1

PRAGMATICS DEFINITIONS � Pragmatics is the study of how people use language (Macmillan Dictionary

online) � Pragmatics is the practical knowledge needed to use language for

communicative purposes (McGraw Hill online). � Pragmatics “studies the factors that govern our choice of language in social

interaction and the effects of our choice on others.” (David Crystal), � Pragmatics as a way of investigating and understanding, without ambiguity,

‘meaning beyond the words’. The extra meaning is there, not because of the semantic aspects of the words themselves, but because users (either as speakers/writers or hearers/readers) share certain contextual knowledge with the writer or speaker of the text. (Steve Campsall)

Yule focuses on this definition of pragmatics in terms of study; namely, pragmatics is

1) the study of speaker meaning, i.e. the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader);

2) the study of contextual meaning, i.e. the interpretation of speaker meaning in its context, since context affects what is said;

3) the study of how more gets communicated than is said. In a communicative act, the speaker usually interacts with a listener, who is called to make inferences about what is said in order to interpret the speaker’s intended meaning;

4) the study of the expression of relative distance, i.e. the physical, social, or conceptual distance (or closeness) between the speaker and the listener.

Pragmatics is the only field of linguistic analysis to be concerned with humans and their verbal (and non-verbal) interactions. This inevitably poses a series of problems, which decrease or increase depending on the degree of familiarity between the speaker and the listener, that is on what Yule refers to as the relative distance between the speaker and the listener: the closer the distance between speakers, (e.g. a familiar social group), the more successful their interaction. The important role played by extralinguistic or language-external features in communicative acts. Language is regarded not only as meaning something, but also as doing actions: � performing “speech acts”. In summary:

2

Pragmatics may be defined as the study of the interactions among people, considered as social and cultural individuals, who produce meanings and perform actions in a context, both cultural and situational. Therefore, meaning cannot simply be interpreted on the basis of syntactic and semantic instruments. Sources: Charles Morris: Semiotics consists in syntax / semantics / pragmatics Syntax studies the relationships between signs, more specifically the relationships between linguistic forms, how these forms are arranged, and the ordering of sequences. Semantics investigates the relationships between signs and the objects they refer to, namely between linguistic forms (words) and entities in the world. Pragmatics focuses on the relationships between signs and their interpreters, between linguistic forms and the users of those forms. In other words: while syntactic and semantic rules are just the verbal actualization of the speakers’ habits to use some signs, pragmatics studies language as a social communication act or a set of social communication acts. The three dimensions of semiotics are interrelated, in that pragmatic factors affect both syntax and semantics. Other sources for this view of pragmatics as the study of language in use: Wittgenstein’s “linguistic games”, i.e. the whole of activities characterising the human language behaviour. Main sources: J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle J.L. Austin: How to do things with words and the speech act theory What is a speech act?

Speech situation Speech event Speech act Cultural scene and physical setting

Within Speech situation, composed of Speech acts

Minimal unit of speech event

Market place Transaction Offer/Demand/Supply Conversation Story Preface / Conclusion Ceremony Prayer Invocation

Other speech events: salestalk, chat, gossip, debate, sermon. Typical written forms: recipe, personal and business letters, newspaper column, sonnet, short story, etc. (Adapted from Norrick)

3

Key aspect: people’s utterances, that is the things they say, are equivalent to actions. e.g. “I now pronounce you man and wife” or “With this ring, I thee wed” create a new social or psychological reality. Three aspects: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. � Locutionary acts are simply the speech acts that have taken place, i.e. they

are utterances that are well organised in grammar terms. � Illocutionary acts are, instead, the real actions that are performed by the

utterance, where saying equals doing, as in betting, welcoming and warning, just to quote a few.

� Perlocutionary acts, finally, are the effects of the utterance on the listener, who accepts the bet, is welcomed or warned.

If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot

A locutionary act has meaning; an illocutionary act has force in saying something; a perlocutionary act is the achieving of certain effects by saying something.

