gardane. Many direct hits were scored on vehicles and much da­mage was done by machine-gunning; the high­light of the operations was the blowing up of a petrol tanker and twenty other vehicles which were standing by waiting to be re-fuelled. In ad­dition to the attacks on road transport, shipping in Zuara harbour was bombed in order to delay its departure before an attack by our Naval for­ces.

Offensive Patrols

Meanwhile, on the 21st and 22nd January, Spit­fires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks carried out offensive patrols over the Tripoli-Zuara area and maintained air supremacy. On the 21st, Spit^

Enemy aircraft on Castel Benito airfield after three nights' straffing by Allied and U.S. aircraft

fires engaged two formations of enemy aircraft, shooting down three JU.87s and two MC. 202s and probably destroying two more Stukas and an­other fighter without loss to themselves. The following day, Spitfires and Kittyhawks con­tinued their sweeps without sighting any hostile aircraft.

Attacks on Ports and Bales

From the time that the enemy established him­self at Buerat in late November, 1942, the Axis supply ports in Tripolitania, Tunisia, southern Italy and Sicily were subjected to heavy bombing by Allied aircraft based in Egypt and Cyrenaica, and this was supplemented by attacks carried out from Malta and N.W. Africa.

By the end of 1942, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers based in Egypt had carried out over 70 effective sorties against port installations and shipping at Tripoli; Wellingtons had also made an appreciable number of attacks and these were continued in the New Year from Malta Thfe majority of the 1942 sorties against Tripoli were flown by the heavy bombers of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. which dropped an estimated bomb-load of 459,000 lbs. on the harbour.

The attacks on Tripoli harbour were re-com­menced in 1943 on 15th January by Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. and continued for the next six days. During this week of bombing, the Libe­rators carried out 73 effective sorties and drop­ped 364 x 1,000 H.E. bombs on shipping in the harbour and port installations. The Liberators again demonstrated the effectiveness of their fire by shooting down one M.E. 109 and one M.C. 200, -probably destroying three M.E. 109s and damag­ing two more without loss to themselves, although on two occasions the American heavy bombers sustained damage through intense anti-aircraft fire.

Further west in Tunisia, U.S. Liberators and Liberators of No. 160 Squadron carried out heavy attacks against the ports of Sousse and Tunis. The following table showing the estimated daily tonnage discharged at the main Tunisian ports during the month of January indicates the result of the combined effort of the Royal Navy and Air Force in the sinking of Axis ships en route to Tunisia, and of the Allied air attacks, delivered from bases east and west of the enemy, on his port facilities and shipping in harbours.

Normal daily Average daily Port. discharge. discharge in January.

Tunis 2,400 tons. 700 tons. Bizerta. 1,800 tons. 1,000 tons. Sousse. 1,500 tons. 300 tons. Sfax. 1,500 tons. 200 tons. Gabes. 300 tons. Nil.

In addition to attacks on the mainland, U.S. Li­berators, during the first three weeks in January, reached across the sea to strike at the Axis sup­ply bases at Naples and Palermo. These attacks were multiplied and extended in the following weeks.

The F

Shortly after dawn on 23rd January, armoured units of the VHIth Army entered Tripoli. On the spot where II Duce had been presented with the "Sword of Islam" the Commander of the VHIth Army received the keys of the last city of the Italian Empire.

All sea-worthy ships had left Tripoli by 21st January, although several of these were inter­cepted by our destroyers. In an attempt to delay our re-commissioning of the port the enemy had carried out extensive demolitions (where R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombs had not done the job for him) and five block-ships were sunk in the en­trance to the harbour.

Rommel knew that his forces were still ina­dequate for the task of giving battle to the Vlllth Army and his object was to gain time until he had established himself at his next main halting-place — the Mareth Line. The plans for delaying our pursuit which had proved effective during his retreat across Cyrenaica and Tripolitania were still operative; maximum damage was inflicted to ports in order to increase our difficulties of supply, delay was imposed by rearguard actions and the mining and blocking of roads, and landing grounds were rendered unserviceable in an at­tempt to limit our air operations.

By 6th February all enemy forces had with­drawn across the Tunisian border. The intensive attacks of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. in this southern sector of the Tunisian battle area are indicated in Section 2.

For two or three days after the capture of Tripoli the Allied fighter-bombers continued their attacks on enemy road traffic between Sabratha and Zelten (twelve miles west of Zuara), and on the night 23/24th January a small force of light bombers and night-flying Hurricanes extended their attacks as far as Ben Gardane. Owing to the increased dispersal of the withdrawing enemy forces, however, few suitable targets were now available and there was a lull in this activity until vehicle concentrations were located in the Ben Gardane area on 5th February.

From 25th January to 4th February, the enemy pressed into service all types of sea-going craft, including, motor-vessels, schooners, barges, ketches and "F"-boats in order to relieve the strain on road transport carrying supplies to his forward troops at the Tunisian frontier. Accord­ingly, during this period the R.A.F. fighter-bomber attacks were directed principally against enemy coastal shipping off the island of Djerba and along the strip of coast between Zarsis and Pisidia (20 miles west of Zuara). In spite of bad weather which limited the scope and scale of air operations, on practically every one of the eleven days coastal craft were located and bombed and machine-gunned.

Meanwhile, in the rear of the vmt h Army, with the Cyrenaican ports brought into full use and Tripoli rapidly being put into commission again, R.A.F. fighters provided constant protec­

tion to the ships bringing up supplies to <5ur land and air forces. During the week ending 10th February, for instance, R.A.F. fighters flew 400 sorties over shipping plying between the Nile Delta and Tripoli and a further 120 aircraft were engaged in anti-submarine patrols. In addition, over Tripoli harbour itself 88 fighter sorties were carried out to cover the unloading of convoys. The Hurricane squadrons were chiefly responsi­ble for this air protection of our coastal shipping; although their sorties were now less spectacular then during the "Battle for Egypt" their work was vital to the prosecution of the war in Tuni­sia.

Pursuit Slowed Down

Up to 12th February the advance of the VHIth Army was slow. The coastal road had been thoroughly mined and progress was constantly hindered by demolitions covered by enemy fire. Above all, heavy rain on the salt flats, which stretch for over 40 miles south from Ras Agedir (on the Tunisian frontier), rendered going off the main road virtually impossible. These conside­rations, coupled with the delay imposed by our construction of a causeway across the salt flats and the fact that the enemy had strong rear-guards of armour east and south of Ben Gardane and guarding his southern flank, made the con­ditions for an enemy delaying action more fa­vourable than at any time since the Buerat with­drawal.

During this time, moreover, bad weather se­riously restricted our air operations in Tunisia. Mention has already been made of the small-scale but effective attacks of R.A.F. fighter-bombers against the enemy's coastal shipping from 25th January to 4th February; during the next eight days escorted fighter-bombers were able to make a total of approximately 150 effective sorties only in attacks on transport of the enemy's rear-guard in the Ben Gardane area, -and this activity was rendered practicable only by taking immediate advantage of breaks in the weather.

Vlllth Army approaches Mareth

During the night 12/13th February, the enemy withdrew a large proportion of his armoured units, which had been performing the duties of rearguards, for service on the Western Front and the task of rearguard now devolved entirely upon his depleted 15th Armoured Division.

In view of this weakening of his delaying for­ces the enemy abandoned Ras Agedir and Taguel­mit, evacuated Ben Gardane, and by 16th Fe­bruary had withdrawn the main part of his 15th Armoured Division to the area west of Medenine.

While these withdrawals were in progress at­tacks were made by No. 239 Wing Kittyhawks, which had moved up to an advanced landing ground at El Assa (28 miles west of Zuara), on transport in the Ben Gardane and Medenine are_a and these aircraft also carried trols over our forward

On 20th February our land forces occupied Medenine. The enemy's armoured units which withdrew on that day were followed and engaged at Metameur by our armour and part of his forces was nearly cut off. This engagement resulted in the accelerated withdrawal of the enemy's 15th Armoured Division and by 21st February it had dropped back into positions dug in front of the southern end of the original Mareth Line.

While the enemy was withdrawing his remain­ing forces to the Mareth defences the Western Desert Air Force activity was limited to a few tactical reconnaissances carried out by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron as bad weather prevented any offensive fighter operations.

Lull at Mareth

By withdrawing to the Mareth defences, Rom­mel had rid himself of many supply difficulties and was no longer obliged to suffer the hand­to-mouth existence experienced at Agheila and Buerat. The bulk of his supplies continued to come from Bizerta and Tunis and a determined effort made to increase the tonnage off-loaded at these ports met with some success, in spite of sea and air attacks on his shipping and the constant bombing of the ports. Supplementary to the shipping plying between southern Italy (and Sicily) and the northern Tunisian ports, the enemy was using air transport on a large scale ; 50 to 75 transport aircraft, chiefly JU.52s, were arriv­ing in the Tunis area daily and, in addition, about five ME.323s (six-engined transport air­craft).

Photographic reconnaissance revealed that coastal shipping to Sousse and Sfax had greatly diminished and supplies were sent overland to the forces at Mareth. The air attacks delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft on this supply line are dealt with in Section 2. In February, two trains per day, each with a lift of 300 tons, nor­mally ran from Tunis to Sousse and one of them continued to Gabes. The remainder of Rommel's supplies was brought up by road transport; with a line of communication not exceeding 300 miles, however, this presented no great difficulty.

Until 3rd March there were no land operations on an appreciable scale in the Mareth area and the respite before the Vlllth Army's inevitable attack enabled the units from Rommel's army which had been diverted to the Western Front to achieve some local successes and remove any immediate threat to the rear of the Mareth Line. Meanwhile, work went on apace in strengthening the Mareth defences where the enemy had decided to stand and fight.

The Mareth defensive zone stretched from the Gulf of Gabes to Fount Tatahouine, a distance of sixty miles, with outlying strong-holds further south. From Fount Tatahouine north to Toujane, the Matmatas Mountains, fortified and tunnelled,

BsfililP&d a strong line of defence. From Toujane, $hr||JBh the village of Mareth to the sea, about \tk Smffes, was the heavily fortified zone which »\ _ <' iJ§

had given its name to the entire , ^ fortifications comprised not so muph' a 'Hine" as a series of fortifications in depth which included permanent anti-tank obstacles and concrete em­placements. To the north the line was covered by a coast unsuitable for landings and to the south by rough and difficult country. The develop­ment of the existing Mareth defences was slow up to the end of January, as much cleaning out and patching up of the original works were ne­cessary, due to the half-hearted demolitions car­ried out by the French in compliance with the 1940 arTnistice terms. In February, however, the work on the defences was speeded up. New stretches of anti-tank ditch were dug near the coast and in the sector of the line six miles south from Mareth, and many new infantry positions were dug and some minefields laid down, parti­cularly in the vicinity of Arram, four miles south­east of Mareth. ' The enemy did not use the case­mates of the line extensively, but sited his guns in new positions between them, preferring to sa­crifice the protection they afforded to increased mobility. It was evident even at this stage that Rommel envisaged the likelihood of another with­drawal and was not going to risk the possibility of having to leave his guns behind him.

Attacks on Enemy Landing Grounds

During the last week in February, while the opposing armies were preparing for the renewal of the land fighting, heavy attacks were made on the landing grounds immediately behind the Mareth defences, in order, primarily, to limit the enemy's fighter activity and ensure that the Western Desert Air Force continued to be master of the air over the battlefield.

The enemy's principal forward air base on the Eastern Front was the Gabes west landing ground; accordingly, this became the nightly ob­jective of the Middle East long-range bomber force. The attacks previously delivered by N.W. African-based aircraft are mentioned on page 32. in Section 2. Fresh crews were available for the Halifaxes and No. 462 R.A.A.F. Squadron now added weight to the Wellington attacks. The attacks on Gabes west landing ground began on the night 23/24th February and continued for the following three nights; in all, 21 Halifax and 64 Wellington effective sorties were carried out and, in addition to attacks on the landing ground, tar­gets in the town were also bombed. Bombs rang­ing from 4,000 to 250 lbs. each were dropped on dispersed aircraft, runways and administrative buildings and on each of the four nights fires and explosions were caused. The enemy protected the landing ground by extremely accurate anti­aircraft fire but only one Wellington was shot down in the course of these operations.

On three occasions the night raids on Gabes west landing ground were followed up on the succeeeding mornings by fighter-bomber attacks — a practice which had proved effective against the Daba landing grounds during the previous October. The Allied fighter-bombers also attacked

y enemy fighters at fiordj Touaz; spuTh^wes^f Mareth, and on 26th February" heaVy attacks' * were made simulta­neously on that landing ground and on the one at Gabes. On that day, eight bombing attacks were delivered, comprising a total of 133 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Kittyhawk and 24 U.S. Warhawk effective sorties, and escort was provided by 48 Kittyhawks. The Kittyhawk-bombers made in­creasing use of 40 lb. bombs on these operations, a stick of six of these bombs being substituted for the usual 500 lb. bomb. Enemy fighters on 26th February put up a determined resistance and seven ME. 109s were shot down in combat, three probably destroyed and five damaged ; on our side, nine Kittyhawks failed to return, one crash-landed at base and two were seriously da­maged. The effect of these and the previous medium and heavy bomber attacks were appa­rent on the following day when few aircraft were located on the Gabes west landing ground. The fighter-bomber effort was then switched against the El Hamma landing ground, four attacks being delivered by escorted Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers on 27th February.

The air offensive against the enemy's advanced landing grounds succeeded in forcing him to evacuate or partly evacuate several of his ad­vanced bases and greatly limited the activity of the enemy's fighter force.

Air Attacks on Mareth Line and Concentrations Beginning in the third week in February, si­

multaneously with the attack on the enemy's advanced landing grounds mentioned in the pre­ceding paragraphs, the Western Desert Air Force began its attacks on the Mareth positions and transport in their vicinity and rear. The night attacks were carried out by Allied light bombers and the day attacks by fighter-bombers.

The air offensive against the Mareth Line and vehicles in the battle area was opened on the night 23/24th February with attacks by 26 Bos­tons and fifteen Baltimores of No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing and seventeen U.S. Mitchells and on the following two nights a total of 93 effective sorties by Allied light bombers was made against the same targets. On each occasion fires were caused and in several instances these were accompanied by explosions. The biggest fighter-bomber effort during the week against these objectives was made on 25th February when two attacks were made on enemy transport vehicles and armoured cars in the Gabes and Mareth areas. Until the beginning of March, however, the fighter-bomber attacks against enemy positions and transport were sub­ordinate to their attacks on the enemy's advanced landing grounds.

On 1st and 2nd March, considerable road mo­vement was reported in the rear of the Mareth Line by reconnaissance aircraft of No. 1437 Flight. It was evident that reinforcements and supplies were moving up to the Mareth defences in preparation for an enemy attack and, in par­ticular, the 21st Armoured Division was in pro­

15

cess of leaving the Front.

On these two days, Kittyhavvk-Hbmters" afta' ed enemy vehicles, particularly on the road be­tween Gabes and El Hamma, and on the night 2nd/3rd March attacks were made on dispersed enemy transport vehicles in the Mareth and Gabes areas by 20 Wellingtons and five Halifaxes. 57 tons of bombs were dropped which burst across vehicles and tents and close to tanks, causing eight fires and several explosions.

Rommel Prepares to Hit Back In February the enemy, as related in Section 2,

had scored several striking successes in attacks against Sbeitla and Gafsa in the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield, and had also launched an offensive in the north; his third stroke was in­tended to cripple the VHIth Army before it was ready to launch its assault on the Mareth de­fences.

On 3rd March, a small scale attack, supported by 30 tanks, was made from the enemy's strong­hold of Arram, south-east of Mareth. This was merely a feint, however, and the attacking forces withdrew the same night.

During the day, Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted by Kittyhawks and Spitfires, carried out 77 ef­fective sorties. The principal attacks of the fighter-bombers were directed against eight hun­dred vehicles reported by tactical reconnaissance aircraft to be moving southwards between Gabes and Matmata: hits were scored on vehicles and many were also machine-gunned. Increased ene­my air opposition was encountered, but our air­craft had the better of the exchanges. Kitty­hawk-bombers shot down two ME.109s and da­maged three others and Spitfires and Kittyhawks, on patrol over the Gabes area, destroyed one ene­my fighter and damaged two more. As a result of the day's operations we lost one Kittyhawk. That night, five Halifaxes and 28 Wellingtons bombed enemy vehicles and troops which were massed in the Mareth area. Hits were scored on vehicles and tents and buildings in Mareth village and four of the medium bombers also made low-level machine-gun attacks on vehicles and searchlight positions.

There were now indications that the enemy intended to attack our positions in strength and on 4th March more than 100 Kittyhawk and Warhawk fighter-bombers attacked vehicles moving up to the battle area. The principal attacks were made in the Bardj Touaz and Hal­louf areas but targets were classed as "poor."

One formation of U.S. Warhawks which was. at­tacked by ME. 109s succeeded in shooting down one of. the German fighters and damaging two more. Covering sweeps were provided by Spit­fires, and in combat with enemy fighters, No. 92 Squadron shot down two ME.109s without loss.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance of enemy disposi­tions and rail and road movements were made by No. 40 S.A.A.F. Squadron and No. 1437 Flight

N a 6 8 0 s < 3 u a d r o n a n e v e keptgrounds.

y , R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. fighter-bombers attacked a group of large transport ve­hicles dispersed west of Toujane, and Spitfires carried out offensive patrols to cover the Kitty­hawk-bombers and swept the Gabes and Medenine areas, in the course of which two fighters were lost. For the greater part of the day, however, sand storms prevented offensive operations. The bad weather continued during the night, causing two Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron sent out to make independent night reconnaissances*of the Sfax area to return to base with their mission unfulfilled.

Rommel's Abortive Attack On the morning of 6th March, Rommel at­

tempted to hit back at the Vlllth Army. Enemy forces which had achieved success on the Western Front now determined to try their luck against our yeteran desert forces. The enemy attacked in three columns: the 15th Armoured Division, 90th Light and the Italian Spezia Divisions ad­vanced south-east from Mareth; the 21st Armour­ed Division came througn the Toujane defile and advanced eastwards to Metameur; and the 10th Armoured Division passed through the Hallouf defile and approached the predominating height of Point 270, two and a half miles north-west of Metameur. Meanwhile, a reconnaissance group, reinforced by 20 tanks, guarded the enemy's southern flank.

The northern column made three attacks during the day in the area of the Abdulla feature (high ground eight miles north-west of Metameur). Two of these attacks in the afternoon met with slight initial success but later our land forces counter­attacked successfully. The 21st Armoured Divi­sion tried to attack twice during the day some miles north-west of Metameur but failed, and the 10th Armoured Division's attacks on Point 270 were equally unavailing. Our massive concent­ration of field, medium and anti-tank guns sited along the high ground north-west of Medenine effectively barred the enemy's passage and the Allied fighter-bomber attacks mentioned below added to the destruction wrought by our gun­ners. By nightfall the enemy had had enough and the next day his withdrawal was in full swing. Over fifty tanks were left abandoned on the field of battle and these were blown up by our sappers. "Auf zum Angriff! Sprit ist da!" (Forward to the attack! Petrol has arrived!) proved to be a disastrous war cry. As in his abortive offensive of the previous September, Rommel once again under-estimated the power and precision of our artillery, with the same la­mentable consequences to his armoured forces.

In spite of bad weather, six escorted Allied fighter-bomber attacks, mostly at three-squadron strength, were made against the enemy columns approaching Medenine from the west. In parti­cular, a group of tanks with refuelling vehicles and a transport column were effectively bombed

and fires were started amongst the Vehicles-other hits were scored on a tank carrier and gun posi­tions. Several formations of Kittyhawk-bombers, however, were unable to locate targets owing to bad visibility and low clouds.

The enemy's offensive was not preceded by air attacks on our landing grounds and supply lines, but the assault itself was supported by JU.87s, ME.109 and FW.190 fighter-bombers and ME.210s employed as bombers. A number of attacks were made on our forward troops and one on an ad­vanced landing ground, but little damage was re­ported. This was the first appearance of FW.190s and ME.210s in southern Tunisia and they had apparently been transferred to the area especially for this operation. When the Axis land attack petered out the enemy air effort was reduced and the FW.190s and ME.210s returned presumably to northern Tunisia and Sicily respectively. The FW.190s were not seen again in this sector until the Vlllth Army launched its attack on the Ma­re th Line.

Offensive sweeps over the forward area, for the purpose of covering our fighter-bomber opera­tions, were made by 75 Spitfires. There were se­veral engagements with enemy aircraft, which were attempting to support their advancing land forces. In all, one ME.109 and one JTJ.87 were shot down, one JU.87 was probably destroyed, and six other aircraft were damaged. We lost one Spitfire.

Bad weather over the battle area prevented our fighter-bombers locating suitable targets on the following morning, 7th March, but in the aft­ernoon enemy columns still retiring in the hills near Hallouf and Toujane, after their unhappy experience at the hands of our gunners, were suc­cessfully attacked, although low cloud rendered these targets extremely difficult to find.

Spitfires, which carried out over 100 sorties in patrols over the battle area, had a very success­ful day. One formation of 20 ME.109s was forced to jettison its bombs, and six ME.109s and two MC.202s were shot down, three ME.109s and two MC.202s were probably destroyed and seven ME. 109s, two MC.202s and one JU.88 were damaged without loss to our fighters. In other engage­ments, two enemy aircraft were destroyed, one probably destroyed, and two others damaged; in addition, during an attack on our forward land­ing grounds a ME.109 was hit by our anti-aircraft fire and was subsequently shot down by a Spit­fire.

The next day, 8th March, Kittyhawk-bombers continued their attacks on enemy transport col­umns still withdrawing into -the hills near Hal­louf: bombs burst near a group of tanks and transport vehicles were machine-gunned, but tar­gets were now "thinning-out." One fighter-bomb­er formation attacked by ME.109s succeeded in shooting down one of the enemy fighters.

Spitfires flew over 100 sorties on offensive patrols. Following their mauling on the previous day, however, enemy aircraft were not greatly in

evidence and "Spitfires had one engagement only, as a result of which one ME.109 was destroyed.

Rommel's last full scale attack on the Vlllth Army had proved an utter fiasco; it was the gambler's last big throw to recoup his losses.

The R.A.F. Aids the Fighting French Although the enemy was now obliged to await

the inevitable assault of the Vinth Army, he made one more attempt at offensive action, but this time on a limited scale. On 10th March, light armoured units of two enemy reconnaissance groups attacked positions held by the Fighting French at Ksar Rhilane, 50 miles south-west of Medenine. Our holding of the high ground in that area was of great strategic importance as it enabled us to deny the enemy observation to the south.

The Fighting French reported the position of the attacking force of armoured cars and other vehicles and it was decided that these constituted suitable targets for the Hurricane IIDs. Ac­cordingly, after their period of enforced in­activity, the "tank-busters" of No. 6 Squadron again went into action and scored a decisive success. Thirteen Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires, located a group of 20 enemy vehicles and this was attacked for 30 minutes: nine to twelve vehicles were set on fire and others were damaged. A second formation of six escorted Hur­ricane IIDs succeeded in scoring direct hits on a Mark IV tank and an armoured car. In the after­noon, another target consisting of vehicles and guns was reported by the Fighting French and two squadrons of Kittyhawk-bombers were de­spatched to make an attack. Fifteen vehicles, including an armoured car, an ammunition truck and a petrol bowser, were destroyed and about twelve more vehicles were damaged.

The Spitfires escorting the first Hurricane formation over the target shot down an ME.109 which attempted interception, and Kittyhawk­bombers prevented a heavily escorted formation of JU.87s from bombing our Ksar Rhilane posi­tions and shot down two ME.109s and one JU.87 and damaged one ME.109. At dusk another JU.87 formation, which was approaching Ksar Rhi­lane, turned tail on sighting a Spitfire patrol, and made for home.

As night fell, the enemy began to withdraw from the Ksar Rhilane area; his attack had fail­ed. The R.A.F. losses for the day were six Kitty-hawks, but the wrecked vehicles and ten guns abandoned by the enemy paid tribute to the help given to the defending land forces. For a brief spell the days at Bir Hakim had been lived anew, but this time with a happier outcome.

Air Attacks on Enemy Positions As the time for the Vlllth Army's assault drew

near, the Allied air forces renewed their bombing attacks on the enemy's Mareth positions. The attacks re-commenced on 11th March when eighteen S.A.A.F. Bostons, escorted by Kitty­

hawks and with a Spitfire top cover, bombt enemy positions at Arram, the strong-point four miles south-east of Mareth. For the next three days, S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells took turns in delivering the attacks on the fortifications in the Mareth area, carrying out 49 effective sorties against these objectives. On 16th March, the day preceding the Vlllth Army's first tentative night attack against the Mareth Line, the air attacks were on a somewhat increased scale, seventeen Baltimores, escorted by Kittyhawks and eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, attacking enemy positions at Arram and Mareth respectively. As a result of the light bomber attacks on the five days mentioned, hits were scored on pillboxes and gun positions, and several fires were caused. These attacks, however, merely foreshadowed the supreme air effort which was to be made in the following week when the Vlllth Army resumed its offensive.

While the Allied bombers were carrying out these attacks, enemy air opposition was ne­gligible. On one occasion only, the 13th March, were enemy fighters brought to combat. On that day 36 U.S. Warhawks, with top cover provided by twelve Spitfires, carried out an offensive sweep over the Gabes area. A formation of about 30.ME.109s and MC.202s was encountered north­west of Gabes and in the ensuing fight the War-hawks shot down four ME. 109s, probably de­stroyed another and damaged four more; the Spitfires added to the bag by destroying one ME.109 and damaging two others. Four U.S. Warhawks were shot down but the pilot of one aircraft was saved. For the next three days enemy fighters avoided combat.

Attacks on Italian and Sicilian Bases

While the enemy was engaged in building up his Tunisian supplies the ports of on-loading in Italy and Sicily were attacked by the Middle East Air Forces.

Attacks on Naples by Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. and No. 160 Squadron had been fairly frequent during the last month of 1942, but in January of the next year operations against this port were limited owing to adverse weather con­ditions. During the month one effective attack only was made by Middle East-based aircraft, namely on 11th January when eight U.S. Libera­tors dropped 40 X 1,000 lb. bombs on the harbour installations. Observation of results was obscured by low cloud but one fire was seen to break out in the town. The Liberators succeeded in shooting down one of the ME.109s which attacked them, but they themselves lost two aircraft.

Low cloud over the Naples area continued to hamper the heavy bomber effort in February. On several occasions U.S. Liberators were unable to locate shipping in the harbour through bad visibility and an alternative target such as qro­tone (near the entrance to the Gulf of Taranto) was attacked, or bombs were brought back. One

of the most successful February efforts was the attack on the 15th, when two formations of U.S. Liberators attacked shipping in Naples harbour at dusk, carrying out fifteen effective sorties; The target area was partly covered by low cloud which prevented the complete observation of damage caused, but two merchant vessels along­side the Massaniello Mole were seen to be hit by thousand pound bombs. Photographs taken two days later revealed that the stern of one of the vessels was submerged and the other had ap­parently sunk. The Liberators proved more than a match for attacking enemy fighters: three ME.109s and two MC.202s were shot down and six more fighters were probably destroyed. One Li­berator failed to return and another was damag­ed by anti-aircraft fire. In all, the Ninth U.S.A. A.F heavy bombers carried out 48 effective sorties against Naples harbour during February and dropped 116 tons of bombs.

Attacks on Naples harbour were continued during March by the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. Liberators which made 98 effective sorties; Liberators of No. 178 Squadron also attacked this objective on three nights, carrying out eleven effective sorties. As in the previous two months adverse weather conditions considerably limited the scope and scale of our air attacks: the attacks succeeded, nevertheless, in causing considerable damage to port installations and shipping in the harbour.

Owing to the success of our sea and air attacks (from Malta and N.W. Africa) on his shipping, however, the enemy was dissuaded from the attempt to provision Bizerta and Tunis direct from Naples. Increasing use was made of Sicily as an advanced dumping base and ships were run under cover of darkness from Palermo and other Sicilian harbours to the northern Tunisian ports. The supplying of Sicily entailed a vastly increas­ed rail and road traffic down the Italian coast and across the train ferry at Messina. The valu­able work done by Malta-based aircraft in at­tacking these rail and road communications and the Messina terminus is dealt with elsewhere in the "Review."

As the Sicilian ports and railway terminus at Messina acquired increasing importance, the at­tacks of the Middle East-based bombers, like those of the sister force in N.W. Africa, increas­ed in scale and frequency.

During January, Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. carried out 22 effective sorties against Palermo and an equal number against Messina. At this stage, however, the attacks usually re­presented the bombing of alternative targets when bad flying weather prevented aircraft reaching Naples. An examination of photographs revealed that at Messina damage was done to quays and railway tracks and at least two ferry boats were immobilised.

In February, the majority of the Ninth U.S.A. A.F. Sicilian attacks were centred on Messina while R.A.F. Halifaxes and Wellingtons made Palermo their main objective. As in the previous

Sousse under attack by U.S. Liberators in January, 1943.

naval jetties and north of the harbour, including month, hpwever, adverse weather conditions pre-the dry dock area. The smoke screen, which was cluded the carrying out of an intensive air of-now a standard protective measure for the Me­fensive. The heaviest attack on Palermo during diterranean Axis ports, prevented one Welling-February was made by six Halifaxes and 30 ton only from locating the target and this aircraft Wellingtons on the night 22/23rd: one explosion attacked four ships outside the harbour. The and eight fires were caused in the harbour and most effective attacks on Messina during the town areas and bursts were observed across the

month were made by two formal American Liberators, comprising eighteen air­craft, on the 23rd. Hits were scored on the train ferry terminus and on the railway sidings to the south of the harbour and many fires and ex­plosions were caused. In addition, a bomb burst on, or very near, a vessel in the harbour. In the course of the month, Messina was attacked by 45 Liberators and six Halifaxes and Palermo by eighteen Halifaxes, 23 Liberators and 73 Well­ingtons.

During March, there were four attacks on Palermo by R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based aircraft, comprising sixteen Halifax and 86 Wellington effective sorties. These attacks, which took place in the first half of the month, undoubtedly caused considerable damage to port installations and shipping in harbour, but low cloud prevented the full observation of results. During the latter part of the month the bombing of Palermo was continued by Fortresses based in N.W. Africa: the havoc wrought by these aircraft is indicated in Section III. Messina was attacked on five occasions by Cyrenaican-based aircraft, seven effective sorties being made by R.A.F. Liberators and 46 by American Liberators. The heaviest raids were made on the 24th, when two attacks were made by nineteen U.S. and six R.A.F. Liberators respectively. Photographs taken dur­ing these attacks showed hits in the vicinity of the train ferry terminus, and it- appeared that the western end of the building housing the operating gear was hit and one of the train fer­ries damaged. Other hits were scored on naval installations near the U-boat base, where an oil fire was started, and on quays, warehouses and railway sidings.

These air attacks on the main Italian and Sicilian ports of on-loading during the first quarter of 1943 played an important part in consistently hampering the Axis attempts to pro­vision his Tunisian forces.

Air Protection of the VHIth Army's Supply Line Early in March, A.H.Q., Egypt, was re-named

A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean. The latter title denoted more fully the formation's

creased responsibilities, which included the air defence of Egypt and the protection of sea and land communications from Tripoli (Levant) to Tripoli (Tripolitania). The formation controlled four groups located at Tripoli, Benina, Alexan­dria and Haifa.

It is not purposed in this account to give de­tails of the defensive activities which rendered the continuance of our ground and air offensive pos­sible, but the scale of effort of Middle East-based fighters engaged in the protection of our Medi­terranean convoys is indicated by the following, figures. At no time for the period 29/30th De­cember, 1942, to 27th March, 1943, were the fort­nightly totals of sorties flown on this activity fewer than 785 and during one fortnight, 17th to 30th January, the 1,000 mark was exceeded. In all, during the three months mentioned, 5,500 sorties were flown on shipping protection. In addition', units operating under A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean flew constant sorties in defence of our supply ports and land lines of com­munication.

Meanwhile, No. 201 Group units, in co-opera­tion with the Royal Navy, kept a constant watch for enemy shipping and submarines. As the enemy was driven further and further westwards, how­ever, the main stream of Axis shipping came more and more within the orbits of squadrons based in Malta and North-west Africa and the offensive sorties of Middle East-based aircraft decreased. During the first three months of the year, as a result of 129 effective sorties, one medium-sized M/V was sunk, one probably sunk and four damaged; six other M/Vs were attacked with unobserved results. Two barges and one schooner were destroyed, one schooner was da­maged and fourteen barges and schooners were attacked with unobserved results. In addition, four attacks were made on enemy submarines, but it was impossible to give an assessment of the damage caused.

Thus, during the first three months of 1943 the sea lanes from the Turkish to the Tunisian borders were kept clear for our shipping; at no time was the supply line of the VIHth Army and Allied air forces in danger of being cut by the enemy.

(Continued on page 23).

Cagliari Harbour - 2&th Fe­bruary, 1943. Two M/Vi­be fore attack; right centre

and bottom left.

Both vessels on fire after bombing by B. 17/s.

SECTION 11. TUNIS! The Great Armada

s ON 8th NOVEMBER., 1942, the peoples of the United Nations who had recently been heartened by the news of the Axis collapse at El Alamein were astounded to learn that British and Ameri­can forces had landed at nodal points along the 400 miles stretch of coast from Casablanca to Algiers.

The first convoy for North, Africa left the United Kingdom more than a fortnight before the landings were effected, the escorting British and American naval vessels comprising 34 large warships, 102 destroyers and 45 miscellaneous warships. The total number of ships involved in carrying out this greatest amphibious operation in military history was put at 500 transport ves­sels and 350 warships.

The task of providing air cover for the convoys was a tremendous one. The danger of enemy sub­marines converging in thfe path of the convoys was ever present and to counter this it was ne­cessary to provide air escort for each convoy during the hours of daylight. Meanwhile, anti­submarine patrols in the Bay of Biscay were maintained at maximum intensity and Iceland-based aircraft continued their anti-submarine activity and in addition watched for a possible break-out of enemy warships from the Norwegian ports. Coastal command, strengthened by Hali­faxes from Bomber Command and Liberators from the Eighth U.S.A.A.F., was able to meet its heavy commitments and carrier-borne fighter aircraft provided protection for the convoys en route.

When the enemy realised that Dakar was not the Allied objective after all, U-boat opposition increased in intensity. By that time, however, our coastal aircraft were operating from the Oran and Algiers areas. Some indication of how the menace of the U-boats was countered by the the Allied air forces is shown by the fact that during the period 23rd October to 30th November, 1942, aircraft from the British Isles made 29 U-boat sightings, resulting in sixteen attacks, and those from Gibraltar and North-west Africa sight­ed 113 of which 60 were attacked.

