Racial Profiling Report - American Civil Liberties Union profiling... · Racial Profiling Since...

February 2004

SANCTIONEDBIAS:Racial Profiling Since 9/11

SANCTIONED BIAS:Racial Profiling Since 9/11

Published February 2004

THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION isthe nation’s premier guardian of liberty, workingdaily in courts, legislatures and communities todefend and preserve the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and thelaws of the United States.

OFFICERS AND DIRECTORSNadine Strossen, PresidentAnthony Romero, Executive DirectorKenneth B. Clark, Chair,

Executive Advisory CouncilRichard Zacks, Treasurer

National Headquarters125 Broad Street, 18th Fl.New York, NY 10004-2400(212) 549-2500www.aclu.org

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Ethnic Profiling Has Become Official Government Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

The Secret Roundup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

FBI Questioning of Arab, Muslim and South Asian Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Special Registration Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

“Racial Profiling Is a Lazy Method of Law Enforcement” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

The Human Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

S A N CT I O N E D B I A S : R a c i a l P ro f i l i n g S i n ce 9 / 1 1

The fight to keep bias from influencing lawenforcement actions is as old as theConstitution itself. And, tragically, for much

of our history, biased policing – based on fear insteadof fact – has been widespread and ineffective.

The ACLU was founded in 1920, in response to thebroad suppression of dissent in World War I and aseries of huge mass detentions and deportations,largely of recent immigrants from eastern Europe,initiated by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in1919. The Palmer Raids, as they are now known,came in response to a series of terrorist acts, includ-ing the bombing of Palmer’s house, that were attrib-uted to left-wing anarchists and socialists.

In response, Palmer ordered federal agents toround up thousands of immigrants based not onevidence of any conspiracy, but on their ethnicity,and in the case of the many Jews who weredetained and deported, their religion. It was racialprofiling before the term was coined.

Eighty years later, history is repeating itself. Sincethe tragedy of 9/11, we have seen an increase in thenation’s willingness to condone law enforcementand security actions based primarily on skin coloror other immutable characteristics, and a clear will-ingness on the part of the Bush administration toimplement such programs.

The nation’s Arab, Muslim and South Asian pop-ulations are most affected by these new initia-tives. Policies primarily designed to impact cer-tain groups often result in the destruction of civilliberties for us all. Moreover, racial profilingmakes us less safe as a country, since we are

diverting limited law enforcement resources andsingling out individuals who ought not fall undergovernment scrutiny.

This report details how the trauma of 9/11 hasmade general anti-immigrant sentiment accept-able in the guise of law enforcement and hownational security initiatives incorporate discrimi-nation into their application.

Just as troubling is Congress’ inability to pass legis-lation to address the problem of bias-based policingboth in the contexts of post-9/11 security measuresand the traditional “driving while black or brown”turnpike racial profiling. A bill called the End RacialProfiling Act (ERPA) is pending in Congress today– and it deserves our support.

Among other things, the ERPA is a good first steptoward addressing traditional racial profiling, driv-ing while black or brown and some post-9/11selective enforcement. It provides victims a legalrecourse, implements and funds key data collectionprograms to identify and track discriminatorypolicing and gives the attorney general the abilityto deny funds to police departments that refuse tocomply. Please visit www.aclu.org/action to findout how you can encourage your members ofCongress to sign on to this necessary legislation.

We can, and must, be both safe and free. Toaccomplish this, we must replenish security poli-cies that depend on old fashioned policing, basedon evidence and fact, and respect the tradition ofminority and individual rights in America. Byallowing base prejudice to decide who gets pulledover on our highways or who gets detained andstrip searched in our airports, we betray that fun-damental promise.

And, most tragically, we do so unnecessarily.

ANTHONY D. ROMEROExecutive DirectorAmerican Civil Liberties Union

Foreword

Introduction

On June 17, 2003 President Bush publiclyreleased a set of guidelines promulgatedby the Civil Rights Division of the

Department of Justice entitled, Regarding the Useof Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.The introduction to the guidelines alluded to thepresident’s February 2001 address to Congress inwhich he declared that racial profiling is “wrongand we will end it in America.” The accompany-ing Fact Sheet on Racial Profiling issued by theDepartment of Justice contains phrases like:

• “racial profiling is wrong and will not betolerated;”

• “America has a moral obligation to pro-hibit racial profiling;” and

• “stereotyping certain races as having agreater propensity to commit crimes isabsolutely prohibited.”

But the guidelines themselves fall far short ofthe Bush administration’s rhetorical posturing.Since they are only a set of guidelines, ratherthan a law or an executive order, they have noteeth. They acknowledge racial profiling as anational concern, but they provide no enforce-ment mechanisms or methods for trackingwhether or not federal law enforcement agen-cies are in compliance.

The guidelines’ most serious flaw, however, isthat they carve out a huge national securityloophole. The guidelines specify:

“The above standards do not affect cur-rent Federal policy with respect to lawenforcement activities and other efforts todefend and safeguard against threats tonational security or the integrity of theNation’s borders…”

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it has been theofficial policy of the United States govern-ment to stop, interrogate and detain individu-als without criminal charge – often for longperiods of time on the basis of their nationalorigin, ethnicity and religion. In fact, the veryinclusion of a national security exception inthe guidelines is an admission by theDepartment of Justice that it relies uponracial and ethnic profiling in its domesticcounterterrorism efforts.

In response to the severe shortcomings in thepresident’s guidelines, a bipartisan group oflawmakers in both the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate has introducedthe “End Racial Profiling Act,” a comprehen-sive package designed to track and providesteps toward eliminating racial, ethnic, reli-gious and national origin profiling. As thisreport went to print, nearly 100 members ofCongress had co-sponsored the measure and alarge coalition of public advocates from manypoints on the political spectrum, including sev-eral law enforcement organizations, wereactively working to ensure it receives its dueconsideration in Washington.

Specifically, the bill would define racial, ethnic,religious and national origin profiling, ban theiruse and provide a cause of action for individuals

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A n ACLU R e p o r t

SANCTIONED BIAS:RACIAL PROFILING SINCE 9/11

harmed by these forms of profiling. It wouldpermit the attorney general to withhold fundsfrom non-compliant police departments andgovernment agencies and would provide grantsto aid compliance. And, crucially, it wouldrequire data collection to ensure policeaccountability and provide police executiveswith a needed management tool.