He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ Locution He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ Illocution He urged me (or advised, ordered,

etc.) me to shoot her ‘In saying x I was doing y’ or ‘I did y’

Perlocution He persuaded me to shoot her ‘By saying x I did y’ or ‘I way doing y’

I authorize the University to release to SAS Institute Inc., my name, address, local phone number, and status at the UW. I specifically recognize that, by signing this document, I am, for the purposes of this certification, waiving any and all rights of confidentiality which I could otherwise assert to prevent the University from disclosing this information to SAS Institute Inc. (Source: University of Washington Agreement Form) "Autorizzo l'Ente Agenzia Regionale per il Lavoro-Sede Territoriale di Sondalo al trattamento dei miei dati personali ai sensi della legge 31/12/1996 nr. 675" (source: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali) Searle’s Speech act classification relevant to illocutionary acts only Declarations: kinds of speech acts that change the world via the utterance

a. Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife. b. Referee: You’re out!

4

c. Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty. Representatives: kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be the case or not. In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief).

a. The earth is flat. b. Chomsky didn’t write about peanuts c. It was a warm sunny day.

Expressives: kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow.

a. I’m really sorry! b. Congratulations! c. Oh, yes, great, mmmm, wow!

Directives: kinds of speech acts speakers use to get someone else to do something.

a. Give me a cup of coffee. b. Could you lend me a pen, plese? c. Don’t touch that.

Commissives: speech acts which commit speakers to a certain course of action. In using a commissives, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words.

a. I’ll be back in a minute. b. I’m going to get it right next time. c. We won’t ever do that again.

Key aspect: we use particular verbs and sentences to perform acts with social and interactional consequences. Performative acts are speech acts of a special kind where the utterance of the right words by the right person in the right situation effectively is (or accomplishes) the social act. In some cases, the speech must be accompanied by a ceremonial or ritual action. Whether the speaker in fact has the social or legal (or other kind of) standing to accomplish the act depends on some things beyond the mere speaking of the words. These are felicity conditions. Test for performatives: the “hereby” test,

I hereby confer upon you the honourable degree of Bachelor of Arts. Does it make sense? If so, the act is performative. 9. No Warranty, Disclaimer of Liability and Indemnity

5

Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the high quality and accuracy of the Site, The Economist makes no warranty, express or implied concerning the Economist Content, the Site, software or products or services available through the Site (the "Site Services"), which are provided "as is". The Economist expressly disclaims all warranties, including but not limited to warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and warranties of merchantability. In no event will The Economist, its affiliates or other suppliers be liable for direct, special, incidental, or consequential damages (including, without limitation, damages for loss of business profits, business interruption, loss of business information or other pecuniary loss) arising directly or indirectly from the use of (or failure to use) or reliance on the Site Services, even if The Economist has been advised of the possibility that such damages may arise. […] Disclaimer " I contenuti offerti dal portale ANSA sono gratuiti, redatti con la massima cura/diligenza, e sottoposti ad un accurato controllo da parte dell'ANSA. L' ANSA, tuttavia, declina ogni responsabilità, diretta e indiretta, nei confronti degli utenti e in generale di qualsiasi terzo, per eventuali ritardi, imprecisioni, errori, omissioni, danni (diretti, indiretti, conseguenti, punibili e sanzionabili) derivanti dai suddetti contenuti. […] “Felicity conditions”: necessary to the success of a speech act. In order for performatives to be successful, specific conditions must take place. Felicity conditions criteria: status, age, power, etc. Only certain people are qualified to declare war, baptize people or sentence convicted felons. Other prerequisites for the success of a speech act: the speaker’s sincerity (as in apologizing and vowing) and the suitability of external circumstances.

“Can you give me a lift?” conditions to be fulfilled: a) the hearer must have a motor vehicle; b) s/he must be able to drive it somewhere; c) the speaker must have a reason for the request. Three kinds of felicity conditions: � preparatory conditions, i.e. the status or authority of the speaker who

performs the speech act, as well as the situation of other parties involved in the speech act: e.g. in order for a marriage to be valid, the ceremony must be solemnized by a priest, and neither of the couple must already be married;

� conditions for execution, i.e. the ritual or ceremonial action that usually accompanies the speech act;

� sincerity conditions, i.e. the speaker must really intend what he or she says.

