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Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 4 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 72–88

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Process Safety and Environmental Protection

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Public perceptions of design options for newnuclear plants in the UK

Martin J. Goodfellowa,b,c, Paul Dewickd,∗, Jonathan Wortleyc,Adisa Azapagica

a School of Chemical Engineering and Analytical Science, The Mill, Sackville Street, The University of Manchester,Manchester M13 9PL, UKb School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering, Sackville Street Building, Sackville Street, The University ofManchester M13 9PL, UKc Rolls-Royce Plc., PO Box 2000, Raynesway, Derby DE23 7XX, UKd Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, BoothStreet West, Manchester M15 6PB, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 14 July 2014

Received in revised form 14

November 2014

Accepted 11 December 2014

Available online 19 December 2014

Keywords:

Nuclear power

Public perceptions

Risk management

Design

Innovation process

a b s t r a c t

An important consideration for any new nuclear build programme is an understanding of

the public’s viewpoint, as in many countries this can influence the direction of future energy

markets. This paper presents a first attempt at understanding public views on the design of

new nuclear plants. A survey of 1304 adults in the UK was carried out using a questionnaire

developed in this research. The study suggests that the general public are willing and able to

express preferences for design aspects of nuclear power plants and that meaningful infor-

mation can be obtained to inform designers. Responses indicate that public preferences are

consistent with current design practice for nuclear power plants. Further analysis reveals

that public preferences related to plant design are not influenced strongly by their exist-

ing attitudes. Our findings contribute to the literature on the governance of energy supply

technologies and the involvement of the public in the innovation process. We argue that

involving the public in the design of nuclear power plants is an important aspect of a more

transparent, participatory approach intended to improve trust in the governance of future

Energy supply governance energy supply options.

© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC

BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Guseo (2012) point to the future scarce supply of uranium and

1. Introduction

Nuclear power, for years an anathema in many countries,could be poised for a revival. In the UK, a convergence ofcircumstances including a need for low carbon electricityto mitigate climate change, an emerging energy gap andincreased concerns over security of energy supply, have ledpolicy makers and increasingly the public, to reconsider theuse of nuclear power as a part of the UK’s energy mix(Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 2009). Planned new nuclear build
is on the rise worldwide after two decades of decline (WNA,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 0161 306 3431.E-mail address: [email protected] (P. Dewick).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.12.0080957-5820/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Th(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

2012). However, planned new build and actual new build arenot one and the same and some doubts remain over the‘reality’ of nuclear renaissance. Internationally the picture ismixed, with nations such as Germany, Japan and Switzerlandmoving away from nuclear power whilst countries such asthe UK, China, USA, India and others continue to see newnuclear build playing a part in future energy policy. Indeed,the current surge in interest for developing new nuclearpower stations may only be a temporary affair. Guidolin and

declining nuclear reactor new build, paralleled by declining

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Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 4 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 72–88 73

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onsumption dynamics at world and regional levels. Similarly,ez (2012) notes the constantly rising costs and associated

roblems of financing nuclear power plants and a shortage ofechnical expertise, amongst other hindering factors.

In October 2013 the UK government announced the firstew build nuclear reactor since 1995, which may unlock otheruclear build in the UK (FT, 2013). The deal followed a draftnergy Bill in 2012 (DECC, 2013) that detailed its approach tonsuring that future investment in UK energy infrastructures low-carbon. In the Bill the Government committed to creat-ng a market that makes it commercially viable for companieso invest in low-carbon technologies such as renewables, coalith carbon capture and storage, and nuclear power. The Bill

lso included interventionist measures, contradicting previ-us policy which favoured a free and open energy market (DTI,007). In particular, ‘contracts-for-difference’ will be issued tonergy producers guaranteeing a given price for the energyhey produce regardless of the current market price. Whilsthe Bill may go some way towards reassuring investors thathe economics of low-carbon generation, including nuclearower, are viable, other issues relating to the public opin-

on of nuclear power stations, such as NIMBY-ism (‘Not Iny Backyard’) (Welsh, 1993) and risk perception, are likely to

nfluence future nuclear build in the UK. Lee et al.’s (2007)nalysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threatsSWOT) for nuclear power reveals the relevance of ‘politi-al consumerism’ for energy supply, which manifests itselfndirectly in terms of influencing government decision mak-ng on the contribution of nuclear to the energy mix, andirectly in terms of decentralised domestic energy productionnd consumption. But there is no simple definition of ‘public’pinion; instead, a wide range of groups exist with differentositions, opinions and discourses, from absent to ambiva-

ent to deeply held (Pidgeon et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011;arkhill et al., 2013). Pidgeon et al. (2008) also note the signifi-ant number of people that remain opposed to nuclear powern the UK and point to the potential for social mobilisationnd conflict around future nuclear development. Key issueselated to the public’s views of nuclear power include trustf the nuclear industry, understanding of nuclear technologynd confidence in ‘expert’ views on risk issues such as reac-or safety and the long-term solutions for the storage and/orisposal of radioactive waste (Ipsos MORI, 2010). Perception

ssues of trust, safety and knowledge are not unique to theK public, nor to the nuclear industry. Huang et al. (2013) andpham and Roberts (2011) provide an insight into the public’serception of the chemical industry and of carbon capture andtorage (CCS) technologies, respectively. Huang et al. (2013)how evidence that personal knowledge, effect of accidents,erceived benefits and trust in the risk management abilitiesf the authorities were significant in explaining public per-eptions of the chemical industry in Jiangsu Province, China.imilarly, Upham and Roberts (2011) provide international evi-ence of the public’s perception of CCS as determined by theiramiliarity, concern about storage risks and a lack of trust inovernment and industry.

Understanding how psychological factors play out within wider socio-cultural context is particularly difficult. Theaffect heuristic” (Keller et al., 2012) asserts that people’serceptions of nuclear power are based on the images andssociations they hold. People who support new nuclearnstallations associate the technology with positive images
uch as guaranteeing energy supply; those against associateuclear plants with images such as radioactivity, accidents,
risks, war (Siegrist and Visschers, 2013). Barnes Truelove (2012)carried out a wide-ranging study of perceptions of differentenergy generation technologies (including nuclear) in the US.Of the energy sources surveyed, Barnes Truelove reports thatnuclear and coal energy were viewed most negatively by thepublic; importantly, the perceptions were a significant factorin the variation in support for each of the energy sources.

When (major) incidents occur, like the one at Fukushima,Japan, in March 2011, perceptions of nuclear power are nega-tively affected (as one would expect), but longitudinal studiesshow that the effect is moderate, and that perceptions are sta-ble in the long-term (Siegrist and Visschers, 2013). This doesnot mean, however, that perceptions cannot be changed. Anevolutionary perspective on nuclear power in the Netherlandsby Geels and Verhees (2012) and Mulder (2012) draws attentionto the ‘cultural legitimacy’ of new technologies and focuses onthe role of ‘legitimate’ organisations in shaping public opinionof nuclear power. Cultural change is considered as a con-tested process by Geels and Verhees (2012), shaped by variousgroups who attempt to influence the attitudes and opinionsof different audiences, one of which is the general publicwhose support is required to progress the ‘innovation journey’(i.e. facilitate diffusion of nuclear power plants). The authorsargue that by creating positive images early-on (pre-1970), theinnovation journey of nuclear power was facilitated in theNetherlands only to be slowed later (1970s and 1980s) whenthese positive images and legitimacy of the industry wereundermined by the popularity (credibility) of anti-nuclearmovements; wider concerns about the environment, technol-ogy and governance; and the accident at Chernobyl. Mulder’s(2012) analysis complements that of Geels and Verhees bydrawing specific attention to the importance of public trustin the government and nuclear industry to safeguard publicinterests and not to create unacceptable risks.

