Power Social Exchange

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Structure, Action, and Outcomes: The Dynamics of Power in Social ExchangeAuthor(s): Linda D. MolmSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jun., 1990), pp. 427-447Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095767

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2/22

STRUCTURE,

ACTION, AND

OUTCOMES:

THE

DYNAMICS

OF POWER

IN SOCIAL

EXCHANGE*

LINDA D. MOLM

Universityof Arizona

Two levels of power

-

the

structure of

power in exchange networks,

and the strategic

use of power

resources by actors

-

affect

the

frequency and distribution

of exchange

outcomes. Theories

of power

and exchange suggest alternative

hypotheses about how

structural

power

and

strategic

action are related

to each other and to outcomes.

These

are tested with data

from

a

series

of experiments in which

power

relations

are

based on

control

over

rewards

and

punishments.

Both

structural

power

and its

strategic

use

have

substantial

effects

on

exchange outcomes, but structure and

action

are

related only

weakly

to each

other.

Their relative

effects

on

exchange

outcomes

vary

with

the

base

of

power. Structural

power

has

stronger

effects

on

reward

exchange,

and

strategic

action

onpunishmentexchange. Theasymmetryof rewardexchange in the

relation,

the traditional

measure

of power

use in

powerldependence theory,

is

affected

by

both.

Social scientistshave conceptualizedpower

in various ways: as a structuralpotential

(Bierstedt 1950; Wrong 1968; Emerson 1962),

as a process of behavioral

or

tactical influence

(Rubin and Brown 1975; Michener and Such-

ner

1972; Tedeschi

and Bonoma

1972),

and

as

the successfuloutcomeof influence Dahl 1957;

Mayhew, Gray, and Richardson 1969; Simon

1957).

I

argue

hata

completeanalysis

of

power

must ncludeall three acets. Understandinghe

relationsamongthemrequires ntegrating on-

cepts

at

micro nd macro evels of

analysis

(Alexander 1987; Munch

and

Smelser 1987).

The macro evel of power is the structure f

control that

provides

the

opportunities

and

constraints

within

which

the

micro

evel

of

power, the strategicbehavior

of

actors, oper-

ates. Together, structureand action produce

outcomes of

consequence

for

actors

and

rela-

tionships.

I investigatehow structure nd action affect

the amount and distribution

of

exchange

in

power/dependence

elations.Previous

research

on

power

and

exchange

has

studied only the

relations between power structure the struc-

*

This workwas supported y a grant romthe

National

cience

Foundation

SES-8419872).

am

gratefuloSuniLeeforherassistancenconducting

the

researchnd

analyzing

he

data,

o

WilliamDixon

for

his

advice

n

the

design

nd

xecution

f the

ogit

analysis,

ndto

Mark

Hedley

or

his assistance

n

data

analysis.William

Dixon,

Neil

Fligstein,Barry

Markovsky,

ecilia

Ridgeway,

MichaelSobel and

anonymous

eviewers ffered aluable

uggestions

tural relationsof dependence

n exchangenet-

works) and power outcomes

(the resultingdis-

tribution f exchangeamongactors) e.g., Cook

and Emerson 1978; Cook, Emerson,Gillmore,

and Yamagishi 1983;

Molm 1981). As Turner

(1988) notes, theories of social exchange say

little about the actual process of interaction.

Theoriesof bargaining ower,on the otherhand,

have tended to ignore

structureand examine

only the relations between strategiesor tactics

of influence threats,

romises,concessions,and

so

forth)

and

power

outcomes. (See

Bacharach

and Lawler

1981,

and Lawler

and

Bacharach

1987 for an exception.) None of these analyses

conceptualizes

or

measurespower

use

dynami-

cally, by examininghow actors

use their

power

resources selectively

and contingently in re-

sponse to others' behavior, to influence the

course of the ongoing exchange

relation.

I in-

vestigate the

role

of these behavioralstrategies

in

power relations,using statisticaltechniques

recently developed for analyzing patterns

in

interactionsequences

(Gottman 1980; Allison

and

Liker 1982).

Theory andresearchon power

and

exchange

suggest

thatstructure nd action may

be related

to

power outcomes

in

several ways:

structural

on earlierdraftsof this paper. also thankLynn

Motley,

Connie

Siegel,

AmandaGibson, Peggy

BauschRansom,Cathy

Amoroso, nd-Kent tock,

who

conducted

he

experimental

essions.

An ear-

lier version f thispaper

was

presented

t the 1989

annual

meeting

f

the

American

ociological

Asso-

ciation.

AmericanSociological

Review, 1990,Vol. 55

(June:427-447)

427


3/22

428

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

power

may affect

exchange

outcomes directly,

regardless

of interaction

strategies (Emerson

1972;

Cook and Emerson 1978);

structural

power

may

affectexchangeoutcomes

ndirectly,

through ts effect on action (e.g., Thibautand

Kelley 1959);

and interaction

strategies

may

affect exchange

outcomes

independently

of

structural ower (Bacharach

and Lawlei

1981;

Markovsky

1987). These

causal relations

are

tested

with data from a series

of

experiments

on power

in

exchange relations

imbedded

in

largernetworks.

The experiments

ystematically

manipulate

hreedimensions

of structural

ower

the source

or base of power

(control

over

rewards

or

punishments),

the asymmetry

or

imbalanceof power, and the total strengthor

magnitude

of power

in

the

relation and

then

measure

corresponding

dimensions

of power

strategies

and

power

outcomes.

BASIC CONCEPTS

AND

CONDITIONS

OF

EXCHANGE

The analysis

is

based

on

the social exchange

theories

originally

formulated

by

Thibaut

and

Kelley (1959)

and Emerson

(1962, 1972),

and

subsequently

developed

andextendedbyEmer-

son, Cook,

and their associates (Cook

and

Emerson 1978;

Cook et

al. 1983) and

Molm

(1987, 1989).

Since

differencesexist

within

his

theoretical

esearch

program

Cook,

Molm,

and

Yamagishi,

forthcoming),

it is important

to

specify

the

basic concepts

and conditions

of

exchange

that

I

assume.

The

basic

theoretical

unit is

the

exchange

re-

lation between

two actors

A

and

B,

who

exchange resources with one another.Actors

may

be individuals r

collectivities.

Eachactor's

resources

n

the

exchange

relation

are items

in

that

actor's behavioral

repertoire

hat

produce

consequences

of

value

for the other

actor

(Emerson

1972).1

The valuedconsequences

of

A's behavior

or

B

may

be

tangibleobjects

such

as

money

or

goods,social

rewards uch as

status

or

approval,

or

psychological

states

such

as

happiness

or

self-esteem.

The exchange

rela-

tion provides

actors

with

opportunities

o ex-

change

resources;

relations

vary in

the fre-

quency

with which these

opportunities

re used

over time and the value and distributionof

exchange.

Because

actors provide

valued benefits

for

one

another,

hey are mutually

dependent.

A's

dependenceupon

B

varies

(1) directly

with

the

value

of the benefit

B can

provide,

and (2)

in-

versely

with

the availability

of the benefit

to A

fromalternative

ources Emerson

1972).These

alternatives

are

typically

other exchange

rela-

tions, connected

to

one another

in

larger ex-

change

networks.

Two

relations

are

connected

if exchange none relationaffectsthe frequency

or

value

of exchange

in

the other.

