Pakistan Trip Report

8/3/2019 Pakistan Trip Report

1/25www.americanprogress.o

Meeting the Challenges in Pakistan

Trip report and recommendations or U.S. policy

Lawrence J. Korb, Brian Katulis, and Colin Cookman May 2009


2/25

Meeting the Challenges in PakistanTrip report and recommendations or U.S. policy

Lawrence J. Korb, Brian Katulis, and Colin Cookman May 2009


3/25

1 Cee f Aeca Pgess | meeg e Caeges Paksa

Introduction and summary

During he Obama adminisraions rs our monhs in oce, Pakisan has reemerged

as a op naional securiy concern. Inernal insabiliy and violence in Pakisan has esca-

laed, wih a aliban insurgency seizing more erriory and milian groups undermining

a weak Pakisani sae. Divisions among Pakisans poliical leaders, which came o a

head in a batle beween Pakisans wo leading poliical paries in March, have impeded

a naional consensus on addressing he long lis o Pakisans problems. Furhermore,

a volaile regional securiy environmen has deerioraed, wih he Mumbai erroris

atacks in lae November escalaing ensions beween India and Pakisan, and he war

in Aghanisan having a direc impac on Pakisans securiy. Te Unied Saes is now

ransiioning rom ormulaing a new sraegy on Pakisan o he more dicul ask o

policy implemenaion and execuion.

Presiden Barack Obama, in his March 27, 2009 speech oulining he preliminary resuls

o his adminisraions review o U.S. policy oward Aghanisan and Pakisan, embraced

he concep o building a long-erm parnership wih Pakisan, which he Cener or

American Progress oulined in las Novembers Parnership or Progress repor on he

counry. Tis general concep o parnership has also inormed a number o legislaive

proposals inroduced in boh houses o Congress in atemps o implemen a shi in

sraegy on Pakisan.

A his pivoal juncure, he Cener or American Progress sen a delegaion o Pakisan

in April 2009 o examine he dynamic siuaion in he counry and gain a beter under-

sanding o he challenges acing he Unied Saes as i adjuss is bilaeral policy

oward Pakisan. Te Ceners analyss me wih more han 100 individuals in Islamabad,

Rawalpindi, Karachi, and Lahore, including represenaives o he Pakisani civilian

governmen, civil sociey, and non-governmenal acors; serving and reired members o

he Pakisani securiy services and diplomaic corps; scholars and local and inernaional

press observers; and Unied Saes embassy sa. Te ollowing observaions and recom-

mendaions are a resul o hose conversaions and our research.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.html


4/25


Observations

Te delegaion assessed he siuaion in Pakisan and developed recommendaions or

advancing U.S. policy in Pakisan. Te eam ound ha:

The U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship remains plagued by a mutual trust deficit.

Boh counries sill need o ake signican seps o enhance rus and cooperaion inorder o build a lasing bilaeral parnership and overcome he ransacional legacy o

he relaionship.

Weak governance remains an endemic challenge throughout Pakistan. Te chal-

lenges ha he Pakisani governmen aces in delivering basic services, seting policy priori-

ies, carrying ou long-erm planning, and implemening reorms has crucial implicaions

or he counrys securiy as well as is economic developmen. In pars o he counry

where he sae has ailed o provide law and order and does no mee he basic needs o

he people, exremis groups work o exploi he siuaion by lling he gap. Improvemen

will ulimaely depend on Pakisans civilian leadership and he abiliy o is public o hold

hem accounable or heir acions. Sill, he Unied Saes needs o place an even greaer

prioriy on hese issues in is own bilaeral relaionship wih Pakisan.

Pakistans willingness and capacity to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency

and counterterrorist operations remains limited. Pakisans miliary esablishmen

remains ocused on convenional confic wih is neighbor India, and cooperaion

beween civilian and miliary leaders on counererrorism acion remains mixed, despie

increasing domesic anxiey abou he acions o milians in he counrys norhwes.

Ten key recommendations

As he Obama adminisraion moves o implemen key policy iniiaives on Pakisan in

he coming years, i should work o advance a comprehensive and inegraed diplomaic,

securiy, economic, and governance agenda aimed a building a long-erm parnership

wih Pakisan. Based on our rip, our 10 key recommendaions or U.S. policy are:

1. Build on recent regional and international diplomatic initiatives such as the trilat-

eral U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan talks and the Friends of Pakistan forum. In addiion

o coninuing o paricipae in inernaional eors o enhance regional securiy and

increase economic developmen in Pakisan, he Obama adminisraion should also

reengage in regional diplomacy ha seeks o revive dialogue beween Pakisan andIndia, including a discussion o Kashmir. Pakisans hrea percepions are a acor in

advancing sabiliy in he counry and broader region. Oher key neighbors and global

powers mus also be included in discussions, including Russia, China, and Iran.


5/25


2. Initiate a comprehensive diplomatic engagement with a broad range of Pakistani

institutions and actors. Te miliary in Pakisan reains considerable infuence and

mus also be included in any parnership, bu he hisory o relaions under ormer

Presiden Pervez Musharra shows ha i is insucien or any U.S. policy o rely on an

exclusive parnership wih army chies or paricular leaders o advance U.S. ineress

in he counry. Te adminisraion should iniiae an expansive plan o esablish broad

conacs and cooperaion beween Pakisani and American civilian insiuions, includ-ing hink anks, lawyers groups, civil sociey organizaions, and he general public.

3. Formulate and sign a bilateral strategic framework agreement with Pakistan. Formalizing he goals or cooperaion in a bilaeral sraegic ramework agreemen

can help boh counries engage in sraegic planning on a range o ronsand i can

help boh he Unied Saes and Pakisan break he cycle o ransacional and reacive

policymaking ha has plagued he bilaeral relaionship or decades.

4. Strengthen the police and judicial component of counterterrorism assistance.A op

prioriy or U.S. counererrorism assisance should be providingproessional rain-ing, equipmen, and manpower o he cours, he Federal Invesigaion Agency, he

Inelligence Bureau, and provincial police orceswhich serve on he ron lines o

Pakisani counererrorism operaionsin order o conduc successul invesigaions,

prosecuions, and convicions o suspeced erroriss. Te miliary has an imporan

role in sabilizing key pars o he counry, bu in he long run, a well-uncioning

police and judicial secor are more eecive weapons in counering erroris neworks.

5. Increase assistance for internally displaced persons.Te Obama adminisraionsMay 2009 announcemen o $110 million in assisance or inernally displaced persons

feeing confic areas is a good sar. Bu much more assisance will be needed given he

size o displacemens resuling rom inernal violence in Swa and oher pars o hecounry. Te quick response o he devasaing 2005 earhquake in Pakisan helped he

Unied Saes improve is sanding wih he Pakisani people and marginalize milian

groups, and he growing IDP crisis is a momen when he Unied Saes can sand wih

he Pakisani people and address heir basic needs.

