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ARTICLES 2-3DIGESTSTopic: IntroductionDe Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City and Hon Ruben Galvez GR No. 159418-19Facts: Norma De Joya was convicted for violating BP22, the decision was released March 21, 1997. She remained at large and was arrested December 3, 2002. On November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court issued Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 giving courts option to impose penalty over imprisonment.Issue:Norma De Joya contended that her detention was illegal and that Administrative Circular No 12-2000 have erased the penalty of imprisonment. This case also raises the issue: Are Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence sources of Criminal Law.Ruling:No. Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence are not sources of Criminal Law. The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a penalty of fine or a penalty of imprisonment only or both fine and imprisonment. Therefore, the petition was dismissed due to lack of merit.Topic: IntroductionPeople vs Gregorio Santiago GR No 17584 March 8, 1922Facts: Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy, by striking him with an automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless imprudence and was sentenced to one year and one day imprisonment. He was prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.Issue:If Act 2886 is unconstitutional and does the Philippine Legislature have power to pass laws.Ruling:For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as the Philippines:The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)Limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.The Court holds that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.The sentence was therefore affirmed.

Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal CodeUS vs. H.N. Bull GR No. 5270 January 15, 1910Facts: he appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. HN Bull was travelling with cattles and did not observe proper care for the animals. Issue:Act 55 as passed by the Philippine Congress was deemed unconstitutional.Ruling:The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.) Therefore, Act 55 is not unconstitutional.The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal CodePeople vs Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924Facts:Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. Issue:The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.Ruling:There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statuteThe order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.

Topic: Article 2People vs Look Chaw GR No 5887Facts:The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium, and that he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium.Issue:The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. Ruling:The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

US vs Ah Sing GR No. 13005 October 10, 1917Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamshipShun Chang. TheShun Changis a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamshipShun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.Issue:Whether Philippines has jurisdiction over the case.Ruling: Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, isprima facieevidence of importation. (TheMary[U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S.vs.Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perotsvs.U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present. The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

ARTICLE 3-FELONIESPeople vs Gonzales G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990Facts:In a decision1dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months ofreclusion temporal,to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."2The victim was Lloyd Peacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo. Custodio Gonzales was the only appellant in this case.Issue: Whether Custudio Gonzales has criminal liability. When can a person incur criminal liability?Ruling:After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements36even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch37he made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada.It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:1. By any person committing a felony (delito)although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.(Emphasis supplied.)Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.Art. 3.Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.(Emphasis supplied.)Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world."40In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death. This was not established by the prosecution.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costsde oficio.

Topic : Article 3People vs Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza GR No. L- 35748Facts:Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day ofcadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day ofpresidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.Issue:Whether Romana Silvestre is criminally liable just because she remained silent and did not report the crime?Ruling:For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted withone-half of the costsde oficio. So ordered.

Topic: Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of LawDiego vs CastilloFacts:This is an administrative complaint against Judge Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and rendering judgment in gross ignorance of law. Lucena Escoto was acquitted of the crime of bigamy, she contracted a second marriage after filing a divorce in the state of Texas for her first marriage. The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused.Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent.The combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247thJudicial District, effective February 15, 1978.Issue:Can Lucena Escoto be excused because of the misinterpretation of the law? Is this case a mistake of fact or a mistake of law?Ruling:In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.This Court, inPeople v. Bitdu,[4]carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability.Bitduheld that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act.This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.[5]Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, isPeople v. Schneckenburger,[6]where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in thePhilippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

People vs Bindoy G.R. L- 34665Facts:The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day ofreclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the following information:That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in atubawineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of thetubadrinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (aliasAgaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered sometubato Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.Issue:Whether Bindoy is criminally liable when there is no intent to kill Emigdio Omamdam.Ruling:The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United Statesvs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under investigation.In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costsde oficio. So ordered.

ARTICLE 4CRIMINAL LIABILITYInjurious Result is greater than that intended- praetor intentionemPP VS. CAGOCO, 58 PHIL 524FACTS: About 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk. Yu Lon was standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take leave of his father, approached Yu Lon from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued but then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking by, saw the incident and joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lons assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in the left kidney.HELD: In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished for slight physical injuries only instead of murder. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. In the Brobst case,supra, it was held that death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; that where death result as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of ones illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96.) The reasoning of the decisions cited is applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22).

