Questioning Iran’s Pursuit of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle · • Confirmed record of hiding sensitive...

IranIran’’s Nuclear Fuels Nuclear FuelCycle Facilities:Cycle Facilities:A Pattern of A Pattern of Peaceful Intent?Peaceful Intent?

OVERVIEW: OVERVIEW: Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?

• Confirmed record of hiding sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities from the IAEA.

• Iran’s rationale for “peaceful” nuclear fuel cycle does not hold up under scrutiny. – Given Iran’s insufficient uranium reserves, Iran cannot achieve its

goal of nuclear energy independence.

– Moreover, indigenous fuel cycle costs are substantially greater than importing nuclear fuel at market prices…or taking full advantage of its current wasted hydrocarbon resources.

• But Iran’s uranium reserves could give Iran a significant number of nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran’s facilities are scaled exactly like another state’s facilities that were designed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Fuel Cycle RationalizationFuel Cycle Rationalization

1. “Iran cannot rely on energy from fossil fuels for the following reason: resources are limited…and the local use of these resources will drastically affect foreign exchange earnings.”

-- Iranian Vice-President and Atomic Energy Minister Aghazadeh, May 2003

2. “The best use that a country like mine can make out of its uranium ores is to replace oil as a primary source of energy…within two decades most of our oil production will be consumed internally, leaving nothing tangible for export.”

-- Iranian Representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Salehi, March 2003

Senior Iranian officials have stressed two themes to rationalize Iran’s extensive nuclear fuel cycle expenditures in support of plans tobuild 7000 Megawatts of nuclear power by 2020:

IranIran’’s Nuclear Fuels Nuclear FuelCycle Facilities:Cycle Facilities:Concealment & DeceptionConcealment & Deception

A History of A History of Concealment & DeceptionConcealment & Deception

Long-standing IAEA safeguards violations show that Iran kept its nuclear activities hidden until they were first revealed by others.

Iran’s provision of “changing or contradictory information,” as described by the Director General, leaves major issues remain unresolved:

•Apart from “contamination,” the full extent of centrifuge research and development;

•The full extent of plutonium experimentation;

•Military involvement in any nuclear activity.

Gachin

Lashkar A’bad

Ardekan

Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002

Natanz Gas Centrifuge Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment ComplexUranium Enrichment Complex

•Covert facility in remote location, could enrich uranium for weapons•Dummy structures to prevent detection and identification•Concealed underground, hardened, well defended

AFTER: 20 JUN 04DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

Dummy bldg Dummy bldg to conceal to conceal entrance rampentrance ramp

Covered electric Covered electric transformer stationtransformer station

Dummy bldgs Dummy bldgs to conceal to conceal Ventilation shaftsVentilation shafts

20 SEP 02

Bunkered underground Bunkered underground production halls production halls

Admin/engineering Admin/engineering office areaoffice area

Vehicle Entrance Ramp Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial)(before burial)

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

21 JUL 04

Bunkered underground Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls Centrifuge cascade halls

Dummy building concealing tunnel entrance ramp

Helicopterpads

New security New security wallwall

Vehicle Entrance Ramp Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial)(after burial)


Admin/engineering Admin/engineering office areaoffice area

Concealment EffectivenessConcealment Effectiveness

June 2004-March 2005, significant progress on Heavy Water plant construction

•Full production of primary line planned for 2005Despite IAEA Board request to forgo construction,

•Reactor is well underway and progressing rapidly

Iran says reactor needed for medical and industrial isotopes…A capability already inherent in Iran’s 10 Megawatt Tehran Research Reactor.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor Complex: Arak Heavy Water Reactor Complex: Reactor could produceReactor could produce……

~1~1--3 Bombs worth of Pu/yr3 Bombs worth of Pu/yr

Arak Heavy Water Reactor ComplexArak Heavy Water Reactor Complex

Arak 40 MWth Heavy Water ReactorArak 40 MWth Heavy Water Reactor

14 FEB 05

Auxiliary building foundationAuxiliary building foundation(for Laboratory/Hot cells?) (for Laboratory/Hot cells?)

Foundation for reactor and Foundation for reactor and containment structurecontainment structure

Foundation Foundation for reactor for reactor ventilation ventilation

stackstack


Arak 40 MWth Heavy Water ReactorArak 40 MWth Heavy Water Reactor

22 MAR 05

Auxiliary building foundationAuxiliary building foundation(for Laboratory/Hot cells?) (for Laboratory/Hot cells?)