Congress should act expediently to make thislegislation law. Only through federal legisla-tion can the problem of racial profiling be com-prehensively identified and ended.

This report is the latest in a series issued by theACLU on government actions since 9/11 thatthreaten fundamental rights and freedoms andfail to make us safer. The ACLU opposes allracial, religious and ethnic profiling, whetherin the context of routine law enforcement, ordomestic counterterrorism. As we have arguedrepeatedly in our litigation, legislative advoca-cy and public statements over the years, racialprofiling is in every instance inconsistent withthis country’s core constitutional principles ofequality and fairness.

We have also argued that law enforcementbased on general characteristics such as race,religion and national origin, rather than onthe observation of an individual’s behavior, isan inefficient and ineffective strategy forensuring public safety. The strength of thisargument has been borne out over and overagain by data that has been collected by indi-vidual police departments throughout thecountry in response to ACLU lawsuits andthe public’s demands for answers and policeaccountability.

We now have incontrovertible proof thatracial profiling does not, in fact, give thepolice a “leg up” in fighting crime. The

premise upon which it is based – that certainethnic minorities are more likely than whitesto be in violation of the law – is simplywrong. Studies consistently show that “hitrates” – the discovery of contraband or evi-dence of other illegal conduct – amongminorities stopped and searched by thepolice are lower than “hit rates” for whiteswho are stopped and searched. Indeed, thefindings of numerous studies throughout thecountry have been so consistent that policeofficials are starting to recognize that racialprofiling, while still practiced broadly, isineffective and should be rejected. TheInternational Association of Chiefs of Police,the world’s oldest and largest nonprofitmembership organization of police execu-tives, has adopted a resolution condemningracial profiling:

“We must ensure that racial and ethnicprofiling is not substituted for reason-able suspicion in traffic stops and otherlaw enforcement activities. The bestway to ensure the trust of citizens andthe courts, and to protect our officersfrom unfair criticism, is to develop ananti-profiling policy that delineatesapproved techniques for professionaltraffic stops, and makes a clear state-ment that profiling is not one of thosetechniques.” 1

There is no reason to believe that a counterter-rorism strategy based on ethnic profiling willbe any more effective. The overwhelmingmajority of Muslims, Middle Easterners andSouth Asians are hardworking, law-abidingpeople. Singling them out for special lawenforcement scrutiny will produce the samelow “hit rates” as has racial profiling in thecontext of drug law enforcement.

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1 IACP Resolutions: Condemning Racial and Ethnic Profiling in Traffic Stops (1999); Condemnation of Bias-Based Policing(2001).

Not long after the 9/11 attacks, agroup of senior U.S. intelligencespecialists combating terrorismcirculated a memo to Americanlaw enforcement agents worldwidecautioning against relying on eth-nic profiling as a counterterrorismtool. As reported in the Oct. 12issue of The Boston Globe, “thefour-page memo warns that look-ing for a type of person who fits aprofile of a terrorist is not as usefulas looking for behavior that mightprecede another attack.” One of theauthors of the memo, all of whomspoke on condition of anonymity,said,

“There are at least a millionpeople of Middle Easterndescent in the U.S. Do weconsider them all potentialterrorists?”

Another explained,

“…Fundamentally, believ-ing that you can achievesafety by looking at charac-teristics instead of behaviorsis silly. If your goal is pre-venting attacks…you wantyour eyes and ears lookingfor pre-attack behaviors, notcharacteristics.” 2

Another expert, Vincent Cannistano,the former head of counterterror-ism at the CIA, told Newsweek,“It’s a false lead. It may be intu-itive to stereotype people, but

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2 Bill Dedham, "Fighting Terror/Words ofCaution on Airport Security: Memo warnsagainst use of profiling as a defense," TheBoston Globe, Oct. 12, 2001.

THE END RACIALPROFILING ACT OF 2004

The End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) has several keyprovisions, each one of which would work in tandemwith the others to procedurally root out, discourageand end bias-informed police stops. Sponsored byReps. John Conyers, D-MI, and Christopher Shays, R-CT, this bipartisan bill has, at the time of writing, gar-nered nearly 100 co-sponsors.

Highlights in the current legislation include sec-tions that would:

• Define racial profiling as the practice of relyingon race, ethnicity, religion or national origin toselect which individuals to subject to a lawenforcement encounter.

• Make such conduct illegal.

• Provide victims of such profiling with the rightto sue.

• Introduce a nationally uniform data collectionthat would – like the Uniform Crime Reports –track and monitor bias-based policing.Providing a baseline of information throughwhich the public can identify bias-basedpolicing, it would increase police accountabil-ity and ensure the legitimacy of challenges tobias-based policing. This system is also beingheralded by some police executives as a nec-essary management tool.

• Allow the attorney general to withhold fundsfrom police departments that refuse to com-ply with the law, an enforcement mechanismnotably lacking from the president’s racialprofiling guidelines.

• Provide grants to help police departmentscomply with the law.

profiling is too crude to be effective. I can’tthink of any examples where profiling hascaught a terrorist.” 3

But in spite of the overwhelming evidence thatracial profiling is counterproductive, and inspite of the counsel of intelligence experts thatthe better method for identifying potential ter-rorists is through observation of “pre-attack”behaviors, Attorney General John Ashcroftimmediately launched a counterterrorismstrategy that centers on profiling based onnational origin. Moreover, even as it becameobvious that the strategy was not producingresults, the attorney general continued to con-ceive and implement increasingly grandioseschemes based on ethnic profiling. These arethe “activities and other efforts” PresidentBush has exempted from his guidelines. Thepurpose of this report is to demonstrate thatthe exemption is both unnecessary andunwise.

ETHNIC PROFILING HAS BECOMEOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Secret Roundup

In the hours and days immediately following9/11, the Department of Justice launched whatamounted to an extensive program of preventivedetention. It was the first large-scale detention ofa group of people based on country of origin orancestry since the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Within hours ofthe terrorist attacks, federal agents swept throughArab, Muslim and South Asian neighborhoodsthroughout the country, snatching men fromsidewalks, as well as their homes, workplacesand mosques.