6. Enhance efforts to keep Pakistans nuclear arsenal safe and secure. Increased coop-

eraion on he nuclear ron will help preven he illegal ranser o nuclear echnology

and experise and saeguard he arsenal rom unauhorized access. Broader diplomaic

eors will be necessary o reduce he regional ensions ha conribue o he argu-

men or an arsenal expansion.

7. Launch a comprehensive effort to advance Pakistani civilian government capacity

and expertise in coordination with proposed bilateral development assistance

increases.o he greaes exen possible, he Obama adminisraion should workwih he insiuions o he Pakisani governmen and key non-governmenal organiza-


6/25


ions o conduc long-erm economic and social developmen planning or he counry,

ideniy key projecs or new assisance money, and build habis o ransparency wih

heir Pakisani parner minisries. Making an increased U.S. developmen assisance

program eecive will require greaer coordinaion wih oher bilaeral assisance

programs and inernaional and mulilaeral iniiaives by he Inernaional Moneary

Fund, or IMF, World Bank, and he Friends o Pakisan group.

8. Include careful oversight and accounting mechanisms in assistance legislation. Te

U.S. adminisraion should work hrough a bilaeral ramework o gain inpu rom he

Pakisani governmen o he greaes exen possible on which projecs new assisance

money should und.

9. Reform the leading institutions of U.S. diplomacy and foreign development assis-

tance. For decades, he Unied Saes has underinvesed in is own civilian insiuions

o diplomacy and economic developmen. Pakisan will likely be he greaes es case

o wheher he Obama adminisraion can reorm hese insiuions o mee he chal-

lenges o he 21s cenury.

10. Engage with Congress and the American people on the importance of Pakistan

policy. Broad consensus currenly exiss wihin he oreign policy communiy abou

he need o shi greaer atenion o Pakisan. Ye he Obama adminisraion needs o

do a beter job in engaging members o Congress and he American public o garner

suppor or a policy aimed a building a long-erm parnership wih Pakisan. Te

American public needs o hear a sronger raionale or is policy and specic plans or

implemenaion o he expanded commimen oward Pakisan and Aghanisan.

Te observaions and recommendaions in his repor build on CAPs body o work

on he siuaion in he broader regionincluding Aghanisan. Our previous sraegyrepor, he November 2008 Parnership or Progress: Advancing a New Sraegy or

Prosperiy and Sabiliy in Pakisan, discussed Pakisans muliple and inerrelaed chal-

lenges o inernal and regional insecuriy, poliical insabiliy, and economic underde-

velopmen in greaer deail. Ta repor concluded ha he U.S.-Pakisan relaionship

needs o shi away rom he shor-erm, ransacional patern ha has characerized

much o he wo naions relaions or decades.

Replacing ha relaionship wih a proacive long-erm bilaeral engagemen will serve as a

bulwark agains regional and global insabiliy. Tis repor aims o oer pracical seps or

making his necessary shi in he sraegic relaionship a realiy, while aking ino accoun

he dynamic landscape in Pakisan and he Unied Saes.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/sustainable_afghanistan.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pakistan_report.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/sustainable_afghanistan.html


7/25

The six months since the Center released its Partnership or Progress report

on Pakistan were a tumultuous period or Pakistan and the broader region,

coinciding with the transition in U.S. administrations. In this period, our key

events and dynamics have served to make the situation in Pakistan and the

broader region even more complicated than it was last year.

Growing instability and insurgency inside Pakistan

The dynamic situation in Northwest Frontier Province, or NWFP, district o

Swat erupted onto the ront pages o U.S. newspapers this April, coinciding

with the CAP trip and perpetuating the crisis mode that has dominated

U.S.-Pakistan relations. The NWFP provincial government has been under

constant attack rom the local aliate o the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the

umbrella terror organization led by Baitullah Mehsud, and aced persistent

criticism or the slow provision o justice and other services in the area. As

the situation worsened, the NWFP government sought to use recently reed

cleric Maulana Su Mohammads Tehrik-e-Niaz-e -Shariat-Mohammadi

party, or TNSM,as an interlocutor with militants as part o a deal that wouldhave instituted a orm o sharia courts in the Malakand Divisionwhich

encompasses Swatin exchange or peace.

Earlier this year, the agreement was endorsed by parliament and signed into

law by President Asi Ali Zardari as the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, or NAR, yet

the provincial government ailed to enorce provisions to disarm Taliban

orces. The militants subsequent armed expansion into adjacent districts

raised concerns in the United States and Pakistan that the agreement repre-

sented a government capitulation to militant demands, reinorcing persistent

U.S. worries about the willingness o its ally to seriously conront militant and

terrorist groups. The military response to the deals disintegration, which has

relied heavily on artillery and aerial bombardment, has resulted in a growing

crisis o more than 2.4 million internally displaced persons.

Power struggles and divisions among Pakistans political leadership

Pakistans successul parliamentary elections in February 2008 were a cause

or celebration, yet the countrys leadership remains divided. The two major

partiesthe Pakistan Peoples Party, or PPP, led by President Zardari, the

husband o the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; and the Pakistan Muslim

League-Nawaz, or PML-N, o ormer Prime Minister Nawaz Shari, who led

the country rom 1997 to 1999are still unwilling to share power with

one another. These tensions boiled over in March 2009, when the Supreme

Court o Pakistan issued an edict blocking Shari and his brother Shahbaz,

chie minister o the Punjab parliament, rom holding oce. This decisionled to mass protests and a planned march on Islamabad that threatened to

topple the government. The governments concessions and reinstatement

o deposed Chie Justice Itikhar Chauhdry helped prevent a complete

political breakdown, but the prospects now look remote or a national unity

government capable o mobilizing the majority o Pakistanis to conront

the countrys many challenges.

Escalating tensions with India and the Mumbai terror attacks

Regional tensions also continue to present a challenge or advancing s

in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group based in Pakistan, killed more tha

people in a vicious terrorist attack in the Indian city o Mumbai in Nove

2008. This attack derailed a nascent rapprochement between Pakistan

dia called the composite dialogue process, which began in 2004. The

had successully negotiated the opening o commercial ties across the

Control in Kashmir the month prior to Mumbai or the rst time in 60 y

Long-standing mutual suspicions between the two countries remain h

although U.S. and other international intelligence and investigative se

have oered assistance to the two countries in the ongoing investigat

prosecution o those responsible.

