Oral Arguments Abridged

8/8/2019 Oral Arguments Abridged

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ORAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION ING.R. NO. 193036 (REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, ET. AL. VS.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO M. OCHOA, JR. AND

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET SECRETARY FLORENCIO T. ABAD).

[PRESENTED BY PETITIONER REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN]

I.EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 SUFFERS FROM

CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES WHICH WARRANTTHE INVALIDATION OF THE PHILIPPINE

TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

1.A. EXECUTIVE ORDERNO. 1 CREATING THEPHILIPPINE TRUTHCOMMISSION OF 2010

VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLEOF SEPARATION OFPOWERS BY USURPINGTHE POWERS OF THECONGRESS (1) TOCREATE PUBLICOFFICES, AGENCIES ANDCOMMISSIONS; AND(2) TO APPROPRIATE

PUBLIC FUNDS.

1. One of the enduring hallmarks of the presidential system in

a republican democracy is the principle of separation of powers.


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2. Separation of powers as a model for governance of

democratic states traces its ancestry to ancient Greece and the

Roman Republic.

3. The term separation of powers is attributed to Baron de

Montesquieu, a French Enlightenment political philosopher.

4. According to Thomas Jefferson, The first principle of a

good government is certainly a distribution of its powers into

executive, judiciary and legislative, lodging each with a distinct

magistracy.

5. Caution is made that Let that clear line of distinction and

responsibility be blurred, and liberty and the peoples interest are

alike in jeopardy.


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6. The doctrine of separation adopts the notion that the

powers of government consists largely in making laws, executing

laws and applying them to particular cases through the rule of law.

7. The principle of separation of powers is well entrenched in

our constitutional history. The present 1987 Constitution provides

that legislative power shall be vested in the Congress; the

executive power shall be vested in the President of the

Philippines.; and the judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by

law.

8. The separation of powers between the Executive and the

Legislative Departments is well explained by the Honorable

Supreme Court in the case of Ople vs. Torres (293 SCRA 141).


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9. Inherent in the congressional power to enact laws is the

legislative authority to create public offices, agencies, and

commissions. Verily, the Congress may create or abolish offices

except those created by the Constitution itself. This plenary

legislative prerogative has been consistently upheld by the

Honorable Supreme Court, like in the cases of Secretary of the

Department of Transportation and Communications vs. Mabalot

(378 SCRA 128) and Alba vs. Evangelista (100 Phil. Reports 683).

10. The Office of the President arrogated the power of the

Congress to create a public office when it issued Executive Order

No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

11. Executive Order No. 1 which was issued on 30 July 2010

infringed upon and violated the sanctity of separation of powers.


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12. This power to create public offices is not shared by the

Constitution and by the Congress with the President of the

Republic, except in a very limited and circumscribed delegated

authority as provided for in the Administrative Code of 1987, and

this delimited delegation is with respect to the continuing structural

reorganization of the Office of the President which is granted tox

the President by authority of law.

13. The Office of the President anchored the establishment of

the Truth Commission on the Presidents continuing authority to

reorganize the Office of the President pursuant to the

Administrative Code of 1987.

14. This limited delegation of authority is circumscribed by the

following standards prescribed by law:


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(a) The power is limited to the reorganization ofexistingagenciesandoffices;

(b) The reorganization must pertain only to theadministrativestructureofthe Officeofthe President;

(c) The reorganization may entail (i)restructuringoftheinternalorganizationof the Office of the President;(ii)

transferoffunctions; and(iii)transferofagencies; and

(d) The reorganization is to achieve simplicity,economyandefficiency.

15. The creation of the Truth Commission defies all the

foregoing standards imposed by the Administrative Code of 1987

because:


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(a) The Truth Commission is a new creation andnottheresultofastructuralreorganization. Before the

advent of Executive Order No. 1, the Truth Commission was

hithertononexistent;

(b) The Truth Commission is not a restructuring,transferoffunctionsortransferofagencies; and

(c) The Truth Commission does not achievesimplicity, economyandefficiency in the operation of the

Office of the President. In fact, itduplicatesandsupplants

the functions and powers of the Ombudsman and the

Department of Justice even as its budget lacks transparency

and limit.