The roundup and incarceration of thousands ofmen were carried out under an unprecedented

veil of secrecy, leaving wives, children, class-mates and employers wondering where thesepeople had been taken, and who would be next.The Federal Bureau of Prisons imposed acommunications blackout that prevented thedetainees from contacting family, friends, thepress and even attorneys. And in another actof almost unprecedented secrecy, the attorneygeneral ordered that the deportation hearingsof immigrants deemed of “special interest” tothe government be closed to the public andthe press, effectively concealing all immigra-tion hearings of Arabs and Muslims. In a sce-nario eerily reminiscent of the “disappear-ances” of labor and student activists inArgentina during the 1980s, Arab, Muslimand South Asian men were plucked off thestreets of American cities. America now hadits own “disappeared.”

Once it became clear that scores of individualsin New York City and elsewhere were beingarrested and detained, the ACLU and otherimmigrant rights organizations immediatelytook steps to learn the identities and locationsof the detainees, and the charges upon whichthey were being held. We wanted this informa-tion, which is routinely accessible in immigra-tion cases, in order to determine whether or notthe roundup was within constitutional bounds.But we were met with a wall of silence.

On Oct. 17, 2001 the ACLU wrote to the attor-ney general asking him for information aboutthe detainees. He did not respond. We posedthe same questions to FBI Director RobertMueller at two meetings on Sept. 25 and Oct.25, but were once again rebuffed. On Oct. 29,2003 the ACLU and several other organiza-tions filed a Freedom of Information Act(FOIA) request for the names and locationsof the detainees. But Attorney GeneralAshcroft, in a radical departure from pastpractice and basic democratic principles of

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3 Fareed Zakaria, "Freedom vs. Security," Newsweek, July 8, 2002, p.30.

open government, issued a directive discourag-ing federal agencies from releasing the infor-mation requested.

On Dec. 5, 2001 the ACLU and several otherorganizations filed a lawsuit in federal courtunder the FOIA demanding that the govern-ment disclose the names and whereabouts ofthe detainees. Judge Gladys Kessler orderedthe government to release the information onthe grounds that “secret arrests are ‘a conceptodious to a democratic society,’ and profound-ly antithetical to the bedrock values that char-acterize a free and open one such as ours.” Butsoon after her ruling, the government appealedand Judge Kessler issued a stay of her order. 4

As the days turned into weeks and thenmonths, information began to trickle out assome of the detainees were released or deport-ed, and immigration lawyers fought for, andsometimes won, access to the detention cen-ters. It soon became clear that most, if not all,of the several thousand detainees picked up byfederal agents in the immediate aftermath of9/11 were guilty of little more than being Arab,Muslim or South Asian, and in the wrong placeat the wrong time.5 The “tips” leading to theirarrests were often tainted with ethnic bias. Thevast majority of the men were detained on pre-texts: They may have been guilty of minorimmigration law offenses for which they wouldnot have been detained, much less deported,under normal circumstances. The men wereheld for months on end under extraordinarilyrestrictive and, in some cases, abusive condi-tions. Of the thousands of men who weredetained and questioned, not one has beenpublicly charged with terrorism.

FBI Questioning of Arab, Muslimand South Asian Men

On Nov. 9, 2001 Attorney General Ashcroftdirected the FBI and other law enforcementofficials to search out and interview at least5,000 men between the ages of 18 and 33 whohad legally entered the U.S. on non-immigrantvisas in the past two years, and who camefrom specific countries linked by the govern-ment to terrorism. The list of individuals wascompiled solely on the basis of national origin,and even the Justice Department acknowl-edged that it had no basis for believing thatany of these men had any knowledge relevantto a terrorism investigation. Unannounced, theFBI descended upon thousands of Arabs,Muslims and South Asians at their workplaces,homes, universities and mosques. Althoughcalled “voluntary,” the interviews were inher-ently coercive and few felt free to refuse. TheFBI agents, sometimes accompanied by immi-gration officials, asked questions about sensi-tive activities protected by the FirstAmendment such as religious practice,mosque attendance and feelings towards theUnited States.

In March 2002, the Department of Justiceannounced another round of interviews of anadditional 3,000 Arab, Muslim and SouthAsian men legally in the U.S. as visitors orstudents. The federal government requestedthat local police departments assist in thisdragnet. While many police departmentsenthusiastically participated in the biasedtargeting of innocent individuals, somepolice officials publicly declined to take onthe task of immigration enforcement. In

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4 On Jan. 12, 2004, the United States Supreme Court refused to consider whether the government properly withheld names andother details about the hundreds detained.5 We cannot be sure of the numbers because our government refuses to release them. On Nov. 5, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroftannounced that in the two months since Sept. 11, law enforcement had in custody 1,200 detainees. After that he refused to dis-close what appeared to be the growing number of men in custody. Hundreds more Arab and Muslim men continued to disappearinto detention. Immigration advocacy groups estimate the number of detainees to be around 3,000.

addition to concerns that racial, religious andethnic profiling are bad law enforcementtechniques, some police officials expressedconcern that this would destroy the trust,cooperation and faith that it takes years tobuild. A sampling follows:

“We’ve been trying to get the immi-grants in our town to believe that we’renot like many of the governments intheir old countries, governments thatwere corrupt and wanted to railroadthem, not serve them.” (Sgt. RobertFrancaviglia, Hillsdale, New Jersey PoliceDepartment) 6

“Because of our immigrant populationhere and our diverse communities, wedon’t want to alienate anybody, or giveanybody fear…That’s just not our policy.Hasn’t been for twenty years.” (Sgt. JohnPasquariello, Los Angeles PoliceDepartment) 7

“Communication is big in inner-cityneighborhoods and the underpinning ofthat is trust. If a victim thinks they’regoing to be a suspect in an immigrationviolation, they’re not going to call us,and that’s just going to separate us evenfurther.” (Chief Gerry Whitman, DenverPolice Department) 8

In an effort to encourage voluntary coopera-tion with the FBI, the attorney generalpromised that he would help non-citizenswith their visas in exchange for providinguseful information to the government. Butthis promise bore all the hallmarks of a stingoperation, as individuals with even minor

visa violations were arrested on the spot andsent to detention facilities. In fact, the attor-ney general’s memorandum governing theconduct of the questioning specificallyinstructed FBI agents to contact the nearestImmigration and Naturalization Serviceofficial if they had any suspicion aboutsomeone’s immigration status. 9

Special Registration Program

In June 2002, Attorney General JohnAshcroft announced the implementation ofNSEERS, the National Security Entry ExitRegistration System, which established aseries of regulations and registration require-ments. One of the most ambitious aspects ofthis program is Special Registration. In amassive operation reminiscent of the Nazis’requirements for Jews living in Germany andcountries under German occupation, all malenationals over the age of 15 from 25 coun-tries were ordered to report to the govern-ment to register and be fingerprinted, pho-tographed and questioned. With the excep-tion of North Korea, all targeted countriesare Arab and Muslim. Despite the fact thatthe government gave no individualizednotice for this poorly publicized require-ment, all those who failed to register weremade vulnerable to deportation and criminalpenalties. The ACLU denounced the plan asa thinly veiled effort to trigger massive anddiscriminatory deportations of certain immi-grants.