Ongoing challenges from Afghanistan

The porous border between Pakistan and Aghanistan poses a challen

both countries. It is widely known that militant groups have used lawle

parts o western Pakistan to stage attacks in Aghanistan, but the situa

Aghanistan also threatens Pakistani security as well. An estimated 2 m

reugees who fed the war in Aghanistan remain inside o Pakistan, ad

considerable stress to Pakistans already strained inrastructure and soc

vices capacity. Terrorist and militant groups that once operated out o

territory are now in Pakistan, and these groups have increasingly targe

Pakistani people and security orces with their operations. The annual

ism report released by the State Department in late April 2009 reporte

terrorist attacks inside o Pakistan have quadrupled since 2006.

Developments in Pakistan: 2008April 2009

National Capital

Towns

Cities

Federally Administe

Settled Areas and/o

Administered Tribal

Frontier Province

0

0 50 K

Peshawar

AFGHANISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

PunjabBaluchistan

PAKISTAN

PESHAWAR NOWSHERA

KOHISTAN

SWATDIR

SHANGLA BATTAGRAM

MANSEHRA

ABBOTTABA

HARIPUR

MARDAN

BUNER

SWABI

ORAKZAIAGENCY

KHYBER AGENCY

MALAKANDAGENCY

CHARSADDA

KARAK

BAJURAGENCY

LAKKIMARWAT

HANGU

Mansehra

(Admins

North

Dir

Kalam

LandiKotal

DamaAdam

Khel

Nowshera

BannuKalabagh

Tank

TANKWana

SOUTHWAZIRISTAN

Zhob

Attock

Kohat

KOHAT

DERA ISMAILKHAN

Dera Ismail Khan

Islamabad

Jalalabad

Khowst

Gardeyz

Kabul

KHOST

PAKTIA

PAKTIA

NANGARHAR

KUNAR

Parachinar

KURRAMAGENCY

MOHMANDAGENCY

CHITRAL

Chitral

MiramshahNORTH

WAZIRISTAN BANNU

Red border indicates areas where the Pakistan

government is currently engaged in fghting insurgent

groups and the Taliban in Swat and neighboring areas.


8/25


Key observations from April 2009

The U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship remains plagued by amutual trust deficit

Despie leadership ransiions in boh he Unied Saes and Pakisan during he pas

year, he U.S.-Pakisan relaionship remains plagued by muual misrus o each ohers

inenions. Boh counries need o ake signican seps o enhance rus and coopera-

ion in order o build a lasing bilaeral parnership on several issues, including secu-

riy, miliary, inelligence, diplomaic, economic, educaional, and culural aairs. op

ocials in he Obama adminisraion and Congress have publicly expressed a lack o

condence in Pakisans leaders on securiy and inelligence maters. Pakisani leaders

express worries ha he Unied Saes, despie is saed inenions, is no aking seps

o move beyond he ransacional hisory o he relaionship and coninues o view

Pakisan as a disposable ally.

During he rip, we saw he lingering eecs o he Bush adminisraions war on error

ramework, combined wih persisen misinormaion and ourigh conspiracy heories

abou he Obama adminisraions inenions, as a major impedimen o building his par-

nership. A more vigorous public diplomacy eor is necessary in order o build a sronger

U.S.-Pakisan parnership.

Many Pakisanis welcomed Presiden Obamas oureach eors o he Muslim world,

including his April speech in urkey. Presiden Obamas saed inenion o bring assis-

ance direcly o he Pakisani people also receives broad suppor. Neverheless, Pakisani

public opinion is no supporive o he Unied Saes counererrorism goals in he region.

Recen polling conduced by he Inernaional Republican Insiue in March 2009 and

released in early May conrms hese senimens: Only 10 percen o hose polled indi-

caed errorism was he mos imporan issue acing he counry, compared o infaion

(idenied by 46 percen) and unemploymen (22 percen). Even hough he increased

requency o erroris atacks inside Pakisan during he pas wo years has heighened

concerns among Pakisanis, a srong majoriy (61 percen) oppose cooperaing wih heUnied Saes o comba errorism.


9/25


We heard several concerns on our rip abou he impac o he unmanned aerial droneatacks conduced by he Unied Saes in Pakisani erriories, including anger abou he

rising civilian oll o hese atacks. Ye a he same ime, a number o Pakisani govern-

men ocials we me wih acknowledged privaely ha hese atacks had some uiliy in

addressing hreas o he Pakisani sae and global securiy, an acknowledgmen echoed in

he public requess by Pakisani leaders o ranser he drone echnology o Pakisan.

Muliple visis by Obama adminisraion miliary and diplomaic ocials and recen high-

prole U.S. saemens on he securiy o Pakisans nuclear arsenal and is willingness and

abiliy o conron he aliban and Al Qaeda dominaed he public discourse during our

ime in he counry. Tere was a srong percepion across muliple segmens o Pakisani

sociey ha he Unied Saes makes excessive demands on Pakisan based on Americasown securiy needs wihou serious concern or Pakisans own regional hrea percepions.

Some Pakisani analyss acknowledged he need or beter monioring and oversigh

mechanisms on U.S. assisance o heir counry. Sill, many inerpreed discussions o

condiionaliy on U.S. aid as a perpeuaion o he relaionship in which he Unied

Supporters o a peace committee pagainst suspected U.S. drone missile

Pakistani tribal areas at a rally in Pesh

AP Pho


10/25


Saes was perceived o ren he services o Pakisans miliary agains Al Qaeda-aliaed

milians in exchange or expanded aid. Very ew in Pakisan see he relaionship wih he

Unied Saes as one o genuine parnership. One analys described he Unied Saes as a

pursuing a series o one-sho policies wih litle concern or heir eec on he long-erm

uure o he counry or he relaionship.

Pakisani concern or he spillover eecs o U.S. miliary operaions in neighboringAghanisan was also high. Several serving and reired represenaives o he Pakisani

securiy services inerpreed aliban miliary successes in Aghanisan o be he resul o

a marginalizaion o he Aghan Pashun populaion in he Kabul governmen, and saw

hemselves as suering he consequences o he Bush adminisraions mishandling o

Americas war.

Several Pakisanis we me wih quesioned Americas saying power in Aghanisan or he

region, ciing he U.S. hisory o disengagemen rom he region ollowing he end o he ani-

Sovie jihad in he 1980s. Tey worried abou he eecs o anoher wihdrawal o ineres

rom heir counry. Secreary o Sae Hillary Clinon acknowledged he U.S. role in he ani-

Sovie jihad and some o is elemens mauraion ino exising Pakisani milian groups in

remarks on April 25, 2009, and many Pakisanis looking o he Unied Saes or some sense

o shared responsibiliy or he siuaion heir counry aces oday embraced her saemens.