Whilst there is no consensus in the literature, a review ofthese studies indicates that public support for nuclear is adetermining factor in its diffusion, that public perception isdynamic and can be shaped by legitimate ‘actors’ and thattransparency and stakeholder participation in the decision-making process are important. Given the inertia of perceptionsof nuclear power, going beyond awareness raising to engagingthe public in the design process of nuclear power plants mayoffer a more transparent, participatory approach to improvethe governance of energy supply options. Previous work by theauthors has identified a need for research into the possibilityof including public input in the design of new nuclear powerplants (Goodfellow et al., 2011). The purpose of this researchwas to begin to explore the public’s perceptions of nucleardesign options with the ultimate aim of integrating such viewsinto the design of new nuclear plants (see Goodfellow et al.,2014).

This aim is not trivial and there are at least two issuesto consider: how to determine the public’s views on differentnuclear plant design options; and how to integrate this largelynon-technical or ‘soft’ information into the design processalongside the ‘hard’ technical design input and strict regula-tory requirements.

This paper focuses on the former issue; for the latter seeGoodfellow et al. (2014). Previous efforts to understand theinteractions between public perception and nuclear designhave been very limited (Goodfellow et al., 2011). Krieg (1993)proposed simplifying containment structures around nuclearplants and using more transparent design methods in order
to assist the public in understanding the safety procedures

74 Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 4 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 72–88

in use. Krieg’s argument was that “engineered safeguards notonly are to prevent damage and injuries to people and theenvironment, but are to make all these achievements plausi-ble to the public. . .” (sic). However, it is not clear if and how thisargument has been integrated into the design of nuclear plantsthat are currently being proposed. Sohn et al. (2001) used thepsychometric model (Fischhoff et al., 1978) to quantify publiclyexpressed risk perception for use in decision-making models.The work suggested that risk perception is an important factorin nuclear-related decision making, but that such engagementand incorporation of views can only take place when a trans-parent, fair and two-way process is applied. A recent exampleof attempting to engage the public on a design issue can befound within the nuclear industry through the original deci-sion by Horizon Nuclear Power to pursue fan-assisted coolingtowers in the new-build developments on the Oldbury site inGloucestershire, UK. According to Horizon, this decision wasmade, in part, through consultation and feedback provided bylocal communities (Horizon Nuclear Power, 2010).1

In this paper we take a broad approach to determine thepublic’s views on a variety of possible design options fora new nuclear plant. We use an electronic survey to elicitopinions but acknowledge that, in practice, multiple meth-ods of engagement would be required to fully understand thepublic’s views of reactor design. These would likely includefocus groups, liaison meetings, interviews and formal writtenresponses (Powell and Colin, 2008). The approach documentedin this paper is a first attempt at eliciting a response on thistopic and should be considered ‘proof of concept’, demon-strating that a two-way engagement between the public andthe nuclear designer is possible and feasible. Our underly-ing hypothesis is that by engaging the public in the designprocess at an early stage, some of the problems of trust andlegitimacy can be ameliorated. Our findings contribute to theliterature on the governance of energy supply technologiesand the involvement of the public in the innovation process.The paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 dis-cusses the research method we used to explore the public’sperceptions of design aspects (the full questionnaire appearsin the Supplementary Information). The results of the studyare then presented and discussed in Section 3. Further dis-cussion of the implications of the findings in light of previousstudies follows in Section 4. The conclusions of the study andrecommendations for future research are summarised in Sec-tion 5.

2. Research method

A survey using an on-line questionnaire and a subsequentstatistical analysis were used to capture and analyse the pub-lic’s views on the design options of nuclear power plants. Forthese purposes, a cross-section of the UK population (n = 1304)was surveyed using a set of novel questions developed as partof the research. Most questions had multiple choice options,where respondents could express the intensity of their opin-ion on a ‘Likert’ scale (Bryman, 1995). In this section wedescribe the development and the content of the question-naire and how the survey was carried out. The statistical
analysis is discussed in Section 3.
1 Note that since Horizon Nuclear Power was acquired by Hitachiin 2012, the intention is now to build Advanced Boiling Water Reac-tors instead. See www.horizonnuclearpower.com for more details.

An on-line survey by questionnaire was selected for thiswork because of the need to consult a reasonably largeand representative sample over a relatively short period oftime. The former was necessary to ensure that the public’sviews are as representative of the UK population as possi-ble, and the latter to minimise the effect of possible eventsthat could occur in the course of carrying out the survey(such as a nuclear accident) and bias the research. For thesereasons, interviews or focus group discussions were consid-ered inappropriate. It was also deemed impractical to havean open-ended questionnaire due to the complexity of thesubject, so the questions were designed to focus on specificaspects with the respondents being able to choose amongmultiple-choice answers.

The development of the questionnaire was carried out intwo steps. A pilot was developed first and tested on a smallsample of the public (n = 80) to find out if the concept wouldwork and ensure that the questions were clear. Later, the fullquestionnaire was developed, comprising three sections:

• Section A, with questions on the participants’ familiaritywith, and their existing views on, nuclear power and thenuclear industry;

• Section B, with questions on 12 aspects of nuclear plantdesign, such as siting and size of new plants, type of safetysystem and nuclear fuel recycling; and

• Section C, with a range of questions to determine the demo-graphics of the sample.

Section A and section B of the questionnaire are presentedin full in Supplementary Information. Section A was includedin the questionnaire to test if and how the respondents’ under-lying views and beliefs about nuclear power (independentvariables) may influence their choice of design options in sec-tion B (dependent variables).

As noted in the introduction, there are many factors thatcould potentially influence the public’s opinion on differentdesign options for nuclear power plants and it would be impos-sible to probe all areas within one piece of work. To ensureconsistency and to enable cross-comparisons with previousstudies on the public’s views on nuclear power, several of thequestions are either identical or similar to the questions askedin other studies, as follows:

• Q1.1, 1.2 and 1.5 were asked by Ipsos MORI (2010, 2011); and• Q1.6 was similar to a question asked by Eurobarometer

(2010).

The other questions in section A are driven by a variety offactors:

• Q1.3 on how well respondents understand the technicalaspects of nuclear power;

• Q1.4 focussed on the impending ‘energy gap’ in the UK(Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 2009), which is one of the pri-mary drivers for new build of power plants (nuclear orotherwise) in the UK;

• Q1.7 and 1.8 were inspired by recent research that suggestedthe public’s attitude to nuclear power in the UK was gov-erned by a risk vs. risk trade-off between the risk of nuclearwaste and the risk of climate change (Poortinga et al., 2005;Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Pidgeon et al., 2008); and

• Q1.9 and Q1.10 were asked in an effort to understand ifrespondents’ interest in nuclear power or other general

http://www.horizonnuclearpower.com/


Table 1 – Percentage of respondents that stated that the issue in question was something about which they had concerns.