Network

connections

are

positive

to the degree

that ex-

change

in one relation

is contingent upon

ex-

change

in

the

other, and negative

to

the

degree

that

exchange

n

one relation

s contingent

upon

nonexchange

n

the other Emerson

1972).

Only

negatively

connected

relations

are analyzed

here.

Because

they

involve

exchanges

in the

same

resource domain,

negatively

connected

relations

provide

alternative

xchange

partners.

For example, in the B-A-C network (where

the

A-B and

A-C relations

are

negatively

con-

nected at

A),

B and C might represent

alterna-

tive employees

for

a single job

controlled

by

employer A,

or countries

that are alternative

suppliers

of a

natural esource

needed

by

coun-

try

A.

Actors

in

structurally

dentical

ocations

in a

network

are

said

to

occupy

the same

position.

Structurally

dentical ocations

provide

equiva-

lent access to alternativerelationsof equiva-

lent

value, .e.,

relations

of

dependence

re

equal

(Cook

and

Emerson

1978).

Within

this

general

framework,

his

analysis

is based

on certain assumptions

about

the na-

ture

and

conditions

of

social

exchange:

(1)

Exchange

behavior

is choice

behavior.

The

structure

f

exchange

relations

provides

actors

with a set

of

opportunities

o

choose

among

alternative

xchange

relations

and,

within

those

relations,

alternative behaviors

that

produce

specific value for a partner(e.g., going to a

movie

the other

wants

to

see, critiquing

a

colleague's paper,

voting

for a

political

candi-

date). (2)

Actors

choose

exchange partners

nd

behaviors

on

the basis

of

the rewards

and

costs

that

these

choices

have

produced

n

the

past

or

can be

expected

to

produce

in the future.

Ac-

tors behave

in

ways

that

tend

to maximize

1

Resources are not defined as objects that are

transferred

rom

one actor

to another;

nstead,

they

are behaviors

that

one actor performs

to produce

consequences

of value

for another

actor.

Thisdefini-

tion is

consistent

with Emerson's

(1972)

original

conception

of resources.

These behaviors

may

im-

pose

costs

on the actor

performing

hem, both

in

the

form

of

opportunity

osts and costs

attached o

the

behavior

per

se.


4/22

STRUCTURE,ACTION,

AND

OUTCOMES 429

rewardsand minimize costs.

(3) Actors initiate

exchanges

without

formal negotiations and

without explicit

agreements

of

whether,when,

or to what degree others will

reciprocate.(4)

As a consequence of (3), exchange relations

develop

as extended

sequences

of interactions

in which

the

returns or one's

investmentare

uncertain, and the distribution

of

exchange

outcomes is determinedover

time

rather han

on discrete transactions.

Some of these conditions differ

from

those

used in analyses of

exchange as bargaining

transactions,

n which

actors

formally negoti-

ate

tradesand

agree upon

the division of

joint

profit (e.g.,

Cook and

Emerson 1978;

Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988). While

some social

exchange

relations exhibit

these

characteristics,many

others do not.

Consider,

for

example,

the

exchange

relationsthat

might

develop

between

work

associates, spouses,

or

political

cronies.

During

their

extended inter-

action,

the actors

may performmany

behaviors

that benefit

one another

-

they support

another's

political

position, they

cook the

other's favorite

dinner,

they

attend a commit-

tee

meeting

in

the other's

place. They

do not

negotiate a deal, but they expect some recip-

rocity.

Because the

exchange

relation nvolves

many

such actions

by

both

parties,

t

is

difficult

to

identify

a discrete transaction

n

which

A

gives

x

and

B

gives y.

Instead,

over time the

distribution f these behaviorsdetermineswho

is

contributing

more

to the

relation.

These conditions

of

exchange

are closer to

those

of

the

early

exchange

theorists such as

Homans

(1974),

Blau

(1964),

Thibaut and

Kelley (1959), andEmerson 1972) inhisorigi-

nal formulation. While previous studies con-

ducted under

both

sets of

exchange

conditions

have

supported

the basic

predictions

of

Emerson's

theory

of

power/dependence

rela-

tions

[e.g.,

Cook

and Emerson

(1978)

for bar-

gaining exchanges,

and

Burgess

and Nielsen

(1974)

and

Molm (1981)

for choice

exchanges],

one shouldnot assume hat he

hypotheses

ested

in

this

papergeneralize

o otherconditionswith-

out

empirical

test.

Thus,

my

four

assumptions

constitute hescopeconditionsfor thetheoreti-

cal

predictions.

CONCEPTS

OF POWER:

STRUCTURE,

ACTION,

AND

OUTCOMES

Emerson

(1972) distinguishes

between

power

as a structural ttribute f

exchange

relationsor

networksandpower use as a behavioralattrib-

ute of actors. I further

distinguishbetween two

aspects of power use:

strategic action, which is

the

dynamicprocess of using structural ower,

andthe exchangeoutcomesof poweruse, which

are

the resultingfrequency and distributionof

exchange.

Structural

Power

Structural ower

is

the potentialpower created

by

the relations

of

dependenceamong actors

n

exchange

networks. It

encompasses

several

specific dimensions,defined

below.

All

of

these

definitions are derived from

the basic insight

that A's power overB is equal to B's depend-

ence

on

A.

In

turn,

B's

dependence

on

A

is

a

functionof access to alternative

xchange

rela-

tions and the value

of those alternative rela-

tions. I

combine these two variables, available

alternativesand their

value,

to

produce

a

quan-

tifiable definition of

dependence

that allows

measurement ttheratio

evel:

B's

dependence

on

A,

and A's

power

over

B,

is

equal

to the

value that B can

receive from A's behavior,

divided

by

the total

value

that B

can receive

from all of B's potential partners n the net-

work.

Thus,

if B

can

exchange only

with

A,

B

is

completely dependent

on

A;

if B

has

other

potentialexchange

partners,

B's

dependence

s

a

function of the relative control over benefits

exercised

by

B's

alternative

xchange partners.

Two

central dimensions of structural

power

in

the

A-B

relation, power

imbalance

and av-

erage power,

are derived from

the

power/de-

pendencies

of

the

individualactors:2

The

power

imbalanceof the relationis the difference be-

tween the

actors'

power/dependencies.

f

B

is

more

dependent

on A

than

A is on

B,

then

the

less

dependentand more

powerfulactor,A,

has

a

power advantage

n

the relation.

The

greater

the

asymmetry

n

power,

the

greater

he imbal-

ance. The

average power

in

the relation s the

average

of the two

actors'

power/dependencies.

Whereas

power imbalance

is a measure of

the relative

power

of actors

in

the

relation,

average power

is

a

measure

of the

absolute

strengthof their mutual power over one an-

other.3Even in a

balanced

relation, power

is

2Lawlerand Bacharach 1987) refer

to these same

two dimensions as relative power and

total power.

3Emerson (1972) proposes that average

power is

a measureof the cohesion in the relation.

Although

this point is debatable cohesion may

be affected by


5/22

430 AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

fully operative, and

variations n the strength

of this power can affect

behavioralexchange.

These two dimensions

can vary independently

i.e., two relations can

have the same level of

imbalancebut be high or low on the absolute

strengthof power. Together, the two dimen-

sions completely define the

amountand distri-

bution

of

structural

ower

in an

exchange rela-

tion.

