Heirs of Roman Soriano v CA Parties:HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.Facts: Adriano Soriano originally owned a 24,550 square meter land in Pangasinan. Such property was leased to Spouses de Vera for 15 years and Adrianos son, Roman was caretaker thereof. When Adriano died, his heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement which subdivided the land into two lots: Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Spouses Abalos acquired Lot 60052 (sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia) and of Lot/ 8459 (sold by Elocadio, Francisca and Librada). In 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker. Roman then filed a case with the agrarian court for reinstatement and reliquidation; however, the agrarian court approved his ejectment. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, agrarian courts decision was reversed. But prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. The agrarian court approved such agreement. In 1976, Spouses Abalos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459. The trial court granted their application. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for review filed with the Supreme Court by Roman Soriano, it was denied for lack of merit. On July 15, 1983, Roman filed with the RTC an action for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 159568. Spouses Abalos moved to dismiss on the grounds of red judicata among others but was denied. In 1984, 11 years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera, Spouses Abalos (substituting Spouses de Vera) filed with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. Roman moved to suspend but was denied. Roman filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985 and he was represented by his heirs. Civil Case No. 159568 was amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-defendant for having purchased part of the property from Spouses Abalos. But the amended complaint was dismissed as such altered the cause of action. Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and Spouses Abalos were ordered to file their Answer. Spouses filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A. GR SP No. 22149. Court of Appeals denied Romans petition for certiorari. His heirs then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. 93401. In 1990, the Court of Appeals also denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Spouses Abalos, ruling the land registration court did not err to refuse the rule of res judicata. Spouses Abalos then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. 99843. In 1991, the Supreme Court held in G.R. 93401to grant the petition filed by the Heirs of Roman. On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the denial of the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149,and consequently, Civil Case No. 15958for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered dismissed. On October 18, 1993, Heirs of Roman filed with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication BoardDARAB cases for Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction. The decision of the land registration court was partially executed: Lot No. 8459-A assigned to Heirs of Roman, and Lots No. 60052 and 8459-B assigned to Spouses Abalos. Heirs of Roman appealed to CA. CA affirmed the partition but reversed order directing the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15958. On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99843, dismissed Civil Case No. 15958. Spouses Abalos then moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. However, said motion was held in abeyance until and after DARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer for status quo, has been resolved.

Issue: Whether Spouses Abalos having won the land registration case can effectively eject Heirs of Roman who are possessors thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latters occupancy was unlawful.While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed by Heirs of Roman before the DARAB. Although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. However, the status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject propertyPossession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.PETITION GRANTEDDBP v CA G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999Parties:DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES TIMOTEO and SELFIDA S. PIEDA, respondents.Facts: Spouses Pieda are the registered owners of a 238,406 square meter land in Capiz. On March 7, 1972, they mortgaged it to DBP to secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00. They failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage. DBP extrajudicially foreclosed on February 2, 1977, as the highest bidder, the Sheriff Certificate of Sale was executed in its favor. Such certificate contained the following provision: This property is sold subject to the redemption within five (5) years from the date of registration of this instrument and in the manner provided for by law applicable to this case On April 25, 1977, the certificate of sale was registered in the Register of Deeds of Capiz and on March 10, 1978, DBP consolidated its title over the foreclosed property by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. A Final Deed of Sale was executed in favour of DBP and it took possession of the foreclosed property and appropriated the produce thereof. On July 5, 1978, the Ministry of Justice issued Opinion No. 92 which declared that lands covered by P.D. No. 27, including present subject property, may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings. The spouses then offered to redeem the foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 which was accepted by DBP. On November 11, 1981, DBP sent the spouses a letter informing them that pursuant to P.D. 27they cannot repurchase the property because it was tenanted. However, Ramon Buenaflor, acting for DBP sent a letter to the Register of Deeds to cancel the title issued in the name of DCP and reissue such in the name of the spouses. They were advised by the Registry to file a petition in court which DBP did. In 1982, the court declared the foreclosure and sale null and void and the title of the spouses was revived. On December 21, 1981, Spouses Pieda filed complaint against DBP for cancellation of certificate of title and/or specific performance contending that DBP, in evident bad faith, caused the consolidation of its title to the parcel of land in question in spite of the fact that the 5-year redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to redeem the foreclosed property was made well within said period of redemption. The RTC ruled in favour of the spouses. Upon DBPs appeal to CA, CA affirmed RTC decision.

Issue: Was DBP in bad faith when it took possession of the disputed lot?Ruling:No. The Supreme Court held that DBP was not in bad faith. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. It was therefore incumbent on the spouses to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title (i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure). This, they failed to do.The spouses contention that DBPs bad faith stems from the fact that DBP consolidated title over the disputed property despite the statement in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale to the effect that said land was subject to a five year redemption period is wrong. The period of redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed land is provided under Section 6 of ACT No. 3135 which provides for one year. Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.If no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is entitled as a matter of right to consolidate and to possess the property. Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract between DBP and the spouses where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and to hold possession of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore be tainted with bad faith.The Supreme Court further held that without the act of DBP consolidating title in its name, the spouses would not be able to assert their right to repurchase granted under the aforementioned section. In the case of Maneclang vs. Baun, the Court held that when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it held the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor ceases when an action to recover possession of the property is filed against him and he is served summons therefore. In the present case, DBP was served summons on June 30, 1982. By that time, it was no longer in possession of the disputed land as possession thereof was given back to the spouses after the foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. Therefore, any income collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the property on May 30, 1978 up to February 22, 1982 belongs to DBP as a possessor in good faith since its possession was never legally interrupted.PETITION GRANTEDSomodio v CA G.R. No. 82680 August 15, 1994Parties:NICANOR SOMODIO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA, and FELOMINO AYCO, respondents