Many o hose wihin Pakisans civi l sociey highlighed he need or greaer oureach

eors beween he people o he Unied Saes and Pakisan o overcome some o hese

rus gaps. Fulbrigh grans, Inernaional Miliary Educaion and raining programs, and

rack II dialogue programswhich remain paricularly limied or Pakisanoer invalu-

able opporuniies o bridge he divide beween he wo counries. Teir expansion and

developmen will likely have a ar greaer impac on chances or orging a genuine parner-

ship over he long erm han op-level diplomaic pledges or more miliary aid.

Weak governance remains an endemic challenge throughout Pakistan

Te challenge o governance as he crucial and cenral issue acing Pakisan was high-

lighed in nearly every meeing he Ceners delegaion held. Te Pakisani governmens

inabiliy o deliver services, deermine prioriies, and carry ou long-erm planning has

obvious and serious implicaions or he counrys economic developmen and abiliy

o improve is human inellecual capial reserves. Bu i is also a core securiy issue. Te

saes ailure o provide or he basic needs o is people eecively and ecienly has

conribued o he rise o he aliban and oher insurgen groupswhen he sae ails odeliver, milian groups sep in o ll he gap.

Te hrea o physical violence agains governmen ocials and he public played an impor-

an role in aliban advances in Swa, Buner, Dir, and Shangla disrics in he Norhwes

Fronier Provinces, as i has in he Federally Adminisered ribal Areas. Bu he aliban


11/25


insurgency movemens claim o popular appeal ress heavily on he absence o an eec-

ive and equiable jusice sysem in he region. Te sluggish pace o jusice since he ormer

princely sae o Swa ormally enered he civil adminisraion o Pakisan in 1987 conrib-

ued direcly o he governmens ailure and he alibans advance in his par o Pakisan.

One analys esimaed ha 80 percen o all cour cases brough during his weny-year

period have ye o reach eiher provincial or ederal-level appeals; his ailure o provideimely jusice has been a major rallying cry or a aliban insurgency seeking o insiue is

own vision o law or he counry. Addiionally, he ailure o he governmen o provide

consisen securiy or hose opposed o he aliban or economic reconsrucion in he area

ollowing previous miliary operaions diminished public suppor or he sae, allowing

greaer aliban consolidaion in he monhs leading up o Nizam-e-Adl deals breakdown.

Many Pakisan analyss we me wih worried abou he governmens abiliy o conduc

eecive economic planning and o prioriize developmen ha reaches he people as

opposed o he disribuion o paronage. Several conribuing acors o he governance

gap are underinvesmen in educaion or incoming civil servans, years o miliary rule

ha weakened civilian ocials charged wih conducing he day-o-day operaions o

governmen, and he lingering poliicizaion and corrupion o he sae apparaus.

ensions over he dispersal o revenues beween he ederal cener and he provincial and

local governmens also complicae plans o increase U.S. assisance o he counry. Local

governmen represenaives make a srong case or heir abiliy o respond mos direcly

o he needs o heir consiuencies, bu disbursing assisance in he absence o a broader

provincial and naional plan raises concerns ha such an iniiaive migh conribue o he

urher poliical ragmenaion o he counry.

Ulimaely, overcoming hese diculies will depend o a much greaer degree on heacions o Pakisans leaders and he abiliy o is public o hold hem accounable or heir

acions han any oers o assisance or pressures rom he Unied Saes or any oher ou-

side acor. Many conemporary media repors pain a generally dire picure o he counry,

bu Pakisan does have srong emerging civil sociey, acive media, and educaed poliical

and legal class. While insiuions oen uncion poorly, hey do exis, and he opporuni-

ies or genuine parnership and programs o suppor are considerable.

U.S. policymakers should no assume he counry has reached or will soon reach he level

o sae ailure seen in pos-invasion Aghanisan or some pars o sub-Saharan Arica

despie recen negaive rends. Americas role as a major donor and key ally o Pakisan

suggess ha i does reain a leas some leverage on he governance issue. U.S. policymak-ers mus use ha infuence in conjuncion wih indigenous demands or greaer accoun-

abiliy o make eecive represenaive governance an even higher prioriy or Pakisans

poliical leaders.


12/25


Pakistans willingness and capacity to conduct comprehensivecounterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations remains limited

Closely linked o he issue o governance is he abiliy o he Pakisani sae o conron he

milian insurgency i currenly aces in he counry s norhwes. Pakisan has a power-

ul miliary esablishmen wih an educaed proessional core ha has resised atemps

by he Pakisani civilian governmen o exercise greaer oversigh and conrol over isoperaions, he counrys nuclear arsenal, and is lucraive economic holdings. Pakisans

miliary is one o he larges ghing orces in he world, bu is ocus has largely been on

convenional warare and preparaions or batles wih oher naion-saes, such as India.

In order o achieve greaer sabiliy, he Pakisani people will need o suppor eors by

he civilian-eleced governmen o convince he miliary o work more cooperaively wih

oher elemens o Pakisans governmen.

Pakisans abiliy o address he deeper poliical challenge posed by orces such as he

aliban is direcly ied o is governmen having he abiliy o govern eecively. Many news

repors during he April 2009 rip warned o an incipien aliban akeover o he counry, as

ghers seized conrol o disric oces in Swa, Buner, Dir, and Shangla. Te real problem,

however, is he poenial spread o aliban infuence as a resul o he absence o eecive

governance, raher han ourigh orce o arms. Pakisan mus work o ll he law-and-order-

and-governance vacuum i i wans o avoid a repea o Swa in six monhs or a year.

Te unwillingness o Swa aliban ghers o disarm and public saemens by prominen

milian ideologues, including Swa peace broker Maulana Su Mohammad, alienaed

and alarmed many Pakisanis, promping condemnaion even rom some Islamis paries.

During our rip, many observers cied he saemens by Su Mohammed challenging he

wri o he Pakisani Consiuion and rejecing he pracice o democracy as un-Islamic.

Tese acions have been a major wake-up call o segmens o Pakisani sociey ha havepreviously discouned he seriousness o he hrea.

Te Pakisan miliary has been relucan o ake ownership o operaions agains is own

populaion wihou cover rom he civilian poliical esablishmen. A high-prole saemen

by Prime Miniser Gillani announcing miliary acion in Swa in lae April, he endorsemen

o miliary acion by members o parliamen, and an All-Paries conerence in mid-May pro-

vided he poliical backing or he laes Swa operaion. Te armys exclusive purview over

naional securiy policy has long marginalized Pakisani civilian poliicians, and he civilian-

miliary division ha has prevened he developmen o an eecive, coordinaed counerin-

surgency sraegy across he Pakisani poliico-miliary esablishmen.

