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EADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST

APRIL-JUNE

MIDDLE EAST

REVIEW IMO3

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST

Contents

Tunisian Finale ... Page 5 Prelude to Invasion ... • )t 41 Tables Showing Scale of Effort „ 59 Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean „ 63 Malta Prepares „ 69 Air /Sea Rescue ' . . . „ 75 The Axis Air Forces in the Middle East, 1940-1943 ;, 88 Flying Control ti 98 The Fight for the Mediterranean „ 107 S.A.A.F. in the Western Desert „ 125 Maintenance and,Supply „ 138 From the 540s „ 145 Acknowledgment M 151 Maps :- The Battle Area—1st April to 14th May, 1943 . . . . . . „ 4

Strategic Bombing „ 40 German Air Force Arrival in Mediterranean Area, 1941 „ 90 Axis Air Force Range—June to November, 1941 ... „ 93

„ „ „ „ July to October, 1942 „ 95 „ „ „ „ at evacuation of Tripolitania,

February, 1943 „ 96 The Eastern Mediterranean „ 108

WFrw.^ liddle East Review is Secret (•= American Confidential). It isTHI/Kh'ded for the information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approved by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within those limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O., H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone out­side the Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc­tion of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised person obtaining possession of a copy should immediately forward it in a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Foreword

T>he events reported in this number

of the R.A.F. Middle East Review were not only the most favourable, but

also the most important for,,the Allied cause which had so far materialised

in the Mediterranean area. The complete clearance of all Axis forces from

North Africa finally removed any threat to the Middle East, opened the.

Mediterranean Sea once more to Allied shipping from Gibraltar to Haifa,

and restored the short sea route via the Suez Canal to India and the Far East.

The period reviewed, the second quarter of 1943, is thus a conclusive

one, and advantage has been taken of the fact to include articles which begin

with Italy's entry into the war,, and to end them as preparations are made

to divorce her from the Axis partnership.

In view of the movement of operations westward and northward from

the Middle East theatre {using that term in its narrowest sense), it lias

been decided to clxange the name of the R.A.F. Middle East Review to the

R.A.F. Mediterranean Review commencing with the next issue, No. 4.

Thus all Mediterranean operations, including those in Italy and southern

Europe, will be legitimately covered in the historical narratives, although the

Review will continue to include domestic aspects of the Middle East opera­

tions from which so many valuable lessons have been learned in the last

three years.

PRINCIPAL ROADS SECONDARY ROADS AND MOTOR TRACKS R Al LWAY 5 SALT LAKES AND MARSHES &? NAME OF PLACE UNDERLINED INDICATES EXISTENCE OF AIRFIELD OR LANDING GROUND

THE

BATTLE AREA 1ST APRIL TO 14TH MAY

1043

Tunisian Finale 1st APRIL TO 14th MAY, 1943

BY THE END of March, 1943, as recounted in the previous issue of the R.A.F. Middle East Review, the Allied armies, supported by the North-west African and Western Desert Air Forces, were closing in on the enemy's Tunisian forces. Meanwhile, Allied bombers based in North-west Africa and Cyrenaica continued their attacks on the enemy's ports, airfields and con­voys, and naval co-operation and defence'•squa­drons controlled the Mediterranean sea-ways.

The following account treats of tRe air activity during the last six weeks of the Tunisian cam­paign, which ended in the enemy's relinquishment of his remaining foothold in Africa.

Continuing the practice previously adopted, the operations of ilfaZta-based aircraft during this period are considered separately elsewhere in the "Revidw."

The Enemy's Unenviable Position By the beginning of April, 1943/the enemy's

position in Tunisia was unenviable. Following the Vinth Army's outflanking of

the Mareth Dine in the last week of March, Rom­mel's battered remnants withdrew to their next delaying point — the Oued Akarit; our pursuing land forces immediately established contact with the enemy at this new position.

Meanwhile, north of the Gafsa - Gabes road American forces, operating east of Guettar, maintained pressure on the enemy's perimeter, although for the moment their advance was checked by enemy armoured units in that area.

In the central sector the Allied forces which had advanced north-east from Sbeitla on 26th March, and had occupied Fondouk] were now threatening Kairouan, the focal point of the road system of the central Tunisian pj^in.

In the north, our land forces had captured Sedjenane on 30th March and occupied Cap Ser­rat two days later. The advance along the Sed-jenane-Mateur road, however, was rendered dif­ficult not only by the enemy's mining of the rold and blowing-up of bridges but by the exceedingly heavy going and bad weather.

The Opposing Air Forces At this stage the German Air Force strength in

Tunisia was estimated at 325 aircraft, including 180 single-engined fighters and 55 fighter-bom­berg. The Italian Tunisian force comprised ap­proximately 100 MC.200/MC.202S. In Southern Italy, Sardinia and Sicily the German Air Force comprised approximately 405 aircraft, of which

about 210 were JU.88/HE.III bombers and tor­pedo-bombers. The Italian air forces in Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily and Pantellaria totalled approxi­mately 545 aircraft; of these the majority of the fighters was based in* Sicily and torpedo bombers in Sardinia. Serviceability was estimated at 50 to 55% for German and 50% for Italian air­craft.

The Allied air forces were now immeasurably stronger than those of the Axis. The Western Desert Air Force squadjpns under the>operational control of the North-west African Air Forces) were located in the Gabes area, as near the enemy's Akarit positions as possible. In this forward area the Force consisted of eight Kittyhawk and five U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­ber squadrons; four Spitfire squadrons (including the Polish Flight) and four U.S. Warhawk squa­drons; one night-flying and one "tank-busting" Hurricane squadrons; five R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bomber and two U.S. Mitchell squadrons; and tactical, strategical and photographic recon­naissance squadrons.

Further east four Wellington squadrons were located at Bir el Gardabia. Two Liberator Groups of the Ninth U.S. Air Force had bases at Berka and Solluch and the R.A.F. Liberator and Halifax squadrons, under the operational control of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, operated from airfields near Solluch and Bir el Gardabia, respectively.

No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group continu­ed to control the sea-ways of the Eastern Medi­terranean and A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Me­diterranean, controlling four groups of fighters based in the Tripoli, Benina, Alexandria and Haifa areas, was responsible for the safety of our land and sea communications from Tunisia to the Levant.

To the west of the enemy's Tunisian perimeter squadrons of the North-west African Tactical Air Force were disposed in order to give full support to our land forces. In particular, six U.S. Spit­fire squadrons, three Hurricane-bomber squa­drons, and seven squadrons of U.S. Warhawks and Airacobras, located in the Thelepte-Sbeitla area, were ready to give close support in the central sector and to the south. Ten R.A.F. Spitfire squadrons were available for operations in the central and northern sectors and a total of thirteen squadrons of U.S. Bostons U.S. Mitchells, and R.A.F. Bisleys were located at Canrobert, Berteaux and Oulmene, respectively.

The Strategic Air Force included three groups of U.S. Fortresses, two of U.S. Mitchells, and one

of U.S. Marauders; night bombing was carried out by two Wellington squadrons. The American bombers operated principally from the Constan­tine area and the Wellingtons from Blida. Bom­ber escort and fighter-bomber commitments were met by six squadrons of U.S. Lightnings.

The Coastal Air'Force was responsible for the safe passage of our Central Mediterranean con­voys, coastal protection and night shipping stri­kes. A total of five Albacore, Hudson and Slwordfish squadrons operated from Tafaroui and Blida and a Marauder squadron was also based in the last named area; three Beaufighter squa­drons operated from Maison Blanche and Setif; and four fighter squadrons1* of Hurricanes and Spitfires had operational bases at Maison Blan­che, Jemmapes and Taher.

Rommel's Forces at Akarit

At the end of March, Rommel's retreating army was establishing itself at^its next delaying posi­tion — the line of natural anti-tank barriers formed by the Oued Akarit and the Fatnassa and Zemlet el Beida hills. In some respects the Aka­rit position can be compared with that at Mareth; in particular, the eastern obstacle in each case was formed by a deep wadi. The water channel in the wadi Akarit was extremely narrow, how­ever, unlike the 50 foot stream in the wadi Zig­zaou which proved such a formidable obstacle during the frontal attack on the Mareth .Line. Above all, the artificial defensive works at Akarit were vastly inferor to those at Mareth.

The Axis troops were disposed in much the same way as at Mareth. The coastal area was held by Italian troops and the junction between them and a further Italian division on their right was cemented by elements of the German 90th Light Division. The rest of the line was held by predominantly Italian forces, with elements of the 90th Light Division guarding the main pass between Djebel Zemlet el Beida and Djebel Hai­doudi. The immediate armoured reserve behind the Akarit line was provided by the 21st Armour­ed Division, while the 15th Armoured Division, located south-west of Skhirra, formed the strate­gical reserve which could be switched to the Akarit or Guettar areas as required. In its tank strength, however, the two divisions were in a bad way and at this stage it was estimated that about 50 runners only were available. An even greater weakness was the paucity of German infantry in the front line.

Air Activity Prior to VHIth Army's Advance

For the first five days of April, after the bustle of the withdrawal and chase from the Mareth Line, both Rommel's forces and the VIHth Army concentrated on preparing for a renewal of the battle.

During this short lull the Western Desert Air Force limited the enemy's fighter activity by attacks on his landing grounds behind the Akarit position, retained mastery of the air o\

southern battlefield, and "softened", to some ex­tent, the enemy's Akarit defences.

On 1st April attacks were renewed on Sfax el Maou airfield, the enemy's most southerly Tuni­sian landing ground, in order to limit the opera­tions of ME.109s and MC.202s over the Akarit area. At this time, also, Sicilian-based JU.88s and ME.210s were probably using Sfax as an advanced landing ground when operating in the southern sector. Our attack was carried out by eighteen iS.A.A.F. Bostons, 54 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores and fourteen U.S. Mitchells, flying in three formations; escort was provided by Spit­fires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. Bombs hurst across the landing and dispersal areas, causing fires, and near misses were scored on aircraft and buildings.

The following day, 2nd April, the light bombers and fighter-bombers turned their attention to the enemy's Akarit positions. Five attacks were made, by a total of 98 escorted Allied bombers and three by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers. In general, results were not observed, although some fires were seen to break out and at least one hit was scored on an 88 mm. gun position. Proof that targets were difficult to locate is shown by the fact that later 63 U.S. Warhawks made seven armed reconnaissances over the Akarit area without making any at­tacks.

For the follpwing three days bad weather limit­ed our air attacks on military targets. Apart from small-scale fighter-bomber attacks on enemy transport vehicles and a raid on Zitouna landing ground, the only attack of note was that made by five Halifaxes and 31 Wellingtons, with Albacore illumination, on Sfax (the principal coastal town behind the Akarit position) on the night 4th/5th April. Hits were scqred on the railway station, barracks and factories north of the town.

R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Spitfires definitely held the upper hand in the days before the VIHth Army's attack. On 2nd April, Spitfires on of­fensive patrols over the southern battle area shot down five ME.109s and damaged three others without loss, and two days later they destroyed two ME. 109s and damaged a FW.190, again wit.-i no Spitfire casualties.

Meanwhile, .No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. main­tained its reconnaissances of the Akarit defences and No. 680 Squadron covered the enemy's land­ing ground and Sfax harbour.

Enemy Resistance in the El Guettar Sector

While the VHIth Army was preparing to launch its attack, the American forces operating east of El Ghiettar continued to press on the enemy's western flank. Rommel, well aware of the seriousness of the threat from this quarter, switched over armoured units which checked any further advance of the American forces and, in fact^ regained some high ground in the vicinity

" bel Kreroua.

U.S. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force main­tained air superiority over the El Ghiettar battle area. On 1st April, for example, three JU.88s were shot down over El Guettar and three more near Bou Hamran. Successes against enemy fighters included two ME.109s destroyed, one pro­bably destroyed and three damaged in combats fought over the area Sebkret Sidi Mannsour -Djebel Idarine, and the destruction of one ME.109 and the damaging of another caught straffing American troops east of El Guettar. Three Spitfires failed to return. On the 3rd, fourteen JU.87s were destroyed near Djebel Berda for the loss of one Spitfire; on this occasion, although the Stukas were escorted by FW.190s and ME.109s one half-hearted attack only was made by a single ME.109.

Attacks on Central Sector Landing Grounds At the beginning of April it was estimated

that the enemy had approximately 120 fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft based at the various landing grounds in the vicinity of Sfax, La Fau­connerie and El Djem for operations in the southern and central sectors of the Tunisian battlefield. In addition, the El Djem airfield ac­commodated a number of JU.87s and was re­gularly used by Sicilian-based JU.88s and ME.210s when operating in Tunisia,.

Mention has already been made of the bombing of Sfax el Maou airfield by aircraft of the West­ern Desert Air Force; attacks were now inten­sified on La Fauconnerie and El Djem landing grounds by U.S. Bostons, and U.S. Mitchells of the North-west African Air Forces.

In all, during the first week of April, over 250 Bostons and nine Mitchells were despatched to attack La Fauconnerie airfield and approximately 50 Mitchells and 50 Bostons against El Djem. Most of the formations were escorted by strong forces of U.S. Spitfires or U.S. Warhawks. In practically every attack bomb bursts were ob­served in the dispersal areas and, in certain cases, more specifically among parked aircraft .

1 Combats with enemy fighters yielded a "bag" of nine destroyed, seven "probables" and about ten damaged. Intense flak was encountered over the two airfields which, rather than the enemy's air opposition, accounted for the loss of about 2% of the U.S.. bombers and seven escorting fighters; in addition, at least 20 aircraft were damaged.

These attacks on the enemy's landing grounds at La Fauconnerie and El Djem, prior to and during the battle of Akarit, considerably lessened .the enemy's air activity over the southern and central battle areas.

Plan for Dislocating Enemy's Air Transport System

In the previous issue of the R.A.F. Middle East Review mention was made of the part played by the enemy's air transport force in rushing men, material and supplies to Tunisia immediately af­ter the Anglo-American North African

Jmerit • during the first three months oT <T$i;$fi$6r the purpose of sup­plementing sea-borne reinforcements and sup­plies. By the end of March the JU.52 and ME.323 traffic between Italy, Sicily and Tunisia was reaching its peak; an average of well over 100 transport aircraft arrived daily in Northern Tunisia during the last days of the month.