6

Speech acts may be direct or indirect, i.e. types of speech acts can also be distinguished on the basis of structure. Direct Speech Acts: the relationship between structure and function is direct Utterance Structure Communicative

Function You wear a seat belt. Declarative Statement Do you wear a seat belt? Interrogative Question/Demand Wear a seat belt! Imperative Command Indirect Speech Acts: the relationship between structure and function is indirect e.g. a declarative used to make a request is an example of an indirect speech act. Utterance Direct Speech Act Indirect Speech Act It’s cold outside. I hereby tell you about

the weather. Structure: Declarative Function: Statement

I hereby request of you that you close the door. Structure: Declarative Function: Command

Most common types of indirect speech act in English: the interrogative form is not typically used to ask a question. Take for example the two sentences below:

Could you pass the salt? Would you open this?

Do we only expect a yes/no answer or rather the addressee’s action? Other examples of Indirect Speech Acts. Utterance Group Can you pass the salt? Have you got change for a dollar? You could be a little more quiet

Sentences concerning Hearer’s ability to perform A

I want you to do this for me, Henry I’d rather you didn’t do than any more I wish you wouldn’t do that

Sentences concerning Speaker’s wish or want that Hearer will do Action

Officers will henceforth wear ties at dinner Would you kindly get off my foot? Aren’t you going to eat your cereal?

Sentences concerning Hearer’s doing Action

Would you be willing to write a letter of recommendation for me? Do you want to hand me that hammer over there on the table? Would you mind not making so much

Sentences concerning Hearer’s desire or willingness to do Action

7

noise? You should leave immediately. Must you continue hammering that way? Why don’t you try it just at once?

Sentences concerning reasons for doing Action

Would you mind awfully if I asked you if you could write me a letter of recommendation? I would appreciate it if you could make less noise.

Sentences embedding one of these elements inside another; also, sentences embedding an explicit directive illocutionary verb inside one of these contexts

Another key aspect of Speech Act Analysis (besides their performative nature): it is a way of studying how more gets communicated than is said. � Paul Grice’s Cooperative Principle, Conversational Maxims and Conversational Implicature Conversational implicature: the way hearers manage to work out the complete message when speakers mean more than they say. Grice’s innovation: he explicitly acknowledges an important role to the hearer for the success of speech acts � Austin’s and Searle’s theories: the hearer is only implicitly referred to or simply mentioned in the arguments about the preparatory conditions. � Ehlich’s and Tischer et al.’s action-centred functional pragmatics: the need to give equal status to speakers and hearers who perform “speech actions” rather than “speech acts”. The conversational implicature is a message that is not found in the plain sense of the sentence, but is implied by the speaker. The hearer is able to infer, to work out the speaker’s implied message with the help of : the cooperative principle, i.e. the way in which people (speakers/writers and hearers/readers) try to make conversations (as well as written texts) work. The cooperative principle includes four rules or maxims or Gricean maxims, or conversational maxims (Crystal): Maxims can be explained as unstated assumptions we have in conversations.

� the maxim of quality, i.e. speakers’ truthfulness, we assume that they are telling the truth. Rules: a) do not say what you believe to be false; b) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence;

� the maxim of quantity, i.e. the amount of data required for the conversation to proceed, we assume that people are normally going to provide an appropriate amount of information. Rules: a) make your contribution as informative as is required (for current purposes of the exchange; b) do not make your contribution more informative than is required;

8

� the maxim of relevance, i.e. speakers’ consistency with the purpose of the exchange; we assume that the piece of information communicated is relevant. Rule: be relevant

� the maxim of manner, speaker’s clear, orderly, and unambiguous way to give his or her contributions, we assume that the speaker is trying to be as clear as he can. Rules: a) be perspicuous; b) avoid obscurity of expression; c) avoid ambiguity; d) be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity); e) be orderly.

OBSERVING, FLOUTING AND VIOLATING MAXIMS Observing Maxims there are certain kinds of expressions that allow speakers to adhere to the maxims: hedges. � Hedges realizing the maxim of quality: ‘as far as I know’, ‘I may be

mistaken’, ‘I’m not sure if this is right’, ‘I guess’. The speaker likes to draw his/her hearer’s attention to the fact that they are only saying what they believe to be true, and that they lack adequate evidence, as in.