Foundation for reactor and Foundation for reactor and containment structurecontainment structure

Foundation Foundation for reactor for reactor ventilation ventilation

stackstack


New excavationNew excavation

Saghand Saghand Uranium MineUranium Mine


N

24 AUG 04

Uranium mining and Uranium mining and prepre--processing processing support facilitysupport facility

Uranium mining Uranium mining shaft headframeshaft headframe

From AEOI website

One Uranium Mine public, One clandestine…Why?

Clandestine Uranium Mine & MillClandestine Uranium Mine & Mill Still Under IAEA InvestigationStill Under IAEA Investigation

•Iran omitted from national websites, pre-2004 declarations to IAEA, and OECD/IAEA “Red Book”reporting… any indication of Gachin, while regularly citing Saghand

•DDG’s June Oral Statement reiterated that the Agency seeks to “better understand the complex arrangements governing the current and past administration of the mine.” Possible Military Involvement?

•IAEA investigating “why the work on the very promising [Gachin] project was suspended by the AEOI from 1994 to 2000” while Iran focused on the “much less promising ore deposit at Saghand.”

Iranian Government Iranian Government Misrepresented Uranium MineMisrepresented Uranium Mine

Mine M_26_13 is located at the Gachin Uranium Mill but is listed only as the Sandrasang mine near the village of Gachin for “building stone.”

Map overlay from NGDIR website

(Later modified)(Later modified)

Reagent storage areaReagent storage area

Crushing / grinding circuitCrushing / grinding circuit

Entrance/securitEntrance/securitgategate

Production AreaProduction Area(leaching/ion exchange/precipitation(leaching/ion exchange/precipitation

/drying/packaging)/drying/packaging)

Tailings pipelineTailings pipeline

22 AUG 02

Gachin Uranium Gachin Uranium Production PlantProduction Plant(Undeclared prior to (Undeclared prior to

May 2004)May 2004)

Waste Tailings pondWaste Tailings pond

Ore receiving areaOre receiving area

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageNN

(heavily discolored from dust from (heavily discolored from dust from recently crushed ore)recently crushed ore)

Reagent storage areaReagent storage area

Crushing / grinding circuitCrushing / grinding circuit

Entrance/security Entrance/security gategate

Tailings pipelineTailings pipeline

DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageNN8 JUN 04

““HotHot--testtest””operations operations indicatedindicated

Waste Tailings pondWaste Tailings pond

Discoloration from Discoloration from acids, wash & acids, wash & sludge from initial sludge from initial trial operationstrial operations

Ore receiving areaOre receiving area

Production AreaProduction Area(leaching/ion exchange/precipitation(leaching/ion exchange/precipitation

/drying/packaging)/drying/packaging)

Gachin Uranium Gachin Uranium Production PlantProduction Plant(Undeclared prior to (Undeclared prior to

May 2004)May 2004)

Section IISection IIIranIran’’s Nuclear Fuels Nuclear FuelCycle Facilities:Cycle Facilities:The Myths of Self Sufficiency and The Myths of Self Sufficiency and Maximizing Energy ResourcesMaximizing Energy Resources

• Alternate investments in natural gas or oil refining would be more attractive.

• Iran lacks adequate deposits of natural uraniumto be self sufficient for civil nuclear power.

• Iran’s supply of other energy resources far from depleted.

Why IranWhy Iran’’s Large Nuclear Fuel Cycle s Large Nuclear Fuel Cycle Investment Makes No Sense Investment Makes No Sense

EconomicallyEconomically

Estimated Fuel Cycle CostsEstimated Fuel Cycle Costs

Capital costs of selected nuclear facilities (Arak, Esfahan, Saghand, Gchine, Natanz) approximately $600 million - $1 billion.

For seven planned reactors, Iran would need to invest at least another $6.0 billion.

• The role of economies of scale not clear in the Iranian nuclear program.

•Additional developmental hurdles unclear, such as with the fuel fabrication plant.

Attractive Alternatives to Investing Attractive Alternatives to Investing in the Nuclear Fuel Cyclein the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

• If Iran invested $2.5 – $3.2 billion to upgrade its natural gas infrastructure rather than to construct a nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure, Iran could save, at current market prices, $1.6 – $2.2 billion worth of natural gas annually.

• Were Iran to invest $5.5 billion in oil refinery projects to upgrade its gasoline refinery capacity, Iran could increase the annual net revenue for its petrochemical sector $982 million.