Many transport aircraft had already been de­stroyed in the Allied air forces' heavy raids on the enemy's Tunisian and Sicilian airfields and an appreciable number had been caught en route to Tunisia, particularly by U.S. Lightnings escort­ing U. S. Mitchells and U. S. Marauders on shipping strikes. Early in February, however, a plan was conceived for the complete dislocation of the enemy's Mediterranean air transport system, but it was held in abeyance partly in order to accumulate more intelligence on which to gauge the position of the enemy's transport aircraft at given times but more especially so that the blow could be given at a time most critical to the enemy. The information essential to the planning of the operation related to the size of the enemy's air transport formations and escorts, their airports of departure and arrival and intermediate stopping places, the time-tabies and routes followed, and the scale of enemy fighter cover from Tunisia. On this intelligence was formulated a plan for the interception of enemy transport formations en route to Tunisia and concerted attacks on the landing grounds where they were accommodated.

The Plan in Operation The plan was implemented on 5th April. In

all, twelve missions were flown by the North­west African Strategic Air Force; six missions were flown by 142 U.S. Lightnings, four by 91 U.S. Fortresses and two by U.S. Mitchells. In addition, R.A.F. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force carried out offensive sweeps in the Tunis and Bizeta areas and provided fighter cover for U.S. Fortresses attacking the airfields in these areas.

The attacks opened when 26 U.S. Lightning or a fighter sweep over the Sicilian Straits inter­cepted a large formation of 50 to 70 JU.52s and six JU.87s, escorted by ME.109s, FW.190s and FW.187s, heading for Tunisia. The Lightnings shot down eleven JU.52s, two JU.87s, two ME.109S and one FW.187; two Lightnings failed to return.

A little later, eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Lightnings, successfully attacked an enemy convoy, while the Lightnings engaged the aerial cover; seven JU.52s, three JU.87s, three ME.109s, one ME.210, and one ME.110 were de­stroyed. Four Lightnings were reported as missing.

Shortly afterwards, UJS. bombers attacked the main airfields in the Bizerta and Tunis areas. Eighteen Fortresses dropped 2,448 x 20 lb. frag­mentation bombs on Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) and

tion nf 23 Fortresses dropped 3,312

Milo-Trapani airfield und: ortresses, Sth April, 1943 . . .

x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs on El Aouina (Tunis) airfield. In the latter attack, bombs were dropped on about 30 parked aircraft, mostly transports, and hangars were also hit. In each case R.A.F. Spitfires provided fighter cover.

The Sicilian landing grounds concerned were attacked by U.S. Mitchells and U.S. Fortresses. Thirty-six UJSi. Mitchells, escorted by U.S. Light­nings, dropped fragmentation bombs on 80 to 90 badly dispersed aircraft on Bo Rizzo airfield. In combats with enemy fighters six M.E. 109s were shot down; two Mitchells, however, were forced

down into the sea. Meanwhile, U.S. Fortresses attacked the airfields at Bocca di Falco (Palermo) and Milo (Trapani). At Bocca di Falco, bombs were dropped on 100 to 150 aircraft dispersed along the edges of the airfield. These areas were well covered with bursts and several huge fires could be seen for 100 miles on the return journey. The Fortresses destroyed two ME. 109s and one MC.200 in combat without loss to themselves. At Milo, the escorting U.S. Lightnings reported that 52 transport aircraft and bombers were destroyed on the ground.

and after

In the course of the afternoon 54 U.S. light­nings covered the Sicilian Straits, but no enemy enemy aircraft were sighted.

Results of First Operation

As a result of the day's operations 40 enemy aircraft were shot down and, after an examina­tion of photographs taken by reconnaissance air­craft, it was estimated that a further 161 air­craft, including many transport types, were des­troyed on the Tunisian and Sicilian airfields. Allied losses were three aircraft definitely des­troyed and six missing.

On several other occasions in April the same principles of timing and interception were used as in the original operation recounted above and equally striking results were achieved. These supplementary operations against the enemy's air transport system are dealt with chronologi­cally.

The Akarit Defences Stormed

In the early morning of 6th April the Vlllth Army launched a frontal attack on the enemy's Akarit defences. Although the enemy had de­voted six days to the final strengthening of the line the position was held for one day only.

The action was by no means a "walk-over" for the VTIIth Army, however, and fierce opposition was encountered, particularly at the pass over the Djebel Fatnassa and the northern end of the Djebel Roumana. This latter point, in fact, was in the enemy's hands until the late afternoon, due to the resistance of the German armoured units, including the 15th Armoured Division which had moved south from Skhirra when the battle was joined.

While our land forces were making their initial attack 78 Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers, escorted by Spitfires, all of the Western Desert Air Force, carried out armed reconnais­sances over the enemy's positions; trucks filled with troops were machine-gunned west of Oued Akarit and transport vehicles and gun. positions were bombed in the hills 25 miles east of El Gruettar. Confirmation was also obtained of the reports made by tactical reconnaissance aircraft of No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. on the enemy's reac­tions to the Vlllth Army's attacks.

Later in the day, when the enemy attempted to counter-attack at two points north of Oued Akarit, five attacks were delivered on enemy concentrations in these areas by 54 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons and Baltimores and eighteen U.S. Mitchells, escorted by Spitfires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks. Five additional attacks were carried out by over 100 Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers. Apart from a number of fires which were seen to break out, however, details of the damage inflicted could not be ob­served.

"Tank-busters" of No. 6 Squadron had a rather disappointing day: three armed reconnaissances were made for reported enemy tanks, but one

Mark III tank only was located and forthwith destroyed.

Towards evening, vehicles began to retire north­wards from Oued Akarit and by nightfall the enemy's withdrawal was in full swing. The de­fection of the Italians, of whom 5,000 were cap­tured on the one day, and the defeat of the in­adequate German infantry had rendered the po­sition untenable.

The enemy transport vehicles moving north­wards along the coast during the evening were straffed by Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks of the Western Desert Air Force, and Spitfires pa­trolling the area reported nine large fires burning simultaneously among vehicles near Skhirra. One Kittyhawk and four U.S. Warhawks failed to return.

During the one-day battle continuous offensive patrols over the Akarit area were maintained by 161 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Spitfires. One large escorted formation of Stukas was intercepted and their attack broken up and there were several engagements with small formations of enemy fighters. In all, the Spitfires shot down two ME.109s and one MC.202, probably destroyed two ME.109s and damaged three others without loss; in addition three JU.87s and one ME.109 were destroyed by our anti-aircraft fire.

The collapse of Axis resistance before the Vlllth Army compelled the enemy in the El Guet­tar and Faid sectors to join in the retreat and left the 2nd U.S. Corps in possession of the battle­field. The Allied armies in Tunisia were now able to form one continuous front, with a resul­tant improvement in co-ordination and flexibility.

The Pursuit to Enfidaville

Rommel's forces were on the move again, this time to EnfidaviUe, where a natural defensive line was provided by the hills which run west­wards to join the Grande Dorsale ridge in the Djebel Fkirine area. This line of defence, made more formidable by anti-tank ditches and pro­tective works, linked up with the enemy's posi­tions to the north-west, thus forming the final bridgehead. Within lay the coastal plain — and Tunis.

On 7th April the VIII Army began its six day pursuit which covered 150 miles. The advance was delayed more by the difficulties of the terrain and problems of supply than by enemy rearguard, actions. The stages of the pursuit were marked by our occupation of the coastal towns; Mahares fell on the 9th, Sfax on the 10th and Sousse on the 12th.

From the commencement of the enemy's with­drawal on the night of 6/7th April until the night of the 8/9th the Western Desert Air Force light bombers and fighters attacked the retreating enemy columns by day and heavy and medium bombers of No. 205 Group bombed both the ene­my's vehicles and coastal towns by night. On 9th and 10th April targets had thinned out in the southern sector and, in addition, bad weather

limited offensive operations. Therea were switched to the enemy's airfieldsTbehln Enfidaville defences.

During the night 6/7th April attacks were de­livered by 69 Wellingtons; 21 of the medium bombers concentrated on bombing Sfax where the railway sidings, the phosphate quay and stores depot were hit and the remainder attacked enemy transport, particularly in the Mahares area. Dur­ing the night, also, eight Bisleys of the Tactical Air Force bombed vehicles on the roads near Sfax and Sousse but results were unobserved. Five Halifaxes and 53 Wellingtons repeated their pro­gramme on the following night, with the help of flare-dropping Albacores; on this occasion, how­ever, Sfax town received less attention, the main attacks being made against vehicles and convoys en route. The next night, 8/9th April, five Hali­faxes and 50 Wellingtons extended the attacks to Sousse, again with the help of flare-dropping Al­bacores. The heavy bombers and a fifth of the medium bombers attacked targets in the town itself and the remainder attacked a landing ground, transport, roads and camps in the vici­nity of El Djem and Djemmal.

Meanwhile, during the hours of daylight on 7th and 8th April, the Western Desert Air Force bombers and fighters harassed the enemy's re­treating columns incessantly. On the 7th, conti­nuous attacks were delivered by a total of 124 Allied light-bombers, heavily escorted by Kitty-

t targets were loca-El Guettar to J3fax,

along which ~enemy*ffWeP^ere retiring in order to avoid being cut off by our troops advancing from the south. Hurricane "tank-busters" also operated on this day, setting on fire at least two tanks; anti-aircraft fire, however, was intense and three Hurricane IIDs did not return. The following day, the attacks were intensified on the enemy vehicles withdrawing to Sfax along the coastal road and over the tracks from Mezzouna. Eleven attacks were made by 162 Allied bofribers while 300 Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks straff­ed and bombed the retreating columns from dawn to dusk. One Kittyhawk and four U.S. War-hawks- did not return. A conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on enemy vehicles by the bombing and machine-gun attacks on 7th and 8th April was 130 destroyed and 200 damaged.

During these two days enemy air opposition in the southern coastal area was slight, due to the abandonment of forward landing grounds. Such fighters as did appear, however, were engaged by patrolling Western Desert Air Force Spitfires; three ME.109s and one ME.110 were shot down, one ME.109 probably destroyed and three da­maged for the loss of one Spitfire.

In addition to the attacks mentioned in the preceding paragraphs American aircraft of the Tactical Air Force on 7th April attacked the enemy forces which were forced to withdraw from

Road and rail bridges over the wadi Akarit destroyed by the enemy before retreating.

11

the El Guettar sector when the A karit defences had been over-run.

Most of the attacks were delivered against the enemy columns retreating through the Djebel Chemsi Pass, east of El Guettar. In this restrict­ed area attacks were made by two formations of escorted Warhawk-bombers, twelve escorted Bos­tons and twelve escorted Mitchells. In particular, the Bostons dropped bombs on 40 to 50 closely-packed trucks and a large column of black smoke was seen issuing from the burning vehicles when the American aircraft left the scene.

Even more effective were two attacks delivered by twelve escorted Bostons and 36 Warhawks on enemy columns east of Maknassy. The Bostons bombed two large concentrations of vehicles held up by a road block and reported damage to nearly 100 vehicles. The Warhawks bombed and straffed a column of vehicles, causing over twenty fires; five Warhawks failed to return from this mission.

Attacks on Enemy Columns Continued From the afternoon of 9th April Rommel's re­

treating forces sought to escape the attacks of the Western Desert Air Force by accelerating the rate of their withdrawal. The enemy columns approaching Enfidaville and those vehicles con­tinuing northwards were then attacked by aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces.

These fresh attacks on the enemy's retreating columns were initiated on 9th April by fifteen Hurricane-bombers, escorted by Spitfires; bursts were observed on transport vehicles and among troops. During the night the attacks' were con­tinued by fifteen Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force which dropped 21 tons of bombs on troops and vehicle concentrations on the roads around Enfidaville. Attacks on road junctions in the area were also made by two French Leo 45s of the Huitieme Groupement.

•

The following day, 10th April, the attacks on Rommel's forces were intensified. Six attacks were made by well-escorted formations of Hur­ricane, Spitfire and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­bers, and U.S. Marauders and U.S. Bostons flew ten and 45 sorties respectively. The fighter-bombers concentrated particularly on troop car­riers which were first bombed and then straffed; the results observed indicated that numerous ve­hicles, including petrol bowsers, were destroyed or immobilised and many casualties inflicted on troops. The Marauders attacked vehicle concen­trations on the coastal road from Sousse to Bou Ficha and scored hits on a supply dump and gun emplacements. The Bostons, escorted by Spit­fires, successfully attacked truck convoys approa­ching Enfidaville. Throughout the night the attacks on the enemy columns were continued by 59 Bisleys and four French Leo 45s.

On the 11th, the attacks were renewed by two escorted formations of Hurricane and U.S. War-hawk fighter-bombers and over

escorted by Spitfires. The Hurricane-bomber at­tack was particularly successful; after dropping their bombs the Hurricanes and escorting Spit­fires shot up about 50 vehicles and left them in flames. Intense flak was now being encountered over the Enfidaville area and three Hurricane-bombers were shot down. When the day raids had finished, fifteen Wellingtons took over and attacked general targets in the area Enfidaville - Bou Ficha - Zaghouan.

Rommel's retreating forces had now completed their long trek from Oued Akarit to Enfidaville. The Allied air attacks in this battle area were then turned against those enemy landing grounds which had acquired importance due to the ene­my's loss of airfields in the south. These attacks are considered on pages 15 to 17.

Allied Advance in the Central Sector During the first week in April the Allied land

forces had maintained a steady pressure against the enemy in the Pichon and Fondouk areas, in the central sector of the Tunisian battlefield. There were, however, no major engagements. The air activity on either side was also subdued: U.S. Airacobras, Warhawks and Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force carried out offensive sweeps over the area, extending as far as Kairouan to the east and Faid to the south, but, in general, there was "nothing to report." Reconnaissance missions over the area were also carried out by the U.S. 3rd Photographic Group.

While the retreat of the Axis troops in the south was in progress after the battle of Akarit, our pressure in the central sector increased. In spite of strong enemy resistance, the high ground dominating Fondouk was occupied on 9th April. During the day U.S. Spitfires and U.S. War-hawks of the Tactical Air Force carried out of­fensive sweeps over the Pjchon - Fondouk - Kai­rouan area, but no enemy air activity was re­ported until the evening, when 24 U.S. Spitfires intercepted sixteen JU.88s. Eight enemy bombers were destroyed, three probably destroyed and one damaged for the loss of one Spitfire.

