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Transcript of Plamondon 1975 Dialectica
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Th e C ontemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism
By Ann PLAMONDON
Summary
In the contemporary literature, mechanism and organicism are represented as the-
ses which make incompatible claims. Much of the debate has come about because the
key concepts in the principal theses which divide mechanism and organicism have not
been adequately analyzed. I argue that making sense of the key concepts in the respec-
tive theses of the mechanist and the organicist shows that these theses are not at all
logically incompatible. The reconciliation, however, involves the mechanist in presup-
posing metaphysical doctrines not ordinarily associated with
his
position.
RCsumC
Dans la litt6rature contemporaine, le mCcanisme et l’organicisme sont prksentts
comme des thtses dtfendant des postulats incompatibles. Une grande part du dCsac-
cord provient du fair q ue les principales theses q ui opposent l’organicisme au mkcanisme
on t CtC insuffisamm ent analyskes. L‘auteur m on tre qu e ces thbses ne
sont
pas logique-
m ent incompatibles. Cette rCconciliation n’est cepen dant possible q u e parce qu e le
mC-
canisme moderne ne correspond plus h 1’idCe traditionnelle qu’on s’en faisait.
Zusammenfassung
In der zeitgenossischen Literatur werden mechanische und organische Thesen als
solche dargestellt, die unvereinbare Anspriiche aufstellen. Ein wichtiger Anteil an die-
sem Widerstreit
riihrt
davon her, dass die Hauptthesen, die die organistischen Auffas-
sungen den vitalistischen entgegenstellen, ungeniigend analysiert worden sind. Der Ver-
fasser zeigt, dass diese Thesen logisch nicht unvertraglich sind. Diese Aussohnung ist
allerdings nur deshalb moglich, weil die moderne mechanistische Betrachtungsweise
nicht me hr m it der traditionellen iibereinstimmt.
In the contemporary literature, mechanism and organicism are repre-
sented as theses which make incompatible claims. This has come about for
two reasons. First, the major thesis of vitalism is not distinguished from the
theses
of
organicism. Second, the key concepts in the theses which divide
mechanism and organicism have not been adequately analyzed. In what fol-
lows,
I
argue that organicism is not vitalism and that making sense of the
key concepts in the respective theses of the mechanist and the organicist
shows that these theses are not at all logically incompatible. The reconcilia-
tion, however, involves the mechanist in presupposing metaphysical doc-
trines not o rdinarily associated with his position.
Dialectica
Vol.
29,
No
4 1975)
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214 Ann Plamondon
1. What organicism is not.
Organicism
is
not vitalism. I think this can be clearly seen by considering
two definitions
of
vitalism.
1)
Vitalism is a traditional and persistent belief that the laws of physics
that hold in the inaminate world would not suffice to explain the phe-
nomena of l i e ”
2)
vitalism
=
“Elements
+
Organization + Vital Principle
-
Living
Being
” z.
It is important to notice that in definition 2), he v ital principle is “ ex-
trinsic
”
to the elements and their organization. It is this extrinsicness
of
the
vital principle that characterizes vitalism. The extrinsicness makes vitalism
set up a fundamental ontological dualism between living and non-living.
This dualism
is
the ground for definition
1)
. e., it is the ground for
the claim of the irreducibility of biology to physics and chemistry
in
the
sense that biological concepts are not
in
principle)
“
definable
”
in physico-
chemical terms and biological relations are not in principle)
“
derivable
”
from physico-chemical relations.
Organicism, however, is non-dualistic. The theses of organicism derive
from the metaphysical doctrine of internal relations3. The application of
this doctrine to organisms entails a distinction in degree, but not
in
kind,
between living and non-living4. Hence the theses of organicism do not in-
volve extrinsic vital principles
or
even extrinsic principles of organization
s.
Further, organicism does not entail the irreducibility of biology to physics
and chemistry.
I hope to make these claims clear by setting out the principal issues that
divide mechanists and organicists and by exploring what each means. In
1
I .
Bronowski, “New Concepts in the Evolution
of
Complexity,” Synthese
21
1970),
p.
228.
Bronowski correctly classifies Elsasser as
a
“vitalist”, although Elsasser
calls his view “organicism”. See
W.
lsasser, “Synopsis
of
Organismic Theory,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology
7 1964),
pp.
5 3 - 6 7 .