Alternative Investment Example: Alternative Investment Example: Recovering Natural GasRecovering Natural Gas

0.00%

1.00%

2.00%

3.00%

4.00%

5.00%

6.00%

7.00%

Saudi Qatar U.A.E. Syria Kuwait Oman Iran

Flar

e/Ve

nt R

ate,

% o

f Gro

ss P

rodu

ctio

n

World Average 2.26%

Middle East Avg. 3.26%

North American 0.53%

Arabia

Data from U.S. EIA International Energy Annual 2002, Table 4.1, Photo from World Bank.

Benefit of Recovering Benefit of Recovering Wasted GasWasted Gas

In 2002, Iran wasted 6.78% of natural gas gross production equal to 290 billion ft3.

• Assume Iran moved to world average (2.26%)• Approximate investment = $2.5 billion• Savings equivalent to:

• $1.6 billion (Market price 7.78$/MMBtu)3

• 2.8 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant equivalents4

• Assume Iran moved to N. American Average (0.53%)• Approximate investment = $3.2 billion• Savings equivalent to:

• $2.22 billion (Market price 7.78$/MMBtu)3

• 3.9 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant equivalents4

1,2 – Data From U.S. EIA International Energy Annual 2002, Table 4.1 3 – Market Price U.S. EIA Natural Gas Weekly Update 7/13/05

4 – Replacement for CCTG Plants - 7200 BTU/kw-hr heat rate, 85% capacity factor, 1070BTU/ft3 natural gas

Alternative Investment Example: Alternative Investment Example: Reducing Gasoline ImportsReducing Gasoline Imports

• In 2001, Iran was importing 8.5 million liters of gasoline per day

• In 2004, Iran was importing 40% of their daily gasoline needs, or 22 million liters of gasoline per day1 valued at $2.5 – $3.0 billion2.

• Annual demand increasing at around 9% per year2

• Gasoline imports could potentially cost Iran $4.5 billion for 20053

1- Iran Daily News – 9/28/04, 12/16/04, 2- EIA Country Analysis, 3 - Iran News – 5/10/05

Benefits of Gasoline Production Benefits of Gasoline Production UpgradeUpgrade

•If Iran were to invest $5.6 billion in a high gasoline yield Western-type refinery, it could eliminate its dependence on imported gasoline and increase its annual net oil-related revenue by approximately $982 million.

0.0Market Fuel Costs Indigenous Fuel

Costs - LowIndigenous Fuel

Costs - High

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

300.0

350.0

400.0

Mill

ions

of D

olla

rs/Y

ear

Fuel Fabrication

Enrichment (4.4%)

Comparative Nuclear Fuel Costs Comparative Nuclear Fuel Costs for 7000 Megawatts: Indigenous for 7000 Megawatts: Indigenous

Vs. MarketVs. Market• Iran could

save $59 -$161 million per year by purchasing fuel from abroad.

Conversion to UF6

U308

The Myth of Nuclear Fuel The Myth of Nuclear Fuel Self SufficiencySelf Sufficiency

•Setting economics aside, even if speculative uranium deposits in Iran are assumed and included, Iran is not close to possessing sufficient uranium to fuel seven 1000 MWe for their lifetime. It is thus impossible for Iran to avoid dependence on a foreign supplier for its uranium fuel.

Limited Uranium ResourcesLimited Uranium Resources

• Known uranium (1,427) + speculative (13,850) = 15,277 tons U• Assume Bushehr burns 22 tons of LEU annually

Iran does not have enough uranium to fuel its planned reactors

Known Uranium Known + Speculative Uranium

Number of Operational Reactors

Years of Operation Years of Operation

1 6.5 69.42 3.2 34.73 2.3 23.24 1.6 17.45 1.3 13.96 1.1 11.67 0.9 9.9

Resources from OECD/IAEA Redbook Uranium 2003: Resources, Production, and Demand, NEA No. 5291, OECD 2004.

Fuel Resource Constraints 2006Fuel Resource Constraints 2006--20262026

•Known uranium will be exhausted by 2010 with only two operational reactors.

