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20102010

Report of the

Auditor Generalof Canadato the House of Commons

DECEMBER

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

The Public Sector IntegrityCommissioner of Canada

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The Report is available on our Web site at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca.

For copies of the Report or other Office of the Auditor General publications, contact

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

240 Sparks Street, Stop 10-1

Ottawa, Ontario

K1A 0G6

Telephone: 613-952-0213, ext. 5000, or 1-888-761-5953

Fax: 613-943-5485

Hearing impaired only TTY: 613-954-8042

Email: [email protected]

Ce document est galement publi en franais.

Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2010

Cat. No. FA3-66/2010E-PDF

ISBN 978-1-100-17430-3

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To the Honourable Speaker of the House of Commons:

I have the honour to transmit herewith my special report on the Public Sector Integrity

Commissioner of Canada, which is to be laid before the House in accordance with

the provisions of subsection 8(2) of theAuditor General Act.

Yours sincerely,

Sheila Fraser, FCA

OTTAWA, 9 December 2010

Auditor General of CanadaVrificatrice gnrale du Canada

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Report of the Auditor General of CanadaDecember 2010 iii

Table of Contents

Foreword 1

Introduction 3

Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada 3

Complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada 3

Observations 5

Conduct and interactions with PSIC staff 5

The Commissioner engaged in inappropriate conduct 5

The Commissioner engaged in retaliatory actions 7

Performance of mandated functions 9

Operational guidance was not finalized or implemented 9

There are concerns about a reluctance to investigate 9

Decisions were not always supported 10

Conclusion 13

Subsequent Event 13

About the Audit 14

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Report of the Auditor General of CanadaDecember 2010 1

Foreword

This report presents the results of our audit of the allegations related

to the conduct of the former Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of

Canada as a deputy head. The Office of the Public Sector Integrity

Commissioner of Canada (PSIC)was created in April 2007 to provide a

means for federal public servants and members of the public to disclose

potential wrongdoing in the federal public sector. Under the Public

Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA or the Act), if a federal publicservant or member of the public wishes to make a disclosure of

wrongdoing that concerns PSIC, the disclosure may be made to the

Auditor General of Canada. In investigating that disclosure, the Auditor

General has the same powers and duties as the Public Sector Integrity

Commissioner (the Commissioner). I recently exercised some of these

powers and duties as a result of disclosures that I received under the Act.

In light of the statutory requirement for an independent review of the

PSDPA in April 2012, I wish to bring to the attention of Parliament

two matters related to the Act that we identified in the course of our

work. The first is the inability to pursue information outside the public

sector during an investigation under the Act. The second is the lack of

an independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within

PSIC. We did not look at all of the provisions of the Act.

During an investigation into wrongdoing under the PSDPA, the

Commissioner can only obtain information from within the public

sector. If the investigation involves obtaining information from outside

the public sector, the Act requires the Commissioner to cease that part

of the investigation and refer it to a competent authority. This prevents

the Commissioner from obtaining information relevant to certaininvestigationsfrom former public servants, for example. In the case

of the disclosures that I received under the Act, we determined that

our work would require information from outside the public sector.

In ceasing an investigation under the PSDPA and transferring it to

another authority, however, none of the individuals who cooperate in

the new process receive the same protection from reprisals as they

would have under the PSDPA.


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Report of the Auditor General of CanadaDecember 20102

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONEROF CANADA

In addition, while the Auditor General can receive disclosures of

wrongdoing concerning PSIC under the PSDPA, there is no

independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within

PSIC. Reprisal complaints under the Act can only be filed with the

Commissioner, and the Commissioner has the sole authority todetermine whether an investigation will be conducted. The

Commissioner also has the sole authority to determine whether a

reprisal complaint will be referred to the Public Servants Disclosure

Protection Tribunal for a determination of whether the complainant

has been subject to reprisals. In this case, it was the Commissioner

herself that was alleged to have engaged in reprisal actions.

As a result of these two limitations of the PSDPA, the Office of the

Auditor General of Canada ceased its investigations and converted

them into a performance audit under theAuditor General Act.