I tak e “organicism”, “emergentism”, an d
“holism” to involve approximately the same set of theses. Also
I
understand “reduc-
tionism” and “mechanism” to be the same. “Vitalism” is
a
distinct third alternative.
2 W.
.
Carlo , “Reductionism a nd Em ergence, M echanism an d Vitalism Revisited,”
Proceedings
of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association
40 1966),
p.
97.
Carlo
tends to suggest the identification
of
vitalism and organicism, p.
96.
3
See D.
C.
Phillips, “Organicism in
the
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentie th
Centuries,” Journal of the History of Ideas
31 1970),
pp.
4 1 3 4 3 2 .
4
See
I.
Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence George Allen an d Unwin Ltd.,
London,
1972),
p.
313;
A. N.
Whitehead,
Science
and the Modern World
The Mac-
millan Company, New York,
1925),
pp.
115-116; and
Whitehead, Process
and
Reality
Vhe Macmillan Company, New York,
1929)) Part 11
Ch.
3.
H. Hein claims the contrary.
See
“Molecular Biology
vs.
Organicism: The En-
during Dispute Between Mechanism and Vitalism,” Synthese
20 1969),
p.
241
and
p.
243.
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The Contemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism
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5
treating the explication of the organicists’ theses
I
shall limit my remarks
to what the o rganicist must logically accept in accepting the various claims.
2.
The principal issues that divide mechanists and organicists.
be summ arized in four claims.
M-1 Organisms are no t more than the sum of their physico-chemical parts.
M-2
The understanding of an organism can be achieved in principle) by a
full understanding of the physico-chemical parts of the organism.
M-3
The physico-chemical parts determine the nature of the organism.
M-4
Organisms can be adequately studied by analytical methods.
0-1
Organisms are more than the sums of their physico-chemical parts.
0-2 The understanding of an organism cannot be achieved by a full under-
standing of its physico-chemical par ts in isolation from the organism.
0-3
The organism determines the nature of its physico-chemical parts.
0-4 The complexity and hierarchical organization of organisms precludes
an adequate understanding by analytical methods.
1) M-1-M-4 and 0-1-0-4 are related in such a way that all four claims must
be accepted if any one is.
2)
M-1-M-4 and 0-1-0-4 seem to be contrary sets
of
claims.
I wish to examine these claims in succession. 1) above indicates the dif-
ficulty of a truly independent examination of the claims.
The principal issues that divide mechanists and organicists can, I think,
3. M-1
VS.
0-1
Organicists base the claim of the irreducibility of organisms to sums of
physico-chemical parts on the evidence that such parts, say, i, j, and
k,
may
behave differently in isolation than they behave when they organize a com-
plex C6. The organicist has sometimes been interpreted as meaning that i
exhibits “new characters” in
C
haracters not found to be predicable
of
i
in isolation. “New characters
”
is a somewhat ambiguous notion.
If
it
is taken to mean characters for which there is no ground
in
the isolated part
i7, the organicist is put in th e position of being logically absurd, resorting
to miracles
”
8 But there is another way of construing new charac ters ”,
viz., that these characters are potentially predicable of
i in
isolation which
become actually predicable of
i
when i, j , and k organize complex
C.
This
6 See,
for
example,
E.
Laszlo, The Systems
V i ew o f
the World George Braziller,
New York, 1972), p. 31, and
Laszlo,
“Systems and Structures oward Bio-Social
Anthropology,”
Theory
and Decision 2 1971), p. 179.
7 Phillips, p. 417.
8 M. Simon, The Matter of Life Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971), p. 156.
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216 Ann Plamondon
meaning of
“
new characters ” is not logically absurd, and it is in complete
accord with the empirical evidence on which the organicist claim is based.
Contemporary mechanists do not mean organisms are mere aggregates
when they claim the reducibility of organisms to “ sums
”
of physico-chem-
ical parts. Nagel’s discussion of the meaning of um
”
is most illuminating g.
Consider i,
j ,
and k organizing complex C. C is a sum
of
i,
j,
and k, if the
theories which explain isolated i, isolated j, and isolated k T-i, T-j, T -k)
explain the behavior of i,
j,
and k in complex C. More precisely, C is the
sum of i, j, and k, if one can deduce from T-i, T-j, and T-k the laws ex-
plaining the properties of i,
j,
and k n
C.