A I’ll ring you tomorrow afternoon then. B Erm, I shall be there as far as I know, and in the meantime have a word with

Mum and Dad if they’re free. Right, bye-bye then. A Bye-bye, bye. � Hedges realizing the maxim of quantity: ‘As you probably know’, ‘So, to cut

a long story short’, ‘I won’t bore you with all the details’. Some speakers know that in giving too little information they risk not being explicit enough or, conversely, in giving too much information they risk boring their hearers

Well, to cut a long story short, she didn’t get home till two. � Hedges realizing the maxim of relevance: (usually found in the middle of

speakers’ talk), e.g. ‘by the way’, ‘anyway’, ‘well, anyway’ or (as initial phrases) e.g. ‘I don’t know if this is important’, ‘This may sound like a dumb question’, ‘Not to change the subject’. In both cases, speakers use such expressions in order to indicate how their comment has relevance to the conversation, as in

A I mean, just going back to your point, I mean to me an order form is a contract. If we are going to put something in then let’s keep it as general as possible

B Yes

9

� Hedges realizing the maxim of manner: ‘This may be (sound) a bit confused (odd)’, ‘I’m not sure if this makes sense’, ‘I don’t know if this is clear at all’. Under certain circumstances, speakers can realize that what they are saying is not clear enough, so they may use hedges that can help them to fulfil the maxim of manner and, thus, enhance the cooperative principle.

Thank you Chairman. Jus – just to clarify one point. There is a meeting of the Police Committee on Monday and there is an item on their budget for the provision of their camera.

The use of hedges by speakers proves that they are aware of the maxims; moreover, it proves that speakers are trying to observe these principles in order to establish a cooperation with their listeners. Flouting Maxims Literally, flouting means that you deliberately do not obey or follow a law, an order, etc. When speakers appear not to follow the maxims but expect hearers to appreciate the meaning implied we say that they are ‘flouting’ the maxims. Just as with an indirect speech act, the speaker implies a function different from the literal meaning of form; when flouting a maxim, the speaker assumes that the hearer knows that their words should not be taken at face value and that they can infer the implicit meaning. In many cultures, it can be socially unacceptable to always say exactly what is in one’s mind unless one knows the hearer very well (� politeness principle) Flouting quantity

Well, how do I look? Your shoes are nice … Lynn Yes I’m starving too Martin Hurry up girl

Flouting quality

Lynn Oh dear, stop eating rubbish. You won’t eat any dinner A So what do you think of Mark? Flouting

relation B His flatmate’s a wonderful cook. Flouting manner

I wouldn’t say when you’ve seen one Western you’ve seen the lot; but when you’ve seen the lot you get the feeling you’ve seen one.

Violating maxims A speaker can be said to ‘violate’ a maxim when they know that the hearer will not know the truth and will only understand the surface meaning of the words. They intentionally generate a misleading implicature. The speaker deliberately supplies insufficient information, says something that is insincere, irrelevant or ambiguous, and the hearer wrongly assumes that they are cooperating. A Does your dog bite? B No A [Bends down to stroke it and gets bitten] Ow! You said your dog doesn’t

10

bite! B That isn’t my dog. the use of maxims can be helpful in analysing and interpreting conversation and, above all, may reveal purposes of which (either as speaker or listener) we were not previously aware. POLITENESS PRINCIPLE (Geoff Leech)

During her successful General Election campaign in 1979, Margaret Thatcher undertook various photo opportunities to emphasise how in touch she was with ordinary people. On one occasion, she was photographed standing on the back of a platform bus. As this was taking some time, she said, ‘I’m beginning to feel like a clippie …’ And then, observers recall, you see the realisation in her eyes that she might have said something patronising, so she added, ‘… who are all doing a wonderful job’.

It is intended to explain how politeness operates in conversational exchanges. Politeness refers to forms of polite social behaviour, or etiquette, that participants, belonging to a particular culture and involved in social interactions, attend to in order to establish and maintain harmony. A common case of enforced politeness is Political Correctness. In order for the politeness attitude to take place in social interactions, speakers must adhere to a variety of factors:

� social relationships, in terms of social distance and closeness. � the relative status of the participants, including age and power. e.g.

lower status speakers use address forms that include a title and a last name (e.g., Mr Smith, Dr Adams), but not the first name.