Facts: On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas conveyed to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential lot in General Santos City. Nicanor Somodio paid one-half of the purchase price. Thus, Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half undivided portion. The land was partitioned into two portions, Somodio took the western part. Immediately after the partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees. In 1976, Somodio began constructing a structure on his lot. It was however left unfinished when he went to North Cotabato. In October 1977, Somodio allowed Felomino Ayco to transfer the latters hut to the lot in question. Six years later, Somodio demanded that Ayco vacate the premises. On August 23, 1983, Somodio filed an action for unlawful detainer against Ayco at the MTC. On June 26, 1983, Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. 4 days later, Somodio, in the same court, filed against Purisima a complaint for forcible entry. These two cases were consolidated. Purisima contended that the lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of Lands. The lot was actually a gift to his father, a geodetic engineer for having surveyed the parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc. Ayco anchored his right to possess on Purisimas evidence. On April 30, 1986, the trial court ruled in favour of Somodio and ordered Ayco and Purisima to remove their respective houses, to deliver the land. RTC affirmed in toto decision of MTC. However, upon appeal to the CA, CA reversed RTC decision.

Issue: Who had the prior possession of the land in question and thus have better rights?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Nicanor Somodio had the better right to possess. Somodio took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.

Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

The Supreme Court noted that priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession. Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. Even if Purisima's father surveyed the property of help to his cause or Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the services of his father and that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean that Purisima himself had prior possession.

Prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right of ownership over the same. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION REVERSED

Equatorial Realty Development v Mayfair Theater G.R. No. 133879. November 21, 2001Parties:EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC, petitioner, vs. MAYFAIR THEATER, INC., respondent

Facts: Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. (Carmelo) owned a parcel of land with two 2-storey buildings constructed thereon at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. Carmelo entered into two contracts of lease with Mayfair Theater both for a period of 20 years and had provisions regarding right of first refusal (it must be initially offered to Mayfair before other purchasers) to purchase properties. First, on June 1, 1967with 1,610 square meters of floor area which became the Maxim Theater and second, on March 31, 1969 with 1,064 square meters and 300 square meters which became the Miramar Theater. On July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. (Equatorial) for P11,300,000 without being initially offered to Mayfair. Mayfair filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. The RTC ruled in favour of Carmelo and Equitorial. Upon appeal to the CA, CA completely reversed and set aside RTC decision. On April 25, 1997, Mayfair filed a Motion for Execution, which the trial court granted. However, Carmelo could no longer be located. Upon payment of P11,300,000 with the clerk of court and issuance of deeds of reconveyance and sale, the certificate of title was issued in the name of Mayfair. On September 18, 1997, Equatorial filed with the RTC an action for the collection of a sum of money against Mayfair. Equatorial wanted to claim rentals or reasonable compensation for the Mayfairs use of the subject premises after its lease contracts had expired from 1987 and 1989 respectively. RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the subject Deed of Absolute Sale having been rescinded by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 106063, Equatorial is not the owner and does not have any right to demand backr entals from the subject property. Such was subjected to res judicata of the previous mother case.

Issue: Is Equatorial is entitled to back rentals?

Ruling: No. Equatorial is not entitled to back rentals.

The Supreme Court held that no right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period. Ownership of the thing sold is a real right which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. In the present case, it is clear that petitioner never took actual control and possession of the property sold.

Also, the Court citing Vda de Sarmiento v Lesaca held that, the possession referred to in the contract evidently refers to actual possession and not merely symbolical inferable from the mere execution of the document As provided in Article 1462, the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and possession thereof, which situation does not here obtain because from the execution of the sale up to the present the vendee was never able to take possession of the lands. The execution of a public instrument gives rise, therefore, only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the instrument itself expresses or implies that delivery was not intended; or when by other means it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a third person was actually in possession of the thing. In the latter case, the sale cannot be considered consummated. Mayfairs opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the property into the latters hands.

The Supreme Court noted that it may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil Code, Equatorial as buyer acquired a right to the fruits of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to petitioner arose. However, Article 1385 of the Civil Code provides: Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest; x x x. Not only the land and building sold, but also the rental payments paid, if any, had to be returned by the buyer.

Also, it is to be emphasized that the fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso facto recognition of Equatorials title. They were made merely to avoid imminent eviction since there were already two ejectment suits against Mayfair.

Even assuming arguendo that there was valid delivery, Equatorial still is not entitled to any benefits from the rescinded Deed of Absolute Sale because of its bad faith. The contract of sale between Equatorial and Carmelo was knowingly entered into in violation of the rights of and to the prejudice of Mayfair. Equatorial even admitted that its lawyers had studied the contract of lease prior to the sale. Equatorials knowledge of the stipulations therein should have cautioned it to look further into the agreement to determine if it involved stipulations that would prejudice its own interests.

PETITION DENIED

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San Miguel Corporation who purchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying its application for registration of the said land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto.The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that the land in question is part of public domain and that petitioner being a private corporation is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain. In this case, petitioner claims that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land in question based on documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts, and testimonial evidence of vendor Silverio Perez.ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that petitioner and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over Lot 684.HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land but mere indicia of a claim of ownership. They only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. Also, the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez as proof of actual possession is weak and was not corroborated by other witnesses.