On the other hand, C is not a sum
of i, j , and k if one cannot deduce these laws from T-i, T-j, and T-k. In
such cases, a wider theory
T
is needed to explain the behavior of
i,
j
and
k in C. Nagel concludes that whether or not any complex is a sum of its
parts is relative to a theory. In brief, a complex is a sum when theories
about its parts explain the relationsh ip of the parts in the complex but not
a sum when a wider theory is required to explain the relationsh ip of the
parts in the complex.
Nagel’s discussion clearly shows mechanists do not mean organisms are
aggregates by M-1; they m ean organisms are parts in interrelation. Further,
it would seem that the empirical evidence is against construing organisms
as “ sums
”
as Nagel defines this term.
To
explain organisms, wider theories
T s) are required; indeed, on the whole, such theories are still lacking
lo
This is not to say, however, that biological relations are not reducible to
physico-chemical ones. I t is quite possible that organisms fail to be sums
”,
yet T is a theory which contains only physico-chemical laws.
But a more important point is the nature of T , The existence of any
T * affirms the potentiality of any physico-chem ical part to behave dif-
ferently solated
”
than it behaves in
a
complex it organizes. This is pre-
cisely the meaning of 0-1
if
0-1
is
to make any sense at all). Hence, the
theses
M-1
and 0-1 are only apparently contraries.
4
M-2
VS.
0-2
Claims M-2 and 0-2 are generally taken to be theses about predictability.
That is, 0-2 implies that it is not possible to predict the properties of phy-
sico-chemical part i in biological complex C i,
j,
k)
by having knowledge
of the properties of i, j , and k n isolation. Defenders of M-2 bring evidence
9 E.
Nagel, The Structure
of
Science Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New
York,
10 See Bronowski, pp. 228 246.
1961),
p.
390.
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The Contemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism
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17
against 0-2 ll. The evidence is, on the whole, against “chemical emer-
gence ”. It is suggested that defenders of 0-2 and emergence” generally)
must mean that com pounds, say, water, have properties not in principle pre-
dictable from the properties of their atomic components hydrogen and
oxygen). However, this is not the case. The properties of compounds can
in principle be predicted from the spectroscopic properties of their con -
stituent atoms.
Let us consider how such a prediction is possible. It is possible because
we have a theory which explains how parts behave in a complex, i. e., a
theory about the relations of the pa rts within the complex. Generalization
of the possibility of prediction of the kind tha t is claimed by M-2 prediction
of the behavior of physico-chemical part i in biological complex C i,
j ,
k)
from know ledge of iso lated
i, j ,
and k) depends upon the existence of a
theory which explains the po tential of the physico-chemical parts for rela-
tionship in C. This condition for predictability suggests that “ full knowl-
edge ” of isolated parts includes knowledge of the potential predicates appli-
cable to the part for any biological complex that the physico-chemical part
can organize. If this be the meaning of “fu ll know ledge” in thesis M-2,
then the organicist must accept M-2 because M-2 becomes trivially true.
The behavior of
i in
C i,
j , k)
is surely
analyzable
from the knowledge as
to how i behaves in any complex it can organize.
5 .
M-3 VS. 0-3
There is an interpretation of 0-3 which renders it logically absurd12.
The organicist must accept the obvious fact that organisms are organized
of physico-chemical parts; hence, there is a sense in which the organism is
determined by its physico-chemical parts. The only logical meaning of “de -
termine ” in 0-3 is a reference to the fact that there is modification of phy-
sico-chemical part according to the biological complex it organizes
13.
But
this amounts to nothing more than the affirmation of the empirical claim
that we have seen in sections
3.
and 4 above that physico-chemical parts
have the potential to behave differently in different complexes they orga-
nize. Indeed, this kind of behav ior is exemplified by physico-chemical parts
organizing physico-chemical complexes the behavior of an “ solated ” elec-
tron is not the same as its behavior in the hydrogen atom).
11
C.
W. Berenda, “On Emergence and Prediction,” Journal o f Philosophy 50
1953), p. 271; Simon, p. 155; and
J.
J
C.
Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism
Random House, N ew York, 19 67 , pp. 51-52.
1 2 See Phillips, p. 418; Hein, p. 247.
13 See W hitehead,
Science and the Modern World
pp. 115-116 and pp. 215-216;
David Bohm, “Further Remarks on Order,”
Towards a Theoretical Biology
2:
Sket-
ches
ed. C . H. Waddington Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 51-58.