� the degree of friendliness. e.g. in the course of a social interaction, participants can move from a title-plus-last name to a first-name basis within the talk.

These factors have an influence not only on what we say, but also on how we are interpreted. In many cases, the interpretation goes beyond what we might have intended to convey. Recognizing the impact of such evaluations makes it very clear that more is being communicated than is said. Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson’s model of politeness strategies. Compared with Geoff Leech’s approach, Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness is basically founded on the notion of ‘face’. Technically speaking, politeness implies showing awareness and consideration of another person’s public self-image, i.e. face, that is that emotional and social sense

11

of self that everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize. Showing awareness for another person’s face when that other seems socially distant is often described in terms of respect or deference. Showing the equivalent awareness when the other is socially close is often described in terms of friendliness, camaraderie, or solidarity. Awareness of social distance emerges, for example, in a student’s question to his teacher, whereas awareness of social closeness emerges in a speaker's question to a friend of his (or of hers). Within their everyday social interactions, people generally behave as if their expectations concerning their public self-image, or their face wants, will be respected.

� Face threatening acts occur if a speaker says something that represents a threat to another individual’s expectations regarding self-image: e.g. you screwed up; you’re a phony

� Face saving acts are performed when, given the possibility that some action might be interpreted as a threat to another’s face, the speaker can say something to lessen the possible threat: e.g. no harm done; it’s not your fault

Many different ways of performing face saving acts depending on our attempt to save another’s face. Brown and Levinson distinguishes between negative face wants and positive face wants.

� A person's negative face is the need to be independent, to have freedom of action, and not to be imposed on by others.

� A person's positive face is the need to be accepted, even liked, by others, to be treated as a member of the same group, and to know that his or her wants are shared by others.

In other words, negative face is the need to be independent and positive face is the need to be connected.

� negative politeness: is a face saving act which is oriented to the person’s negative face. The speaker will tend to show deference, emphasize the importance of the other’s time or concerns, and even include an apology for the imposition or interruption. Negative politeness is found in ways of mitigating the imposition: e.g. hedging devices, deferences, impersonal constructions, apologizing.

� positive politeness: is a face saving act concerned with the person’s positive face. The speaker will tend to show solidarity, emphasize that both the hearer and him/herself want the same thing, and that they have a common goal. Positive politeness means being complimentary and gracious to the addressee.

12

What would you do if you saw a cup of pens on your teacher's desk, and you wanted to use one, would you

a. say, "Ooh, I want to use one of those!" � face-threatening act (bald-on record)

b. say, "So, is it O.K. if I use one of those pens?" � direct positive politeness c. say, "I'm sorry to bother you but, I just wanted to ask you if I could use one

of those pens?" � negative politeness d. Indirectly say, "Hmm, I sure could use a blue pen right now." � indirect

positive politeness (off-record) DEIXIS The relationship between an utterance and its context (Levinson): language encodes the features of the context of utterance, and in turn, the context of utterance affects the interpretation of the utterance itself. Literally speaking, deixis means “verbal pointing”, that is to say “pointing by means of language”. Any linguistic form used to accomplish this ‘pointing’ is called a deictic expression, a deictic marker, a deictic word, or an indexical. We use deictic expressions to indicate things in the immediate context: Common types of deixis � people deixis (i.e. me, you): used to indicate people, � spatial deixis (i.e. here, there) or location � temporal deixis (i.e. now, then) or time.