A third

dimension

of

structuralpower is its

base. Traditionally,

social

exchange

theories

have been restricted

o

power based on control

over rewards.Aversive actions

( positivepun-

ishment n behavioral

erms)

have

been

omit-

ted

fromtheir scope, and the

only costs consid-

ered have been opportunitycosts. I have re-

cently argued that control over

punishments,

the

coercive power classically studied by

sociologists (e.g., Bierstedt 1950), is also a

source of

dependence and can be studied

pro-

ductively within the same theoreticalframe-

work

(Molm 1988, 1989).

If

A's behaviorpro-

duces consequences for

B

that

are either posi-

tive or negative in

value,

then

B

is

dependent

on A for the

quality

of

outcomes

B

experiences

and

A

has

power

over B. In most

power

rela-

tions, actors control a

range

of rewards and

punishments for each other. For

example,

employers

can hire or

fire, promote

or

demote,

praise

or criticize

their

employees. Family

membersandnations

similarlycontrol,

and

use,

a

range

of rewards and

punishments

n their

interaction

with one another.

Theoretically, n actor's

control

over

rewards

and

punishments

or

another onstitutes

a

single

variable, consisting

of

the

range

of

conse-

quences

-

from positive to negative

-

that

one actor's behavior can

produce

for

another.

This

rangemight vary,forexample,from +5 to

0 if an

actorcontrols

only

rewards,

but from +5

to -5

if

an actorcontrolsboth rewardsand

pun-

ishments. Reward and

punishment

power

are

analyzed

here

as

separate

bases rather hanas a

single

continuumbecause extensive

empirical

evidence

suggests

that

equivalent gains

and

losses do not

have equivalenteffects

on

judg-

ments

or

behavior

see

Kahnemanand

Tversky

1979, Gray and Tallman 1987, and previous

studies

in this research

program

uch as Molm

1988, 1989).

StrategicAction

Structural ower

providesactorswith the means

to influence the

outcomes of exchange. How

thatpower is exerciseddepends on its strategic

use. By selectively giving or withholding

re-

wards or punishments

for exchange

partners,

contingent

on the other's priorbehavior,

actors

can use their structuralpower to alter

the fre-

quency and distribution f exchange outcomes

in

the relation.This

is a straightforward

otion

that has its roots

in

the behavioral

bases of

exchangetheories.But wherebehavioral

analy-

ses

traditionally

xamine the impact of

sched-

uled

contingencies

of reinforcement

r

punish-

ment on behavior,taking those schedulesas a

given, the analysis

of social interaction

equires

a differentset of questions:How do actors

use

theirpower resourcescontingently

o influence

each others' behavior?How does

the structure

of

relationships

affect this strategic use

of

power? And

how do power strategies affect

exchange

outcomes? By examining both the

determinantsand effects

of

contingent

action,

this approach

ombines

the rational

choice and

behavioral

perspectives

that characterize

ex-

changetheories.

Power

strategies

may take many

forms.

In

this analysis, strategy

refers

to

the contingent

use

of

power

resources

rewarding

and

punish-

ing behaviors), .e., power strategies

are condi-

tional relations between sequential behaviors

of two

actors,

in

which

the

probability

of one

actor's

behavior

is

contingent upon

the other

actor's

prior

behavior.

Strategies specify

the conditional

relations

betweenspecific behaviors,by specific actors,

at

specific

time

lags.

For

example,

one

might

specify

the conditional

relation between A's

punishmentof

B

at time

t andB's nonexchange

with

A

at

time t- 1.

Reciprocal

strategies

are

conditional relations between

functionally

equivalentbehaviors

of

actors,e.g.,

the contin-

gency

of

one actor's rewarding

behavior

on

an-

other

actor's

prior

rewarding

behavior.Nonre-

ciprocal strategies

are conditional

relations

between

nonequivalent

ehaviorsof

actors,e.g.,

the contingency of rewardson prior punish-

ment.

Strategies

also

vary

on dimensions

parallel

to

those

defined for structure.

First,

they vary

by

the

base

of

the

contingent

behavior, i.e.,

whether

it is rewards or

punishments

hat are

contingent

on

another's

prior

behavior.

Sec-

ond,

measuresof the

average trength

nd

asym-

relational dimensions other than

average power,

includingpower imbalance),the

importance

of

this

dimensionof relational

power remains.


6/22

STRUCTURE,ACTION,

AND

OUTCOMES

431

metryof specific strategies

used by both actors

in

a relationship can be

computed from the

measures or the

individualactors.

ExchangeOutcomes

The outcomes of

power referto the amount

and

distributionof

behavioral

exchange

over the

course

of

extended interaction.

Exchange

may

be

rewarding

or

punishing,

it

may

be

high

or

low in

value or frequency,

and

it

may be dis-

tributedsymmetrically

or

asymmetrically

be-

tween the

actors

in a

relation. These distinc-

tions describe four

power outcomes that corre-

spond to the dimensions of

structuralpower:

the average rewardexchange in the relation,

the

asymmetry

of

reward

exchange

in the

rela-

tion,

the

averagepunishment

xchange, and

the

asymmetry

of

punishment

exchange.

Like

power

strategies,

the outcomes of

power

are

behavioral

measures,

but

they

are summaries

of the

frequenciesof

exchange

over

time

rather

than measures of the

conditional relations

be-

tween

sequential

behaviors.

Within the

framework of social

exchange

theory,

it is

these outcomes

that actors

try

to

changeto theiradvantage. examinehow both

structural

power

and the

strategic

use

of that

power

affect actors'abilities o

do so. The

asym-

metry

of

reward

exchange

is the

traditional

measureof the outcome

of

power

use

in

power/

dependence

relations;

t

measures the

relative

benefits

that actors receive from the

relation.

Less attention has been

paid

to

the

average

exchange

n

the

relation,

but actors

benefitfrom

the

absolute amount of

reward

exchange (and

suffer fromthe absoluteamountof punishment

exchange)

as well as

from

a

favorable

distribu-

tion of

exchange.4

PREDICTINGRELATIONS

AMONG

STRUCTURE,ACTION,

AND

OUTCOMES

Power/dependence theory

distinguishes

be-

tween

structural

power

and the

outcomes of

power

use and

posits

a

causal relationbetween

the

two.

The

role of

strategic

ction

n

thismodel

4

Outcomes

f

power

use

may

also be

subjective,

i.e., actors

may

be

relatively atisfied r

dissatisfied

with heir

bjective

utcomesrom

herelation.

Ac-

tors'

subjective

atings

f

theirrelations re

meas-

ured

n

these

xperiments

nd

analyses

f the

effects

of

structure

nd

strategy

n

these

outcomes re

in

progress.

is

less clear. The

classical theories

of social

exchange (Thibautand

Kelley 1959; Hlomans

1974; Blau 1964) view

action as

mediatingthe

relation

between structureand

outcomes. For

example,Thibautand Kelley (1959) explicitly

propose that

fate control (structural

power)

can be

converted o behavior ontrol f

actors

make their valued

resources

conditional on

others'behavior.

Consider wo

co-workerswho

hold reward

power over

one another(A con-

trols valued information

about the company

bureaucracy; has

greater echnical

expertise).

Let's

say power imbalance s

tipped

n

favor of

B. This

proposition suggests that B's

power

advantage

will

give B an

advantage

n

the ex-

change (relativelymore information n return

for

relatively less

expert

help) only

if B

makes

expert help

contingent on

information,

with-

holding help

until

information s forthcoming.