On the whole, Vichy French opposition to the Anglo-American forces was not formidable. Al­giers capitulated first and port installations were found intact; moreover, the authorities readily co-operated and shore labour was soon available. Within twelve hours of the capitulation R.A.F. fighters were operating from the Maison Blanche and Blida airfields. Stronger resistance, parti­cularly naval, was encountered in the Oran and Casablanca sectors, but in a short time these too had been invested.

Almost immediately afterwards, Bougie, Phil­lipeville and Bone in eastern Algeria were oc­cupied by our seaborne and parachute troops without any opposition being encountered. Th«J

building up of the 1st Army was at once initiated in the Bone area and the Tunisian border was crossed in the succeeding days.

The immediate implications of the North Afri­can landings were obvious. The Axis forces fleeing westwards across Cyrenaica were now menaced by fresh troops who would presumably advance and cut off their line of retreat; then with the linking of the vni th Army and the North African Expeditionary Force and the con­sequent occupation of the entire southern shore of the Mediterranean, Allied mastery of that sea would be assured.

The importance of this mastery to the United Nations' cause can hardly be exaggerated. Apart from the fact that southern Europe becomes im­mediately vulnerable to attack, a direct sea route is opened from America and Great Britain to the Indian Ocean. Thus the transit of vital supplies to Russia and India can be immeasurably acceler­ated. The way is opened for an offensive against the tenuous power of Japan in east Asia, and the Axis plan for the coalescence of the Nazi-Fascist land bloc with the Japanese zone of con­quest becomes impossible of fulfillment.

Axis Reactions The enemy's answer to the Anglo-American

landings was to occupy Vichy France and Corsica and rush troops by air and sea to Tunisia. Within a few days of our landings the enemy took pos­session of the ports of Bizerta and Tunis and the airfields in their vicinity. By 16th Novem­ber the enemy had already approximately 5,000 troops available to provide a protective screen for his Tunisian bridgehead, and protective detach­ments were soon pushed out to the approaches to these ports to a radius of 25 to 30 miles. In the course of the next five days, moreover, the ports and airfields at Sousse} Sfax and Gabes were oc­cupied and the Axis forces in Tunisia then num­bered about 12,000.

It became increasingly evident that the rein­forcing of the Axis forces in Tunisia was consi­dered of supreme importance and the transmis­sion of supplies to Rommel's retreating army was of secondary importance.

Meanwhile, practically the entire German Me­diterranean bomber force had been concentrated in Sicily and Sardinia and fighters and dive-bom­bers were established at El Aouina airfield (Tu­nis). Italian reinforcements of fighters and tor­pedo-bombers were also sent to Sardinia and some fighters joined the German contingent at Tunis.

The attacks on the Axis airfields and ports which were immediateay delivered by Malta-based aircraft are considered elsewhere in the "Review."

In spite of our sea and air attacks on his shipping and the bombing of his ports, the enemy, principally by the extensive use of air

2.'5

ofmidable force in the northern sector and occupied the entire eastern coast.

The November Advance "If it were done when 'tis done, then t'were

well it were done quickly." Acting on this belief the Allied ground forces pressed on as quickly as possible towards Bizerta, Tunis and Sfax. On 18th November came the first clash be­tween advanced columns of the 1st Army and German units. Considerable losses were inflict­ed on the enemy's infantry and eleven tanks knocked out. Our losses were comparatively slight.

On the 24th November, Allied forces were advancing into Tunisia along three lines; one along the coast road towards Bizerta, one to­wards Tunis, and one in the direction of Sfax. At that date, Allied troops were 30 miles from Bizerta, 35 miles from Tunis and 120 miles from Sfax. The situation appeared satisfactory.

Early Air Effort A formidable air force composed of British

and American squadrons was quickly established in N.W. Africa under the joint control of the Eastern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F.

Aid to our advancing ground forces was pro­vided principally by fighter-bombers, while Allied fighters carried out patrols over the for­ward area and our supply ports.

In order to hamper the enemy's air effort de­termined attacks were made on his Tunisian airfields. Typical of the bomber effort in No­vember, 1942, were the attacks delivered on the nights 27/28th and 28/29th. On the former night 33 U.S. heavy bombers attacked Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield, fifteen Bisleys attacked El Aouina (Tunis) airfield, and twelve other air­craft bombed landing grounds at Gabes. The following night. the attack on Sidi Ahmed was renewed by seventeen Bisleys.

The December Set-back In the early days of December, 1942, it became

evident that the Allied attempt to hustle the enemy out of Tunis and Bizerta before adequate Axis supplies and reinforcements arrived had failed. Within three weeks of the North African landings the enemy had built up a Tunisian force strong enough to turn from defence to counter-attack. In achieving this he was cer­tainly favoured by possessing short lines of communication to Italy and Sicily and a large force of transport aircraft, but quick decisions and rapid improvisation also played their part.

On 10th December, the enemy attacked our positions at Medjez el Bab, the gateway to the Tunisian tip. The following day our troops were compelled to withdraw along the line of the Mejerda valley, although the town itself still re­mained in our hands. The enemy thus succeed­ed in widening his Tunisian bridgehead and wa^

back on the perimeter which he held before our drive towards Tunis and Bizerta began. In ad­dition, the enemy reinforced his troops in the southern sector and began offensive patrolling towards Faid and Sbeitla.

During the first week in December the air sup­port to our ground forces varied from attacks delivered by U.S. Lightnings on enemy tanks in the Djedeida area to the bombing of enemy forces south of Gabes by U.S. Mitchells.

The following week low cloud and heavy rain hampered the air operations of both sides. Never­theless, an effort was made to give support to our ground forces withstanding the enemy attacks in the Medjez el Bab area; in particular, Spitfires carried out effective straffing attacks against enemy tanks and transport vehicles. In the south the attacks on enemy vehicle concentrations and gun emplacements around Gabes were continued by U.S. Marauders and U.S. Lightnings.

Lull in the Ground Fighting

During the last fortnight in 1942 the ground fighting in Tunisia was on a small scale. Both sides took advantage of this respite to concentrate on building up supplies. In the north, the enemy, having safeguarded his bridgehead, returned to the defensive; in the centre and south, enemy protective patrols were extended westwards in order to deepen the defences covering the Sousse ­Sfax - Gabes line of communication. By the end of the year, the constant heavy rains had caused widespread floods which permitted limited patrol activity only.

In spite of the bad flying weather and bogging of landing grounds, air attacks on the enemy's lines of communication and encampments -in­creased as the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. squadrons grew in strength. The following examples illus­trate the attacks on the enemy's rail communi­cations, which relieved the JlfaZfa-based Beau-fighters and long-range Hurricanes of part of this activity. On 19th December, five Mitchells and six Marauders, escorted by six Lightnings, all of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F., attacked the rail­way sidings at Sousse; in spite of the intense flak encountered direct hits were scored on a goods train and station buildings. At dusk on the same day light bombers, escorted by Spitfires, attacked the sidings at Sfax. On 23rd December, U.S. Warhawks shot up a train between Sousse and Kairouan and three days later destroyed two loco­motives during an offensive sweep in the north­ern sector.

During the luil in the ground fighting, enemy transport vehicles were both bombed and straf­fed. Two of the most effective bombing attacks were delivered on the afternoon of the 17th and in the brilliant moonlight of the night 28/29th respectively. On the former occasion, twelve U.S. escorted Bostons successfully bombed vehicle concentrations at Massicault (south of Tunis) and on the latter, Bisleys and Blenheims patroll­ing the roads from Tunis to Massicault and Pont

du Fahs attacked vehicles at various points and set on fire a considerable number of trucks.

Owing to the dispersal of vehicles, however, fighter and fighter-bomber attacks were more effective than those of the bombers. On 24th De­cember, six U.S. Warhawks reported the destruc­tion of 60 vehicles out of a group of about 100 near La Fauconnerie and of another six south of Fondouk el Aouareb (south-west of Kairouan). On 28th December, eight U.S. Lightnings, in spite of an encounter with ten ME.109s, destroyed eight vehicles south-west of Tunis and U.S. War-hawks destroyed another ten during an offensive

'reconnaissance north-east of Kairouan.

Fighter Engagements The Allied fighters' tasks in December, apart

from fighter-bomber and straffing attacks, in­cluded the defence of our Algerian supply ports and back areas, shipping cover, escort to our day bombers and interception of enemy bomber attacks. In the latter activity, particularly, our aircraft were usually outnumbered by the enemy escorting fighters. During the month, however, the fighter activity on either side was limited through bad weather and landing grounds were unserviceable from time to time owing to flood­ing.

The following are typical of the December com­bats. On the morning of the 2nd, twelve U.S. Lightnings sweeping the Mateur-Djedeida area encountered eight JU.88s escorted by ME.109s. The JU.88s were forced to jettison their bombs in enemy territory and one JU.88 was destroyed, one ME.109 probably destroyed and two aircraft damaged; two Lightnings only suffered damage. A revealing encounter took place on 12th Decem­ber between a U.S. Lightning and a FW.190. The latter confidently attempted to out-climb the Ame­rican fighter, but was beaten at his own game. The two aircraft engaged at 12,000 feet and then the FW. 190 resumed its climb. The Lightning followed and at 19,000 feet pulled up under the German fighter and shot it down. On 28th De­cember, ten Spitfires engaged six JU.88s, escort­ed by six ME.109s, south-west of Pont du Fahs. In the ensuing combats two JU.88s and one ME.109 were destroyed and one bomber and one fighter damaged; one of our Spitfires failed to return. Later in the afternoon, fifteen ME. 109s were sighted over our Souk el Arba aerodrome; on this occasion the enemy had the better of the exchanges and two Spitfires were destroyed.

Throughout the month the work of the night Beaufighters, operating from Souk el Arba, was outstanding and, in particular, their "bag" in­cluded a number of HE. 11 Is shot down over the Bone area.

Attacks an Enemy Airfields During December the Allied air forces based in

N.W. Africa intensified their attacks on the enemy's Tunisian airfields in order to hamper his attempts to secure air supremacy in the northern sector.

The heaviest attacks were El Aouina (Tunis) airfield. On the 1st Decein-" ber, attacks were made by six escorted Bostons and thirteen escorted Fortresses of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F.; these were followed up at dawn on the following day by six Bisley and three hours later by nine U.S. escorted Bostons. Photographs taken after these raids showed that apart from fresh damage to hangars at least 30 of the 60 aircraft photographed on the ground were damaged. Later in the morning twelve U.S. escorted Marauders took up the attack: fires were started near the hangars and of the 50 aircraft observed on the landing area about fifteen were destroyed. Dur­ing the same week a night attack was delivered by sixteen Bisleys, but a ground haze prevented the observation of results. Additional attacks on El Aouina airfield during the month included that on the 16th by seven U.S. Marauders, when bombs were dropped on dispersed aircraft.

Determined attacks were also made on 8idi Ahmed (Biserta) airfield. On the evening of 2nd December an attack was deJivered by U.S. Fort­resses and this was followed up on the night 3rd/4th by Bisleys which made both bomb­ing and machine-gun attacks. Other effective attacks in December included that made by eight U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, on the 8th.

In addition to the bombing of the Axis' main air bases at Tunis and Bizerta, attacks were also made on the enemy's landing grounds at Sidi Tabet ('west of El Aouina) and Mateur.

Destruction of Enemy Supplies The Tunisian campaign was above all a war of

supplies: the denial of them to the enemy in­volved the liquidation of Von Arnim's and Rom­mel's aflmy alike. Accordingly, the shipping strikes and attacks on the enemy's ports by AfaWa-based aircraft were now paralleled by in­tensive attacks from N.W. Africa.

From the successful attacks on shipping may be cited that made by seven Swordfish at Ferry­viUe on 13/14th December. While four Bisleya carried out a diversionary bombing attack on the harbour installations, the Swordfish made torpedo attacks on shipping: one ship, believed to be a tanker, was hit and burst into flames and an­other ship was damaged.

In general, throughout December, Malta-based bombers concentrated on night attacks against the enemy's Tunisian ports and the N.W. African squadrons were chiefly engaged in day bombing.

The heavy day attacks on the port of Tunis in December began on the 6th, when fifteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, attacked shipping in the harbour. The attacks were con­tinued on the 13th and 14th by seventeen and fifteen escorted U.S. Fortresses and on the 15th by seventeen U.S. Liberators. An interesting feature of an attack made on 16th December was the reporting by Spitfires escorting American bombers that twenty fires were burning in the dock area before the bombers attacked the target

25

' W 2 7 Malta-based WWffigtbris on the previous night.

During the second half of December, N.W. Afri­can-based boimbers made night attacks on Tunis in addition to the usual day bombing. On the night 13/14th, for example, Bisleys made an ef­fective attack and on the following night Bisieys and U.S. Fortresses resumed the attack.

Many day attacks were also made against the port of Bizerta during the month. On 2nd De­cember, U.S. Fortresses bombed the port installa­tions and two days later U.S. Fortresses and Ma­rauders made another attack ; on the latter occa­sion hits with 500 lb. bombs were scored on mer­chant vessels in the entrance to the docks. An effective low-level bombing attack was carried out on the 6th by Bisleys, and one of the several fires caused in the docks area was described as "out­standing". During the second week in December, successful attacks were delivered by U.S. Fort­ressses and Liberators on the 14th and by Libe­rators on the following day. In the course of the attack on the 15th, 60 x 1,000 lb. bombs were dropped in the target area and hits were scored on several ships. During the third week in De­cember U.S. Bostons took over the day bombing of Bizerta, and in an attack on the 19th many hits were scored with 1,000 lb. bombs on ships in the harbour, including one on a light cruiser. The heaviest raid in the last week of the year was made by eighteen escorted U.S. Fortresses on the 26th, when fires were started in the docks and probable damage was inflicted to vessels at the quays. Shortly afterwards, on the night 28/29th December, Wellingtons made their debut under the Eastern Air Command with an attack on the Bizerta docks and goods station.

In the latter part of December, also, Sousse and Sfax, which had already been bombed by aircraft based in Malta and Egypt, were attacked from the N.W. African end, in order to limit the sup­plies reaching Rommel's retreating army. Thus, on 27th December, the port of Sousse was attack­ed from all sides. In the morning fourteen Alge­ria-based Fortresses bombed shipping and the docks; in the afternoon twelve Liberators from Egypt scored two direct hits on a vessel and caused large fires in the area north-west of the harbour, and three MaZta-based Albacores bombed a group of barges; then during the night six Egypt-b&aed Liberators set on fire a motor-vessel with 1,000 lb. bombs and started large fires on the quays.

It is evident from the above accounts that the December bomber activity against enemy supply bases by N.W. African-based aircraft was inten­sive; it remains to be emphasised that it was achieved despite adverse weather conditions.

The Enemy's Strength and Intentions In spite of the sea and air attacks on his ship­

ping and the blasting of his ports, the enemy suc­ceeded in building up his Tunisian forces. By 1st January, 1943, it was estimated thpt he had amassed 30,000 German and 14,500 Italian com­

ti-.s

26

battant troops; his tank strength was put at 160­190 German tanks, of which about 140 were serviceable, and 60 Italian tanks, whose service­ability was an unknpwn factor.

Opposing the enemy's land forces in the north­ern sector, roughly in the area north of the line east to west through Pont du Fahs, was the Bri­tish 1st Army. The central sector (the area north of the 8fax - Sbeitla road), and the south­ern sector (the area south of this line), were held by the 2nd U.S. Corps and by four French divisions.

The German forces were for the most part con­centrated in the northern sector and the Italians were mainly in the central and southern sectors. The latter were soon to be reinforced, however, by the 21st Armoured Division, withdrawn from Rommel's Army and non-mobile Italian units from Tripolitania.

The enemy's task was to secure the coastal plain against an Allied advance. To do this it was necessary (a) to secure his positions in the Mateur a r ea ; (o) to t a k e Medjez el Bab; (c) to seize the mountain range from Djebel Fkirine to Pichon; and (d) to capture Sbeitla and Gafsa in the south in order to safeguard the coastal route which was Rommel's main line of communication. How far the enemy succeeded in putting his plan into effect will emerge in the following pages.

By the beginning of 1943, also, the enemy's air forces were in a position to make a maximum ef­fort in Tunisia. It was estimated that the German Air Force strength in Tunisia, southern Italy, Si­cily and Sardinia amounted to 610 aircraft, of which 225 were JU.88 bombers and 150 ME.109/ FW.190 fighters. Italian aircraft in the same areas numbered about 560, including 250 fight­ers of various types. German serviceability was estimated at 55-60% and the Italian at 50%.

Serviceable aircraft figures for 5th January in respect of the Allied squadrons in N.W. Africa were :— R.A.F.:— 144 fighters, 20 Beaufighters, 23 fighter-bombers, 11 light bombers, 20 medium bombers, 30 G.R. aircraft, 3 P.R.U. aircraft. Twelfth U&.A.A.F.:— 149 fighters, 22 light bom­bers, 41 medium bombers, 35 heavy bombers, 3 P/R aircraft, 23 transport aircraft. A combined total of 524 serviceable aircraft. In the follow­ing weeks reinforcing went on apace. ' Elsewhere in the Mediterranean zone there was

a vastly increased force at Malta, while the West­ern Desert Air Force, with defence fighters and heavy and medium bombers in its rear, was fol­lowing up the Vlllth Army.

Spitfires Reinforced

Early in January, 1943, the N.W. African Spit­fire squadrons were reinforced. This strengthen­ing of the fighter force coincided with increased enemy air activity and combats became frequent. In particular, the Spitfires did good work in in­tercepting enemy aircraft attacking our shipping in Bone harbour.

During the first half of January the average daily sorties of R.A.F. fighters exceeded the 100 mark; thereafter, with the further strengthen­ing of the fighter force this figure was soon doubled.

Air Attacks on Battlefield Targets

From 1st to 17th January inclusive, while the ground activity was still on a small scale, the Allied air forces increased their attacks on trans­port vehicles, rail communications and enemy positions.

Attacks on enemy vehioles were not numerous as these were not concentrated to any extent and were often concealed in woods or camouflaged in fields. In the early days of January attacks were made on vehicles in the northern sector by Spit­fires and Hurricanes, while U.S. light bombers and fighter bombers straffed tanks at Fon­douk el Aouareb in the central sector. In the following week U.S. Bostons, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, turned their attention to the southern sector, where the enemy was building up his armoured forces, and attacked tank concentra­tions near Gabes. Meanwhile, Bisleys, operating at night, patrolled the coastal road and bombed and machine-gunned enemy vehicles, particularly between Tunis and Sfax.

A number of attacks were made on enemy positions in all three sectors but on many oc­casions bad weather caused the cancellation of operations. On 6th January Hurricane-bom­bers, escorted by Spitfires, in support of our troops west of Mateur, succeeded in silencing enemy gun batteries and on the same day U.S. Bostons, escorted by U.S. Lightnings and U.S. Warhawks, attacked a camp near Kairouan- The following day U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, bombed barracks at Gabes in addi­tion to the airfield there. Other camps attacked included the one at Kebili (65 miles west of Ga­bes) by U.S. Bostons on 10th January and on the same day a U.S. Warhawk dropped a 500 1b. bomb plumb through the German Headquarters at Kairouan.

Attacks on Lines of Communication During the January lull in the ground fight­

ing air attacks by the Twelfth Air Force on the enemy's land lines of communication were in­tensified, particularly on railways and bridges in the central and southern sectors. On 4th January, eight escorted Mitchells attacked the railway yards at Kairouan and another eighteen resumed the attacks two days later. The next week the attacks were extended to the southern sector in order to cut Rommel's supply line. On 8th January, twelve escorted Mitchells attacked the railway junction at Graiba (west of Mahares) and destroyed two bridges, and six more escort­ed Mitchells bombed the railway junction at Ka­laa Srira (west of Sousse). On the 10th, nine escorted Marauders attacked the marshalling yards at Gabes and on the following day six escorted Fortresses bombed the railway and road

jUes Fthe

Tencha "bridges (south of Sfax) by twelve escorted Marauders on the 12th; attacks by ten and six escorted Marauders on railway junctions near Sousse and Mahares res­pectively on the 14th; an attack on bridges across the Oued Akarit by eighteen escorted Ma­rauders on the 15th; and the bombing of the rail­way junction at Graiba by twelve Mitchells on the 17th.

These attacks inflicted local damage but were not of sufficient intensity to cause a serious dis­location of the supply route to Rommel's forces across the Tunisian frontier.

The Enemy's Attack in the Central Sector On 18th January an enemy attack in some

strength, in which units of the 10th Armoured Division participated, was launched south-west from Pont du Fahs. The enemy's aim was to secure the range of mountains from Djebel Fki­rine to Djebel Ousselat, which would deprive us of positions from which to debouch on to the coastal plain. A breach was made in our posi­tions in the Oued el Kebir and the enemy's forces passed through. On 21st January the enemy thrust in a southerly direction along the road to­wards Pichon and, in spite of Allied opposition, by the end of the day had advanced to the general line of Kairouan - Ousseltia - Sidi Amara. In the succeeding days our ground forces halted the enemy's advance in the Ousseltia valley and re­gained local initiative. Axis forces, however, re­tained the major part of their gains — the range of mountains .from Djebel Hannikat - Djebel Haifa - Djebel Bou Dabous and northwards, to­gether with part of Djebel Ousselat. Thus the po­sition stood at the end of January.

Air operations in support of our ground forces in the central sector were carried out by Spit­fires, Hurricane-bombers and Bisleys. Spitfires, operating from Souk el Arba, made daily recon­naissance of the battle area and passed back targets for the Hurricane-bombers.

Enemy troops and vehicles, in general, were not concentrated sufficiently to provide targets for day bomber operations, but there was in­creased scope for fighter-bomber activity. On one occasion onily — the 21st January — day bombers were despatched to attack a group of tanks re­ported near Pont du Fahs, but the eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells briefed for the attack were unable to locate the tanks and bombed Pont du Fahs town instead. From 18th January to the end of the month almost daily attacks were made by escorted Hurricane-bombers, in the course of which troop-carriers and other vehicles were attacked and enemy positions and bridges, par­ticularly in the vicinity of Pont du Fahs, were bombed. By night, Bisleys, operating from Can­robert (about 42 miles S.E. of Constantine), at­tacked road and rail communications in the Tunis

Teboura — Pont du Fahs area, and on occa­sions £xteni|ed Xhe activ-J^y 'to north ofr^Kairouan;

vehicles on the road and trains were successfully; attacked and rail' and road j.lincti<)nrarid,f.viai[ii^i^ were bombed.

The Enemy Captures Faid Having improved his positions in the central

sector, the enemy now sought to do the same in the southern sector, in order to safeguard the Rommel supply line along the coastal plain.

South of Pichon the country is less mountainous than the area considered in the preceding para­graphs. The dorsal ridge continues, however, although less defined, and is broken by two main passes, one at Maknassy on the Sfax - Gafsa road and the other at Faid, where the Sfax -Sbeitla road cuts through Djebel Kralif.

Maknassy had been in the enemy's hands from the beginning, but he now made determined attemps to eliminate our forward troops at Sened Station, 30 miles east of Gafsa. Sened changed hands several times but the Axis forces were un­able to push along the road to Gafsa as intended. At Faid, however, they had greater success and occupied the defile on 30th January. The enemy thus succeeded to some extent in deepening the defences covering the Sousse - Sfax - Gabes line of communication, which was vital for the main­tenance of Rommel's army, now in process of crossing the Tunisian border.

Mention has already been made on page 27 of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.P. attacks on enemy com­munications in the southern sector during the lull in the fighting from 1st to 17th January. The attacks in the southern sector were now intensified as Rommel's army established itself in the Ben Gardane - Medenine - Gabes area. Constant at­tacks were made on transport vehicles, principal­ly by U.S. Lightnings. Thus on the 19th Ja­nuary eighteen Lightnings swept the Ben Garda-ne - Zuara road and straffed about 20 vehicles, including two petrol carriers. On the 21st, seven Lightnings shot up a 20 truck convoy near Mede­nine and 26 Lightnings shot up military traffic on the Gabes - Ben Gardane road and reported the destruction of 65 vehicles; further attacks were made on the same day on vehicle concen­trations by U.S. Bostons. Other Lightning at­tacks included the straffing of "countless vehi­cles" moving west on the Gabes - Medenine - Ben Gardane road on the 23rd and the shooting-up of vehicles on the Sfax - Gabes road on the 27th. Meanwhile, U.S. escorted bombers attacked ene­my encampments and railway mashalling yards. Medenine town and car park were attacked by eighteen escorted Mitchells an the 19th; sixteen Fortresses bombed a camp and barracks at Gabes on the 20th ; and eighteen escorted Mit­chells attacked the marshalling yards and bar­racks at Sfax on the 28th. The building up of the Axis forces in the southern sector did not proceed unhampered.

Attacks on Enemy Airfields During the first three weeks of January the

Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. made several heavy attacks on the Castel Benito airfield, south of Tripoli, in

order to supplement air attacks being made from the east and hasten the liquidation of the enemy's Tripolitanian-based air forces. On the 9th Ja­nuary, five escorted Marauders dropped frag­mentation bombs on the hangars, and three days later twelve escorted Fortresses destroyed about 20 of the 75 aircraft seen on the ground. On the former occasion, three enemy fighters which at­tempted interception were shot down and during the latter raid fourteen ME.109s were claimed as destroyed. A third attack was made by thirteen escorted Fortresses on the 18th, when numerous fires were started; intercepting enemy fighters again received a mauling, three being destroyed, five probably destroyed, and four damaged for the loss of one Fortress and one escorting Light­ning.

The enemy air forces withdrawing from Tri­politania were not allowed to settle down unhin­dered at their new base at Medenine. On the 22/23rd eleven Wellingtons attacked the main landing ground, where patrolling U.S. Lightnings had previously reported the presence of 100 enemy aircraft; bombs were dropped varying from 4,000 lbs. to 30 lbs. each but results were not observed. The raid presumably had good effect, however, as eighteen U.S. escorted Mi­tchells despatched to attack the same landing ground on the 24th found it deserted. A move had been made to a landing ground west of Me­denine and the 60 to 70 aircraft found on the ground there were bombed with good results. Other attacks on enemy landing grounds in the southern sector included successful U.S. Marau­der attacks on the important base at Gabes.

In the central sector attacks were made by Bisleys and U.S. Marauders on Kairouan airfield, and in the north two night attacks by Welling-tons were made on Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield and several day attacks by various aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. on El Aouina (Tunis) airfield.

The outstanding blitz of the month was the three attacks on El Aouina airfield on the 22nd. The first attack was delivered by 40 U.S. Fort­resses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, in the course of which 471 fragmentation clusters and 57 x 500 lbs. G.P. bombs were dropped. Many fires were started, including some which could be seen for 80 to 100 miles on the return journey. Later in the morning, twelve U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, renewed the attack and dropped 208 x 100 lb. bombs on dispersed aircraft, and in the afternoon eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells dropped 203 fragmentation clusters. Many fires and heavy smoke were seen issuing from the numerous parked aircraft when the Mitchells left the scene.

Shipping Strikes The most outstanding shipping attacks reported

during January were those delivered by Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. Marauders and Mitchells in the latter part of the month. The following accounts indi­cate the success of these attacks.

28

On 20th January six Mitchells, escorted by twelve Lightnings, sighted a tanker 300 to 400 feet long, accompanied by a small motor vessel and two destroyers, between Sicily and Tunisia; 15.x 500 lb. bombs were dropped from a height of 200 feet and one direct and two very near misses were scored on the tanker which was seen to settle in the water after a violent explosion. On the 22nd, six Marauders, escorted by twelve Lightnings, scored hits on a freighter en route to Tunisia and left it listing. The following day further small freighters were attacked by five escorted Marauders; one ship exploded, one caught fire and capsized and another was listing when last seen. On the 27th, six escorted Mitchells attacked two enemy destroyers. Two direct hits and three near misses were scored on the starboard side of one destroyer, which was left on fire and listing heavily, and four near misses were scored on the stern of the other. Two days later, six Mitchells, escorted by twelve Lightnings, attacked an enemy convoy consisting of two cargo liners, six freighters, four destroyers and several smaller vessels. Two direct hits were scored on a 350 to 400 foot vessel and another vessel of similar size was set on fire. Sixteen enemy fighters which attempt­ed to prevent the attacks received a mauling.

The most successful attack on a submarine was that delivered by a Hudson of No. 500 Squadron on the 17th against a fully surfaced tT-boat. In the first attack the aircraft dropped 3X250 lb. D.Cs from 300 feet, but overshot by 50 yards. A firing duel then followed between the two opponents and in a second attack, made from 1,600 feet, one 250 lb. G.P. bomb fell within 20 feet of the submarine. The Hudson then con­tinued straffing, but return fire ceased from the ;U-boat as it submerged. The aircraft remained in the vicinity for three and a half hours, and observed an oil streak eight miles long.

Destruction of JU. 52s During January as many as 70 JU. 52s landed

in Tunis from Sicily and Naples in a single day. Apart from the destruction of transport aircraft on the ground during the heavy raids on El Aouina airfields previously mentioned, escorted formations were on several occasions caught en route, particularly by U.S. Lightnings escorting U.S. Marauders and U.S. Mitchells on anti-ship­ping sweeps. In particular, there were several successful interceptions in the third week of January.

Thus, on the 15th six JU. 52s, one ME. 323 and two escorting FW. 190s were shot down and several other aircraft damaged; on the 17th two JU. 52s and one JU. 88 were destroyed at the cost of one Lightning, and four days later one JU.52 and one FW.190 were shot down.

Attacks on Tunisian Ports Intensified During January, Wellingtons, which had re­

cently arrived to strengthen the Eastern Air Command's bomber force, made the night bomb­ing of Bizerta, the enemy's principal port of off-

loading, their prime consideration. The Welling-tons attacked the harbour on sixteen nights, car­rying out a total of approximately 150 effective sorties; on the remaining nights of the month adverse weather conditions prevented operations or alternative attacks were made on enemy air­fields. During the first half of the month low cloud rendered the target extremely difficult t.o locate and hampered the observation of results. Beginning on the night 14/15th January the weather cleared and on this and four of the following five nights Wellingtons carried out 71 effective sorties and inflicted wide-spread damage on the docks. The bombs dropped included an appreciable number of 4,000 and 1,000 pounders and vast quantities of incendiaries in addition to the usual 500 and 250 lb. bombs. On several occasions the fires caused were visible for 40 miles on the return journey.

During the latter part of the month U S. escorted Fortresses carried out several day at­tacks on Bizerta and Ferryville comprising ap­proximately 100 effective bomber sorties. In addition to the fires started on the docks, direct hits were scored on shipping in the harbour. A striking feature of the attacks was the conside­rable number of enemy fighters destroyed— a tribute to the concentrated fire of the Fortres­ses and the skill of the U.S. Lightning escorts.

Tunis was attacked by U.S. Fortresses on three occasions and once by U.S. Marauders; on several occasions, however, missions were abandoned owing to bad weather in the target area. The attacks were not confined to the docks area and included such objectives as the power-house, military camps, the industrial area south of Tunis and the marshalling yards south-east of the town. Once again the Fortresses shot the op­posing fighters out of the skies; in particular, on 2nd January, it was reported that seventeen enemy fighters were destroyed, ten probably destroyed and fifteen damaged for the loss of two American aircraft.

In the southern sector, Sfax was attacked on three separate days by a total of 64 U.S. escort­ed Fortresses, eighteen U.S. escorted Mitchells and fifteen U.S. escorted Marauders. The most damaging attacks were made on the 28th Ja­nuary, when 27 Fortresses, escorted by eighteen Lightnings, began the attack at 14.22 hours by dropping 319 x 500 lb. G.P. bombs on the docks; ten minutes later eighteen Mitchells, escorted by eleven Lightnings, attacked the marshalling yards; and at 14.50 hours, fifteen Mitchells, escort­ed by eleven Lightnings, attacked the harbour, dropping 273 x 100 lb. demolition bombs. In combats with enemy fighters six were destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged; Ame­rican bosses were one Mitchell and one Lightning.

Sousse was also successfully attacked by U.S. escorted Fortresses on three occasions and damage was inflicted on shipping in the harbour.

The success achieved in January in limiting the enemy supplies reaching Tunisia by sea and air attacks on Axis shipping and the bombing of ports is indicated by the table on page 13.

First German landings photographed at El Aouina airfield, Tunis.

Small-scale Ground Operations During the first half of February the ground

fighting was on a small scale. The enemy re­sisted tenaciously any local advances on our part and, in fact, improved certain positions in the central sector. In particular, he gained more points of vantage north of Pichon and in the Maknassy-Sened area.

In the main, R.A.F. fighters and fighter-bom­bers operated in the northern part of the central sector and American aircraft in the south/

Spitfires made daily offensive reconnaissances of an extensive area south of Pont du Fahs and regularly shot up transport vehicles, particularly ,on the Pont du Fahs-Enfidaville road, and at­tacked ^several tented camps. When suitable

burnt-out aircraft were destroyed in an attack by Bcaufighters from Malta.

targets were located escorted Hurricane-bom­bers took up the attack; thus, successful attacks were made on troops and transport south-west of Pont' du Fahs on the 6th.

Meanwhile, aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. attacked enemy positions and vehicles in the vicinity of Faid and Maknassy, where the enemy was preparing to resume offensive operations.

In the Faid area the most successful attacks were the bombing qf tanks and transport vehicles by six U.S. Bostons on 1st February and the silencing of gun positions at Sidi Bou Zid by U.S. Airacobras on the 6th. The attacks in the Maknassy area included the bombing of road and railway bridges across the river north of Mak­nassy by eighteen U.S. Marauders on 3rd Fe­

31

bruary; attacks on transport on the Maknassy-Gafsa road by U.S. Airacobras on the 6th; and the destruction of four 88 mm. guns west of Sened by six U.S. escorted Bostons on the 12th.

These attacks on military targets were made in spite of bad flying weather which limited the scale of our air operations.

Apart from adverse weather conditions, how­ever, effective direct support to our ground forces throughout the campaign was extremely difficult to provide as the hilly wooded terrain of the central and northern sectors often pre­vented the positive identification of enemy posi­tions. Stmoke was used on occasion by our troops to indicate enemy positions but this auto­matically betrayed their presence to the enemy and, moreover, could be copied by him to confuse the issue further.

Attacks on Gabes Landing Grounds While Rommel's forces were establishing them­

selves on the Eastern Front heavy attacks were made by aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. on the landing grounds at Gabes in order to limit enemy air activity in the southern sector.