•Total uranium resources will be depleted by 2023 with all reactors far short of their 40 year design lifetime.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026

Year

Ura

nium

(met

ric to

ns o

f LEU

fuel

2500

)

CumulativeFuel Use

Complete Construction - 7 Total Reactors -2020

Known Uranium Plus Speulcative Uranium Exhausted

1 R

eact

or

2 R

eact

ors

3 R

eact

ors

4 R

eact

ors

5 R

eact

ors

6 R

eact

orsKnown Uranium

Exhausted

Which Resource Truly Scarce?Which Resource Truly Scarce?• Oil

– 125.8 billion barrels proven reserves

– Roughly 10% of world total

• Natural Gas– 940 trillion cubic

feet proven reserves

– World’s 2nd largest supply, 15.5% world total

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Natural Gas Oil Coal Nuclear

Ener

gy (Q

uadr

illio

n 10

^15

BTU

s) 1005.8

729.6

6.741.5

Energy equivalence used = 1070 BTU/ft3 natural gas, 5.8e6 BTU/barrel oil, 11,000 BTU/lb. coal, 4.41e11 BTU/mton U-235. Source Nuclear Engineering: Theory and Technology of Commercial Nuclear Power –Knief. Energy data from March 2005 U.S. EIA Iran Country Analysis Brief.

(Known + speculative uranium)

0

50

100

150

200

250

Oil Natural Gas Know n Uranium Know n +Speculative

Uranium

Rese

rves

/Pro

duct

ion

Ratio

(Yea

rs)

Duration of Energy ResourcesDuration of Energy ResourcesUnder Current Production and ConsumptionUnder Current Production and Consumption

88.4

220.0

0.99.9

Note 1 - Oil production 2004, gross natural gas production 2002 from EIA

Note 2 - Nuclear fuel production based on requirements of 7000 MW nuclear with a once through fuel cycle

Section IIISection IIIIranIran’’s Nuclear Fuel s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: Cycle Facilities: To What End?To What End?

IranIran’’s Program Makes Sense for s Program Makes Sense for Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Weapons

Iran’s nuclear program is well-scaled for a weapons capability, as a comparison to another state’s nuclear weapons infrastructure shows.

When one also considers Iran’s concealment and deception activities…

…it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons.

Uranium Reserves:Uranium Reserves:Only Enough for WeaponsOnly Enough for Weapons

As noted, Iran’s uranium resources cannot support the peaceful program Iran says it is pursuing.

However, Iran’s uranium resources are more than sufficient to support a nuclear weapons capability.

•The Gachin mine’s output (~21 tonnes/yr) alone could supply enough uranium, if enriched, to produce ~4 nuclear weapons/yr.

Comparing Nuclear InfrastructuresComparing Nuclear Infrastructures

Gas Centrifuge Plant Gas Centrifuge Plant at NatanzIranAnother State


~16 Tonne/yr Heavy Water Plant

Iran~13 Tonne/yr

Heavy Water Plant

Another State


IranAnother State~40 Megawatt Heavy Water

Reactor For Plutonium production

40 meters diam40 meters diam..

40 meters diam40 meters diam..

40 Megawatt Heavy Water Reactorat Arak

Comparing Nuclear InfrastructuresComparing Nuclear InfrastructuresIran’s program is strikingly similar to Another State’s Program in other ways:

•Uranium mining – Both States have limited known domestic reserves (Iran ~ 71 tons/year versus ~ 23 tons/year)

•UF6 Conversion – Both state’s seek a 200 ton/year production capacity

Comparing Delivery CapabilitiesComparing Delivery CapabilitiesIran’s Shahab III and Another State’s Variant Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)

derived from the DPRK’s No Dong

System Range (km.)

Payload (kg.) CEP

Shahab III 1,300 ~1,000 ~250 m

~250 m

~250 m

Variant ~2,000 700

No Dong 1,300 700-1,000

Shahab III Variant

No Dong

Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?Nuclear Energy or Nuclear Weapons?• Extensive Concealment and Deception Record

• Once revealed, Iran offered rationale for “peaceful”nuclear fuel cycle……However:– Nuclear energy independence not feasible given ore reserves

– Iran could maximize its earnings and energy by:• Importing nuclear fuel

• Reducing waste of natural gas currently flared

• Increasing gasoline production for domestic energy independence

• Iran’s uranium reserves cannot support planned nuclear power plants, but are well-scaled to give Iran a significant number of nuclear weapons.

• Iran’s nuclear program is very similar to another state’s nuclear weapons program.

CONCLUSION:CONCLUSION:

IranIran’’s past history of concealment s past history of concealment and deception and nuclear fuel and deception and nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure are cycle infrastructure are most most consistent with an intent to consistent with an intent to acquire nuclear weapons.acquire nuclear weapons.

Questioning Iran’s Pursuit of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle · • Confirmed record of hiding sensitive...

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