This is a

straightforward

ehavioral

predic-

tion, i.e., to

the extent that one's control over

another's rewards

and

punishments

is

used

contingently

o

rewarddesirable

behaviorsand

punishundesirable

behaviors,structural

ower

should be more effective.

However,

Thibaut

and

Kelley

do not

propose a direct functional

relationbetween structuralpower and its use.

A

structural

power advantagedoes

not,

in

and

of

itself,

cause an

actor to make the rewardsor

punishments

they control

contingent

on the

other's behavior. In

the above

example,

B's

power

advantage

does not

cause

B

to make

expert help

contingent

on

information rom A.

But

if B

uses power

strategically,

B's

greater

structural ower

will

enhancethe

effectiveness

of

that

strategy.

Emerson's (1972) subsequentdevelopment

of

power/dependence relations

in

social ex-

change

does not

include

strategic

action as a

separate

causal link.

Both Emerson's

theoreti-

cal

statements,

in

particular

his

well-known

phrase,

to

have a power

advantage

s to use it

(1972, p. 67), and

subsequentempirical

work

(Cook

and Emerson

1978;

Cook et al.

1983)

suggest

a

direct functional

relation between

structural

power

and

power

outcomes

as

long

as

(1)

nonstructural onstraintson

power

use

areabsent,and(2) actorsbehaverationally i.e.,

they try

to maximize their

benefits).

Under some

conditions,

t

may

be reasonable

to assume

that

strategies

of actorsare

relatively

unimportant.

They

are

most

likely

to affect

outcomes

under the

scope

conditions of the

present

theory,

in

which actors make choices

without

knowing

the terms

or

timing

of the


7/22

432

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Structural

a

3

Exchange

power

outcomes

b c

Strategic

action

Figure

. Model f Potential

elations

mongStructure,

ction,

ndOutcomes

other's reciprocity.

Under such conditions of

uncertainty,actors are more likely to use be-

havioral nfluence

o affect exchangeoutcomes.

The results of many studies suggest that struc-

tural power does

not completely determine

power outcomes.

When reward power is

im-

balanced,

he

asymmetry

f

exchangeoftenfalls

below the maximum evel

predicted,

and

some-

times structural

power is not used at all. The

relationbetween

punishmentpower and power

outcomes is

particularly

weak. Punishment s

rarely used, and a

punishmentpower advan-

tage is effective only underparticularcondi-

tions

(Molm 1988, 1989). Michaels

and

Wig-

gins (1976) have

suggested hatstructural ower

determines the

range

of

values within which

the distributionof

exchange

must fall

(what

they

called

the profit

atitude, .e.,

the

range

of

exchangeratios hat

are

mutuallyprofitable),

but not the

specific location within this range.

Similarly,

Bacharach

and

Lawler

(1981)

have

argued

hat

strategic

action not only intervenes

between structuralpower and outcomes, but

can

alter the

power relationship.Recent simu-

lation

experiments

by Markovsky 1987) show

thatpoweroutcomes

can be determined ointly

by

the

strategies

of

individual actors and the

structure

of

the relations

among them.

These

analyses suggest

that action not

only

mediates

the effects of

structure,but affects outcomes

independently

of

structure.

In summary,

previous work suggests three

potential

causal relations

among

structural

power,strategic ction,andexchangeoutcomes,

shown in Figure

1

and stated here as the three

central

hypotheses

of this

study:

(1)

Structural

ower

has direct

effects

on ex-

change

utcomes

path

in

Figure1).

(2)

Structural

ower

affects

xchange

utcomes

indirectly,hrough

trategic

ction

path

b-c

in

Figure 1).

(3) Strategic

action affects exchange outcomes

directly, independentof structure

path c, inde-

pendentof b in

Figure 1).

Let us consider

in more detailhow different

dimensions of

power must be related to one

another to producethese

effects. The central

prediction f power/dependence

heory, hat m-

balance

in

structural

ower producesasymme-

try

in exchange outcomes, is

supported

in

numerous studies (e.g., Burgess and Nielsen

1974; Cook and

Emerson 1978; Cook et al.

1983; Molm

1981).

In

parallel fashion, Emer-

son

(1972)

predicts the average frequency of

exchange

in

a

relation

will

increase with the

average

power/dependencies

f the

actors,

and

Michaels

andWiggins (1976) find that it

does.

If

these effects occur indirectly,

hrough trate-

gic action, then specific

corollaries

o

hypothe-

sis 2

obtain:

(2.1) Reciprocalstrategies ncrease,and nonre-

ciprocal strategies

decrease, with average struc-

tural

power of the same

base.

(2.2)

Nonreciprocal strategies increase, and

reciprocal

strategies decrease, with structural

power imbalanceof the

same base. Both recipro-

cal and

nonreciprocal strategies

become more

asymmetrical, favoring the

power-advantaged

actor.

If

reward and

punishment strategies affect

exchange behavior n accordwithbasic behav-

ioral

principles (i.e., rewards

increase,

and

punishments

decrease,

the

frequency

of behav-

iors on which

they are

contingent), then an-

other

corollary

ollows:

(2.3)

The

average frequency of exchange

in-

creases with

the

averagefrequency

of

reciprocal

strategies

of the

same

base,

and

the

asymmetry

of


8/22

STRUCTURE,

ACTION, AND OUTCOMES

433

exchange ncreaseswith the average requency

of

nonreciprocal trategiesof the same base and

with

asymmetry n both reciprocal and nonreciprocal

strategies.

If these threecorollariesare supported, ower

strategiesshould mediate

the traditionalrela-

tions between power imbalance and exchange

asymmetry, and between average power and

average exchange. For

reward-based

power,

greateraveragerewardpower will increasethe

reciprocity of rewards, which

in

turn

will in-

crease the average frequency of reward ex-

change.

Reward

power

imbalance

will

lead to

asymmetrical reward exchange through

the

mediatingeffects of nonreciprocal trategiesof

reward and nonexchange: the more powerful

actorwill

reciprocate i.e., reinforce)

he other's

rewards only intermittently,whereas the less

powerful

actorwill

maintain

his

patternby

re-

wardingthe other's nonexchange.For punish-

ment-based

power,greateraveragepunishment

power will increase the reciprocityof punish-

ment, which

in

turn will increase the

average

frequencyof punishment xchange.Punishment

power imbalance should

lead to

asymmetry

n

both punishment exchange and reward ex-

change, through he mediating

effects of asym-

metries

in

both

reciprocal

and

nonreciprocal

punishment trategies: he

more

powerful

actor

should be more likely to punish

the other's

nonexchangeas well as the other'spunishment.

This

strategy

n

turn

shoulddecrease he occur-

rence of those behaviors and

increase

the

fre-

quency

of

the other's reward

exchange.

To

the extent that the relationsamong

struc-

ture, action, and outcomes deviate from these

predictions, the indirect

effects

of

structural

power

will

be weaker.

If

strategic

action af-

fects

exchange

outcomes

independently

of

structural

power,

we

should

find

support

for

corollary2.3, but not for

corollaries2.1 or 2.2.

Thus, corollary 2.3

is also

a

corollary

to hy-

pothesis

3.