The following day, 10th April, British armour­ed units advanced along the Fondouk - Kairouan road and successfully engaged a force of enemy tanks south of Kairouan. On the 11th our arm-our routed another enemy tank force to the north of the town; later in the day Kairouan was oc­cupied and our forward units reached Sbikha.

American aircraft of the Tactical Air Force rendered support by attacks on enemy transport vehicles and communications. On the 10th, eleven Bostons bombed vehicles on the road near El Alem, north-east of Kairouan. The next day, 24 escorted Warhawk-bombers attacked enemy transport, including troop carriers, on the roads north-east of Kairouan, nine escorted Bostons attacked vehicles north of El Alem and twelve escorted Bostons bombed a bridge in the same area.

Our Threat From Medjez The threat to the enemy did not come from the

south only. While the Allied armies were ad­vancing in the southern and central sectors our land forces operating north-west of Medjez el Bab were making steady progress. Spectacular ad­vances, however, could not be expected in such mountainous country.

On 9th April Chaouach was captured and the next day an advance was also made in the high ground south-east of Medjez. The enemy realis­ed the seriousness of our threat and rushed up his best remaining reserves in the northern sector. In spite of the enemy's increased re­sistance, however, our troops had pushed north­wards to Djebel Ang by the 15th. Thereafter our advance was halted for a time.

The Allied air activity over the Medjez area during the first fortnight in April consisted prin­cipally of fighter sweeps and tactical and pho­tographic reconnaissances by R.A.P. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force. In the absence of large concentrations of enemy vehicles the Allied bombers were not required to render close sup­port to our land forces; ground attacks, how­ever, were delivered by R.A.F. Hurricane-bom­bers and Spitfires whenever suitable targets could be located.

The Spitfires' most successful interceptions over the Medjez area occurred on 7th April. During the afternoon twelve Spitfires were scrambled to intercept fifteen JU.87s, escorted by ME.109s, north-west of Oued Zarga. On sighting the Spitfires, the Stukas jettisoned their bombs and in the ensuing combats five of them were destroyed, four probably destroyed and one damaged. A few minutes later, twelve Spitfires of No. 232 Squadron, on a fighter sweep over Medjez, sighted three more Stukas and shot them down. After this engagement the Squadron turned southwards to Pont du Fahs, where two more Stukas were seen; one of the enemy dive-bombers was destroyed- and the other was damag­ed. In the above-mentioned combats there were no Spitfire casualties.

During the last week in April our threat from Medjez became more serious. The heavy fight­ing which then broke out in this area is referred to on page 21.

Massacre of Enemy's Air Transport Continued

While the enemy was retreating from the south and was being hard pressed in the central and northern sectors the plan for .dislocating the enemy's air transport system was again put info operation.

During the morning of 10th April a fighter sweep was made over the Sicilian Straits by U.S. Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force in two flights, twelve aircraft on the deck and eight at 1,000 feet. A formation of about 50 JU.52s, with a fighter cover of approximately fifteen MC.200S and FW.190S, was encountered. The lower flight of Lightnings shot down 20 transport

aircraft and the upper flight destroyed eight of the enemy fighters.

Shortly after noon, eighteen U.S. Mitchells of the Strategic Air Force, escorted by 21 U.S. Lightnings, on a shipping sweep ten miles north of Cape Bon, intercepted a formation of 25 JU.52s, accompanied' by a number of JU.88s, M.E.llOs, JU.87s and ME. 109s, heading for Tunis. The Mitchells shot down ten JU.52s and two JU.88s without loss to themselves, and the Light­nings destroyed ten more JU.52s, a JU.88, a ME.110 and a ME.109. One Lightning collided with the ME.110 and crashed. Most of the trans­port aircraft attacked burst into flames and ex­ploded, indicating that they were carrying oil and petrol which were more than ever urgently re­quired by the Axis' forces after the battle of Akarit.

In addition to the two operations recounted above, R.A.F. Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force on a fighter sweep in the Tunis - Bizerta area shot down four more JU.52s. Two Spitfires fail­ed to return.

The following morning, 11th April, nineteen U.S; Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force, dur­ing a fighter sweep over the Sicilian Straits, met about 20 JU.52s and an unidentified transport aircraft, with an escort of miscellaneous aircraft, off Cape Bon en route to Tunis. All 21 transports and five other enemy aircraft were destroyed within a few minutes. Three Lightnings were lost in this encounter.

Later in the morning, another U.S. Lightning formation shot down five JU.52s south of Marettimo Island for the loss of one Lightning.

Thus, on 10th and 11th April, at the time when the Axis armies were being pushed back into the Tunisian Tip, 71 enemy transport and eighteen escorting aircraft were destroyed. This further massacre of the JU.52s seriously hindered the enemy's attempt to rush in supplies to his hard-pressed Tunisian forces.

Sinking of the "Trieste" At the beginning of April there were three

heavy cruisers, each with a standard displace­ment of 10,000 tons and having a main battery of 8 inch guns, left in the Italian navy—the "Trieste", "Gorizia" and "Bolzano". The last-named ship, however, had been previously damag­ed and was undergoing repairs.

Following reports received from the North­west African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing that the heavy cruisers "Trieste" and "Gorizia" were located at La Maddalena Naval Base, Northern Sardinia, three attacks were made by U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force on 10th April.

In all, 84 effective Fortress sorties were carried out: the first two formations comprising 60 air­craft dropped a total of 360 x 1,000 lb. (.1 and .025 delay) bombs on the two cruisers and the remaining bombers dropped 287 x 500 lb (.1 and .025 delay) bombs on the submarine base and harbour installations. Both cruisers received

1 H several direct hits and near mis caused the sinking of the "Trieste" and damage to the "Gorizia".

Three days later, on 13th April, three U.S. Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force made a further attack on the "Gorizia" dropping three 1,000 lb. (.1 and .025 delay) bombs from 3,000 feet. One hit on the cruiser's stern and two near misses were scored.

The "Gorizia", although badly damaged by the Fortress and Lightning attacks, managed to

| Where the "Bolzano" was being repaired. Attacks on this port were then made by aircraft of the R.A.F. Bomber Command on the night 13/14th April.

Thus, due to the successful attacks of the Strategic Air Force on the 10th and 13th April the Italian fleet was left without a single service­able heavy cruiser.

The other successful shipping strikes by air­craft of the North-west African Air Forces dur­ing April are dealt with on pages 22 to 24.

The "Trieste" protected by tor

14

The Blitz on Tunisian Airfields As a result of the withdrawal to Enfidaville

and his loss of territory in the Kairouan area the enemy was obliged to abandon at least 22 landing grounds in the southern and central sectors.

Many unserviceable aircraft were perforce left behind in the lost areas; the remainder was trans­ferred principally to landing grouds which already existed, or were hastily prepared, in the rear of the Enfidaville defences and in the Cape Bon pe­ninsula. In particular1, the landing grounds at St,

Marie du Zit, Oudna, Korba, liman and Megrine (Fochville) now acquirer! in­creased importance. Advantage was accordingly taken of the lull m the ground fighting to deliver heavy air attacks on these landing grounds, so that the enemy's air effort would be at a mini­mum when the final battle commenced. Aircraft under the operational control of the Western De­sert Air Force concentrated solely on the landing grounds in N.E. Tunisia while the North-west African Air Forces attacked the main air bases

at BisefW eRKTfunis in addition to these landing grounds.

Apart from an attack on Enfidaville landing ground by eighteen U.S. Mitchells on 10th April and one on Korba south landing ground by 35 R.A.F. Baltimores and eighteen U.S. Mitchells on the 19th, all the attacks of the Western Desert Air Force light bombers and heavy and medium bombers of No. 205 Group were carried out at night. From the night 10/llth to 23/24th April, with the exception Qf two occasions when bad

weather caused the cancellation of operations, the enemy's landing grounds received nightly visits from our bombers. In the course of the twelve nights bombers under the operational control of the Western Desert Air Force flew four heavy, 423 medium and 168 light bomber effective sorties against the enemy's landing grounds in N.E. Tu­nisia. The heaviest attacks were delivered against the airfields at St. Marie du Zit and Korba. Against the former, where dive-bombers as well as fighters were based, two heavy, 140

ste" after bombing.

16

medium and 105 light bomber sorties were made, and against the latter 101 medium and seventeen light bomber sorties. Other landing grounds at­tacked included those at Creteville, Menzel Temi­me and 8 oilman.

Although there was sometimes difficulty in lo­cating the target and haze and low cloud often hampered the observation of results, it was evident from the fires and explosions caused and the subsquent reports of reconnaissance aircraft that considerable damage was inflicted on dis­persed aircraft, petrol dumps, buildings and run­ways.

Meanwhile, from the 11th to 22nd/33rd April attacks were being delivered on the enemy's land­ing grounds, both by day and night, by the North­west African Air Forces. The night attacks were delivered principally by Bisleys and the day at­tacks by American bombers—Fortresses, Mit­chells, Marauders, and Bostons. In addition, two attacks were delivered by Hurricane and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers. Cover and escort for the day bombers was provided by Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force.

With the exception of one attack on Megrine (Fochville) airfield by nineteen Wellingtons on 12/13th April and a few sorties by French Leo 45s, the North-west African ^ Air Forces' night attacks were carried out by Bisleys, which flew approximately 150 ̂ effective sorties. The Bisleys' main targets were the landing grounds at La Sebala and La Marsa but their heaviest, and per­haps most successful, attack was that on Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta) airfield during the clear night Qf 19/20th April, when -56 effective sorties were flown.

From 11th to 19th April a daily average of two U.S. Mitchell formations (each of eighteen air­craft) made attacks and these were supplemented on several days by U.S. Marauder and U.S. Bos­ton attacks; the bombers were escorted by Spit­fires in all case. Oudna landing ground, south of Turns, was the main target, but the landing grounds at St. Marie du Zit and La Sebala also received attention. In addition, on the 14th, 24 U.S. Fortresses attached El Aouina. (Tunis) airfield, dropping 2,742 x 20 lbs. fragmentation bombs. In practicallly all the attacks the land­ing grounds were covered with bursts and many fires were caused. Enemy fighter opposition was slight, but on several occasion damage was inflicted on the bombers by intense flak.

The North-west African Air Forces' attacks reached their climax on 20th April, when an all-out effort was made to pin down and destroy enemy aircraft during the vni th Army's attack recounted on page 18. Throughout the day co­ordinated attacks were made by heavily-escorted formations of bombers and fighter-bombers. The enemy had now withdrawn many aircraft from his landing grounds immediately behind the Enfi­davtile defences and in the Cape Bon peninsula and had dispersed them on numerous landing grounds in the territory between Turns and Bizer­

to. Accordingly, apart from the heavy' attacks on La Marsa airfield (near Tunis) and Sidi Ahmed airfield (Bizerta) the weight of the attacks were against the landing grounds at Prot­ville (northwest of Tunis), Mabtouha (west of Protville), La Sebala (north-west of Tunis) and Creteville (south-east of Tunis). ' La Marsa and Sidi Ahmed were each attacked

by 23 U.S. Fortresses, escorted by Spitfires; an­other Fortress formation which set out later to bomb Sidi Ahmed encountered solid overcast from 8,000 to 28,000 feet over the target and was oblig­ed to abandon the mission. During the attacks on La Marsa and Sidi Ahmed bomb bursts were observed in each case all over the target area and at Sidi Ahmed, where visibility was good in the morning, many fires were seen. An exami­nation by N.A.C.I.U. of the results achieved in the attacks on the 20th revealed that the attack on La Marsa airfield was the most successful of the whole series. Meanwhile, U.S. Mitchells made four attacks on the landing grounds at Mabtou­ha, La Sebala and Protville and U.S. Marauders attacked Creteville landing ground. A feature of the Fortress and Mitchell attacks was the dropp­ing of thousands of pamphlets, chiefly in German, in the target areas. The most frequent attacks during the day, however, were carried out by escorted formations of U.S. Bostons, which main­tained a shuttle-service principally against the landing grounds in the Mabtouha and Protville areas. In general, although some of the landing grounds were difficult to locate, the results achieved were good and .many hits and near misses were scored on aircraft on the ground.

The excellent work of the escorting Spitfires is shown by the fact that only one Mitchell fail­ed to return and another forced-landed; neither casualty, however, appeared to be due to enemy air action. In combats with the enemy the es­corting Spitfires shot down at least six fighters and probably destroyed several more; four Spit­fires were reported missing. In addition to pro­viding escort for the bomber formations through­out the day, Spitfires of the Tactical Air Force flew nine fighter sweeps aggregating 162 sorties. In all, on 20th April, aircraft of the North-west African Strategical and Tactical Air Forces flew over 1,000 sorties. The attacks seriously limited the enemy's air effort at a critical period: during the remaining weeks of the campaign the ene­my's Tunisian airfields were attacked on a num­ber of occasions but heavy concerted attacks were never again necessary.

Further Blows to Enemy's Air Transport

During the latter half of April fighters of the Western Desert Air Force carried out a series of attacks which virtually gave the coup de gra­ce to the enemy's Mediterranean air transport system.

On the afternoon of the 18th, 46 U.S. War-hawks, with R.A.F. Spitfires as high cover, on offensive patrol ,pver the Gulf qf Tunis* intercept­

17

ed about 100 JU.52s, strongly escorted by" fighters, heading north-east near Cape Bon. In all, 74 enemy aircraft were shot down, compris­ing 58 JU.52s, fourteen ME.109s and 110s and two MC.202s. The beaches and sea were litter­ed with wreckage and eighty per cent of the air­craft shot down burst into flames. Allied los­ses were six U.S. Warhawks and one Spitfire.

The following day, 19th April, formations of Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks, with a Spitfire top cover, again carried out fighter sweeps over the Gulf of Tunis with the object of intercepting enemy transport aircraft. About 20 well-escort­ed JU.52s were encountered in the early morn­ing: twelve of the transport aircraft and three of the escort were destroyed and four more JU. 52s and one S.79 were probably destroyed. We lost one Kittyhawk. As a result of subsequent engagements with smaller formations of enemy aircraft, one JU.87 towing a glider and one JU. 88 and two ME.109S were destroyed, one JU.87 was probably destroyed and one ME.109 damag­ed. Five Spitfires and two U.S. Warhawks did not return from these later operations.