On 3rd February fifteen Marauders, escorted by Lightnings, attacked the main airfield; obser­vation of results, however, was prevented by dust. Stiff opposition was encountered from enemy fighters and a running fight which lasted for forty minutes resulted in three ME. 109s being destroyed, two probably destroyed, and three da­maged for the loss of one Marauder and two Lightnings. The following day the attack on the airfield was renewed by eighteen Fortresses, es­corted by Lightnings, and six or seven fires were caused among aircraft on the ground. The Fort­resses were attacked by ME.109s and FW.190s during the bomb run; the Fortresses claimed nine enemy fighters destroyed and eight damaged. Later in the day, 24 additional Fortresses, escorted by Lightnings, attacked the important landing ground west of Gabes. Many bursts and a great column of smoke were observed in the target area. As a result; of a running fight for 50 miles with enemy fighters, sixteen enemy fighters were claimed as destroyed, nine probably destroyed and one damaged; on the American side one Fortress was shot down and four Lightnings failed to re­turn. Attacks on the Gabes landing grounds were also made on 8th March by fifteen Ma­rauders and eighteen Mitchells. Many bursts and fires were observed in the target area.

Later in the month, as mentioned on page 15 in Section I, the attacks on the Gabes landing grounds were continued from the east by the Allied squadrons following up the advance of the Vlllth Army.

The Enemy Attacks Rommel, by withdrawing to the Mareth de­

fences, had strengthened the enemy forces in the southern sector. Meanwhile, as indicated in Sec­tion I, the necessity of building up supplies from Tripoli^ the bad going and adverse weather con­

ditions were all combining to delay the inevitable assault of the Vlllth Army. The enemy took advantage of the lull on the Eastern Front to direct forces northwards. The 21st Armoured Division had already joined Von Arnim's forces and had turned the scales at Faid on 30th Jan­uary; in addition, on 12th February, half of the armoured units which had been acting as re­arguard east and south of Ben Gardane departed for the Western Front. The enemy now had strong striking forces in the central and south­ern sectors and planned to use them before an assault on the Mareth Line necessitated their withdrawal southwards again.

On 14th February, an enemy force of all arms, including 80 to 100 tanks of the 21st Armoured Division, moved west from Faid. The main body, with about 50 tanks, advanced along the Faid -Sbeitla road and in spite of Allied counter-attacks had approached to within fifteen miles of Sbeitla by the afternoon. Meanwhile, a small force of about 30 tanks, advancing from the north-east, had reached a point south-south-east of Sbeitla. Further tanks were kept in reserve south of Faid. As a result of this advance and ths threat of enemy armoured units, withdrawn from Rom­mel's army, which were approaching Gafsa from Gabes, the Allied forces at Gafsa were withdrawn to Feriana during the night 14/15th February. Allied armoured units on the 15th then initiated a counter-attack southwards towards Sidi Bou Zid and fighting in that area continued throughout the day.

Our troops involved in these engagements were predominantly American and operations in the battle area were carried out by the air support units of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. which made ex­tensive straffing and reconnaissance missions. In the course of the two days, also, American fighters destroyed eight ME.109s and four F.W. 190s, probably destroyed four ME.109s and da­maged seven other aircraft.

Meanwhile, R.A.F. Spitfires continued their of­fensive reconnaissances further north in the area north-west of Pont du Fahs and on the 15th made sweeps over the Pont du Fahs - Kairouan, Pont du Fahs - Fkirine, and Mateur - Medjes el Bab -Tebourba areas in order to see if any attack was pending in the northern sector. Little movement was observed and no enemy aircraft were encoun­tered.

During the night 15/16th February, fifteen Bisleys bombed transport on roads near Kairouan which probably represented elements of 10th Ar­moured Division en route to reinforce the 21st Armoured Division's attack.

The Enemy's Success The enemy now endeavoured to thrust as far

north as possible in order to cut off or force a withdrawal of our forces threatening Tunis and Bizerta.

During 16th February, in spite of unfavourable weather, American air support units continued their straffing missions. In particular, six escort­

ed Bostons attacked gun emplacements Bou Zid and put out of action six howitzers; six more escorted Bostons attacked enemy concen­trations north-west of Gafsa, and Airacobras at­tacked suitable targets in the Kairouan - Sidi Bou Zid - Gafsa area. Nevertheless, it became evident that the Allied counter-attack towards Sidi Bou Zid from the north had failed and the enemy established himself on a line running southwards from Djebel Lessouda to Sidi Bou Zid and thence south-west to Djebel el Hafey.

On the night 16/17th the enemy broke into the Sbeitla defences and our forces withdrew to the line of hills running south-west from the Djebel Barbrou and covering the defiles running north and north-west from Sbeitla, Kasserine and Feriana.

The following morning, the enemy's 21st Ar­moured Division occupied Sbeitla and a force consisting principally of the 10th Armoured Di­vision moved west and occupied Kasserine. Si­multaneously, enemy artnoured units from the south occupied Feriana and Thelepte. An attack on Pichon on the same day, however,- was re­pulsed and our troops withdrew unhindered across the Ousseltia valley that night.

During the 17th Spitfires continued their tac­tical reconnaissance and straffing of vehicles around Pont du Fahs and destroyed one FW. 190 and damaged another without loss. American fighters, meanwhile, carried out sweeps over the central sector battle area and reported the des­truction of several tanks and many vehicles. Enemy vehicle concentrations south of Feriana were also attacked by six U.S. escorted Bostons and that night twelve Bisleys effectively bombed transport on the roads Fondouk - Sbeitla, Faid-Sbeitla and Gafsa - Feriana.

On 18th February, all bombing missions were cancelled on account of unfavourable weather, but American fighters in the course of offensive sweeps over the forward area attacked troop concentrations and encampments in the vicinity of Sbeitla and Feriana.

On the following day, the enemy's attack was renewed. Armoured units from Feriana advanced to Kasserine in two sections — one northwards from Sbeitla along the Le Kef road and the other to the north-east of Kasserine. The attack from Sbeitla was held in the Sbiba pass and made no progress, but the other from Kasserine succeeded in capturing the defile on the 20th.

Offensive air operations on 19th February were prevented by bad weather. During the night, how­ever, in spite of unfavourable weather conditions, 26 Bisleys attacked roads and railways in the Gafsa area, but results could not be observed. On the following day, while the enemy was en­gaged in capturing the Kasserine defile, the con­tinued bad weather prevented air operations on an appreciable scale but U.S. Airacobras made a few attacks on enemy vehicles near Kasserine. During the night, also, 24 Bisleys bombed trans­port and roads in the Thelepte - Kasserine - Fe­riana area; once again the bad weather prevented an assessment of the damage caused.

Anglo-American Co-operation

On 19th February, the squadrons of the East­ern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. merged to form the North-west African Air Forces. The final sub-divisions comprised five main formations, three of which were operational and two concerned with training and servicing.

Of the operational formations, the Tactical Air Force, consisting of fighter, fighter-bomber, light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons, was to afford close support to the Allied armies; the Strategic Air Force, composed of heavy and medium bomber squadrons, was allotted, prima­rily, the task of attacking enemy , bases and convoys; the Coastal Air Force, embodying gen­eral reconnaissance and certain fighter squadrons, was responsible for the defence of our ports and convoys, shipping sweeps and anti-submarine patrols.

The three formations, however, by no means worked in water-tight compartments; their com­mitments often over-lapped and aircraft of the different formations co-operated as the need arose. The aim was to create a flexible all-round air force: the guiding principle was to select the most appropriate aircraft for the job in hand.

The Eastern Air Command and the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. had each done splendid work. In spite of fulfilling the heavy commitments involved in supporting ground operations and attacking enemy bases and convoys, sight was never lost of the prime necessity of shooting the opposing air forces out of the sky. The following figures, giving Axis aircraft destroyed in combat, indicates the success achieved in this activity during the time the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. operated as independent partners (8th November, 1942, to 18th February, 1943):—

ProbablyDestroyed Damaged Destroyed

E. A. C 255 55 160 12th U.S.A.A.F. ... 384 127 166

Totals 639 182 326

Following the creation of the unified force, the Allied air attacks increased; thus, in the first three weeks of its existence the North-west African Air Forces dropped two and a half million lbs. of bombs, which represents more than a third of the total poundage dropped by the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. during its 105 days of official existence.

Furthermore, the creation of the Mediterranean Air Command, having ultimate control of all Allied air forces based in the Middle East, North­west Africa and Malta, ensured that large-scale operations could be co-ordinated with the mi­nimum delay.

The Enemy's North-west Drive Abandoned.

On 21st and 22nd February the enemy forces which*hoped to push on to Thala were engaged

i^-y y * ^•iw

by Allied armoured units. ^.lthough certain enemy advanced units thrust to within four miles of their objective, by the evening of the 22nd it was clear that further progress was problema­tical; accordingly, on the following day the enemy decided to withdraw. Above all, these armoured units were now required to return to the Mareth defences to meet the threat of the VTIIth Army.

During this time, in spite of bad weather con­ditions, considerable help was given to our troops by the Allied air forces. On 21st February, ten U.S. Mitchells attacked the railway yard at Gafsa and U.S. Airacobras continued their straff­ing of enemy vehicles in the Kasserine area. The following morning, twelve Hurricane-bombers, escorted by 28 Spitfires, effectively bombed the enemy's forward units approaching Thala. In addition, straffing attacks were carried out by American fighters around Kasserine; seven U.S. Fortresses dropped small fragmentation bombs on a bridge in the Kasserine area ; and U.S. Mitchells also provided close support to the Allied land forces.

The Enemy Withdraws The enemy withdrew much faster on his left

flank than on his right and he held on to Sbeitla after he had evacuated Kasserine in order to prevent the forces on his left flank from being cut off. The roads were heavily mined and rear-guards attempted to delay the advance of our troops; in spite of these, however, Feriana was re-occupied on 28th February and Sbeitla on 1st March.

While the enemy was engaged in this with­drawal he was subjected to the constant attacks of the Allied air forces.

On the first day of the withdrawal proper— the 23rd—45 U.S. Fortresses bombed Kasserine, and eighteen U.S. Marauders concentrated on the actual pass. Twelve U.S. Mitchells attacked heavy traffic on a road near Sbeitla and U.S. Bostons attacked traffic between Kasserine and Thelepte. The damage caused could not be as­sessed owing to poor visibility. Meanwhile, U.S. Airacobras and Spitfires carried out offensive sweeps over this particular battle area. The following day, U.S. escorted Bostons attacked Sbeitla town, the railway, and traffic on the Feriana-Gafsa road, while U.S. Airacobras and Spitfires swept the whole area of the enemy's withdrawal and shot up enemy transport vehicles.

For the remaining days of the enemy's with­drawal air operations in this sector were on a reduced scale, due partly to unfavourable weather conditions and partly to the fact that the enemy had initiated an attack in the north which ne­cessitated increased air operations in that sector.

Von Arnim's Attack in Northern Sector

Meanwhile, on 26th February, the enemy launched an attack with about two divisions and a battalion of tanks in the_n<artta«iflsBPflolrlthis

was an opportunist move designed to take ad­vantage of the fact that we had been obliged to send reinforcements southwards to counter the enemy's push mentioned in the preceding para­graphs. The enemy planned to thrust down the road from Mateur to Beja, with a secondary at­tack in the north towards Sedjenane, and to advance southwards to El Aroussa. The latter was to be attacked from the east through Bou Arada and the Djebel Mansour. The successful completion of these operations would have left Medjez el Bab in a salient projecting nearly 20 miles forward.

The two thrusts from Mateur at first met with some success, but a skilful counter-attack by our ground forces halted the enemy three miles north of Sedjenane. A few enemy tanks penetrated the mine barrier on the road from Mateur to Beja on 27th February and approached to within ten miles of the town, but they were stopped by our artillery fire and the air attacks mentioned in the next paragraph. Further north, enemy forces on the road to El Aroussa were engaged by our armoured forces and forced to retire. The enemy attacks from the east against Bou Arada and Djebel Mansour, moreover, were both suc­cessfully held by our ground forces.

Air operations in support of our troops in the northern sector were carried out principally by Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers and many enemy vehicles and tanks were destroyed. The air at­tacks were particularly intensive on the 28th. On this day, Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers flew 276 sorties comprising seven attacks; two of the attacks were against tanks and vehicles in the Sidi Nsir area, five against similar targets north-east of Beja. In addition, U.S. escorted Mitchells attacked enemy position at Mateur. During the first three days of the attack—26th to 28th February—enemy air opposition over the northern sector of the battlefield was negligible.

The Enemy Captures Sedjenane The enemy's attack towards Sedjenane was

resumed on 1st March. He achieved some initial success and eventually, after suffering severe casualties during the heavy fighting on the 3rd and 4th, succeeded in capturing the town. Further exploitation, however, was prevented by our land forces.

Meanwhile, the Axis force attacking towards Beja met with little success and all attacks made against Hunt's Gap, ten miles north-east of Beja, were repulsed by our troops, aided by the attacks of the Tactical Air Force. On 5th March, 30 German tanks were observed immobilised in this area.

By the 7th March the enemy's attack in the northern sector had lost all momentum and he was digging in six miles south-west of Sedjenane and north-west and south-west of Hunt's Gap. At the cost of many casualties in men and arm-our he had forced us back over a triangular stretch of land twenty miles across in the north running down to a point at Medjez el Bab, We

34

were now further from Bizerta, but we had re­tained our hold on Medjez— the approach to Tunis.

To a considerable degree the stemming of the enemy's advance was due to the support given to our land forces by the Tactical Air Force. Air operations were especially intensive during the first five days of the month, when over 1,000 fighter and bomber sorties were flown in attacks on targets in the northern sector. In particular, widespread attacks on transport and troops were delivered by Spitfires and Hurricane-bombers, and Spitfires carried out continuous offensive sweeps over the entire battle area. Their most successful interception occurred on 4th March when ten to fifteen JU.87s, escorted by ME.109s, were prevented from bombing our troops in the Jefna-Sedjenane area and forced to jettison their bombs. Two JU.87s were shot down, one was probably destroyed and four others were damaged. In the course of other offensive sweeps on the same day seven ME.109s were damaged.

Reduced Activity on Western Front

From 7th to 17th March operations on the Western Front were restricted to local attacks and patrolling in strength. At 8edjenane the enemy managed to retain the ground previously won. Pichon remained a no-man's town with strong enemy positions on the hills on either side. In the Gafsa area the enemy withdrew from Tozeur and Metlaoui, but continued to patrol sporadically for a distance of about thirteen miles west of Gafsa. The situation in general in this area, however, could best be described as "fluid."

In spite of adverse weather conditions the Tactical Air Force carried out operations in all sectors. In particular, Spitfires continued to maintain air superiority in the northern and central sectors. Thus, on 8th March, Spitfires on offensive sweeps in the north damaged six ME.109s and in the central sector destroyed a FW.190 in the vicinity of Pichon. Two days later, Spitfires destroyed five ME.109s and damag­ed two more near Jefna. Meanwhile, Spit­fires and Hurricane-bombers continued their attacks on enemy transport in the northern sector, whenever suitable targets were located. U.S. Marauders also made effective attacks in the central sector, their most successful being that against railway bridges and supply dumps at Enfidaville on the 12th, when 21 tons of bombs were dropped.

Further south, around Gafsa, U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Warhawks, "softened" enemy resistance preparatory to an attack by the Allied land forces.

Attacks on Enemy's Tunisian Airfields

During February and the first fortnight of March, the enemy's principal Tunisian airfields were regularly attacked, although bad weather caused the cancellation of several missions against

these objectives, IJartfedlit-li tcfiNfoeftjft end ol February.

In February, apart from the raids on the Gabes landing grounds already referred to on page 32, the principal attacks were against the airfields at Tunis, Kairouan and Sfax.

The most effective raids on El Aouina (Tunis) airfield were made on the 13th and 24th. On the former occasion, an attack was made by thirteen U.S. escorted Marauders; bursts were observed among concentrations of aircraft in the south-west corner of the airfield. Enemy fighters which attempted to prevent the bombing received their usual punishment: four ME. 109s were re­ported as destroyed, three probably destroyed and four damaged for the loss of one Marauder. On the 24th February, an attack was made by eleven U.S. escorted Marauders and hits were scored on transport aircraft and single-engined types. During this attack the flak was intense and enemy fighter opposition was formidable. The latter made determined attacks on the Marauders rather than on the escorting fighters; two Marauders were lost but the enemy achieved this only at the expense of five ME.109s destroyed, one probably destroyed and another damaged.

Sfax el Maouh airfield was effectively attacked on 2nd February by fourteen U.S. Marauders and eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Bomb bursts covered the airfield, causing a large fire, and some aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

Attacks on Kairouan airfield were most fre­quent during the second and third week in February, when fighting was again intense in tha central sector. On 9th February, an attack was delivered by 24 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, and bursts were reported to cover the entire airfield. On the 15th, attacks were made by thirteen U.S. Marauders and nine U.S. Mit­chells; in each case U.S. Lightnings acted as escort. A total of 2,028 x 20 1b. fragmentation bombs was dropped and several fires were caus­ed. In combats with enemy fighters it was reported that five ME.109s and two FW.190s were destroyed, three ME.109s probably destroyed and one FW.190 was damaged; on the American side one Mitchell was lost. On the 24th an attack was made by 22 U.S. escorted Fortresses: 2,970 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs were dropped and bursts were observed all over the airfield.

During the first fortnight of March particular attention was paid to the landing grounds north­west of Gabes and those in the Tunis area.

On the 3rd, when Rommel's forces were pre­paring to hit back at the Vlllth Army, nineteen U.S. escorted Fortresses attacked a landing ground north-west of Gabes which covered an area of four or five square miles. Bursts cover­ed the target area, on which fifteen to thirty aircraft were well dispersed, and a large fire and black smoke was observed. Three other landing grounds in the same area were subsequently at­tacked by ten U.S. escorted Marauders and fifteen U.S. escorted Mitchells.

Attacks on airfields in the Tunis area included two on El Aouina by U.S. escorted Fortresses on 3rd and 10th March. The first-mentioned attack was delivered by fifteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings; bursts which were observed over the entire target area were particularly con­centrated in the north-east corner, where 35 to 40 aircraft were seen. The attack on 10th March was on a larger scale, being carried out by 37 U.S. escorted Fortresses. Hits were scored on three large aircraft on the ground and eight to ten other aircraft were left burning. Air combats with enemy fighters resulted in five ME.109s being destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged. On the same day, JU.52 concentrations on the landing ground at La Marsa, in the Tunis area, were also attacked. The 34 U.S. escorted Fortresses which carried out this raid dropped 4,824 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs and the air­field was reported to have been well covered by bursts. Of the enemy fighters which attempted interception one ME. 109 was destroyed, and two others were damaged.

Sardinian Air Bases Raided During February attacks were extended across

the sea to the airfields around Cagliari, Sardinia, in order to limit the enemy's JU.88 activity.

The raids were initiated on the night lst/2nd February with an attack by nine Wellingtons, which dropped approximately fifteen tons of H.E. bombs on Elmas airfield. The first aircraft over the target dropped incendiaries and flares which lit up the hangars in the west corner of the air­field; the succeeding aircraft bombed this area and the south of the airfield causing fires and explosions.

On the 7th, aircraft of the Twelfth U.S.A.A.F. made their first attacks against the Sardinian air bases, when Elmas airfield and the seaplane base at Cagliari were bombed. In all, 32 Fortresses and nineteen Marauders participated in these attacks, escort being provided by Lightnings. 84 x 1000 lb. H.E. and 4,782 x 20 lb. fragmenta­tion bombs were dropped and the results were described as "satisfactory". Many fires were started, including some caused by aircraft des­troyed on the ground, and runways, buildings and hangars were hit. In encounters with the enemy five ME.109s were destroyed and two RE.2001s and one ME.109 damaged.

That night (7/8th February) the attacks were resumed when sixteen Wellingtons were despatch­ed to attack Villacidro landing ground, about 20 miles north-west of Cagliari. On arriving over the Sardinian coast 7/10ths to 10/10ths cloud was encountered and consequently only eight aircraft located the target. Bursts were observed in the south-east corner of the airfield. Of the remain­ing aircraft, three attacked Decimomannu land­ing ground, about ten miles north-west of Ca­gliari, and five bombed the estimated positions of Elmas airfield. A total of 56,660 lbs. of bombs were dropped on these targets.

Adverse weather conditions prevented the at­tacks from being resumed for nine days, bi

18th February American aircraft made up for the lull by increasing the weight of their attacks. The airfield at Elmas was bombed by 44 Fort­resses, escorted by Lightnings; the latter, how­ever, were unable to observe the results of the bombing owing to poor visibility. Of the enemy fighters which attacked the two formations one FW. 190 and one MC.200 were destroyed without loss to the U.S. aircraft. On the same day nine U.S. Mitchells attacked the airfield at Villacidro, and three U.S. Mitchdlls and fifteen U.S. Marau­ders attacked the alternative target of Decimo­mannu airfield; all of these aircraft, which bombed at 12,000 feet, were escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Bursts were seen on the north-eas^t side of Villacidro airfield and many aircraft were believed to have been destroyed on the ground at Decimomannu. Over the latter airfield two Ma­rauders were lost in a collision.

Ports of Off-Loading Attacked The local successes gained by the enemy in

February and the early days of March were illu­sionary. Once the enemy's stream of supplies

-could be reduced to a trickle it would avail him little that he demanded this or that djebel and occupied this or that pass. Accordingly, the Al­lied air forces continued their set plan of striking methodically at the Axis supply ports.

Bizerta, the enemy's principal port of off-loading, remained primarily the objective of the Wellington force. The most effective medium bomber attacks were delivered on the nights 3rd/4th and 15/16th February by eleven and twelve Wellingtons respectively. On both nights many bursts were observed in the harbour and town areas. In addition to the frequent Welling­ton attacks a heavy attack was delivered by 32 U.S. escorted Fortresses on 25th February, when numerous hits were scored on the docks and near misses on the ships in the outer harbour.

The principal attacks on Tunis during Feb­ruary and the first half of March were delivered in the early days of each month. On 1st February, nineteen U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, dropped 60 x 1,000 lb. and 166 x 500 lb. bombs on the docks and shipping. Fires were caused along the harbour and hits were scored on a large ship at the docks. Enemy fighters attacked during the bomb run but re­ceived short shrift from the Fortresses and escorting Lightnings : nine enemy fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed and four damaged. A Fortress was lost by being rammed by a FW. 190, whose pilot had presumably been killed. On 2nd March, eighteen U.S. escorted Fortresses scored many hits on the quays and on the same day eighteen additional U.S. Fort­resses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, bombed the power-house, ship yard and dry dock areas at La Goulette. Later in the month, on the night 12/13th March, eleven Wellingtons dropped 2 x 4,000 lb., 62 x 500 lb. bombs and 1,080 x 4 lb. incendiaries on the docks and marshalling yards

Concentrated bombing on Tunis docki.

at Tunis and on the centre of the city. Some of the fires started were visible for 60 miles on the return journey. On this occasion, also, pam­phlets were dropped over a wide area.

In addition to attacks on Bizerta and Tunis, a few heavy attacks were made on the docks and shipping at Sousse. On 8th February, 42 U.S. escorted Fortresses dropped 186 x 1,000 lb. bombs on this target: considerable damage was inflict­ed on jetties and buildings and two ships in the harbour received direct hits. On 12th March, another heavy attack was delivered by 38 U.S. escorted Fortresses when one hundred and four­teen tons of bombs were dropped from 24,000 feet. Fires were caused in the docks area and bursts were observed in the marshalling yards and in the vicinity of the power-house and oil

storage and loading piers. In addition, a hit was scored on a medium-size vessel in the harbour.

Attacks on Sicilian and Sardinian Ports

In February, N.W. African-based aircraft sup­plemented the air attacks of our Malta and Libya based bombers on the Sicilian and Sardinian supply ports from which the Axis ships made their hit-or-miss dashes to northern Tunisia.

Trapani was attacked on several nights by Wellingtons; in particular, successful attacks were made on the nights 31st January/lst Fe­bruary and 9/10th February by seven and ten bombers respectively. On each occasion bursts were observed in the docks area.

The principal attack on Palermo from the N.W. African end in February was made on the 15th by eighteen U.S. Fortresses. , One large ship was hit and left burning in the harbour, an oil tank was set on fire and bursts were observed in the docks area. On 1st March an even more devastating attack was carried out by 38 U.S. Fortresses, escprted by U.S. Lightnings. Many bursts from 2,000 lb. and 500 lb. bombs were observed on the docks, in the dry docks and ship-building areas- and in the town; in addi­tion, hits were scored on one large M/V and several smaller ones in the harbour and five vessels were set on fire.

Towards the end of February, also, heavy at­tacks were made by the Strategic Air Force against the important port of Cagliari, Sardinia. On 26th February, nineteen U.S. Fortresses scor­ed hits on the docks, the railway yards, and in­dustrial area of the town. Two days later a heavier attack was made by 46 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Large fires were started on the docks and in the town and direct hits and near misses were scored on vessels in the harbour and near the docks. The extensive damage caused was confirmed by the evidence of photographs taken during the raid. About nine enemy fighters were engaged by the escort­ing Lightnings which claimed the destruction of two MC. 200s and one ME.109. No losses were incurred by the American aircraft.

Attacks on Convoys

While the bombing of the Axis supply ports and attacks on shipping in harbour were going on, N.W. African-based aircraft supplemented the magnificent work of the Royal Navy by at­tacks on enemy vessels in transit between northern Tunisia and Sicily and Sardinia.

During the first three weeks in February adverse weather conditions usually prevented sightings and often caused the cancellation of missions. The most successful attack during this .spell was carried out by nine U.S. escorted Mitchells on 10th February. Four vessels, be­lieved to be Siebel ferries, were attacked from a height of 500 feet about 40 miles north of Cape Bon; one was sunk and another was left sinking.

From the last week in February onward, how­ever, considerable success was achieved, as is shown in the following table. The results ta­bulated represent those obtained from 19th Fe­bruary (when the Allied squadrons merged to form the North-west African Air Forces) to 19th March inclusive. The categories are defin­ed as follows:—

(a) Sunk. Ships seen to sink or explode. (b) Severely Damaged. Ships seen to be

heavily listing, to be in a sinking con­dition, or in flames.

(c) Damaged. When direct hits claimed, but no further results observed. When observed damage could not be consider­ed critical. Near misses, unsupported

by additional evidence of damage, have been disregarded.

(a) Sunk. 20

(b) Severely Damaged. 15

(c) Damaged. 11

The most successful attacks during the period were carried out during the week ending 12th March. Five anti-shipping missions were flown by U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders, escort being provided by U.S. Lightnings. Six enemy vessels, including several Siebel ferries, were sunk, eight severely damaged, and three damaged. The thoroughness of the attacks is exemplified by the fact that Wellingtons des­patched from Malta on the night 7/8th March to finish off the remnants of a convoy attacked by U.S. escorted Mitchells and Fortresses during the day reported that the latter had done such a good job that further action was unnecessary.

In nearly every case in this week, also, the American formations were attacked by enemy escorting aircraft. 28 of these were destroyed, fifteen probably destroyed and four damaged; the American losses, in comparison, were small.

Protection of Shipping and Ports

Day in, day out the Coastal Air Force ensured that our shipping was adequately escorted, ports and supply bases protected against enemy air attack and the U-boat menace kept in check.

By night, Beaufighters carried out local and convoy patrols. These were usually made with­out incident, but on the occasions when the enemy's JU.88s were operating, the Beaufighters made their presence felt; thus on the night 11/12th March, for example, a JU.88 was des­troyed 40 miles north-east of Bone. During the day, Hurricanes and Spitfires maintained conti­nuous patrols on local defence and convoy escort duties: few enemy air attacks materialised and combats were rare. There is little doubt that the enemy's caution was dictated by his appre­ciation of the reception always awaiting him.

Meanwhile, Hudsons and Swordfish kept up their unceasing search for U-boats. On a num­ber of occasions enemy submarines were attack­ed but, as is usual in U-boat attacks, the damage caused could only be conjectured. There was no doubt, however, about the results aohieved by a Hudson on 4th March. A fully surfaced U-boat was sighted and immediately attacked with three A/S bombs. As these appeared to have no effect the attack was renewed with machine-gun fire, and subsequently three depth charges were dropped. White smoke was observed coming from the U-boat, and oil and bubbles appeared on the water as it began to sink. The Hudson remained in the vicinity for half an hour; by that time the submarine had disappeared and twenty-five bodies were observed in the sea.

Eve of the Allied Attack

Mid-March found the North-west African Air Forces ready to play a full part in the coming battle. The fusion of R.A.F. and U.S. squadrons into a mighty striking force was complete. British and American commanders were imbued

y, and beat him utterly.

The following section gives an account of the Allied air activity on both fronts from 17th March to the end of the month. The process of squeezing the enemy out of Africa was then ap­proaching its final stage.

A heavy attack on \7th February, 1943, by U.S.A.F. bombers on Naples harbour, during which hits were scored on a number of vessels and the

military barracks.

PINCERS BEGIN TO CLOSE

Preliminary Attack on the Mareth Line

IN PREPAEATION FOR the VHIth Army's of­fensive, scheduled for four nights later, a limited attack was launched on the Mareth Line east and north-east of Arram on the night of 16/17th March; this achieved sufficient local success to establish close contact with the enemy between the road and the sea and to provide information about enemy dispositions. The northern sector of the line, with its salt marshes and formidable anti-tank obstructions, was held by Italian troops; in view of the strong natural and artificial de­fences it had evidently been decided that for the moment German stiffening was unnecessary. The central sector was screened by the enemy's 90th Light Division in positions dug along the Mede­nine road, and further south the Hallouf and Kreddache passes were guarded by elements of the 164th Division. The 15th Armoured Division was in position as immediate reserve in the Ma­reth area, and the 21st Armoured Division, in the vicinity of Gabes, was available for either the Eastern or the Western Front. Meanwhile, the 10th Armoured Division had apparently left the Eastern Front temporarily to strengthen Kairouan in the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield. It was estimated that the Axis troops numbered 100 to 110,000 in southern Tu­nisia: of these, 45 to 50,000 Germans and 30 to 35,000 Italians were with combatant units. The total German tank strength in the south was put at 150 runners; Italian runners, however, were so few that they could be practically ignored.

Air Support In order to bring the full weight of the air

arm to bear on the enemy's Mareth positions practically all the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons and a light bomber wing of the Wes­tern Desert Air Force (now controlled by the North-west African Tactical Air Force) were up in the Medenine-Neffatia-Ben Gardane-Bu Grara area. Some of the fighter-bomber squadrons were located only twelve miles behind the front-line and anti-tank guns were in posi­tion 300 yards from the landing grounds. The se­cond light bomber wing, the U.S. Mitchell squa­drons and four additional fighter squadrons were further east at Zuara and El Assaj about 30 miles across the Tunisian border. In the rear, a Hali­fax and four Wellington squadrons based at Bir el Gardabia, south-west of Misurata, were ready to carry out intensive night attacks.

From the night 16/17th until 19/20th March, Allied air attacks on enemy positions were limit­ed, as low cloud and dust caused most of the operations planned to be cancelled. On one occasion only, the 17th, Spitfires were able to patrol in strength and as a result of four engage­ments one ME.109 was shot down, one MC.202 probably destroyed and three ME., 109s, were

damaged. Two Spitfires were lost but both pilots were saved. The following day, 18th March, 36 Bostons and Baltimores bombed enemy concentrations and positions at Toujane and Mareth respectively, but low cloud hampered both the operations and observation of results.

On the night 19/20th March, the weather clear­ed sufficiently to enable our medium bombers to resume their attacks. Thirty-four Wellingtons with Albacpre illumination, bombed enemy camps and transport vehicles along the main road west of Mareth; many fires and one violent explosion were caused and a hit was also scored on an anti-aircraft gun position.

The next day, 20th March, the Allied light bombers operated at maximum intensity in order to "soften" the northern sector of the Mareth de­fence zone preparatory to the Vlllth Army's night attack. Nine attacks were made in the Mareth area comprising 71 Boston, 54 Baltimore and 36 U.S. Mitchell effective sorties, escort being pro­vided by 187 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. The bombing was particularly successful around Mareth village, where many hits were scored on dug-in positions and buildings, including bar­racks, and south of Mareth where enemy strong-points were heavily attacked. Enemy fighters made no attempt to intercept these formations but two Bostons were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Meanwhile, two formations of 36 U.S. War­hawk-bombers, escorted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks, attacked transport vehicles in the enemy's rear near Gabes.

Offensive patrols over the forward area were carried out by Spitfires and Kittyhawks and No.l S.A.A.F. gained the honour of being the first Western Desert Air Force squadron to shoot down a F.W. 190.

The Americans Attack

Meanwhile, further south, American ground forces on 17th March initiated a full-scale attack and occupied Gafsa and Zannouch. The attack .of the II Corps on Gafsa was preceded by the ef­fective bombing of the town by U.S. escorted Bostons and Mitchells. Other air activity during the day included the straffing of enemy tanks and transport withdrawing along the road from Gafsa to El Guettar, about 70 miles west of Gabes. The following day the American forces pushed on to El Guettar and Sidi Bou Zid, south-west of Faid.

The Blitz on Southern Landing Grounds

Coinciding with the opening of the Western Desert Air Force's offensive against the Mareth defences on the night 19/20th March the North­west African Air Forces began their blitz on enemy landing grounds in the Gabes-Sfax area, in order to limit air opposition during the period of the Vlllth Army's attacks and the Americans'

advance in the El Guettar area. The night attacks were delivered by Wellingtons and Bisleys and the day attacks by U.S. escorted Fortresses, Ma­rauders, Mitchells and Bostons.

From 19/20th to 26th March inclusive nine at­tacks were made on the enemy's Djebel Tebaga landing grounds, in the course of which 356,160 lbs. of bombs were dropped; 8fax el Maouh airfield was attacked on four occasions and 131,640 lbs. of bombs were dropped; landing grounds in the vi­cinity of Gabes and Mezzouna were also attacked with bomb-loads of 57,600 lbs. and 35,440 lbs. res­pectively. Widespread damage was inflicted on enemy aircraft, runways and administrative buildings, and the effect in reducing enemy air activity at the time of the intensive operations of the AWied air forces recounted in the following pages cannot be over-emphasised.

Frontal Attack on the Mareth Line During the night 20/21st March a full-scale

attack was launched by the VHIth Army against the enemy's northern positions between the road and the sea. The assault was preceded by an air attack delivered by eleven Hal^faxes and 45 Wel­lingtons, with Albacore illumination, on enemy concentrations and encampments along the road west of Mareth as far as Katena. Fourteen fires and three violent explosions were caused and several of the Wellingtons added to the effect of the bombing by low-level machine-gunning.