NSEERS is a discriminatory and poorlyimplemented plan that neither advancesnational security nor improves the efficiencyof the country’s immigration system. Not all

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6 "Policing Immigration," Bergen Record, April 22, 2002.7 "Police Want No Part In Enforcing Immigration," Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2002.8 "Immigration Bill Has Police Uneasy," Denver Post, April 22, 2002.9 Nadine Strossen, "Department of Justice Oversight: The Massive, Secretive Detention and Dragnet Questioning of People Basedon National Origin in the Wake of September 11," Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Dec. 4, 2001.

of its requirements have been adequatelypublicized or translated into all appropriatelanguages. Many people are not even awarethat continuing regulations require registra-tion upon change of address, employment oracademic institution and when leaving andentering the country.

In December, 2002 up to 700 men and boysfrom Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria werearrested in Southern California by federalimmigration authorities after they voluntarilycomplied with the NSEERS “Call-In” pro-gram. In many cases, the men were arrestedfor minor visa problems caused by the INS –a federal agency whose incompetence is leg-endary. Some were awaiting the approval oftheir green card applications. Others were stu-dents who had allegedly not attended enoughclasses at the universities where they wereenrolled. The summary arrests of so manypeople spread panic in Arab, Muslim andSouth Asian communities across the countryand discouraged men from other countriesfrom reporting on successive registrationdates.10 In December 2003, the Department ofHomeland Security suspended two parts ofthe registration requirement, but most of theprogram’s discriminatory provisions remainin effect, and there is no relief for the thou-sands who fell afoul of the program’s confus-ing requirements.11 In one year, the SpecialRegistration program registered 83,310 for-eign nationals, placing 13,740 into deporta-tion proceedings. Not a single one of theseindividuals was ever publicly charged withterrorism.

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TWO YOUNG VICTIMSOF NSEERS

Ahmad and Hassan Amin think ofthemselves as regular Americanteenagers. Ahmad, 17, is a star on hisCupertino high school’s football team.His brother, Hassan, 19, is studyingaccounting at De Anza College inCupertino. They live with their mother,Tahira Manzur, who is a full-timeteacher at a children’s developmentcenter. “We sold our house in Pakistanto come to this country so that my sonscould have a better education and abetter life,” she explains. “Our life ishere.”

But Ahmad and Hassan may be forcedto return to Pakistan – a country theyno longer know and where they have nofamily. “I don’t even know if I remem-ber how to write my language,” saysHassan.

The boys and their mother believed theywere in the U.S. legally and in theprocess of becoming permanent resi-dents. But unbeknownst to them, theirvisas had expired because of bad advicefrom an immigration lawyer. When theyreported for Special Registration,Hassan was detained, arrested and sentto Yuba County Jail, where he was heldovernight in a criminal cell until he wasreleased on $4,000 bail. Ahmad is nowrequired to miss school every thirdWednesday to register with the INSoffices. Both brothers will likely soonface deportation.12

10 In addition to Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria, SpecialRegistration countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain,Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar,Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan,Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan andKuwait.11 The Department of Homeland Security subsequentlyimplemented a new immigrant tracking program, USVISIT. It is an addition to, not a substitute for, SpecialRegistration.

12 ACLU of Northern California,www.aclunc.org/aclunews/news0309/backlash.html

“RACIAL PROFILING IS A LAZYMETHOD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT.”

Veterans of law enforcement who were policeofficers during the 1980s and 1990s, when the“war on drugs” was in full swing and racialprofiling was rampant, are among the country’smost knowledgeable experts on the effective-ness of racial profiling in fighting crime. Hereare some of their comments:

Barbara A. Markham has been a policeofficer with the Oak Point PoliceDepartment in North Texas since 1983. She

has been an undercover narcotics investiga-tor since 1986, and is the recipient of awardsand letters of commendation from theDepartment of Treasury-Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco and Firearms for her investigativework. She has also been an outspoken criticof the Texas police for engaging in racialprofiling in the enforcement of narcoticslaws – profiling that has focused virtuallyexclusively on African Americans. In arecent interview, Officer Markham told theACLU:

“Racial profiling is utilized when youhave no intelligence and you’re justcasting a wide net and having to use aprocess of elimination out of that widenet. Racial profiling is a lazy methodfor law enforcement. You’re not usinginvestigative leads; you’re not usingany investigative skill, all you’re doingis casting a wide net against one group,one segment of society, and that’s whatwe call ‘going fishing,’ and you’regoing to come up empty-handed. Thebetter way is to simply investigate ter-rorism by behaviors exhibited by spe-cific individuals. It’s not the color ofone’s skin or their ethnicity that shouldindict them or bring them under policescrutiny. It should be their behaviors oractions – what they do.” 13

Hiram Monserrate was a patrol officer withthe New York Police Department for twelveyears. Today, he is a prominent member of theNew York City Council, where he sits on thePublic Safety Committee. CouncilmanMonserrate also founded the Latino OfficersAssociation. He is an ardent critic of racial pro-filing by the police, and, like BarbaraMarkham, he does not believe ethnic profilingis effective as a law enforcement tool. He toldthe ACLU:

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Barbara A. Markham

13 Telephone interview, Oct. 21, 2003.

The

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“It’s easy to go to an area like JacksonHeights [Queens, New York] searchingout South Asian males under the guiseof counterterrorism. It’s easy to do that.It’s also easy to detain lots of innocentpeople. I think that is neither a goodcourse of action, nor is it the best use oflaw enforcement resources. The betterway is to do the intelligence work andinvestigation that needs to be done, andbe able to identify individuals wherethere is reasonable suspicion to believethey are in fact engaged in some type ofcriminal activity, and then go to those

individuals and stop them to questionthem and ultimately detain them. Goodpolice work is not about cutting corners.It’s about using resources and beingintelligent. Law enforcement going outand engaging in sweeps and randomstops really produces very little in qual-ity arrests.” 14