These further blows gainst the enemy's JU.52s practically stopped their traffic by day; during the remander of the campaign their main em­ployment was by night and on a limited scale only. Night-flying Hurricanes and Beaufighters then made these night trips exceedingly hazar­dous.

In view of the heavy land fighting mentioned in the following pages, the enemy was now in the utmost need of supplies, particularly fuel. As a result of the Allied fighters' successful attacks on 18th and 19th April, the enemy feared to risk his depleted JU.52 force for the transportation of supplies; on the other hand, the requirements of his Tunisian forces were too pressing to be entrusted entirely to sea-transport, which, more­over, was susceptible to both naval and air at­tacks.

The decision was taken to rush in immediate supplies and reinforcements by ME.323s. The enemy's venture failed entirely, however, as this heavily escorted formation of 31 huge transport aircraft was intercepted over the Gulf of Tunis on 22nd April by an offensive patrol of two and a half squadrons of Spitfires and five squadrons of Kittyhawks. All the ME.323s were shot down and nine ME.109s, one MC.202 and one RE.2001 were also destroyed. These successes were gain­ed for loss of four Kittyhawks. Most of the ME.322s were obviously carrying petrol as they immediately burst into flames when attacked. The enemy thus lost the greater part of his total ME.323 force in a single day.

The seriousness of the loss to the enemy of at least 70 JU.52s and 31 ME.323s at this juncture can hardly be over-emphasised. The load of a JU.52 making the Sicily to Tunis trip was ap­proximately two and a half tons and that of a ME.323 approximately ten tons. In the early days of April an estimated average of 150 JU.52

"ahS" eight ME.323 trips were made daily, re­presenting the transport of 455 tons per day. During the second half of April it was estimated that the enemy required a minimum of 40,000 tons of supplies monthly to sustain his effort in Tunisia. If the enemy's transport aircraft sorties had been maintained on the scale mentioned above nearly a third of the minimum tonnage could have been transported by air. In the last week of April, however, the enemy's air trans­port traffic had practically ceased as a result of the attacks mentioned in the preceding para­graphs and on pages 7 and 13. Ilie risk had to be taken of transporting more and more supplies by sea. The Allied air attacks on the Axis shipping and ports, which prevented a large part of the supplies and reinforcements from reaching the enemy's forces, are dealt with on pages 22 to 28 and 30.

Enemy Resistance on Villth Army Front

During the night 19/20th April the VIHth Army launched an attack on the enemy's Enfida­ville positions. The enemy's chief centres of re­sistance were the Takrouna Hill and the Djebel Garci. Takrouna Hill, on account of its preci­pitous sides, proved a difficult obstacle; the enemy units holding it, in fact, had had to use rope ladders in some places to scale the rocks. For two days the enemy resisted stubbornly, but by the 22nd the feature was entirely in our hands. Meanwhile, Enfidaville, which was not strongly held, was occupied by our troops on the 20th and patrols were pushed out in the flat country to the north. ,

The attack on Djebel Garci proved even more difficult than that on Takrouna Hill. In spite of fierce enemy counter-attacks our land forces retained their hold on the southern slopes but the enemy, who were mainly Italians, continued to occupy the summit and northern side.

The Villth Army's initial attack, unlike those of the previous six months, was not preceded or supported by heavy air attacks. Reconnaissances of the enemy's positions were carried out by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. and fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force made a few armed reconnaissances without incident; there were no concentrations of transport and enemy positions were concealed in difficult country. In addition, low cloud over the battle area further limited offensive operations. During these days a better dividend was paid by the attacks on the enemy's landing grounds and air transport already con­sidered.

When enemy resistance" stiffened on the Djebel Garci, however, the Western Air Force Allied light bombers and fighter-bombers carried out attacks on the enemy's gun emplacements and dug-in positions. During this period, however, the principal employment of the fighter-bomber force, was in attacks on enemy shipping In or near the Gulf of Tunis." The success achieved in this activity is Indicated on page 23.

Korba landing ground (south) during an attack by Allied aircraft on 29th April, 1943.

19

THONARA PECHERIt

BOATS

WRECKED DESTROYER

^ west of Cape Bon. The six crash­JU.S2s, circled in white, are some of the 58

transport aircraft shot down on ISth April, 1943.

The Allies Advance

During the last ten days in April, while the stalemate continued on the VTIIth Army's front, fighting flared up along the rest of the front in the northern sector. The North-west African Tactical Air Force gave the fullest support to the simultaneous attacks of our land forces and covered the entire northern sector battlefield. Owing to the innumerable targets attacked in all battle areas it is beyond the scope of this short account to relate each air attack to the appropriate land thrust. A clearer picture in this instance can lae given by first mentioning the main attacks of .the Allied armies and then in­dicating the scale and direction of the air effort. A summary of these air operations is given in the following section.

On the night 20/21st April, in order to forestall an expected British advance, the Her­man Goering Armoured Division launched an attack in the Goubellat plain between Medjez and Sidi Mahmoud*. The enemy employed three battalions of infantry supported by 50 to 70 tanks. Heavy fighting took place by moonlight, but the enemy made little progress and lost 30 tanks. Desultory fighting took place on the, 21st, but it was evident that the 1st Army had the si­tuation well in hand long before the day drew to a close. The following day our land forces counter-attacked in the area between Goubellat and Bou Arada. In the north of this sector good progress was made, but in the south strong re­sistance was encountered and fierce tank battles were fought. The enemy then reinforced his positions in the Djebel Bou Kournine area, and stopped any further advance during April.

Meanwhile, on 23rd April, our troops operating east of Medjez had pushed along the Medjerda valley and occupied. Crich el Oued. Heidous, north of Medjez, was captured two days later. Enemy resistance then stiffened; east of Medjez we were held up by the Sidi Abdullah feature and enemy tank reinforcements prevented further progress in the Medjerda valley sector.

U.S. forces were also on the move. As part of the preparations for our general offensive aimed at breaking through the enemy's Enfidaville-Pont du Fahs - Medjez el Bab - Sedjenane perimeter at several points, the American 2nd Corps had moved across the 1st Army's communications and had taken over the northern sector. The Ame­ricans made good progress along the axis of the Beja-Mateur road and in the coastal area. The enemy's forces in the latter area, particularly, had been weakened in order to strengthen his vulnerable central front and accordingly in the early days of May the rate of the American ad­vance was accelerated. - On the v m t h Army's left flank, at the north­ern end of the Grande Dorsale, French troops advanced on 24th April with little opposition from the enemy, who withdrew towards Pont du Fahs. By the 28th our Allies had crossed the Pont du Fahs - Enfidaville road; from tha t !

any further

.The last week in April was a period of solid if, at first glance, unspectacular gains. To a considerable degree our successes were due to the air operations mentioned in the following paragraphs. The Allied armies were now ready to make their final attacks which eliminated the Axis forces in Tunisia.

Air Support

While the land operations mentioned in the previous section were proceeding the North-west African Air Forces carried out their heaviest air attacks to date against military targets.

On 21st and 22nd April light bombers and fighter-bombers flew nearly 250 sorties, medium bombers 24 sorties, and fighters over 700 sorties on offensive sweeps, tactical reconnaissances and bomber escort duries. Most of the air attacks were in support of our land forces in the Medjez area. In particular, on the 21st, R.A.F. Bostons attacked enemy positions to the north-east of Medjez and to the south-east at Longstop Hill. On the following day, R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons attacked the Longstop Hill positions ; troops, camps, and a suspected headquarters at Ksar Tyr, east of Medjez; enemy positions in the Crich el Oued area, north-east of Medjez; and build­ings at Ain el Asker, south-east of Ksar Tyr. On several occasions fires and explosions were re­ported. On the same day U.S. Mitchells made two attacks on a suspected headquarters eleven miles north-east of Pont du Fahs and R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons also attacked enemy positions in the same, area.

The next day, 23rd April, the fighter-bomber and light bomber effort rose to approximately 260 sorties, medium bombers flew 52 sorties and fighters, in addition to bomber escort and tactical reconnaissance commitments, carried out sixteen Spitfire sweeps over the entire battle area. In addition to increased attacks in the areas men­tioned above a considerable part of the bombing and straffing effort was directed to helping the American land forces advancing towards Mateur. Escorted U.S. Mitchells effectively bombed the marshalling yards at Mateur and tracks east of the town and escorted U.S. Marauders attacked targets along the Beja - Mateur road. U.S. War-hawks made low-flying bombing and straffing attacks over the entire northern battlefield and, in particular, many "targets of opportunity" were located near Sidi Nsir, south-west of Mateur, and Jefna, west of Mateur. The main R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons effort, supplemented by two U.S. Mitchell attacks, was directed to close support in the Medjez sector, with enemy positions at Ksar Tyr as the primary objective, but targets south of Beja and in the Pont du Fahs sector were also attacked. In the latter area attacks on gun emplacements were particularly effective.

l, adverse ff»«but a number

fighter sweeps were made over a wide area in the course of which gun emplace­ments, troops and transport were successfully attacked.

With the improvement in the weather tne Tactical Air Force attacks during the next four days, 25th to 28th April inclusive, were inten­sified. Over 700 sorties were flown by bombers and fighter-bombers and Spitfires maintained complete supremacy over the entire battle area.

On the 25th, U.S. Warhawks bombed and straffed military targets over a wide area; in particular, their attacks on transport and fortifi­ed hill positions in the Mateur sector were especially successful. The R.A.F. and U.S. Bos­tons, meanwhile, concentrated mainly on enemy positions to the north of Pont du Fahs and they were helped in this activity by Hurricane-bombers. The following day, the Allied light bombers' principal effort was directed against tank and transport concentrations near Ksar Tyr, in the Medjez area, and U.S. Mitchells delivered an ef­fective attack on the marshalling yards at Mateur. On the 27th, R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons made many effective attacks on enemy concen­trations in the Medjez area", particularly in the vicinity of Ksar Tyr; U.S. Warhawks attacked tanks and transport, especially in the Pont du Fahs sector; and Hurricane-bombers attacked a variety of targets west of Tebourba and tanks near Ksar Tyr. The main effort on the 28th was again the Allied light bombers attacks on enemy positions at Ksar Tyr, with subsidiary attacks against concentrations to the north at St. Cyprien.

The weather had deteriorated somewhat on tne 29th and 30th and our light bomber and low flying attacks were reduced; in all, U.S. Mitchells flew 36 sorties and Allied light bombers and fighter-bombers approximately 145 sorties. A feature of the attacks on the 29th was the ac­curate bombing of enemy positions and tanks near Ksar Tyr: our land forces in the vicinity reported that the bombing was extremely ac­curate and greatly assisted their operations. The light bombers, meanwhile, paid most attention to enemy positions at Derdouri. On the follow­ing day U.S. Warhawks attacked gun positions in the Mateur sector and R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons and U.S. Mitchels attacked the enemy's positions near Ksar Tyr and concentrations further north around Furna.

In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, Bisleys on several occasions made night attacks on roads and transport. The results of the at­tacks were, in the main, unobserved through poor visibility, but the attacks undoubtedly hampered the enemy's night movements.

It is impossible to estimate the total material damage inflicted in the course of these attacks. Most of the operations were carried out over mountainous country and often in cloudy weather. On many occasions when fires and explosions were not observed it was,reported that the bomb pattern was

attack. Above all, the moral influence was enormous. Enemy troops were on edge and hampered in their movements while the Allied armies could move freely, knowing that attacks from the air were extremely unlikely.

It was evident that the Allied fighters were complete masters of the air over the battlefield. Few enemy fighters could be spared for low-flying attacks or patrols over the battle area as the comparatively small enemy fighter force now left in Tunisia was more urgently neded to pro­tect shipping in the Gulf of Tunis which had to run the gauntlet of our naval and air attacks. Combats were therefore few. On the 21st, enemy fighter-bombers were prevented from attacking our troops in the Medjez area and in this and other combats during the day three FW.190s and three ME.109s were destroyed and two ME.109s probably destroyed for the loss of two Spitfires. On the 23rd one FW.190 and five ME.109s were destroyed and one FW.190 probably destroyed without loss. Thereafter, even fewer combats took place until during the last two days of the month one encounter only with enemy aircraft over the battle area was reported.

The Allied armies now preparing to make their final attacks were assured of complete local air supremacy in every sector. Moves of whole formations on a few roads and the massing of troops at selected points of attacks could ac­cordingly be made with every chance of tactical surprise.

Attacks on Central Mediterranean Shipping As was emphasised in a previous issue of the

R.A.F. Middle East Review, the campaign in Tunisia was above all a war of supplies. From November, 1942, the enemy's Tunisian forces had been sustained by a flow of supplies borne by sea and air transport from Sicily/Italy; from the beginning of 1943 Rommel's retreating army also drew from the enemy's Tunisian bases. It follow­ed that once this flow of supplies was stemmed Axis resistance in Tunisia would become an im­practicability.

Mention has already been made of the Allied air attacks which succeeded in dislocating the enemy's air transport system: in April, also, the Royal Navy's and Allied air forces' attacks on enemy shipping were intensified and these suc­ceeded in depriving the enemy of vital supplies, particularly fuel, during the most critical phase of the land battle.

The aircraft employed on counter-shipping missions by day in the Sicilian Narrows and Tyrrhenian Sea from the African mainland were U.S. heavy and medium bombers and U.S. and R.A.F. fighter-bombers; in general, the bomber and fighter-bomber formations had strong fighter escort.

U.S. Fortresses were employed against shipping in harbours and less regularly against large con­voys; in certain cases, also, operations were icarried out against pin-pointed sea targets as

when the Italian heavy cruisers were a_ La Maddalena. Against vessels at sea high1

titude bombing was found to be extremely ef­fective and it was estimated that the Fortresses needed to drop on an average 28 tons of bombs to sink a medium-sized merchant ship. The usual formation of eighteen Fortresses could therefore be expected, given favourable conditions, to sink two vessels.