Our ground attack met with initial euccess and during the following day, 21st March, in spite of strong enemy opposition, a bridgehead was es­tablished over the Oued Zigzaou, the natural anti-tank obstacle in front of the enemy's main positions. Meanwhile, a subsidiary attack had been launched by a mobile force, composed prin­cipally of New Zealand troops, which moved round the enemy's west flank and by the evening of 21st March had reached the enemy's line of defences between the Djebel Tebaga and the Dje­bel Melab.

The Western Desert Air Force threw in the full weight of the light bomber squadrons in sup­port of the vn i th Army's frontal attack. Ten attacks were delivered on 21st March by 72 Bal­timores, 54 Bostons and 54 U.S. Mitchells, escort­ed by 139 Kittyhawks and 96 U.S. Warhawks, on enemy concentrations between Katena and Ma­reth. Targets were far more plentiful than on the previous day and the attacks were of great help in "softening" enemy opposition. Numerous direct hits were scored on enemy positions and fires and explosions were caused among vehicle concentrations. Few enemy aircraft were en­countered during these operations and only one attempt, which proved unsuccessful, was made to interfere with our bombing programme. Con­sidering the scale and effectiveness of the air attacks casualties were light: a Kittyhawk and a U.S. Warhawk failed to return and another Kittyhawk crashed.

In the enemy's immediate rear, also, to help our out-flanking attack, U.S. Warhawks bombed

and straffed dispersed transport; iricludirig'vtahks, south-west of Gabes, anfl y'escortecf, Kittyjhawk­bombers attacked an enemy strori-g 'pojfot'-in the same area, starting eleven fires.

Enemy air activity over the forward area was again negligible ana patrolling Spitfires had one engagement only witn enemy lighters, as a re­sult of which one ME.109 was probably des­troyed.

During the night 21/22 March, air attacks were delivered with the object of "softening" op­posiaon to me main and subsidiary attacks, of the land forces. Concentrations of the enemy's 2ist Armoured Division in the Gabes area and transport on roads near Katena were heavily at­tacked by ten Halifaxes and 51 Wellingtons, the target areas being illuminated by Albacores.

• While these air attacks were taking place, our land forces in tue northern sector maae a further auvance and succeeded in occupying Ouerzi Est and Ouerzi Ouest. During the night our out­flanking force also met witn success and succeed­ed in piercing the enemy's defences between the Ujebels Tebaga and Melab.

The Enemy Resists

The enemy's anticipated counter-attacks were duly launched on 22nd March. The attack at the northern end of the Mareth line was carried out mainly by his mobile reserve (the 15th Ar­moured Division), his last reserve of German in­fantry, and elements of the 90th Light Division. Bitter fighting ensued but eventually the enemy succeeded in re-taking the Ouerzi Est and Ouerzi Ouest positions. Our out-flanking force was also held up by German armour, supported by 88 mm. guns, fifteen miles south-west of El Hamma.

The Allied light bombers were unable to operate on the morning of 22nd March owing to bad wea­ther and low cloud. With the improvement in the weather in the afternoon, however, three successful attacks were delivered by a total of 53 Bostons, Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells, es­corted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks, on enemy concentrations near Zaret which were massing to stem our frontal attack. The enemy's air effort was also more intensive than formerly. Enemy fighters attacked two of our bomber formations and in the ensuing combats escorting U.S. War-hawks probably destroyed two ME.109s and da­maged three ME.109s and a MC.202. Our bomb­er casualties included a U.S. Mitchell which fail­ed to return and a S.A.A.F. Baltimore shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Meanwhile, a group of 40 tanks, armoured cars and transport vehicles, menacing our out­flanking force south of Hamma landing ground, was bombed by twelve escorted Kittyhawk­bombers and the attacks were continued by eight­een Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires and Kittyhawks. The flying "tin-openers" had their most successful day to date: hits were scored on 32 tanks, nine of which were destroyed, and four armoured cars and an, 88 mm. .gun' were also hit.

Mareth village under attack by S.A.A.F. light bombers. Three direct hits were scored on barrack buildings.

S.A.A.F. Bostons en route to bomb Zarat.

S.A.A. F. Bostons over typical Tuni­sian country, en route to Djebel Ter­

baga airfield.

inemy fighters which attempted to dispute our mastery of the air over the battlefield received short shrift from patrolling Spitfires. Two for­mations of ME. 109s were engaged with the result that three enemy fighters were destroyed, two probably destroyed and three damaged without loss to our aircraft.

The Frontal Attack Abandoned

During the night 22/23rd March, the enemy continued his counter-attack at the northern end of tne Mareth Line and succeeded in re-capturing most of his lost strong-points. While the land lighting was in progress enemy transport con­centrations and encampments between Gabes and Mareth were attacked by 34 Wellingtons and ten Halifaxes near Katena, where a large fire giving oif clouds of black smoke was started among a group of vehicles.

Throughout the next day our land forces across the Oued Zigzaou stubbornly resisted the enemy's onslaught which became ever-more vehement. The fullest support was afforded by the Western Desert Air Force. Allied light bombers made ten attacks on enemy concentrations in the Mareth area, comprising 166 effective sorties; escort was provided by 136 U.S. Warhawks. Many large fires accompanied by explosions were caused a­mong enemy positions and groups of vehicles and a number of guns were silenced. One bomber formation was attacked ineffectively by ME.109s and the escorting Warhawks destroyed one of the enemy fighters. Meanwhile, enemy positions south of Mareth were attacked by escorted Kittyhawk-bombers.

In order to weaken enemy resistance to the New Zealand outflanking force, 36 Kittyhawks and 24 Spitfires effectively machine-gunned an enemy strong-point south-west of Gabes, im­mobilising about fifteen vehicles, including a troop-carrier, and inflicting casualties on troops. At least six fires were ablaze in the area when the last of our aircraft left.

Spitfires carried out over 100 sorties on of­fensive patrols between Mareth and Gabes, but there were only two indecisive engagements with enemy fighters.

On the night of 23rd/24th March our bridge­head across the Oued Zigzaou was given up and in consequence the frontal assault on the Mareth Line was abandoned. The. enemy's opposition was greatly helped by the wadi, which proved an unsurmountable obstacle. Apart from the dif­ficulty of negotiating its width — 250 feet — the wadi at this time held a stream 50 feet wide, and efforts to build a causeway were frustrated by enemy machine-gun nests which had remained concealed in the banks. In consequence, the re­inforcing and supplying of our troops across the uiner side became increasingly difficult.

While our troops were withdrawing across the Oued Zigzaou, the nightly bombing of enemy transport and encampments between Gabes and Mareth was continued by 23 Wellingtons and

three Halifaxes, and night-flying Hurricanes of No. 73 Squadron carried out offensive reconnais­sances from Mareth westwards. The following morning, transport vehicles and tanks massed near Zaret, at the northern extremity of the Mareth Line, were most effectively bombed by 78 Allied light bombers. This was the last big attack on the line proper; thereafter, the attacks were switched to the Hamma area in order to give the fullest support to our out-flanking forces.

Out-flanking of the Mareth Line

A great tactician is essentially an opportunist: the Commander of the VHIth Army proved that he was both by giving up his plan of- a frontal attack immediately it was checked in favour of reinforcing his out-flanking force, thus turn­ing its limited attack into a major assault. Additional mobile forces were sent round the enemy's southern flank to the area south-west of Hamma, while an infantry force invested the Hallouf and Kreddache passes, in order to secure a shorter supply-line, and moved north against the Italians in the hill position at Toujane and Mutmata. To counteract our threat to his rear the enemy moved his only mobile reserve behind the Mareth Line, the 15th Armoured Division, westwards. By the evening of 25th March, it was in reserve behind the 21st Armoured Division, which was blocking the passage between the Djebels Tebaga and Melab. In addition, further Italian and German units were withdrawn from the Mareth defence zone to positions along the djebels themselves.

While these land operations were in progress the Allied air forces concentrated on "softening" the enemy's opposition to our forces south of Hamma and attacked enemy landing grounds in the southern sector of the Tunisian battlefield.

On the 24th March, two most successful attacks were delivered south of Hamma by escorted Kit­tyhawk-bombers and Hurricane LCDs. In the first attack 47 Kittyhawks and twelve Hurricane IIDs, escorted by Spitfires, sent up in flames four tanks and about twenty transport vehicles, and three armoured cars and fifty other vehicles were damaged. In addition, two guns were silenced and their crews killed. In the second attack, seven "tank-busters", escorted by sixteen Spitfires, attacked a group of sixteen tanks and destroyed six of them. The widespread damage caused by these attacks was confirmed by our ground forces. Our aircraft encountered intense flak, but the four Hurricanes and two Kitty-hawks hit managed to make forced-landings within our lines.

During the night, intensive bombing of the enemy's concentrations south-west of Hamma and along the Hamma-Gabes road was carried out from dusk to dawn by nine Halifaxes, 65 Wellingtons, 25 Bostons and 34 Baltimores. The target area was illuminated by Aibacores. Heavy damage was inflicted on vehicle concentrations and fifteen large fires and numerous smaller ones were started.

The next morning, 25th March, escorted R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers supplemented the attacks being made by the North-west African Air Forces on the landing grounds at Sfax el Maouh and north of Djebel Tebaga in order to limit enemy air opposition to the Western Desert Air Force's great offensive planned for the morrow.

Meanwhile, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks continued their straffing of vehicles and encamp­ments south-west of Hamma and in the Djebel Tebaga area.

Spitfires were on constant patrol throughout the day. One formation of six Spitfires inter­cepted about fifteen ME. 210s, escorted by a

'large number of ME. 109s, south-west of Gabes, and forced most of the ME. 210s to jettison their bombs on their own troops; in addition, one ME.210 was shot down and a ME. 109 damag­ed. In other engagments, Spitfires destroyed two ME. 109s and three MC. 202s and damaged one ME. 109. Three of our fighters failed to re­turn..

That night, 25/26th March, six Halifaxes, 59 Wellingtons, 40 Baltimores and 28 Bostons con­tinued the bombing of the enemy's concentrations of tanks and vehicles south of El Hamma. Fif­teen fires were started, some of which appeared to be petrol burning, and a number of explosions were caused.

Epic Air Attack Blitz methods were now necessary to blast a

way through the bottle-neck between the Djebels Tebaga and Melab so that our land forces, which were superior in strength to the enemy, could be deployed in the open country beyond. Mention has already been made of the heavy air attacks by night on the enemy's 15th and 21st Armoured Divisions in this area; it remains to be emphasis­ed that these succeeded not only in inflicting widespread material damage but weakened the enemy's will to fight by denying sleep to his troops.

The epic Western Desert Air Force's attack of 26th March began in the afternoon with an onslaught by light bombers followed by concen­trated and continuous low bombing and straffing by Kittyhawk-bombers and Hurricane "tank­busters".

As the country was exceedingly difficult for navigation a scheme of indentification was devis­ed which included the sending up of coloured smoke from a striking land-mark throughout the period of the attack. Simultaneously, our for­ward troops sent up smoke of another colour. Then, for the first few minutes of the air .blitz our artillery shelled the enemy's principal strong-points with smoke shells in order to indicate them to the fighter-bombers. Half an hour after the air attack had begun our artillery fired a heavy barrage which crept forward at the rate of 100 feet per minute, thus automatically de­fining the bomb line.

ing by escorted light bom fittflJ strength, which achieved surprise by their low approach. Thereafter, two and a half squadrons of Kittyhawk-bombers were fed into the area every quarter of an hour. These aircraft were briefed to bomb particular targets followed by the straffing of gun positions which constituted a menace to our armour. Meanwhile, the Hurri­cane IIDs broke up the enemy's tank concen­trations.

In order to guard the fighter-bombers and "tank-busters" from enemy interference a Spit­fire patrol, at one squadron strength, was main­tained over the area of operations. Moreover, as mentioned on page 40, the North-west African Tactical Air Force was engaged in attacking enemy landing grounds in the vicinity, in order to limit air opposition and create a diversion.

Our air blitz came as a total surprise to the enemy and the concentrated low bombing and straffing completely disorganised his defences. The forward elements of the VHIth Army were thus able to capture the Axis strong-holds and our armour passed through the bottleneck un­molested.

The evidence of prisoners of war and the great quantities of war material abandoned by the fleeing enemy bore witness to the extensive moral and material effect achieved.

The complete air attack was carried out in the space of two and a quarter hours, during which time 412 sorties were flown at the cost of eleven pilots missing.

Advances in Southern and Central Sectors

While the Mareth battle was in progress the American ground forces in the southern sector, which had occupied Gafsa and Zannouch, advanc­ed to Sened station and then continued to push on to Maknassy. Simultaneously, an effort was made to exploit eastwards from El Guettar. The two manoeuvres constituted a threat to Rom­mel's line of retreat to the north.

In the central sector Allied forces advanced north-east from Sbeitla on 26th March and oc­cupied Fondouk, without serious opposition, on the 27th. During the following days, however, the enemy's resistance in this sector stiffened.

Aircraft operating under Advanced Headquar­ters Tactical Air Force gave extensive support to the Allied ground forces. On 23rd March, nineteen missions, comprising 336 sorties, were flown in the Kairouan, Maknassy, Mezzouna and El Guettar areas. In particular, road transport near Maknassy and east of El Guettar was ef­fectively straffed and 90 U.S. escorted Bostons and eighteen escorted Mitchells added to the weight of these attacks and bombed enemy troops and transport concentrations.

The following day, attacks were continued in the above-mentioned areas and also extended to Fondouk, 378 sorties being carried out. The at­tacks. iasJudadf-an ,^cor,ted Boston attack on

Barracks at Gabes wer-e bombed in support of the Vlllth Army's advance. Inset shows area before bombing.

88 mm. gun positions in the El Guettar area; the Djebel Tebaga landing grounds while the three guns were put out of action. Western Desert Air Force blitzed the enemy at

On 25th March, fighters and fighter-bombers El Hamma. operated at full pressure, bombing and straffing vehicles and troop concentrations. The next day, Mareth Line Evacuated apart from the shooting up of transport around The concentrated attack of the Western Desert Maknassy, the main effort was directed against Air Force on 26th March on the enemy forces

astride tne runnel leading to El Ham extended that night to enemy concentra and around Gabes town. Five Halifaxes and Wellingtons carried out the attack and hits were scored on barrack blocks, fuel installations, rail­way sidings and transport on the main road. Five fires, described as "good", were started in the area. One Wellington failed to return.

The following day our armour drove the 21st Armoured Division up to El Hamma, and an enemy counter-attack from the south-east, launched by the 15th Armoured Division, was beaten off by another of our armoured brigades following up. The German 164th Light Divi­sion attempted to stop the advance of our in­fantry but at length withdrew to the north-east, after suffering heavy casualties.

Unfavourable weather restricted the Western Desert Air Force's activity during the day, but Kittyhawk-bombers made three bombing and machine-gun attacks on enemy transport vehicles on the road between El Hamma and Gabes.

Spitfires patrolled the Gabes area throughout the day. A formation of JU.88s was intercept­ed near Gabes and forced to jettison its bombs on enemy territory; two JU.88s were destroyed and three damaged. In another encounter the Spitfires destroyed one ME.210 and damaged four others. Three Spitfires were lost.

That night, 27/28th March, under cover of a thick haze which prevented air operations, the enemy evacuated the Mareth Line. The enemy's 15th and 21st Armoured Divisions took up posi­tions south-east of El Hamma to screen the eva­cuation.

On 28th March, our troops occupied the whole Mareth Line and part of our armour advanced towards Gabes from the south-west. Meanwhile, the enemy held on resolutely at El Hamma.

Continued bad weather, including sand storms, limited our air activity to a few fighter-bomber attacks on enemy vehicles between El Hamma and Gabes in support of the thrust by our ar­moured forces. Later in the day, when the weather improved, fighter-bomber attacks were made on transport vehicles withdrawing north­wards from Gabes.

Rommel Retreats to Oued el Akarit

During the night 28/29th March the enemy rear-guard at El Hamma was withdrawn and Rommel's forces in the Gabes area retreated northwards for seventeen miles to his next delay­ing position at Oued el Akarit.

Towards dawn the weather cleared sufficiently to enable operations to be carried out by four Halifaxes and 48 Wellingtons, assisted by flare-dropping Albacores. Enemy transport concentra­tions from Oudref, twelve miles north-west of Gabes, right up to 8fax were attacked. Targets were described as "excellent" and ten large fires were caused among vehicles.

and armoured \g days they

Oued el Akarit. The enemy forces retreating northward from

Gabes on the 29th were subjected to heavy bomb­ing and straffing attacks by a total of 418 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Kittyhawks and U.S. War-hawks and 36 escorted, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bos­tons and Baltimores.. Damage was inflicted on transport vehicles as far north as Mahares and fires were caused all along the road. At least 50 vehicles were destroyed and 270 damaged and six anti-aircraft posts were wiped out. Attacks were also made on landing grounds between Oudref and Sfax, in the course of which three aircraft were destroyed and six damaged on the ground. Four Kittyhawks and three U.S. War-hawks did not return from these intensive ope­rations.

During the day, also, escorted Baltimores and U.S. Mitchells made two heavy attacks on the Sfax el Maouh and Zitouna landing grounds, causing seven large fires. One U.S. Mitchell was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

Meanwhile, patrolling Spitfires, which included the Polish Flight, had a very successful day, shooting down six ME.109s, two MC.202s and one JU.88 and damaging five other aircraft without loss.

Attacks on Sfax el Maouh Airfield

By 30th March enemy vehicles had become well dispersed; accordingly, the main attacks of the Western Desert Air Force were directed against Sfax el Maouh, the enemy's principal airfield be­hind the Oued el Akarit defences. Three attacks were made by a total of 71 Allied light bombers, escorted by Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks. Se­veral aircraft were seen burning on the ground but observation, in the main, was prevented by low cloud.

During that night the attacks were continued by 45 Wellingtons, with Albacores acting as "path-finders"- Fifty fires were caused which were visible for eighty miles.

On 31st March, further attacks were delivered by escorted S.A.A.F. Bostons, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores, and U.S. Mitchells; several air­craft were destroyed on the ground. Two U.S. Mitchells hit by the intense flak encountered over the target came down in the sea off Djerba island. After mid-day, bad weather prevented further operations from being carried out against the airfield.

Re-occupation of Sedjenane

Meanwhile, in the northern sector, an attack in considerable strength was launched by the 1st Army against the enemy's positions north-east of Djebel Abiod on 28th March. Although pro­gress was difficult owing to bad weather, heavy going and thick undergrowth an' advance of ten miles was made on a broad-front arid Sedjenane

was re-occupied by our groun on 30th

Owing to the adverse weather?*- conditions air operations in this sector were limited. Whenever possible, however, Spitfires carried out offensive sweeps but ground attacks were restricted.

War of Supplies Continued While the Allied forces were achieving suc­

cesses in all sectors of the Tunisian battlefield the air attacks on the enemy's supply lines con­tinued unabated.

During the last week in March the principal attacks on the enemy's ports of off-loading were made by U.S. escorted Fortresses of the N.W. African Strategic Air Force. On 23rd March, 22 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, at­tacked Bizerta and bursts were observed on the docks on both sides of the channel, on quays and in the town; in addition, near misses were scored on a ship in the lake. In air combats with enemy fighters over the target three ME. 109s were destroyed and three others damaged for the loss of one U.S. Lightning. On the following day, the U.S. Fortresses turned their attention to Ferryville where 250 x 500 lb. bombs were dropped on the docks, causing many fires and explosions. A report from a reliable ground source stated that three vessels, one of which had a cargo of ammunition, were sunk. On 25th March, Sousse was bombed by 22 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by U.S. Lightnings. Apart from the damage done to the jetties, hits were scored on a large ship at the south quay and a smaller vessel was sunk in the harbour. Other attacks on enemy bases included one on bomb and fuel storage installations at Groubalia, south-east of Tunis, on 26th- March by 12 U.S. Mitchells, but poor visibility on this occasion prevented the observation of results.

Attacks were also continued on the main Sicilian and Sardinian supply ports. On 22nd March, U.S. escorted Fortresses supplemented the Libyan-based bombers' offensive against Palermo mentioned on page 20. 287 x 500 lb. bombs were dropped and bursts were observed among ships in the-harbour; one burst, in parti­cular, caused an explosion which was felt by the bombers at 24,000 feet. Photographs taken two days later confirmed that tremendous damage had been inflicted on port installations. On 31st March, docks and shipping at Cagliari harbour were attacked by 24 U.S. Fortresses, which drop­ped 288 x 500 1b. (.021 to 1 second delay) bombs from 23,000 feet. Photographs taken by the bombers revealed that two large M/Vs were set on fire, three more M/Vs and a coaster received direct hits, and damaging near misses were scor­ed on nineteen small craft. The dock area was well covered with bursts and a large explosion occurred in the north-west corner of the harbour.

The most successful attacks, on enemy CJ in the latter half of 20t

tacked, a convoy of four M/Vs and two escort v^ss^ls and 24 x 500 lb. demolition bombs were dropped from heights of 750 to 150 feet. One M/V was set on fire and near misses were scor­ed on one of the escort vessels. On the 22nd/ fifteen U.S. escorted Marauders bombed a large troopship, three medium-sized M/Vs and sb escort vessels from heights of 7,500 feet to.3,500 feet. Direct hits were scored on the troopship which caused an explosion and left it in flames and listing, and direct hits were also scored on one M/V and one escort vessel. During botjf these shipping attacks interception was attempt­ed by formations of enemy aircraft; in all, sixteen ME.109s, two JU.88s and an unidentified Italian fighter were claimed as destroyed by the American bombers and fighters.

In the meantime, aircraft of the Coastal Air Force were dealing with enemy submarines. On 28th March, a Hudson sighted a U-boat at peri­scope depth and attacked with three depth charges which forced the U-boat to the surface. Two 100 lb. A.S. bombs were then dropped which blew the submarine fifteen yards broadside to star­board. When last observed the submarine was unable to submerge and was progressing at about five knots.

Heavy attacks on Sardinian Airfields On the last day of March heavy attacks were

made by the Strategic Air Force on the enemy's' airfields in Sardinia, from which Italian and Ger­man torpedo-bombers and JU.88 bombers sallied out to attack our convoys and ports and enemy fighters provided protection for convoys to Bizer­ta and Tunis.

The attack on Decvmomannu by sixteen Wellingtons on the night 30/31st was followed on the next day by attacks on that airfield and those at Monserrato and Villacidro by a total of 68 Fortresses, which dropped 9,072 x 20 lb. frag­mentation bombs. Photographs taken during the raids showed that 44 aircraft were destroyed or badly damaged on Decimomannu airfield, twelve at Monserrato and one at Villacidro. In addi­tion, thirteen enemy fighters were shot dowfffl by the American formations over the targets.

Beginning of the End in Tunisia By the end of March it was evident that the

Tunisian campaign was about to enter its final phase. The Vlllth Army had pursued Rommel's forces to the Oued Akarit;. in the El Guettar and central sectors American and French troops were increasing their pressure on enemy positions which were rapidly becoming untenable; in the north, the 1st Army was ready for a trial of strength with the forces of Von Arnim.

To a great extent the imminence of victory was due to the varied and intensive operations of the Allied air forces. A mighty air arm had been forged which was ready not only to play its full part in the final struggle in Tunisia, but to strike heavier and heavier blows at the south­ern bastions of Hitler's European "fortress."

Palermo docks and shipping under attack on 22nd March, 1943.

The force of this explosion at Palermo on 22nd March was felt by the aircraft at 24,000 feet. Results are slioivn on page 71.

Tables Showing Scale Of Effort

The following tables show in fortnightly periods the scale of air force effort in effective sorties by aircraft of the Middle East Command, including that of the Ninth U.S.A.F., from 29/3Oth December, 1942, to 27th March, 1943.

The tables dealing with operations in the Eastern Mediterranean include sorties from Malta against shipping and submarines1., but the complete effort from Malta is tabulated separately with the article entitled "Malta's Contri­bution on pages 68-70.

Although activities by British and American aircraft of the North­west African Air Forces are described in Section II of the main historical narrative, "Forward to TunisV, information is not available to summarise the effort in table form. The following figures, however, provided by Headquarters, North-west African Air Forces, show the total number of bomber sorties carried out from the inception of the N.A.A.F. to Zlst March, 1943. There being no "fighter-bomber" category for US.A.F. such sorties are included in the Light Bomber category.

Figures in respect of the Twelfth US.A.F. and the Eastern Air Com­mand (8>th November, 1942 to 17th February, 1943J are not available at the time of going to press..

NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES

Scale of Bomber Effort, 18th February to 31st March, 1943 :

Total Number of Heavy Bomber Sorties U.S.A.F. 990 R.A.F. Nil

}, >> >> >> >> >' „ „ „ Medium „ „ U.S.A.F. 924

R.A.F. 120 , , >> )> 1! J> >>

„ Light U.S.A.F. 358 R.A.F. 799

RECONNAISSANCE BY AliTcTtAJJiJl ' W « U E MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

(2,9/3© December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

Tactical and Strategical

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Tac/R. Strat/R. TOTALS

20/30 December, 1942 — 16 January,

16/17 January •— 30 January

30/31 January — 13 February

13/14 February — 27 February

27/28 February — 13 March

13/14 March — 27 March

1943 97

86

44

71

114

125

41

37

10

13

18

17

138

123

54

84-

132

142

GRAND TOTALS • 537 136 673

Eastern and Central Mediterranean

Submarine FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-Shipping (area and close TOTALS

cover searches)

29/30 December, 1942 — 16 January, 1943 ,.. 30 163 193

16/17 January — 30 January 33 248 281

30/31 January — 13 February ... 14 215 229

13/14 February — 27 February 17 209 226

27/28 February — 13 March 16 234 250

13/14 March — 27 March 9 246 255

GRAND TOTALS ... 119 1315 1434

ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY BOMBER AND MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT

OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND, INCLUDING THE NINTH TJ.S.A.F. U.8.A.F.Key: BRITISH. (29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

ENEMY CAMPS, POSITIONS, iPORTS and ]BASES AIRFIELDS and a n d TjTNTfiS

(including Mine-laying) LANDING GROUNDS of COMMUNICATION FORT­

T71/"\T"> ffTlVT T /"^ T TFTT "\T

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Hea

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Hea

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Med

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29/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943 ... 99

12 10 12 —

99

34

12

1

12

24 57 —

24

82 20

15

49

45

86 117

60

272

183

388

cS 16/17 January — 30 January 104

6 9

40

— 65

144

80

_

3

28

32

19

124

_

166

4?

325

_

4

20

35

176

163 373

196

575

387

980

3QZ3^January — 13 February 99

19 35 — 79

99

133 —

9

16 — 12

9

28

2

1 8

_

— 175

2

184

110

345

iffl^jS^feeBruary — 27 February 68

7 53 —- —

68

60 37

2

65

67

— 260

69

362

2

1

49

10 102 81

51

194

188

616

WBSm

2SZsj&^'ebruary 13 March 45

21 88 — —

45

109

_

—

_

2 —

_

— 2

3

10 49

kt

54 366

50

479

95

590

13/ff/$l«Farch 27 March 58

14 — — —

58

14 —

_

2 18 20 53

206

356

223

727 193

429

1329

487

1363

*

L I?J ^ g ^ H P TOTALS

473

79 195

40

12 144

513

430

12

41

51

141

86

199 438

149

819

7

89

290

507

491

1132 1305

788

3033

1450 tm

4282 £ £<3

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT

OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND, INCLUDING THE NINTH U.S.A.F.

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

Offensive Sweep—

Land

Ground attack—

S. & T.E. (including cannon)

Ground attack—.

F/Bomber (U.S.A.F.

light bomber)

Ground attack—i anti-tank

Bomber escort

Recon­naissance

escort

Local Defence

Anti-ship­ping and offensive sweeps

Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943 162

662 59

45

117

91

297

+8

85 655 879

January — 30 January 333 128

2S5

604

30

235 219 75 1120

338

27i4

30/31 January — 13 February 24 266 141 495 54 949 1929

13/14 February — 27 February 152

67

341 288 805 785

91

2371

27/28 February — 13 March ... 56

531 34 366 19 360 19

2

775 943

85

3048

13/14 March — 27 March 102

699

22

117

223

193 60

523

655 1080 874

870

3678

70 617 6U 48 16 GRAND TOTALS

2401 338 1887 79 1976 104 4029 132 5550 16496

Tables Of Operations In The Mediterranean

The follotving five Tables cover operations in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean by aircraft of the Middle East and Malta Commands in the first three months- of 1943.

It will be seen that in this period Middle East aircraft flew 1,434 sea reconnaissance sorties as against 810 flown by Malta aircraft; that Middle East aircraft flew 133 effective sorties against shipping at sea, sinking one ship, probably sinking four, damaging five, and making a further 22 plus attacks of which the results were unknown; that Malta aircraft flew 226 effective anti-shipping sorties, sinking eight vessels and one submarine, pro­bably sinking fourteen vessels, damaging 59 vessels and one submarine, and having 33 "results unknown."

These attacks, combined with those by surface and submarine vessels of the Navy, effectively reduced the Axis sea lines of communication to Africa, forcing the increased use of air transport which met with disaster in April.

In addition to aggressive sorties during the period under review there were 577 by aircraft from Malta, and 5,550 from the Middle East, floivn in protection of friendly shipping in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. Middle East aircraft also made 42 Air/Sea Rescue sorties, saving 23 person­nel, and Malta 223 sorties, saving a further eight personnel.

The above operations are not dealt with in a separate article in this issue of the R.A.F. Middle East Review. The next issue, however, will contain a complete survey of the fight for the control of the Mediterranean during the three years from June, 1940, when Italy entered the war, until June, 1943, when Mediterranean routes •were once again opened to British and Allied shipping.

iCONNAISSANCE OF THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

BY AIRCRAFT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

AND MALTA

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

ANTI­SHIPPING

SUBMARINE (area and close cover searches)

COMBINED TOTALS

N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta

29/30 December, 1942 — 16 January, 1943 30 135 163 12 193 147

16/17 January — 30 January 33 154 248 17 281 171

30/31 January — 13 February 14 83 215 5 229 88

13/14 February — 27 February 17 148 209 37 226 185

27/28 February — 13 March 16 76 234 12 250 88

13/14 March 27 March 9 108 246 23 255 131

GRAND TOTALS 119 704 1315 iO6 1434 810

SORTIES FLOWN BY AHtCRAFT ON PROTECTION

OF FRIENDLY SHOPPING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

(29/30 December, 1943 — 27 March, 1943)

BY AIRCRAFT FROM MALTA 577

BY AIRCRAFT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST 5550

Results of attacks from Results of attacks from COMBINED ©

N. AFRICA/LEVANT MALTA TOTALS

FORTNIGHTLY >3 23 «

PERIODS 3 «H

•si >» -a

6 bo

02 .a i

W

i 8

RESULTS OF ATTACKS (BY* EFFECTIVE SORTIES) AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA

IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY AIRCRAFT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

( Shipping(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943) Key : I Submarines

29/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943

16/17 January — 30 January

30/31 January — 13 February

73

1

L3/14 February — 27 February...

r/28 February — 13 March ...

March — 27 March ...

-'tftlAND TOTALS

£ -: a

...

15 1

7*

n I

77 IS

1*

1

23

1

1

73

l

15*

5

1 39

9

12

17

6

1

25

45

1

9

14

42

22

1

32*

4

21S

13

59

1

342

17

ymbol indicates an estimate of 1 plus vessels where number attacked is unknown.

EFFECTIVE SORTIES AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL, MEDITERRANEAN BY

AIRCRAFT OF THE MLDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

Attacks on shipping (29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943) Key : Attacks on submarines

Number of Effective Sorties CQ

FORTNIGHTLY F/Bomber Heavy Medium Light TOTALS PERIODS and cannon

8 *N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta N. Africa Malta

6 2320/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943

1 1 1

19 26 69 32 75 77 150 January — 30 January

1 1

21 u 29 73 30/31 January — 13 February

12 2S 6 39 45 13/14 February — 27 February

1 1

S 9 9 27/28 February — 13 March

12 12 14

15 17 10 13/14 March — 27 March

GRAND TOTALS 16 77 113 63 129 213 342

1 1 1 12 4 13 17

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING (BY TYPES OF VESSEL) AND SUBMARINES AT^ffA

BY AIRCRAFT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

AND MALTA

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

From N. AFRICA.Key: From MALTA.

Sunk or Probably Results TYPE OF VESSEL Damaged TOTALS Beached Sunk Unknown

-CARGO VESSELS, etc.

1 S 5 9M/Vs (up to 5,000 tons) 3 7 24 15 49

1 1 1 5(5/15,000 tons) 3 1 5 7 16

— — „ (15,000 tons and over) — — —

— — — 2 2 .Tankers (1/5 000 tons) 1 2 1 4

(5/15,000 tons) 2 42 — 2 — 9 11

"F"-Boats or Barges 2 4

— 1 1 5* 7* Schooners and Trawlers 2 11 1 14

—— — — Motor Lfvunohpf? 2 I

— — Tugs 2 4 6

NAVAL VESSELS. — —— — —

Battleships . 1 — —

Cruisers . o 2

K 9 1

— MXBs 2 2

— — " E "-Boats 2

— Escort Vessels (unspecified)

k Submarines 1 21

v EBB 4fc •GRAND TOTALS

1 14 i- -P. 33 9

;' — IHJI is '' u m * Symbol indicates an estimate of 1 plus vessels where number attacked is unknown.

59

I

/SEA RESCUE OPERATIONS—EASTERN AND CENTRAL, MEDITERRANEAN

BY AIRCRAFT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(29/30 December, 1943 — March, 1943)

# t From N. Africa. \Total Number of Personnel rescued during the quarter. From NORTH AFRICA — 23. y : I From Malta.M A L T A — 8.

Number of Sorties Effective locations of aircrew or wreckage

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Rescues Wreckage,(1 or more empty dinghy, Bomber Fighter TOTALS TOTALS persons) etc.

29/30 December, 1942 — 16 January, 1943 19

9 28

19

37

5

3

16/17 January — 30 January 3

7 57

3

64 4*

•1*

30/31 January — 13 February 2

2 16

2

18 1*

13/14 February — 27 February 3

9

8

9

3*

27/28 February — 13 March 3

1 47

3

48

1

3*

6

14

1

33

7

47

1*

1

38 k

33 190 223 14

* Indicates co-operation with H.S.L.

MALTA'S CONTRIBUTION

THE NEW YEA£, 1943, found Malta in a stronger position than it had been since Italy entered the war in 1940. The days when as many as 400 enemy sorties between a single morning and evening could be met with only a handful of fighters had gone and showed little likelihood of returning.