Variations

by

Base

of

Power

The relative strengthsof the causal relations

proposed

in

hypotheses

1-3 are

likely

to vary

for reward- nd

punishment-basedower.

Struc-

tural

power

is

expected

to

have

weaker

direct

and

indirect effects on

punishmentexchange

than on reward

exchange.

This

is

suggested

by

a

variety

of

theoretical

perspectives.

Several

theorists

e.g.,

Blau

1964;

Eckhoff

1974) argue

that

nonstructural

ariables,

such

as norms

of

justice,

constrain

he use

of

punishment

power

more than

rewardpower.

When used,

punish-

ment

is more likely

to provoke

retaliation,

ei-

therbyreciprocalpunishmente.g., Lawlerand

Bacharach

987)

orby withdrawal

f

the other's

valued reward

exchange.

In

addition,

recent

analyses

of

individual

choice and

decision-

making (Kahneman

and Tversky

1979;

Gray

and Tallman

1987) find

that potential

losses

have stronger

ffects on

behavioral

hoices

than

potential

gains.

In

exchange

relations

of bilat-

eral power,

this tendencyhas two

implications:

First, if

actors fear

the

other's retaliation

of

punishment

more than hey

value the

rewards t

might bring, they will be less likely to use a

punishment

power

advantage.Thus,

the

effects

of structural ower

on the

frequency

of punish-

ment

will

be weaker than the

effects of struc-

tural

power

on the frequency

of

rewardex-

change.

Second,

punishment

strategies

when

enacted should

have stronger

effects on

ex-

change outcomes

than

rewardstrategies.

The two

bases

of power also

provide

differ-

ent structural

ncentives to use a power

advan-

tage.

Structuralpower

imbalance

can

directly

induce the use of rewardpower,without nter-

vening

strategies,

but

not the use

of

punish-

ment

power

(Molm

1989).

The

reason

lies

in

the

different

effects

of alternatives.

Regardless

of awareness

of

power

or intent to influence,

imbalanced

rewardpower

will

lead

to reduced

exchange by

the

more

powerful

actor

simply

because

that

actor

has more

valuable alterna-

tives.

The

alternatives

provide

the

structural

incentive

to

withhold rewards

from

the more

dependentactor.Rewardexchangecan be with-

held intentionally

and contingently,

to

influ-

ence

the other's behavior,

but

it need not

be.

Rewardpower

imbalance

can

directlyproduce

rewardexchange

asymmetry

without

nterven-

ing power

strategies.

In

contrast,

the

average

strength

and

imbal-

ance of

punishment

power

affect actors' rela-

tive

capacities

to

inflict harm

on one

another,

compared

to

other actors

in the

network;

but

alternative

sources of

punishment

provide

no

incentiveto use thatpower.The mere potential

for

punishment

can have

direct effects

on

re-

wardexchange fear

of

punishment

an

increase

the other's

reward

exchange,

even

if

punish-

ment

is not

used),

but it

is

unlikely

to

affect

punishment

xchange

directly.

As severaltheo-

rists

have

pointed

out,

the

use

of

punishment

power

must

be an intentional

response

to


9/22

434

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

another's behavior (Miller and Vidmar 1981;

Eckhoff 1974). It can be affected indirectlyby

structuralconditions that affect the partner's

behavior,but directeffects are unlikely.

This analysis suggests three additionalhy-

potheses that are modifications, rather than

corollaries,of hypotheses

1

through3, and are

therefore abeled differently:

(1A) Structural ower directlyaffects reward

outcomes utnotpunishmentutcomes.

(2A)

Structural

ower

has weaker ndirect f-

fects on

punishment

utcomes han on reward

outcomes.

(3A) Punishmenttrategies ave trongerffects

on reward ndpunishmentutcomeshan eward

strategies.

METHOD

The

dataare takenfrom

a

series of five experi-

ments

on rewardand

punishmentpower.

The

experimentsused identicalprocedures, ubject

pools, and conceptual and operationaldefini-

tions of

the variables.

The Exchange Setting

The exchange setting

in

the experiments is

consistent with the conditions of

exchange

specified

earlier. On a series of

exchange op-

portunities,

actors choose between different

behaviors

with

consequences

of fixed value for

otheractors

n their

exchangenetwork,

without

explicit agreements

of

whether

or

when others

will

reciprocate.To simplify the analysis,be-

havioralchoices towardanotheractor arelim-

ited to

(1) producing

a reward of fixed value

for the

other, (2) producing

a

punishment

of

fixed value for the other, and (3) not acting

toward the

other

(i.e., choosing

to

reward or

punish

a

different

partner).

The

costs

to

the

actor

of

performing

an action with

consequences

for

anotherare limited to

opportunity

osts.

The exchange networks structuredifferent

relationsbetween

actorson

dimensions

of

struc-

tural

power. They provide subjects

with

vary-

ing degrees of dependenceon one another ora

valued

benefit money (subjects

were under-

graduate tudents, ecruited n the

basis of their

desire to earn

money). Power/dependence

ela-

tions

were

manipulatedby varying

the amount

of

money subjects

could add to each

other's

earnings(rewardpower)

or subtract rom each

other's

earnings (punishmentpower)

on

each

SA 1 ------------------A SA2

Figure 2.

The ExchangeNetworks

n the Experiments

of

a

series of exchange opportunities.

All networks were presented o the subjects

as consisting of four actors,

connectedto one

anotheras shown

in

Figure

2. In fact, only ac-

tors

A

and

B

were real subjects; he other

two

positions were played by

computer simulated

actors(SA's). Each real subject n thenetwork

was negatively

connected

to the otherreal sub-

ject and

to

one

of

the

simulatedactors,

giving

each

subject

a mutually exclusive choice

be-

tween two partners

on

each

exchange

opportu-

nity. Thus,

the number of alternativepartners

was held

constant.

Structuralpower was ma-

nipulated

by varying the

value of exchange in

the alternative elations.

Subjects

interacted

with each other through

remote video terminalsconnected to a central

microcomputer.

A

preliminary

matchinggame

with the computer provided

subjects

with a

bankaccount of money

that could be added

to

or subtracted from

during

the

exchange.

Following

this

game,

subjectsexchanged with

each

otherfor 250

exchange opportunities.

On

each

opportunity,

ubjects

made two choices:

(1)

which of their two interactionpartners

hey

wished to act

toward,

and (2) which action they

wished

to make, adding

or

subtracting

a fixed

number of points to or from the other's earn-

ings (one point equaled

one

cent). Neither

ac-

tion affected the actor's own points. Subjects

made their choices simultaneously,

without

knowledge

of

their

potential partners'

inten-

tions.

They

were informed of their partners'

choices

at

the end

of

each

exchange opportu-

nity. Subjects

could potentiallygain (or

lose)


10/22

STRUCTURE,

ACTION,

AND

OUTCOMES

435

points from

both of their

partners'actions

on

the same exchange

opportunity;

t is thatpossi-

bility that

makes an asymmetrical

exchange

of

rewards

beneficial

to the actor

who exchanges

less.

Because that actor

uses fewer opportuni-

ties to

act towardhis or her partner

or

a given

level of returns,

he or she has

more

chances to

enter nto

the

alternative

xchange

relationthat

can

provide

additional

rewards.

The Manipulation

of Structural

Power

Subjects

were randomly assigned

to different

conditions of structural

power

and to the

A or

B

position

of the relation.