U.S. Mitchells continued to be the aircraft most generally used for day shipping sweeps, but dur­ing the month U.S. Lightning fighter-bombers were employed on an increased scale against ships and convoys at sea, but not, as a rule, against shipping in harbour. It became the practice also for some of the Lightnings which escorted the medium bombers to carry bombs; having dropped their bombs these fighters became part of the ordinary escort. Ships at sea were normally attacked from the rear. When a convoy was sighted, each flight of six aircraft attacked one vessel, the aircraft being staggered at altitude intervals of 300 to 500 feet to provide freedom of movement for evasive action.

In practically every case escorts for the heavy and medium bombers employed in attacks on shipping were provided by U.S. Lightnings of the Strategic Air Force.

During April aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces delivered nine attacks on enemy shipping in the vicinity of Tunis, involving the expenditure of nearly 238 tons of bombs, and carried out sixteen effective shipping sweeps, in the course of which just under 161 tons of bombs were dropped. Nearly 90% of the U.S. Fortress sorties were effective as the heavy bombers were briefed to attack shipping in harbours and select­ed convoys or particular ships whose locations were known. Of the U.S. Mitchell and U.S. Lightning sorties, however, flown almost entirely in shipping sweeps, about 50% resulted in no at­tacks being made due to lack of sightings, return of escorting fighters owing to the jettisoning of long-range tanks, and other causes. On several occasions, however, when no enemy shipping was sighted escorted Mitchell formations attacked enemy aircraft en route to Tunis with consider­able success. In the course of several effective shipping attacks, also, casualties were inflicted on enemy aircraft escorting convoys.

In addition to the North-west African Air Forces' attacks, towards the end of April large formations of Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force had outstanding success in attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Tunis.

On a number of occasions during the month successful night shipping sweeps were carried out by Albacores of the North-west African Coastal Command. On the night 4/5th April near misses were scored on an 8,000 ton mer­chant vessel; on the 10/llth near misses were scored on a beached vessel; on the 1©/I7feh a, tanker was hit by torpedoes and left stationary;

Ises were scored

JH1§S H.Q. North-west" Africa Mwb*orces' assessment

of the damage inflicted on shipping was based on the following rules:— Ships were only claimed as "sunk" when they were seen to explode or sink; "severely damaged" implied that the vessel was last seen heavily listing, in a sinking posi­tion, or observed in flames; when direct hits were scored but other results were unobserved the vessel was classed as " damaged"; near misses were ignored unless additional evidence indicated that damage had been caused. The totals given below include vessels which received damage in attacks on harbours.

Adverse weather conditions prevented shipping strikes being made during the first three days of April, but as a result of six air attacks during the next five days two vessels were sunk, eight severely damaged, and eighteen damaged. The vessels sunk were a destroyer blown up by U.S. Mitchells on the 5th and a merchant vessel of 6,000 tons, probably a munition carrier, blown up by U.S. Fortresses on the 6th. The "severely damaged" ships were principally merchant vessels and barges left in flames.

From 10th to 16th April two vessels were sunk, six severely damaged and seven damaged. The sinking of the Italian cruiser "Trieste" on the 10th has already been dealt with on page 13 ; the other vessel sunk was a large barge blown up by U.S. Lightnings on the 15th. The remaining casualties included merchant vessels hit by U.S. Fortresses and smaller beached vessels attacked by U.S. Lightnings.

During the next week, 17th to 23rd April, adverse weather conditions often prevented sight­ings and successes against enemy shipping fell to one sunk, four severely damaged and five damaged.

The volume of enemy shipping to Tunisia in the last week of April was on an increased scale. Apart from the fact that weather conditions were favourable for the successful passage of shipping, it was imperative for the enemy to rush in supplies in readiness for his last stand. The annihilation of the enemy's air transport also necessitated the increased use of sea transport. An all-out effort was made by aircraft of the North-west African Air Forces in attacks on enemy shipping at sea. In particular, U.S. Light­nings successfully attacked Siebel ferry convoys on the 26th and 29th and U.S. Mitchells scored direct hits on two merchant vessels on the 28th and left a destroyer in a sinking condition on the 30th. The most successful attacks of the week, however, were those delivered by Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force on shipping in the Gulf of Tunis during the last three days of the month. On one day alone, 30th April, Kittyhawks and U.S. War-hawks operating from Cape Bon to the Gulf of Tunis csank a destroyer, an_ escort vessel, a mer­chant vessel of 1,000 tons, .a Siebel ferry, an

ASSIFIED

E-boat and an F-boat, apart from damage in­flicted on other vessels. The total shipping losses inflicted on the enemy by the North-west African Air Forces (including the Western Desert Air Force) from 24th to 30th April as originally reported were:— one destroyer, three merchant vessels, one Siebel ferry, two E-boats and two F-boats sunk ; two destroyers, four merchant vessels and one E-boat severely damaged; and four merchant vessels, two Siebel ferries, two E-boats and two F-boats damaged.

The final figures for the month of April, after due adjustment in the light of photographic inter­pretation respecting vessels located in harbour, were 20 vessels sunk, sixteen severely damaged,

and 32 damaged. The successes of MaZfa-based

aircraft against enemy shipping during April are mentioned in the article " Malta Prepares."

Throughout the month, also, the Royal Navy made incessant attacks; the success achieved by our surface vessels and submarines is indicated in the article " The Fight for the Mediterranean,5' elsewhere in this number of " Review."

Our air and sea attacks on enemy shipping were not primarily aimed at the destruction ut his sea transport; it was a war against cargoes and troops. By the end of April the enemy was in the utmost need of supplies and reinforce­ments to support his hard-pressed land and air forces, due to the success of our anti-shipping attacks, our destruction of his air transport, and our blasting of his supply ports.

ck a convoy off Bizerta

"#*.*, %

leading ship disintegrates under.direct hits, and the second is damaged

by near misses.

Supplemental^ &o:, t#^jsh>ppin;|

tacls .̂ ni&sKippfngf 'in iTiajbour aW pn-!*'t>eachted Sis ^already men&onea, air attacks were con-

April against the Axis ports of off-loading and on-loading.

The general procedure for the enemy's small and medium-sized merchant vessels and Siebel ferries was to load and depart principally from Palermo, Marsala and Trapani and put in at Bizerta, Tunis or La Goulette; cargoes for these vessels were brought by rail and road down the west coast of Italy and taken by train ferries across to Messina and then to the Sicilian ports mentioned. Large' merchant vessels loaded chiefly at Naples and made the long sea-trip to the northern Tunisian ports. Some hugged the coast of Sicily and made a quick dash to their appointed port of off-loading; others took a cour­se westwards towards Sardinia, to avoid the night strikes of MaZta-based aircraft, and made the longer last dash to Tunisia.

During the month, the enemy employed shal­low draught vessels such as E and F-boats on a greatly increased scale. The (hilf of Tunis af­forded excellent beaches for the use of these ves­sels and they could make the passage to and from Sicily over-night. Moreover, some mer­chant vessels were being unloaded by lighters from off-shore anchorages. It followed that at­tacks on the installations of the northern Tuni­sian ports were not of such importance as hitherto.

Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force attack­ed the docks and marshalling yards at Tunis on three occasions, during April, carrying out 50 effective sorties and dropping 117 tons of bombs. The Wellingtons also made two effecti­ve attacks on Bizerta, dropping a total bomb load of nearly 56 tons. The medium bomber at­tacks were delivered principally in the dark pe­riod. "Path-finders" marked the target by drop­ping incendiary bombs and the remaining air­craft dropped their loads, including an appre­ciable number of 4,000 and 1,000 lb. bombs, in the lit-up areas; large fires were caused on prac­tically every occasion. The most effective U.S. Fortresses attacks on Tunis and Bizerta were made during the second week of the month: eighteen effective sorties were flown against Tunis and 27 against Bizerta. In addition, U.S. Fortresses made one very successful attack on harbour facilities at Ferryville, comprising six­teen effective sorties. On several occasions, however, heavy bomber attacks on these ports were abandoned owing to bad weather over the target area. A feature of the above-mentioned attacks was the dropping of thousands of leaflets in German, Italian and Arabic over a wide­spread area.

The U.S. bomber attacks which had the des­truction of shipping in the Tunisianjj^^purs as

the primary objectives have already been consi­dered in the previous section.

Meanwhile, heavy attacks were being made by Cyrenaican and North-west African-based aircraft against the main Axis ports of on-loading. Apart from the attacks of No.178 Squadron Liberators and a few sorties by Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force, all the attacks were delivered by day by American aircraft of the North-west African' Air Forces and the Ninth U.S. Air Force.

Naples, the Axis' main supply port, received the greatest attention from the Allied bombers. Eighty-three effective sorties were carried out against the port by Liberators of the Ninth U.S. A.F., sixteen by Liberators of No. 178 Squadron, and 64 by U.S. Fortresses of the Strategic Air Force. The Fortress sorties were all flown on 4th April, when more than 100 tons and appro­ximately 56 tons of bombs were dropped on shipping facilities and the marshalling yards, respectively. Apart from the extensive damage to the shipping in the harbour, the power and gas plants, barracks and docks were all hit. Over half of the Middle East aircraft's total sorties were flown by U.S. Liberators on the 10th and 11th. Hits were scored on a torpedo boat and merchant vessel and on the harbour moles and quays; during the two attacks five enemy figh­ters were shot down, and seven probably destroy­ed for the loss of one Liberator. This aircraft was destroyed by small bombs dropped from above by enemy fighters. This was the first success achieved by "air to air" bombing in the Mediterranean area.

Palermo was attacked on three occasions from North-west Africa and five times from the Mid­dle East; in all, 95 effective sorties were flown by U.S. Fortresses, 43 by U.S. Liberators and seven by R.A.F. Liberators. All the attacks of the Strategic Air Force Fortresses were deliver­ed on the 16th, 17th, and 18th; the examination of photographs taken during the attacks re­vealed that six vessels and the power station had been hit, and in the attack on the marshal­ling yards on the 18th nearly all the bombs burst in the target area. The attacks of the R.A.F. and U.S. Liberators were aimed primari­ly at inflicting damage on the quays and moles: in practically every case direct hits were observ­ed and many fires were started.

Messina was attacked six times by Middle East-based aircraft during' April; thirteen effec­tive sorties were flown by R.A.F. Liberators and 71 by U.S. Liberators. In particular, considera­ble damage was caused to train ferry berths, the building housing the operating gear and rail­way sidings. The attacks appreciably increased the enemy's difficulties in transmitting supplies from the Italian mainland to the Sicilian ports of departure to Tunisia.

Trapani was attacked on three occasions dur­ing April from North-west Africa; twice by U.S. Fortresses and once by Wellingtons. The American heavy bombers flew 52 effective sor­

26

Inset shoivs Ferryville before attacks began. The large photograph shozvs

the harbour after attack by U.S. Fortresses on 7th April, 1943.

&8» a*.\­

,

• i f q • - , * i <,

arbour; on mer­

*%Towafrciis jfcheLdjjfliSdle*' of April it was discovered .it-feat there ̂ was increased shipping activity at Ca­

tania. Accordingly, attacks .were delivered by Middle East Liberators; U.S. Liberators of the Ninth Air Force and R.A.F. Liberators flew 56 and six effective sorties respectively. Hits were scored on shipping in the harbour, on the docks, and in the vicinity of the oil storage tanks and port railway station.

In addition to the attacks on the supply ports mentioned above, a few sorties were carried out by Middle East heavy bombers against the Ita­lian bases at Bari, San Giovanni, Crotone, Co­senza and Pizzo. Bombers of the Strategic Air Forces also attacked port facilities at Maddalena and Carloforte in Sardinia and Marsala harbour Sicily, on a few occasions during the month.

The co-ordinated attacks of the Middle East and North-west African Air Forces on the Axis ports of off-loading and on-loading, convoys, and air transport during April contributed greatly to the rapid collapse of the enemy's Tunisian for­ces which were left without sufficient supplies to withstand our offensive launched in the first week in May.

Attacks on Mediterranean Air Bases. In addition to the constant raids on the enemy's

Tunisian landing grounds already considered, the Allied air forces delivered heavy air attacks dur­ing April on the Axis air bases in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. Apart from a devastating attack on Bari airfield by Liberators of the Ninth Air Force the entire effort against the airfields was made by the North-west African Strategic Air Force.

The attacks opened on 4th April when Capodi­chino airfield, near Naples, one of the main ba­ses of the German air transport fleet, was at­tacked by 27 U.S. Fortresses. It was reported that 25 of the 50 aircraft seen on the ground were destroyed or damaged. On the following day, as part of the plan to dislocate the enemy's air transport system, the Sicilian airfields at Bocca di Falco (Palermo) and Milo (Trapani) were attacked: these attacks have already been considered on page 9.

During the week 10th to 16th April, when over 70 JU.52s were shot down in air combat, heavy attacks were made on the Axis airfields in order to destroy aircraft (particularly transport types) on the ground. In all, U.S. Fortresses flew 100 and Wellingtons 43 effective sorties. A total bomb load of nearly 200 tons was dropped on these targets; the types of bombs used varied from 20 lb. fragmentation to 4,000-sjMJunders and included a large number of dej ion types, In Sicily, Castelvetrano ransport and torpedo-bomber !ransport aircraft intermedia! were at­tacked; in (where JU.

88s and fighters were based), was attacked on three occasions, Monseratto (where fighters were based) twice, and Elmas (a JU.88 base) and Villacidro (used by JU.88s and HE.llls) once each.

It is impossible to give an accurate assessment of the effect of these raids but observed results indicated that wide-spread damage was inflict­ed on aircraft on the ground, runways, hangars nd buildings. Some idea of the damage caused in these raids is given by photographic inter­pretation reports on two of the airfields attack­ed. For example, on 13th April Milo and Castel­vetrano airfields were attacked. The reports on these attacks show that at Milo out of approxi­mately 120 aircraft on the ground at least four­teen received direct hits and fourteen others were damaged; at Castelvetrano, of the 90 aircraft present at least three. ME.323s, seventeen other transport planes, and 22 additional aircraft were hit. Even these estimates of damage are in­complete as photographic cover and interpreta­tion cannot provide a complete assessment of da­mage inflicted on aircraft bombed with fragmen­tation bombs.