Other forms of deixis (Levinson, Lyons, Fillmore) � discourse deixis: i.e. deictic reference to a portion of discourse; � empathetic deixis: i.e. the metaphorical use of deictic forms to indicate

emotional or psychological distance or proximity between speakers; � social deixis: i.e. reference to the social characteristics of, or distinctions,

between the participants or referents in a speech event. Proximity and distance in deictic expressions are expressed by means of proximal terms, and distal terms. � Proximal terms are, for instance, ‘this’, ‘here’, ‘now’, which imply that the

deictic expressions are ‘near speaker’. � Distal terms are, instead, terms such as ‘that’, ‘there’, ‘then’, which imply

that the deictic expressions are ‘away from speaker’. Focus on social deixis. The T/V distinction: Some languages, such as Italian, German, French, Spanish, distinguish between forms used for a familiar versus a non-familiar addressee (tu

13

vs. Lei in Italian; tu vs. Vous in French; du vs. Sie in German; tú vs. Usted in Spanish). The speaker’s use of one form rather than the other communicates his/her relationship with the addressee. ‘I’ and ‘you’: proximal forms in terms of person deixis third person pronouns: distal forms, since in deictic terms ‘he’, ‘she’ or ‘it’ are not direct participants in basic (I-you) interaction. Some uses of ‘third person’ pronouns: the speaker addresses to the addressee with a third person form: this happens whenever the speaker wishes to communicate distance or non-familiarity with respect to the hearer, or s/he has an ironic or humorous purpose or intention.

Would his highness like some coffee? the speaker wants to make potential accusation without being direct as he/she would be using the second person pronoun. Compare

You didn’t clean up Somebody didn’t clean up after himself

Each person has to clean up after him or herself. The same purpose can be achieved by the speaker by involving him/herself and other people: i.e. thru the use of the first person plural ‘we’, as in

We clean up after ourselves around here. Utterances like these can lead to ambiguous interpretation in that ‘we’ can be either exclusive (speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee), or inclusive (speaker and addressee included). What is the difference between ‘Let’s go’ (to some friends) and ‘Let us go’ (to someone who has captured the speaker and friends). So what do we do? Don't overreact some say. We aren’t. We haven't lashed out. No missiles on the first night just for effect. Don't kill innocent people. We are not the ones who waged war on the innocent. We seek the guilty. Look for a diplomatic solution. There is no diplomacy with Bin Laden or the Taliban regime. State an ultimatum and get their response. We stated the ultimatum; they haven't responded.Understand the causes of terror. Yes, we should try, but let there be no moral ambiguity about this: nothing could ever justify the events of 1l September, and it is to turn justice on its head to pretend it could. speech given by Tony Blair at the Labour Party Conference, Saturday 13 October 2001. taken from Fairclough, N. Analysing Discourse

14

The aspect of deixis is strictly related to the topic of reference (see also Halliday) The correct interpretation of deictic expressions relies on the fact that the speaker and the hearer share the same context. Deixis is particularly important for learners of second languages as well as for analysis of conversation and discourse analysis. For presupposition and entailment (see Yule) To sum up some key aspects so far analyzed: Language is not only used to produce syntactically correct and semantically sense-making expressions but also to perform actions, speech acts. In order for speech acts to be successful, our hearer must be able to understand not only what is said in an overt and direct way, but also what is covert and indirect. When we speak we always communicate much more than what we say. As a consequence, in order for the communicative act to be successful, speaker and hearer, writer and reader must share the same situational and cultural contexts, they must belong to the same community. Then, what about communication between actors belonging to different social, cultural, linguistic, and sectoral groups? Do speech acts fail in these situations? � Answers to these questions come from INTERCULTURAL PRAGMATICS Preamble: consider the relation between discourse analysis and pragmatics � the pragmatics of discourse. Discourse analysis is basically concerned with the investigation of a wide range of linguistic and cultural phenomena. From discourse analysis perspective, speakers (as well as writers) are fundamentally seen as language users. To consider discourse from a pragmatic perspective means looking behind the forms and structures present in the text, and paying much more attention to psychological concepts such as background knowledge, beliefs, and expectations. In the pragmatics of discourse, we inevitably explore what the speaker or writer has in mind. Our automatic interpretation of the unsaid (or the unwritten) must be based on pre-existing knowledge structures, which function like familiar patterns from previous experience that we use to interpret new experiences: i.e. schemata. Schemata, in order to be efficient to make sense of the world, must be culturally determined. Of course, interaction between language users belonging to the same cultural and linguistic community, and hence sharing the same cultural schemata, works better than interaction between users with different cultural schemata. The study of linguistic and cultural differences is part of a broad area of investigation generally known as cross-language, or else, interlanguage pragmatics: a new-born