Ignacio Wong v Carpio

203 SCRA 118 Civil Law Property Possession; cant be recognized in two personsEjectment Force, Intimidation, Threat, Strategy, or StealthIn 1972, apacto de retrosale was executed by William Giger in favor of Manuel Mercado. Giger failed to repurchase the land within the agreed period hence Mercado was able to consolidate the title unto himself and the sale was notarized in 1973. Since then, Mercado paid the taxes on the land and he would periodically go to the said parcel of land and gather coconut products for his business.However, in July 1976, Giger again sold the same land to Ignacio Wong. Giger then delivered the title of the land to Wong. In August 1976, Wong started deploying his laborers to the said farmland; he built a farmhouse thereon; he fenced the boundary; and he also put up a signboard which indicates that the land is his.In September 1976, Mercado learned of the presence of Wong within the disputed land. In November 1976, Mercado filed an ejectment case (forcible entry) against Wong.In his defense, Wong insists that a forcible entry case is not proper because, in possessing the land, he never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; that he entered the said land without issue after he purchased the same from Giger.The trial court agreed with Wong as it ruled that Wong had a better title because it was he who hadprior, actual and continuous physical possession of the disputed property as opposed to Mercados only acts of going to said land periodically.On appeal, Judge Lucas Carpio reversed the decision of the municipal trial court in the ejectment case.ISSUE:Whether or not Wong has a better title over the disputed property.HELD:No. Mercado had prior possession. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary.In this case, the notarized sale made by Giger in favor of Mercado transferred the possession of said land from Giger to Mercado.The second sale made by Giger to Wong did not transfer possession to Wong because in the first place, by that time, Giger is not in possession of the land anymore. Further, possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession, which is not the case here.Anent the argument of Wong that he never acted withforce, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS), the Supreme Court held thatif a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.The Supreme Court also noted the rules regarding questions regarding the fact of possession:a. Present possessor shall be preferred;b. If there are two (or more) current possessors, the one longer in possession is preferred;c. If possessors acquired possession at the same time; the possessor who can present a title is preferred;d. If all possessors present the foregoing conditions equally, then the property in question shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOTG.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000. Kapunan, J.DOCTRINE: Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party.FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that they are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639 which was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted.Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying rentals therefore. They likewise built houses on their corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and that the respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon bypetitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heardto question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents' possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of anowner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Petition was granted.