I hope that these observations on my Offices experience with

the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act will be of assistance to

Parliament when it considers the review of the operation of the Act.

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Introduction

Office of the Public Sector

Integrity Commissioner of Canada

1. The Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of

Canada (PSIC) was established under the Public Servants DisclosureProtection Act (PSDPA), which came into force on 15 April 2007.

The PSDPA and PSIC exist to provide a means for federal public

servants and members of the public to disclose potential wrongdoing in

the federal public sector. The PSDPA also protects public servants who

make a disclosure, or public servants who cooperate in an investigation,

against reprisal.

2. The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada

(the Commissioner) is the head of PSIC and has the rank and powers

of a department deputy head. The Commissioner is an independent

Agent of Parliament appointed by the Governor in Council afterconsultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and

House of Commons, and following the approval of the appointment by

resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. The first Public

Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada, Christiane Ouimet, began

her seven-year term at PSIC on 6 August 2007. On average, PSIC has

employed about 20 full-time equivalents since its inception.

Complaints received by

the Office of the Auditor

Genera

l of Ca

na

da

3. If a federal public servant or member of the public wishes to

make a disclosure (or complaint) of wrongdoing that concerns PSIC,

section 14 of the PSDPA allows them to make the disclosure to the

Auditor General of Canada who has, in relation to that disclosure, the

powers, duties and protections of the Public Sector Integrity

Commissioner under this Act.

4. On 28 November 2008, 30 April 2009, and 17 July 2009, the

Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) received complaints

from three individuals against Public Sector Integrity Commissioner

Christiane Ouimet. Details on the specific allegations against the

Commissioner were obtained in meetings with each of the complainants.

Allegations of wrongdoing made against the Commissioner were related

to her conduct as a deputy head and interactions with PSIC staff, reprisal

(or retaliatory) actions taken by the Commissioner against former

employees, performance pay decisions, and the performance of her

mandated functions.

5. The OAG commenced investigations into the first two disclosures.

On 11 May 2009, the OAG ceased its investigations and converted

them into a performance audit under theAuditor General Act. This was

done for two reasons. First, the investigative work would involve

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obtaining information that was outside the public sector, which is not

permitted under the PSDPA. Second, the PSDPA does not identify an

independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within

PSIC. While the Auditor General can receive disclosures of wrongdoing

concerning PSIC under the PSDPA, reprisal complaints can only be filedwith the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner who, in this case, was

alleged to have engaged in the reprisal actions.

6. In the course of our audit, we met with 34 current and former

PSIC employees, as well as with senior government officials and third

parties. We reviewed documentation and communications at PSIC,

and documentation at PSICs service providersthe Canadian Human

Rights Commission for financial administration services, and Status of

Women Canada for human resource services. Finally, we interviewed the

Commissioner on 2 December 2009 and on 13 and 14 September 2010

to obtain her representations regarding the allegations made against herby the complainants and the information that we collected in the course

of our audit.

7. We have organized the allegations against the Commissioner into

the following categories, which we discuss in the observations section

of this report:

Conduct and interactions with PSIC staff

Retaliatory actions

Performance of mandated functions

8. On the allegations dealing with performance pay decisions, we

have reported separately to the Chief Human Resources Officer at the

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, and to PSIC Management.

9. The period covered by our audit was 15 April 2007 to

31 July 2009. More details concerning the audit, including the audit

objective and criteria, can be found in About the Audit at the end

of this report.

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Observations

Conduct and interactions

with PSIC staff

10. The complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General

of Canada included allegations about inappropriate conduct by theCommissioner, including in her interactions with PSIC staff. These

allegations included statements to the effect that the Commissioner

yelled, swore, and also berated, marginalized, and intimidated certain

PSIC employees, and that she engaged in reprisal actions. We sought to

determine whether allegations made by the complainants concerning the

Commissioners conduct were founded. Specifically, we looked at whether

human resource decisions and management practices of the

Commissioner reflected the highest standards of ethical conduct

as required by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service;

human resource management practices of PSIC and ofthe Commissioner fostered a respectful workplace for all

PSIC employees;

actions of the Commissioner raised reasonable grounds for

believing that a reprisal was taken against a complainant.