Dimensions

of struc-

turalpower

-

averagerewardpower,average

punishment

power,

reward

power

imbalance,

and punishment power

imbalance

-

were

manipulated

by systematically

varying

the

numberof

points

that

subjects

could

add to

or

subtract

rom each other's earnings.

Subjects

were fully

informedaboutthe

point values that

they

and

their

two partners

ould exchange.

The operationaldefinitions

of dimensions

of

structural

power

correspond

o

the

conceptual

definitions

stated earlier:

A's reward

or

pun-

ishmentpower over B is equal to the total re-

wardor punishment

units (i.e., points)

that

B

can receive

from A's behavior, divided by

the

total

points

that

B

can receive

from both of

B's

potentialpartners

n the

exchange

network.

Each

subject

could

gain

a total

of

10

points

if both

partners

added to his or

her

points

on an

ex-

change opportunity,

r

lose

a

total of

10

points

if

bothpartners

ubtracted

romhis or her

points.

If,

for

example,

A

could

receive 8 cents

from

B

and

2

cents

from

SA1

on each

exchangeoppor-

tunity,

then A's reward

dependence

on B

(and

B 's

rewardpower

over A) was equal

to

8/(8+2),

or

.8,

and

A's reward

dependence

on SA1

was

.2. Punishment

power

was calculated

n

a com-

parable

way,

with

power

defined

by

the

num-

ber

of

points

that one actorcould

subtract

rom

another.

The

manipulated

values of structuralpower

in

the relationare derived

from these values

of

individualpower.

Each

of the five

experiments

variedtwo or more of the dimensionsof struc-

tural

power

while

holding

the others constant.

When

imbalanced,

reward power

always

fa-

vored actor

A. Punishment

power

also favored

actor A

when it

was

the sole source

of struc-

tural

imbalance.

When both reward

and

pun-

ishment power

were

imbalanced,

he direction

of

punishment

power

imbalance

was

also ma-

nipulated, so

that power

favored either

actor

A

or actor

B. For

this

analysis, the

actual

ratio

values

of average

power and

power

imbalance

are used; they

range

from

0 to .8.

The variables

are

operationally

defined as

follows:

Average

reward

power

=

[(A's

reward

power

over B)

+

(B's

reward

powerover

A)]/2

Average punishment

power

=

[(A's punishment

power

over B)

+

(B's

punishment

power

over

A)]/2

Rewardpower

imbalance

=

(A's

rewardpower

over

B)

-

(B's rewardpowerover A)

Punishmentpower

imbalance

avoring

A

=

(A's

punishment

power

over B)

-

(B's

punishment

power

over A)

when punishment

power

imbalance

avorsA;

otherwise 0.

Punishmentpower

imbalance

avoring

B

=

(B's

punishment

power

over

A)

-

(A's punishment

power

over

B)

when punishment

power

imbalance

avors

B;

otherwise

0.

Table

1

shows

the values

of these

five vari-

ables

in

the 29

conditions

of the five

experi-

ments.5

The

structural relations

of the simulated

ac-

tors to their partners

and

the

probabilities

of

their

programmed

behavior

were

identical

in

all conditions.

For analytical

purposes,

they

could be

treated as experimental

controls.

In all

conditions,

the power

relations

between each

subject

and the

SA

were balanced.

The simu-

lated

actors'

behavioral

choices

were

contin-

gent

on

the

prior

choices

of the real subjects

with

whom

they

were

paired;

in

general,

they

responded

in a tit-for-tat

fashion,

but at proba-

bilities less

than

1.0

to prevent

suspicion.

Ten exchange

networks

were run

in each

of

the

29 experimental

conditions.

A total of

580

subjects

participated

in

the

five

experiments,

with equal

numbers

of

male and

female sub-

jects

in each condition.

Only

same-sex

networks

were studied. Gender is of no theoretical inter-

S

The

ranges

of values

for

average

reward

power

and

averagepunishment

power

were constrainedby

the

manipulation

of

power

imbalance

in

the

same

experiments.

Very

high

or

very

low levels

of aver-

age power

permit

little

imbalance

n

power;

conse-

quently,

moderate

evels

of

average

power

were

used.


11/22

436

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

Table 1. Values of ManipulatedStructural

Power

Variablesby ExperimentalCondition

Punishment Punishment

Average Average Reward Power Power

Reward Punishment Power Imbalance Imbalance

Experiment/Condition Power Power Imbalance FavoringA FavoringB

Experiment

1

Condition

1

.6 .6 0 0

0

Condition

2

.6

.6

.4

0

0

Condition3 .6

.6

0

.4

0

Condition

4

.6 .6

.2 .2

0

Condition5 .6

.6 .4 0 .4

Experiment

Condition

1

.6 .9 0 0

0

Condition

2

.6

.3

0 0

0

Condition

3 .6 .9

.2 .2

0

Condition

4

.6

.3

.2

.2

0

Experiment

Condition

1

.6

.6 0

.8

0

Condition

2

.6 .6

.4

0 .8

Condition3 .6 .6

.4 .4

0

Condition

4 .6 .6

.4

.8

0

Experiment

Condition

1

.65 .65 .5

0

.5

Condition2 .65

.65

.5

.5

0

Condition

3 .35 .65 .5

0

.5

Condition

4

.35

.65

.5 .5

0

Condition5 .65

.35

.5

0 .5

Condition

6

.65

.35

.5

.5 0

Condition7 .35

.35

.5

0

.5

Condition

8

.35

.35 .5 .5 0

Experiment

Condition

1

.55

.35

.3

0

.5

Condition

2

.55

.35 .3 .5

0

Condition3 .55 .65

.3

0

.5

Condition

4

.55

.65

.3 .5

0

Condition

5

.55

.35

.7 0

.5

Condition6

.55 .35

.7 .5 0

Condition7

.55 .65

.7 0 .5

Condition8

.55 .65 .7

.5

0

All Conditions

X

.56

.54

.37

.24

.18

(s.d.) (.09) (.17) (.22) (.22) (.25)

est

in

this analysis

and was counterbalanced

or

controlpurposes.

Measures of Strategy

For each case,

a data set

consisting of 250 se-

quentiallyordered behaviorchoices made by

each

of the two

subjects

was recorded.

To

measurethe conditional

relationsbetween be-

haviorsof the

two actors, stimatesof how

much

each actor's behavior

choice is affected by

the

other actor's prior

behavior choice are com-

puted

across

all 250

exchange opportunitities

for

specific

combinations

of behaviors by

A

and B. On each exchange opportunity,each

actor could perform one

of

three behaviors

toward

the other

-

rewarding,punishing,

or

not acting (nonexchange).Thus, nine combina-

tions

of

behaviors by

two actors are

possible,

andmeasuresof

nine

separate trategies

or

each

of the two actors are computed.6

These measuresof strategywere obtainedby

an

innovative

techniquefor measuring agged

6

The

nine behaviorcombinations or the A-B re-

lation, representingone actor's behavior at time t

and the other actor's behavior at time t+1, are: re-

warding-rewarding,punishing-rewarding,nonex-


12/22

STRUCTURE,ACTION, AND OUTCOMES 437

dependencies n sequentialcategorical

data on

dyadic interaction suggested by

Allison and

Liker(1982). The estimated ogistic coefficient

for the lagged dependence of one

actor's be-

havior on the other's provides the desired in-

dex of the contingencyof that actor'sbehavior

on the other's behavior.Ratherthan the usual

use of regressionanalysis to test hypotheses, it

is used here to produce measuresof strategy

which serve as variables in subsequentanaly-

ses.7

A

series of logistic regressions

was calcu-

lated for each A-B dyad. One setregressedA's

behavior at time t on B's behavior

at time t-

1.