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIOv. HONORATA BOLANTEG.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000. Panganiban, J.DOCTRINE: For all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted is still deemed to be the legal possessor.FACTS: Before 1954, the land in question was originally declared for tax purposes under the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were daughters of Margarito Mendoza. The tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled, and subsequently placed the tax declaration under the name of Margarito. The respondent was the occupant of that land. During the cadastral survey of the land, the brother of petitioner and Honorata had a dispute over the ownership of the property. The trial court said that petitioners are the lawful owner of the property. However, in a turn of events, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with the respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Art. 538 of the Civil Code.ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, Honorata had a better right over the propertyHELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Art. 538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. The petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Art 536 of the Civil Code. We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possessionbecause possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot. Possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mt. Province vs- CA, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and Juan Valdez || G.R. No. 80294-95, Sept. 21, 1988 Facts: The documents and records presented reveal that the whole controversy started when petitioner VICAR filed with CFI-Baguio an application for registration of title over four lots found in La Trinidad, Benguet. The lots were the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gym and dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The private respondents (HEIRS) filed their opposition, asserting ownership and title thereto. The Land Registration confirmed the registration of the lots. Heirs (ang kay Octaviano and Valdez) appealed the decision of the land registration court to CA. CA reversed the decision, dismissed Vicars application. The Heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, praying for the CA to order the registration of the 3rd lot in the names of the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano; eight days later, the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez filed their motion for consideration, praying that lots 2 and 3 be registered under their name. This was denied by the CA, on the grounds that there was no sufficient merit to justify the reconsideration one way or another. They also denied Octaviano heirs reconsideration. The SC denied both minute resolution of Vicar and Heirs for lack of merit. Upon the finality, the Octaviano Heirs filed with CFI-Baguio a Motion For Execution of Judgment, praying that they be placed in possession of Lot 3. The Court denied the motion. Octaviano heirs presented their witness, Fructuoso Valdez, who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio, and his written demand to Vicar for the return of land to them. Vicar countered that the land in question was not covered by any title in Egmidios name, and that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3 for 75 days continuously and peacefully. ISSUE: Who is entitled to the ownership of the lots in question?HELD: It was not positively declared by the CA that the private respondents were the owners of the land, neither was it declared that they were not owners of the land, but it held that the predecessors of private respondents were possessors of Lots 2 and 3, with claim of ownership in good faith from 1906-1951. Vicar was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes. When Vicar applied for registration over the lots in 1962, it has been in possession in concept of owner for only 11 years. While ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for 10 years, it is always with just title extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. The findings of the CA may no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res judicata shall open the door to endless litigation over the same issues. Art. 555 of the NCC provides that a possessor may lose his possession by possession of another, subject to the provisions of Art. 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one year. But the right of real possession is not lost until after the lapse of 10 years. Vicar has not met the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over the lots, nor did it satisfy the 10 year requirement for ordinary acquisitive prescription because it lacked the title. The private respondents have Free Patent Application for those lots since 1906, and the predecessors have been in possession of the questioned lots since then. The bailees failure to return the subject matter of the commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession, since they are holding the property in trust for the bailor. The adverse claim only arose in 1951, when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez vs- Manuel de Guzman and Max B. Solis, GR No L-28721, Oct. 5, 1928Facts: Leandra Solis and her husband Bernardo brought an action in the CFI-Tayabas against Mendoza for the recovery of a certain piece of land. The Court ruled in favor of Mendoza, which was subsequently affirmed by the SC. When the case was remanded to the lower court, the judge issued an order requiring the provincial sheriff to immediately dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction and put Mendoza in possession of the land. In the cadastral proceedings in Tayabas, the piece of land in question was adjudicated in favor of petitioners in equal parts, pro indiviso, subject to the right of retention of the part of Manuel de Guzman (respondent) until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements on the land. The spouses and de Guzman were ejected from the land when Mendoza acquired possession of such. Since they were unable to agree upon the amount for the improvements, petitioners requested the court to fix the value of the improvements and require the defendant to render an accounting of the fruits, plus decree the restitution of the possession to the plaintiffs. Defendant filed a general denial. During the pendency, Bernardo (known as Max B. Solis) asked leave to intervene, alleging that De Guzman has transferred all his rights in the improvement and in the lot to him, except for two coconut trees. This petition was granted by the Court. ISSUES: (1) The amount of the indemnity to be paid by the defendant for the improvements made by him on the said lot and the basis upon which said amount shall be fixed;(2) WON the defendant is obliged to render an account of the fruits received by him from June 1924 until the improvements are delivered after same have been paid for; (3) Whether the value of the said fruits and products received by defendant shall be applied to the indemnity to which he is entitled, or whether said defendant is obliged to deliver to the plaintiffs the remainder in case of excess; (4) WON the defendant has the right to be paid by the plaintiffs in whole or in part for the value of the fruits received by petitioners from the respective dates that they were in possession and enjoyment of the land. HELD:(1) In accordance with the provisions of Art. 435 and 454 in relation with Art. 361, the value of indemnization to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him when he introduced it to the plantation in question; [TC held that defendants have the right to collect P2,046 as compensation from the plaintiffs. 20% to de Guzman and 80% to Solis](2) The plaintiffs (petitioners), as owners of the property, shall have the right to make their own demands upon payment in the form indicated in number (1), the defendant having the right to retain the land until expenditures have been refunded; [De Guzman and Solis are obliged to pay petitioners the sum of P666.93 per annum, 1/5 for de Guzman and 4/5 by Solis] (3) Defendant is obliged to render a detail and just account of fruits and profits received by him from the property for their due application; (4) The value of the fruits received by the defendant should first be applied to the payment of the indemnizacion, and in that it exceeds the value of such, the excess shall be returned to the plaintiffs. The Court did not make any pronouncement as to whether or not the plaintiffs are obliged to return to the defendant the value of the fruits received by them before the defendant took possession of the land.It was further deemed that indemnizacion, whether it means compensation or indemnity, the amount is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in Art 453 and 454 of NCC, which are the necessary and useful expenditures that was incurred by defendants. SC concurred with the decision of the RTC.Evarista Robles + Enrique Martin (husband) vs Lizarraga Hermanos | GR No. L-16736, Dec. 22, 1921 Sociedad Lizarraga Hermanos v. Evarista Robles de Martin + Enrique Martin | GR No. L-16661 Dec. 22, 1921Evarista Robles + Enrique Martin vs Lizarraga Hermanos & Reg. of Deeds, Iloilo | GR No L-16662 Dec 22 1921Facts: Anastacia de la Rama died and left behind 6 children: Magdalena, Jose, Evarista, Zacarias, Felix and Purificacion Robles. She also left some properties, among which is the house on Iznart St., Iloilo, which is the object of the controversy of the three cases. The children and heirs of Anastacia entered into a partnership with Lizarraga Hermanos in liquidation and settlement of their accounts. The Court awarded to the partnership the properties left by the deceased, including the disputed house. Evarista, one of the heirs, has been occupying the house with her husband Enrique by the permission of her mothers and consent of the co-heirs [after mothers death] and lastly by agreement with the partnership. Lizarraga notified Evarista that beginning April, the rent of the upper story of the house shall be raised to P60, and if she did not agree with it, she will vacate the house. Evarista refused, thus Lizarraga brought an ejectment suit against her. Evarista, in turn, sued Lizarraga to recover the value of the improvements, and in another action, that said value be noted on the certificate of title as an encumbrance. Evarista contends that the understanding with Lizarraga by virtue of which she continued to occupy the house and make improvements was a contract whereby it was agreed to sell her the house, the deed of sale to be executed as soon as the title deeds of the property were transferred to the name of the partnership. It was by virtue of the contract that she remained in the occupation of the building, and that in one of the stipulations of the contract of sale, Evarista assumed the liability of P14,000 on the estate and another in favor of the Agricultural Bank and its successor, National Bank, paying the interest thereon as well as the tax and premiums of 5 insurance, all of which payments were made through the same firm of Lizarraga, who, as a result of the liquidation of accounts, held funds in their possession. Evarista does not seek the execution of the proper instrument of evidence this constract of sale, nor the performance thereof she only claims the cost of the improvements made at her expense, and that this be recorded in the corresponding certificate of title. Lizarraga denies that she entered into an agreement with Evarista concerning the sale of the building. However, the Court found that the verbal contract was proven by evidences in the exhibits and oral evidence.Issues: WON Evarista is the owner of aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand payment of their value;Art. 453 of the NCC states that necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him. This applied to personal and real property the expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to stand just as before, but they were USEFUL, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for which it is intended. On the question of Evaristas good faith, Lizarraga did not allege nor prove that Evaristas possession was in bad faith, for she began to occupy by permission of the previous owner, and continued to occupy with consent among the parties involved. The improvements were only created after the agreement of sale. (Please note that the issue of the other cases is: WON Evarista has the right to retain possession of the house until she is indemnified for such improvements the ruling of the Court was not connected to it, indi ko gets ngaa lease ila na wakal so please read na lang kay basi wrong info pa di mabutang ko | Second, Should her payment of improvements be cited in the TCT?)Jose B. Aznar vs Rafael Yapdiangco and Teodoro Santos | GR No. L-18536, Mar. 31, 1965 Facts: May 1959 Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. On May 28, 1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming to be a nephew of Vicente Marella (who dafuq is this) went to the Santos residence to answer the ad. Santos was out, so his son Ireneo received and talked with De Dios. The latter told the young Santos that he had come in behalf of his uncle Marella, who was interested to buy the car. When Irineo told Santos, the latter instructed his son to see Marella the following day at his given address. Thus, Irineo met with Marella, who agreed to buy the car for P14,700 on the understanding that the price shall be paid after it is registered in his name. Santos and De Dios went to the office of Atty Padolina, where the deed of sale was executed in Marellas favor. They proceeded to the Motor Vehicles Office in Quezon City to effect the registration. Note that the price has not been paid yet. Santos returned to his house and gave the registration papers and a copy of the deed of sale to Ireneo, with strict instructions that he shall not part with it until Marella has paid the full price. Irineo, together with De Dios, proceeded to Marellas residence wherein the latter lacked P2,000 and begged off to be allowed to secure the shortage from his sister who lived nearby. Marella managed to secure the registration papers and the deed of sale by telling Irineo that he just wanted to show it to his lawyer. Irineo agreed, and they, as well as an unidentified third person, proceeded to Marellas sisters house. De Dios asked Irineo to wait at the sala, and was never seen again. Irineo discovered that they all left him, and when returned to De Dioss house, only to be told that no such man lived there. He also returned to Marellas house, and nobody was there. He returned home to his father, who promptly told him to go to the police authorities. Marella was able to sell the car to Jose Aznar on the same day for P15,000. Aznar acquired the car in good faith, for valuable consideration and without notice of the defect appertaining to vendors title. When Aznar tried to register the car, it was seized by agents of the Philippine Constabulary on the report of Santos. Aznar filed a complaint for replevin against Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco, the head of the unit responsible for seizing the car in question. Teodoro Santos was allowed to intervene by lower court. TC: awarded motor vehicle to Teodoro Santos; the basis of which is Art. 559 of the NCCISSUE: Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of the car?Held: Teodoro Santos. Aznar accepts that the car in question originally belonged to and was owned by Santos, and that the latter was unlawfully deprived of the same by Vicente Marella. However, he contends that upon the facts of the case, the applicable provision was Art. 1506, and not Art. 559. The SC held that this was unmeritorious, since it is required that in 1506, the seller should have a voidable at least in this case, the seller had no title at all. The car in question was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of contract. Marella obtained the car through theft. Common law principle also states that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, does not apply in a case where it is covered by an express provision of the NCC. Between common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs CA and City of Dagupan | GR No L-54526, Aug. 25, 1986 Facts: The City of Dagupan (referred to as City) filed a complaint against Nawasa (now Metropolitan Waterworks sewerage system called Nawasa na lang) for the recovery of ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. Nawasa imposed the special defense of RA 1383, vesting upon it ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines, and counterclaimed that it must be reimbursed P255,000 for necessary and useful improvements. TC rendered judgment in favor of City, finding Nawasa to be a possessor in bad faith, thus not entitled to indemnities. Issue: (1) WON MWSS/Nawasa has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by Nawasa to the Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that Nawasa was found to be a possessor in bad faith? (2) Do the provisions of Art. 546, 547, 549 of the NCC settle the question of whether a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvementsHeld: NO. Art 449 of the NCC states that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. As builder in bad faith, Nawasa lost whatever useful improvements it has made without right to indemnity. Art. 546 states that only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with right of retention until reimbursed and that Art. 547 states that only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements IF this can be done without damage to principal thing and the person who recovers does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements done for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession.