During the following week, 17th to 23rd April, Bocca di Falco (Palermo) airfield was attacked twice by U.S. Fortresses and Alghero airfield, Sardinia, once by U.S. Mitchells. On the former nearly 84 tons of bombs were 'dropped and on the latter a little over 10 tons. Photographic interpretation revealed that ten aircraft, the fuel storage and explosive dumps, hangars and build­ings were hit at Bocca di Falco and at least five aircraft and a large hangar were hit at Alghero.

In the last week of April, the Italian airfield at Grosseto and Villacidro airfield, Sardinia, were attacked by 43 and nineteen U.S. Fortresses respectively. The results at Grosseto were main­ly unobserved due to cloud over the target but at Villacidro the airfield and revetments were re­ported to be completely covered by bomb bursts.' Photographic interpretation based on partial cover only of Grosseto revealed that of 21 air­craft on the ground three were destroyed by di­rect hits and at Villacidro it was evident that three medium bombers were destroyed and one damaged, and previously damaged aircraft were also hit. In addition, damage was caused to buildings and anti-aircraft posts. Decimoman­nu airfield was also attacked by 24 Wellingtons. A great explosion and several fires were caused in the target area.

The Ninth U.S. Air Force's attack on the Ita­lian air base at Bari was carried out on 26th April by 62 Liberators, which dropped 234 x 500 lb. and 1,008 x 20 lb. fragmentation bombs. Direct hits were seen on all hangars, which were left in flames, and the whole of the airfield was co­vered by bomb bursts. Fires and explosions were also caused in the dispersal areas and among oil tanks.

The above-mentioned air attacks on the Medi­terranean airfields, together with the attacks on

28

Attack on Xaplrs by ('S.

the enemy's Tunisian landing grounds previously mentioned, played a considerable part in the achievement of the Allies' air supremacy in the Central Mediterranean theatre of \Var.

The Coastal Air Force While the operations recounted in the foregoing

pages were in progress aircraft of the North­west African Coastal Air Force carried out its many and diverse duties. By the use of air power in the closest co-operation with sea power the Allies now controlled the sea-ways of the Central Mediterranean.

On the defensive side, fighter protection was provided for our convoys; anti-submarine patrols were constantly flown; fighter protection was given to our ports, harbours and land commu­nications; and air-sea rescue work was under­taken. The coastal area covered stretched

Liberators on 2X//? April, 1943.

Agadir to Tunisia. On the offensive side, Ma­rauders and Beaufighters by day and Hudsons and Albacores by night (in co-operation with Malta-based aircraft) watched the enemy's ship­ping lanes. On the basis of the information si­gnalled back the air and naval staffs briefed forces against the enemy shipping sighted. When co-operating with naval forces our aircraft often remained and shadowed enemy vessels to the limit of endurance and in the face of attacks by enemy fighter escorts. The shipping strikes at night carried out by Fleet Air Arm Albacores under N.A.C.A.F. control are mentioned on page 23.

N.A.C.A.F. fighters had comparatively few decisive combats with enemy aircraft. There is no doubt, however, that the enemy was deter-

our ship-of the op­

position always awaiting was done, in particular, by night-flying Beau­fightersV. The following are three of the April "high-lights". On the evening of 18th April abdnt fifteen JU.88s attacked Algiers. Four Beaufighters were scrambled to intercept them. Three of the enemy aircraft were destroyed and one probably destroyed. In the early morning of 21st April fifteen JU.88s approached a convoy off Algiers. Their attack was broken up by Beaufighters and the convoy sustained no da­mage; in addition, four of the JU.88s were des­troyed. During the last week in April, in an attempt to lessen the danger of interception by Allied fighters, bases in Sardinia were used for the first time as intermediate landing grounds for enemy transport aircraft. Small formations then made the journey to Northern Tunisia in the early morning. Beaufighters made this a hazardous proceeding. Just before dawn on 30th April a Beaufighter operating from Bone was vectored on to JU.52s flying north-west 30 miles south of Cagliari. The Beaufighter destroyed five of the enemy transport aircraft in ten minu­tes; four of them exploded in the air and the other crashed into the sea. The total score of the night fighter squadrons during the six months of the Tunisian campaign was 100 enemy aircraft destroyed.

The achievement of both defensive and offen­sive sides of the Coastal Air Force should not be judged only according to the number of enemy submarines, aircraft or ships destroyed. It is more truly indicated by the safe arrivals of our own convoys, without which our armies and air forces would have been ineffective, and the help given to our naval and air forces which resulted in the destruction or turning back of enemy supplies.

The activity of the Middle East formations which controlled the sea ways from the Turkish to the Tunisian borders is mentioned on page 38.

Attacks on Shipping and Ports Continued

In readiness for the decisive battles recounted in the following pages the enemy, during the first weefc in May, continued to make desperate ef­forts to push across supplies to the Northern Tunisian ports. Although, as shown below, his shipping losses were heavy, considerable tonnage was unloaded at the ports. In addition to some small merchant vessels many Siebel ferries and T.L.Cs made the passage from the western Si­cilian harbours during the week, but towards the end of it this traffic was disrupted by successful air attacks.

For the first four days of May bad weather and poor visibility prevented U.S. Lightning figh­ter-bombers and U.S. Marauders and Mitchells, which carried out several shipping sweeps^ making sightings. An attack by on shipping facilities at ed largely

During these four days, also, escorted fighter bombers of the Western Desert Air Force, which made extensive offensive reconnaissances of the Gulf of Tunis, also met with little success, due to bad visibility, although a beached destroyer, previously damaged, was attacked and the jetties in the Cape Bon peninsula were effectively bombed.

On 5th May the weather improved and the Strategic Air Force shipping sweeps paid a di­vidend again. Twenty-seven escorted U.S. Fort­resses covered the Sicilian Straits and southern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea. A large merchant vessel, presumably carrying munitions, exploded when attacked and smoke and flames were seen rising from it for 60 miles on the Fortresses' return journey. Escorted U.S. Mitchells encoun­tered an unescorted convoy of one medium and two small merchant vessels, west of Marettimo Island; one small merchant vessel was sunk, the other damaged and the largest ship was left in flames. Escorted U.S. Marauders during the day scored direct hits on a beached merchant vessel east of Cape Zebib. A by-product of another escorted U.S. Mitchell sweep was the destruction of six SM.82s and three escorting fighters for the loss of two escorting U.S. Lightnings. Mean­while, escorted Kittyhawks and Warhawk fight­er-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force con­tinued their offensive reconnaissances over the Gulf of Tunis and off Cape Bon. Direct hits were scored on two merchant vessels and the Cape Bon peninsula jetties were bombed. Two ME.109s were shot down in combat.

On the 5th, also, U.S. Fortresses flew 26 and 27 sorties against Tunis harbour and La Goulet­te harbour, respectively. At Tunis, damage was caused to the phosphate and south quays and marshalling yards and leaflets in German were dropped; at La Goulette, hits were scored on shipping and bombs burst in the barracks, oil storage and oil loading areas.

On the following day, 6th May, the attacks of the Strategic Air Force met with even greater success and also prevented troops escaping from Tunisia. U.S. Lightning-bombers sank three Siebel ferries and four other small boats, and a few minutes later U.S. Marauders sank three Siebel ferries and damaged five other small ves­sels. All the vessels attacked were filled with troops and heading for Sicily at points 30 to 45 miles south-west of Marettimo Island. Later in the morning escorted U.S. Mitchells sank another Siebel ferry and damaged others in the same area as the above-mentioned attacks, but this time the vessels were heading for Tunisia.

Meanwhile, attacks were made on the western Sicilian ports of Marsala, Trapani, and Favigna­na, whence shallow-draught vessels were making the dash to Northern Tunisia. At Marsala, 21 escorted U.S. Fortresses scored hits and near misses on six Siebel ferries and two medium sized merchant vessels, a merchant vessel was probably sunk and another was left burning. At

Favignana, 36 escorted U.S. Mitchells scored near misses on two merchant vessels and dock installations were hit. At Trapani, attacks were delivered by 28 escorted U.S. Fortresses against the docks, naval base, marshalling yards and oil storage. The entire target area was left in fla­mes and emitting black smoke.

Other damage was inflicted by medium bom­bers and fighter-bombers of the Strategic Air Force during the day on beached vessels at Ca­pes Zebib and Fortass.

Fighter-bombers of the Western Desert Air Force continued the search for enemy shipping in the Gulf of Tunis, carrying out over 100 escorted Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bomber sorties. In the evening, two destroyers, believed to be carrying troops were sighted off La Gou­lette heading north-east. One of the destroyers blew up after receiving three direct hits and the other was set on fire. The latter, however, was later observed continuing on its course.

That night, 6/7th May, thirteen Wellingtons of the Strategic Air Force bombed docks and shipping at Trapani as a diversion for a mine-laying mission by Malta-hased aircraft.

On the 7th the weather deteriorated and ham­pered our shipping attacks. U.S. Warhawk­bombers of the Strategic Air Force, however, straffed three motor-boats and a 150 foot yacht off Tunis, sinking the latter. Western Desert fighter-bombers, which operated at full strength, despite bad weather, against shipping in the Gulf of Tunis, reported direct hits and near misses on a number of vessels.

In all, during the first week in May, as a re­sult of the Allied air attacks 20 enemy vessels were sunk, seven probably sunk and twelve da­maged. The vessels sunk comprised two mer­chant ships (one small and one of unreported size), one destroyer, four Siebel ferries, three T.L.Cs, and ten small unidentified vessels.

The attacks by Middle East-based heavy bom­bers during the same week, apart from seven XL®, Liberator sorties flown against Taranto, were all delivered against Reggio di Calabria in the toe of Italy, against which six R.A.F. Libe­rator and 67 U.S. Liberator effective sorties were carried out. The Ninth U.S. Air Force attack on the 6th was particularly heavy and devastating; 51 sorties were flown by two formations. The first formation scored direct hits on two mer­chant vessels and caused many fires and explo­sions in the harbour area. The second forma­tion scored direct hits on a large ship, and se­veral other merchant vessels were destroyed; huge explosions were observed around the har­bour.

Meanwhile, particularly by night, the Royal Navy was also on the look-out for enemy ship­ping: their most striking success reported dur­ing the week was the sinking, on the night 3/4th May, of a 7,000 ton merchant vessel laden with bombs and land-mines, and an escorting yer, off Kelibia.

PerhapsthB Htdtfr^Ypef lAct fgess of our sea and air blockade is provllJfcfc^Pe fact that in the last days of the campaign the enemy's stocks of artillery ammunition were exhausted and the total amount of M.T. and diesel fuel left in stock at the completion of the final battles was 40 tons only.

Prelude to Final Attack During the first five days of May the Allied

armies took up their positions for their final attacks. As already mentioned the considerable troop movements involved were completed under air cover.

In the north the German land forces continued to withdraw, evidently with the intention of re­ducing the length of their line by cutting off the Bizerta sector and taking up positions along the line of hills running north-west of the Medjerda valley. They aid not intend, however, that their withdrawal should be so precipitate as it eventual­ly became and after the capture of Mateur by U.S. forces on 3rd May our Allies encountered increase resistance east and north-east of the town. On the 5th, the Americans, after hard fighting, occupied the western slopes of the AchJcel ridge and on the following day captured the rest of the feature.

Meanwhile, there were no major changess in the Enfidaville sector. South of Pont du Fahs, however, the French continued their drive against the enemy's well-sited positions, and in spite of the intense artillery fire they continued to make satisfactory progress.

In the Medjez sector preparations were in hand for our final break-through to Tunis. In this connection the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Indian Division and the 201st Guards Brigade had been transferred from the Vlllth Army to the 1st Army's front. It was now decided not to persist with our attack launched in the Bou Arada—Goubellat area, which had been halted by the enemy's anti-tank guns, minefields and armour, but to concentrate our main strength for a decisive thrust towards Tunis along the axis of the Medjez—Tunis road.

For the first four days in May our air attacks on military targets were on a reduced scale, due to bad flying weather. Fighter sweeps, how­ever, were maintained by R.A.F. and U.S. Spit­fires on the Tactical Air Force.

The Western Desert Air Force during the four days under review made only one attack of note in the battle area. This was against enemy posi­tions at Djebibina, west of Enfidaville on 4th May; effective sorties were flown by 34 S.A.A.F. Bos­tons, 36 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores and 35 U.S. Mitchells, but observation of results was obscured by haze.

The Tactical Air Force attacks consisted of a few R.A.F. and U.S. Boston sorties against the enemy's positions at Ksar Tyr, and tank con-

a particularly ck by eighteen

Attack on Messina by U.S. Liberators on 28//; April, 1943.

progress on 5th April, 1943.

32

aircraft on troop concentrations west of Tebour­ba; eight Spitfire-bomber sorties in attacks in the Massicault area and 60 Hurricane and Spitfire fighter-bomber attacks, on the 4th, on transport and gun positions in the Zaghouan and Massicault areas.

Meanwhile, R.A.F. and U.S. Spitfires, in spite of bad weather, swept the entire battle area, and carried out tactical and artillery reconnais­sances; few enemy aircraft were sighted and on some days none at all.

With an improvement in the weather on the night 4/5th May our air attacks in the battle area were intensified. Thirty-four Wellingtons, under the operational control of the W.D.A.F., bombed enemy communications west and north west of Tunis, starting fires, and seventeen Tact­ical Air Force Bisleys bombed transport on the roads between Tebourba and Cheylus. The fol­lowing day the Tactical Air Force flew twelve U.S. Mitchell and 59 R.A.F. and U.S. Boston sorties, with Spitfire escorts, against enemy troop concentrations and enemy strongholds on the north-eastern and eastern slopes of Djebel Bou Aoukaz, against which our forces had instituted an attack as an essential preliminary to the drive on Tunis. The attacks materially helped our ground forces to clear these hills on the l.eft ol our imminent attack. No enemy aircraft were encountered during the day.

During the night Tactical Air Force Bisleys and French Leos flew seventeen and seven sor­ties respectively against airfields at El Aouina, La Sebala and Ariana, in the Tunis area, to limit the effort of the enemy's fast-dwindling Tunisian air forces, and 46 Wellingtons (under W.D.A.F. control) attacked road and dispersed transport vehicles near Cheylus, north-east of Pont du Fahs, and Djedeida, north-east of Tebourba.