PEOPLE VS NATALIO ILLUSTRE GR NO L 32076Facts: That on or about June 24, 1929, in the municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippine Islands, the above-named defendant willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan Magsino a blow with his closed fist in the right hypochondriac region, bruising his liver and producing an internal hemorrhage resulting in the death of said Juan Magsino.Issue:The victim already suffered tuberculosis and the question is whether this affects the defendants criminal liability.Ruling:Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with this exception, that while the first two who performed the autopsy on the body, with their own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that is, Doctor Roxas, simply considered the data hypothetically. We are therefore convinced there is no fundamental disagreement among the medical witnesses as to the cause of the victims death; and that is was caused by the defendants blow on the deceased right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and produced an internal hemorrhage.The appellant denies having hit Magsino, protesting that he had no motive for doing so; but the evidence shows that he punched Magsino in the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the ground.The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and suffered from incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the defendants criminal liability, for eve if it rendered the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same. (U. S. vs. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95) And the circumstance that the defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability, since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, but simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the Penal Code. (U. S. vs. Samea, 15 Phil. 227.)The instant case comes under the provision of article 404 of the Penal Code providing the penalty ofreclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its minimum degree in view of the mitigating circumstance just mentioned, or twelve years and one day,reclusion temporal. Therefore, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.1 So ordered.

US VS. MARASIGAN, 27 PHIL 181

FACTS: A fight ensued between the accused-appellant, Filomeno Marasigan and one Francisco Mendoza. As a result of the fight Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most serious. The middle finger of the left hand was rendered useless. The accused asserts that he should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be given another opportunity to present evidence he would be able to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which the court found to have been rendered useless by the cut already described was not necessarily a useless member, inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation, the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also asserts that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third finger instead.HELD: We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused. It does not matter which finger it was.Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

US VS. MOLDES, GR NO. 42122FACTS: There was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of the house and with hisbolobegan cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight. The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the ground, appellant struck at him with hisbolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm. As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action. The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care of a local curandero. This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the deceased died.HELD: The attorneyde oficiourges that appellant did not intend to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the dark and in self-defense. It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use of a lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the natural consequences of his act. It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the wound would not have been fatal. In the outlyingbarrioin which this assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not available.The general rule is that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment .

Doctrine of Proximate CauseVDA BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, 102 Phil 181FACTS: There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. While the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while four passengers could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.HELD: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree.The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan and the other trapped passengers was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus. We disagree. Proximate Cause has been defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

URBANO VS. PP, GR NO. 182750FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, they drunk beer in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomeldens face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomeldens nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious. The deceased told his wife of the mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go to work however, his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the head, prompted him to be admitted at the community hospital. Finally, Tomelden died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latters death.Moreover, the Tomelden only died 12 days later after the incident and was still able to report to work engenders doubt on the proximate cause of victims death. Petitioner, thus, contends that he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.HELD: The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioners lucky punch hitting Tomelden right smack on the face. And even if Tomeldens head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right after the September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains, until his demise 12 days after the blow was made. Significantly, Dr. Arellano opined that the fist blow which landed on Tomeldens head could have shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victims death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident." The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her husbands post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomeldens death and who was liable for it. It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired during the fisticuff incident more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face of [Tomelden], taken together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the proximate cause of [Tomeldens] death. The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve days later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report for work during the intervening days

SEGURITAN VS. PP, G.R. NO. 172896FACTS: Petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis and Baltazar Panis in the house of Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecios carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to stand up. Petitioners punches landed on Lucrecios right and left temple, causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove.Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house. Upon his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then went directly to his room and slept.At around 9 oclock in the evening, Lucrecios wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive Lucrecio but to no avail. He died that same night.NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed Lucrecios body and performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido concluded that Lucrecios cause of death was traumatic head injury.7HELD: Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the right middle fossa of the skull, beneath the area where a hematoma developed was due to the blow he delivered because according to the testimony of Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also be caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also maintains that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had nothing to do with the fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to him, Lucrecio sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the hollow block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling from the opposite end of the bench. Petitioner insists that Lucrecio died due to a fatal heart attack.We are not persuaded. It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy report showed that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by head injuries. Melchors eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner by which the latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised stove is consistent with the autopsy findings prepared and testified to by Dr. Vertido. The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled out petitioners contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack. Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than him, and even if he did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