JOSE R. CRUZ,plaintiff-appellant,vs.REYNALDO PAHATI, ET AL.,defendants-appellees*Application of Article 559*Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.Facts:This is a case which involves a conflict of rights of two persons who claim to be the owners of the same property Jesusito Belizo is engaged in buying and selling second hand cars Jose Cruz has purchased from Belizo the subject car, a year after, in the pretext that Belizo has a buyer he was able to convince Cruz to sell the car. At that time, plaintiff's certificate of registration was missing and, upon the suggestion of Belizo, plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to the Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for the issuance of a new registration certificate alleging as reason the loss of the one previously issued to him and stating that he was intending to sell his car. This letter was falsified by Belizo who turned it into an authorized deed of sale in favor of himself. Using the falsified deed, he was able to register the car in his name. Belizo then sold the car to Bulahan who in turn sold the car to Pahati a second hand car dealer. Lower Court held that Bulahan and Cruz are both buyers in good faith and are victims of fraud devised by BelizoIssue:Who has the better right to the said car?Holding:Cruz has the better rightThe law applicable to the case is Article 559 of the new Civil Code which provides:ART. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

It appears that "one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same" and the only defense the latter may have is if he "has acquired it in good faith at a public sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." And supplementing this provision, Article 1505 of the same Code provides that "where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell.

Applying the above legal provisions to the facts of this case, one is inevitably led to the conclusion that plaintiff has a better right to the car in question than defendant Bulahan for it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been illegally deprived thereof because of the ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to enable him to dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff therefore can still recover the possession of the car even if defendant Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing it from Belizo. Nor can it be pretended that the conduct of plaintiff in giving Belizo a letter to secure the issuance of a new certificate of registration constitutes a sufficient defense that would preclude recovery because of the undisputed fact that that letter was falsified and this fact can be clearly seen by a cursory examination of the document. If Bulahan had been more diligent he could have seen that the pertinent portion of the letter had been erased which would have placed him on guard to make an inquiry as regards the authority of Belizo to sell the car. This he failed to do.The Court further said: It is a fundamental principle of our law of personal property that no man can be divested of it without his own consent; consequently, even an honest purchaser, under a defective title, cannot resist the claim of the true owner. The maxim that 'No man can transfer a better title than he has himself "obtain in the civil as well as in the common law."The common law principle that states "Where one of two innocent parties must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed" (Sager vs. W. T. Rawleight Co. 153 Va. 514, 150 S. E. 244, 66 A.L.R. 305), cannot be applied to this case which is covered by an express provision of our new Civil Code. Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this jurisdiction.