The Commissioner engaged in inappropriate conduct

11. We met with current and former PSIC employees and reviewed

documentation and communications at PSIC. Many of the current

and former PSIC employees that we met with expressed concerns

about the Commissioner communicating with PSIC employees in a

disrespectful and unprofessional manner, including yelling, swearing,

and also berating PSIC employees, at times in front of co-workers.

Several instances of disrespectful and unprofessional communication on

the part of the Commissioner were corroborated by multiple witnesses

and, in some cases, by email communications, electronic documents on

PSICs shared drive, and contemporaneous notes. The Commissioner

denied these allegations and stated that the information provided by

the complainants and the witnesses was exaggerated. The

Commissioner stated that she did not treat her employees in a

disrespectful or unprofessional manner.

12. A large number of the current and former PSIC employees

that we met with also expressed concerns about the Commissioner

marginalizing or intimidating certain PSIC employees. Examples of

allegations with regard to the treatment of these employees included

removing employees from decision-making processes and

communication networks;

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overloading or removing employees workload and duties; and

ignoring employees.

Some of the current and former employees that we spoke with alsotold us that the Commissioner had indicated to them that she

wanted to push certain employees to leave PSIC. Again, several

allegations of marginalization or intimidation were corroborated by

multiple individuals and, in some cases, by email communications. The

Commissioner denied these allegations and advised us that, in some

cases, duties were removed from individuals at their request or because

the duties were no longer necessary after PSIC had completed its

transition from the former Public Sector Integrity Office.

13. We found a high level of turnover at PSIC in the first

two years of its operation. Between 5 August 2007 and 31 July 2009,24 employees left the Office, which amounted to an average turnover

rate of over 50 percent per year. This included the departure of

the majority of staff in senior positions who reported directly to the

Commissioner. The Commissioner told us that the level of turnover

within PSIC was normal for a small entity.

14. We met with 18 of the 24 people that left PSIC during the period

covered by our audit, and with 5 more people who left PSIC after

31 July 2009 but who were employed by PSIC during the period covered

by our audit. Many of these former PSIC employees told us that they

left as a result of the Commissioners conduct and the resulting work

environment. Some of these former employees also told us that they

experienced health problems as a result of their interactions with the

Commissioner. Some very negative terms were used by both current and

former employees to describe the work environment at PSIC.

15. In our interview with the Commissioner on 13 and

14 September 2010, we asked her to respond to some of the specific

alleged events that were brought to our attention. The Commissioner

denied the allegations against her concerning her conduct and

interactions with PSIC staff. She told us that she acted in good faithand within the boundaries of government policies at all times. The

Commissioner stated that some of the current and former employees

who had made allegations against her did so because they were angry

that they were not given the promotions they were promised by

previous managers. The Commissioner also suggested that many of the

current and former employees who made allegations were incompetent

or not productive during their tenure at PSIC. The Commissioner

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acknowledged that PSIC has faced some challenges as a new

organization, but that it is exactly where it should be after three years

of operation.

16. In our view, the allegations against the Commissioner concerningher inappropriate conduct and interactions with PSIC staff are

founded. In arriving at this conclusion, we considered information

gathered from multiple sources throughout our audit. This included

interviews with current and former PSIC employees, the corroboration

in email communications, electronic documents on PSICs shared

drive, contemporaneous notes, the corroborating testimony of

witnesses, and our interviews with the Commissioner.

The Commissioner engaged in retaliatory actions

17. A former PSIC senior executive alleged on 17 July 2009,in the third complaint received by the Office of the Auditor General

of Canada, that the Commissioner undertook a series of retaliatory

actions against him because she believed that he had complained

about her to the Auditor General and that he had cooperated in our

audit. The former PSIC employee (the complainant) alleged that

the Commissioner

provided information of a personal nature to his previous

employer, to senior officials in government, and to a private

sector security consultant;

sought to obtain confidential information from his personnel

files in the possession of his previous employer;

prepared and circulated a large volume of information concerning

his character, health, and performance during his tenure at PSIC,

following his departure from the Office.