As o his wriing, over 2.4 million inernally displaced persons have fed he Swa area

since operaions began in early May, and he Pakisani governmen is appealing or

inernaional assisance o mee he reugee crisis in he NWFP. When coupled wih

more han a hal million people who fed previous operaions in Bajaur and oher pars o

Pakistans displaced

by the numbers

Based on UN High Commiss

or Reugees estimates

100,000

2.4 million

500,000

Over 2 million

Over 5.4 milli

Number o internally displaced people re

daily with UNHCR in Mardan, Swabi, NowPeshawar, Kohat, and Charsadda district

Total number o newly displaced peopl

Swat, Lower Dir, and Buner in May alon

Estimated number o reugees rom

operations in Bajur and Mohmand, FATA

Number o Aghan war reugees.

Total number o external and internal

reugees in northwest Pakistan.


13/25


he FAA, he IDP number is approaching 3 million people. Addressing his immediae

crisis and laying he groundwork or a long-erm governmen presence in Swa and oher

areas mus be a prioriy or boh Unied Saes policy oward Pakisan and he Pakisani

governmens own leadership.

Te hrea o violen exremism in Pakisan is no conned o Swa and he counrys

norhwesern borderlands, whose semigoverned saus causes many Pakisanis o viewhem as disinc rom Pakisan proper. Te provincial police orces, Federal Invesigaion

Agency, or FIA, and Inelligence Bureau, or IB, serve as he ron line agains erroriss

operaing hroughou he counry. ogeher wih he army and oher paramiliary securiy

orces, hey have suered a sring o argeed error atacks in he pas year. Tese agencies

are underresourced, lack sucien raining, and are increasingly demoralized, increasing he

dangers as Pakisan isel becomes a arge or Al Qaeda and oher aliaed regional error

groups. Te eecive prosecuion o hose who hreaen he sae and people o Pakisan will

require addiional poliical will on he par o he poliical and miliary esablishmen, and

he Unied Saes and oher riends o Pakisan canno impose his will exernally. Bu hey

can and should increase basic echnical and unding assisance o parners bes posiioned o

improve he provision o securiy and jusice wihin he counry.

Miliary operaions in Swa have coninued hrough May. Te repower and comba

capaciy o he Pakisani miliary is likely o resul in a aliban deea on ha paricular ba-

leeld. However, he real challenge or combaing nonsae acors such as he aliban and

inernaional erroris neworks is much broader han he convenional miliary batles. I

requires a comprehensive approach o susainable securiy ha enhances he capaciy o

he Pakisani sae o provide law and order, jusice, and basic governance and services o

is ciizens aer he miliary acion ends.


14/25


Recommendations for theObama administration

A litle more han our monhs ino is rs erm in oce, he Obama adminisraion has

se he ramework or a comprehensive regional approach o Pakisan, Aghanisan, and

neighboring counries. o achieve gains in Pakisan during he nex year, he adminisra-

ion should build on is impressive sar and underake specic policy iniiaives on he

diplomaic, securiy, and governance rons in Pakisan. While no exhausive, he ollow-

ing recommendaions, derived rom our meeings and observaions, represen key saring

poins or achieving sabiliy and prosperiy in Pakisan and he region.

Diplomacy

Build on recent regional and international diplomatic initiatives

In is rs our monhs in oce, he Obama adminisraion has embarked on a range o

diplomaic iniiaives relaed o he broader Souh Asia region. Te adminisraion con-

duced a policy review ha included numerous high-level visis o Pakisan, Aghanisan,

and India, and i invied leaders rom Aghanisan and Pakisan or meeings and con-

sulaions in Washingon wo imes in he las our monhs. Te Obama adminisraion

was also an insrumenal acor a he April 2009 Miniserial Meeing o he Friends oDemocraic Pakisan conerence in okyo.

Tis diplomacy and series o meeings have se he ramework or a comprehensive

approach o he region. One key elemen ha needs o be on he agenda is addressing

long-sanding India-Pakisan ensions. Following he conclusion o he Indian general

elecion cycle in mid-May and he subsequen ormaion o a governmen, he Obama

adminisraion and is inernaional allies should engage in regional diplomacy ha seeks

o resar he composie dialogue process beween Pakisan and India.

Any agreemen on peace can only come wih suppor rom boh populaions and heir lead-

ers, and he Unied Saes, boh hrough inernaional orums and independenly, shouldleverage is ies wih boh India and Pakisan o resar he dialogue on muliple racks. Many

U.S. policymakers express rusraion wih he Pakisani xaion on India. Bu Pakisans

regional hrea percepions are no likely o change wihou a susained regional securiy and


15/25


diplomaic eor ha includes seps oward ending he ensions beween India and Pakisan.

Ulimaely, his process will require some join resoluion o he Kashmir quesion, and he

cessaion o assisance o nonsae acors operaing agains each saes ineress.

Initiate a comprehensive diplomatic engagement with a broad range

of Pakistani institutions

Wih Pakisan sill in he early and ragile sages o a democraic ransiion, he Unied

Saes now mus esablish relaions wih a much broader range o ineress and players.

Pakisani percepions o Americas role in manipulaing is inernal poliical sysem make

any such engagemen a delicae issue. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, he U.S. special

represenaive or Aghanisan and Pakisan, was correc o emphasize in recen esimony

beore he House Foreign Aairs Commitee ha he Unied Saes suppors he curren

democraically eleced governmen agains any prospec o exra-consiuional saboage,

while keeping dialogue open wih he democraic opposiion. Te miliary in Pakisan

reains considerable infuence and mus also be included in any parnership, bu he

hisory o relaions under Musharra shows ha U.S. policy canno rely on an exclusive

parnership wih army chies or paricular leaders o advance U.S. ineress in he counry.

Te U.S. governmen mus proceed wihou picking avories or endorsing one leader or

poliical pary over anoher. And i mus engage wih civilian insiuions and agencies o

suppor he ongoing democraic ransiion o power.

Te Unied Saes should also iniiae an expansive plan o esablish broad conacs and

cooperaion beween Pakisani and American insiuions. Tis should include a compre-

hensive plan or cooperaion beween hink anks, lawyers groups, civil sociey organiza-

ions, and he general public. Educaional and culural exchanges are vial o building

sronger ies beween he wo naions.

Formulate and sign a bilateral strategic framework agreement with Pakistan

Te recen and regularly scheduled rilaeral sessions beween Aghanisan, Pakisan, and

he Unied Saes oer a valuable orum in which o discuss securiy and diplomaic con-

cerns shared by he hree counries. Ye ransorming he Unied Saes criical relaion-

ship wih Pakisan will ulimaely require a ar deeper and beter-coordinaed bilaeral

srucure or coordinaion and discussion. In recen years, he Unied Saes has signed

comprehensive bilaeral agreemens wih a range o counries aimed a esablishing a

ramework or broad-based cooperaion.