Question type Free choice (prompted list) Free ‘open’response

‘Agree’ with statement

Sourcea Ipos MORI(2007)

Ipsos MORI(2010)2008 data

Ipsos MORI(2010)2009 data

Butler et al.(2007)b

100%Cotton Ltd

(2010)

Eurobarometer(2007)

Eurobarometer(2010)

Nuclear waste disposal 45% 36% 35% 24% 86% 50% 49%Safety 41% 31% 28% 9% 29% 31% 31%Radiation discharges 44% 36% 24% 4% 50%Environmental impact 22% 13% 11% 4% 49% 19% 52%Terrorism 33% 11% 8% 13% 57%Costs of nuclear electricity 15% 7% 7% 13%Proliferation 46% 45%

Only the most populous responses (highest percentages) are shown.a Respondents in Ipsos Mori surveys were the UK general public, in Butler et al., UK NGOs and in Eurobarometer, the European public.b Percentage data calculated from figures presented in Section 5 of Greenhalgh and Azapagic (2009).

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sented to the public be as clear as possible (shown in Table 2)

issues (e.g. volunteering) affected other answers. For exam-ple, the question about volunteering was used to test theextent to which participants have been engaged in ‘public’issues and are likely to take an interest in issues of widerpublic interest.

The questions in section B were the main objective andocus of this research. Selection of design aspects to bencluded in the questionnaire was determined by analysingrevious research and focussing on the nuclear issues thataused the public the greatest concern. The findings of previ-us studies are summarised in Table 1.

Through an iterative process of discussing, brainstorm-ng and analysing the data in Table 1, in consultation with

range of experienced academic and industrial experts, aist of 31 different design aspects that might be behindhe concerns documented in Table 1 was created. These1 aspects were condensed to 12 by further in-depth con-ultation with 14 experienced individuals including nuclearngineers and engineering managers with significant expe-ience of the UK nuclear industry (between 10 and 40ears); communications and stakeholder engagement pro-essionals with substantial experience of the UK and globaluclear industry (between 20 and 40 years); and indus-rial and academic professionals with experience of protest

ovements and the impact of corporations on culture andociety.

The following criteria were created and applied in the refin-ng process of the design aspects:

relevance: does the aspect relate to the perceived risk and/orthe ‘visibility’ of nuclear power;

technical difficulty: can the aspect be understood by the lay-person and can it be treated (at least to some degree) inisolation from other aspects;

significance: would a positive or negative response relatingto a chosen aspect lead to an obvious shift in the design ofa nuclear plant; and

range: do the aspects cover a range of different and relevantdesign features.

The design implications of some of the aspects in Table 1ay not be immediately obvious. For example, many issues

elated to nuclear waste are associated with final disposal,
hich is something that does not necessarily influence powerlant design. However, issues such as fuel and waste transport
to and from site; recycling nuclear material; and using mixedoxide fuels (MOX) in new nuclear plants, do influence plantdesign. Whilst waste transport may not immediately seemto be part of the design of a nuclear plant, it is importantto consider how the plant integrates into the wider environ-ment. This includes a consideration of local infrastructurereadiness/development and a consideration for how nuclearmaterials can be taken from and to the plant during its life-time. For example, the issue of nuclear waste transport haspreviously impacted large nuclear projects, including in someStates in the USA, denying permission for waste to be trans-ported through their territory en-route to the proposed finalgeological disposal site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada (State ofNevada, 2009).2

Safety influences a wide range of design aspects that alsorelate to other categories (e.g. an outer impact protection domeis related to both safety and security); indeed only three ofthe final 12 questions in section B of the questionnaire didnot relate directly to safety. The environmental impact ofnuclear plants is part of wider considerations relating to otherindustrial facilities and is complicated by the wide range of dif-ferent concerns that the public holds about the environment(Ipsos MORI, 2010). Environmental impact in the context of thisresearch was therefore limited to aspects such as aestheticdesign, visual impact and site location. Terrorism relates to allaspects of the plant, but in very specific ways: aircraft impactprotection was a very clear example where it was thoughtthat the public would be able to make a design choice. Theproliferation of nuclear material is most easily accomplishedwith material that has not recently passed through a nuclearreactor and has been refined to the high isotopic concentra-tions required for use in weapons. Military grade plutoniumwhich has been stored in a ‘pure’ form for possible futureuse in weapons poses one of the highest proliferation risks.In recent years such material has been down-blended for usein mixed oxide fuels in nuclear plants (USEC, 2012). However,historically there have been protests and objections to nuclearweapons and the civilian nuclear industry has been keen todistance itself from military applications (Kasperson et al.,1980).

It was important to ensure that the design options pre-

2 Note that support was withdrawn from the US governmentfor the Yucca Mountain repository in 2010 (Northey, 2011).


Table 2 – The final list of 12 design aspects with the ‘base’ and proposed ‘modified’ states.

Categories Design aspect ‘Base’ state Proposed ‘modified’ state

Waste disposal Fuel type Standard uranium fuelcycle

Recycled waste fuel

Waste disposal, Safety Used fuel storage Underground disposal willwork

Underground disposal will not work

Waste disposal, Safety Waste transport No waste transport Waste transport via road, rail or seaSafety Active vs. passive safety

systemsFully active safety systems Fully passive safety systems

Safety Instrumentation andcontrol

Analogue instrumentationand control withhard-wired systems

Fly-by-wire digital control systems(similar to those used in modern aircrafts)

Safety Reactor Existing reactor design withoperational experience

New reactor design with little operationalexperience

Safety, Environmentalimpact

Proximity topopulation/hazard

Coastal location with seadefences

Site located away from the sea, closer topopulation centres

Safety, Terrorism Aircraft impact protection Concrete dome Alternatives such as no protection, windturbines or sunken with trees or verticalwalls

Environmental impact,Safety

Co-location One large reactor 2–4 smaller reactors on same site

Environmental impact Cooling towers Natural draught coolingtowers when required

Fan-assisted cooling towers whenrequired

Environmental impact Visual appearance ‘Typical’ box and dome Something more aestheticallysympathetic to the surrounding (rural)landscape

Proliferation, Safety Proliferation Standard uranium fuelcycle

Fuel recycled from nuclear weapons

Table 3 – Summary of selected demographiccharacteristics of the sample in comparison with the UKpopulationa.

This survey UK census data(ONS, 2009)

No. of respondents Percentage Percentage

Age16–24 160 12 1525–34 244 19 1635–44 245 19 1945–54 225 17 1655+ 430 33 34Total 1304 100 100SexMale 643 49 49Female 661 51 51Total 1304 100 100RegionScotland 126 10 9North

East/Yorks/Humber169 13 13

North West 160 12 12East and West

Midlands237 18 17

Wales andEast ofEngland

183 14 15

South East 311 24 23Greater

London118 9 13

Total 1304 100 100b

a Excluding Northern Ireland.b

and that jargon and technical language was replaced withplain English. To aid this, some of the questions includedimages or a short explanatory text. Furthermore, the questions(see Supplementary information) were designed to minimiseimplicit bias towards any particular response. For that reason,some aspects such as costs of nuclear plants were excludedfrom the questionnaire as they had the potential to cloud anyunderlying risk perceptions owing to the high costs associ-ated with nuclear power. Similarly, radiation discharges fromthe normal operation of nuclear plants were not consid-ered either. Although the radiation discharges from modernnuclear power plants are typically very low (EnvironmentAgency et al., 2013), the issue is controversial because of theassumed ‘linear no-threshold’ model used for estimating thehealth effects of exposure to low levels of radiation (Tubianaet al., 2006).