The tide had begun to turn in May, 1942, when, with Spitfires becoming available in increasing numbers, Malta's fighters had got the measure of the attackers. They, never relaxed their grip. The bombers, too, which had often been compelled to operate under almost impossible conditions, were coming into their own again. Strikes against enemy shipping had never ceased and from November, 1942, medium bombers, specially sent over from Egypt, had once more taken up the task of dealing hard blows against land targets in North Africa.

long and trying defensive period was over IR.A.F. was ready to pay the enemy back ­rest—for the damage done to the island

^spring. The first three months of the New fear saw this aggressive policy gaining in strength.

These three months were eventful ones. R.A.F., Malta, became Malta Air Command in February; coi^oys arrived steadily with war material; en#iy air attack fell right off and it was quite

T n t when even four or five ME.109S flew ver the coast; fighters and fighter-bombers > go and flush the enemy over their own ds; Mosquitoes, the all-purposes aircraft had made their first sorties from Malta

at the end of the year, operated successfully over Sicily and, with Spitfire-bombers, trod hard on the toe of Italy; attacks on shipping forced the enemy to attempt such disguises as added funnels on tankers; attacks on airfields so confused and worried the enemy A.A. gunners that they often fired wildly at their own aircraft; attacks on locomotives in Sicily and Italy made engine-driving such a precarious job that the Italians awarded one driver a posthumous decoration for carrying on under f i re . . . .

The Navy, too, had the offensive spirit well developed. Destroyers and M.T.Bs sailed from Malta bases to harass the enemy, and submarines, not content with attacking shipping, went right up to the coast of Italy and shelled railway bridges and other targets.

The Policy of Aggression As far as the R.A.F. was concerned, almosf all

activity was planned with the same end—aggresa sion—in view. Main activity may be summarised thus :— . . .

(a) Reconnaissance of ports and shipping " routes, to gain information on which to

base strikes and to watch Italian fleet movements.

(b) Reconnaissance of airfields in Sicily and Italy, to spot any suspicious con­centrations of aircraft and to discover which were the best places to attack­

(c) Shipping strikes wherever shipping «oufa be found.

61

62

(d) Intruder operations over enemy airfields, often coinciding with shipping strikes and designed to disrupt enemy night-flying activity.

(e) Attacks on railways in Sicily and Italy, with the object of causing confusion and delay on the lines.

supplies wps|0§^UP24MPW wtimKvmm normally" escorted by motor boats some 50/60 feet in length. On 17th March, no fewer than twenty-two Siebel ferries and twelve motor boats were seen in Marsala, where the ferries were being loaded with small crates. Messina Roads were still used as a protective anchorage for ships

(f) Bombing attacks on ports, bases, air­fields and road traffic in Tripolitania and Tunisia, in co-operation with aircraft operating from North Africa.

Practically the only R,A.F. activities that can­not be classed as aggressive were the protection of friendly shipping and local defence, on which Malta's fighters flew 577 and 734 sorties res­pectively. The various aspects of Malta's effort are dealt with separately in the ensuing para­graphs.

Reconnaissance Activity Reconnaissance activity was maintained at a

steady level. Harbours were covered 218 times and other land targets 147 times; 704 sorties were flown on shipping reconnaissance and 106 sorties on area and close cover searches for hostile submarines.

The predominant concern of reconnaissance aircraft was, of course, the watching of the enemy's embarkation ports and the routes by which he attempted to run supplies to North Africa. On the information brought back by P.R.XJ. Spitfires and Baltimores the striking forces were briefed.

Naples and Palermo were found in January to be still the chief enemy supply ports. The larger merchant vessels bound for Tunisia were normal­ly routed from Naples towards Sardinia and thence south, to keep as far away as possible from Malta's torpedo-bombers. In February, in anticipation of trouble in the shape of bombers, a dispersal policy was inaugurated at Naples. Merchant vessels loaded there were moved to the small neighbouring ports of Torre Annunziata, Torre del Greco and Pozzuoli before proceeding

'south in convoy. Although these precautions were taken, however, it was clear from the daily turnover—some 16;000 tons of shipping—and the quayside activity that our bombing had not yet seriously curtailed the working of Naples harbour.

Palermo, which had for a long time rivalled Naples as a supply port, showed a decrease in shipping activity in February, but the reason was not certain. Trapani, on the other hand, con­tinued to retain its value as a base for destroyers and escorting vessels convoying the merchant­men across the Sicilian narrows. Its poor facili­ties for handling merchant shipping were partly overcome by the increased use of "F"-boats and Siebel ferries, which could take on deck cargo of M.T. and guns without the help of cranes.

These "F"-boats and other light craft were also frequently spotted in the small harbours of Marsala and Termini Imerese. They continued to be used in considerable numbers in running

making for Tunisia from Italy. Interesting and valuable photographs were

taken by a reconnaissance Baltimore on 20th February. They showed a 10,000 ton tanker, previously seen loading its cargo of fuel at Na­ples, with a dummy funnel amidships, intended to disguise it as an ordinary merchant vessel. Neither this camouflage, however, nor the tanker's escort of an armed merchant cruiser and several destroyers, saved it from attack by torpedo-bom­bers. Two nights later another extremely suc­cessful photograph showed black smoke rising from the burning wreckage of the tanker.

After the evacuation of Tripoli on 23rd Janua­ry, Tunis and Bizerta received most of the mate­rial intended for the Axis forces in North Africa. Tripoli was covered up to the last minute, as in­dicated in the special article on page 105. The last photographic reconnaissance undertaken from Malta showed a tall column of smoke ris­ing from the deserted and shattered Spanish Mole.

Reconnaissance of Naval Bases In order to safeguard our own shipping move­

ments, regular reconnaissance was made of the Italian naval bases and the dispositions of war­ships. The greater part of the Italian fleet had left Naples for Spezia in December, and was still there in the New Year.

Close watch was kept on Taranto and Messina, where two battleships and three six-inch cruisers were respectively based. On the night of 31st January/lst February it was noticed that the three cruisers had dispersed in the face of heavy daylight bombing attacks by U.S.A.A.F. aircraft. For the rest of the period Messina was not used as a cruiser base. The fugitives were soon re­located, one in Naples and the others in Taranto.

Taranto, formerly an important supply base for Tripoli and Benghazi, reverted in March to an almost purely naval role as the base of two battle­ships and a cruiser squadron.

Several submarines, believed to be French, were seen at Naples and Taranto in February. Other French vessels identified included one or pro­bably two large tankers in Naples which had been present in Marseilles when the Germans oc­cupied the port; at least three merchant vessels being mounted with guns in Naples were also almost certainly of French origin.

Reconnaissance of Enemy Airfields Checks were systematically made of the Axis

airfields in Sicily and Southern Italy. The most significant feature of the period was the vast increase in the number of transport aircraft. In February 131 transport aircraft were photo­graphed on the north-west Sicilian airfields.

63

^ as t50 JU.52s were aircraft present on the airfields covered was, on seen en route to Tunisia, wherea hundred trans­port aircraft were reported to have landed In a single day. In March over 300 aircraft were en­gaged in ferrying men and material to Tunisia. To protect them and the sea convoys some 650 aircraft were based in Sicily.

Thirty-two airfields south of Borne were cover­ed, many of them for the first time. Several con­tained large concentrations of aircraft. At Fog­gia, for instance, there were 98 JU.87s on one occasion and 34 gliders at San Pancrazio, on the heel of Italy _ the biggest flock of gliders ever photographed from Malta. The total number of

an average, about 1,100 of all types. An ill-fated reconnaissance venture was the

first sortie made from Malta ,by a U.S.A.A.F. Lightning. It set off on 28th March on a photo­graphic reconnaissance and failed to return.

Strikes Against Shipping As the battle moved westward, responsibility for

smashing enemy convoys devolved more and more on Malta's aircraft. The maximum effort was put up on this vital task and results overshadowed the effort put up by aircraft of the Middle East Command. In January, February and March,

Trapani retained it, < ®a$e for destroyers and escort vessels con-the Sicilian narrows.

r f.

Malta-based bombers and torpedo-bombers flew 226 effective sorties, sank nine vessels, probably sank fourteen, damaged sixty and made thirty-three other attacks of which the results were unknown. In the same period aircraft of the Middle East Command made 133 sorties, sank one vessel, probably sank four, damaged five and had twenty-six plus " results unknown."

Of the shipping claimed as sunk from Malta, three were merchant vessels up to 5,000 tons ; three between 5 and 15,000 tons; two tankers between 5 and 15,000 tons; and one submarine.

Results were obtained through a combination of regular reconnaissance of ports and sea lanes, co-ordinated night strikes by Wellingtons, Beau-forts and Albacores, a successful Beaufort and Beaufighter day strike, and cannon and machine-gun attacks by Beauflghters and Mosquitoes on the smaller fry in the way of "F"-boats, schooners, tugs and barges.

A typical strike against a 10,000 ton tanker was made in February. It was first sighted early in the morning of the 20th by a Baltimore south of Naples. The following night ten "Wellingtons and four Beauforts were briefed to attack. Heavy electrical storms were encountered and only one Beaufort located the tanker some forty miles north of Trapani. Although the tanker was not sunk, it delayed its crossing to Tunisia until the next night. It was then located at 18.15 hours half way between Trapani and Cape Bon. Another attack was made and three torpedoes from three Beauforts scored direct hits, setting it on fire. An hour later a fourth torpedo from another Beaufort struck the tanker and caused it to settle in the water. At 02.00 hours only pieces of frame­work remained above the water in the middle of a large patch of burning oil.

The daylight strike by Beauforts and Beau-fighters occurred on 17th March. A reconnais­aance Baltimore first sighted a southbound convoy with a destroyer escort in the Gulf of Taranto at 07.05 hours. Nine Beauforts, escorted by nine Beaufighters, were briefed to attack, and some five hours later found the convoy protected by about fifteen ME.llOs and JU.88s.

While the Beaufighters held off the air escort, seven of the Beauforts attacked the largest vessel, probably a tanker of 8/10,000 tons, with seven torpedoes. Three hits were claimed and a column of water and a cloud of smoke were seen at the stern of the vessel and smoke poured from its decks. Later, a Baltimore, sent to photograph the results of the strike, could find nothing ex­cept a JU.88 and a twin-engined flying-boat circling a patch of oil a quarter of a mile in dia­meter. The flying-boat, for some unknown reason, stalled on seeing the Baltimore and crashed into the sea.

A feature of this strike was the accuracy of the Beauforts' return fire against attacking enemy aircraft. Together with the Beaufighters, they accounted for one ME.110 destroyed, two ME.llOs probably destroyed and several more damaged. One Beaufort and one Beaufighter were missing.

-What"was a rare craft were concerned was the sinking of a sub-' marine on 14th January. A Beaufort, patrolling ahead of a convoy some 136 miles south-east of Malta, found a large Italian supply submarine, and promptly attacked it with depth charges. The bows were blown into the air, causing the submarine to stop, with a list to starboard. Ma­chine-gun attacks followed and casualties were inflicted on those of the crew who were on the deck. Finally, the crippled submarine was finish­ed off by Naval units who wer« attracted to the scene by the Beaufort's signals.

Operations by Mosquitoes Valuable, if indirect, help was given to our

shipping strikes by Mosquito and Beaufighter in­truder operations over enemy airfields. These were often timed to coincide with shipping attacks and undoubtedly contributed to the scarcity of night-fighter protection for enemy convoys.

The patrol area of the Mosquitoes was nor­mally the Comiso — Catania and Castelvetrano Trapani group of airfields. Enemy aircraft were attacked wherever they were seen, both in the air and on the ground; flare paths were sprayed with cannon and machine-gun fire; searchlights and landing lights were shot out. It was difficult to assess the exact number of enemy aircraft accounted for, owing to indifferent weather and to the frequent necessity of taking violent evasive action to avoid ground defences.

There is no doubt, however, that the enemy were shaken by these unwelcome visitors. On many occasions enemy aircraft were fired at by their own A.A. guns; intense barrages were some­times put up over airfields while the intruder Mosquito was looking on from a distance of twenty miles; and the mere presence of a Mos­quito in the neighbourhood is thought to have caused one enemy aircraft to hurry its landing at Castelvetrano and crash in flames.

The Mosquitoes, indeed, seldom had a dull moment. In January they made two successful cannon and machine-gun attacks on shipping, causing an explosion on an escort vessel in one case and causing debris to fly from the bridge and superstructure of a 3,000 ton merchant vessel in the other case; with Beaufighters they straffed M.T. columns on the coast road between Tripoli and Tunis; and they shot up railways in Sicily and Italy.

Attacks on Railways in Sicily and Italy This last uctivity grew in importance and effi­

cacy as the period went on. The enemy relied largely on the railways to run material down to Sicily where it could be loaded on small craft bound for Tunisia. From both Naples and Ta­ranto the railway follows the coast southward. The two tracks meet opposite the Messina train ferry, whence the railway leads westward along the north coast of Sicily to Palermo. The whole extent of these tracks became the happy hunting ground of Mosquitoes, Beaufighters and Spitfires

65

l hirty-four gliders at ban tancrazio; the Largest flock ever photographed from Malta.

— especially Mosquitoes, which quickly proved ideal train-busters.

Combined results of attacks were spectacular. In January fourteen locomotives were destroyed or severely damaged; in February there were thirty; and in March — in spite of much ground haze at night — the figure rose to seventy-four permanently or temporarily out of action.

Most results came from cannon fire, but Beau-fighters occasionally scored hits with 250 lb. bombs. Attacks were normally carried out at night, but fighter and bomber Spitfires also ope­rated in daylight against railways, stations, sid­ings and bridges in south-east Blctty. These and the other attacks by Mosquitoes and Beaufighters on station buildings, goods yards and warehouses in Sicily and Southern Italy started many fires, one of which, at Metaponto, could be seen forty miles away. On one occasion a Mosquito, follow­ing the Italian west coast railway, almost reached the environs of Rome and straffed four trains between Cisterna

The effect of these attacks went beyond the destruction of rolling stock and goods being car­ried. In the first place there was widespread dislocation of traffic; secondly, night travel be­came distinctly unpopular; thirdly, A.A. defences were forced to spread out up and down the long stretches of coast; finally, the mounting total of locomotives written-off must have had repercus­sions beyond Italy, since the total Axis output of railway engines is estimated at not more than 300 a month. The Italians complained bitterly about the "barbarity of British attacks" and an­nounced that an engine driver was given a post­humous award for sticking to his post under air attack.

Operations by Spitfires

In addition to their railway strafes, bomber and fighter Spitfires carried out other offensive pro­grammes whenever the weather permitted. Nor­mally the Spitfire-bombers carried 2 x 250 lb. H.E. bombB, fused instantaneous or, occasionally,

eleven seconds delay. Satisfactory results, too, were sometimes reported when 250 lb. Incendiary bombs were used.

Continuing the good work against industrial targets and airfields in Sicily that had begun in the autumn, the Spitfires put the chemical fac­tory at Porto Empedocle out of action ; twice damaged the power station at Cassibile; and scored hits on factories at Pozzallo, Marzemimi, Bampieri and Bdcli. They made many hits in the dispersal areas and among the airfield buildings at Lampedusa, Comiso, Gela and elsewhere. In an attack on the Syracuse base, a seaplane hangar was destroyed, a 200 ton steamer sunk and hits scored on railway yards and buildings. By way of a little variety, on the return Journey from one operation, Spitfires jumped a submarine five miles east of Avola and damaged the hull, superstruc­ture and conning-tower.

During the full moon periods Spitfires also set out on night operations. Bombs were dropped and cannon and machine-gun attacks made on railways, bridges, military camps and other targets. Altogether Malta's fighters put up 303 sorties on ground attack and 562 sorties on offen­sive reconnaissance; fighter-bombers flew 439 sorties on ground attack.

The Bombing Programme The light and medium bomber programme from

Malta against land targets was not as ambitious as it had been in November and December. The main reason was that, with the enemy squeezed Into Tunisia, it was easier to attack his North African bases from the mainland. Consequently, the Wellingtons which had been sent over In No­vember to operate under No. 238 Wing-were with­drawn on 21st January.

In spite of the extremely bad weather, which restricted activity on several nights, the Welling-tons before their departure made nearly 200 sorties and dropped a total of 270 tons of bombs.

The first attack of the month was against Pa­lermo, but the chief target, as in November and December, was Bousse, against which 64 medium bomber sorties were made. On 8th January, however, a series of attacks on Tripoli harbour began, which was kept up until the Wellingtons left. With the object of hampering the enemy's retreat and dislocating his supply lines, bombing attacks were also made on road junctions east of the town.

Beauflghters, with 250 lb. bombs, and other Beaufighters and Mosquitoes, with cannon and machine-gun fire, added to the road and rail traf­fic chaos by numerous night attacks. Some idea of the dislocation caused is shown by the fact that early In January our aircraft normally found 3/LT. moving along the roads both east and west with full headlights; as heavier attacks developed vehicles were seen to be travelling with dimmed lights and drawing off the road and stopping as soon as aircraft were detected. Many additional AJL batteries were also placed along the roads. Several of these were attacked and silenced.

Enemy Activity Against Malta ;, ESiemy aircraft; .had,been bitten so often that Eheyr wer% nojy usually shy of approaching any­uvHer^-iiear tyaltd: R'.A.F. fighters put up 734 3orties~6ri local defence rinf had the situation well under control. The following examples are typi­cal of enemy effort during the period: 4th Ja­nuary: "Raiders approached but turned back be­fore reaching island". 16/I7th January: "Three raiders approached Malta at great height, but returned without dropping bombs; Beaufighters up". 30th January: "Twelve enemy fighters ap­proached island at great height, avoided combat with Spitfires and withdrew". 3rd March: "Ap­proximately nine ME.109S flew over island. Inter­cepted by Spitfires and forced to withdraw."

On no occasions were bombs dropped on the island, and in March there were only six alerts all for reconnaissance or high-flying aircraft.

In spite of the paucity of effort against the island, the enemy kept over 600 aircraft in Sicily alone. Their main activity, however, consisted in trying to protect shipping and transport air­craft. The escorting of air convoys became in­creasingly arduous. In March some 300 trans­port aircraft were in use, and 115 extra fighters and 46 extra JU.88s came to Sicily to give them protection. What was a record number of JU.88s — 241 — were seen by photographic reconnais­sance from Malta, and these aircraft were report­ed as operating on convoy escort, reconnaissance work, anti-submarine patrols and even as night-fighters.

The transport aircraft escaped comparatively unscathed during the first three months of the year, apart from the damage done by night intruders. This was part of a deliberate policy; the day of reckoning, when complete convoys were wiped out In the air, was to come In April.

The Shape of Things to Come "Malta" cannot have been a popular word in

German and Italian air force messes in Sicily and Italy. By the end of March the island's score of enemy aircraft destroyed was nearing the thousand mark.

Malta's aircraft were responsible In the first three months of 1943 for 24 enemy destroyed, eight probably destroyed, and 30 damaged; in all operations — involving 422 bomber sorties, 3,378 fighter and fighter-bomber sorties, and 1,175 reconnaissance sorties—we lost 73 aircraft. Con­sidering the extent of those operations, this was not an excessively heavy price to pay. Balanced against our losses were, in addition to the enemy aircraft casualties, nine ships definitely sunk and fourteen probably sunk, representing many thou­sands of tons; over a hundred locomotives put out of action; and much damage done to ports, harbours and industrial targets.

These three months, then, had seen the policy of aggression developing satisfactorily. Yet the successes scored, as the enemy well knew, were merely the shape of things to come. The Axis had not yet heard the last from Malta, as the next months were to show.

67

SED ON MALTA

1943)

Land and Harbour

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

29/30 December, 1942 — 16 January, 1943

16/17 January — 30 January

30/31 January — 13 February

13/14 February — 27 February

27/28 February — 13 March

13/14 March — 27 March

GRAND TOTALS

Eastern

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

29/30 December, 1942 — 16 January, 1943

16/17 January — 80 January

30/31 January — 13 February

13/14 February — 27 February

27/28 February — 13 March

13/14 March — 27 March

GRAND TOTALS

Land Harbour

... ^ 36 48

29 32

25 34

25 36

15 33

17 35

147 218

and Central Mediterranean

Submarine Anti-Shipping (area and close

cover searches)

... 135 12

154 17

83 5

148 37

76 12

108 23

704 106

TOTALS

84

61

59

61

48

52

365

TOTALS

147

171

88

185

88

131

810

ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R.A.F. BOMBER AND MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

ENEMY CAMPS, POSITIONS, PORTS and BASES AIRFIELDS and and LINES (including mine-laying) LANDING GROUNDS of COMMUNICATION FORT­

FORTNIGHTLY NIGHTLY PERIODS

Hea

vy

Med

ium

Lig

ht

Fig

hter

-B

ombe

r

TO

TA

LS

Hea

vy

Med

ium

Lig

ht

Fig

hte

r-

Bom

ber

TO

TA

LS

Hea

vy

Med

ium

Lig

ht

Fig

hter

-B

ombe

r

TO

TA

LS

TOTALS

'29/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943 ... 16/17 January — 30 January 30/31 January — 13 February 13/14 February — 27 February ... 27/28 February — 13 March 13/14 March — 27 March

— — —

—

119 20

—

22 31 22 —

—

25 44 24 48 30 14

166 95 46 48 30 14 — — —

55 32 8

11 21 22

55 32 8

11 21 22 —

43 10

—

4

—

—

5 54 8

22 2

14

48 68 8

22 2

14

269 195 62 81 53 50

GRAND TOTALS — 139 75 185 399 — — — 149 149 — 53 4 105 162 710

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY R.A.F. FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943) ,

Local Ground

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS

Defence and cover to

returning offensive

Attack— S. & T/E including Cannon

Ground Attack— F/Bomber

Offensive Recce.—

Land and Sea

Intruder Patrol

Bomber and Recce.

Escort

Anti­shippirig

Shipping Protection TOTALS

recce. & M/G

29/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943 123 46 85 168 41 117 10 86 676

16/17 January — 30 January ... 149 • 115 130 152 22 126 32 28 754

30/31 January — 13 February ... 132 46 40 73 43 45 8 83 470

13/14 February — 27 February ... 102 40 81 34 39 26 4 204 530

27/28 February — 13 March ... 116 9 53 87 51 31 15 73 435

13/14 March — 27 March 112 47 50 48 32 36 10 103 438

GRAND TOTALS 734 303 439 562 228 381 79 577 3303

JT SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES

AT SEA IN THE E A S T E R I ' T A N D CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

BY MAJLTA-BASED AIRCRAFT

(29/30 December, 1942 — 27 March, 1943)

Attacks on Shipping Key :

Attacks on Submarines

Number of Effective Sorties

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS F/Bomber

Heavy Medium Light and TOTALS Cannon

i 6 6 17 29/30 Dec, 1942 — 16 Jan., 1943 ...

1 1

19 26 32 16/17 January — 30 January 77

21 8 30/31 January — 13 February 29

12 23 k13/14 February — 27 February 39

— 1 5 3 9 27/28 February — 13 March

12 12

IS n 10 4« 13/14 March — 27 March

— 73 77 63 £13GRAND TOTALS

1 12 13

For results of attacks on enemy shipping and submarines, see Tables on page 59.

A reconnaissance photograph showing the extensive damage caused at Pa­lermo. (See photographs on pages 49 and 5 0 / The explosion took a bite out of the quay and sank all shipping in the vicinity. Two coasters were

lifted bodily from the water onto the lower quay.

MANY BTORIES HAVE been told of the rescue of pilots and air Grews from the sea. These stories, however, are usually told from the air-man's point of view. The following account of a sea rescue .is told from the rescuer's point of view and shows something of the difficulties and hardships that have to be met and overcome in the course of their normal work by those who man the Air/Sea Rescue launches.

The incident described took place between 05.00 hours on 3rd January, 1943, and 16.30 hours on the 6th. The rescuers were the crew of High Speed Launch No. 2517; the rescued crew of a Mitchell

\ STORM

Orders to Leave Next Morning The story begins with orders being given by

N.O.I.C., Tobruk, on the evening of 2nd January for H.S.L. No. 2517 to leave the next morning to search for survivors of a crashed aircraft in posi­tion 32.18 N., 24.30 E. Everything was conse­quently made ready and at 05.00 hours the launch proceeded from her berth. By 05.35 hours the boom was passed and ten minutes later the swept channel was cleared.

There was a light south-west wind and slight to moderate south-west sea and swell. The baro­

was falling- and there was every indication impending storm.

After being stopped twice by patrols off Tobruk at 06.10 and 06.30 hours, the launch reach­ed the required position at 07.00 hours, at first light, and began a square search.

The search went on for over four hours, but was unavailing. Contact was made once by W/T with Tobruk. Reception, however, was poor and subsequently failed. At 11.24 a message broad­cast from Alexandria was intercepted. It was corrupt on decoding, but one point was clear— "Dinghy in position 33.06 N., 24.45 E." At 12.00 hours course was set for this position and an­other search began.

The Mitchell Crew Found

The south-westerly wind was now rising and the barometer had fallen from 30.00 inches to 29.60 inches since the previous night. The sky looked threatening.

At 14.10 hours a Walrus was observed low on the horizon. The launch made a burst at full speed to attract the pilot's attention with the wake. The aircraft flew over and signalled, " Follow me." On testing, the launch's W/T was now found to be unserviceable.

The launch followed the Walrus, and at 14.40 hours two dinghies lashed together were sighted in position 33.14 N., 24.48 E. Ten minutes later the launch was alongside and at 15.00 hours the seven Americans who made up the Mitchell's crew were hauled inboard along with their gear and the dinghies. Two of them were injured and all were stiff and sore since they had been in the sea for twenty-four hours.

The Gale Begins to Break

The gale was now breaking as course was set for Tobruk at easy speed while the survivors were being attended to. At 15.30 hours engine speed was increased to 1400 R.P.M., but after an hour and ten minutes cruising, speed had to be reduced to 1200 R.P.M.

The weather was blowing very fresh and the moderate head sea rising rapidly. The launch "began to ship water heavily. Events followed each other fast:—

"17.20 hours: Reduced to 1000 R.P.M." "17.40 hours: Reduced to 800 R.P.M. Mode­

rate gale blowing." "19.50 hours: Engines stopped." "20.00 hours: Engines started again, 700 R.P.M.

Launch wallowing in heavy sea, difficult to steer."

"20.30 hours: Master anxious to make lee of land; increased to 750 R.P.M."

The launch shipped an exceptionally heavy sea and laboured heavily. The first coxswain had to fight hard to keep the vessel head to wind. At 21.00 hours speed was reduced to 600 R.P.M. and half an hour later the launch had no steerage way. She shipped another heavy sea, dipped her bows completely under and carried a great volume of water to the wheel-house top.

Oil Sp

At 2^jp •BuflFffl5* nauhcE stopped in ap­proximate position 32.18 N., 24.11 E., within sight of the searchlights on the boom at Tobruk and of the aircraft beacon to the west. No contact with the land, however, could be made since the W/T was still completely unserviceable.

There was now a half gale of wind and a boisterous south-west sea. The launch lay in the trough. To prevent wave crests breaking on board, engine oil was spread on the sea. The effect of the oil during this first night of the gale, when the sea was rising high and short, saved the launch from damage. Oil continued to be used for two days and not a single sea broke on deck, although the launch, in the words of the master, "was like a floating cork in the seaway and the seas played with her at will, swinging the ends of the vessel as they swept by and beneath her."

An " oil bag" was streamed out from the weather quarter and a cigarette-tin of oil was poured into each of the two lavatories every half hour. Fortunately, there was plenty of reserve engine oil on board.

Caught in a Depression By midnight on the 3rd it was evident that

the launch was in the south-east quarters of a depression moving eastward. The barometer had ceased to fall and the wind remained steady. The drift to the north-east was estimated at four knots.

At 08.00 hours on the morning of the 4th two destroyers were seen steaming westward about six miles away to the south. All efforts to con­tact them by visual signal failed

Daylight came in with fierce squalls, after each of which the wind decreased slightly. From noon until 13.00 hours the wind varied through west-south-west to west, where it finally settled and remained for nearly twelve hours. The baro­meter began to rise a little. A heavy sea was running from the south-west, but it was length­ening. The estimated position at noon was 32.57 N., 24.57 E.

The use of oil was continued carefully as a new sea arose from the westward and as the sea from the south-west fell into a long swell. The estimated height from the trough to the wave crest on the largest rollers was eighteen feet.

Squalls increased as the day progressed and file barometer rose steadily. The approximate Jrift to the eastward was still estimated at four *iots. At midnight the wind hauled again /nrough west-north-west to north-west and de­jreased in force. The barometer was still rising.

The Sun Shines Again The morning of the 5th found the sea moderat-^

ing slightly, although there was cross-sea and swell. Jhege. were squalls ing reffch«^bpiilh^p^S^:

•73

'^4r

ed airmen was hung-up/toSry j6n the>jr|dls. The estimated position was now 32M N., 26.26 B.

Nothing occurred until 15.15 hours when a Wellington was seen heading south-west. Efforts to contact by visual signal failed and the aircraft turned to the westward and flew away.

In the afternoon the sea was moderating and the swell became more uniform. The use of oil was discontinued. By 20.00 hours the barometer had risen to 30.20 inches and then remained steady. Orders were issued to prepare to get under way at 05.00 hours on the morrow.

On the Way to Bardia On the 6th the barometer stood at 30.22 inches,

the wind had fallen and was still tending to haul from the north-west to northward, there was a moderate north-west swell, and the weather in general was fine and clear. The estimated posi­tion was now 32,13 N,, 26.38 E., to the north of Sidi Barrani.

At 05.05 hours the engines were started up and a course steered south at 800 R.P.M. The launch ran well before the swell and by 05.29 hours speed was increased to 1200 R.P.M. At 07.20 hours, in first daylight, land was sighted about four miles ahead. The launch was stopped and the position checked. Longitude was found to be 26.20 E., the drift to the eastward during the gale having been over-estimated by some fifteen miles. At 07.40 hours course was set for Bardia and preparations made to land the survivors as soon as port was made.

By 09.00 hours the launch was off Bardia and fifty minutes later it was fast alongside in the harbour. The master went ashore to obtain medical assistance and to inform N.O.I.C., Tobruk, what had happened. The medical officer and ambulance arrived and took the rescued air­crew away.

The launch was refuelled and prepared for the passage to Tobruk. At 12.50 hours the engines, were started and ten minutes later the launch cleared port. At 15.55 hours it was off Tobruk, at 16.14 hours it entered the boom, and at 16.30 hours was fast at No.4 jetty. The master went ashore to report at Navy House while the crew carried out general maintenance.

What the Americans Said

Thus an adventure that at one time must have caused the master a good deal of anxiety ended satisfactorily. All the crew, he reported, behav­ed well, although many were sick. The American survivors, after being assured that the launch had come through much heavier weather, gra­dually grew confident of their chances of being able to fly again.

A saying by one of the airmen, however, perhaps epitomised what most of them felt. "Say, Skip," he said on the second day he was aboard, "if ever I get back to terra firma, I'll go down on my bended knees and kiss the earth." An­other, when told that "this is an American launch and may be only 'lease and lend'," replied, "Well, you needn't pay for this one; we'll write and tell our President to chalk it right off !"

Ihosy airfield, Madagascar, being bombed.

Madagascar Sid

COMPARED WITH OPERATIONS in other theatres of the war, the Madagascar campaign in 1942 was little more than a field day. For the land and air forces involved it was, more than anything else, a lengthy obstacle race. There were some ca­sualties on both sides, but it is true to say that more trees were felled than bodies. In the nine months between the first landing and the Armis­tice, only one aircraft was lost through enemy action and only five air force personnel were killed. In spite of the minor nature of the ope­rations, however, there were some interesting features and the Air Component did all that was asked of it.

The decision to occupy the French island of Madagascar was taken by the British Govern­ment in February, 1942. The reason for this decision was that the island's strategical position in the Indian Ocean constituted a threat to our supply lines to both the Middle and Far East; This threat became too serious to be ignored after the entry of Japan into the war in Decem­ber, 1941, had extended hostilities eastward to­wards Australia.

There is no doubt that Japan hoped to dominate the Indian Ocean and there is also little doubt that she sought the connivance of the Vichy-controlled island of Madagascar in furthering that plan. Colour was given to this assump­tion by reports that reached Air Ministry in February that three Japanese ships were in Diego Suarez harbour and by another report that a Japanese Military Mission had arrived in Tana­narive, the capital, to discuss the occupation of the island by Japanese forces.

Although this latter report was denied by Vichy, such incidents and the possibility of Ma­dagascar being used as a submarine base or being occupied entirely made action necessary.

The Expeditionary Force Lands The expeditionary force, under the command

of Rear Admiral E.N. Syfret, comprised three brigades of land forces, supported by Nos. 795 and 796 Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm on the aircraft carriers "Illustrious" and "Indomitable" A squadron of the S.A.A.F. and a flight of the R.A.F. were to follow when Diego Suarez, the first objective, was In our hands.

The opposing forces throughout the island were estimated at 15,000 all ranks, of which approximately 4,000, white and coloured, were in the Diego Suarez area. Local air strength consisted of five Morane 406s, three Potez 63s and one Potez 25; a few other aircraft were based elsewhere.

Diego Suarez, which was chosen as the land-Ing place for its strategical position and impor­

tant harbour, is situated at the northern point of the island, to the east of a small isthmus about ten miles long. At the western end of the isthmus is Courier Bay. The landing was to be made on the beaches there, with the immediate intention of crossing the isthmus towards Diego Suarez.

The expeditionary force reached Courier Bay at dawn on 5th May. Mines had to be swept, and in the course of this task the corvette "Auri­cula" struck one and sank. Units of the Army and Royal Marines took part in the initial land­ing and met with strong opposition.

After three days' resistance, however, the local Vichy forces surrendered and Diego Suarez was occupied.

Air Support for the Landing The first assignment of the Fulmars of No. 795

Squadron and the Albacores of No. 796 Squadron was an attack on Arrachart, the Diego Suarez aerodrome. The suddenness of the attack result­od in the destruction of aircraft on the ground; others, coming in from other parts of the island, were shot down in combat. Further operations consisted of close support for the land troops, reconnaissance and sea patrols.

Arrachart aerodrome was soon made ready for the arrival of the R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Air Com­ponent. No. 20 Squadron S.A.A.F. flew in from IAndi, East Africa, on 12th May, the ground staff and equipment being brought In twelve Lodestars loaned from the Union. No. 1433 (Army Co-ope­ration) Flight arrived by sea on 29th May and the aircraft were assembled at Arrachart. No. 20 Squadron's aircraft were six Marylands and six­teen Beauforts; No. 1433 Flight flew Lysanders.

In the first phase of the campaign the Air Component was under the control of Rear Admi­ral Syfret and, after his departure, that of Major General R.C. Sturges, the officer commanding the land forces.