Te Obama adminisraion should apply he model o recen sraegic ramework agree-

mens o Pakisan. Te adminisraion should work wih a range o Pakisani leaders o

agree on common goals or cooperaing on miliary, inelligence, and securiy maters, as

well as diplomaic, poliical, culural, and economic cooperaion. Working wih Pakisani


16/25


parners o se an ocial sraegic ramework agreemen would help se he righ con-

ex or cooperaion on a broad range o issues o common concern o boh counries.

Formalizing he goals or cooperaion in a bilaeral sraegic ramework agreemen can

help aciliae sraegic planning on a range o ronsand i can help boh he Unied

Saes and Pakisan break he cycle o ransacional and reacive policymaking ha has

plagued he bilaeral relaionship or decades.

Security policy

Strengthen the police and judicial component of counterterrorism assistance

Invesmen in raining, equipping, and expanding Pakisans police orce and judi-

cial sysem will have he greaes impac on Pakisans capaciy o marginalize and

eliminae exremis and erroris groups. Te esablishmen o he proposed Pakisani

Counerinsurgency Capabiliies Fund o provide addiional raining and equipmen o he

Pakisani miliary will also play a key role in improving he saes abiliy o conron he

aliban insurgency. Bu he aliban insurgencys abiliy o ake advanage o he ocial

jusice sysems weaknesses and insead oer heir own swi and ransparen sysem

remains one o is sronges sources o suppor, and aid ocused solely on miliary and

paramiliary sources will be insucien.

Providing he cours, he FIA, provincial police orces, and he IB wih he proessional

raining, equipmen, and manpower o conduc successul invesigaions, prosecuions,

and convicions o suspeced erroriss should be a op prioriy or U.S. counererrorism

assisance. As he Unied Saes is learning in is atemp o shu down he miliary prison a

Guananamo Bay, Cuba, exrajudicial eors o conron errorism are ulimaely unsusain-

able in a democraic counry where he rule o law applies. A sizable amoun$100 mil-lionis specically earmarked or police raining purposes in he curren language o he

Kerry-Lugar Advanced Parnership or Pakisan Ac legislaion. Bu his amoun may no be

sucien o help Pakisan mee is subsanial law and order challenges.

In using his assisance, he Unied Saes and he Pakisani governmen should work o

srenghen he civilian governmens oversigh o Pakisans securiy apparaus and decrease

he role ha organizaions like he Pakisan Rangers, a paramiliary orce, play in providing

inernal securiy and policing. In paricular, hey should work o increase he capaciy o he

counererroris operaions in he FIA and he IB and resis he empaion o creae oo

many new, specialized anierrorism srucures ha marginalize he counrys already-exis-

ing insiuions. Counererrorism invesigaions require a degree o specialized raining,bu broader assisance or basic police work raining, increased salaries o comba corrup-

ion, and an expanded judiciary o address he counrys massive case backlog a he disric

and provincial levels will have a greaer impac on he provision o jusice in he counry

and he legiimacy o coninued democraic governance.


17/25


Increase assistance for internally displaced persons

Recen ghing beween Pakisani securiy orces and he aliban is creaing major

humaniarian, economic, and securiy challenges. Crisis relie operaions o bring aid

and sheler o he massive populaion o reugees displaced by ghing in Swa and oher

areas are no a subsiue or longer-erm invesmens. Bu relie or inernally displaced

persons oers an immediae opporuniy or he Unied Saes and oher donor coun-ries o demonsrae heir commimen o he people o Pakisan. Te quick response o

he devasaing 2005 earhquake in Pakisan helped he Unied Saes improve is sand-

ing wih he Pakisani people and marginalize milian groups. Te growing IDP crisis

provides anoher momen when he Unied Saes can sand wih he Pakisani people

and address heir basic needs.

As o lae May, over 2.4 million regisered reugees have fed he Swa region; coupled wih

inernally displaced persons rom previous operaions in Bajaur Agency and oher pars o

he FAA, almos 3 million people have been displaced rom heir homes. A $543 million

fash appeal rom he UN High Commission on Reugees or greaer humaniarian aid

mus be me wih a sepped-up response rom he inernaional communiy.

Secreary o Sae Hillary Clinons May 19, 2009 announcemen o $110 million in

iniial American aid or relie represens a srong sar, and Congress should augmen

his urher wih supplemenal unding language as he siuaion warrans. Privae relie

und eors also oer American nongovernmenal and civil sociey groups he opporu-

niy o build people-o-people relaions by showing a commimen o helping Pakisans

disressed communiies.

Displaced Pakistani men line up as t

or donated ood during a distributio

Chota Lahore reugee camp.

AP Pho


18/25


Enhance efforts to keep Pakistans nuclear arsenal safe and secure

Pakisan currenly has a sizable nuclear arsenal ha expers esimae consiss o 50 o 100

weapons, and he nuclear sockpile is reporedly growing. Admiral Michael Mullen, he U.S.

Chairman o he Join Chie o Sas, who warned o is expansion also noed ha he Unied

Saes has worked wih Pakisans securiy esablishmen o saeguard is nuclear arsenal.

Cooperaion on screening programs and aciliy securiy should be increased o preven heillegal ranser o nuclear echnology and experise and o saeguard he arsenal rom unau-

horized access. Given is sraegic hrea percepions, Pakisan is unlikely o respond o U.S.

pressure o reduce he size o is nuclear arsenal, even a he risk o subsanial aid cus, mak-

ing regional and inernaional diplomacy he op prioriy or oresalling a regional arms race.

Advancing governance and democracy

Launch a comprehensive effort to advance Pakistani civilian government

capacity and expertise

Te Obama adminisraion and Congress are correc o emphasize civilian economic and

social developmen and suppor or Pakisans democraic insiuions in he proposed U.S.

assisance package or Pakisan. Bu any increases in nonmiliary assisance will require

subsanial governance reorms in Pakisan o ensure ha he money is no wased.

wo key seps are necessary. Firs, he governmen o Pakisan will need o underake

serious reorms and prioriize he needs o is ciizenry. Te Unied Saes and oher allies

should conribue o his process by providing expanded raining and educaional oppor-

uniies or civilian bureaucras, parliamenary commitees, and civil sociey groups in he

Unied Saes and oher counries. Te Obama adminisraion should work wih Pakisanigovernmen insiuions o conduc long-erm economic and social developmen planning

or he counry, ideniy key projecs or new assisance money, and build ransparency

habis wih Pakisani parner minisries.