The complainant further alleged that these actions taken by the

Commissioner could adversely affect his current and/or future

employment or working conditions, or his ability to obtain future

contracts with the federal public service.

18. We met with senior officials in government, including with

the complainants previous employer, with the private sector security

consultant, and with certain current and former PSIC employees. We

also reviewed relevant email communications and documentation at

PSIC. We interviewed the Commissioner on 2 December 2009 to

obtain her representations regarding the allegations that she

undertook retaliatory actions against the complainant.

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19. We found that the Commissioner

disclosed personal information about the complainant to his

previous employer, to senior officials in government, and to the

private sector security consultant;

requested access to the complainants personnel file from his

previous employer in order to use this information in a security

investigation that targeted the complainant and three other

former PSIC employees;

prepared and circulated information about the complainant within

PSIC, which included leading the preparation of four binders

comprising 96 documents and totalling more than 375 pages of

information about him, circulating at least 50 emails about him,

and involving at least 6 of her staff in these activities; and

did not meet her obligations under the Treasury Boards Policy on

Privacy Protection and under the Privacy Act, in responding to the

requests made by the complainant to access his personal

information in PSICs possession.

20. In addition, we found that the Commissioner took the above

actions against the former PSIC employee at a time when he had not

yet made a complaint to the Auditor General, and more than six to

eight months after he had resigned from public service. In our opinion,

the Commissioner also breached the Privacy Act in undertaking theseactions. As a direct result of the Commissioners actions against the

complainant, senior government officials in three government

organizations, individuals at a private sector security company, and a

number of PSIC employees were provided information concerning the

Commissioners opinions about the complainants character, health,

and performance.

21. The Commissioner told us that she acted in good faith at all times

and intended no prejudice toward anyone. The Commissioner told us

that she had acted to protect the reputation of her Office and on the

advice that she received from PSICs Departmental Audit Committee.

22. We concluded that the allegations made by the former PSIC

employee that the Commissioner undertook a series of retaliatory

actions against him because she believed that he had complained about

her to the Auditor General and that he had cooperated in our audit are

founded. Again, we considered information gathered from multiple

sources in the course of our audit in arriving at this conclusion.

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Performance of mandated

functions

23. The complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General of

Canada included allegations that the Commissioner was not properly

performing her mandated functions. These allegations included

statements to the effect that the Commissioner did not want to

conduct investigations or refer complaints of reprisal to the PublicServants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal), and that she

did not establish policies and procedures within PSIC for dealing with

disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal. We sought to

determine whether these allegations were founded. Specifically, we

looked at whether

PSIC had established, implemented, and monitored effective

procedures and practices to receive, record, review, investigate,

and otherwise deal with disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints

made with respect to reprisals;

investigations into allegations of wrongdoing or reprisal received

by PSIC were conducted in accordance with the Public Servants

Disclosure Protection Act.

Operational guidance was not finalized or implemented

24. We spoke to members of PSIC investigative and legal staff and

reviewed documents provided to us. We found that, for the period

covered by our audit, draft internal guidance for handling disclosures

of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal under the PSDPA existed.

This included discussion papers concerning the legal framework of the

PSDPA and certain key concepts under the Act. However, procedures

for conducting investigations had not yet been finalized or implemented.

25. During the interview on 13 and 14 September 2010, the

Commissioner told us that many policies and procedures have been

developed by PSIC, and she subsequently provided us with copies of

12 different internal policies. We reviewed the documents provided by

the Commissioner and found that none of them set out procedures for

handling disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal received

under the PSDPA.

There are concerns about a reluctance to investigate

26. According to its 200708 and 200809 annual reports, PSIC

received a total of 114 disclosures of wrongdoing and 42 complaints

of reprisal in the first two years of its operation. During this period,

out of the 156 files, three formal investigations were conducted.

No disclosures of wrongdoing were determined to be founded and no

reprisal complaints were referred to the Tribunal. Following the period

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covered by our audit, PSIC released its annual report for 200910. For

its third year in operation, PSIC reported having received an

additional 56 disclosures of wrongdoing and 16 complaints of reprisal.