The survey was carried out on-line using the services ofTNS who have access to a large cross-section of UK population.A typical sample size for national opinion polling is around1000 (Ipsos-MORI, 2000). In this research, a sample of n = 1304adults aged 16+, and demographically representative of the UKpopulation, was surveyed over the period 18–22 August 2011.Selected demographic characteristics of the sample are shownin Table 3.

Care was taken to ensure that other research in the TNSresearch omnibus that week was dissimilar from this researchin an effort to minimise any potential for crossover influenceon responses. The following section presents and discussesthe results of the survey.

3. Results

Owing to space limitations, only abridged data are includedand discussed; the full data set and results from the question-naire can be obtained directly from the authors.

The total may not add up to 100% because of rounding off.

3.1. Section A – public’s views on nuclear power

Findings from the questions on respondents’ views on nuclearpower asked in Section A are outlined in Table 4. The responses

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Table 4 – Results from Section A of the questionnaire indicating public’s views on nuclear power (n = 1304).

Question Answer

Q1.1 How well do you feel youknow the nuclear powerindustry?

Very well (1)a Fairly well (2) Neither wellnor not at all (3)

Not very well(4)

Not at all (5) I don’t know

Number of respondents 38 221 376 353 273 43Percentage of total responses 3% 17% 29% 27% 21% 3%

Q1.2 How favourable orunfavourable is your opinionof the nuclear industry?

Very favourable(1)

Fairlyfavourable (2)

Neitherfavourable norunfavourable(3)

Fairlyunfavourable(4)

Veryunfavourable(5)

I don’t know


Q1.3 How well do you believeyou understand the technicalaspects of nuclear power?

I understand itvery well (1)

I understandsome partswell (2)

I understand itat a verygeneral level (3)

I understand alittle (4)

I really knownothing aboutit at all (5)

I don’t know


Q1.4 By 2020 there may be agap between the amount ofenergy the UK needs and theamount of energy the UKproduces. Have you heardanything about this before?

Yes (1) No (2) I don’t know

Number of respondents 650 532 122Percentage of total responses 50% 41% 9%

Q1.5 Would you support oroppose the building of newnuclear power plants in theUK?

Stronglysupport (1)

Slightlysupport (2)

Neithersupport noroppose (3)

Slightly oppose(4)

Stronglyoppose (5)

I don’t know


Q1.6 How much of a risk do youbelieve having nuclear plantsin the UK involves?

A great deal ofrisk (1)

Quite a bit ofrisk (2)

Not much risk(3)

Almost no risk(4)

I don’t know

Number of respondents 145 434 435 114 176Percentage of total responses 11% 33% 33% 9% 13%

Q1.7 Please tell us your opinionabout the followingstatement: ‘Nuclear power isa low carbon option forgenerating electricity’

Strongly agree(1)

Slightly agree(2)

Neither agreenor disagree (3)

Slightlydisagree (4)

Stronglydisagree (5)

I don’t know

78

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72–88

– Table 4 (Continued)

Question Answer


Q1.8 Please tell us your opinionabout the followingstatement: ‘There is a clearway forward on how to dealwith nuclear waste’

Strongly agree(1)

Slightly agree(2)




I don’t know


Q1.9 How frequently do youthink about nuclear power?

Daily (1) 2–3 times aweek (2)

Once a week (3) 2–3 times amonth (4)

Once a month(5)

Less than oncea month (6)

Only when I’masked about it(7)

Never(8)

I don’tknow

Number of respondents 7 20 42 65 72 127 641 256 74Percentage of total responses 1% 2% 3% 5% 6% 10% 49% 20% 6%

Q1.10 Are you involved in anyform of voluntary work orcivic engagement activity?

Yes, I currentlyvolunteer (1)

I havevolunteered inthe past but Idon’t at themoment (2)

No (3) I don’t know

Number of respondents 197 263 802 42Percentage of total responses 15% 20% 62% 3%

a The numbers in brackets throughout the table correspond to the numerical coding used for data analysis and were not visible to the participants.


Fig. 1 – Support and opposition to new nuclear build in the UK (December 2003–December 2011).Diamond data points represent research by Ipsos Mori (2011), triangular data points by FoE and GfK NOP (2011) and squarep date

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tdta2sspr2qtctF

oints are data from this research. Vertical line denotes the

uggest that there is more support for than opposition touclear power and associated new build in the UK. How-ver, mirroring other studies, this is tempered by a significantevel of concern about the level of risk posed and a lack ofwareness or information around key issues such as long-erm waste disposal, the relation between nuclear power andlimate change, and understanding the technical details ofuclear power. The fact that half of the respondents onlyhought about nuclear power when prompted and almost twohirds have never done any volunteering work suggests thatngaging the public in issues related to nuclear power may behallenging.

On the subject of new nuclear build in the UK, Fig. 1 showshe trends for public support and opposition over the lastecade (see also Table 5 for the questions asked). The generalrend over the last decade has been an increase in supportnd decrease in opposition to new nuclear build (Ipsos MORI,011). Immediately after the Fukushima incident there was aharp dip in support and rise in opposition, although this hasince reverted back to levels in line with the trends observedreviously (FoE and GfK NOP, 2011; Ipsos MORI, 2011). Theesearch detailed in this paper was carried out in August011 and Fig. 1 suggests that the public’s answers to theuestions posed in the survey were probably not affected byhe Fukushima incident, although it is difficult to rule outompletely its potential influence. Our findings are consis-
ent with other recent studies reflecting on the response toukushima (e.g. Siegrist and Visschers, 2013), and those that
Table 5 – The questions used to plot the data in Fig. 1. ‘Strongly‘support’ and ‘oppose’ data used in Fig. 1.

Study Question Answer

Ipsos MORI(2011)

To what extent would you support oroppose the building of new nuclear powerstations in Britain TO REPLACE those thatare being phased out over the next fewyears? This would ensure the sameproportion of nuclear energy is retained.

Stronglysupport

FoE GfK NOP(2011)

The UK currently has a number of nuclearpower stations that are due to be phasedout over the coming years. To what extentdo you support or oppose the buildingnew nuclear power stations to replacethose that are being phased out over thenext few years?

Stronglysupport

This study Would you support or oppose the buildingof new nuclear power plants in the UK?(Q1.5)

Stronglysupport

of the Fukushima nuclear incident.

have considered the legacy of previous nuclear accidents (e.g.Bolsen and Cook, 2008), which demonstrate that downturnsin the favourability of nuclear power can follow incidents butthat the impact is moderate and that long-term opinions arerather stable.

3.2. Section B – public’s views on design aspects

As this is the first questionnaire to attempt to ask the publicquestions relating to nuclear design options, the first ‘test’ wasto find out if the public could answer the questions in a mean-ingful way. Whilst it is difficult to establish criteria to judgewhat a ‘meaningful’ answer is in this context, one criterionwhich potentially highlights the level of difficulty that partici-pants had in answering the design questions is the proportionof people that answered ‘I don’t know’ for a given question.This is summarised in Table 6, with the three questions withthe highest percentages of ‘I don’t know’ highlighted in grey.