PP VS. RAFAEL MARCO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT, GR NOS. L-28324-5FACTS: Simeon Marco, son of appellant Rafael, approached Constancio Sabelbero and after asking him if he were the one who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a hunting knife, which caused Constancio to run away. While thus running, he passed by appellant who hit him with a cane causing him slight physical injuries. When Simeon was about to pursue Constancio, the latter's father, Vicente, who was in the crowd, grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding the knife. When Vicente, however, saw that appellant, who was holding a round cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted to Constancio and to his other son Bienvenido who appeared in the scene to run away, which they did, as he himself released Simeon and ran away. Appellant followed Bienvenido and stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow which caused injuries to his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run farther but his feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down. Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near the anus, followed by Simeon who stabbed him on the left side of the breast. Thereafter, Bienvenido died. On the theory that there was obvious conspiracy among appellants Rafael, Simoen, and Beltran, the trial court convicted them of murder. Only Rafael appealed.The Supreme Court ruled that the act of appellant stabbing the victim which caused injuries to the latter's left hand is separate from the fatal stabs inflicted by his two co-accused, because the existence of bad blood between the families of the deceased and the accused which could have established commonality of intent on the part of the three accused was denied by both parties. Moreover, there was no clear evidence connecting the act of appellant in trying to stab the victim which caused the latter injuries on the left hand, with the fatal stabs inflicted by his two other co-accused.HELD: Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent under Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. "Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides that, 'criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.' Under this provision, one who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death of the decedent was not the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant.There was an active intervening cause,which was no other than the sudden and unexpected appearance and participation of Simeon Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. And there is authority thatif the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible for such consequence.

PP VS. VILLACORTA, GR NO. 186412FACTS: Mendeja narrated that onJanuary 23, 2002, she was tending hersari-saristore located atC-4 Road, Bagumbayan, Navotas.Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at Mendejas store.At around two oclock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick.The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body.Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled.Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta.When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruzs body.Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital.When Cruz sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient.Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital onFebruary 14, 2002, where he died the following day, onFebruary 15, 2002.While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

HELD: There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.The proximate cause of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center.OnFebruary 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, onFebruary 15, 2002.The prosecution did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction of Villacorta for murder.There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection.If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later.As the Court noted inUrbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality.Ultimately, we can only deduce thatCruzs stab wound was merely theremotecause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death.The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability.Villacorta is guilty of slight physical for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

PP VS. DOMASIAN, GR NO. 95322FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two barangaytanodswhen his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and thetanodswent after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.2At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination.3The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson Tan.4On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so he could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.HELD: Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus: Criminal liability shall be incurred: By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

INTOD VS. PP, GR NO. 103119FACTS: Petitioner together with other men, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at bedroom of Palangpangan. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe trial court's decision. This petition questions the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime,HELD: Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where: it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable.Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act, (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.In the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factuallyor physically impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge that is, attempt.This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

PP VS. ENOJA, GR NO. 102596SYNOPSIS: The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other. The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the "New People's Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an nformation for murder against herein appellants and their three companions who remained at-large. They were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellants herein guilty as charged. The trial court did not give credence to the claim of self-defense and found conspiracy in committing the crime. The appellants filed this appeal before the Supreme Court.DIETIn this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding that conspiracy was present in this case. Both the victim and the assailant knew each other and the victim gave no provocation in the attack. Clearly the qualifying circumstance was present in this case. The defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants failed to prove the physical impossibility of their presence at the crime scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed with modification that the award of actual damages was deleted.As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that even assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59 thereof.Appellants theorize that the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts their defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi.

ARTICLE 6Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated Stages

ATTEMPTED STAGEPP VS. LAMAHANG, GR NO. L-43530FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and CR Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At the time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.HELD: There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yus store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he has started to make in the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the arrival of policeman Tomambing did not develop beyond the first steps of execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another persons dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. The fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.