Out of these 72 additional files, two disclosures of wrongdoing were

reported as having been closed after formal investigation, neither ofwhich resulted in a finding of wrongdoing. Two reprisal files were

reported as being under formal investigation.

27. Many current and former PSIC employees we met with as part

of our audit expressed concerns that the Commissioner was reluctant

to investigate disclosures of wrongdoing and to refer complaints of

reprisal to the Tribunal. Additionally, some of these current and former

employees raised concerns about the Commissioners objectivity and

impartiality in her decisions and her involvement in operational files.

Most of the individuals who expressed these concerns were members of

PSICs investigative or legal teams and were directly involved in theoperational files.


Commissioner told us that the statistics reported in her annual reports

are normal for a new organization such as PSIC, especially one with a

complex mandate. She also told us that the PSDPA gives her a large

amount of discretion in deciding whether to conduct formal

investigations into disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of

reprisal, and whether such investigations are in the public interest.

The Commissioner informed us that she is not reluctant to commence

investigations, and that a number of investigations have been initiatedand are well under way.

Decisions were not always supported

29. We reviewed 86 PSIC closed operational files as part of our audit.

In many cases, we found that decisions by PSIC to refuse to formally

investigate, or to dismiss, disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of

reprisal were not supported by the nature of work performed, the

documentation on file, or both. In our view, a more thorough approach

to these files was warranted before decisions to refuse to investigate, or

to dismiss, these disclosures and complaints could be reached.

30. In one case of disclosure of wrongdoing, the complainant alleged

that he was directed by his manager to accept a late bid on a

procurement contract contrary to the Treasury Board Contracting Policy

and applicable law. The manager who allegedly issued the direction also

allegedly had an interest in the organization that submitted the late bid.

Although PSIC recognized that the alleged actions by the manager

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would constitute a wrongdoing, it refused to investigate the disclosure

because the contract was never awarded, and because PSIC was satisfied

that the situation had been properly dealt with by the Senior Officer of

the government organization. We did not find any evidence on file to

demonstrate that the government organization had addressed thealleged conflict of interest and direction by the manager to accept the

late bid. The complainant also filed a complaint of reprisal in relation

to this disclosure based on other events that took place. PSIC refused

to investigate the reprisal complaint on the basis that managements

actions were within its privilege in the course of managing an office.

Again, we did not find any evidence on file in support of this conclusion.

We asked the Commissioner for her position regarding PSICs

conclusions on this file. The Commissioner told us that she was satisfied

by the recommendations of her staff. PSIC subsequently informed us

that it recently conducted a review of a number of its files, and that the

case described in this paragraph has been re-opened.

31. In a second case of disclosure of wrongdoing, the complainant

alleged that a public servant was being permitted to pursue studies on a

full-time basis while at the same time collecting a full salary for duties

not being performed. PSIC refused to investigate the disclosure of

wrongdoing based on its conclusion that an agreement was in place

between the government organization and the employee in question,

allowing for the situation described in the disclosure. As part of the

work that PSIC performed in this file, PSIC contacted officials within

the government organization in which the wrongdoing was allegedlyoccurring. According to documents on file, department officials

confirmed that the studies were not a requirement of the position held

and that related costs were not reimbursable. Department officials also

contended that an agreement with the employee in question was in

place, but no such document was on file at PSIC. PSICs decision to

not investigate the disclosure of wrongdoing is not supported by the

documents in the file, and PSIC did not conduct a probing analysis

into the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement. We asked

the Commissioner for her position regarding PSICs decision on this

file. The Commissioner responded that she did not wish to discuss the

merit of PSICs decision; that the letter of decision was not signed byher; but that she was satisfied the investigation had followed PSIC

procedures. PSIC subsequently informed us that the case described in

this paragraph has also been re-opened.

32. In the case of a complaint of reprisal, PSIC refused to investigate the

complaint based on its conclusion that the alleged measures taken against

the complainant were not the result of a protected disclosure under the

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PSDPA (and therefore outside of PSICs jurisdiction) and, further, that the

matter was a workplace conflict. We found that PSIC reached these

conclusions despite evidence on file that the complainant had in fact

made a protected disclosure (and therefore it was within PSICs

jurisdiction), and without any evidence that PSIC had investigated theworkplace to determine if there was indeed a workplace conflict. We asked

the Commissioner for her position regarding PSICs decision on this file.