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Ann Plamondon
This kind of “dete rm ina tion” of physico-chemical part by biological
complex is in no way contrary to M-3, if we have correctly stated the mea-
ning of “ ull understanding
”
in M-2.
In
discussions
of
the mechanist mea-
ning of the properties of physim-chemical parts, one finds the following
phrases:
i) relational properties ” l4
ii) potential of being fashioned into
”
l5
iii) basic architectonic tendency inherent in the fundamental particles of
iv) nherent power of spontaneous self-assembly
”
17.
matter itself ” l6
If properties i)- iv) be included in a listing of the properties of physico-
chemical parts, then clearly there is no real difference in meaning between
claims M-2 and 0-2; M-3 and 0-3.
“
Full understanding ” of physico-chem-
ical parts which includes such properties as i)- iv) above precludes any
possibility of making sense of
“
n isolation ” in 0-2, and
“
determination ”
of a biological complex by these properties of physico-chemical parts in-
cludes “ determination” of the physico-chemical parts by the biological
complex.
6 .
M-4 VS.
0-4
Three preliminary remarks will help to clarify the issues involved in
1) 0-4 cannot mean that organismic biologists do not proceed by the
use of analytical methods . e. by “ concentrating on a limited set of
properties things possess and
ignoring
at least for a time) others, and by
investigating the traits selected for study under controlled conditions
”
la
2) 0-4 cannot mean that there has been no success in biology by using
analytical methods
19.
3)
M-4
cannot mean that there are no conditions under which it will
not be necessary to study an organism by methods other than analysis of
its physico-chemical parts. In particular, studying the whole organism as
well as studying its physico-chemical parts will be necessary when a theory
is lacking as to what characteristics are predicable of a physico-chemical
part when it organizes the organism
20.
M-4 and 0-4.
14 Simon, p.
155.
1s
Ibid. p. 156.
16
Hein, p. 242.
17 Ibid. p. 248.
18 Nagel, p. 445.
19 J
Monod,
Chance and Necessity
Alfred
A.
Knopf, Inc.,
New York,
1971),
20 Nagel, p. 440.
pp.
79-80.
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The Contemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism
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0-4
denies the adequacy of analytical methods because of the comple-
xity and hierarchical nature of organisms. Let us consider each.
The complexity of organisms, on the whole, refers to the inhomogeneity
of biological complexes as opposed to the homogeneity of the physico-chem-
ical parts which organize them 21. That is, the physico-chemical parts of orga-
nisms can be classified into sets in such a way that sampling will, in general,
provide the ground for good ” generalizations. On the other hand, while
it is possible to find homogeneous classes in biology, such classes are “ho-
mogeneous in one respect or a few respects,
. .
not homogeneous in all rel-
evant biological respects
”
22 Such limited homogeneity precludes the general
use of methods of physics and chemistry. However complexity only entails
that the use of these methods could reveal at best rather restricted general-
izations.
The hierarchical organization of organisms involves recognizing i) levels
of organization or stratification of stability ” and ii)
“
vertical relation-
ships ” 24. It is the
“
vertical relationships ” which make difficulty for analyt-
ical methods in biology. These relationships require a cooperation ”
of
the levels of physico-chemical parts. This is
to
say there are vertical laws
”
of organization which are in essence laws of modification hey are laws
describing the determination
”
as we have used the term in section
5 .
of the physico-chemical part by the complex which it organizes25. These
laws are to be contrasted with “horizontal laws” of the physico-chemical
parts,
i.
e., laws which describe the behavior of isolated parts ” without
describing their modification in the various complexes which they can or-
ganize. Hence 0 4 rejects the adequacy of analytical methods in so far as
analysis omits vertical laws. There is a further problem with analysis be-
cause vertical relationships suggest the possibility of different analyses at
different levels
of
organization in the same complex. This, it would seem,
is the foundation for the claim that more traditional biological methods are
valuable in guiding the proper application of the analytical methods of phy-
sics and chemistry 26
It seems clear, however, that with the existence of a theory containing
laws of modification, analysis would not be inadequate from the organicists’
21 R.
Ackermann, “Mechanism, Methodology, and Biological Theory,”
Synthese
22 Ackermann,
p.
222.
23
Bronowski,
p.