In paricular, he Sae Deparmen and he U.S. Agency or Inernaional Developmen

should expand heir programs o provide raining and advisors or a broad range o govern-

men employees in Pakisan in naional and provincial minisries, as well as local govern-

men. Te ocus o his raining and advisory suppor should be on helping he Pakisani

governmen a all levels become more capable in planning, budgeing, and implemening is

programs. Funding or he Naional Endowmen or Democracy, which suppors nongov-

ernmenal groups who increase public accounabiliy and ransparency, should increase.

Second, U.S. bilaeral developmen assisance should be delivered as one componen

o an overall inernaional sraegy o help Pakisan creae a more susainable economic

sysem. Tis will require greaer coordinaion wih oher bilaeral assisance programs

and inernaional and mulilaeral iniiaives by he Inernaional Moneary Fund, World


19/25


Bank, and he Friends o Pakisan group. Pakisan has already beneed rom subsanial

increases in assisance, loans, and donor pledges. Donors pledged more han $5 billion o

assisance a he April conerence in okyo, and las year he IMF provided a sandby loan

o $7.6 billion. Te World Bank gave Pakisan an ineres-ree $500 million Inernaional

Developmen Associaion credi in March 2009.

All o hese eors, along wih sizable assisance o Pakisan rom counries such as China,Japan, Briain, and Saudi Arabia, among ohers, and assisance rom he Asian Developmen

Bank, require a coordinaed eor. Pakisans civilian governmen needs o develop a sra-

egy based on a comprehensive needs assessmen ha ensures aid and loans are a bridge o

advance undamenal reorms ha help Pakisan achieve a susainable economic posiion.

Oher mechanisms such as proposed reconsrucion opporuniy zones can help aciliae

growh, bu hey are no a panacea o Pakisans subsanial economic problems.

Include careful oversight and accounting mechanisms in assistance legislation

Requiring ransparency and oversigh in aid programs is good public policy. Whas more, he

misuse o millions o reconsrucion dollars in Iraq and Aghanisan and he lack o rans-

parency in he Coaliion Suppor Funds program or Pakisan make hese enes a poliical

requiremen or any legislaion using U.S. axpayer money. As par o hese addiional over-

sigh and reporing requiremens, he U.S. adminisraion should work hrough a bilaeral

ramework o gain inpu rom he Pakisani governmen on which projecs his money will be

spen. Presidenial cericaions o Pakisans coninuing eors agains milian and erroris

organizaions wihin is erriory and o eecive civilian rule wihin he counry are appropri-

ae. Bu legislaors should rerain rom imposing sric condiions ha reinorce Pakisani per-

cepions ha heir governmen is being bribed o carry ou a U.S. counererrorism agenda.

Tese provisions could wreck he spiri o parnership cenral o he increased aid program.

Clear merics or progress and success mus be esablished or any expanded U.S. aid pro-

gram in Pakisan. Tese merics should ocus on oucome and resuls, raher han inpus

such as money spen on paricular secors or projecs. Esablishing he righ merics will

require a ocused developmen assisance program ha helps Pakisan mee a need unul-

lled by oher developmen programs by oher counries and mulilaeral insiuions.

Policy reforms for the U.S. government

Reform leading institutions of U.S. diplomacy and foreign development assistance

As he Unied Saes prepares o dramaically expand is annual assisance budge o

Pakisan, many concerns remain abou he capaciy no jus o he Pakisani governmen,

bu also he U.S. governmens own insiuions. Te Unied Saes has many alened and

dedicaed civil servans working hard in Pakisan and oher counries around he world.


20/25


Bu decades o underinvesmen in Sae and USAID have reduced he size, experience,

and eeciveness o our diplomaic corps and aid adminisraors a a ime in which is

eors are mos criical o our success in shoring up he Pakisani sae. Pakisan will likely

be he greaes es case o wheher he Obama adminisraion can increase he capaciy

o hese insiuions o mee he challenges o he 21s cenury.

Te proposed personnel expansion o hese services is a necessary sep oward correc-ing he imbalance in U.S. powers and implemening a sraegy o susainable securiy ha

addresses sabiliy concerns in Pakisan on he diplomaic, securiy, and developmen

levels. Ye he criical need or on-he-ground experience means ha he shorage o mid-

and high-level ocers will persis or years. Alering Sae and USAID hiring rules o ease

he mid-career enry ino he services oers one means o overcome his lag, bu is no a

subsiue or he broader long-erm enlargemen o he oreign service. In he inerim he

Unied Saes may need o employ privae rms wih experise in adminisering he grans,

bu his is no a long-erm soluion o he capaciy gap wihin he U.S. governmen.

Te increased presence o U.S. personnel in Pakisan will require he Sae Deparmen, oher

agencies, and nongovernmenal groups o manage subsanial securiy risks in Pakisan. In

order or he proposed expansion in bilaeral developmen assisance programs o have

maximum impac and o ensure ransparency and accounabiliy o hese eors, he Obama

adminisraion will need o implemen new measures ha ensure he saey o increased U.S.

personnel in Pakisan while also allowing he fexibiliy aid adminisraors need o ge ou o

diplomaic green zones and carry ou rs-hand inspecions o U.S.-unded projecs.

Engage with Congress and the American people on the importance

of Pakistan policy

Broad consensus currenly exiss wihin he oreign policy communiy abou he need o

shi greaer atenion o Pakisan. Bu he adminisraion will need o do more o engage

wih members o Congress and he general public abou he raionale or is acions and

specic plans or implemenaion o he expanded commimen oward Pakisan and

Aghanisan. Tis will no be easy as Congress and he public are already batered by mul-

iple domesic challenges and wo wars.

Reporing requiremens in proposed legislaion or Pakisan assisance may require

addiional resources or he adminisraion o carry ou. Bu he ocus on ransparency

and accounabiliy is a necessary one o win public suppor or a poenially cosly and

long-erm engagemen wih Pakisans many challenges.As he presiden makes he caseo lawmakers and he American public or an expansive agenda on healh care, energy,

and economic reorm, he argumen or a reorienaion o he way America conducs is

oreign and naional securiy policy mus also be a he op o he agenda. He mus make

clear ha while he oal invesmen in Aghanisan and Pakisan will no rival ha o Iraq,

i will be expensive and enduring, lasing years and perhaps decades.


21/25


Conclusion

Our rips ndings oer several concree recommendaions o help he Obama adminisra-

ion make he ransiion rom he reormulaion o policy oulined in previous CAP work

on Pakisan o raising addiional quesions o how o implemen a proacive sraegic

relaionship wih boh he leadership and he people o Pakisan. Overcoming he crisis-

o-he-momen menaliy ha prevens boh U.S. and Pakisani leaders rom ackling core

challenges on a long-erm susainable basis remains one o he op challenges acing he

Obama adminisraion, Congress, and our parners in Pakisan. We hope o coninue o

conribue o overcoming hose challenges hrough his visi, uure rips, policy research,

and coninued ineracion wih Pakisani counerpars.