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP.,petitioner,vs.THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.Interpretation of unlawfully deprived, Art. 559 of the CC:Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid thereforFacts: A certain Prof. Jose Cruz who claimed to be the dean of the De la Salle College placed an order of 406 books with EDCA payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price of P8,995.65 He later then sold 120 of these books to Pivate Respondent for 1,700 who relied on the invoice for the ownership of the seller After placing another order, EDCA became suspicious and inquired to De La Salle College and who denied the employ of Jose Cruz and Phil. Amanah Bank who denied having the accounts of such EDCA sought the assistance of the Police to set an entrapment operation, further investigation disclosed that Cruz was really Tomas de la Pena and that he sold 120 of the books to Private Respondents On the night of the same day, petitioner with the help of the police forced their way to the bookstore, threatened Leonor for prosecution of buying stolen goods and seized the books w/o warrant and later turned over the books to the pet. PR sued for recover The petitioner contends that the private respondents have not established their ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought the stock. And that petitioner acquired the goods not in good faith Lower courts ruled in favor of the Private Respondents, and upholding their good faith citing first paragraph of Art. 559 because the PR relied on the invoice presented to them by the impostor EDCA then contends that they have been unlawfully deprived of their property because the imposter acquired no title to the books since the check paid bounced for lack of funds, they cited cases defining unlawful deprivation which favors them the recovery or reimbursement.Issue:Whether respondents were unlawfully deprived of their propertyRuling: NO, there was no unlawful deprivation.EDCA was negligent in issuing the invoice to the impostor without first verifying his identity and without first waiting for the check to be cleared.As regards the sale to of aka Cruz:The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.xxx xxx xxxArt. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof.Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price.It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchaseonlyif there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing soldevenif the purchase price has not yet been paid.Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.The remedy for EDCA is to go after the imposter who caused all the trouble.

CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA,respondents.This case is a petition for Certiorari on the decision held by CA, however, SC in its introduction already affirms in toto the decision of the CA Facts: This is a case for the recovery of the ring allegedly owned by Angelina Guevarra. That sometime before the case was instituted, Guevarra was talking to Garcia who was wearing the said ring, Guevarra having recognized the ring, told Garcia that the ring belongs to her and it was the ring that was stolen. That very moment, Garcia lent the ring to Guevarra and the ring fitted. Few days later upon the request of Guevarra, she and her Lt. husband together with Lt. Cementina and Garcia and Garcias lawyer went to the Mr. Rebullida to verify whether the ring was the same ring that was bought by Guevarra to Mr. Rebullidas pawnshop. Mr. Rebullida then confirmed that the ring was the one that Guevarra bought from him sometime ago. The ring was returned to Garcia. After demand by Guevarra, Garcia did not return the ring. Thus, Guevarra sued for recovery, RTC denied because of the discrepancy in the weight of stone on the ring, CA reversed.Issue: 1) Whether Guevarra has been unlawfully deprived of her ring and is entitled to the remedy provided for by Art. 5592) Whether possession Good Faith is equivalent to title in favor of GarciaHolding:1) Yes. Art. 559: "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati,the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle inAznar v. Yapdiangco.7Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction."

2) NO.

"Actually, even under the first clause, possession in good faith does not really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a period of acquisitive prescription for movables through `uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a period of three years), so that many Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code),the title of the possessor is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive prescription(II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol, 6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title established by the first clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that `one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.'

FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCOT. SYCIP,respondentsFacts: Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against private respondent Francisco T. Sycip.The case was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to private respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the Francel Townhomes, at 22 Real Street, Maliksi, Bacoor, Cavite, for P451,000.00.The Contract to Sell providesinter aliathat in case of default in the payment of two or more installments, the whole obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will then be entitled to rescind the contract and take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity of any court action and the down payment will be treated as earnest money oras rental for the use of the premises. Petitioner alleged that PR failed to pay the demandable installment and therefore prayed that he vacate the premises and pay monthly rental. After having been denied by MTC the motion to dismiss PR in his answer, said that his non-payment is due to the pending case he filed in Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against Pet for unsound real estate business practice. In his complaint filed with HLURB PR sought the ff amounts; P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P75,000.00 as attorneys fees and that he be given all other remedies just and equitable. MTC later dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction however MTC awarded damages to PR which was affirmed by RTC. CA, decided that MTC has jurisdiction for unlawful detainer case irrespective of the damagesIssue:Whether the MTC has jurisdiction to award the damages after it has decided that it has no jurisdiction of the caseRuling:No, MTC does have jurisdiction to award damages.A reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As held inBuan v. Camaganacan, an award of attorneys fees without justification is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which would warrant such an awardPetitioners complaint is for unlawful detainer.While generally speaking such action falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property.Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after givingdue notice to the owner or developer of his decision to do so because of petitioners alleged failure to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for complying with the same. The case thus involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No.957.Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.The action here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under PD. Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices.Although the case involving Antonio Sarte is still pending resolution before the HLURB Arbiter, and there is as yet no order from the HLURB authorizing suspension of payments on account of the failure of plaintiff developer to make good its warranties, there is no question to Our mind that the matter of collecting amortizations for the sale of the subdivision lot is necessarily tied up to the complaint against the plaintiff and it affects the rights and correlative duties of the buyer of a subdivision lot as regulated by NHA pursuant to P.D. 957 as amended.It must accordingly fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said Board, and We find that the mEven assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, however the award of damages to private respondent must be disallowed for the following reasons:(1) The MTC decision itself stated that the answer with its counterclaim was filed out of time or more than 10 days from private respondents receipt of summons. In effect, therefore, private respondent did not make any counterclaim.(2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision showed no justification for the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. As held in Buan v. Camaganacan,[9] an award of attorneys fees without justification is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It should accordingly be stricken out. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the present action which would warrant such an award.G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon",petitioner,vs.LOURDES G. SUNTAY,respondent.