PP VS. RIVERA et. al. GR No. 16632 FACTS: The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and assaulted one Ruben Rudil, hitting him with a piece of hollow block while the latter went to a nearby store to buy food together with his daughter. People who saw the incident called for them to stop. Policemen arrived in the scene prompting the three accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to the hospital where the attending physician declared that the wounds sustained by Ruben were slight and superficial and would heal in about 7 days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of attempted murder. Accused, now petitioners, aver that the prosecution had failed to prove that they had intention to kill Ruben. They aver that based on the testimony of the attending physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal wound. HELD: As stated by the attending physician, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block hit his head and had the police not promptly intervened. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three brothers helped each other maul the defenceless victim, and even if he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them proceeded to hit the victim with a hollow block had not the police arrived. The accused commenced of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder by reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, Ruben Rodil was able to run away and the timely response of the policemen. Furthermore, petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by victim was superficial and thus not life threatening. However, the nature of the injury does not negate the intent to kill. An essential element of murder and homicide, whether, consummated, frustrated or attempted, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injury. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

PEOPLE VS LIZADA GR NO 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003Facts:Accused-appellant[2]was charged with four (4) counts of qualified rape under four separate Information for raping his stepdaughter.Issue:Will Lizada be charged with attempted rape or act of lasciviousnessPrinciples Applied:In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture or within thepudendumof the vagina of private complainant.Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable for consummated rape.[36]The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.In light of the evidence on record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:Art. 336.Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished byprision correccional.[37]The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code reads:There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:1. The offendercommencesthe commission of the felony directly by overt acts;2. Hedoes not performall the acts of execution whichshould producethe felony;3. The offenders act benot stopped by his own spontaneousdesistance;4. Thenon-performance of all acts of executionwas due tocauseoraccidentother than his spontaneous desistance.[40]The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:(1) That there beexternal acts;(2) Such external acts havedirectconnection with the crimeintended to be committed.[41]Ruling:In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years ofprision correccionalin its maximum period,as minimum to ten years ofprision mayorin its medium period, as maximum.Accused-appellant

ARANETA VS CA JULY 30, 1990

Facts:In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.

Issue:Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused?

Principles Applied: The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for homicide.18His liability should therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight physical injury.Ruling:Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta, Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months ofprision correccional. Although, he is still guilty of attempted homicide.

PP VS. BALEROS, JR. GR NO. 138033SYNOPSIS: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in Manila, the accused Renato Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, and commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with he but was unable to perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to her damage and prehudice. The petitioner argues, however, that the above mentioned information, does not allege the complained act of covering the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and disturbance. HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an information for unjust vexation. The paramount question (in a prosecution for unjust vexation) is whether the offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That the victim, after the incident, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond reasonable doubt that she was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the acts of the petitioner.

FRUSTRATED STAGEUS VS. EDUAVE, GR NO L-12155FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly an struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo. A deadly weapon was used. The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and causing her pregnancy. HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause between the beginning of the commission of the act and the moment when all the acts have been performed which would result in the consummate crime. In other words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the case at bar, the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up, he declared that he had killed the complainant. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control. In this case, he thought he already killed the victim.

PP VS. DAGMAN, et al GR NO. L-23133FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked by a crowed of persons and was nearly killed. The motive of the crime was that the persons who harbored enmity against Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. Magbual managed to escape death from his tormentors by the use of feigning death.HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all acts of execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual. There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the life of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their fingering of the nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought they had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. The particular parts of the body of the person struck during the assault, the deadly character of the weapons used, the violence of the attack, and the accomplishment of the crime with alevosia, classifies the crime as frustrated murder. And finally, the victim did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or reason independent of the criminal act performed.

VALENZUELA vs. Pp, GR NO. 160188FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within the SM Complex by security guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was seen unloading cased of Tide detergent with an accomplice. Valenzuela then haled a taxi, loaded the detergent inside and boarded the same. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi and asked for the receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner and accomplice was about to flee when Largo fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and accomplice was then apprehended at the scene. The trial convicted the two with consummated theft. Only Valenzuela appealed to the CA asserting that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft. CA affirmed decision of the trial court hence the present petition.HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Dio and Flores cases. In both cases, the accused were convicted of frustrated theft, of which it was held the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary. Under Article 308 of the RPC, Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons not force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent. Reading the Dio and Flores cases, the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft defined under Article 308 of the RPC. In the present case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question is, when is the crime of theft produced? Theft is produced when there is the deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all acts of execution for theft, is able to unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, it can only be consummated or attempted.