15

field of research � its bearing on translation studies, second language acquisition and learning, language for specific purposes, intercultural studies, and applied linguistics as a whole. The development of interlanguage pragmatics � the rapid changes brought about by globalization, including the contact (and the clash, to some extent) between different cultural communities � the re-formulation of the old pragmatic paradigms and the provision of a new perspective on language and communication. Studies on interlanguage (and intercultural) pragmatics as a field of research have increased considerably in the last fifty-sixty years and are bound especially to the establishment of international institutions, both Intergovernmental Organizations (e.g. UNO, EU, etc.) and Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g. Médecins sans Frontières, UNHCR, etc.). These are places where different cultures and languages interact and affect each other. It follows that, on a linguistic level, the realization of a communication, void of ambiguities and misunderstanding, is a hard goal to achieve. What is more, the success of communication depends not so much on the possibility of sharing a common language (i.e. a lingua franca, an interlanguage) as on the possibility of sharing a common cultural texture. Regardless of the language spoken, the success (or the failure) of speech acts, in Austin’s sense, depends on the quality and the quantity (and, even the manner and relevance, to use Grice’s nomenclature of maxims) of the cultural knowledge that speakers share. The need for a pragmatic approach to the study of language: B. Malinowski (1923, 1935), J.R. Firth, M.A.K. Halliday � a pragmatic view of language, a dynamic model of language. Quell, for instance, in his study on multilingual institutions, with particular reference to the European Union, works out a model that he calls “dynamic choice of languages”, which is based on the interaction between a number of interactants (Firth’s dramatis personae and Halliday’s tenor) who, through their roles, their functions, and their cultural background, determine the linguistic choices within their working place. Kecskes: the involvement in communication of interactants with different national, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, and different first languages, entails a more dynamic, constantly changing view of language and culture, and hence a new approach in pragmatics research, in a word, an interlanguage pragmatics. A shift of interest from the monolingual ideal speaker’s grammar and language use to the language user considered in his or her interaction with other users, whose

16

language development and use is determined not only by individual features but also by the socio-cultural environment and situations in which he or she operates. The intercultural and interlanguage reality obliges researchers to shift their attention to the field of linguistics outside the linguistic paradigm itself, that is towards more pragmatics topics. Kecskes suggests an approach which combines syntactic-lexical merging, conceptual blending, and cultural crossing. Language users (speakers or writers), then, can know the world in two forms: � one provided by their prior encounters and experiences (i.e. the context of

culture) and is encapsulated in lexical items; � the other is given by the actual linguistic and extralinguistic context framed in

the given situation (i.e. the context of situation). In fact, meaning is the result of the interaction of these two forms of world knowledge. The complexity of meaning can be understood only if we accept that context is characterized both by regularity and variability: context is coded in lexical units (regularity) that interact with actual context (variability) in communication. The two forms of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of context of situation and of context of culture, are hence essential for the success of interactions, both in monolingual situations and in bi- or multilingual situations. The instruments developed in the field of pragmatics, i.e. Austin’s Speech Act Theory, Searle’s Cooperative Principle, and so on, were accounting for monolingual contexts. The amount of non-shared knowledge between members with different cultures and different languages will be higher than in situations where speakers of the same culture are involved. This shortage of knowledge, according to Moeschler, will regard rather the context of culture than the context of situation and, as a consequence, will affect the retrieval of information (i.e. the retrieval of intended meaning on the part of the second language speaker) and cause intercultural misunderstandings, that is pragmatic misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings cannot be ascribed to the hearer’s (or reader’s) difficulty to understand or interpret what is implicated (i.e. ‘the unsaid’) in the speaker’s (or writer’s) utterances (as traditional pragmatists used to do). In intercultural communication, misunderstandings are also due to false inferences caused by false explicatures, since the greater the audience’s mastery of the speaker’s language, the greater the risk of intercultural misunderstanding. The reason is that speakers tend to attribute to non-native speakers cultural background which is in due proportion to their own mastery of language and therefore do not necessarily imply the right explicature of the utterance.