The Drive on Tunis At dawn on 6th May our main attack was

launched on a 3,000 yard front along the axis of the Medjez—Tunis road. The initial advance was made by infantry, supported by concentrated ar­tillery fire ajid the direct air support mentioned below.

Our first objectives were soon taken and dur­ing the morning our armour passed through the infantry, successfully engaged enemy tanks, and pushed on to Furna. Meanwhile, another British armoured force had by-passed Furna and oc­cupied our main objective, Massicault, in the afternoon and had contacted enemy positions at St. Cyprien by the evening. Thus, in a single day our troops had broken through the enemy's line and had reached points fifteen miles from 1 \nis.

The Tactical and Western Desert Air Forces provided full air support throughout the entire day.

The Tactical Air Force's effort was made up as follows:— light bombers flew 227 sorties, com­prising 153 U.S. and 74 R.A.F. Boston sorties ;

U.S. Mitchells flew 24 sorties; U.S. "Warhawks carried out 120 sorties in straffing and bombing attacks; and Hurricane and Spitfire fighter-bom­bers made 72 and 36 sorties, respectively. In figh­ter sweeps, escort duties and miscellaneous re­connaissance missions R.A.F. and U.S. Spitfires flew approximately 600 sorties. The majority of these sorties were flown in support of the advance from Medjez, but some, which are specified on page 34, were carried out in the northern sector.

The light bomber effort in the early morning was directed against the enemy's positions at Bordj Frendj, which constitued the first objecti­ves of our infantry attack. The Boston attacks, coupled with our heavy artillery barrage, softened opposition to such an extent that our infantry made a speedy advance and cleared the way for our armoured thrust. Later, the light bombers went ahead of our advance and attacked enemy concentrations in the area between Furna and St. Cyprien and in the Djedeida area. The U.S. Mitchell attacks were delivered against enemy positions in the Furna - St. Cyprien area and on vehicles at St. Cyprien. The Tactical Air Force bomber attacks caused widespread damage at all points of resistance in the line of our advance. Perhaps the most successful individual attack was that delivered in the early evening by twelve Bos­tons of No. 38 Squadron on a convoy of 100 ve­hicles in the St. Cyprien - Djedeida area: all the vehicles were left stationary after the bombing and thick clouds of smoke rose from the target area. No light bombers were lost during the day's operations but 21 were damaged by the intense flak encountered.

The most effective U.S. Warhawk attack was made by 72 aircraft in the early evening on traf­fic jammed on the road south-west of Tunis; troops and vehicles were bombed and straffed with good results. Meanwhile, Hurricane-bom­bers made seven attacks in the Massicault -St. Cyprien area and along the Cheylus - Dje­deida - Tunis roads, and Spitfire-bombers carried out free-lance missions, chiefly in the St. Cy­prien area.

Enemy air opposition was on an increased scale but there were no serious attempts to interfere with our escorted bomber formations and there was, in fact, a definite reluctance to fight. In the course of the day R.A.F. Spitfires destroyed eight ME.109s and probably destroyed two ME.109s and one FW.190 for the loss of one of our fighters; U.S. Spitfires destroyed eight ME.109S, two FW. 190s and one MC.202 and probably destroyed two ME.109s without suffering any casualties. The only offensive action by enemy aircraft was a morning attack by six FW.190 fighter-bombers east of Medjez el Bab.

The Western Desert Air Force's effort in the battle area consisted of two concentrated attacks by Allied bombers in the Furna and St. Cyprien areas, in support of the thrust of our land forces, and Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bom­ber attacks on road traffic west and south of

Tunis. In all," 89 effective sorties were flown by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Baltimores, 54 by S.A.A.F. Bostons and 51 by U.S. Mitchells; R.A.F. and U.S. fighter-bombers made 55 and 45 effective sorties respectively. Escort for the bombers was pro­vided by over 200 Spitfires, Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawks, and for the fighter-bombers by 90 Spitfires and Kittyhawks.

The Allied bombers' attacks were extremely accurate and after the second attack over twenty fires were seen burning in the target area. Our losses were one Baltlimore and one Mitchell. The fighter-bombers found good targets scarce, but inflicted casualties on small groups of transport vehicles over a wide area. Of the few enemy aircraft encountered during the day Western De­sert Air Force Spitfires shot down one ME. 109 without loss to themselves.

The Fall of Tunis , During the night 6/7th May, six Halifaxes and

43 Wellingtons, operating under the control of the Western Desert Air Force, bombed the main roads converging on Tunis from Bizerta and from the west and south. Electrical storms, rain and low cloud were encountered, but many bombs were seen to burst on the roads and four fires were observed. A Halifax and a Wellington failed to return.

The speed of our land forces' drive to Tunis on the 6th and the destruction caused by our air and artillery attacks completely upset the enemy's defensive plans. On the 7th our advance was continued in the face of disorganised and scat­tered resistance and our armoured cars entered Tunis in the afternoon.

Bad weather limited the scale of the Tactical Air Forces' attacks against land targets during the day and several missions had to be abandoned. Three attacks on transport vehicles on the Tunis-Bizerta and other roads leading into Tunis were made by escorted formations of R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons and U.S. Mitchells; 55 Hurricane-bom­bers attacked troops withdrawing towards Tunis; and 48 U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers bombed and straffed aircraft on the ground at El Aouina airfield and troop concentrations in the vicinity. Spitfires which swept the entire battle area throughout the day encountered no enemy air­craft but, together with Spitfire-bombers, they attacked transport vehicles over a wide area. Four Spitfires were destroyed by the enemy's anti-aircraft fire.

The Decisive Factor In the final drive to Tunis the influence of our

air power on the land operations was decisive. The Allies' air supremacy made possible the rapid movement of large troop formations and concen­trations at the point of attack. The break through from Medjez necessitated tne massing of our land force on an extremely narrow front,, volving the bottle-neck of a singtf Medjez over which the i

had to be maintained for six divisions during1 the advance. The result was a great traffic conges­tion which constituted a sitting target — but the enemy air forces were unable to attack it. The more obvious help afforded by the Allied air forces' co-ordinated bomber and fighter-bomber attacks in softening resistance before the break­through, and later in support of our armoured forces, was yet another example of how air power can blast the way for advancing land forces.

Occupation of Bizerta While the main thrust towards Tunis was to

progress U.S. 2nd Corps, which included French troops in the coastal area, were approaching Bi­zerta. Armoured units succeeded in out-flanking enemy positions east of Mateur, where resistance was still strong, and entered Ferryville during the early afternoon of 7th May. A few hours later Bizerta was occupied. The American forces also cleared the enemy from the Chouigui Gap and from the high ground west of Chouigui. By that time the enemy had already evacuated Tebourba.

As already mentioned, bad flying weather over the battle area limited our air activity on the 7th. Spitfires, however, flew fighter sweeps covering the roads Djedeida-Mateur and , Bizerta-Tunis and at points where traffic congestion was ob­served vehicles were machine-gunned with grood effect. In addition, as already mentioned U.S. Mitchells and R.A.F. and U.S. Bostons at­tacked vehicles on the Tunis-Bizerta road.

The Round Up Our armies now began their extensive mop­

ping-up operations, backed by the Allied air for­ces which, as recounted in the following section, attacked the retreating enemy at will and in con­junction with our naval forces prevented any at­tempt to stage an Axis "Dunkirk".

On 8th May our land forces cleared the Marsa peninsula, north-east of Tunis, and. occupied La Goulette. In Bizerta there was still some desul­tory opposition in the morning, but resistance in the area as a whole ended during the day with the surrender of German forces, including elements of the 15th and 10th Armoured Divisions, in the Protville area.

Our armoured forces continued their advance from Tunis and captured Hammam Lif in the morning and continued south-east in order to cut off the enemy's retreat into the Cape Bon penin­sula. Enemy resistance on the hills south of Hammam Lif and around Creteville was not fi­nally overcome until the afternoon. Our advance was then continued along the axis of the .Grom­balla - Hammamet road. Hammamet itself was occupied during the night of 10/11th May and columns branched south and north to Nabeul and Bou Ficha, respectively.

The Axis troops between Zaghouan and the sea at first intended to obey orders to fight until their ammunition was exhausted, but with the ap­proach of our column advancing south from Bou

Castelvetrano airfield, Sicily, shotting l\IE.323s and other transport aircraft, and the elaborate dispersal pens, before the attacks by N.A.A.F. in April.

Fichu, the Italian First Army was now directly threatened from the rear as well as in front. In the afternoon of 12th May the Army Comman­der, after a bombing attack, asked for terms and formally surrendered unconditionally on the morning of 13th May.

Meanwhile, Africa Corps on the west flank had surrendered on the 11th to the French forces west of Zaghouan.

Unopposed Air Attacks From 8th to 12th May, while our land forces

were overcoming the enemy's last resistance, the Allied Air Forces bombed and straffed the demo­ralised Axis troops who were left without even the semblance of an air arm, and units of the Royal Navy bombarded points of resistance in the Cap Bon peninsula. On the 8th the enemy air forces had only the Menzel Temime and Korba landing grounds in the Cape Bon peninsula from which to operate. Throughout the day only about 60 sorties were flown over Tunisia by enemy air­craft, including some by fighters, fitted with long-range tanks, which operated from Sicily and Pantelleria. On the following day enemy air ac­tivity was even less, and for the remaining days of the campaign there was none at all over the battle area. A few JU.52s, however, attempted to

make night trips to bring stores or evacuate per­sonnel from Cape Bon peninsula but night-flying Hurricanes and Beaufighters made this a hazar­dous undertaking. A few bombers, also, made a night raid on Algiers which proved disastrous for them.

On 8th May Allied light bombers and fighter-bombers of the Tactical Force flew approxima­tely 300 and U.S. Mitchells over 50 sorties in sup­port of our advancing ground forces and fighters carried out approximately 600 sorties in escort duties, offensive sweeps, and straffing missions in the battle' area.

Most of the R.A.F. and U.S. Boston attacks were made in the Hamman Lif area and to the east, in support of our land forces' push from Tunis; attacks on transport vehicles were parti­cularly heavy near Soliman and these were sup­plemented by U.S. Warhawk-bomber attacks. Other light bomber sorties were flown against the enemy's armoured division in the Protville area prior to its surrender. Eight Hurricane-bomber missions and one by Spitfires over the Cape Bon peninsula and in the Protville area were especially successful. Troops, emplacements, transport and landing grounds were all attacked with good results and eight vessels were also bombed and shot up. Meanwhile, Spitfires car­

base of the Caji£"JB<?W"'penin"sula. Ig -the destruction of enemy vehicles, twelve fighters

were destroylppoft"1' the ground and eight other aircraft, including two transport planes, were damaged. In the course of fighter sweeps over the Oudna - Soliman - Gulf of Tunis area Spit­fires destroyed three ME.109s and probably des­troyed two more for the loss of two of our figh­ters.

During the night, Wellingtons, under the con­trol of the Western Desert Air Force, bombed targets in the Kelibia, Soliman and Grombalia areas, causing large fires and explosions.

On the 9th the Tactical Air Force continued its attacks on enemy positions, troops and vehicles with the same intensity as on the previous day. Escorted Allied bombers made four concentrated attacks against retreating enemy columns; three in support of our land forces' attack at Soliman, the important road and rail junction east of Ham­mam Lif; and two against enemy positions on the high ground north-east of Soliman. The results in general were described as "excellent" and many fires and explosion were caused. Hurricane-bombers' flew nine missions in attacks on road transport, enemy positions and jetties in the Cape Bon peninsula; in particular, gun positions and vehicles along the Grombalia road were attacked with great success. Spitfire-bombers concen­trated on attacking enemy columns retreating from Hamman Lif to Soliman and U.S. Warhawk ­bombers operated against enemy transport vehi­cles across the base of the Cape Bon peninsula from Hammamet to Soliman.

Meanwhile, R.A.F. and U.S. Spitfires flew over 20 fighter sweeps and straffing missions, princi­pally over the Cape Bon peninsula; attacks on enemy troops and vehicles were particularly nu­merous around Soliman and on roads leading to the south-east. During the day, also, six R.A.F., S.A.A.F. and R.A.A.F. fighter-bomber squadrons and the U.S. Warhawk-bomber force of the Wes­tern Desert Air Force, strongly escorted by Spit­fires, Kittyhawks, and Warhaws, took time off from their shipping attacks around the Tunisian coast and participated in the bombing and straf­fing of troops, vehicles and supply bases in the Cape Bon peninsula and destroyed several JU.52s on a landing ground near Menzel Temime. During the night attacks on traffic in the Cape Bon pe­ninsula were continued by Wellingtons, which flew 28 effective sorties, and night-flying Hurri­canes and Beaufighters shot down two JU.52s and straffed transport vehicles over a wide area.

On the 10th it was evident that the enemy for­ces still at large, apart from those pinned down by the Villth Army, were nearing the end of their tether. Our air attacks on targets in the Cape Bon peninsula were accordingly on a some­what decreased scale. Twelve missions, compris­ing 130 sorties, were flown during the day by R.A.F. and U.S. Mitchells of the Tactical Air Force. Four attacks were which was put out

Temime landing ground, and a landing ground fUJar Cape Bon, respectively, in the course of which several JU.52s were destroyed on the ground; and four agamst* troops and vehicles around Ke­libia. In all.Mst under 100 tons of bombs were dropped and Mddespread devastation was caused. These attacdl were supplemented by U.S. War­hawk-bomber attacks on Soliman^town and troops in the Hammamet - Korba area and north of Menzel Temime; Spitfire-bombers attacked ve­hicles and a road bridge over the river CMba, north of Korba; and Hurricane-bombers on free­lance bombing missions over the Cape Bon pe­ninsula inflicted considerable casualties on troops and vehicles, particularly north of Korba and along the western coastal road. In addition, escorted Kittyhawk and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers ofthe Western Desert Air Force operated in strength against road targets in the Cap Bon peninsula area generally throughout the entire day. During the night thirteen Wellingtons bom­bed enemy transport vehicles on the road between Nabeul and Menzel Temime, in support of our armoured column advancing northwards from Nabeul.