272.
24 Bohm,
pp.
51-58; Laszlo, “Systems an d Str uct ure s
- ” pp.
178- 179; an d
25 Bohm,
p. 57;
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World pp. 215-216.
26 Ackermann,
p.
224; B. Commoner, “In Defense of Biology,” Science 133 1961)’
20 1969),
pp.
219-222; Elsasser,
p.
59.
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World pp. 215-216.
p.
1747.
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Ann Plamondon
point of view. Hence 0-4 is pointing to the lack, on the whole, of such theo-
ries for organisms; whereas M-4 is referring to the possibility of finding them.
0-1-0-4 do not entail that such theories will not be found; nor do 0-1-0-4
entail that if such theories are found, they will not be expressed in physico-
chemical terms and relations. Hence there seems to be no disagreement in
principle between M-4 and 0-4.
7.
What mechanism
is
not.
Contemporary mechanism
is
very far removed from traditional mech-
anism. A recent discussion of mechanism suggests that the thesis is con-
cerned primarily with the question
of
relations and not with material nature
of physico-chemical parts at all.
We are thus saying that what is definitory of a machine struc-
ture a re relations and, hence, that the s tructure of the machine has
no connection with materiality, that is, with the properties
of
the
components that define them as physical entities
27
. . the basic assertion for biological mechanism: living systems
are machines of one
or
several well-defined classes. That is to say:
the definitory element in the living organization is a certain struc-
ture the set of interrelations leading to a given form of transitions)
independent of the materiality that embodies it; not the nature of
the components, but their interrelations 28.
Contemporary mechanism disassociates the material nature
of
physico-
chemical parts from their interrelatedness. It is in one sense clear why this
must be done. The notion of materiality is logically incom patible with the
nature
of
physico-chemical parts as they are represented in the explication
of M-1-M-4.
This
is because materiality entails a theory of external rela-
tions.
In a theory
of
substance as matter, in itself fully actual, all rela-
tions between substances must be completely external to the sub-
stances. Since the substances are fully actual, relations
of
distance
from each other, for example, can make no difference whatever to
the substances in question. The same is true of temporal relations.
Any individual substance remains exactly what it is, in no way af-
fected
by
other substances, and it would indeed remain unaffected
even if all other substances were annihilated. All relations which are
27
F.
G Varela and
H.
R. Maturana, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation,”
28 Zbid. p. 380.
Philosophy of Science, 39 1972),p. 378.
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The Contemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism
221
quantitatively specifiable are of
this
kind;
in
this theory they must
necessarily be entirely external to the material substances 29
Yet the explication of theses M-1-M-4 has involved
a
rejection of ex-
ternal relations.
In addition, the question must be raised as to the appropriateness of
characterizing the nature of physico-chemical existents as material. Are
we simply to disassociate the nature of physico-chemical existents from
their interrelatedness? Might not physico-chemical existents be conceived
in such a way that the nature and interrelatedness of the physico-chemical
existent be in an important sense identified? What is the nature of a phy-
sico-chemical existent whose properties include the potential of being
fashioned into
”
and nherent power of spontaneous self-assembly ”? Im-
portant advances in answering these questions have been made 30.
8. The reconciliation of mechanism and organicism.
The reconciliation of mechanism and organicism,
I
suggest, is brought
about by the contemporary mechanist’s acceptance of the doctrine of internal
relations. Making sense of M-1-M-4 has involved an implicit acceptance
of this doctrine. The explication of the key concepts of M-1-M-4 has led
to the theses that physico-chemical parts have the potential
to
act differently
in different complexes, that physico-chemical parts are modified according
to the complexes they organize, and that the complete description of phy-
sico-chemical parts must involve reference to this potential for modification.
These notions do not suggest that the interrelatedness of physico-chemical
parts is to be disassociated from their nature; rather they suggest that their
nature is their relationships.
Once it is seen that contemporary mechanism accepts the doctrine of
internal relations, the reconciliation of mechanism and organicism is clear.
0-1-0-4 are nothing more than the application of the doctrine of internal
relations to organisms.
29 Leclerc, p. 265.
30 See, especially,
Bohm
and Leclerc.
Ann Plamondon
Department
of
Philosophy
Box 9 Loyola University
New Orleans
La.
7 118
U . S .
A .
Dialectica
Vol.
29, No 4 1975)