The Commissioner referred us back to the analysis contained in the file

and stated that she was not aware of any additional information

supporting the conclusion. We reviewed the file once again, and

concluded that the reasons provided for the refusal to investigate this

reprisal complaint are not supported by the documents on file.

33. Under the PSDPA, in considering whether to make an

application to the Tribunal for a determination of whether a reprisal

was taken against a complainant, the Commissioner must considerwhether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal was

taken. In the only complaint of reprisal formally investigated by PSIC

during the period covered by our audit, we found that the

Commissioner stated in her decision letter that she was dismissing the

complaint on the basis that she could not conclude an act of reprisal

had occurred. The rationale set out in the Commissioners decision

letter to the complainant was that PSIC could not identify a clear

nexus (or clear link) between the alleged reprisal action and the

disclosure of wrongdoing. In our view, such a determination extends

beyond the Commissioners responsibilities under the PSDPA because

it goes further than assessing whether there are reasonable grounds

for believing that a reprisal was taken. In our interview with the

Commissioner, she stated that, for all cases of alleged reprisal, a clear

nexus between the disclosure of wrongdoing and the alleged reprisal

actions is the minimum criterion that must be met in order to proceed

with the complaint. PSIC subsequently informed us that it does not

agree with our finding that the Commissioners determination in this

file extended beyond her responsibilities.


Commissioner acknowledged that she is accountable for, and stands

behind, all of the decisions made by PSIC, and that these decisions

were based on the advice received from experts, including her staff.

She also told us that the PSDPA gives her a large amount of discretion

in deciding whether to conduct formal investigations into disclosures

of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal, and whether such

investigations are in the public interest.

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35. In our view, the allegations against the Commissioner concerning

the improper performance of her mandated functions are founded.

During the period covered by our audit, procedures for conducting

investigations were not finalized or implemented. We also found that, in

many cases, decisions to refuse to investigate, or to dismiss disclosures ofwrongdoing and complaints of reprisal were not supported by either the

nature of work performed, the documentation on file, or both. It is also

our view that decisions by the Commissioner to refuse to investigate

certain complaints of reprisal on the basis that she could not conclude

that an act of reprisal had occurred extended beyond her responsibilities

under the PSDPA. Again, we considered information gathered from

multiple sources in the course of our audit in arriving at this conclusion.

Conclusion

36. In our view, the allegations made by the complainants

concerning the Commissioners inappropriate conduct and

interactions with PSIC staff, retaliatory actions by the Commissioner,

and the failure by the Commissioner to properly perform her mandated

functions, are founded. As previously noted, we have reported

separately to the Chief Human Resources Officer at the Treasury

Board of Canada Secretariat and to PSIC management on the

allegations related to performance pay decisions.

37. We are of the view that the Commissioners conduct and

actions were inconsistent with the spirit of the Public ServantsDisclosure Protection Act, the same Act from which she obtains her

mandate. Further, the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service

states that Public servants shall act at all times in a manner that will

bear the closest public scrutiny; an obligation that is not fully

discharged by simply acting within the law. In our view, the

Commissioners behaviour and actions do not pass the test of public

scrutiny and are inappropriate and unacceptable for a public servant

most notably for the Agent of Parliament specifically charged with the

responsibility of upholding integrity in the public sector and of

protecting public servants from reprisal.

Subsequent Event

38. On 20 October 2010, PSIC announced that Christiane Ouimet

retired from public service, effective 18 October 2010. We provided

Ms. Ouimet with the opportunity to comment on a draft of our report,

but we did not receive a response from her.

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About the Audit

All of the audit work in this report was conducted in accordance with the standards for assurance

engagements set by The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. While the Office adopts these

standards as the minimum requirement for our audits, we also draw upon the standards and practices of

other disciplines.