ARTICLE 559 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE: 'The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.'

FACTS: Respondent Suntay entered into an agency of sale agreement with a certain Clarita R. Sison on June 13, 1962; Respondent herein delivered a diamond ring worth P 5,500 for Clarita R. Sison to sell; Unbeknownst to the respondent, the niece of Clarita R. Sison, Melia Sison, pledged the subject ring herein to the Petitioner for the amount of P 2,600; Due to insistent demands from the Respondent, Clarita R. Sison finally caved in and gave her the receipt for the pledge; Upon knowing this, Respondent herein immediately filed a case for Estafa against Clarita R. Sison; During the pendency of the case against Sison, Respondent thru counsel wrote a letter to the Petitioner, demanding the return of her ring; When the Petitioner refused to return the ring, the Respondent filed a case with CFI Manila for the recovery of said ring; The CFI issued the writ of replevin prayed for by the Respondent herein (Plaintiff in the CFI case) and thus the ring was return to her possession; Therefore, the CFI ruled that the Respondent herein had the right to possession of the ring in question; Subsequently, the Petitioner herein sought to have the decision of CFI reversed by the CA but was unsuccessful thereto; Thus the Petitioner herein went to the SC for a petition on review

ISSUE: Who has rightful possession of the ring?

HOLDING: The SC declared emphatically that the Petitioner herein has the right to the ring in question. In holding its decision, the SC anchored the same on Article 559 of the New Civil Code. (See above)December 26, 1967G.R. No. L-21577REMEDIOS C. LEDESMA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and POLICARPIO MAMON,respondents.

FACTS:

On August 18, 1951, Benigno Labrador sold his and that of his wife's share, interest and participation in the aforementioned property to Policarpio Mamon , reserving for themselves, however, the right to repurchase it within two years after the expiration of three years from the date of the deed of sale THEY FAILED TO EXERCISE THIS RIGHT Said deed was not signed by Benigno's wife, nor was it registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. However, Mamon immediately took possession of the property and cultivated it until the middle part of 1959. On August 23, 1951, Marcelina J. Labrador Benigno Labrador's wife executed in Manila a power of attorney authorizing her husband to encumber her share in the same property to secure a loan. The record further discloses that in Civil Case No. 2932, entitled "Remedios C. Ledesma, plaintiff, vs. Marcelina J. Labrador, accompanied by her husband, Benigno Labrador, etc.," the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, on February 19, 1955, rendered judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, this Court renders decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant Marcelina J. Labrador to pay to the herein plaintiff the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY (P870.00) pesos, with legal rate of interest from October 26, 1954 (date of the filing of the complaint) until fully paid; TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) pesos for damages; ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) for attorney's fees and the costs of this suit. After the decision had become executory, the corresponding writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction on April 9, 1956, 1/3 of Lot No. 9403 to the herein petitioner, as the highest bidder Upon failure of the spouses to redeem their property within one year from the auction sale, the corresponding final certificate of sale was executed in favor of the purchaser The provisional as well as the final certificates of sale were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. Thereafter, Ledesma repaired to the land to take possession thereof, but found Mamon cultivating it. Demands on the latter were made for him to vacate and surrender the land to petitioner, but said demands were not heeded. Thereupon, petitioner instituted the present action (Civil Case No. 4562) against Jose Labrador, Magdalena Labrador and Policarpio Mamon In their answer to the complaint Jose Labrador and Magdalena Labrador denied that a big portion of the property was riceland and, as special defense, further alleged that it was already subdivided for taxation purposes into three equal parts of 26,750 square meters each between them and Mamon as lawful owners, In his separate answer Mamon made a general denial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as special defense, invoked possession and ownership of 1/3 of said realty since 1951, which portion had already been segregated from that of the two other owners On June 24, 1959, through the intervention of the Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, Mamon eventually surrendered possession of the property to Ledesma who, since then has been in possession thereof.After due trial, the lower court on June 21, 1961 rendered judgment as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Remedios C. Ledesma by declaring her as absolute owner of 1/3 of Lot No. 9403 of the cadastral survey of Pototan, Iloilo, described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7953, with costs against defendant Policarpio Mamon. From the above decision only Mamon appealed to the Court of Appeals where, after proper proceedings, the appealed judgment was rendered: MODIFYING the one rendered by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 4562 by declaring that she and Policarpio Mamon are the owners pro-indiviso of a 1/6 portion each of Lot No. 9403 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo, described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7958 From the assailed decision of the CA, Petitioner herein filed this case for review

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is qualified to hold 1/3 of the subject land thru judicial sale?