The three highlighted questions are arguably the hardestfor any person to answer (including experts in the field) so it isperhaps unsurprising that they were the questions with whichparticipants struggled most. It also seems unsurprising thatthe lowest ‘I don’t know’ percentage (11%) is for question 2.2which deals with aesthetic design, perhaps the easiest conceptfor participants to understand and identify with. Questions2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.11 all had ‘I don’t know’ responses of
slightly higher than 20% (20–23%). This is still a relatively highproportion, again suggesting that around one fifth of people
’ and ‘tend to’ responses are combined to obtain the

Tend tosupport

Neithersupport noroppose

Tend tooppose

Stronglyoppose

I don’tknow

Tend tosupport


Tend tooppose

Stronglyoppose

Don’tknow

Tend tosupport


Tend tooppose

Stronglyoppose

I don’tknow


Table 6 – Percentage of ‘I don’t know’ responses for each question in Section B of the questionnaire (n = 1304)a.

Question I don’t know (%)

Q2.1 What is your opinion about locating any future nuclear plants in the UK further away from thecoast, perhaps closer to cities?

22%

Q2.2 How much of a difference would it make to your opinion of nuclear power if you could choose fromdifferent design options that ‘fit in’ more closely with the local environment?

11%

Q2.3 If you were given the choice by a utility company over which towers to use at a power plant to bebuilt in your region, which of the following would best describe your opinion?

21%

Q2.4 Given the same total energy output, how does the idea of having several smaller reactors on one siteinstead of one large reactor make you feel?

21%

Q2.5 If a new nuclear power reactor were to be built, which of the following would best describe youropinion related to nuclear reactor design?

27%

Q2.6 Which of the following would best describe your opinion about possible protection measures fromexternal impacts?

20%

Q2.7 If both active and passive safety systems are accepted for use on nuclear plants by the independentnuclear safety regulator, which of the following options would you prefer?

32%

Q2.8 If new nuclear plants used ‘high integrity’ digital computer controls that were certified by theindependent nuclear safety regulator, how would you feel?

23%

Q2.9 Do you believe that nuclear fuel should be recycled? 26%Q2.10 Do you agree or disagree that nuclear weapons material should be used to produce electricity? 17%Q2.11 It is proposed that nuclear waste be stored underground indefinitely. I believe. . . 22%Q2.12 Some of the options in the previous question on waste disposal would require the waste to be

moved between sites. This can be achieved by rail, road or sea transportation (or a combination ofthese). How do you feel about this?

16%

a Dark grey shading indicates the highest percentages of ‘I don’t know’ answers.

either struggled to understand the question or to reach a deci-sion. As always with this type of research, it is possible thata higher proportion of people did not know but ‘guessed’ ananswer. However, the percentage of ‘I don’t know’ answersobtained here is in line with values seen in other nuclear-related questionnaires (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2010), suggestingthat the questions asked in the current research were no moredifficult for the lay public to answer than in other relatedsurveys. In line with previous research (e.g. Pidgeon et al.,2008) this demonstrates that the majority of the general pub-lic is able to express opinions on quite complex technicalissues.

The full results from section B, indicating the public’s viewson different aspects of nuclear power plant design, are shownin Table 7. Briefly, the results highlight a strong preference(more than 50% support) for locating future nuclear powerplants away from cities, for recycling reactor nuclear fuel, andfor the use of nuclear weapons material as fuel for electricityproduction. There was a second group of responses where sup-port accounted for around 40% of all responses: a preferencefor the design of nuclear power plants to be in-keeping withthe local environment, for using alternatives to the hard outerimpact dome to counter terrorism, and for fan-assisted (asopposed to natural draft) cooling towers. Also in this secondgroup of common responses, a preference for not transport-ing nuclear waste (because it was deemed dangerous) wasobserved. Other questions elicited less consensus: for exam-ple, a third of respondents expressed a preference for multiplesmaller reactors but slightly more respondents were unsureof the safety implications of more small versus fewer largereactors on a single site. Finally, one question divided opin-ion: there was no clear preference for underground storage ofnuclear waste.

What might be under-pinning responses to the sec-tion B questions is explored next. First, the relationshipsbetween the answers in Sections A and B are presented, fol-
lowed by analysis of the answers for different demographicgroups.
3.3. Analysis of relationship between answers inSections A and B

Further analysis of the data from the questionnaire was car-ried out by cross-tabulating the results from section A withthe results from section B to find out if the former had aninfluence on the latter. Somers’ D, commonly used in rankstatistics, was used for these purposes (Somers, 1962; Newson,2014). Somers’ D is a measure of the relationship between twoordinal variables; its values range from −1 to 1 with a valueof 1 indicating a strong positive relationship, −1 a strong neg-ative relationship and 0 no relationship. The direction of therelationship is dependent on the direction of the numericalcoding applied to the answers in the questionnaire, which isshown in Tables 4 and 7. A positive relationship means thatas variable A increases variable B also increases; it is impor-tant to remember that this ‘increase’ is in the coded valueof the variable rather than the variable itself. This meansthat in some cases as the coding scale increases, the nega-tive relationship with the coding scale (i.e. negative D value)may in fact indicate a positive relationship with the variable.As per standard practice in statistical analysis, only relation-ships with the probability of occurring of 99.95% and greater(i.e. with the p-value of p ≤ 0.05) are deemed statistically sig-nificant. Because Somer’s D is an ordinal–ordinal comparativerelationship, responses such as ‘I don’t know’ and ‘Other’ werediscounted from the statistical analysis.

The data from sections A and B were cross-tabulated usingthe statistical analysis package SPSS 16.0 and Somers’ D wascalculated to determine the probability of the existence of anyasymmetric (one-directional) relationships between depend-ent (Section B) and independent (Section A) variables. Fewstatistically significant relationships were found. Those thatwere discovered are described below. Only relationships withp ≤ 0.05 and of a strength greater than 0.2 or −0.2 were con-sidered to be meaningful. A relationship strength of Somers’
D 0.2 or −0.2 is still weak but any number of factors mightinfluence an individual’s responses to the section B questions.

Process

Safety

an

d En

viro

nm

enta

l Pro

tection

9

4

( 2

0 1

5 )

72–88

81

Table 7 – Results from Section B of the questionnaire, indicating public’s views on different aspects of nuclear plant design (n = 1304)a.

Category Question Answer

Safety Q2.1 What is your opinionabout locating any futurenuclear plants in the UKfurther away from thecoast, perhaps closer tocities?

Moving awayfrom the coast,perhaps closerto cities, is agood idea (1)b

Moving awayfrom the coast,perhaps closerto cities, mightbe a good ideabut I’m not sure(2)

I am indifferentto the idea ofmoving awayfrom the coast,perhaps closerto cities (3)

Moving awayfrom the coast,perhaps closerto cities, mightbe a bad ideabut I’m not sure(4)

Moving awayfrom the coast,perhaps closerto cities, is abad idea (5)

I don’t know


Aesthetics Q2.2 How much of adifference would it make toyour opinion of nuclearpower if you could choosefrom different designoptions that ‘fit in’ moreclosely with the localenvironment?

A bigdifference, it isworthwhiledoing this (1)

Somedifference, it isworthwhiledoing this (2)

I’m not surehow muchdifference thiswould make

Somedifference, it isnot worth doingthis

No difference, itis not worthdoing this

I don’t know


Aesthetics Q2.3 If you were given thechoice by a utility companyover which towers to use ata power plant to be built inyour region, which of thefollowing would bestdescribe your opinion?