Objective

The objective of the audit was to investigate and assess the allegations pertaining to the conduct of the

Commissioner as a deputy headincluding her conduct and interactions with PSIC staff and the

performance of her mandated functionsand to determine if her conduct and other actions are consistent

with applicable legislation, government policies and public sector values and ethics.

Scope and approachOn 28 November 2008, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) received a disclosure under

section 14 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA). The disclosure alleged wrongdoing on

the part of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada, Christiane Ouimet (the Commissioner).

The allegations pertained to the Commissioners behaviour as a deputy head, including her interactions

with staff from the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada (PSIC), turnover of PSIC

employees, performance pay decisions, and performance of her mandated functions.

On 30 April 2009, the OAG received a second disclosure under the PSDPA in relation to the

Commissioner. This disclosure also alleged wrongdoing by the Commissioner relating to her conduct and

to the performance of her mandated functions.

On 11 May 2009, the OAG ceased its investigations into the two disclosures and converted them into a

performance audit under theAuditor General Act. This was done pursuant to sections 24 and 34 of the

PSDPA. Specifically, the Auditor General was of the opinion that the investigations would involve

obtaining information that was outside of the public sector. Section 34 of the PSDPA instructs that, in

such situations, that part of the investigation must be ceased and referred to an authority that she

considers competent to deal with it. The Auditor General was of the opinion that the subject matter of the

disclosures (including the allegations of reprisal relating to the Commissioners actions) could more

appropriately be dealt with through a performance audit under sections 5 and 7 of theAuditor General Act.

In the course of the audit, on 17 July 2009, the Auditor General received another complaint pertaining to

the conduct of the Commissioner as a deputy head. This complaint raised allegations of retaliatory action(an allegation of reprisal can only be made under the PSDPA) taken by the Commissioner against the

complainant in response to her belief that he was the, or one of the, original complainant(s), and that he

had participated in our investigations and audit. The OAG included examination of this complaint in its

ongoing performance audit.

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The Commissioner was provided with a full opportunity to respond to the allegations against her. She was

also given a full opportunity to provide us with additional information that she considered to be relevant

to our audit. On 18 September 2009, we provided the Commissioner with documentation that we had

collected in relation to the third complaint. We interviewed the Commissioner on 2 December 2009 to

obtain her representations regarding these allegations. On 11 June 2010, we provided the Commissionerwith documentation that we had collected in relation to the remainder of our performance audit. We

interviewed the Commissioner on 13 and 14 September 2010 to obtain her representations regarding all

allegations made against her by the complainants and others who had provided information to the OAG.

The periods between each of the disclosures of evidence and the subsequent interviews were to provide

the Commissioner with enough time to review the materials that the OAG provided to her in preparation

for the interviews.

In the course of our audit, we met with 34 current and former PSIC employees, as well as with senior

government officials and third parties. We reviewed documentation and communications on site at PSIC,

and documentation at its service providers, the Canadian Human Rights Commission for financial

administration services, and the Status of Women Canada for human resource services.

Period covered by the audit

The period covered by our audit was from 15 April 2007 to 31 July 2009. This period was chosen based on

the allegations made in the three complaints. Audit work for this report was substantially completed on

8 October 2010.

Criteria

To investigate and assess the allegations pertaining to the conduct of the Commissioner as a deputy headincluding her conduct and interactions with

PSIC staff and the performance of her mandated functionsand to determine if her conduct and other actions are consistent with applicable legislation,government policies, and public sector values and ethics, we used the following criteria:

Criteria Sources

Human resource decisions and management practices of the

Commissioner reflect the highest standards of ethical conduct as

required by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service.

Public Service Employment Act

Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service, Treasury Board

Ethical Guidelines for Public Office Holders, Privy

Council Office

Terms and Conditions of Employment for Full-Time Governor in

Council Appointees, Privy Council Office

Human resource management practices of PSIC and of the

Commissioner foster a respectful workplace for all PSIC

employees.

Public Service Employment Act

Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service, Treasury Board

Policy on Prevention and Resolution of Harassment in the

Workplace, Treasury Board

Actions of the Commissioner raised reasonable grounds for

believing that a reprisal was taken against a complainant.

Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act

Privacy Act

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