Jerry Sanders was a member of the SanDiego Police Department for 26 years, andfor the last six of those years he served asthe department’s chief of police. ChiefSanders was credited with bringing about adramatic reduction in crime and for buildingcommunity-police partnerships. He was alsothe first chief of police to announce that hewould begin collecting traffic stops data ona voluntary basis in order to determinewhether or not his department’s officerswere engaging in racial profiling. He toldthe ACLU:

“One of the things I can remember beingup on the bulletin boards at work was asign that said, ‘Random patrol producesrandom results.’ If you’re doing this ran-domly, just trying to blanket places, Ithink you get pretty random results. Idon’t think you get a high hit rate. Rightafter 9/11 everybody wanted a quick fix.I was certainly concerned and I wantedthings done quickly, too. But it takestime to investigate, to find out who wasinvolved in these things, and goodinvestigative techniques are not alwaysfast. I don’t think you get a quick fix bystopping everybody and getting theirnames, and then trying to figure outwhat’s going on. I think a much moretargeted response would be a much bet-ter way of doing that without alienatinghuge parts of the community.”15

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Hiram Monserrate

14 Live interview at councilman’s office, Oct. 16, 2003.15 Telephone interview, Oct. 15, 2003.

All three police offi-cers also expressedtheir concern thatcurrent counterter-rorism practices thatrely on ethnic profil-ing actually compro-mise public safety.First, such practiceslead to the misuse ofscarce policeresources. OfficerMarkham explained:

“When you’re engaged in racial profiling incounterterrorism you’re casting a wide net, andthen by process of elimination you have to look atevery person in that wide net, and you’re going towaste a lot of time, manpower and energy.”

This is an accurate description of the JusticeDepartment’s post-9/11 investigation. In April2003 the Office of the Inspector General of theDepartment of Justice issued a comprehensive198-page report revealing in detail for the firsttime the Justice Department’s policies, direc-tives, and activities in the wake of the Sept. 11attacks. Entitled The September 11 Detainees:A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held onImmigration Charges in Connection with theInvestigation of the September 11 Attacks (theOIG report), it was based on a year-long inves-tigation that included extensive interviewswith federal law enforcement officials andagents, and with some of the detainees. One ofthe OIG report’s findings was that since theattorney general issued a “hold until cleared”policy for all aliens arrested in the 9/11 inves-tigation, law enforcement personnel had tospend time identifying the detainees, investi-gating their backgrounds and analyzing what-ever information came in from the CIA andother agencies. And each of these investiga-tions was so time-consuming that “[t]he FBI

cleared less than 3 percent of the September 11detainees within three weeks of their arrest.”(OIG report, p. 51) The report paints a vivid pic-ture of the time and resources wasted clearingindividuals who in large part were “suspicious”only because of their national origin:

“[The FBI’s] resources were insufficientto permit the group to analyze the CIAinformation in a more timely manner for anumber of reasons. First, according to oneof the SSAs (supervisory special agent)assigned to the project, the volume ofcases was simply too great. One of theFBI requests to the CIA for informationcontained the names of 190 detainees.Second, the SSA pointed to many techni-cal difficulties and ‘growing pains’ theyfaced when they first started in lateNovember 2001…Third, many of thepeople working on this project were notfocused exclusively on this task, due tothe many demands on the FBI. Finally,some of the cases required contacting FBIoffices overseas or other agencies, whichtook time, especially because the FBIoffices in the Middle Eastern countriesalso were over-burdened at the time.”(OIG report, p. 61)

At a time when every investigator could havebeen following up real leads based on observa-tion of “pre-attack” behaviors, many were tiedto their desks, clearing individuals about whomthere was no reason to be suspicious. What’smore, the futility of this effort became clearearly in the process. According to the report,“A variety of INS, FBI and Department offi-cials who worked on these September 11detainee cases told the OIG that it soon becameevident that many of the people arrested duringthe PENTTBOM16 investigation might not havea nexus to terrorism.” (OIG report, p.45) Butbecause of the “hold until cleared” policy, the

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16 PENTTBOM is an acronym for Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombings.

Jerry Sanders

investigators had to go through this futile andtime-consuming process.

As was the case with racial profiling during the“war on drugs,” ethnic profiling alienates thecommunities whose cooperation is essential tothe gathering of good intelligence. As PoliceChief Sanders explained:

“Whole communities get very upsetwhen they see that pretty soon every-body that they love has been arrested,and I think that creates far more prob-lems. The issue is one of communitytrust. If you’re relying on the public toassist you in just about any way, and ifyou’re stopping people in communitiesof color, and your stops are out of syncwith the way they are in every othercommunity because you’re simply stop-ping people because you think they maylook suspicious, we found that it’sawfully difficult for those communitiesto support and trust the efforts of whatthe police are doing.”

Councilman Monserrate, whose district is com-prised of a section of New York City with alarge South Asian population, also commentedon this problem:

“I do know that in the South Asiancommunity, there is a lot of concernabout people being taken off the streetand detained without charge. Thatleaves an aura of fear and suspicion.And I think that fear and suspicionlargely hampers the police mandate tohelp protect property and lives. Thebest way is for the communities to bepartners with the police and not to be infear of the police, because that hamperspublic safety.”

THE HUMAN COSTS

The human costs of our government’s ethnicprofiling policies are incalculable: hard-work-ing, law-abiding men suddenly finding them-selves shackled hand and foot, held incommu-nicado in solitary confinement for months at atime; families separated; homes and businesseslost; and lives turned upside down. For many,the greatest loss of all was the bitter discoverythat their adopted country, which promisedfreedom and opportunity, no longer wantedthem.