I have a strongpreference for‘natural draft’cooling towers(1)

I have a slightpreference for‘natural draft’cooling towers(2)

I don’t have apreference foreither type ofcooling tower(3)

I have a slightpreference forthe‘fan-assisted’cooling towers(4)

I have a strongpreference forthe‘fan-assisted’cooling towers(5)

I don’t know


Reactor size Q2.4 Given the same totalenergy output, how doesthe idea of having severalsmaller reactors on one siteinstead of one large reactormake you feel?

Much more safe(1)

Slightly moresafe (2)

Neither morenor less safe (3)

Slightly lesssafe (4)

Much less safe(5)

I don’t know


82

Process

Safety

an

d En

viro

nm

enta

l Pro

tection

9

4

( 2

0 1

5 )

72–88



Reactor type Q2.5 If a new nuclear powerreactor were to be built,which of the followingwould best describe youropinion related to nuclearreactor design?

I would preferto keep theexisting nuclearreactor design(1)

I would preferto keep theexisting nuclearreactor design,but moreinformation onthe alternativedesigns mightpersuade me tochange myviews (2)

Nuclear reactordesign does notmake anydifference tome (3)

I would prefer anew, alternativenuclear reactordesign, but Iwould like tosee a slowtransition (4)

I would preferchanging to anew, alternativenuclear reactordesign (5)

I don’t know


Counter terrorism Q2.6 Which of the followingwould best describe youropinion about possibleprotection measures fromexternal impacts?

I have a strongpreference forthe hard outerimpact dome (1)

I have a slightpreference forthe hard outerimpact dome (2)

I have noparticularpreference onthis issue (3)

I have a slightpreference foralternativesolutions (4)

I have a strongpreference foralternativesolutions (5)

I don’t know


Safety Q2.7 If both active andpassive safety systems areaccepted for use on nuclearplants by the independentnuclear safety regulator,which of the followingoptions would you prefer?

A fully activesystem (1)

A mainly activesystem withsome passivebackup (2)

A blend ofactive andpassivesystems (3)

Mainly passivesystems withsome activebackup (4)

Just passivesystems (5)

I don’t know


Control systems Q2.8 If new nuclear plantsused ‘high integrity’ digitalcomputer controls thatwere certified by theindependent nuclear safetyregulator, how would youfeel?

Much more safe(1)

Slightly moresafe (2)

Neither morenor less safe (3)

Slightly lesssafe (4)

Much less safe(5)

I don’t know


Process

Safety

an

d En

viro

nm

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l Pro

tection

9

4

( 2

0 1

5 )

72–88

83



Proliferation Q2.9 Do you believe thatnuclear fuel should berecycled?

Recyclingnuclear fuel isdefinitely agood idea (1)

Recyclingnuclear fuelmight be a goodidea but I needto know more(2)

I’m indifferentto the idea ofrecyclingnuclear fuel (3)

Recyclingnuclear fuelmight be a badidea but I needto know more(4)

Recyclingnuclear fuel isdefinitely a badidea (5)

Nuclear powershould not beused in the firstplace

Other I don’tknow

Number of respondents 254 472 112 95 25 6 1 339Percentage of total responses 19% 36% 9% 7% 2% 0.5% 0.1% 26%

Waste Q2.10 Do you agree ordisagree that nuclearweapons material shouldbe used to produceelectricity?

Strongly agree(1)

Slightly agree(2)




I don’t know


Waste Q2.11 It is proposed thatnuclear waste be storedunderground indefinitely. Ibelieve. . .

Storing nuclearwasteundergroundindefinitely willwork (1)

Storing nuclearwasteundergroundindefinitelymight work butI need moreinformation (2)

I have noopinion on thismatter (3)

Storing nuclearwasteundergroundindefinitelymight not workbut I need moreinformation (4)

Storing nuclearwasteindefinitely inany way willnever work (5)

Other I don’t know

Number of respondents 69 325 158 264 199 8 281Percentage of total responses 5% 25% 12% 20% 15% 1% 22%

Waste Q2.12 Some of the optionsin the previous question onwaste disposal wouldrequire the waste to bemoved between sites. Thiscan be achieved by rail,road or sea transportation(or a combination of these).How do you feel about this?

I believenuclear wastetransportationis very safe (1)

I believenuclear wastetransportationis fairly safe (2)

I have noparticularpreference onthis issue (3)

I believenuclear wastetransportationis fairlydangerous (4)

I believenuclear wastetransportationis verydangerous (5)

I don’t know


a Only the questions are shown; the explanatory text for questions can be found in the questionnaire in Supplementary Information.b The numbers in brackets throughout the table correspond to the numerical coding used for data analysis and were not visible to the participants.


Table 8 – Somers’ D for relationships where gender split shows a substantial difference (>25%) in value a.

Relationship Male Female

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and plant aesthetics making lessdifference (Q2.2)

0.165 0.317

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and plant aesthetics making less difference(Q2.2)

0.136 0.340

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and choice of control system tendingtowards passive (Q2.8)

0.182 0.296

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and dislike of nuclear fuel recyclingincreasing (Q2.9)

0.309 0.173

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and dislike of nuclear fuel recyclingincreasing (Q2.9)

0.354 0.194

Level of perceived risk posed by nuclear power decreasing (Q1.6) and dislike ofrecycling weapons material decreasing (coding scale is increasing hence negativerelationship) (Q2.10)

−0.279 −0.189

Technical understanding decreasing (Q1.3) and perceived safety of nuclear transportdecreasing (Q2.12)

0.214 0.129

Belief in a clear solution for waste decreasing (Q1.8) and the perceived safety ofnuclear transport decreasing (Q2.12)

0.283 0.397

a Dark grey shading highlights statistically significant results (Somers’ D >0.2 or <−0.2 and p ≤ 0.05).

Therefore, it is unsurprising that the only relationships foundbetween the relatively short list of section A questions and thesection B questions are weak.

In particular, the following relationships are observedbetween questions in Section A and B, respectively:

• As familiarity with the nuclear industry decreases (Q1.2 inSection A), dislike of weapons material recycling increases(Q2.10 in Section B, D = 0.356, p < 0.005), belief in a long-term solution for nuclear waste declines (Q2.11, D = 0.354,p < 0.005) and the perception of waste transport being unsafeincreases (Q2.12, D = 0.470, p < 0.005).

• Similarly, as support for new build decreases and opposi-tion increases (Q1.5), dislike of weapons material recyclingincreases (Q2.10, D = 0.400, p < 0.005), belief in a long-termsolution for nuclear waste goes down (Q2.11, D = 0.351,p < 0.005) and belief in waste transport being unsafeincreases (Q2.12, D = 0.469, p < 0.005).

• As the level of perceived risk of nuclear power decreases(Q1.6), the belief that waste transport is safe increases(Q2.12, D= -0.385, p < 0.005).

• People who perceive nuclear power as more carbon inten-sive (Q1.7) also have a tendency to believe that recyclingweapons material is a bad idea (Q2.10, D = 0.366, p < 0.005).

• Respondents who have a more negative view on the exist-ence of a clear solution for long-term waste disposal (Q1.8)are more negative about indefinitely storing nuclear wasteunderground (Q2.11, D = 0.366, p < 0.005) and believe thatwaste transport is less safe (Q2.12, D = 0.334, p < 0.005).