On 1st September operational control of the Air Component passed to the A.O.C., No. 207 Group (East Africa), in turn responsible to H.Q., R.A.F,, Middle East. With this arrangement No. 20 Squadron was detached from D.H.Q., Pre­toria, and became No. 16 Squadron under H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Situation After the Initial Occupation The first step after the occupation of Diego

Suarez was to call the French civil authorities together and explain the situation to them. They were asked to carry on their usual administrative work in collaboration with the British Military authorities. This request met with a mixed re­ception, but on the whole there was little trouble.

75

OPS. RECORDS m, H.Q.,R.A.F.,M E

GRAND COMORE O C E A N FIRST PHASE OF CAMPAIGN BEGAN W I T H LANDING HERE ON 5TH MAY

PIEGO SUAREZ

OCCUPIED IN MAY AFTER PHOTO­GRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE HAD ENABLED NAVV TO PLOT CHANNEL

•O

FRENCH PLENIPOTENTIARIES FLOWN FROM HERE TO M A J U N G A IN SEPTEMBER TANANARIVE

3*

FIANARANTSOA FRENCH GOVERNORS HQ. AFTER CAPTURE OF T A N A N A R I V E OCCUPIED ON 29TH OCTOBER

FINAL BASE FOR FRENCH A IRCRAFT; BOM5ED FOR THREE DAYS IN OCTOBER

TULEAR Sm»

FORT DAUPHIN.

MADAGASCAR AIRFIELDS . ® 5TH MAY-6T H NOVEMBER LANDING GP.OUNDS . . . O RAILWAYS « i »—i—*- IQ42

Diego Suarez, situated at the northern point of the island, was chosen as the landing place for our Expeditionary Force owing to its strategical position

and important harbour.

Those officials that proved non-co-operative wereeventually evacuated.

As for the unoccupied part of the island, it was clear that any attempt to extend our influence would meet with resistance. Until the end of June, therefore, the position remained static, apart from reconnaissance patrolling and a slight ex­tension of our control to Anivorano and Ambilobe on the west coast. During the first fortnight of July Mayotte, an island in the Comore Archipela­go, 200 miles west of Diego Snares, was occupied.

From then until the beginning of September the lull continued. The Governor-General, M. Annet, was deliberately temporising by making offers to negotiate, hoping to gain time for further sup­plies to reach the island, and possibly also hoping that if we could be put off long enough, the ap­proaching wet season would hamper operations more than the available French land and air forces could. He was soon to find out his mis­take.

Air Operations during the lull .During the static period before September the

R.A.F. operated from Arrachart and Cap Diego aerodromes. Tasks included sea patrols on both sides of Madagascar and photographic and visual feconnaissance for the land forces. Photographic iffeconnaissance of the Comore Archipelago before the occupation of Mayotte enabled the Navy to pJot a channel to -the island; a 200 square mile mozaic of the Majunga area and of the road be­tween it and Diego Suarez provided information on which to act when the time came in Septem­ber.

In the course of a patrol in Ampasindara Bay, on the west coast, two unidentified submarines

were seen. A tug and two lighters were nearby and it was thought that the submarines were, awaiting an opportunity to refuel, thus streng­thening the intelligence reports that enemy sub­marines were using bays on the Madagascar coast for operations in the Mozambique Channel

Extension of the Occupation The lull was broken on 10th September when

operations began against the unoccupied part of the island. The first objective was Majunga, the port on the north-west side of the island. The attack was to be made from the sea, and the necessary force, - including R.A.F. ground crews and their equipment, sailed on the 3rd. The task of the RA.F. personnel on landing was to prepare Majunga North aerodrome for the ar­rival of our aircraft. While the Advanced Sea Party was on the way, the S.A.A.F. aircraft left at Arrachart carried out four reconnaissances, covering Majunga harbour and the local aero­dromes.

Within three hours of the landing at Majunga, the town Was occupied. Martlets and Sword­fish from the "Illustrious" provided cover for the landing parties on the 10th, 11th and 12th and carried out tactical reconnaissance.

The only untoward incident — which fortunately did no harm — was caused by a premature signal which directed the aircraft from Arrachart to take off before Majunga North was ready for them. In fact, the ground crews were still on board ship in the estuary when they saw their aircraft fly over. However, all aircraft landed safely.

By 12th September the Air Component was established at Majunga, under the command of

77

Colonel S.A. Melville, S.ifktf?ft& The Btores, petrol, bombs, ammunition and water were assembled and the aircraft were ready to operate. No. 1433 Flight was now placed directly under the control of No. 22 Brigade to carry out tacti­cal reconnaissance and close support. No. 16 Squa­dron (originally No. 20, but renumbered on 4th September) was suffering from maintenance dif­ficulties, particularly among its Beauforts. The main trouble was that when the squadron left South Africa, it took sufficient spares for only one month's flying, and during four months of ope­rations no major spares reached Madagascar. Ingenuity and improvisation on the part of the ground crews, however, enabled the aircraft to answer the calls made on them.

Negotiations for an Armistice

French resistance to the Majunga landing con­sisted only in the blocking of roads with tree trunks and the burning of certain minor bridges. It appeared that the French did not wish to do any needless damage that might interfere with their future means of livelihood.

The Governor appealed on the radio to the inhabitants to remain calm and said that we had landed In great force. An armistice was suggested and a Maryland was sent to Ivato aerodrome to fetch the plenipotentiaries to Ma­junga on the 17th.

This aircraft, however, became unserviceable on arrival at Ivato — a fact that gave the air crew an opportunity to gain first-hand informa­tion about the aerodrome and its surroundings while waiting for repairs to be carried out.

A second Maryland collected the plenipoten­tiaries and negotiations lasted until the next day. The British terms were rejected and the talks came to nothing. A Maryland returned the pleni­potentiaries to Ivato — and the opportunity was taken on the flight to obtain useful photographs of the terrain.

The rejection of the armistice terms was fol­lowed on the 21st September by a leaflet raid on Tananarive. The leaflets explained that the French delegates broke off the negotations ; that the British intention was to prevent Japanese oc­cupation of the island; and advised the local po­pulation to keep indoors if fighting took place.

Air Support for Further Operations

Following the abortive negotations, operations continued, with full support from the air. The way had been paved between 12th and 20th Sep­tember by Marylands attacking Ivato aerodrome and enemy troops on the move; by Beauforts and Albacores reconnoitring the condition of the road and bridges along the main route to Tana­narive; and by Lysanders searching for suitable advanced landing grounds.

One of the few S.A.A.F. casualties occurred during the attack on Ivato. A machine-gun bullet struck an observer .who died later from the wound. Another incident was a grass fire

iiLTirilijiI>|JIM1W 1«rH* in which 4,000 gallons of petrol were destroyed. Prompt action by the ground staff saved further destruction of stores and equipment.

In order to be in closer contact with the land force with which It was working, No. 1433 Flight moved from Majunga to Marotsipoy on the 18th. From there, as preparations proceeded for the advance on Tananarive, the Flight flew seven sorties in which gun positions and probable op­position points In the Mahitsy area were bombed and machine-gunned.

On the 20th a reconnaissance was made to find out the position of railway rolling stock south of Tananarive. I t was necessary to pre­vent it from being withdrawn since it was needed by our own troops. Consequently, when it was observed that rolling stock was being moved, bombers were briefed to destroy a bridge over which it would pass. The bridge selected was of concrete and spanned a ravine on the Betsiboka river, and only a direct hit would destroy It. A Maryland, three Beauforts and three Albacores tried on three successive days, but without hitting it. By that time, however, the strategic position had changed with the occupation of Tananarive on the 23rd.

The Last Phase of the Campaign

With Tananarive1 in our hands, Colonel Mel­ville went to Ivato to inspect the aerodrome be­fore transferring the Air Component from Ma­junga. The French had left behind well-equip­ped stores; the Photographic Section found much useful material; and the Air Intelligence Sec­tion found photostats giving details of most of the island's aerodromes and landing grounds, which proved valuable In the subsequent elimi­nation of the Vichy air force.

On 3rd October the Air Component moved to Ivato. No. 1433 Flight went forward to Antsi­robe in order to keep in close touch with the advancing land forces, but had to be brought back on the 10th when they had only two Lysan­ders serviceable. This circumstance put the Flight out of operations for the rest of the cam­paign, since further Lysanders did not reach it until the day the armistice was signed. No. 1433 Flight was replaced at Antsirabe by a mix­ed flight of three^ Fulmars and five Albacore^ from the F.A.A. Squadrons.

Air support was given to No. 22 Brigade In its continued advance. Information was provided of the location of the scattered French troops arid of such details as road obstructions and gun positions. When they were found, these gun positions were bombed, and on their daily sorties; aireraft straffed troops, transport and tree-fel­ling parties!

During one tactical reconnaissance a Fulmar machine-gunned a small convoy of cars; it was later learned that the Governor and his A.D.C. were among the passengers and that they pro­bably owed their lives to their agility in running for cov"

78

A bridge over the Betsiboka river. A good example of the half - hearted des­truction by the Vir

chy-French.

Tananarive, on which leaflets were dropped on 2\st

September, 1942.

Bombing Vichy-French defensive position in typical terrain.

Apart from a sharp encounter at Mahitsy be­fore reaching Tananarive, our land forces had little hard fighting as they moved towards Fia­narantsoa, the Governor's new H.Q. The Vichy forces decreased steadily, more by capture and desertion than by casualties. Finally oh 29th October, organized resistance ceased with the occupation of Fianarantsoa, although some slight attempts at obstruction were still met as our forces advanced further south before the armis­tice was signed on 6th November.

Elimination of the Vichy Air Force In addition to supporting the land forces, the

Air Component dealt with the Vichy Air Force. After an abortive attempt by two Potez 25s to destroy a bridge on 10th September, Vichy air­craft were not seen again until 30th September when a single Morane 406 fired at our troops north of Antsirabe.

The outcome of this sortie was the briefing of a Maryland to reconnoitre the neighbouring aerodromes to find out from which one the Mo­rane operated. This search failed. Following further appearances of the Morane and of a Potez 63, a sweep of all the aerodromes within range was carried out on 7th October. For this reconnaissance the photostats captured at Ivato proved useful, since they showed landing grounds not marked on our maps.

The hiding-places were not spotted, although the Potez 63 was seen in the air by two Ful­mars, but got away owing to its superior speed. From a study of reconnaissance reports, however, it was thought that the French aircraft were using Ihosy as a base and Fianarantsoa East as an advanced landing ground.

On the next day, the 8th, three Beauforts circling Ihosy before bombing it, noticed some aircraft hidden in the bush about a mile and a half away. After raking the hidden aircraft with machine-gun fire, they took photographs and re­turned to report. These photographs showed three Potez 25s, a Potez 63 and a Morane 406.

A Maryland, sent immediately to attack, re­ported that the Morane had been removed, and on the 10th only two Potez aircraft remained— probably, it was thought, too damaged to be taken away. Bombs were distributed between these aircraft and the hangar; but it needed three days of bombing and fifty-nine bombs be­fore a direct hit was scored on the roof of the

hangar. A: civilian aircraft were found in The hanga7

maged beyond repair. Subsequently, two Goe­land passenger aircraft were discovered, hidden in the bush.

A certain amount of communication flying was necessary after the armistice on 6th Novem­ber. One aircraft flew the ex-Governor and his wife from Ihosy to Tamatave to catch a ship.

Summary of the Operations The Air Component's part in the expedition

was concluded successfully in spite of the various snags that arose. Maintenance was one of the most anxious problems, as already mentioned. Especially disconcerting was engine failure among the Beauforts; four crashed on landing.

Although the air opposition could hardly be counted as such, the tricky weather conditions over the mountains and wild jungle country of the island, and the enforced use of landing grounds too small for operational aircraft, made the pilots' task sufficiently hazardous in itself. It was almost impossible to find landing grounds large enough for our aircraft aYid near enough to our advancing land forces to afford close sup­port all the the time. Sufficient transport for the rapid movement of units of the Air Com­ponent was another problem, but the Military authorities did their best in this direction.

From the time it was formed, Air Component provided 230 operational sorties, excluding those made from H.M.S. "'Illustrious," entailing 590 hours, 55 minutes flying. The effort was divided as follows:— No. 16 Squadrons S.A.A.F. "A" Flight (Mary­

lands) — 33 sorties. No. 16 Squadron S.A.A.F. "B" Flight (Beau­

forts) — 34 sorties. No. 1433 Flight R.A.F. (Lysanders) — 29 sorties. No. 795 Squadron F.A.A. (Fulmars) — 45 sorties. No. 796 Squadron F.A.A. (Albacores)—64 sorties. A/S Patrols at Majunga (Albacores)—25 sorties.

Only one aircraft was lost through enemy ac­tion) but six were damaged beyond repair and three others slightly damaged. Among the per­sonnel there were three deaths through enemy action, one each of the R.A.F., S.A.A.F. and F.A.A. The only other fatalities were two members of the S.A.A.F., one of whom died of malaria and the other was shot accidentally.

The Other Side Of The Picture

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE is a verbatim trans­lation of a German broadcast, made on 23rd May, 1943, by one Captain Berndt, reputed to be an officer on Rommel's staff. It was designed for home consumption and therefore contains many absurdities and inaccurate statements which the R.A.F. Middle East Review reader who knows his desert campaigns will see at once. But it also contains much that is true, and confirms, in no uncertain terms, the success of the R.A.F. policy of cutting the enemy's lines of supply. Well did Napoleon say, "The enemy also has his diffi­culties"; he might have added that victory goes to the side which can take most advantage of them. The whole tenor of this broadcast is the squeal which always comes from the Teuton pig when he is beaten. His cry changes from the superior numbers of men and equipment the Bri­tish were supposed to possess, to the unfair strangle-hold our air force and our Navy de­veloped on his shipping lines, ports and bases and lines of communication.

The title of this ingenious excuse for the col­lapse of the Italian Empire and the loss of ail Axis footholds in Africa is :—

"Experiences During 27 Months of War in Africa" For two years and three months the Swastika

flag waved over the African desert in brotherly comradeship with the green, white and red colours of Italy. These 27 months bequeathed to us changing fortunes, quick advances; tough and hard battles against immense superiority in num­bers, defeats which made us harder, but never broke our courage for even a second, and also new victories and successes.

Unbending pride grew up from the battles, the toil and victory. In a land in which we were strangers, but in which the enemy had always been at home and for which he was adequately equipped, we confined with numerically far in­ferior forces the whole might of the British Empire, which had only this as its theatre of war.

This we did for 27 months and for six of these months U.S.A. forces and the troops of the French traitor generails were added. Similarly, large parts of the enemy's air force and the English submarine fleet were concentrated within this area. We were unable to send gigantic armies to Africa and supply them there, as our ships and harbour installations did not permit it.

A few divisions had to carry out tasks for which'the enemy had to concentrate five times

and finally ten times the forces which were at our disposal. Only superior leadership and iron determination permitted us to keep the campaign under control. The genius of Rommel and the unsurpassed e"lan of our soldiers surmounted all difficulties, including the supply problems which worried us from the first days and brought grey hairs to the head of the Quartermaster General.

Now, this heroic struggle of our comrades is over. What they have accomplished for Germa­ny during these 27 months in a far-advanced out­post will only be realised at a later date. In battle against the numerical superiority of the enemy, the quality of German soldiers was, how­ever, again demonstrated. Even the number of the enemy would have never caused him to lay down his weapons and there is therefore no reason for our opponents to celebrate a victory with jubilation.

Strangulation, the concentration of all the enemy's energy against our supplies put an end to the struggle of the German and Italian Africa forces. For without armour, guns, munitions and petrol no war can be waged. The war on the enemy's territory is over, and for us who were there from the first day this is a bitter pill. Now we are on our own shores, behind us there is a land, railways, and roads. Now, the struggle will really commence and we are not afraid of the results.

Let us once more ponder over the months and years during which we fought in the African out­post of our continent and remember the many days and episodes which delighted our eyes and of which we are proud.

It was a sunny day in February, 1941, when our convoy entered Tripoli harbour after many dan­gers. The English were in Agheila and were probing towards Tripolitania. Mechanisation had won the day against the infantry of Graziani's army; the tank, which had been rejected by ex­perts for service in Africa, owing to high tempe­ratures, had shown that it could be adapted for Africa. A new period began in the history of desert warfare. On the first sheet the God of War wrote a name which up to then had only been known by a small circle of people and whose bearer, Rommel, would record his skill during the next two years.

During the whole night in spite of danger from the air the vehicles of the small reconnaissance

unit were unloaded. In the morning Rommel put himself at the head of the three companies and led them out of the palm groves of the Tripoli oasis into the open desert.

He drives back the enemy, who had never ex­pected fresh German troops, and advances six hundred and fifty kilqmetres eastwards. By the end of March, there were two machine-gun bat­talions, one tank regiment, and two armoured car formations on African soil—there were also three batteries of artillery and one flak forma­tion; altogether half a division and part of an Italian infantry division with only a few vehicles. First arrivals of an Italian tank division are just appearing.

General Rommel raves with impatience. He develops terrific energy. He sends a column to­wards the south into the Fezzan so as to chase enemy troops who had broken in from French Sahara. He orders tanks to be built. They have since been called "Rommel" tanks and they are merely cardboard constructions on ordinary ve­hicles. They look exactly like the real thing from the air and thus the number of tanks which the enemy could see from the air rose from day to day.

To-day they are here, to-morrow they have moved elsewhere. But we know that the enemy has fallen into our trap; he speaks of 500 Ger­man tanks and many divisions and on this Ge­neral Rommel builds his plan. On March 31st, it had reached the point when the British position on the salt marshes by Mersa Brega must be taken. We attack at dawn. The enemy resists desperately, but by nightfall the position is in our hands — General Rommel orders the pursuit and it is not until Agedabia, 80 kilometres further on, that the advanced forces engaged the enemy again. We cannot remain at Agedabia. We must advance. Everything depends on ammuni­tion. His orders are, "Unload all vehicles and send them back". After 24 hours new ammuni­tion had arrived and we advanced through Cy­renaica in several columns. During the night preceding April 4th, German reconnaissance units entered Benghazi and occupied the town.

General Rommel's plan is to cut off the whole t of Cyrenaica. This is a risk. For the first time the troops have to overcome a wide, waterless waste of over 300 kilometres which has no land­marks. To top everything, a sandstorm blows up—the dreaded "Gibli" which makes it difficult to breathe and impossible to find our way. After a few hours the columns are no longer in close formation. Everything is dispersed. Many vehicles have lost all sense of direction and other columns want to wait for an improve­ment in weather conditions. Field kitchens are in front and the armour behind; then it is the other way round.

But everyone, officers and men, are inspired by the will of their commander to push on re­gardless of who remains behind. He himself flies along the desert tracks in a Storch aero­plane, in spite of English fighter aircraft; he

lands from time to time and sets vehicles ana coliynns on the right road again and urges every­one on as quickly as possible to El Mekili where there are thousands of English vehicles. A company stops for no apparent reason when at a height of only a few metres the Storch roars over the vehicles and a message flutters to the ground, on which the Company Commander reads, "If you don't advance at once, I'll come down—Rommel."

The General arrives in front of El Mekili with a well mixed up bunch of vehicles—seven tanks, four armoured cars, a few field kitchens, trans­port vehicles, radio vehicles and ordinary small cars. The General orders, "Make as much dust as possible". From all sides as rapidly as pos­sible the vehicles rush towards the desert fort­resses making huge dust clouds. That is too much for the enemy. He surrenders. Vehicles, supply dumps, and petrol—everything is ours. We capture six generals and 2,000 men.

A few hours later a small formation has reached Derna in a daring attack and occupied the aerodrome and shot up seven tanks. An interpreter, whose former occupation was a hotel manager in Cairo, accompanied by 20 men, caught and disarmed 1,000 British soldiers in a ravine during the course of the night, and also captured 100 vehicles.

On April 10th Tobruk was invested and the following day the Egyptian border at Sollum was crossed. In eleven days we free what General Wavell took more than fifty to win. During the battle for Tobruk there was hardly a day when General Rommel did not enter his car and inspect the positions. He knew every post, every machine-gun position and every dum­my position better than any of the Regimental or Divisional Commanders. He thought conti­nually of improvements and took a shovel him­self so as to demonstrate tricks from his World War experience, which saved many lives.

Rommel's positions are not so easy to find in the desert. They are masterpieces of construc­tion and camouflage. He played the enemy many tricks and on principle always did the un­expected. He is a master of deception and war stratagem. If the enemy thought that our po­sitions were especially strong at a certain point, they were sure to be weak. If he considered them weak and approached them, they were sure £o be strong. ""if he bombarded and fired on tank concentra­

tions then they were certain to be fakes. If he considered them as fakes and left them alone they were certain to be the real thing.

For weeks during April and May, 1941, we were amused by the triumphant broadcasts of Radio Cairo announcing the artillery bombardments and bombing attacks on reputed Axis headquar­ters. It could have been real because it looked so perfect and we had to be careful that it was not torn up by troops who wanted to use the tents and old vehicles for their own purposes.

83

When the enemy worried us for a time at Tobruk with artillery bombardment on observa­tion posts General Rommel ordered the cons­truction of observation towers. Rows of tele­graph poles were sawn down and in one night 30 observation towers were set up in front of our own front all around Tobruk. Straw troops were mounted in these, which observed the enemy, and which moyed up and down ladders on long ropes which were controlled from a hole in the ground. The enemy was properly bluffed. He put up a tremendous barrage and shot for days with all his guns at these targets; he des­troyed some, but the others remained standing. At last he realised he had been fooled and we could now proceed to send up real observers instead of the straw ones.

The theme " Where is Rommel ? " caused the enemy particular annoyance and when in No­vember, 1941, the British tried for the first time to destroy the Axis troops in North Africa with a five-fold superiority in numbers they landed sabotage troops 500 kilometres behind the front on the night before the attack. (This was our attack on Apollonia ; Rommel was missed be­cause he was out—at a cocktail party). These attacked a harmless supply headquarters with the intention of catching General Rommel, but they were all mown down.

General Rommel, who they had presumed to be so far behind the front, was actually at the front among his soldiers and within range of gunfire.

During those November days in 1941 colossal columns of enemy tanks and vehicles marched from a south-easterly direction towards Tobruk, surrounded by tremendous dust clouds. Other columns were by-passing Bardia. General Rom­mel decided that they must not meet and that they must be defeated individually.

He stakes everything on one card. He attacks the head of the larger English unit, destroys a tank division, and captures the Commander. The British main army becomes a little less aggressive as a result. He leaves behind weak infantry formations to oppose and protect the rear of the Italian infantry divisions who are investing Tobruk. But he, with his tanks, ad­vances eastwards and crosses the Egyptian border in the evening.

The German-Italian troops in the Sollum posi^ tion on the other hand have only a few vehicles and are restricted to that position. Our panzer divisions advance past our old positions and clear away any attackers; on the next day they resume their advance towards Tobruk. (A complete turn round! This column was caught refuelling near Sheffersen by the R.A.F. The bombing caused so many fires among the vehi­cles that the column was forced to turn back. It failed in its intention of drawing our main forces after it.)

During this advance towards the Egyptian border, General Rommel's car had its steering

wheel" brffkWPWRe escort car had refrained be­hind. The last vehicles of the tank division were already vanishing in the distance and in the middle of the battle the commander sits in a damaged car in the desert. Every hundred metres the driver has to get out so as to press the front axle in the direction he wants to go. Later they meet a lorry and are able to transfer to it.

A sandstorm continues throughout the night. Unnoticed and unmolested the General's armour­ed car passes through a British artillery posi­tion. Suddenly, an officer notices strange ve­hicles in the vicinity and proceeds towards them and calls to one of the drivers. It transpires that they are in the presence of an English advance party and General Rommel halts a thousand metres away and before him lies part of an English division. During the night no one knows who is friend or foe.

The superior forces of the enemy are concen­trated in the Tobruk region and for the time being the enemy cannot be held up at this spot with the numerically inferior German-Italian forces. The General, therefore, decides to give up the siege of Tobruk.

The non-motorised troops entrench themselves in the region of SoUum and Bardia for there are not enough vehicles to carry all away. German and Italian soldiers hold out heroically with lit­tle ammunition, without supplies, and without water against tremendous numerical superiority. Not for one moment during this winter battle have our troops any feeling of inferiority. Five or ten times a day British tanks roll over them, but they always rise out of their holes, leap to their guns and continue fighting when the tanks have passed.

During these days the Italian artillery is indestructible and if we have to proceed tempo­rarily in a westerly direction the German-Ita­lian units continually attack the enemy and show their claws, so that he has to follow at a distance and as carefully as possible.

Parts of a German regiment have the misfor­tune to be caught between two enemy divisions and are made prisoner, but on the following day Rommel, with his tanks, passes close by the column with its German prisoners and recap­tures the vehicles, and the divisions have now got back a regiment of tank grenadiers. Guns are captured on the battlefield and the former guards enter into captivity.

During these days of the winter battle in 1941­42 there are countless deeds of heroism. Ger­mans and British are equipped with the same vehicles, that is to say British ones. And they have mostly the same guns, also British. If there's a shortage of ammunition we obtain fresh supplies from the British. Continually during this retreat British lorries containing German soldiers appear among the British supply co­lumns and cause confusion. They set fire* to the vehicles or take whole columns prisoners and

bring them with them, if £heir loads are > of special importance.

From beleaguered Bardia German vehicles pass daily through the enemy lines during dust storms; they are closely packed with German soldiers who fight their way through to the German Army.

It is New Year's Eve, 1941-42. The Army is now in the Mersa Brega position whence their great advance started. There are no grounds for celebration, but round about midnight rockets soar everywhere across the sky and songs resound in the night. The temper of the Army is still stubborn and unbroken.

Three weeks later General Rommel adopts a stratagem; during the day he causes an endless procession of vehicles to proceed in a westerly direction. The enemy has been talking for weeks on the wireless that he will drive Rom­mel's troops to Tripoli. Now he triumphs and believes it is a fact. But during the night the patrol turns back and at dawn they suddenly break through the narrow passages through the minefields and attack the confused and surpris­ed enemy; in the first attack they destroy a whole British tank division and over-run the whole of Cyrenaica. North of Benghazi an Indian Division opposes our columns on the road to Derna. The Indians know that the German-Italian troops are following slowly along the coastal road. Suddenly from the mountains in pouring rain General Rommel rushes upon them like a thunderstorm.

Within an hour the Indian Division has been dispersed. Vehicles and guns are in our hands. Our soldiers had accomplished the seemingly impossible. Through a rain-sodden desert and over the red mountainous country of Cyrenaica they had approached the 'enemy's flank un­observed when he considered himself still safe, and with a few hundred men they had destroyed a whole division; they had accomplished this under untold difficulty, continually inspired and driven on by their Commander-in-Chief.

General Rommel intends to advance further. He does not want to remain in Cyrenaica and prepares an offensive with all the means at his disposal so as to anticipate that of the enemy. On May 26th, he by-passes with several divisions the key position of Em El Gazala, which pos­sesses the greatest minefield in the world, leaves the British defenders where they are, and pushes on towards Tobruk. He over-runs supply dumps, aerodromes, and columns. But by this time the enemy has pulled himself together and is bring­ing up reinforcements. A very severe struggle ensues, as he is able to attack with more nume­rous tanks and munitions. Artillery barrages are fired on^our attacking columns; he attacks our supply columns with his tanks and finally he temporarily presses us back against the large minefield.

,,The enemy, triumphs and King George sends telegrams of congratulation to the British Com­mander-in-Chief, but General Rommel has cut his way through the mile deep minefields, and him­self brings supplies in well-guarded convoys.

Then Rommel's Africa tank army begins the systematic destruction of the British strongholds. For days there is a struggle with Free French and adventurers from all nations for the fortress of Bir Hacheim, in which there are 1,500 fortified posts blasted out of the rock, until at last it yields.

To the north are British Guardsmen and also South Africans and other infantry divisions. Fresh British tank forces attack from the east, but, in spite of this, additional portions of the for­tified system are conquered. The majority of the British troops are killed, wounded or taken pri­soner. Their weapons and vehicles are in our pos­session, and we can now put regiments into ve­hicles who had been trudging on foot in the de­sert.

In London and Cairo people say, "What will Rommel do now?" They think Tobruk cannot be taken and therefore they are not concerned about Tobruk. The General pretends that he is making for Egypt with his whole force. The enemy triumphs. Tobruk was again encircled. Tobruk, the invincible fortress which was completed by Marshal Balbo, and which was only taken by the British at the beginning of 1941 because the number of defenders was so small, this Tobruk will now defend itself again and be the starting point for new successes.

On June 18th, we are on the battlefield of Sidi Resegh to the south-east of Tobruk ; the battle­field on which the German Afrika Korps gained resounding fame in November, 1941. During the night we reach the main road at Gambut, between Tobruk and Bardia, and catch whole battalions which fall into our hands without resistance.

The enemy does not believe an attack will be made on Tobruk, but he had thrown about three divisions into the fortress, who defend the excel­lently built fortifications. As long as it still re­sists a small formation is pushed forward to­wards Bardia. The General places himself at their head and moves towards Bardia, but as soon as it grows dark he turns around and now both German divisions go back towards Tobruk.

It is a moonlight night, but one of those Afri­can nights when the light of the moon causes all contours to vanish. Progress is diffi­cult because the irregularities of the ground can hardly be distinguished. Vehicles and tanks roll forward in two columns. The artillery comman­der has just made a surprising announcement. The positions of all our heavy artillery to the south and east of Tobruk dating as far back as 1941 are still untouched and near the positions there are still thousands of heavy calibre shells. Thus, we only had to advance and open fire. That will save us much time and petrol. Through the night we roll and thunder on; there are suppress­ed calls and words of command, a light, from time to time green or red signals from a torch and

it looks as if we are a skein ravelled.

A vehicle driving near the road has just struck a mine. The Colonel-General's vehicle also has come across a wide mined area which is blocking the road. With his usual vitality he jumps out of his car, kneels down and digs out the mines him­self. We follow his example and after five mi­nutes the obstacle is removed. As on the previous nights, this night also no one gets any sleep. Men and officers achieve the unbelievable. The strenuous, exhausting struggle in terrific heat has now lasted for four weeks without an hour's rest.

At 5 a.m. we are standing on a knoll. The Stukas are roaring overhead, and drop their deadly cargoes on the outer fortifications. While the bombs are still bursting, our sappers are al­ready there with their mine-detecting apparatus and begin to clear the ground in front of the Bri­tish positions. The Panzer Grenadiers are follow­ing up. The enemy fires with all his guns. Among the detonations, the bursting shells and the bombs, our sappers carry on with their job and two hours after the attack began the first enemy lines are broken and a number of strong points captured. Our tanks rumble through the breach and tear the line of fortifications open.

In the meantime we get back into our cars and cross the tank trench and are now at the head of the attacking Panzer Division. All around us shells are bursting; shell splinters and frag­ments of rock are hurtling through the air. Both divisions report that the attack is going well. In the afternoon we have reached the ridge and have now a free view of the town and harbour of Tobruk. The battle is still raging, and the air is still filled with bursting shells. . The enemy is resisting; that cannot be denied. He has even got more artillery than we have. But his morale is broken.

Slowly there appear groups here and there from their rocky nests, hands up. In the even­ing we drive down the winding road to Tobruk harbour and we reach the town together with the first tanks. The fortress is now split into two parts. In the meantime the Bersaglieri have taken further strong points and are penetrating deeper into the fortress in a westerly direction. On this evening of the 20th June, 1942, the hearts of all the African fighters are beating faster. For long, long months they lay in front of this fort­ress in 1941 in a waterless, barren desert of rocks and sand, pestered by swarms of flies, burnt by the sun, without shelter or freedom of movement.

The western flank of the line of fortifications has become a small Verdun. For months the battle raged for a few yards of rocky ground. Hundreds of thousands of shells were pumped into a few square kilometres. Long rows of cros­ses to-day testify to the violence of this -battle. In most cases it was impossible to bury the dead properly. When there was a lull in the fighting, graves were quickly dug next to our positions for tour dead comrades. How we cursed then the hell of Tobruk.

right in the centre of the fortress. We are to-day witnessing our most beautiful day in Africa. Our hearts are so filled with joy that we cannot sleep, tired though we are. Col. Gen. Rommel sits in a corner of his car and leans his head against the window; we are lying in our blankets next to his car. We gaze at the fires burning in the harbour and at the funnels and masts of sunken vessels showing above the water...

During the early morning hours of the 21st June a message arrives that Gen. Klopper, with 39 Generals and Staff Officers, has surrendered. The booty is large, 33,000 British troops are taken prisoner But we do not celebrate. In the after­noon, we are well equipped with British canned foods and delicacies; we have filled up with their petrol which lasts us for several hundred kilome­tres. Numerous British guns and a large amount of ammunition are added to ours for the march eastwards.

On the evening of the 22nd June, near Bardia, we are listening to our car radio, while our CO. lies down to rest. The radio gives an account of the capture of Tobruk from records which have been flown by special plane to Germany. And then comes an item of news which makes us sit up and which spreads like wildfire; the Fuehrer has promoted Colonel-General Rommel to the rank of Field Marshal. We cannot help ourselves. We must wake him up to report the news to him.

Two days later Sollum was in our hands. We merely swept past it. On the 25th June, Rom­mel attacks and cuts off Mersa Matruh. During the night the New Zealanders, who are opposing us for the first time since their heavy losses in the winter battle, try in vain to break out. Next morning we take Mersa Matruh. Our men storm the fortress with wild fanaticism.

Now the cry is Supplies ! Supplies ! Now we are short of one extra division, now we lack petrol and ammunition, as the distance from our depots in Cyrenaica is great. But again we find enough in Mersa Matruh to continue our ad­vance. During the night preceding 1st July we stand before El Alamein and find there a modern line of defence which is strongly manned by fresh divisions hastily brought up from the Near East. Nevertheless, we take three strong points. But the fortress of El Alamein, with its naval guns, remains in British hands.

We now face the main gate to Alexandria and Cairo. The enemy supply lines are short, while ours are endless. But we master this situation by improvising and good organization. A further advance seems, however, now impossible.

The battle of El Alamein starts. It almost reminds one of Tobruk in 1941. Arid stretches of rock covered with a thin layer of dust, with no cover from view or the enemy's fire, oppressing heat, billions of flies, no freedom of movement, very difficult to dig in. Our cookhouse orderlies can get forward only by night. The men can only

fver of their trenches at night if they

want to stretch themselves a bit. The enemy concentrates regularly almost his entire air force on this short front. He has only to look after one front; we have to secure the whole of Europe. Thus, our men get little rest day or night. Never­theless, the morale of our troops is excellent. But the supply problem is grave.