On the 11th the main weight of o.ur air attacks was switched against the enemy forces still re­sisting in the area between Zaghouan and St. Ma­rie du Zit. U.S. Bostons delivered four attacks against concentrations in this area, carrying out 48 sorties and dropping over 31 tons of bombs. Leaflets were also dropped informing the enemy troops of the uselessness of further resistance. Two heavier attacks in the same area were also made by over over 100 Allied bombers of the Western Desert Air Force; the bombing was des­cribed as particularly accurate. Meanwhile, es­corted Kittyhawks and U.S. Warhawk fighter-bombers continued their attacks on road targets in the Cape Bon peninsula, destroying 30 vehicles and damaging many more.

On the following day, 12th May, Allied bom­bers of the Western Desert Air Force made the last attacks on land targets in Tunisia. In the early afternoon effective sorties were made by 29 R.A.F. and S'.A.A.F. Baltimores and eighteen U.S. Mitchells in two attacks against the 90th Light Division's defended positions south of Bou Ficha, and six R.A.F. Baltimores bombed gun position in the Enfidaville area. The bombing south of Bou Ficha was reported by our land for­ces in the vicinity to be extremely accurate. Shortly afterwards, the Italian First Army and attached German units laid down their arms.

During the afternoon of 12th May General Von Armin and his staff were captured in the St. Ma­rie du Zit area. The last pockets of resistance were mopped up by 14th May and the Tunisian campaign came to an end. In the final stage of the campaign 248,000 prisoners were taken and a considerable number of tanks and guns.

"Dunkirk" Parody When the Axis ports in Tunisia fell on 8th May,

the enemy's six months struggle to supply these

36

bases ended. During the last week of the cam­paign, as the enemy was unable to attempt an evacuation, there was little Axis shipping in the Sicilian Narrows. Until the final collapse, how­ever, a few small craft crossed daily in a fruitless effort to bring in certain supplies and evacuate personnel.

The Allied air supremacy over northern Tunisia and the control of the Sicilian Narrows by the Royal Navy whittled down the enemy's "Dun­kirk" to vest-pocket size.

On the 8th, Western Desert fighter-bombers, operating in strength against enemy shipping off the Tunisian coast, and helped by Baltimore sor­ties, severely damaged a medium-sized merchant vessel and damaged three others. When, in the evening, enemy fighters tried to interfere with this activity, seven were shot down and several others damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk. During the day, also, U.S. Marauders and U.S. Lightning-bombers of the Strategic Air Force probably sank a small merchant vessel and sank a small trawler; both ships were heading for Sicily. On the following day, U.S. Spitfires set on fire a barge north-east of Tunis and R.A.F. and U.S. Boston «cored near misses on two vessels off the Tunisian coast and U.S. Warhawk-bom­bers straffed barges, with unreported results. On the 10th, Hurricane-bombers intercepted a schoo­ner laden with troops north-east of Bizerta, head­ing for Sicily; as a result of the fighter-bomber attacks the schooner was seen to break into pieces.

Meanwhile, Royal Navy units, on constant pat­rol around the Tunisian coast, sank a barge laden with men and ammunition, and two small mer­chant vessels off Cape Bon on the night 8/9th May; six small coastal vessels filled with evacu­ated troops on the 10th; and damaged an E-boat, capturing most of its occupants, on the 11th.

It is likely that some key personnel were evacuated by JU.52s at night during the last phase of the campaign but, as already indicated, night flying Hurricanes and Beaufighters took their toll of these also.

Attacks on Air Bases Just prior to the fall of Tunis and Bizerta the

enemy withdrew as many aircraft as he could from the Tunisian landing grounds. As a result more aircraft were now located on the Sicilian and Sardinian airfields and the force on Pantel­leria was also increased. In addition, more bomb­ers were present on the Sardinian airfields in readiness for attacks on our Algerian ports and shipping. Accordingly, during the last week of the Tunisian campaign heavy attacks were de­livered by the North-west African Air Forces and Middle East-based aircraft on the above-mention­ed airfields.

The attacks on Pantelleria aerodrome were be­gun on 8th May by escorted bombers of Western Desert Air Force: 89 effective sor were flown by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. Bostons

destroyed on the ground and a large~petrol fire was started jp the north-west corner of the air­field. Shortly afterwards, sixteen escorted Light­ning-bombers of the Strategic Air Force made a further attack and reported the destruction of more aircraft on the ground. In the course of the following two days the attacks were inten­sified by escorted bombers of the Western Desert Air Force: in all, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bom­bers flew 175, and U.S. Mitchells 66 effective sorties. Many fires and explosions were caused as a result of the attacks.

The Strategic Air Force bombers, meanwhile, attended to the Sicilian and Sardinian air bases. On the night 8/9th May, 25 Wellingtons success­fully bombed the airfields at Villacidro, Elmas and Decimomannu in southern Sardinia, where our reconnaissance aircraft had reported the pre­sence of many bombers. On the 10th, two for­mations of U.S. Fortresses, totalling 45 aircraft bombed Milo {Trapani) airfield, setting on fire or destroying at least fifteen aircraft, including an ME.323, and causing fires and explosions. On the same day 46 more U.S. Fortresses attacked Bo Rizzo airfield, further south, causing many fires. Considerable enemy fighter opposition was encountered in the last-mentioned attack and as a result of combats two were shot down and two more probably destroyed for the loss of one U.S. Fortress.

Attacks on Italian Forts

Extensive reconnaissance of the enemy's Me­diterranean ports during the last week of the Tunisian campaign revealed greatly increased shipping activity in the Sicilian, Sardinian and western Italian ports. Attacks on these bases were now made as part of the necessary preli­minaries to our imminent assault on the south­ern bastions of Hitler's European " fortress."

Apart from attacks by 70 R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers and 38 U.S. Mitchells of the West­ern Desert Air Force on shipping in the Pantel­laria harbour on the 10th, the Middle East squad­rons confined their attacks during the second week in May to the bombing of Messina, Augusta and Catania. These attacks were carried out by the Ninth U.S. Air Force.

Two attacks were made on the train ferry ter­minus at Messina by seven R.A.F. and 44 U.S. Liberators, respectively. In particular, hits were scored on the ferry ships and railway yards. On 11th May 48 U.S. Liberators, escorted by Malta-based Spitfires, made a very successful attack on Catania harbour; hits scored on shipping re­sulted in the sinking of an ammunition ship and the setting on fire of a tanker. At Augusta, on the 13th, 48 U.S. Liberators scored hits and near misses on several ships in the harbour and bursts were observed among seaplanes. In addition, fires_ were causedat^he oil installations.

extremely the Sicilian

ports 6$T Palermo and Marsala "and" Cagliari, in southern Sardinia.

On 9th May, Palermo was attacked twice by a total of 122 U.S. Fortresses and 89 U.S. Mit­chells and Marauders, escorted by U.S. Light­nings, and 23 Wellingtons followed up the attack at night. A total of 458 tons of bombs was dropped in the course of the three attacks. Large fires and- explosions were caused, parti­cularly in the areas of the docks, railway yards and Army Headquarters. Two additional ex­plosions were caused through the blowing up of a ship in the harbour and a gas holder. A by-product of the day attacks was the destruction of seventeen enemy fighters which attempted interception. Some indication of the intense and accurate heavy flak encountered over the target is given by the fact that one U.S. Fortress was shot down and over 50 others damaged.

Marsala was attacked twice on 11th May by a total of 180 U.S. Fortresses, Mitchells and Ma­rauders; U.S. Lightnings provided the escort. Once again Wellingtons followed up the attacks during the night, flying 22 sorties. During the three attacks, approximately 435 tons of bombs were dropped. In the course of the day attacks hits were observed on warehouses, docks, rail­way yards, repair shops and in the city; in both the day and the night attacks, also, fires were started which could be observed by our aircraft crossing the Tunisian coast 90 miles away.

13th May was an unlucky day for the Sardini­an port of Cagliari. Two attacks were delivered by 107 U.S. Fortresses and 96 U.S. Mitchells and 22 Wellingtons continued the bombing during the night. In all, 438 tons of bombs were dropped. Direct hits on ships in the harbour resulted in a vessel exploding and four catching fire. Smoke from the larger fires caus­ed by the day attacks was visible for 100 miles by aircraft flying at 15,000 feet and smoke fol­lowing a series of loud explosions caused by the Weflington attacks rose to a height of 6,000feet and was visible for 80 miles on the return jour­ney. Prior to the heavy bombing attacks on Cagliari the port had an estimated daily capa­city of 3,400 tons, with dockage accommodation for twelve vessels ranging from 200 to 400 feet. The above-mentioned attack on 13th May prac­tically completed the process of neutralising Cagliari as a port.

In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, U.S. Fortresses attacked Civitavecchia, south­west of Rome ; U.S. Marauders attacked Porto Ponte Romano and targets in the vicinity ; U.S. Mitchells attacked Olbia, at this stage Sardinia's busiest port; and U.S. Lightning-bombers attack­ed Alghero and Porto Torres, north-west Sardi­nia. In the course of these supplementary at­tacks more than 252 tons of bombs were dropped.

It is evident from the weight of the above-mentioned attacks, delivered during the last week ooff t h ^ ' f u n j j & i & i ^ invasion air7-* ey

Enemy Aircraft Losses During the last six weeks of the Tunisian cam­

paign, apart from the vast number of aircraft destroyed and abandoned on the ground, the Al­lied air forces based on the African m'ainland destroyed over 800 enemy aircraft in combat; our losses, by comparison, were low.

The Eastern Supply Line

Mention has already been made on page 29 of the work of the North-west African Coastal Air Force, operating to the west of the enemy's Tu­nisian perimeter. At the same time units operat­ing under A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediter­ranean and H.Q., No.201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, continued to control the sea-ways to the east from the Tunisian to the Turkish borders, thus protecting the supply line of the Vlllth Army and the supporting Allied air forces.

From 1st April to 14th May Hurricane, Spit­fire and Beaufighter squadrons flew 329 sorties in defence of harbours and 1,991 sorties in pro­tection of convoys. This intensive effort dis­suaded enemy aircraft from attempting to inter­fere with our shipping and few attacks were reported. Constant sorties were also flown in defence of our land lines of communication to Tunisia; enemy raiders and reconnaissance air­craft usually made off when our defence fight­ers were airborne and accordingly few decisive combats were reported.

Middle East naval co-operation units flew over 600 sorties on anti-submarine (close cover) pat­rols and approximately 350 on anti-submarine (area) patrols during the six weeks under review. This increased activity was necessary owing to the increase in shipping in convoy in the East­ern Mediterranean. Thus, in April 122 convoys were given anti-submarine protection as compar­ed with the March figure of 94. During May, with convoys beginning to pass through from Gibraltar to Port Said even greater anti-sub­marine and fighter protection was necessary. Very few submarines were sighted, however, from 1st April to 14th May and no positive claims in respect of damage inflicted on them were made.

Meanwhile, offensive reconnaissances for ene­my shipping were made by Wellingtons, Balti­mores and Beaufighters in the Aegean and along the west coast of Greece. During April the Wel­lingtons and Baltimores were unable to find suitable targets, but the Beaufighters carried out attacks on five occasions, resulting in the destruction of a caique, the setting on fire of three 120 ton schooners, and the scoring of near misses and cannon strikes on two merchant ves­sels. In May both Baltimores and Beaufighters carried out successful offensive shipping sweeps. One merchant vessel of 80Q tons and a 150 ton steamer were sunk and two other merchant vessels damaged; in addition fourteen sailing ""* iels, with a total tonnage of 1,120 tons, were

and 36, totalling 3,385 tons, were damaged.

The work of the A.H.Q., Air Defences Eastern Mediterranean and No. 201 Group squadrons in protecting our land and sea lines of communi­cation from Tunisia to Turkey ensured the safe transit of supplies to our land and air forces operating to the south and east of the enemy's Tunisian forces. The enemy was *not strong enough to offer any appreciable opposition to this passage of supplies and the sorties by sneak raiders, operating either above or below the wa­ters, were rendered ineffective through the cons­tant vigilance of both air and naval forces.

" From Morocco to the Indian Ocean . . . . "

The accounts of the air effort during the "Battle for Egypt" and the Tunisian Campaign given in the first three issues of the R.A.F. Middle East Review have been mainly concerned with the activity of operational units. Other aspects of the manifold activities of the Allied air forces connected with maintenance, supply,

(and will be, dealt with in separate articles

The final victory in Africa could not have been achieved without full co-operation between the land, sea and air services. The Air Commander­in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command, made ''co­operation" the theme of his message to personnel of the Allied air forces on the completion of the Tunisian campaign:,—

"To all ranks of the Allied Air Forces.— By magnificent team work between nationalities, commands, units, officers and men from Teheran to Takoradi, from Morocco to the Indian Ocean, you have, together with your comrades on land and sea, thrown the enemy out of Africa. You have shown the world the unity and strength of air power. A grand job, well finished. We face our next job with the knowledge that we have thrashed the enemy, and the determination to thrash him again."

Attack on Catania harbour on Uth May, 1943. The M/V on fire received at least two direct hits; rolling shock is on fire on the mole and the Pozver

STRATEGIC HEAVY ATTACK.5 ON FER.O.V TEHMlNALb iQIM TO 3OIM JUNf 99O BOMBtfi. SORTIES

BOMBING I4'I5THMAY-3OTHJUNE

1043

S65/ FiOnTER. BOMBER. AND BOMBER SORTIES 8TH MAY 1I1H JUNE

44 BOMBER SOR.TIES

ATTACKS IN NORTHERN ITALY S U M M A R Y OF EFFORT "/Or SHOWN o/v MAP . 15TH M A V - <

ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS: 2 2 9 2 FICnTE.R/BOMBER SPEZlA iT i iJUNf, 112 BOMBER SORTIES AND BOMBER. SORTIES LEGHORN 28TH MAY, 92 BOMBER SORTIES MALTA ATTACKS ON PORTS, BASES L COMMUNICATIONS. LEGHORN * 2 8 T H J U N E 96 BOMBER SORTIES 2 6 3 8 FIGHTER/BOMBER AND BOMBER. SORTIES

LAMPEDUSA GROSSETO (A,rf,tia). 3 0 T H M A Y . 54 BOMBER SORTIES (EXCLUDING ATTACKS ON PANTEUERIA AND LAMPtOUSA)

6O4 FlGMTtR BOMBER AND BOMBER S0RTI15 II TH AND 12THJUNE