No significant relationships were found between how oftenpeople think about nuclear power, whether people currentlyvolunteer or have done in the past, and any of the Section Bquestions on aspects of nuclear design, waste managementand transport. Furthermore, no significant relationships werefound between any of the questions in Section A and questionsQ2.3–2.7 in Section B. This suggests that the public’s choicesfor some design options may not be related to, or influenced
by, their pre-existing views on nuclear power and the nuclearindustry.
3.4. Analysis of results for different demographicgroups

To analyse any influence of the demographic variables on theresults, the data were split by gender, region and age, cross-tabulated for the questions in Sections A and B and Somers’ Dre-calculated. Owing to space restrictions, only results wherea difference between the values of Somers’ D was at least 25%are shown.

Somers’ D was calculated separately for men and women;selected results where disparities between the genders existedare presented in Table 8. The analysis suggests that some ofthe section A variables (Q1.2, Q1.5) influence women morewhen plant aesthetics are considered (Q2.2) and that some ofthe section A variables (Q1.2, Q1.3, Q1.5, Q1.7) influence menmore when fuel recycling (Q2.9) is considered.

An analysis of the data, broken down by geographic regionof North (Scotland, North-West, Yorkshire and Humbersideand North-East), Midlands (East and West Midlands, Eastof England and Wales) and South (South-East, London andSouth-West) is shown in Table 9. This analysis highlightslimited variability in Somers’ D between the regions, which isarguably because the geographic areas used in the breakdownare too large and incorporate too many different communitiesto allow a more granular analysis. However, it is not possibleto carry out a more localised analysis with this data set as sub-samples in the breakdown are too small to allow meaningfulstatistical analysis.

A breakdown by age group was also carried out. In orderto ensure that sub-samples were not too small for anal-ysis, the categories were grouped into 16–34, 35–54 and55+. Several relationships showed variability by age group,as seen in Table 10. In many of the cases in Table 10,the younger respondents showed the weakest relationshipbetween independent and dependent variables, and theolder respondents the strongest; this is particularly obviousin the relationships associated with questions on nuclearwaste disposal (Q2.11) and nuclear transport (Q2.12). Thereverse is observed for the question on site location (Q2.1)where the responses provided by the young seem to have
stronger relationships than those provided by the older peo-ple.


Table 9 – Somers’ D for relationships where geographic region shows a substantial difference (>25%) in valuea.

Relationship North Midlands South

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and plant aesthetics making lessdifference (Q2.2)

0.194 0.291 0.231


0.199 0.291 0.214

Belief in nuclear being low carbon decreasing (Q1.7) and dislike of nuclear fuelrecycling increasing (Q2.9)

0.254 0.312 0.222

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and dislike of recycling weapons materialincreasing (Q2.10)

0.396 0.266 0.410

Technical understanding decreasing (Q1.3) and dislike of recycling weaponsmaterial increasing (Q2.10)

0.231 0.117 0.261

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and dislike of recycling weapons materialincreasing (Q2.10)

0.433 0.303 0.473

Level of perceived risk posed by nuclear power decreasing (Q1.6) and dislike ofrecycling weapons material decreasing (coding scale is increasing hence negativerelationship) (Q2.10)

−0.283 −0.206 −0.260

Knowledge of the nuclear industry decreasing (Q1.1) and the perceived safety ofnuclear transport decreasing (Q2.12)

0.190 0.192 0.323

Belief in a clear solution for waste decreasing (Q1.8) and the perceived safety ofnuclear transport decreasing (Q2.12)

0.429 0.273 0.308

a Dark grey shading highlights statistically significant results (Somers’ D >0.2 or <−0.2 and p ≤ 0.05).

Table 10 – Somers’ D for relationships where age group shows a substantial difference (>25%) in valuea.

Relationship 16–34 35–54 55+

Belief in a clear solution for waste decreasing (Q1.8) and the proximity of nuclear plantsto cities decreasing (Q2.1)

0.236 0.247 0.136

Technical understanding decreasing (Q1.3) and plant aesthetics making less difference(Q2.2)

0.165 0.263 0.286


0.130b 0.304 0.261

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and nuclear fuel recycling being a bad ideaincreasing (Q2.9)

0.148 0.256 0.360

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and nuclear fuel recycling being a bad ideaincreasing (Q2.9)

0.194 0.296 0.375

Technical understanding decreasing (Q1.3) and recycling weapons material being a badidea increasing (Q2.10)

0.240 0.160 0.232

Level of perceived risk posed by nuclear power decreasing (Q1.6) and recycling weaponsmaterial being a bad idea decreasing (coding scale is increasing hence negativerelationship) (Q2.10)

−0.241 −0.201 −0.295

Industrial favourability decreasing (Q1.2) and belief in the viability of undergrounddisposal of nuclear waste decreasing (Q2.11)

0.249 0.383 0.383

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and belief in the viability of undergrounddisposal of nuclear waste decreasing (Q2.11)

0.248 0.384 0.371

Level of perceived risk posed by nuclear power decreasing (coding scale is increasinghence negative relationship) (Q1.6) and belief in the viability of underground disposalof nuclear waste increasing (Q2.11)

−0.117b −0.259 −0.354

Belief in nuclear being low carbon decreasing (Q1.7) and belief in the viability ofunderground disposal of nuclear waste decreasing (Q2.11)

0.149 0.257 0.229

Belief in a clear solution for waste decreasing (Q1.8) and belief in the viability ofunderground disposal of nuclear waste decreasing (Q2.11)

0.387 0.425 0.296

Support for new build decreasing (Q1.5) and the perceived safety of nuclear transportdecreasing (Q2.12)

0.366 0.497 0.498

Level of risk posed by nuclear power decreasing (coding scale is increasing hencenegative relationship) (Q1.6) and the perceived safety of nuclear transport increasing(Q2.12)

−0.256 −0.395 −0.462

a Dark grey shading highlights statistically significant results (D >0.2, D <−0.2 and p ≤ 0.005 unless indicated differently).b The p-value for these questions was ≤ 0.05.

4

OcpTw

. Discussion

n the whole, the results of the survey (shown in Table 7) areonsistent with recent studies that have noted a diversity inublic opinion – a ‘mixed image’ – about nuclear (e.g. Barnes
ruelove, 2012; Corner et al., 2011; Ertor-Akyazi et al., 2012)ith some areas of entrenched opinion (notably safety and
waste) that transcend the nuclear industry (Huang et al., 2013;Upham and Roberts, 2011). It is perhaps not surprising that thedesign issues that most evoked consensus revolved aroundsafety and environmental risks.

Overall, the findings indicate that the design preferences
expressed by the public are largely consistent with the cur-rent approach taken by design engineers. These include a


comprehensive approach to safety, integration of novel tech-nology where appropriate and minimisation of waste andtransportation of nuclear material (EUR, 2011). However, dis-parities exist between the public’s view and the designs of newnuclear build relating to aesthetics. For example, the advancedboiling water reactor currently considered in the UK is largescale (>1200 MW), with several reactors planned at each site,necessitating large containment buildings and the accom-panying infrastructure. This is at odds with the responsesreceived to Q2.4 whereby a significant proportion (32%) of thepublic would prefer multiple smaller reactors.