A

second set

regressed

B's

behavior] at time

t on A's behaviori at time t-1, where i andj

index the three

categories

of

behavior.

These

categorieswere transformed

nto indicator

vari-

ables

for the

analysis,

with the

category

of in-

terest

coded 1 and the

remaining

two

catego-

ries coded 0. Each

regression

controlled or the

dependent ariableactor'sown

behaviorat time

t- 1.

The

regressionscomputed

he

relations

or

up

to

5

lags,

but the effect of

one actor's behav-

ior on another'swas rarelysignificant

or

more

than one

lag. Therefore, he analyses reported

here are restricted o the lag

1results.8

The estimated logistic coefficient

for each

regression

s

the

natural

ogarithm

of

the odds

ratio and has a rangeof ?oo.

It is zero when the

two actors'behaviorsare

statistically ndepend-

ent.

A

positive

coefficient

indicates thata

prior

behavior

by

one actor increases

the likelihood

of a

subsequent

behavior

by

the other

actor;

a

negative

coefficient ndicates

a

decrease

n like-

lihood.9For some of the analyses, particularly

those involving punishment, the coefficient

estimates

are

based

on

too

few observations o

change-rewarding,ewarding-punishing,

unishing-

punishing,onexchange-punishing,

ewarding-non-

exchange,punishing-nonexchange,

onexchange-

nonexchange.

7Ordinarily,

he

use

of

logistic egression

ssumes

independencemong bservations.

n this

case,

the

lack of independencemongobservations

s

not

a

problem

because he

objective

s to measure he

degree

f

dependence

etween

bservations.

8TheprobabilityfA's behaviorattime , given

B's behavior at time t-1 and

controlling

or

A's

own behavior t time

t-1,

is estimated

y B2

in

the

followingogistic quation:

logit

[Pr(At

=

IIBt At

1]

=

60

+

B

At-

+

B2Bt-B

9

AllisonandLiker

1982)

recommend

sing

he

coefficient f a

logisticanalysis

s an indexof con-

tingencyprimarily

ecause

t

is

insensitive

o the

be reliable.

To give

greaterweightin the

analy-

sis

to the more reliable

estimates,

the logistic

coefficients

are divided by their

standarder-

rors.

These regressionsproducenine measures

of

strategy

or

each actor n the

A-B relation.

Two

relational

measures

werecreated

rom each

set

of measures

for the individual

actors:

average

strategy

strength, computed

by averaging

the

individual

measures

of strength

for the

two

actors,

and

strategy asymmetry,

computed by

subtracting

he

measure of the contingency

of

A's

behavior

on B's behavior

rom that

of B's

behavior

on A's

behavior. Greater strategy

asymmetry

ndicates

that

B

(the

actor who

is

disadvantagedn all rewardpowerimbalanced

relations)

is more

responsive to

A's behavior

than

the

reverse.

The mean strategyvalues

shown in Table

2

indicatethat

actors

tend to reciprocate

he be-

havior

of

the

other

actoron the previous

trial, a

tendency

that obviously

will

lead

to

symmetri-

cal exchange. Thus,

to

produce

the

predicted

outcome of

imbalanced structuralpower

-

asymmetrical

behavioralexchange

-

recipro-

cal

strategies

must

decrease andnonreciprocal

strategies ncrease.

Measuresof Exchange

Outcomes

Because actors

in the

experiments

exchange

resources

of

fixed value

without

negotiated

agreements,

exchange

outcomes

are measured

by

the

frequency

rather

than the

value of

ex-

change.

As

Thibaut and

Kelley (1959)

point

out,

a

more

powerful

actor

is

expected

to re-

ceive more frequentlythe benefits he or she

most values

from

the

other,

but these

values

will

not necessarily

be

higher

in

an absolute

sense.

The

frequency

of each

actor's rewarding

or

punishing

behavior

toward

the other

is meas-

uredas a proportion

f the total

(250)

exchange

opportunities;

.g.,

A's

rewarding

=

(frequency

of A's rewards

o

B)/250.

Measuresof the

av-

erage requency

nd

he

asymmetry

n

frequency

of

reward

and

punishment

exchange

are de-

rived fromthesemeasures:

Average

eward xchange

[(A's

rewarding) (B's

rewarding)]/2

distribution

f

marginal

otals.

Thus,

he

variation

across

dyads

andacross

behavioral

ategories

n

the

number

f observations

ill

not affect he

measures

of

contingencies

etween ehaviors.


13/22

438

AMERICAN

SOCIOLOGICAL

REVIEW

Average

punishment xchange

=

[(A's

punishing)

+

(B's punishing)]/2

Rewardexchange

asymmetry

=

(B's

rewarding) (A's rewarding)

Punishment xchange asymmetry=

(A's

punishment) (B's

punishment)

In

all conditions,

positive values of exchange

asymmetry ndicate that

asymmetry

avors

A,

the

actor

with

greaterreward

power

in

all con-

ditions with

imbalancedrewardpower. Aver-

age exchange can

range from 0 to

1

and ex-

change asymmetry

rom

-I

to

+1.

Means

and standard eviations or these

vari-

ables

are

shown

in

Table 3. The

average

fre-

quencyof punishment,andhence its asymme-

try, are

very low.

Because of

the

relativelylow

mean

proportions of

several

of

the

outcome

variables,

he

arcsine ransformationsf all four

are

used for the

analyses.10

RESULTS

Ordinary least

squares regression is used to

examine the effects of

structural ower

on ex-

change

outcomes and

strategic

action,

and the

effectsof strategicactionon outcomes.The unit

of

analysis

is

the

A-B

relation,

not the

individ-

ual;

all

analyses

are

based on 290

dyads.

Each

of the

two levels of

power,

structure

and ac-

tion,

is

measured

by

a set

of

variables

repre-

senting

he

dimensions

of

base,

asymmetry,

and

average strength.Theoretically,

we are

inter-

ested in

the effects of

each set

of variables on

the

exchange outcomes and

the

effects of the

individual

dimensions of

power

within those

sets.

Estimating he direct and indirect effects of

structural

power as

a

set of

variables

poses

special

problems.

Sets

of

variablesdo not lend

themselves to

traditional

path analyticalproce-

dures.

Instead, the sets of

structural nd

strat-

egy

variables are

entered

in

separate

steps

of

hierarchical

regression

analyses (Cohen

and

Cohen

1983). By comparing

differences

in

R2,

the

variance

explained by structure

and strat-

egy

is

partitioned

nto

three components:

(1)

the varianceexplaineduniquely by structure,

(2)

the

variance

explained

uniquely by

strat-

egy,

and

(3)

the

sharedvariance.

Because

struc-

tural

power

is

causally prior

o

strategicaction,

Table

2.

Means

and

StandardDeviations

orPowerStrate-

gies (N

=

290)

Dyadic

Dyadic

Averageb Asymmetryc

Mean Mean

Strategiesa

(S.D.) (S.D.)