Again and again bad news arrives. Tankers and supply ships are sunk. The enemy hunts them with whole squadrons and attacks our ships without respite. The enemy begins to strangle us. The enemy can simultaneously un­load 50, 80 or even 100 ships, and do it beyond our range. If we were opposing the enemy in the North Sea area and we had Bremen, we could do the same to him. But here we are far away from our main bases. The cards are unequally dealt. The enemy's pressure on our positions is gradually increasing, but our lines are protected by a clever system of minefields.

Without any thought for himself the Field Marshal drives through the Egyptian desert right up to the escarpment of the Qattara depression. It is a murderous country; it eats at the health of our soldiers. Day in and day out, hundreds have to report sick. The older ones have been sent home long ago. Alone the Field Marshal keeps going with iron energy as on the first day. But now it has gripped him too, although he does not want to admit it. But the medical reports induce the Fuehrer to recall him to Europe for the sake of his health.

On a sunny autumn day he receives from the hands of the Fuehrer in the Reich's Chancellery in Berlin the Marshal's baton and makes his report on the battle in Egypt. Meanwhile, the enemy increases his preparations. He has now three times as many troops and many times the num­ber of vehicles we can muster. But we still believe that we shall hold the line. It is, how­ever, once more the question of supplies which worries us. We are short of ammunition, and there are hardly any more tankers in the Medi­terranean. The Luftwaffe accompanies the ad­vance of our troops on the eastern front, and it safeguards the Arctic, the Atlantic, the Channel and our homeland. Together with our Italian comrades, it has to patrol the Mediterranean and on the strength of its high quality and offensive spirit it holds its own in Egypt in the face of an extraordinary concentration of enemy planes. Six, seven, eight times a day, our fighters are taking off, and it is seldom that they come back without an air victory. But in the black night the enemy stalks our transport ships and launches his deadly torpedoes.

And then, during the night of 23rd October, the British strike. They have concentrated their guns as in the historic battles of the first World War. With 800 guns, which is far more than we pos­sess altogether, they shower millions of shells on a narrow sector. They send a thousand tanks against our two hundred. They employ 2,000

borriWrs and fighters against us, day and night. "Verdun", that is what the old officers of the last war say. It is exactly the same. But here it is even worse because the murderous rock in­tensifies the effect of each shell, and at Verdun there were no tanks or bomber squadrons.

On the first morning of the offensive, General of the Panzer Troops, Stumme, who had taken over from Rommel, is killed while on a recon­naissance. The Field Marshal does not hesitate for a moment. Although his medical treatment has only just started, he asks the Fuehrer immedia­tely for permission to fly back to his army. On the second day of the battle, he is back at his post and gives vital orders.

Our men fight stubbornly for every inch of ground. The enemy has to run over them with his tanks and to wipe them out with infantry. Enemy messages admitted that every single man had to be dragged from his post, and all the pri­soners were wounded. Right up to Height 28 and further, the burning tanks litter the battlefield. The enemy suffers enormous losses; he has sacri­ficed more tanks than we possess, but he still throws in fresh masses of them. He sacrifices one division after another to force a break through. With cramped hands our men are grimly holding on with their guns. Their only wish is: "If we could only reply in the ratio of one to 10". Large quantities of ammunition are still in Toibruk, but there is still not enough petrol to bring them up in time. The men say: "If we had ammunition they would never get us out of here". But the odds are too great.

On the 12th day of the murderous battle our last reserves are exhausted, the last man has been thrown in. The Italian armoured Ariete Division is fighting the heavy British colossi with light tanks. It is a heroic but unequal battle. The small Italian tanks are destroying British tanks at 30 or 40 metres range, but in the end one after another goes up in flames. In the afternoon of the 4th November, the enemy breaks through at several points and Marshal Rommel is forced to adopt mobile tactics. All German and Italian troops who can be moved are being evacuated. The lorry axles are bending under the heavy loads, but we manage to disengage the bulk of our army from the enemy and to drive back a considerable distance during the night. The or­ders of the enemy read: "The Panzer Army of Marshal Rommel must be captured or destroyed", but this army proves to be surprisingly full of life. In daily hard fighting the pursuing enemy is hit again and again and he suffers heavy losses.

The Parachute Brigade has begun to march because it has no transport. Overnight they come across the spearhead of a British supply column and throw themselves on the drivers. General Ramcke is now able to use these vehicles to break through to the main body of our army. Many heroic deeds are accomplished during these days. The German soldier once more proves that he is the-hesLJadiiiidijftl fif looks losses of!

87

than our own. All vehicles and material which do not stand up to this going are destroyed with­out exception. Nothing, absolutely nothing, falls into the hands of the enemy, and the Tommies make long faces because there is no booty to be collected.

The petrol question is a daily nerve strain. Hardly any ships get through, and the Luftwaffe comes to the rescue. The silent heroes of the transport planes fly every day and every night across the Mediterranean. But what they can bring does not change the situation much; it is like a drop in the ocean and not sufficient for the next leap. These are dramatic days in Cy­renaica. We have to keep to the road as the drive across the desert would cost too much petrol.

On the Field Marshal's birthday we have rea­ched Benghazi. Our troops are practically im­mobilised. We have to think of making a stand in the hills and defending ourselves to the last man. Heavy storms are raging at sea; a tanker has been lost. The destroyers and U-boats, which were supposed to bring us petrol, cannot leave harbour in such weather. It rains, and the clouds are hanging low; the Luftwaffe can­not come to the rescue. Frequent messages bear­ing bad news reach us. The Field Marshal is taken with fever but he gives his orders and keeps going with a great effort.

And the skies are kind. Cloudbursts are turn­ing the desert into a quagmire for days on end. The enemy who meant to cut us off by driving through the desert, gets stuck and our road is open. A few" days later we stand at Mersa Brega. The heavy storm has blown almost the whole cargo of a wrecked supply ship on to the beaches. Over a 30 kilometres stretch of beach are strewn tinned petrol and food. The troops can for a change obtain what they need.

Gradually the enemy begins himself to en­counter supply problems. For days he remains behind and loses contact. But we cannot afford to stay in the Sirte area because, since the land­ing of the great enemy forces in French North Africa, which outnumbers ours many times, the road for us is clear; we must get to Tunisia to link up with the weak forces which have landed there and are keeping the ports open for us. Now we no longer fight for victory in Africa. We know that for two years we have been the shield behind which Europe was conquered and fortified. For two years we have pinned down the whole strength of Great Britain and prevent­ed her from making large scale armament deli­veries to the Soviets. We have also forced her during that time to use those shipping lanes which are the most favourable ones for U-boat attacks.

But Marshal Rommel still plays cat and mouse with the Tommies. When, in December, after careful preparation, they launched a new of­fensive to catch Rommel's a,rmy at last, its bulk has long before left- its positions without the

enemy noticing it. All that is left are rear-guards. They do not warrant the employment of the bulk of the VIHth Army. But they never­theless greatly harass it. And when, in the enemy's words, the bottle is corked and he talks optimistically of successes to follow, he finds the bottle empty.

In January the same game is repeated. When we launch a counter-attack from our positions, the enemy turns back immediately and with­draws to a respectful distance. It is hard for our Italian comrades that the battle is now on for Tripolitania, a country which shows up so strongly the colonial achievements of Fascism which created a paradise out of the desert sand. For the first time in two years we are actually under palm trees. Once more, superior strategy spoils all the enemy hopes. Once more fighting spirit opposes masses of material; on the enemy side it is not a creative strategist but a calculat­ing machine who commands. It is easy to be master with a ten-fold superiority in men and materials.

If the enemy only knew how weak the forces are which are pinning down his masses, how little ammunition they have and how few troops! But the respect and the reputation gained by the Panzer Africa Army throughout the years fills every British soldier with awe. From fre­quent personal experience he has learned to know his opponent. It takes the enemy four weeks after the capture of Tripoli to make the few hundred kilometres up to the Mareth Line. It is only battalions who are holding back an army and gaining fresh glory every day, as the bulk of our army has long ago taken up posi­tions which they are now improving.

The front now to be defended is 650 kilometres long. It thus corresponds in length to the western front of the last war. Companies have to defend sectors ten kilometres wide, battalions hold up to 30 kilometres. All we can actually do is to man some hills, whereas the enemy forces are densely massed against us. Any day they could actually overrun our advanced posts. But they do not dare, because the young Afrika fighters who landed in Tunisia and threw them­selves with a few battalions against the two enemy armies, these young men under the com­mand of Colonel-General von Arnim are com­peting in fighting spirit with the old desert bears.

These fresh troops are not content with de­fending the positions conquered by them, they are extremely active and harass the enemy al­most daily; take positions, passes, roads, villages and aerodromes. The Americans have a deep respect for Gen. von Arnim's soldiers. Compa­nies have to do the work of whole regiments, but the young soldiers are full of life; they are not tightened but full of self-confidence and strength. They bluff the enemy and all the time invent new methods to induce the enemy to concentrate strong forces where it suits them and to draw him away from other points. The enemy is constantly being deceived about their strength. They call themselves divisions, but

tney nave - not even : regimental strength. • .'.vThe are supposed to become divisions when we suc­ceed in reinforcing them with vehicles, tanks and artillery across the Straits of. Sicily.

In central Tunisia Marshal Rommel concentra­tes the combined front line troops of the forces which landed in Tunisia and the old German-Italian desert formations, in order to attack the Americans. The plan is a complete success. The Americans are well equipped, but they lack fighting spirit. They are shy at taking risks and are no good as individual fighters. The number of prisoners taken already exceeds by far that of the attackers, and an equal number Of American dead litters the battlefield. But our troops, who had been landed by air, are now equipped with American I-Tanks and guns. It is again the old method; if everything else fails, we get our weapons and vehicles from the enemy. As much as 80% of the lorries are British.

For the Field Marshal the hour of parting had come. Once more he made the enemy feel the blows of his panzers." Friend and foe have cal­led his march from Egypt to Tunisia a master­piece of strategy and organization without pre­cedent in military history. But now his health urgently demands attention. It is hard for him to say farewell. All his strength belongs to his army and his soldiers, whom he is loath to leave because he knows that before them lies a dif­ficult time. General Messe hands him a fare­well present on behalf of the Italian Africa fighters...

And then one day a message comes through to say that the situation is serious. Our men know very well what is at stake. They know that they now have to pay the price for having enabled the homeland during two years to develop the conquered European countries and to safeguard Europe. We all know how hard it is to pay such a price, but the German soldier is not sentimental. Strongly and firmly he faces the coming battle.

On the 17th March the British Eighth Army attacks the Mareth Line. They are badly cut up and the "calculating machine" knows that he has to try something else, and therefore regroups his forces. The Mareth Line, as adl African posi­tions, is open to outflanking manoeuvres. The enemy, therefore, penetrates into our southern flank, coming through the hilly country, and simultaneously the British and Americans at­tack along the whole front, employing all their forces and equipment. Among their troops are also those of the French traitor generals. For them it is sufficient for a German corporal to wink to make then throw down their arms. But the British are throwing them in as cannon fod­der where they want to spare their own troops. Behind them are the British machine-guns, of course, to reinforce them.

With all their strength our soldiers are hold­ing on. But the tremendous area which they have to defend with weak forces must re­

peatedly be reduced. The mountain range Atlas, which affords them with a last defensive position, runs in a semi-circle around Bizerta. Our troops take thousands of prisoners back into the bridgehead. They are taken even during the last days of the battle.

But the enemy also derives advantage from the position, as the Eighth Army can now be sup­plied from the west. The enemy can move his four armies freely or mass them at one point. From the Near East and Egypt, from Britain and America, he concentrates all available planes. Once again he rallies 2,000 machines to serve as a battering ram for the last offensive. For the Luftwaffe, Tunisia is only a point on the pe­riphery of a tremendous circle round Europe. But the deeds of our fighters, bombers, recon­naissance machines and transport planes perform­ed under Marshal Kesselring throughout these 27 months are worthy of those of our army.

Supplies become increasingly difficult. Small lighters and sailing vessels are attacked ten, twelve times by whole bomber squadrons. Am­munition runs short and so does food. There is no petrol to switch the troops to different sectors. And finally, the enemy concentrates his entire force on one point and the inevitable happens; he breaks through. He reaches the Tunis plain and drives wedges between our formations, thus splitting them. But even after this decisive break-through it takes him many more days yet to bring the battle to an end. In accordance with the old custom of the Afrika Korps, over­night we get arms and ammunition from the enemy with which to continue the fight. And when the ammunition runs out, our men roll rocks down the mountain sides and thus repel enemy attacks at Zaghouan, even at this stage.

But gradually the resistance weakens. Water, food and ammunition are exhausted. The men set vehicles on fire and destroy their weapons. Here and there units form up for the last time and their officers address them in stirring words and salute the Fuehrer and the Fatherland.

Then they march into captivity. They need not be ashamed, for they have inflicted on the enemy to the last hour such heavy, losses that he is bleeding from many wounds. They have done their soldierly duty as only soldiers can.

In this hour the entire Fatherland, and parti­cularly the tens of thousands of old Afrika Korps men who were ordered back home shortly before the end of the battle, think of their com­rades and of the debt they owe to them.

The battle is over. The banners of the glo­rious German Afrika Korps, under which also fought those divisions which joined the Korps later, are still flying. The fresh battalions and regiments carry on the old tradition and one day the hour will come when we shall once more proudly sing our old battle song:

"With clattering trucks, With engines roaring, Panzers roll forward

In Africa."

89

285 WING THE VALUE OF both visual and photographic

air reconnaissance has been proved consistently since the commencement of the war in the Middle East. The increase in the scale of air force operations, and the increase in the number of units undertaking this task brought about a need for the co-ordination of reconnaissance effort; and this need became especially apparent in the opening phases of the "Battle for Egypt" be­tween May and June, 1942.

At that time five units were operating on aerial reconnaissance:— a P.R.U. detachment, newly established and equipped with four special Spitfires under the operational control of Ad­vanced Air Headquarters; a Strategical Recon­naissance Flight; one S.A.A.F. Squadron on sur­vey; and two Tac/R Squadrons on attachment to Corps. The tasks of the P.R.U. and Strat/R units were originally strategical, but circum­stances altered and eventually tactical objectives were included in their sphere of operations. Confusion and duplication of effort was inevitable with all these units operating independently. There existed no intermediate filter where de­mands could be sifted and judged in relation to the up-to-the-minute situation and the needs of all interested parties. Moreover, and this was a factor of great importance, photographic in­formation was not able to reach the smaller Army formations in time to be of operational use, due to the lack of co-ordination and somewhat

haphazard arrangements. It was also felt that Lhe information extracted from reconnaissance, whether visual or photographic, was limited in both scope and distribution, but that latent sources still untapped were extensive, and could be successfully exploited only by a governing body such as a wing.

The above factors, as well as others less important, proved the necessity for the central­isation of the reconnaissance units. Unified control would relieve Air H.Q. of unnecessary operational and administrative work; reconnais­sance would at last have efficient recognition with the fighter and bomber forces; and last, but not least, reconnaissance units would receive an equal chance of development.

No. 285 Wing was therefore formed at the beginning of July, 1942, and later in that month commenced operations.

The composition of the Wing H.Q. was design­ed so that on the operational side there would be a Wing Commander and Squadron Leader Operations with expert knowledge of Tac/R and photographic reconnaissance work, and who would in effect act as advisory staff to the A.O.C. on all matters pertaining to reconnaissance and its development.

The administrative control of the Wing came under the Squadron Leader Admin, and his staff which included Photographic, Equipment, En­

gineering, Signals and M.T. experts. The photo­graphic units of the P.R.U. and Strat/R flights, as well as the A.A.P.I.U. and M.E.I.U. were at­tached to the Wing H.Q., in addition to an Air Liaison Section consisting of a G.S.O.II A.L..O. and a G.S.O.HI A.L.O. and a Counter Battery Officer. It was also found later in practice that the work of G II Air, Vlllth Army, was bound up with Wing Ops., and it was therefore convenient for him to be attached to and live at Wing H.Q. These were the the main components of No. 285 Wing H.Q., when it began to operate, and up to the time of writing no material alterations have been made.

The two Tac/R squadrons originally came squadron came under the Wing for both opera­tional and administrative control, while the P.R.U. Detachment was only controlled operationally, although, as it operated far from its base, Wing was called upon to help in many ways.

The two Tac/R squadrons originally came under the Wing only for administrative control, and except for occasional advice on operational matters Wing did not interfere. The policy for Corps to operate their own Tac/R squadrons had worked well, and it was decided not to disturb the arrangement. Only at El Alamein, where both squadrons were operating on a narrow front, was a certain amount of farming out of photographic commitments called for which was dealt with by Wing H.Q.

At a later date one Tac/R squadron was with­drawn from the Wing, but recently a successful night-fighter squadron has come under command for administrative purposes. Night reconnais­sance is still in its infancy, but there is no doubt of its great possibilities.

It will be seen from the above account that the Wing acted as a clearing house for the re­connaissance demands of the Vlllth Army and A.H.Q. It possessed the means for obtaining vital information, and, while not restricting de­mands, the Wing Operations Control fitted them to the means available with due consideration to priority; if the demands exceeded the means of supply available a ruling on priorities was re­quested from the original source of demand. After the programme had been mapped out the tasks were passed to the units concerned and the pilots briefed in the usual manner.

Upon completion of the sortie, the visual result was. passed on immediately to G.I. Intelligence at Army and to Intelligence at A.H.Q. Information of interest to the Navy was passed to the Naval Co-operation Group. In normal practice the Wing H.Q. was situated at a.landing ground within a few miles of A.A.H.Q. and Main Army H.Q., thus maintaining close liaison by line communication. Photographic results were interpreted and plotted at the Wing H.Q. and first-phase inter­pretation reports telephoned or signalled to those concerned. As soon after this as possible a comprehensive interpretation report was prepar­ed by M.E.I.U. and A.AJ.U. sections and de­spatched by fastest means to Army Corps, A.H.Q.,

groups, and wings, AppreciaT increased until it was the normal thing to'pa­one hundred copies to the Army for distribution. Mosaics for a particular area of the battle front and overprint and target maps were also pre­pared from photographs taken.

The whole operational effort of No. 285 Wing was directed towards obtaining all available information regarding the activities of the enemy and ensuring that such information was passed to the interested parties with minimum delay. The efficiency achieved more than justifi­ed the establishment of the Wing as a controlling medium and enabled improvements and altera­tions in methods to be incorporated with facility.

In its administrative capacity the Wing proved an asset to the squadrons in representing their claims and needs, especially with regard to the provision of the latest and best aircraft. The Wing assumed all responsibility for technical de­velopments, establishments, provision of equip­ment,' etc. and thus allowed squadron command­ers more time for the supervision of operations and training.

The Development of Tac/R Immediately prior to the formation of No. 285

Wing in July, 1942, tactical reconnaissance was carried out by two squadrons, allotted to 30 Corps and 13 Corps respectively, the squadrons being controlled by Corps. These squadrons seemed to exist quite apart from the rest of the R.A.F. and came under the official eye only when some untoward happening occurred or some particular situation demanded co-operation with the fighters.

Their development depended entirely upon themselves as they had no parent unit to whom they could appeal on matters of air policy, nor anyone to assist or direct their administration.

It was clear that although their operational effort was exceedingly high, a good proportion of it was unnecessary and insufficiently ap­preciated to be of full value to those for whom it was expended. The effort was not directed to the most advantageous end, the chief reason for this being that no higher formation existed to ensure that this was done and to exploit the potentialities of their role.

Organisation and Tactics At this time the squadrons were equipped with

Hurricanes I and H and Tomahawks. Towards the end of April, 1942, casualties both to pilots and aircraft had been heavy, and forced an alteration in tactics. This took the form of the introduction of the " weaver " for all sorties in­cluding photographic work.

The advantages of using two aircraft for a sortie are twofold. Firstly, it allows the Tac/R pilot to concentrate on his observation of the ground, while the "weaver" looks after the sky. The second point is that it increases the morale of the pilots who feel they are a member of a

91

team and are more careful in their reports. Sorties were, and still are, carried out at any height from 0-6,000 ft. according to the type of sortie and the prevailing conditions at the time.

This method very quickly justified itself and has been used ever since. It soon became ap­parent, however, that the enemy were aware of the change for they were observed to be using a system of smoke candles to indicate the course of the Tac/R to their fighters, who were be­coming an increasing menace. The adoption of the fighter control system did much to mitigate the threat from that direction. Invaluable as­sistance was rendered to the squadrons before the take-off by the information received from the fighter group regarding the whereabouts of enemy aircraft, and individual aircraft, while airborne, were also warned of enemy aircraft in the vicinity. During this period casualties would probably have been double but for the co­operation of the fighter group.

During the period of building up for the Alamein offensive, between the end of July and October, 1942, Tac/R was carried out by No. 208 Squadron (who had shouldered the major burden since June, 1940) operating under 13 Corps, but covering the 30 Corps front in addition.

The squadrons worked from an advanced land­ing ground adjacent to No. 285 Wing, with base some 60 miles back.

The establishment of aircraft was 24 Hurri­cane Us, including short-range oblique photo­graphic and special long-range vertical photo­graphic cameras.

Main Tactics Employed The tactics employed can be divided into main

groups. Those with fighter escort and those without. With the former the pilot and "weaver" would be briefed by the A.L.O. at the home A.L.G., and they would then fly over to the fighter L:G. to discuss the plan with the Wing leader. The escort was usually composed of two squadrons, with sometimes a top cover of Spit­fires. The Tac/R pilots would fly two of the fighter aircraft equipped with V.H.F. in order to assist inter - communication. After the operation the Tac/R pilots would land at their L.G. for immediate interrogation by the A.L.O. and would later bring back their own aircraft from the fighter L.G.

The Tac/R pilot would normally fly at about 4,000 ft., but it was found that if he wanted to look more closely at some object he had to re­strict himself to gentle 'S' turns for fear of up­setting the wing formation and thus losing touch. One good result of these escorted Tac/Rs, be­sides of course the comparative immunity from casualties, was that the fighters began to ap­preciate the difficulties of the Tac/R pilot.

Unescorted Tac/Rs were carried out either alone or with a " weaver," the reason for the former being the necessity for conserving air­craft, but this was mostly for a short period after the battle had commenced.

No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., during its period of rest prior to the battle, had its tactics defined in that all Tac/Rs were to be carried out by two aircraft, one the Tac/R aircraft and the other the "weaver" whose sole duty was to search the sky. for enemy aircraft. The tactics generally followed were that two aircraft flew in line abreast with the "weaver" slightly stepped up at a distance of some 200 yards. When enemy air­craft were sighted the "weaver" warned his leader and closed on him. The aircraft then carried out close scissor weaving course for base. If an attack was made, both aircraft turned into the attacker, completed a 360° turn and continued on course.

The value of these tactics has, however, been seriously challenged in several combats, for in most cases the pair became separated. There would seem to be no complete defence by two Hurricanes against an attack by five or six ME.109s F. or G. The superior manoeuvrability of the Hurricane enables it to evade the ME.109 for some time but it cannot get out of the area. It was also found that the T.R.9.D wireless sets could not be relied on and frequently the "weaver" was unable to warn the Tac/R pilot of the ap­proach of enemy aircraft, nor could the fighter group contact them.

Distribution of Information In one quiet period the experiment was tried

of broadcasting Tac/R information from the A.L.G. to corps, divisions, brigades and smaller formations of the Army, as well as fighter and bomber groups and wings. The time of broad­cast was sent out over the Air Support links in code, this usually being estimated at some 40 minutes later than the pilot's E.T.A. After the pilot had been interrogated the A.L.O. would write" out his report for broadcasting and the subject matter would be sent out, once in R/T and twice in W/T in clear. Certain items such as reference to tanks and supply dumps were omitted, but the full Tac/R report was always telephoned through to Corps and Main Army. Communication with Corps was improved by the use of an R/T W/T link using a simple code.

The experiment was a success and solved, to a large degree, the problem of disseminating in­formation to the whole Army front, whereas before it rarely got beyond the divisions, and then usually too late to be of any real value. The system was developed under the Wing and con­tinues to be supervised by it.

Photographic Reconnaissance Just prior to the El Alamein offensive a great

deal of photographic work covering the battle front was demanded by the Army. The vertical was mostly done at 15,000 - 20,000 feet, while the obliques were carried out at 5,000 feet. Owing to lack of training the pilots found some difficul­ty in photographing the right areas, but the interpreters already had a complete mosaic of the

l Flight, P.R.U., and could

JU.52's loading up at Heraklion. Note also JUMs.

JU.SZs loading up at Maleme. The MR.UOs seen in the S.IV dispersal area luere used as

escorts.

usually show the pilot/ exactly where he had erred. "'?;•• ""' ^ l

When* the hattle becaine; mobile, photography by the Tac/R<squ,adrons was not required, but a nuittber of photographic recces have been made during recent operations with excellent results.

Movement of Squadrons During the advance from El Alamein to Tripoli,

No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. evolved a scheme where­by the squadron could operate uninterruptedly throughout its moves. The method was for a working flight of ground personnel on the A.L.G. to maintain the aircraft of two flights (a third being at Base); the other working flight standing by as a mobile flight. The moment a new L.G. was nominated the mobile flight moved forward to establish itself there ready for the aircraft (generally maximum of six) when they arrived. Then a sortie was very often briefed at the first L.G. and returned to the new L.G. for interroga­tion. It is nowadays a general rule that the A.L.G. of the Tac/R squadron is that of the most advanced fighter wing. This has the effect of ensuring close liaison regarding the fighter pro­gramme and also is a great saving in time over the old method where the Tac/R pilot had first to fly to the fighter L.G. if escort were required.

From Hurricanes to Spitfires During the static period at Tripoli, what is

probably the greatest step forward in the history of Tac/R in the Middle East was made under the

auspices of No. 285 Wing, when one squadron was re-equipped with clipped wing Spitfire Vs, fitted with the cropped blower. The moral effect throughout the squadron was tremendous, as the advantages of this aircraft over the Hurricane are numerous. They have the speed to get away from ME.109S at Tac/R height so long as thc 109s are out of range when sighted. The period of time spent over the area is shorter, thus giving the enemy fighters less time to be vectored on to them. The same thing applies to A.A.

The Spitfires are well equipped with radio and can receive good warning of the presence of enemy aircraft while the communication between "weaver" and leader is excellent, increasing both their confidence and efficiency. So long as the aircraft is equipped with the bulge hood, the visi­bility is as good as in the Hurricane; oblique photographic runs can be done at high speed with a great reduction of risk to both pilot and aircraft. Lastly, the greater speed considerably shortens the interval between the time of demand for the Tac/R and its result.

It can be said without exaggeration that at last the best available aircraft is being used for tactical reconnaissance. This has been brought about because the importance of the work is now widely recognised, especially by the Army.

The fact that during the last year the enemy has not been able to achieve tactical or strate­gical surprise can without doubt be attributed to the information supplied by our tactical, pho­tographic and strategical reconnaissance.

THE R.A.F. FILM UNIT was formed at the Air Ministry in September, 1941, with the object of obtaining a coir;)lete film record of all R.A.P. activities. O'.iy expert personnel possessing R.A.P. qualifications in addition to wide civilian experience of film and camera work were select­ed. Thus, when the Middle East Detachment left England in January, 1942, every cameraman had operational hours to his credit as either pilot, navigator or air gunner. Briefing orders were "to obtain material for news reels all over the world, produce feature films of propaganda value and to make training and instructional sequences."

On arrival at Freetown the unit divided; one half went up the coast from Freetown to film the work, living conditions and so on of squa­drons convoying supplies, while the other half started filming the Takoradi to Cairo reinforce­ment route. The hazards of the climatic con­ditions and geographical difficulties of this route were described in Number One of the R.A.F. Middle East Review; the benefit derived from this film on briefing new pilots can be appre­ciated. During the flight which was being filmed one of the pilots ferrying a Kittyhawk forced-landed thirty miles from El Fasher in the bush, and news of his plight was brought in by a native on a camel. The rescue party included a member of the film unit who had already taken the packing of rations and formation of

the party. The Kittyhawk and pilot were found after a difficult journey; natives armed with spears had mounted guard over the aircraft while the pilot had been the guest of the local chief in the village all night. His first and only meal had consisted of two quarts of goat's milk, a complete large chicken and eight eggs. The cameraman observed that the pilot did not eat again for the next twenty-four hours!

When the unit reported for duty at H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. it had already shot more than 5,000 feet of film. Laboratories were set up and the first film coverage of the R.A.F. in the Western Desert planned, letters of authority having been obtained from the Deputy A.O.C.-in-C. and the A.O.C., Western Desert. Work then began at Sidi Haneish, the first desert story being made with the co-operation of Blenheim and Kitty-hawk squadrons.

The R.A.F. M.E. Film Unit, in common with all Middle East Forces, had to be self-contained and mobile. Quick advances—and retreats-meant the rapid moving of heavy equipment and valuable cameras, but from the time work be­gan in the spring of ?942, until the entry into Tunis in May, 1943, nothing of value was lost ex­cept one camera in an aircraft which crashed. In the retreat to El Alamein the R.A.F. camera­men shot a full sequence of film showing the order and precision of the air force withdrawal from Baheira to Daba. It will be recalled that

95

squadrons withdrew with a separation of twelve miles only from the enemy, who remained under constant bombing and straffing from our air­craft while the ground parties prepared fresh' landing grounds. To the audience which viewed the film afterwards it appeared that the photo­graphy was based on one aerodrome only but In fact the incidents recorded covered at least eight airfields.

Whole towns blazing with masses of fires make good pictures but attacks on concentra­tions in the desert barely register. Desert pho­tography also demands specially sensitised film used when quite new and processing with hours of exposure; such ideal conditions were, of course, impossible. When urgent "hot" films were taken they were packed immediately and sent by first available aircraft direct to the U.K. for proces­sing and censorship. The Ministry of Informa­tion was then responsible for distribution. One such sequence of film 8,000 feet in length was lost in transit, either by accident or enemy ac­tion, and months of hard work thus went for nothing.

It is the boast of the R.A.F. M.E. Film Pro­duction Unit that it caters for an audience of sixteen millions. In many cases there is a dou­ble release on its films, one copy being distribut­ed direct throughout the vast area south of the Mediterranean, while the copy which is sent home is distributed to America, China, Russia and other parts of the world. Thirty thousand feet of film were taken over the Alamein area and during the subsequent advance, and although but a small amount of this was shown in "Desert Victory," which was primarily an Vlllth Army film, the remainder has appeared in various news-reels on general release.

The R.A.F. cameramen accompanied bombers over Benghazi on many raids, and sometimes had peculiar experiences. On one occasion a Flight Lieutenant found, after take-off, that there was no oxygen plug for him. As the aircraft gained height and the need for oxygen grew he spent his time leaping about among the crew "borrow­ing" gulps of the precious gas. On another oc­casion a Sergeant, flying in a Liberator at 17,500 feet, was faced with the dilemma of two "shots" simultaneously. He was about to photograph a Liberator which had just been shot down, when the bombs were released from his own aircraft. Which should he take ? He decided to do the job for which he was there, and so photographed the bombing.

One of the best films produced by the R.A.F. M.E. Film Production Unit was a sequence on Malta, illustrating the island's now historic de­fence against neutralisation from the air. This production took many weeks and a number of the bomb bursts were photographed at unplea­santly close range. In addition to ordinary

service work the unit also covered news events of political and historical importance; Mr Chur­chill, for example, was accompanied by an R.A.F. cameraman on his visits to Turkey, Cyprus and Tripoli.

All the cameras used by the unit are British, and each is hand made. * In fourteen months they have turned 100,000 feet of film in West and Central Africa, Malta, the Western Desert, Eri­trea, Abyssinia, the Sudan, East and South Afri­xa, Cyprus and Turkey. They have stood up successfully to the sand and damp of the Desert and the West Coast, to say nothing of Malta bomb dust! Captured equipment has also prov­ed its value; one Italian projector now in cons­tant use is worth £2,000. Experiments1 were also made with cameras other than those brought out by the R.A.F.M.E. Film Production Unit, fitted into aircraft of all types from single seater fighters to heavy bombers. Results were some­times good and sometimes bad, due perhaps to bad light, mechanical failures, or to the pilot in his excitement failing to switch on this addition to his already complicated "box of tricks".

In the early days the unit and its cameras were suspect by many squadrons, but after se­veral films had been shown a pronounced rivalry grew up between captains of aircraft to have a camera in their own machine. The most suc­cessful operational results have been obtained from the following aircraft:—

The Boston. Using the bottom rear gunner's position and hand holding the camera. The cameraman replaces the rear gunner and oc­cupies a dual role—ready to shoot film or a " Vickers Gas Operated." First class material was obtained in this way during the retreat from Gazala.

The Mitchell. An excellent camera position is provided by removing the oval hatch in the bomb-bay. This was used successfully during the battle of El Alamein.

The Beaufighter. Is ideal for placing an auto­matic camera in the nose position. Very good material showing road and barge straffing has been obtained in this way.

The Liberator and Fortress. Provide excellent hand-held camera positions and were used suc­cessfully with a six inch lens over Benghazi, Tripoli and Naples.

The advance to Tunis was covered in detail. When the great day arrived some members of the Film Unit entered with the VHEth Army, and immediately set about photographing the destruction and damage caused by our bombing of enemy airfields, while the unit's Hudson circled overhead, filming the historic scene from the air.

The Middle East Detachment of the Royal Air Force Film Production Unit now awaits further developments.

Taking a <jr«nind shot at Gatnbut.

The "pranged" Kittyhaivk 30 miles east of El Fasher,

Camera release, (on left of stick). Release is pulled by Pilot prior to attack.

Camera mounted to armour plating of Beaufighter shozving method of release.

Camera on nose of Beaufighter, shotting position in relation to guns.

Nose of Beaufighter being replaced b\ armourer.

Another viezc of the Baltimore formation.

A Baltimore photographed through the lower gun hatch of another aircraft in the same formation.

A shot taken from a B.25 during the first daylight attack on the radio and telephone centre at El . llamcin

24th October, 1942.

Shooting the film story, "Construction of an aerodrome", at Takoradi.

British convoy on the road near Daba, following up the enemy's retreat.

NIGHT OPERATIONS

BY BOSTONS

The S.A.A.F. Light Bomber Wing began ope­rating in the desert during the summer of 19^1, and quickly proved outstandingly successful. It was originally equipped with Marylands and changed to Bostons during "Crusader". This article deals with one aspect of the Wing's acti­rities—its employment on night operations, for xohich the Bostons were ideally suited.

BETWEEN JANUAKY, 1942, and the opening of Rommel's offensive on 26th May, No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing Bostons made only twenty-eight raids (219 sorties). During the stalemate that exist­ed on the Gazala front during these months, it became increasingly clear that used solely on escorted day raids, Boston squadrons were bound to he unemployed for long periods. Except for isolated raids against enemy aerodromes and a few calls for close support, targets were poor and infrequent; and raids were always limited by the range and other commitments of the Fighter Wings. One abortive and costly raid on Barce had shown the dangers of unescorted raids against deeper targets, and a period of over-sea navigational training, with a view to attacking shipping, had produced no satisfactory results.