In November 2002, frustrated by the continu-ing refusal of the Department of Justice toreveal the identities and happenstances of mostof the post-9/11 detainees, the ACLU decidedto conduct its own investigation. With theassistance of the Human Rights Commission ofPakistan, we located 21 detainees who hadbeen deported to Pakistan, or who had left theU.S. voluntarily to avoid indefinite detention.We met with these men in Lahore, Karachi andIslamabad.17 Their accounts, one of which isdetailed below, are a powerful indictment ofour government’s abuse of power. JusticeThurgood Marshall once wrote:

“History teaches that grave threats to lib-erty often come in times of urgency, whenconstitutional rights seem too extravagantto endure. The World War II camp cases,and the Red Scare and McCarthy-erainternal subversion cases, are only themost extreme reminders that when weallow fundamental freedoms to be sacri-ficed in the name of real or perceived exi-gency, we invariably come to regret it.”18

In the post-9/11 era, the treatment of Arabs,Muslims and South Asians can be added toJustice Marshall’s list of “extreme reminders.”

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17 “America’s Disappeared: Seeking International Justice for Immigrants Detained After September 11,” (January 2004)18 Skinner v. Rainway Labor Executives’ Association, 109 S.CT. 1402 (1989)

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The report by the Office of theInspector General, released to thepublic in April 2003, confirmed theACLU’s long-held view that theDepartment of Justice engaged indeliberate and wholesale civil rightsviolations in the aftermath of 9/11.According to news reports, the releaseof the report was delayed for almost ayear because of ongoing negotiationswith the attorney general’s office overwho would shoulder blame for theabuses it described. The report revealsa stark pattern of ethnic profiling fromthe earliest days of the investigation:

• Many of the tips and leads thatresulted in detentions were basedon little more than ethnic profilingby members of the public andlocal police. For example, an alien“was arrested, detained on immi-gration charges and treated as aSeptember 11 detainee19 because aperson called the FBI to reportthat a grocery store in which thealien worked, ‘is operated bynumerous Middle Eastern men, 24hrs-7 days a week. Each shift dailyhas 2 or 3 men…Store was closedday after crash, reopened daysand evenings. Then later onopened during midnight hours.Too many people to run a smallstore.’” (OIG report, p.17) Had thestorekeepers been other thanMiddle Eastern, it is unlikely thattheir activities would havearoused any suspicion at all.

• Men of Middle Eastern and SouthAsian ethnicity who happened tobe in the vicinity of the subject ofa “lead” were also arrested. TheOIG report found that, “[i]f JointTerrorism Task Force agentssearching for a particular personon a lead arrived at a locationand found a dozen individuals outof immigration status, each ofthem were considered to bearrested in connection with theSeptember 11 investigation… nodistinction generally was madebetween the subjects of the leadand any other individualsencountered at the scene ‘inci-dentally’ because the FBI wantedto be certain that no terrorist wasinadvertently set free.” (OIGreport, p.16)

• As a result, the secret detentioncenters quickly filled up withpeople who had absolutely noconnection to terrorism. The OIGreport cites the following exam-ples of fruitless arrests:

– Several Middle Eastern menwere arrested and treated asconnected to the 9/11 investiga-tion when local law enforce-ment authorities discovered“suspicious items,” such aspictures of the World TradeCenter and other famous build-ings during traffic stops. (OIGreport, p.16)

19 Italics in this section added for emphasis.

OIG REPORT SHOWSTHE FUTILITY OF ETHNIC PROFILING

SYED WASIM ABBAS

Syed Wasim Abbas came to the United Statesfrom Pakistan to attend college. “It was 1992,March 27 when I first landed in New York. Iwent there as a student on an F-1 visa. I wentto Brooklyn College and I worked in between.”At the time of his arrest Abbas had a temporarywork authorization card and was in the processof applying for a green card. He was runninghis own business: “I had a gas station, aSunoco gas station right on Route 30 West.And I had my apartment there and I wanted tosettle down there, bring my wife toPennsylvania. But the circumstances didn’tgive me a chance to do it.”

On June 11, 2002 Abbas was driving home toPennsylvania when he was pulled over by anINS agent. “When he pulled me over he came

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– Another man was arrestedon immigration charges andlabeled a 9/11 detainee whenauthorities discovered that hehad taken a roll of film to bedeveloped and the film hadmultiple pictures of the WorldTrade Center on it but no otherManhattan sites. This man’sroommates were also arrestedwhen law enforcement author-ities found out they were in theUnited States illegally, andthey too were considered 9/11detainees. (OIG report, p. 16)

– On Sept. 15, 2001 New YorkCity police stopped a group ofthree Middle Eastern men inManhattan on a traffic viola-tion. The men had the plansto a public school in their car.The next day, their employerconfirmed that the men wereworking on construction atthe school and that it wasappropriate for them to havethe plans. Nonetheless, theywere arrested and became9/11 detainees. (OIG report, p.42)

Of the 762 cases reviewed by theOIG, all the detainees came fromcountries in the Middle East orfrom Pakistan. Although the aver-age length of detention was 80days under extremely restrictive,and in many instances abusive,conditions, not one of these menwas ever charged with participatingin, or lending support to terroristactivities.

Syed Wasim Abbas

and said to turn the car off. He got the key fromme and said, ‘I’m from INS.’ Then he showedme the paper in his hand and he said, ‘Is thisyou, a-hole?’ I said, ‘Yeah. That’s me.’ He usedreally bad language, so I was scared becausethis was the first time ever I faced somebodypulling me over like that. He said, ‘You have adeportation order.’ Then he handcuffed me andhe searched my car. He took my passport, mylicense, my social security card, my wallet andeverything. He searched the back of the car, thetrunk and then they left my car right there andtook me to the INS office in Newark.”

Abbas was shackled at the INS office: “Theyput chains on my legs and real tight handcuffsand stuff. I told them that it’s really hurting,you know? Can you just open it up and youcan handcuff me in front? But they said, ‘Wecan’t do it. This is how we do it.’ It was veryhard to walk and I wasn’t a criminal. I never,you know, was involved in any crime or any-thing but I was like suddenly I just brokedown, I cried. I can’t express how I felt atthat time.”

After 29 days in the Bergen County Jail,Abbas, who had spent his entire adult life inAmerica, was deported to Pakistan. His gasstation is gone, and his wife, an Americancitizen, is living with relatives in New York.He now lives in London in a state of limbo.When we met him in Pakistan, he told us, “Icould not and cannot take this out of mymind the fact that I’ve been to jail, I’ve beenhandcuffed and I’ve been chained. I do getnightmares sometimes and I get scared andwhen I wake up I’m all sweaty and scaredand that stays there. Another thing is finan-cially. Although my dad he’s pretty good; Ican’t ask him for money because I’m 32years old and those days are gone when Iasked money from my parents.Unfortunately there aren’t much opportuni-ties here to work.”

MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI

Muhammad Siddiqui is an architect inHouston, husband to a busy physician andfather of two young children. When two of hisfamily members called him to say the FBI hadquestioned them, he was understandably con-cerned. He contacted Texas ACLU attorneyAnnette Lamoreaux, who agreed to representSiddiqui should the authorities contact him. Ona Monday evening Siddiqui, who was homewith his children, received a visit from two FBIagents.

S i d d i q u iopened the doorto the agentsand respondedto their requestto question himby saying, “I’dbe happy to talkto you, but I’dlike to have myattorney pres-ent.” One of theagents toldSiddiqui that he

did not need an attorney and that getting anattorney would only make him look guilty. TheFBI agent insisted that Siddiqui submit to theinterview “now.” Siddiqui repeated the phrasethat Lamoreaux had advised him to say: “I’d behappy to talk to you, but I’d like to have myattorney present.” When the FBI agentresponded angrily, Siddiqui called Lamoreauxfrom his cell phone. She asked to speak to oneof the agents and explained that Siddiqui didnot want to speak with the FBI at that time, butif the agent called her office during the day, hemight set up an appointment.

“I do this all the time,” Lamoreaux said. “Assoon as there is a lawyer in the picture, theyhave to play by a different set of rules.” But the

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ACLU attorney Annette Lamoreauxrepresents Muhammad Siddiqui.

FBI agent on the phone did not seem to be pay-ing attention to the rules. He screamed atLamoreaux that Siddiqui did not have the rightto counsel, to which she replied, “That isabsolutely not the law. My client is not going totalk to you without a lawyer present. Call meon Monday morning and we’ll set up a time ifhe is going to talk to you, but he’s not going totalk to you right now and you are to leave thehouse immediately.” The agent refused to talkwith her any further and gave the phone back toSiddiqui.

Lamoreaux informed Siddiqui of his rights andadvised him to insist that the agents leave thehouse. But he did not feel comfortable tellingthem to leave. He was standing in front of avery agitated FBI agent and was afraid that ifhe shut the door, the two of them would breakit down. Again and again, Siddiqui repeatedthat he would only talk to them with his lawyerpresent. One agent shouted, “Turn off that cellphone!” Siddiqui refused, telling the agent thathe wanted his attorney to hear everything thatwas being said. The agents remained in thedoorway of Siddiqui’s apartment, one of thempulling his coat back to reveal a gun. Siddiqui,whose children were inside, was afraid.Finally, the agents saw they were gettingnowhere and left. As they were walking away,one agent turned back to Siddiqui threatening,“We will talk to you. We are watching you.Don’t leave town.”

The next morning Lamoreaux received a callfrom the agent with whom she had spoken.Siddiqui had already decided that it would bebetter to talk to the FBI agents so they wouldsee that he had nothing to hide. Lamoreauxsuggested that they meet on Thursday, whenSiddiqui was free from work and childcareresponsibilities. The agent insisted on meetingthat day and told her that he would stand out-side of Siddiqui’s house until he came out andtalked to him. Later that day, the interview was

held in Lamoreaux’s office. The meeting lasted15 minutes, and an FBI agent confirmed thatSiddiqui was never a criminal target. Havingrepresentation made all the difference, saidSiddiqui. “Once there was counsel involved,attitudes changed dramatically. Laws started tomean something. It was like back home [inPakistan], a guy with a police uniform thinksthat he is God. I saw it make a difference.”Government officials have not contactedSiddiqui since this interview, but others who donot have legal representation continue to be tar-geted. As Siddiqui commented, “It is sad thatpeople go back home to Pakistan and find thatthe system is fairer there than it is here. Peoplenever would have said that two years ago.”

BANAFSHEH AKHLAGHI

In September of 2001, law school professorBanafsheh Akhlaghi abandoned her positionteaching the Constitution to work overtimedefending it. As an activist attorney fighting forthe civil liberties of Arabs, Muslims and SouthAsians, Akhlaghi had represented hundreds ofmen targeted by the government solely becauseof their ethnicity and religion. She was stillswamped with clients over a year later, whenthe first round of Special Registration began.On Dec. 16, the deadline for the first call-ingroup, she spent all day at the San FranciscoDistrict INS Office, providing free legal coun-sel for registrants.

By the end of the day, Akhlaghi watched, help-less, as dozens of her newly retained clientsfound themselves detained. Shackled at thehands and feet, 12 of the men were shovedonto a bus to Oakland, Calif., then flownaround the country. Akhlaghi explains, “Theyare the very faces that our government and themedia continue to feed us with as the faces ofterror. They are Stanford students, they arebusiness owners, they are shoe salesmen, they

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are working for high technology firms as engi-neers, they are in the food industry, they arejust normal, normal folks.”

Two days passed before one of Akhlaghi’sclients was able to contact her. He told her thatthe men, blindfolded and shackled, had beenflown from California to Arizona, to Kentucky,to Chicago, then back to Arizona, then toBakersfield, Calif., then back to Oakland,before crossing the state again to end up in SanDiego – all over the course of 36 hours. Federalofficials had been looking for vacant jail cells.The men had not eaten, showered or slept atany point during the 72 hours in which theyhad been held.