RewardStrategies:

RIR

3.00

1.21

(1.77)

(3.01)

RIN

-2.82 -1.16

(1.68) (2.89)

RIP

-.24

-.30

(.88)

(1.60)

NonexchangeStrategies:

NIR -2.38 -1.08

(1.75)

(3.05)

NIN

2.66

1.06

(1.64)

(2.94)

NIP -.35

.37

(.84)

(1.52)

Punishment

Strategies:

PIR

-.58 .06

(.80)

(1.22)

PIN .21

-.01

(.86)

(1.79)

PIP 1.11 -.12

(1.38)

(-1.70)

a

ilj

=

the

contingency

of behavior on the

prior

occurrence

of behavior

,

where

i and

j

=

R

(reward),

N

(nonexchange),

and

P

(punishment)by

each of the two

actors

b

[(A'silj)+(B'silj)]/2

c

(B's

iV)-(A's

ilV)

the shared variance can be attributed o the

indirecteffect

of

structure

hrough

action.

Thus,

comparing

R2 or the

effects of structural

ower

with and without

strategic

action in

the

equa-

tion

provides

an estimate

of the

relative

strength

of the direct and indirecteffects of

structure.

Structural

Power and

Exchange

Outcomes

To

assess

the

overallrelationbetween

structure

and

outcomes,

each of

the four

exchange

out-

comes is regressedon the five structural ower

variables.These

results are

reported

n

the col-

umns of Table

4

labeled Model I. A second set

of

regressions (labeled

Model

II)

estimatesthe

same effects

after

first

controlling

for the full

set of 18

strategy

variables.

The coefficients

0

The

formula used

for the arcsine transforma-

tion of

variable X is

2(arcsine SIX) Cohen and Co-

hen

1983). These analyses were also conducted control-


14/22

STRUCTURE,ACTION, AND

OUTCOMES

439

for the variables

in

Model

II

represent he

di-

rect effects of dimensions

of structuralpower

as proposed

in

hypotheses 1

and 1A. Differ-

ences

between thecoefficients in Models I

and

II representthe indirect effects of structural

power through

ts

strategic

use

as

proposed

n

hypotheses

2

and 2A. The

direct and

indirect

effects of

the full set of structural ariables

can

be estimated,

respectively,

from the net R2 in

Model

II

(the

variance

explained uniquely

by

structure),

nd from the

difference

between the

total R2 n Model I and

the net

R2

n

Model II.

The R2

values show thatstructural ower

has

both

direct and indirect effects on

exchange

outcomes,

but as

predicted

by hypotheses

1A

and 2A, the relative strengthsof these effects

vary with the base of

power. In Models I and

II,

the variance

explained by structural

power

is

much greater for reward

exchange outcomes

than

or

punishmentoutcomes,

and more

of the

structural

ariables

have

significant

effects on

reward

xchange

hanon

punishment

xchange.

As predicted

by hypothesis

1A,

the net

R2val-

ues show that structural

power

has direct ef-

fects

only

on reward

exchange.

The effects of

structural

ower

on

punishmentexchange

are

reduced virtually to zero once strategies are

controlled. Because the total

effects of

struc-

ture on

punishmentexchange

are so

small,

however,

the issue of whether

hey

are direct

or

indirect

s

less

important.

Somewhat

unexpectedly, hypothesis

2

is

supported

only

for

average

reward

exchange.

Indirect ffects of

structural

ower

on the

other

three

exchange

outcomes are

negligible.

Thus,

the differenteffects for

reward

and

punishment

exchangepredictedby hypothesis2A areonly

partially

observed. The direct and

indirect

ef-

fects of structural

power

on

average

reward

exchange

are

roughly equal

in

magnitude.The

pattern

of effects

for the

asymmetry

of reward

exchange

is

quite

different, suggesting

some

suppression

of

structuraleffects

by

strategy

rather hanmediation.The R2 or the

structural

variables

changes only

slightly

when the strat-

egy

variablesare

added,

and some coefficients

increasewhen

strategy

effects are controlled.

Turning o the relationsbetween the individ-

ual

dimensions

of

structure nd

outcomes,

the

effects of structural

ower

on

average

reward

Table 3. Means and Standard

Deviations for Exchange

Outcomes(N

=

290)

Mean

Exchange Outcomes (S.D.)

RewardExchange:

Average rewarding .42

(.18)

Rewardasymmetry

.14

(.12)

PunishmentExchange:

Average punishment

.04

(.04)

Punishment

asymmetry

-.01

(.06)

exchange provide strong support

for the

con-

ceptual equivalence

of reward

and

punishment

power

as

sources of

dependence.As the coeffi-

cients

in

the first two columns of Table

4

show,

comparable

dimensions of reward

and

punish-

ment power affect average

rewardexchange in

the same

direction,although

the effects of re-

ward

power are stronger,as expected.

Reward

exchange

increases

with the mutual

depend-

ence

(averagepower)of

actors on one

another

for either ewards r

punishments,

nddecreases

with the imbalanceof either rewardor

punish-

ment power that favors actor A. Punishment

power

imbalance

favoring

B has no effect on

rewardexchange.

The similar effects of structural eward

and

punishmentpower

on

average

reward

xchange

do not extend

to the

asymmetry

of

rewardex-

change (the

next two

columns). Rewvard

x-

change asymmetry,

he

traditionalmeasure of

power use, is affected only by structuralre-

ward

power.

The results

support

the

classical

prediction

that reward exchange asymmetry

increaseswith

rewardpower

mbalanceandalso

show that it

increases

with

average

reward

power.

This

latter effect most

likely

occurs

because

average

reward

power

of .5 or

greater

is

a

necessary

condition

for social

exchange

(Michaels

and

Wiggins 1976).

As

average

reward

power decreases,

reward

exchange

be-

comes less

profitable

or both

actors and even-

tuallyeven asymmetrical ewardexchangewill

cease. Punishment

power

imbalance

favoring

actor

B

tends to counter the effects

of A's re-

ward

power advantage,

but

the effect is

weak

and falls short of

significance.'2

ling for only those strategyvariables

hat had statis-

tically significantrelationswith either

the structural

powervariables rthe outcomemeasure.Both

analy-

ses produced he same results.

12

Punishmentpower

imbalancefavoring

actor B

significantly

reduces A's reward

power advantage


15/22

440

AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

Table 4. Unstandardized

Coefficients for Regressions of Exchange Outcomes

on

Structural

Power

(N

=

290)

Reward

Exchange

Punishment

Exchange

Average Asymmetry

Average Asymmetry

Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model

StructuralPower I II I II I II I II

Average reward 2.06*** 1.84*** .71* .80*** .23

.08 -.18 -.05

Average punishment

.26** .21 -.04 -.07 -.06 -.12** .06 -.04

Reward mbalance

-.70*** -.52*** .72***

.72*** .01

-.02

-.22**

-.11

Punishment mbalance -.22* -.24** .03 .02 .18** .06 -.04

-.09

favoring A

Punishment mbalance

.03 -.03 -.12 -.04

.26*** .07

-.11

-.09

favoring B

F/F change 58.25*** 36.61*** 25.27*** 25.07*** 4.22*** 2.19 3.57** 1.31

Total

R2 .51 .58 .31 .45 .07

.68

.06 .35

Net

R2

----

.29

----

.26

----

.01

----

.02

*p

Power Social Exchange

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