The scope of the Boston as a weapon of at­tack seemed definitely limited, and its value

at this time to the Western Desert Air Force was low.

Suitability of the Boston Suggestions had been put forward to use the

Boston for night work, but pilots condemned it on the grounds (a) that the flames from the un­damped exhaust would render it conspicuous up to great heights, and (b) that the instruments were defective. Test flights by day, however, proved the value of the instruments and trial night flights demonstrated that in lean mixture at cruising speed no flames were visible at 1,000 feet. In rich mixture, the flames were visible up to considerable altitudes. Night-flying train­ing was consequently proceeded with, but it took some considerable time to eradicate the distrust of American instruments common to all pilots who had been trained on British instruments.

The Boston soon proved to possess excellent night-flying qualities and comparatively in­experienced crews found no difficulty in handl­ing the aircraft on moonlit nights.

Night-Flying Training

Air Headquarters, Western Desert, had instruc ed that during the moon period In April-May

100

Light Bomber Night Operations """

Squadron

12 24

Total

Aerodromes

Raids Sorties

39 312 35 297

74 609

Raids Sorties

Army

Raids Pargets

Sorties Smoke Raids

Laying

Sorties

20 19

187 172

3 4

11 34

1 1

2 2

39 359 7 45 2 4

Comparison of Peak Night Operational Records

Squadron Raids Sorties

12 7 67 24 2 18

TOTALS 9 85

squadrons were to undertake intensive night-flying training at the Base landing ground, but because the Daba landing grounds were receiving the attentions of the German Air Force during the moon periods, training was carried out from Amiriya. In fact, little training was done. The moon period was short, and on 26th May the Axis forces attacked the Gazala Line, after which, until mid-August when training was resumed from Qasasin, there was time only for operations.

Only eight crews had each completed two hours night-flying training on the Boston when the battle started on 26th May; and the only train­ing received by the majority of the pilots then and since was a few hours at the O.T.U. Never­theless, there was only one casualty during the initial training period, and four during the sub­sequent period. Total casualties during night-flying, including those due to enemy action, were only 2% of the operational sorties performed.

Operational Employment

The Bostons were at first employed on last light operations, when the aircraft took off in daylight and landed at night. These flights, apart from their excellent operational training, were in general not very satisfactory. "Last light" is too indefinite a period, and too much dependent on weather conditions; and the line between safe­ty from enemy interception and good light for accurate bombing is too fine to be drawn with certainty.

The Bostons were employed on every kind of task: against landing grounds, road, rail and sea communications, camps, M.T. and fortified posi­tions, and on smoke-laying tasks. During the period they carried out 122 night raids (1,017 sorties). They attacked at last light, by moon­light and, assisted by flares from Albacores, dur­ing black-out night periods. On one occasion they located a good M.T. target on their return from an aerodrome raid. Within one and a

Period 20/27 Aug. '42.

TOTAL

Raids Sorties

63 59

512 505

122 1017

Period 20/29 Sept. '42. Raids Sorties

11 102 11 101

22 203

Period 12/24 Jan. '43. Raids Sorties

11 11

127 143

22 270

half hours, the aircraft were bombed up, refuelled and on their way to make new history with the first Boston night shuttle-service. They operat­ed night and day with equal success, thus trans­lating into practice No. 24 Squadron's motto : " Per noctem per diem." On many occasions they not only bombed their targets, but also straffed them.

The tables on this page summarise the Light Bomber night effort during the period.

Detailed reference can be made only to some of the more notable operations.

Against Landing Grounds. During the period the Bostons carried out a total of 74 raids (609 sorties) against landing grounds. This was perhaps their most regular employment. Their success is indicated by the large number of wrecked enemy aircraft found on the Sidi Haneish landing grounds, which were attacked only at night by Bostons and Wellingtons.

(a) Between 1st and 15th June, Derna main airfield, the enemy's chief base for ope­rations against our Mediterranean ship­ping, was the object of attack, which was intensified on 13th June, designed to assist the passage of a vital convoy from Alexandria to Malta. The role of the Air Force was to reduce the ene­my's air operations against the convoy from Derna, where increasing numbers of JU.88s were reported, and the ope­ration was successful.

(b) On 13th and 14th September, again in conjunction with the Wellingtons, the 'target was the Sidi Haneish landing grounds, and the aircraft dropped a mixture of instantaneous and delayed action bombs, the delays varying from •125 sec. to 12 hours. Sidi Haneish was the base of the enemy's Stukas, and it was the intention that these airfields should be put out of action during the

passage of our Naval forces to take part in the combined operation against Tobruk. Evidence of the success of the operation is the fact that no Naval craft was lost as the result of action by Sidi Haneish-b&sed. aircraft.

Against Communications. On the Alamein line, the enemy had three available supply routes: rail, road and sea. The railway demanded equip­ment which the enemy found it difficult to pro­vide. As regards the road, his M.T. had been de­pleted by the Boston and fighter-bomber action in May and June, and by the shortage of spares for captured British vehicles. The harbour at Matruh was the key to his imperfect supply sys­tem. Accordingly, "F"-boats and other shipping, and stores and harbour facilities at Matruh, came in for their share of Boston attention, which was also devoted to the other two channels of supply—the road, which was bombed and straffed repeatedly, and the railway, which at Daba station was bombed a number of times.

Against Army Targets. Enemy camps and po­sitions were frequently bombed and straffed by night. The most notable attack on an army target was on 5th June. On this day an attack was planned to take place at dawn, the target being the enemy strong point at 370401 (Beacon 182). After the bombing, an army attack was planned to go in and capture the point. Six Bostons flew to their target individually. They were assisted in finding it by nine white petrol flares laid out by the army in the chape of a V pointing towards the enemy's dug-in positions, some four miles our side of them. The Bostons were over the target for fifteen minutes, and at 05.29 hours, one minute before the zero hour, the bomb doors of the last Boston closed. The ground forces took the point shortly afterwards.

Smoke Laying Operations. For their attack on the Alamein line in October the land forces were faced with the problem of attempting to lift mines at chosen points in the enemy's minefields during a period of bright moonlight. The solu­tion was found in the laying of a smoke screen at these selected points by Bostons. In prepar­ation for the event practice was carried out, sometimes at dawn and later at night, the pilots flying at 30/50 feet on courses indicated by flares. On the night of 23rd October, the actual operation was carried out by four Bostons.

Effectiveness of Night Operations

In the present development of night photo­graphy, the effectiveness of a night operation can be gauged only by the number of fires started. Even on a day operation, with the accuracy and concentrated volume of bursts in the target area of pattern bombing, very few flames are caused.

The majority of damage is caused by the near miss, which cannot be observed at night. Never­theless, a total of 104 fires on aerodromes alone have been started by Boston bombing, and the wreckage caused at Sidi Haneish by Bostons and

Wellingtons proved the effectiveness of this type of operations.

Night bombing has also an important moral effect. The loss of efficiency caused to the enemy by sleepless nights as a result of night bombing cannot be assessed, except generally by reference to remarks such as this in a captured diary: "Night and day it goes on without interruption and there is not a moment's peace. We are be­coming like potatoes, always underground. I sit here and think that 26 out of the 34 months I have spent in Africa I have been underground."

Tactics on Night Operations

Time of Attack and Interval of Take-Off

(a) Last Light Attacks. For these attacks the aircraft took off and flew to their target in loose formation at nought feet as a defence against possible fighter in­terception, and to evade the enemy's R.D.F. They then broke up to bomb in­dividually and return to base separately.

(b) Moonlight Attacks. Here the aircraft took off at an interval determined by the state of the moon, the purpose of the particular operation, and the oper­ational plan as a whole.

(i) State of the Moon. It was found that efficient night-bombing could ge­nerally be carried out only between the f jrst and last quarter, and during a pe­riod between one hour after moonrise and one hour before moonset. Accord­ingly, the interval of take-off was deter­mined by the number of aircraft to operate and the period of useful moon­light.

(ii) Purpose of the Operation. If the purpose of the operation was mainly moral (e.g. to hold up the progress of a retreating or advancing enemy for the longest possible period by harassing the roads), the effort was spread over some hours, and the interval of take-off was longer. If the purpose was to inflict maximum damage on a concentrated target, the interval was reduced (a) so that following observers would be helped by incendiaries dropped and fires start­ed by preceding aircraft, and (b) to re­duce the effectiveness of the enemy A.A. by offering a number of simultaneous targets and so diluting the volume of its fire against any one aircraft, and by confusing the enemy's predictors, (iii) Operational Plan. A.H.Q. frequent­ly ordered that an attack should take place during a definite period, so that there should be no conflict with aircraft of other formations operating over the same target.

(c) Black-Night Attacks. The duration of the attack (and with it the take-off in­terval) was determined by the period

the Albacores were able to provide "illu­mination by flare-dropping, and the time of attack had thus to be carefully synchronised.

Routeing nad to be carefully planned to avoid known radio-location stations, intermediate de­fended areas and known enemy night-fighter patrol areas.

To reduce the effectiveness of enemy radio­location, aircraft flew low out to sea until it was necessary for them to climb to reach their bomb­ing height.

The target was nearly always approached from the sea, as observers could navigate accurately only on the coast-line, main roads, railways and well-known wadis.

Bombing Methods

Attacks could not safely be made below 2,000 feet. Discretion was generally given to individual pilots to bomb from between 3,000 and 9,000 feet, the normal height being from 6,000 to 9,000 feet, out of range of light A.A. and in a zone where heavy A.A. is comparatively inaccurate.

It has been found that objects, such as air­craft on the ground, can be clearly seen at night in conditions of good visibility up to 2,000 feet, and that an airfield can be located visually up to 9,000 feet. As a result, on airfield targets bombs were usually dropped in long sticks in the dispersal areas, and not aimed at definite targets, although occasionally delayed action bombs were dropped on the runways, where the object was to immobilise a landing ground for a period. On road targets, bombs might be dropped singly, or in long and short sticks, according to the nature of the target.

It was common practice to send off the more experienced observers first. Once they had lo­cated the target, following aircraft were assisted by their incendiaries or by any fires started.

On road targets, it has been found that fre­quently the target could not be seen until the aircraft were almost over it. In such cases the rear gunner, instructed by the observer, would drop incendiaries and the aircraft would be turned steeply to come back and bomb on these as markers.

A development of this practice was for a number of aircraft to fly along the road at brief intervals, each aircraft dropping incendiary markers on suitable targets for those following.

On road targets, aircraft flew to one side or other of the road, depending on .the position of the moon, so that they should pick up M.T. dispersed on the sides, as well as on the road

itself. It has been found that the best light for bomb­

ing is that from a half-risen moon, which casts a long shadow of good density. A moon directly overhead was avoided as much as possible. Most observers prefer to bomb directly into, or a quarter into moon, as this enables them to take advantage of the shadows for identifying the

target. For shipping or harbour low moon is preferred, as this gives a well-de­fined lane of light on the sea onto the target.

The run-up was, however, frequently determin­ed by the approach to the target, itself determin­ed by the location of the enemy's A.A. defences, and by means of identifiable pinpoints, with the result that light might be sacrificed for ac­curate navigation.

When Intelligence was able to give accurate A.A. locations, these were found to be useful for identifying the target in relation to the gun positions.

Evasive Action

The Boston with its excellent manoeuvrability could take violent evasive action to avoid A.A., searchlights and night-fighters. The" following methods have been used successfully:—

(a) Approach target one or two thousand feet higher than the determined bomb­ing-height, throttle back and glide in with gentle turns to release bombs, take engine and make a steep diving turn away.

(b) Approach target corkscrewing, i.e. with a diving turn to one side and a climb­ing turn to the other.

(c) In every case, make a steep turn off target and lose height rapidly.

(d) It has been suggested, but not proved, that switching off I.F.F. before bombing confuses the enemy's predictors.

Aircraft normally straffed with front guns in a dive from about 400 feet to as low as 20 feet, the rear gunners firing as the aircraft pulled out.

Enemy Defences

During the period 26th May to 20th June, 1942, attacks were directed mainly against the land­ing grounds at Derna, Martuba and Tmimi where the enemy's defences were well organised and had frequent practice, although they frequently failed to open up at the first few aircraft. Intense light and heavy A.A. and a number of searchlights were encountered. In operations against M.T. the fire encountered was intense, but, because it was probably unpredicted, mainly inaccurate. The evasive tactics adopted were so effective that during this period only three air­craft were lost by A.A. and action by enemy night-fighters, only a few of which were en­countered.

As the majority of night attacks during the next period (21st June to 4th November, 1942) were made against enemy landing grounds be­tween Daba and Matruh, it was to be expected tnat aircraft would encounter both heavy and light A.A. fire from well-prepared positions. Incidentally it was the ro.le of the Bostons at one stage to hit the Haneish L.G. so hard that the enemy would be compelled to reduce his A.A. strength on his forward landing grounds at Daba.

103

Although on numerous occasions fire was re­ported as being intense and accurate, two air­craft only were shot down in flames, a third forced-landed behind the enemy lines, and another aircraft failed to return. Many aircraft, how­ever, were holed. The remainder of the effort during this period was devoted to attacks on M.T., camps, shipping, barracks, tank workshops and "F"-boats at Matruh, railway installations and traffic, and on one occasion to the laying of a smoke screen to cover a land attack. The A.A. fire encountered during the road attacks was usually intense, but inaccurate. The harbour de­fences at Matruh were strengthened by the mooring of a flak-ship, and fire of all types greeted the arrival of the bombers. One aircraft of the four mentioned above was lost at Matruh and many' others were holed.

Enemy aircraft were seldom encountered at night.

During the laying of the smoke screen from a height of 50 feet, the aircraft concerned en­countered only light A.A. and machine-gun and small-arms fire, although a parachute flare was fired at one aircraft.

The final period (5th November to 31st January, 1943) covered attacks mostly against M.T. on the roads and tracks, although some attacks were made against landing grounds. The A.A. de-

the latter usually put up an intense but frequently inaccurate fire, and fire from M.T. was similar to that in the other two periods. In this period one aircraft was lost, and several others were holed.

Night Photography

The first night photographs from a Boston were taken on 20th October, 1942. Their value was established because examination of the re­sults proved that the target attacked was L.G. 09 and not L.G. 21 as reported by the ob­server. Further photographs were taken on the following night, but mist and cloud conditions made them valueless. The difficulty in obtain­ing supplies of flash bombs has been the only reason why night photography has not been further developed in the Wing.

As this article shows, during the eight months from May, 1942, to January, 1943, the Boston — once distrusted by many pilots—showed that it could be adapted to almost every type of night operation. In the course of 1,017 night sorties the S.A.A.F Light Bomber Wing attacked enemy air­fields, communications, fortified positions and M.T. on the roads, and also laid smoke-screens and experimented in night photography. On all these duties only eight Bostons were lost — a remarkable record.

The Enemy's Last Days In Tripoli

This article is based upon aerial photographs taken from 2\st Nov., 1942, to 22nd Jan. 1943

TEIPOLI BECAME OF first importance as a sup­ply centre for the Axis forces after their retreat from El Alamein in October. Previously it had been too far behind the lines, and Tobruk was, the main port of supply; then for a short period supplies were rushed into Benghazi. When this port was in turn occupied by the Allies on 20th November, Tripoli was left as the nearest port capable of dealing with the large quantities of war material required by the enemy, then at Agheila.

Its use as a port was, however, seriously res­tricted by Allied bombing, which succeeded both in preventing ships reaching Tripoli and in hold­ing up the loading and unloading of supplies within the harbour.

Enemy Shipping in the Harbour

When the harbour was photographed on 30th October, only eight active merchant vessels were present. Photographs taken on 21st November, just after the fall of Benghazi, showed fifteen merchant vessels (approximately 33,000 tons), and eighteen "F"-boats in the port, besides six destroyers and torpedo-boats, two naval auxilia­ries, at least three "E"-boats and the 13,000 tons hospital ship "Gradisca". Also lying in the har­bour were four inactive merchant vessels and the damaged hospital ship "Tevere".

Two small merchant vessels arrived on 22nd November, but apart from minor naval units and hospital ships, no vessel over 200 feet entered the harbour until 4th December, when one mer­chant vessel of 4,000 tons and one of about 1,000 tons arrived. After that, no merchant shipping reached the port until a 1,000 tons vessel berthed on 21st December. The next day another small merchant vessel arrived and also a derelict ves­sel of 4,000 tons, later to be used as one of the block ships sunk in the harbour entrance on evacuation.

A small merchant vessel of about 1,000 tons was the last to reach the harbour on 2nd Janua­ry. Thus, during the two months from the fall of Benghazi to the evacuation of Tripoli on 22nd January no more than seven merchant ships of some 11,000 tons reached Tripoli. To the total of munitions and supplies, however, must be ad­ded those carried by at least 33 "F"-boats which arrived during that time.

Considerable activity of minor naval units was seen. One or two destroyers or torpedo-boats and two naval auxiliaries were usually present, and on six occasions a "U"-boat was lying in the harbour.

The hospital ship "Gradisca", 13,870 tons, was seen in the port again on three occasions between 24th December and 11th January. The hospital ship "Virgilio", 11,718 tons, was also there on 15th December and 9th January, and the hospital ship "Sicilia", 9,600 tons, which arrived on 10th January, departed the next day.

Damage Caused by the Allies Out of 28 merchant vessels in the port during

the period at least six, probably more, were da­maged during bombing attacks. The Allies lost no time in attacking the concentration of ship­ping in the harbour on 21st November, and dur­ing a bombing raid on that date at least two merchant vessels unloading at the Spanish Quay were damaged, and considerable destruction caus­ed to warehouses on the quayside. One of these vessels, a merchant ship of 400 /45Q feet, was hit again on 26th November and subsequently lay inactive for some weeks alongside the old wreck at the Spanish Mole. However, by 9th January she had moved into the Naval Basin and appeared to be unloading. She 'left the port between 9th and 11th January. The other merchant vessel of 350/400 feet damaged during the raid of 21st November lay inactive near the southern shore for a long time, but finally left on 14/15th January.

On 29th November a merchant vessel of 350/ 400 feet, lying off the Spanish Quay, was damag­ed. She remained in the same position and was finally abandoned there on evacuation. Another merchant vessel of 350/400 feet was also hit on that day and set on fire. Having burned for two days she was towed across to a position near the old wreck on the north side of the har­bour, where she also was finally abandoned.

Two small merchant vessels of 1/2,000 tons were also damaged during later raids; one lay inactive near the western shore of the harbour for a long period, but finally left the port on 15th January; the other lay near the south-east corner of the harbour for a few weeks and was then sunk in.the harbour entrance on 19th Jan­

105

uary. The "Nino Bixio" class merchant vessel that had lain inactive in the port for so long was damaged during the raid of 15th January and was apparently further damaged on the 21st before being abandoned when the enemy with­drew.

The hospital ship " Tevere," which was towed in during August, after lying damaged outside for some time, was in the end abandoned. The de­relict merchant vessel of 4,000 tons that arrived on 22nd December remained entirely inactive until she was towed across to the harbour entrance on 19th January and sunk as one of the block ships.

The other nineteen merchant vessels all manag­ed to escape from the port before the final evacuation, including the S.S. " Sabbia," which had lain inactive in the harbour since February, 1942; she started loading in the Naval Basin on 12th January and finally left on the 18/19th. All active shipping had departed by

21st"Jami!Tr.^rtWiServiceable vessels, with the possible exception of a few lighters and small craft, being left behind.

Thus it will be seen that the Axis achieved a considerable measure of success in evacuating the harbour, particularly with regard to the three badly damaged vessels which were rendered suf­ficiently seaworthy to leave.

Demolition Carried Out by the Enemy

Every effort was made to render the port un­serviceable to the Allies. As early as 6th Jan­uary preparations similar to those which had been seen at Benghazi for the demolition of the harbour facilities were visible. Pits for demoli­tion charges were formed on the Spanish Quay, along the other quays and jetties of the Spanish Mole and also on the Karamanli Mole. On 11th January pits were seen on the jetty at the west end of the Spanish Quay, and by 14th January the South-West Quay had been mined.

./ general vieiv of Tripoli harbour, ^ increased in importance to the ifti

Reconnaissance photograph taken on 2W January, mi showing the entrance to Tripoli harbour completely blocked; also note the destruct ion

107 T v»

This photograph shows the damage done by bombing to the Spanish Quay at Tripoli, where two warehouses were destroyed and two damaged. The inset shows the area before bombing. Two damaged M/Vs are indicated

by arrows.

Photographs on the 19th showed that actual demolition had begun; the Spanish Mole was breached at its northern point; charges had been blown on the Spanish Quay and in the Naval Basin, and further pits had been dug in pre­paration for demolition of the bridge at the base of the Spanish Mole. Two block ships had been sunk on the north side of the harbour entrance. Some of the oil storage tanks in the town were also burnt out by this date.

Next morning, 20th January, five more craters were seen along the edge of the Spanish Quay, and the jetty east of the Naval Basin had been entirely wrecked. By that afternoon eighteen fresh craters were visible on the Spanish Quay, the Naval Basin Quays had been wrecked, and the Spanish Mole breached on the north side of the Naval Basin. Another block ship had been Bunk on the north side of the harbour entrance, leaving a gap only 110/112 feet wide in the centre.

By the 21st the harbour entrance was com­pletely blocked by the sinking of the boom vessel across the remaining gap. The South-West Quay" had been demolished, and all active shipping, including lighters and small craft, had gone. Finally, on 22nd January, the bridge at the base of the Spanish Mole was destroyed, the road ap­proach to the Karamanli Mole was cratered and further damage done to the Mole itself and to the South-West Quay.

Reconnaissance aircraft had watched all these preparations being made, but the R.A.F. had been unable to prevent them. It speaks well for the organising ability of the Allies, however, that by the 25th Tripoli harbour was put into commission again sufficiently to admit tank landing craft, and that within ten days the average daily dis­charge rose to 1,600 tons. The harbour was opened up completely by the end of February, in spite of delay caused by bad weather, and the discharge had risen to well above 3,000 tons daily.

THE OPERATIONS RECORD UuuK, R.A.F. Form 540, is the day by day historical record maintained by all Headquarters, Formations, Units and Squad­rons from the time of their formation or re­formation to the time of their disbandment. It is in fact a diary record of achievements in the field, at work or at play, and if properly kept and written should give a complete picture of a Unit's employment, organization, honours, move­ments and personnel. Forms 540 are returned monthly to Headquarters, R.A.F., Middle East, in duplicate, one copy for retention and one for onward transmission to the Air Ministry, where they are carefully scrutinized for information which will lead to improving the organization, training, equipment and administration of the Royal Air vForce.

These records, apart vfromr th,pir' informative value, make fascinating reading, and it is there­fore proposed to include extracts from time to

time in the R.A.F. Middle East Review. As far as possible, without prejudice to security, the ex­tracts will be given verbatim; they will not, however, cover only current operations, nor will they be confined to Squadrons.

No. 1. A Gallant Rescue. (From No. 2(J3 Squadron during the Iraq revoit.)

Detailed report of Operation P.M. 10th May, 1941. Aircraft L..9042 Fighter Blenheim was airborne

at 13.55 hours, twenty minutes later than L..9174. No sign of any M.T. or any enemy or Allied Forces was seen until Rutbah Fort was sighted at 14.45 hours where the other Blenheim Fighter was circling one and a half miles to the south. Seeing no aircraft, L.9042 made a dive-bombing attack across the D/F station from the north-west towards the Fort, dropping two 20 lb. F. and two 20 lb. H.E. which fell by the wireless mast closest to the Fort and the front guns were used on the

Fort as the aircraft pulled out of the dive. When pulling out, two lines of about eight armoured cars each were seen manoeuvring two miles to the south of the Fort on the side of some low hills to the south-east. No firing was noticed but it appeared from their dispositions that the two columns were engaged in combat. Our aircraft, however, could not see any difference between one column or the other and therefore decided to continue the attack on the Fort rather than risk attacking our own forces in error. The other Blenheim apparently made the same decision and joined in alternate dive-bombing and front ma-chine-gun attacks on the Fort. L.9042 made in all about a dozen attacks from all heights and angles using four front belly guns, port wing and one free Bren gun fired through the open star­board nose window by the observer, and, in addi­tion, the turret gun when pulling out of the dive. In the fourth attack two 20 lb. F. and two 20 lb. H.E. bombs were dropped into the eastern tri­angular compound of the Fort. Heavy machine-gun fire and rifle fire was put up at first and in the second attack our aircraft was hit by two bullets, one of which entered the starboard outer tank and the other coming through the top of the front window missed the observer's head and passed down the aircraft to nick the air gunner in the right leg (a light flesh wound only). The observer also got a few splinters round the knees from the broken perspex.

Attacks were resumed, however, and no oppo­sition fire was seen after the third attack. After the tenth attack, fixed front gun ammunition was exhausted and the two final attacks by this air­craft were made at the request of the observer who said he still had plenty more ammunition for his Bren gun, while the rear gunner managed to get in further bursts pulling out of the dives. L.9174 was making similar attacks and two lots of bombs were seen to fall, the first lot dropping near the south-west corner of the Fort, just after L.9042 had made its opening attack. The se­cond lot appeared to fall into the Fort on the south side of the main rectangular compound near the wall which separated it from the eastern triangular compound.

During L.9042's eleventh attack L.9174 was seen to have gone over southwards to the arm­oured cars and as L.9042 turned for home the air gunner saw L.9174 apparently making a front gun attack against armed fighting vehicles on the north side of the low hill about two miles south-east of the Fort; the aircraft then pulled up and turned as though to follow L.9042. Barely a- quarter of a minute later the air gunner saw a column of black smoke about half a mile south­west of the hill and shouted to the pilot who immediately dived towards the position. A mo­ment later a figure which turned out to be the captain of the L.9174 emerged from the smoke and began ta wave. The pilot of L.9042 turned into the wind and, without waiting to apply the flaps, landed less than 20 yards from the wrecked Blenheim within a bare fifteen seconds of having sighted the survivor. The observer got out on to

the win and reached the survivor, who was running for the machine, just as the pilot jumped out after him. At the same time the air gunner saw seven armoured cars about 500 yards away rushing to­wards the aircraft with their guns trained on it and turned his turret gun on the leading car. A British steel helmet waving from the top tur­ret reassured him, however, and he turned to help pull the Squadron Leader to the port wing while the armoured cars stopped a few yards away. The captain of the crashed aircraft said that he must get back to the other two of his crew, but, telling him to stay where he was, the crew of L.9042 together with the Squadron Leader com­manding the armoured car detachment (who had left his car) all rushed to the burning wreck, hoping to find the observer and air gunner. Bul­lets were exploding in all directions from the wreckage but the whole thing was so burnt out that no recognisable parts of the aircraft could be found, and there was no sign of the other two of the crew who must have been killed ins­tantaneously. The three searched round the crash while bullets from approaching hostile cars to the north-east were whistling past and others were still coming from the wreckage. The R.A.F. armoured cars returned the enemy fire and the leader went back to his vehicle; as the crew of L.9042 ran for their aircraft they found the cap­tain of the crashed aircraft starting back to­wards the. crash. They pulled him into the front cockpit, took off immediately towards the Fort and started for Base at H.4. Once in the air, the survivor was found to be very badly burnt all over arms, legs and face, and the observer worked at bandaging and applying field dressings and giving him water to drink the whole of the 40 minutes flight back to Base. In spite of the rocks and boulders from which the aircraft had effected the rescue, the only damage sustained from what the observer and air gunner described as an amazing landing and take off, was a da­maged tail unit. In spite of their efforts, how­ever, the captain of L.9174, though conscious on landing, died in the advanced dressing station at H.4 within a few hours of their return.

No. 2. Good Organization.

(From No. 459 Squadron, R.A.A.F., Feb., 1943). This was again a quiet month so far as opera­

tions were concerned, there being 79 sorties for 468 hours—a slight increase on last month. Most of these sorties were routine convoy escorts along the coast, but there were also a.number of sub­marine hunts, in which our a/c co-operated with the Royal Navy. The principal danger areas were in the vicinity of "ABC" and "XYZ," and the Navy eventually had a "kill" off the latter point on the 17th, as detailed in the day-to-day record. As before, almost all our flying was at night, "OO" S.A.A.F. Squadron doing the day work from the same aerodrome. The weather was frequently bad; on two days there was no flying, the land- ing ground becoming u n s e r v i c e b l " "

I l l

heavy rain, and aircraft on patrol often experienc­ed full gales. Nevertheless, this landing ground was more consistently serviceable than many others in the area, and it would seem also that the nuisance of rising sand will probably not be too much in evidence during the spring and summer months. In this respect the unusual rainfall may assist by promoting an extra growth of herbage.

There being a possibility that the Squadron would remain at "X" for some time, plans were made to improve living conditions, and new messes for officers, sergeants and airmen were begun, an Airmen's Messing Committee being formed in the latter case.

In addition, recreational activities flourished. Foremost among these was the very successful sports meeting, as a result of which a combined meeting with neighbouring units was arranged to take place in March. The "X Gaieties", an excel­lent variety show, was conceived, put into re­hearsal and staged within seven days, and the new)y-formed Entertainment Committee prompt­ly started preparations for further shows. The Toe H Circle grew in strength, a Squadron maga­zine began to take shape; educational classes con­tinued; a gymnasium was introduced; and several football matches were played against other units.

Technical Summary. The average serviceability during the month

was 87% and the average number of aircraft held was 12. Serviceability peaks were on the 8th, 11th and 22nd (100%), and the lowest ser­viceability was on the 17th (63%).

The standard of work at Maintenance Units is not all that could be desired, and great strain is added to the routine maintenance in having to rectify all the defects.

As the aircraft are getting older, more spares are wanted, and we have difficulty in keeping essential floating stores. Engine speed altern­ators are still most precious items.

Some of our engines are doing very well; they have even exceeded the Command "engine life" laid down. The engines of "U," "I," "N" and "F" reached well over 380 hours. A total of five en­gines were changed at Major Repair Units dur­ing the month. "A" went down for its second "major" (480 hours).

During the slack period in January, the Elect­rical and Instruments Section built some most elaborate test benches, made out of salvaged equipment and parts of German aircraft.

The long awaited maintenance personnel from Aden returned during the month and are a wel­come addition to the Squadron strength. At the end of the month some ten fitters and riggers were exchanged between the Flights and Main­tenance in order to give the men a more tho­rough training in maintenance.

No. S. Flying Control. (From No. 1 (M.E.) Ferry Control. March, 1943).

During the month of March aircraft continued to use "ABCD" in increasing numbers. 480 air­

craft were booked in at the Watch Office and 500 out. These figures are divided into three classes as follows :—

(a) Reinforcement — 154 In. 161 Out. (b) Air Transport — 238 In. 252 Out. (c) Others. — 88 In. 87 Out. March has been a month of uncertain weather

throughout the Command, but the aerodrome has been unserviceable for a total of ten hours and ten minutes only. Of this time, six and a half hours were on the 21st inst. when an unusually severe sandstorm caused all aerodromes in the area to be closed down for at least a part of the day. Early morning radiation fog accounted for only two hours of the above total. When possible, aircraft have been kept on the ground while the aerodrome was unfit, and others have been suc­cessfully diverted if it has been known that they intended to land here.

There has been very little night flying during the month. A continuous night watch has been kept as usual, and our night flying facilities have been instantly available when required. New Night Flying Instructions for Pilots and A.CPs have been issued and have facilitated the night flying that has been done. The electric flare path has been hampered by the almost system­atic theft of bulbs, but this has decreased notice­ably in the latter part of the month. For use in case of emergency, a complete stand-by flare path made up of glim lamps and goose-neck is laid every night.

During the month a Bendix R/T set was instal­led in the Watch Office. To date this has given a good deal of trouble, but it is anticipated that it will soon be more reliable. The wind-sock has been moved to a position in front of the Watch Office.

Many flares are on demand to implement our night flying stores, but to date these have not been obtained. They would have been of great assistance if they had been available during the heavy sandstorms which we experienced.

There were two accidents on the aerodrome during the month. The first took place when a Spitfire was unable to get its under-carriage down. It made a successful belly-landing in the sand to the side ©f Number Three runway. The second took place during the sandstorm of the 21st inst. when a Blenheim was damaged whilst attempting to land. In neither case were any personnel injured.

It should be noted here that VHF R/T was used to good advantage to direct the Spitfire. Instructions were passed to the pilot by the duty Flying Control Officer and various suggestions were given to the pilot as to how to disengage the under-carriage. When these proved of no avail, he was instructed where to land on the aero­drome. Again on the 19th inst. a Hudson of 216 Squadron forced-landed during a bad sandstorm somewhere to the south of El Daba. A search for this aircraft was organised and directed by the duty Flying Control Officer. In this case

the aircraft was able to take, off the; next -day ments Section^ Wn"en"*It 7s" realised tRat "each and proceeded safely to base." The co-operation of the above movements involved keeping track of the Town Major at El Daba in this matter was of an average of eight aircraft and all their greatly appreciated. movement signals during each aircraft's com-

During the month 695 general movements and plete trip, the amount of work handled by this 79 reinforcements were handled by our Move- Section can be appreciated.

Acknowledgment

is due to the

Officers Commanding

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE,

THE MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE,

THE R.A.F. MIDDLE EAST INTERPRETATION UNIT,

THE R.A.F. MIDDLE EAST FILM

PRODUCTION UNIT,

NUMBER 285 WING,

for their kind permission and co-operation in the production

of material for this number of

THE R.A.F. MIDDLE EAST REVIEW

and also to those Officers who supplied articles

or material or photographs.

113

In the next issue HISTORY

East meets West; the VHIth and 1st Armies join forces; Capture of Kairouan: Axis forces stand at Enfidaville; Initiative switches from VHIth to 1st Army; Bizerta and Tunis Captured; Dunkirk

avenged.

EASTERN M E D I T E R K A I \ E A I

A review of Air and Naval Co-operation, offensive and defensive, from June 1940 until May 1943

THE ORGANISATION BEBIMD MAINTENANCE AN1>

SUPPLY

FLYING CONTROL,

FIELI> DAY IN THE AIR

THE S.A.A.F. EFFORT WITH THE WESTERN DESERT

AIR FORCE - 1941-1 »43

etc.

PREPARED BY

AIR STAFF - OPERATIONS RECORDS

HEADQUARTERS, ROYAL AIR FORCE,

MIDDLE EAST

FOOTNOTE

The basic sources of the information contained in the historical articles are the Sortie Reports (R.A.F. Form HI A), returned by formations under R.A.F. Middle East Instruction Number 3Jf, and the Operations

Record Book, R.A F. Form 5^0.

114

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00514 2534