ARTICLE 8CONSPIRACY

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

PP VS. ALETA, ET AL, GR NO. 179708Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed Aleta was charged for the murder of Celestino Duldulao y Yadao and Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse club with the use of hard objects both the victims. The Court upholds the version of the prosecution: While the deceased Acobs mother, Marina, went to the community center, she heard a commotion on the yard of the appellants. Returning home, she told Acob of the quarrel. Acob went to the appellants compound. Upon following her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio striking Acob with a piece of wood, causing the latter to fall. She thereafter saw Rogelio striking Duldulao causing the latters eyes to pop out. Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand continued to hit them. When Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of wood and clubbed the victims.Held: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part of their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

PP VS. LOPEZ, REGALADO AND ARAGON GR NO. 177302FACTS: Appellant Rogelio Regalado who was outside a tailoring shop, called out to victim, Edencito Chu and prompted him to come out of his mothers bakery. Chu thereupon emerged from the bakery, put his arms around Regalados shoulders and asked forgiveness. Regalado however pushed his arms aside, drew a curved knife and stabbed Chu on the left nipple. As Chu ran towards Villaluz Street, Regalado chased him and picked up two pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu. Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant Aragon also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and joined the chase. The three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed Chu, causing the latter to fall. He then kicked the victim. Lopez stabbed Chu several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu was no longer moving, the three appellants left.HELD: Appellants disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails. The evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design to kill Chu. Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu on the chest, and the two other appellants joined Regalado in chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood along the way. Then, when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon boxed and kicked Chu enabling Lopez to stab him several times. These indicates a conspiracy.

DIRECT PROOF OF CONSPIRACY IS NOT REQUIREDPP vs. PABLO AMODIA, accused-appellant, GR NO. 17391FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends were talking and watching television when he heard a noise coming somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters away from their house. He also heard somebody shouted may away doon. Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge and saw five persons whom he identified as the victim (Felix Olandria Bergao), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa, George Palacio and Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were neighbors. Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim being held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held by Arnold. George was positioned at the victims back and clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him three times. Luther Caberte who happened to be passing by the C-5 bridge at that time, also saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 bridge which was illuminated by a light from a lamppost. He saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the victim. He saw Pablo holding the victims hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He also affirmed that George was positioned behind the victim. He personally knew both the victim and Pablo as they have been neighbors. Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George and Damaso while Luther went on home immediately. The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of alibi. In his appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He alternatively argues that granting that he was part of Damasos group and that the group killed the victim, the prosecution failed to establish the conspiracy among them. There was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing began.HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the prosecutions evidence to establish the conspiracy between him and his other co-accused to make him liable for murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified by the eyewitnesses, only relate to events during and not prior to the assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to kill the victim. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises the very instant the plotters agrees, expressly or impliedly, to commit a felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in order to prove its existence. Absent of any direct proof as in the present case, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. An accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Stated otherwise, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a priot agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the following chain of events however show their commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the victims on all sides; Damaso at the front, George at the victims rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victims head with a piece of wood; and fourth. Damaso stabbed the victim three times.

PP vs. LAGAT and PALALAY, GR No. 187044FACTS: The accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of Qualified Carnapping and the crime of Homicide for the killing of one Jose Biag, owner of the tricycle which the accused-appellants stole. Prosecution witness SPO2 Arthur Salvador testified that he was on duty with other colleagues when they received a report from one Jimmy Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at the Alice Palay Buying Station in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. The police then proceeded to verify the report. At the buying station they saw the tricycle described to them with the cavans of palay and the two accused. They then brought the two to the police station together with the tricycle and its contents. Salvador then contended that when they unloaded the contents of the tricycle, they saw bloodstains inside and outside of the vehicle. They also found a wallet containing the tricycles Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the LTO in the name of Jose Biag. The accused voluntarily admitted that the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle whom they killed and dumped along the Agadanan and Guille