22/25


Acknowledgments

Te Cener or American Progress, paricularly is Presiden John Podesa and Senior Vice

Presiden or Naional Securiy and Inernaional Policy Rudy deLeon, have oered srong

guidance and suppor or his rip and accompanying iniiaives. Our colleague Caroline

Wadhams, while unable o join us on his rip, remains insrumenal in he Ceners work

on Pakisan aer direcing he draing o he Ceners November 2008 Parnership orProgress repor. Our oher colleagues on he naional securiy and inernaional policy eam

a CAP were also generous in sharing heir experise and perspecives prior o, during, and

ollowing he conclusion o our rip. We are indebed o CAPs ediorial and ar eam, includ-

ing Robin Pam, Rober Valencia, Dan Wagener, Shannon Ryan, and Lauren Ferguson, or

heir help ransorming a rough dra ino he nished produc you see.

We are paricularly indebed o he muliude o observers, analyss, and ex pers will-

ing o share heir insighs on he complex siuaion in Pakisan, boh hose based in

Washingon who advised us beore our deparure, and in Pakisan during he w ide

range o meeings we held here. Alhough we do no imagine ha all hose we me wih

will share our inerpreaions and recommendaions, we are exremely graeul or he

opporuniy or dialogue, and hope i will coninue ino he uure. Any errors, as always,

remain he responsibiliy o he auhors alone.

Las and mos criically, we hank Zia Ur-Rehman, our colleague, riend, and aciliaor

who helped us overcome all our logisical challenges and wihou whom his rip ruly

would no have been possible. Bahut shukriya!


23/25


About the authors

Lawrence J. Korb

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow a American Progress and a senior advisor o he

Cener or Deense Inormaion. Prior o joining American Progress, he was a senior el-

low and direcor o Naional Securiy Sudies a he Council on Foreign Relaions. From

July 1998 o Ocober 2002, he was council vice presiden, direcor o sudies, and holdero he Maurice Greenberg Chair.

Prior o joining he council, Mr. Korb served as direcor o he Cener or Public Policy

Educaion and senior ellow in he Foreign Policy Sudies Program a he Brookings

Insiuion; dean o he Graduae School o Public and Inernaional Aairs a he

Universiy o Pitsburgh; vice presiden o Corporae Operaions a he Rayheon

Company; and direcor o deense sudies a he American Enerprise Insiue.

Dr. Korb served as assisan secreary o deense (manpower, reserve aairs, insallaions,

and logisics) rom 1981 hrough 1985. In ha posiion, he adminisered abou 70 percen

o he deense budge. For his service in ha posiion, he was awarded he Deparmen o

Deenses medal or Disinguished Public Service. Mr. Korb served on acive duy or our

years as naval figh ocer, and reired rom he Naval Reserve wih he rank o capain.

Dr. Korbs 20 books and more han 100 aricles on naional securiy issues include Te

Joint Chies o Sta: Te First wenty-ve Years; Te Fall and Rise o the Pentagon;American

National Security: Policy and Process, Future Visions or U.S. Deense Policy; Reshaping

Americas Military; andA New National Security Strategy in an Age o errorists, yrants,

and Weapons o Mass Destruction. His aricles have appeared in such journals as Foreign

Aairs,Public Administration Review, Te New York imes Sunday Magazine,Naval Institute

Proceedings, and International Security. Over he pas decade, Mr. Korb has made over1,000 appearances as a commenaor on such shows as Te oday Show, Te Early

Show, Good Morning America, Face he Naion, Tis Week, Te News Hour wih

Jim Lehrer, Nighline, 60 Minues, Larry King Live, Te OReilly Facor, and

Hanniy and Colmes. His more han 100 op-ed pieces have appeared in such major news-

papers as Te Washington Post, Te New York imes, Te Wall Street Journal, Te Washington

imes,Los Angeles imes, Te Boston Globe, Te Baltimore Sun, Te Philadelphia Inquirer,

and Te Christian Science Monitor.


24/25


Brian Katulis

Brian Kaulis is a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress, where his work

ocuses on U.S. naional securiy policy wih an emphasis on he Middle Eas, Iraq, he

Arab-Israeli confic, and Pakisan. He is co-auhor oTe Prosperity Agenda, a book on U.S.

naional securiy published by John Wiley & Sons in he summer o 2008. A he cener,

he also serves as an advisor o he Middle Eas Progress projec, and was an observer dur-

ing he February 2008 parliamenary elecions in Pakisan. Kaulis has served as a consul-an o numerous U.S. governmen agencies, privae corporaions, and nongovernmenal

organizaions on projecs in wo dozen counries, including Iraq, Pakisan, Yemen, Egyp,

Colombia, Morocco, and Bangladesh.

His previous experience includes work on he Policy Planning Sa a he Sae

Deparmen rom 1999 o 2000, a graduae ellowship a he Naional Securiy Councils

Near Eas and Souh Asian Aairs Direcorae in 1998, and work in he Deparmen

o Deense during his undergraduae sudies. From 1995 o 1998, he lived and worked

in he Wes Bank and Gaza Srip and Egyp or he Naional Democraic Insiue or

Inernaional Aairs.

Kaulis received a masers degree rom Princeon Universiys Woodrow Wilson

School or Public and Inernaional Aairs and a B.A. in hisory and Arab and Islamic

sudies rom Villanova Universiy. In 1994 and 1995, he was a Fulbrigh scholar in

Amman, Jordan, where he conduced research on he peace reay beween Israel and

Jordan. Kaulis has published aricles in several newspapers and journals, including Te

Washington Post,Los Angeles imes,Boston Globe,Baltimore Sun, andMiddle East Policy,

among oher publicaions. Kaulis speaks Arabic.

Colin Cookman

Colin Cookman is a Special Assisan or Naional Securiy a he Cener or AmericanProgress, aer having rs joined he eam as an inern in January 2008. His research work

a CAP ocuses primarily on issues relaed o Pakisan, Aghanisan, and broader counerer-

rorism policy. In his role as Special Assisan, he also oers adminisraive and organizaional

suppor o he range o work conduced by he Naional Securiy eam. Cookman graduaed

rom Boson Universiymagna cum laude wih a bachelors degree in inernaional relaions

in 2005. His wriing has appeared inDeense News, Te Guardian, and Te Hufngton Post.


25/25

The Center or American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute

dedicated to promoting a strong, just and ree America that ensures opportunity

or all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to

these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies relect these values.

We work to ind progressive and pragmatic solutions to signiicant domestic and

international problems and develop policy proposals that oster a government that

is o the people, by the people, and or the people.

Pakistan Trip Report

Documents

Transcript of Pakistan Trip Report