HOLDING: The SC AFFIRMED the decision of the CA. In its decision, the SC averred that: To be borne in mind in this case is the fact that the present action is for partition (see p. 7, record on appeal) where respondent Mamon alleged in his answer that he was the exclusive owner of 1/3 portion of Lot No. 9403 also claimed by petitioner. The action, therefore, necessarily involved the question of whether or not it was petitioner or it was respondent Mamon who was a co-owner of the land sought to be partitioned. Such being the case it cannot be denied that the auction sale made pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 2932 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo in which petitioner was the purchaser of thealleged1/3 share of Marcelina J. Labrador in the property covered by T.C.T. No. 7958, was directly and necessarily involved in the action.

G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994FELICIDAD JAVIER,petitioner,vs.HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales and REINO ROSETE,respondents.FACTS: It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 926, On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,2dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."3The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Br. 3,4dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641.5 Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand. On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0, Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground ofres judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did not file any pleading. In its Order dated 27 January 1978,7the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1,8sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied Thereafter, Petitioner herein filed a motion for review on certiorari with the SC

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Petitioner is barred by res judicata

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In SC's decision, please note the following:

Time and again it has been said that forres judicatato bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action

And, applying the ruling of the CourtEn BancinQuimpo v. De la Victoria,24even if we treat Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO CALAYCAY,respondents.

FACTS:

Subject of this controversy [are the] premises identified as 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, also identified as 26-B [South] D Street, Quezon City. It was the object of a written lease contract executed by the late Nazario Penas in favor of [private respondent] Lupo Calaycay on June 26, 1964, at an agreed monthly rental of One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency. The written lease contract was on a month to month basis Nazario Penas, Sr. died on February 5, 1976 and, thereafter, on June 15, 1976, an extra-judicial settlement of his estate was executed by his surviving heirs, one of whom is his son, Nazario Penas, Jr. Likewise, after the death of plaintiff's mother Concepcion P. Penas on March 2, 1985, her children including [petitioner] Nazario Penas, Jr. executed an extra judicial settlement of her estate. As time [went] on, the monthly rental on the subject premises had been gradually increased by the [petitioners], the latest of which was Six Hundred Ninety One and 20/100 (P691.20) Pesos, Philippine Currency. In a letter of January 18, 1990, [petitioner]-spouses Penas, through counsel notified the [private respondent] that effective March 1990, they were terminating the written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded from the latter to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. In the same letter, [petitioners] opted to allow the defendant to continue occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a new lease contract for a period of one (1) year at an increased monthly rental of Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus two (2) months deposit and, further, gave the [private respondent] up to February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer against the [private respondent] shall ensue. [Petitioners] later finally reduced the monthly rental to Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, only. - THIS IS THE DEMAND WITH WHICH THE MTCC, RTC AND CA CONTEMPLATED (THEY WERE WRONG!) [Private respondent] failed to abide by the demand of the [petitioners]. However, he continued staying on the leased premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the monthly rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name ITF (in trust for) spouses Lucila and Nazario Penas, Jr. under Account No. 688930. Prior to such deposit, [private respondent] together with others, in a letter of March 26, 1990, informed the [petitioners],inter alia, that since [petitioners'] representative refused to accept the rentals, he will deposit the same with a reputable bank and he will [hold] the same intact for the [petitioners]. There was no instance that [petitioners] manifested any desire to withdraw the same deposit in the bank. On August 10, 1992, plaintiffs through counsel sent another letter to the defendant to vacate the subject premises and to pay back rental arrearages in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, per month from March 1990 in the total sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which defendant failed to satisfy. - THIS IS THE DEMAND AS CONTEMPLATED BY SEC. 1 RULE 70 OF ROC Accordingly, on September 25, 1992, after the corresponding Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, [petitioners] filed the present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termination of the month to month lease contract and failure of the defendant to execute a new lease agreement with increased rentals. [Petitioners] tried to impress the Court that after they [had] agreed [to] a new monthly rental of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, [private respondent] refused to enter into a new contract and insisted in paying at a lower rate; that they gave defendant allowance of more than one (1) year within which to sign a new contract of lease but still he refused to do so; that even if conciliation before the barangay is unnecessary as [petitioners] reside abroad, their attorney-in-fact referred the case to the barangay level. Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City rendered a decision dated 16 March 1993 dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision on the finding that the complaint was filed more than one (1) year after private respondent began unlawfully occupying the premises. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial court decision was upheld, the RTC ruling that herein petitioners' remedy was converted from anactio de mero hechoto anaccion publicianasince more than one (1) year had elapsed from the demand upon defendants to vacate. The Regional Trial Court concluded that herein petitioners could initiate a proper complaint with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision*in CA G.R. SP No. 31480 dated 19 November 1993 upheld the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that since herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private respondent, there no longer was any lease contract between the parties for two (2) years since the first letter of petitioners to private respondent. The Court of Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners is to file an action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court. Hence an appeal was made by Petitioners herein to the SCISSUE: The only issue to be resolved in this ejectment case is whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by herein petitioner-spouses represented by their attorney-in-fact Elpidio R. Viernes.

HOLDING: The SC SET ASIDE the decision of the CA. In its decision, SC averred the following:

InVda.de Murga v.Chan4we held that:The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.When private respondent elected to remain in the premises after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September 1992. - THEREFORE, DEMAND WAS MADE WITHIN THE TIME FOR A CASE AGAINST UNLAWFUL DETAINER (Within 1 year of last demand)G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991LIM KIEH TONG, INC.,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y. LIM,respondents.

FACTS: 3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building adverted to in the next preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City; 4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he keeps some of his important belongings, such as his law books, important documents, appliances, etc.; 5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all the occupants of the various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom; 6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building including plaintiff has been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant corporation; 7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read in connection with a case he is handling, he was surprised to find out that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already changed; 8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred expenses in the sum of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases;ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING ORDER 10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; 11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key, above-cited, constitutes a violation of t