When she learned what had happened,Akhlaghi immediately jumped in her car anddrove 10 hours south to San Diego to get infront of the immigration court and securerelease dates for her clients who had yet to seean immigration judge. But she was unsuccess-ful because her clients had not yet beenprocessed into the system that would allowthem to have an immigration hearing. To makematters worse, the judges were on vacation andnot coming back until after New Year’s Day.Despite these setbacks, Akhlaghi was able to

convince a district director to issue bonds toher clients, releasing most of them on Dec. 23and one man on the 24th. Their cases werefinally heard on Feb. 17. But for Akhlaghi’sextraordinary efforts, these men would haveremained in detention until that date.Unfortunately, there were many other men whodid not have access to such an advocate.Akhlaghi remains hopeful despite the presentcrises before her. “After September 11, we alllost our minds here in America, we numbedourselves out to what is just and what is fair.Hopefully, since time has passed we have start-ed to come back to what is just.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Abbas, Siddiqui and Akhlaghi’s stories are notunusual. They are representative of the thou-sands of people racially, religiously and ethni-cally profiled. As detailed in the report, notonly is racial profiling unnecessary and inef-fective, but it destroys countless lives everyyear. Racial profiling is a misguided techniquein the well-intentioned goal of improving secu-rity. We must take the important steps towarderadicating this destructive practice. The fol-lowing are measures the government mustadopt to ensure our safety and freedom:

Target terrorists, not immigrants. This adminis-tration is using immigration law as its chiefinstrument in the “war on terror.” This is ineffec-tive. There is a huge difference, operationally andlegally, between immigration enforcement andcounterterrorism. Terrorism must be pursuedthrough legitimate criminal investigation not bla-tant targeting based on race, religion or ethnicity.

Stop selective enforcement of immigration lawsagainst people of certain national origins orreligious background. Immigration violationsare found in similar percentages across allimmigrant groups.

Banafsheh Akhlaghi

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Eliminate the “national security” loophole inthe Bush administration’s guidelines,Regarding the Use of Race by Federal LawEnforcement Agencies, that allows for blatantand discriminatory targeting of innocentArabs, Muslims and South Asians. Further,these guidelines must be made strongerthrough law and executive order.

Pass the End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA).While the racial profiling epidemic hasbecome more pervasive since 9/11,Congress has yet to act to put an end to thisunlawful practice. ERPA is a good first steptoward addressing traditional racial profil-ing, driving while black or brown and somepost-9/11 selective enforcement. It movesbeyond the rhetorical statements included inthe unenforceable guidelines issued by theDepartment of Justice and implements vig-orous enforcement mechanisms, includingproviding legal recourse for victims injuredby racial profiling.

End all registration. The continuing require-ments, including restricted entry and exit forthose who registered, are discriminatory andineffective. The government must give ade-quate and fair notice of immigration regula-tions and leniency where it has failed in thatrespect.

Reverse the Justice Department’s legal opin-ion in support of state and local enforcementof immigration laws. One of the foremost rec-ommendations to ameliorate the harmfuleffects of racial, ethnic and religious originbased profiling is the repeal of the JusticeDepartment’s Office of Legal Counsel opin-ion that seeks to permit, and force, local, stateand regional police officers to enforce immi-gration law, a task for which they are nottrained, not funded and is contrary to thescope of their purpose. Immigration law is

extremely complex and difficult to under-stand. Poor enforcement carries with it count-less damaging consequences, includingimproper and inconsistent enforcement,destruction of community trust and coopera-tion and corrosive effects to the ability ofpolice to identify and interdict crime and ter-rorism in America’s cities.

Do not conflate criminal law enforcementwith civil immigration law enforcement.Names of people with minor immigration vio-lations should not be entered into NationalCrime Information Center system. This data-base is accessed by state and local police mil-lions of times each day, and will subjectimmigrants to the risk of unlawful arrest bystate and local police.

Abandon mandatory detention policies fornon-citizens. Today it costs more than a mil-lion dollars a day to hold non-citizens indetention.20 Most of these detainees, howev-er, pose no threat to society and pose littleflight risk if released. The mandatory deten-tion laws should be moderated to relievestrain on the system and comport with basicnotions of justice and the prevention of arbi-trary detention.

Return to open government. The administra-tion has consistently refused to release thenames of the detainees. Who are they andwhat happened to them? We may never knowbecause the Supreme Court declined to hearour claim that the Freedom of InformationAct and the First Amendment grants the pub-lic the right to obtain access to the names ofthe people detained. The court’s refusal tohear the case means that this could happenagain, but it doesn’t have to. The blanketclosing of immigration hearings of Arab andMuslim men must end, and be replaced by acase-by-case analysis.

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20 Vanessa Waldref, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. Telephone interviews. Jan. 27, 2004.

CONCLUSION

The practice of profiling by race, ethnicity, reli-gion or national origin runs counter to what isarguably the core principle of Americandemocracy: that humans are created equal, andare entitled to be treated equally by the govern-ment, irrespective of immutable characteristicslike skin color, faith and ethnic or national ori-gin.

The argument for bias in policing is a self-ful-filling prophecy. If blacks are considered bypolice to be more likely to commit crimes, theywill be stopped and investigated more thanwhites, and the “crime rate” among blacks willincrease. Likewise, if the police concentratedtheir efforts on white citizens, they would findan increased hit rate among whites as well. IfArabs or Muslims are considered by the

Department of Justice more likely to be terror-ists, it will investigate, detain, interrogate anddeport more Muslims or Arabs, consequentlycreating a numerical basis for the initial belief.

Numerous law enforcement officials believethat racial, ethnic, religious or national originprofiling actually poses a national security risk.If you are an airport screener and you believethat every terrorist is going to be MiddleEastern, you are not going to look as hard atpeople of other ethnicities. In addition, bias-based profiling – because of its lack of speci-ficity – wastes resources and ineffectively allo-cates personnel.

At stake in the fight to end racial profiling arethe fundamental principles of democracy uponwhich our country is based. Those principlesdeserve our vigorous protection.

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OTHER SAFE AND FREE REPORTS

America’s Disappeared: Seeking InternationalJustice For Immigrants Detained After September11 (January 2004)

A New Era of Discrimination? Why AfricanAmericans Should Be Alarmed About the AshcroftTerrorism Laws (September 2003)

Unpatriotic Acts: The FBI’s Power to Rifle ThroughYour Records and Personal Belongings WithoutTelling You (July 2003)

Seeking Truth From Justice: PATRIOTPropaganda—The Justice Department’s Campaignto Mislead The Public About the USA PATRIOT Act(July 2003)

Independence Day 2003: Main Street America Fightsthe Federal Government’s Insatiable Appetite forNew Powers in the Post 9/11 Era (July 2003)

Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post-9/11 America(May 2003)

Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of anAmerican Surveillance Society (January 2003)

Insatiable Appetite: The Government’s Demandfor Unnecessary Powers After September 11(October 2002)

Civil Liberties After 9/11: The ACLU DefendsFreedom (September 2002)

National Headquarters125 Broad Street, 18th Fl.New York, NY 10004-2400

(212) 549-2500www.aclu.org

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