Interestingly, by exploring the relationship betweenanswers to Section A and Section B, further analysis revealedthat the public’s views are based on and influenced by a rangeof factors. There is evidence of weak asymmetric relationshipsbetween some design preferences and participant’s familiar-ity with, and existing views on, nuclear power and the nuclearindustry. For example, our analysis shows that both unfamil-iarity with the nuclear industry, and opposition to new nuclearbuild, are correlated (weakly) with negative perceptions of pro-liferation and issues around waste. These results lend somesupport to the findings of previous studies that have identi-fied knowledge and awareness and discourse/image ‘framing’to be important factors in shaping perception (Pidgeon et al.,2008; Jones et al., 2012). Furthermore, people with environ-mental concerns about nuclear power also hold negativeperceptions of nuclear proliferation and waste. Previous stud-ies have shown that reservations from an environmentalperspective are deeply entrenched: evidence from the UK sug-gests that support for nuclear amongst people with higherenvironmental values is only “reluctantly” given, and onlythen when other preferred options have been exhausted(Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011).Similar evidence of reluctance can be found in the US (BarnesTruelove, 2012).

In Mulder’s (2012) and Geels and Verhees’ (2012) longitu-dinal studies in the Netherlands, the involvement of citizensin decision making emerged as a necessary (but not sufficient)condition upon which the legitimacy of nuclear power hinged.In their work, engaging the public is seen as reinforcing ‘cul-tural legitimacy’. We suggest that involving the public in thedesign of nuclear power plants is one mechanism for theirengagement, especially when our analysis reveals that thepublic’s preferences for some design options are not related toor influenced by their pre-existing views on nuclear power andthe nuclear industry. Entering into extended/multiple typesof communication with the public (not just survey but othertwo-way research methods, see Sohn et al., 2001) as part ofa transparent design process (Krieg, 1993) may help also toimprove trust between the public and the nuclear industryand government (or bodies responsible for nuclear energy),which can be seen to hold-up ‘innovation journeys’ not onlyin the nuclear industry (Mulder, 2012) but also other industries(Huang et al., 2013; Upham and Roberts, 2011).

Positive framings are also important in shaping (maintain-ing, regaining) public perceptions, which affect support for,or opposition to, nuclear power (Keller et al., 2012). Aware-ness raising of new technology, new design and environmentalimpacts of nuclear will contribute to the discourse and shapepublic perceptions. In light of the UK government’s Energy Act(DECC, 2013), these results suggest that more could poten-tially be done by the nuclear industry to pave the way for new
nuclear build. Closer and deeper engagement with the public,through work such as that presented in this paper, may have
the potential to further reduce the gap between public opin-ion and the drive for nuclear new build, as well as betweenperceived and estimated risk. When engagement does takeplace, care must be taken by those involved to ensure that factsare presented in a neutral manner and not ‘framed’ in a biasedcontext, though recent research has suggested that framingof issues may be less dominant than other factors (such asanchoring to existing beliefs) for the outcome of engagementprocesses (Jones et al., 2012). Interestingly, this was not thecase in our study, which begs further study of the extent towhich the public’s existing beliefs affect their perception ofdesign issues and, by association, of nuclear power.

Previous studies have reported mixed evidence on thesignificance of gender and age (e.g. Barnes Truelove, 2012;Venables et al., 2012). In our study, the age and gender analysishighlighted only small differences of opinion, suggesting thatdifferent design aspects are a little more sensitive to somegroups than others. Although the regional analysis did notshow much difference in opinions across the UK, we know thatproximity and place play an important role in shaping percep-tions (Venables et al., 2012). To that end, it is likely that localresidents’ opinions may need to be prioritised in the design ofnew nuclear plants. This is tempered, however, by the prag-matism required in designing a reactor type that may thenbe situated on multiple sites, in multiple countries; the pre-vailing design vision that ‘one plant fits all’ may not fit withdifferent public views in different locations. It would be quiteuneconomic to customise each reactor for every site with-out significant changes in both the way that nuclear reactorsare designed and the economics of their construction. Suchconsiderations merit further research.

Drawing wider recommendations from our work should bedone with caution. It is likely that different strategies acrosscountries will depend on the state of the discourse betweenrelevant stakeholders. Our results suggest that policy makersin roles related to strategic decision making and technol-ogy selection may need to place more emphasis on the rolethat the public’s interpretation of the specific design featuresplays if they wish to improve the social acceptability of largeinfrastructure projects like nuclear plants. This is potentiallyof greater importance in countries with free energy marketsas the public may expect and demand a higher degree ofengagement. Different national governments employ differ-ent discourses for engaging with their public on the topicof energy policy (Teräväinen et al., 2011). However, this doesnot weaken the case for better public engagement in othercountries where nuclear operations are largely nationalisedas they are as vulnerable to public opposition, protest and inextreme cases, direct action against new build (e.g. protestsagainst the construction of new reactors at the Kudankulamnuclear power plant in India (Times of India, 2012a, 2012b)).Further research is required before the results of this researchcan be generalised beyond the borders of the UK.

5. Conclusions

This paper has presented a first attempt at understandingif the public can provide input into the design of nuclearpower plants and what that input might be. A research ques-tionnaire was chosen as the means to investigate this area.Although this allowed a large number of people to be ques-
tioned, it limited the range of questions that could be askedand the depth to which underlying factors could be explored


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y means of statistical analysis. Our analysis suggests thathe public are willing and able to offer an opinion on differentspects of nuclear design. While some of the considerationsre currently recognised and consulted upon (e.g. environ-ental concerns, waste disposal), others have not received

he same level of attention (e.g. protection systems, multi-eactor sites, passive versus active systems). The methodresented offers an approach by which the public can bengaged on relevant issues to nuclear design. Though fairlyrude, the visual representations and short explanatory textacilitate understanding in a manner that could be appliedo other design aspects, militating against the complexityhat inevitably complicates public engagement in technicalssues and against an expected rise in the number of ‘I don’tnow’ answers. Further work is required to ensure that suchxpressed opinions are a fair representation of the viewsf the wide range of individual views that coexist withinhe public. Although care was taken not to bias the resultsy explicitly outlining trade-offs between different designptions and leading responses, further research using differ-nt methods – such as semi-structured interviews – could besed to understand why specific design aspects were cho-en by the public over the alternatives. This would contributeowards a better understanding of underlying factors driv-ng public’s preferences for the chosen design aspects andllowing more definitive conclusions to be drawn on designreferences.

Our findings suggest that policy and decision makingelated to new nuclear build should seek to understand andccount for the various factors behind the public’s perceptionf nuclear power. Transparency and stakeholder participation

n the decision making process is crucial and this study indi-ates that integrating views of the public in nuclear powerlant design is one contributing mechanism. Further work islso needed on how to integrate such information into thexisting engineering procedures to aid design of socially morecceptable nuclear plants. A method for achieving this integra-ion is proposed in a parallel work by the authors and suggestshat engagement activities, such as that documented in thisaper, ought to be carried out by reactor designers and energytilities at the earliest possible stage of a new build project

ideally during the early stages of reactor design). By doing this,he designer can take into account the views of the people whoill be living with the reactor during its construction and oper-

tion (and possibly decommissioning). This research attemptso elicit such feedback from the public regarding nuclear powerlant design. The paper argues that such efforts will help to

mprove levels of engagement between the nuclear industrynd the public, with the potential gain of improving the socialcceptability of nuclear power.

cknowledgements

he authors acknowledge gratefully funding by the Engineer-ng and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) (Granto. EP/F001444/1) and Rolls-Royce. The authors also thankatissa Carter and Emma Dolby at TNS for their assistance

n the deployment of the research questionnaire. The authorslso wish to thank the anonymous reviewers whose sug-estions helped improve the paper. The views expressedn this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily
hose of the funding bodies or other organisations mentionederein.
Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data associated with this article can befound, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.12.008.

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