16. It must be underscored that this Honorable Court in the

very recent case ofBanda, et. al. vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 166620,


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April 20, 2010, citing Domingo vs. Zamora [397 SCRA 56]), ruled

that the rationale of the Presidents continuing authority to effect

structural reorganization of the Office of the President is in

recognition of the recurring need of every President to

reorganizehis orher officeto achieve simplicity, economy

andefficiency.

17. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of

Executive Order No. 378 because it merely effected the

reorganization of the National Printing Office consistent with the

legislative delegation under the Administrative Code of 1987

granting continuing authority of the President to reorganize his

Office.

18. Moreover, in Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84), the

Honorable Supreme Court ruled that reorganizations are valid

provided they are pursued in good faith. Reasoning a contrario, if a


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reorganization or the creation of an office is made in bad faith like

pursuing a vengeful hostility against the previous administration

and selectively targeting its officers for investigation and

prosecution, then with more reason such creation is fatally infirm.

19. One of the most guarded powers of the Congress,

particularly of the House of Representatives where appropriations

bills originate, is the constitutionally mandated power to

appropriate public funds. Thus, the Constitution provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury exceptin pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (Section29[1], Article VI).

20. The Honorable Supreme Court in Philippine Constitution

Association vs. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506) ruled:

Under the Constitution, the spending powercalled by James Madison as the power of the


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purse belongs to Congress, subject only to theveto power of the President. The President maypropose the budget but still the final say on thematter of appropriations is lodged to Congress.

21. In Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (62

Phil Reports 912), the Honorable Supreme Court defined

appropriation as setting apart by law ofacertainsum from the

public revenue for a specified purpose. (Emphasis supplied).

22. This plenary power of the Congress was usurped by the

Office of the President when it issued the assailed Executive Order

No. 1 wherein the President allocated an undetermined budget for

the Truth Commission in this wise:

Sec 11. Budget for the Commission. The

Office of the President shall provide thenecessary funds for the Commission to ensurethat it can exercise its powers, execute itsfunctions, and perform its duties andresponsibilities as effectively, efficiently, andexpeditiously as possible.


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23. Aside from illegally seizing the power of the legislature to

appropriate public funds, the Office of the President violated a

cardinal tenet that a budget must be a certain or specific amount.

The appropriation language of Section 17 lacks particularity and

transparency because no specific amount is appropriated, no ceiling

is provided and no definitive funding source is identified.

1.B. EXECUTIVE ORDERNO. 1 VIOLATES THEEQUAL PROTECTIONC L A U S E O F THE1987 CONSTITUTIONBECAUSE IT LIMITSTHE JURISDICTION OFTHE PHILIPPINETRUTH COMMISSIONTO OFFICIALS ANDEMPLOYEES OF THE

PREVIOUSADMINISTRATION(THE ADMINISTRATIONOF FORMER PRESIDENTGLORIA MACAPAGAL

ARROYO).


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24. The 1987 Constitution guarantees every person equal

protection of the laws under Section 1 of Article III which provides:

x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the

laws.

25. If eliminating graft and corruption is the noble motive in

the creation of the Truth Commission as evinced in the whereas

clauses of Executive Order No. 1, then equal protection demands

that all persons who belong to the same class of suspected or

alleged perpetrators of graft and corruption must fall under the

jurisdiction of the Truth Commission without regard to

personalities and regimes. All those belonging to this class must be

exposed to the same rigors and processes, the same hostility and

persecution.


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26. There is no substantial distinction of graft reportedly

committed under the Arroyo administration and graft committed

under other administrations to warrant the creation of a Truth

Commission to exclusively investigate for prosecution officials and

employees of the Arroyo administration.

27. Equal protection safeguards all persons against any form

of hostility from the government as succinctly explained by the

Honorable Supreme Court in Philippine Judges Association vs.

Prado (227 SCRA 703).

28. Executive Order No. 1 wantonly violates the equal

protection clause when it deliberately vested the Truth

Commission with jurisdiction and authority to solely target officials

and employees of the Arroyo administration.


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29. These errant selective search for the truth and flawed

pursuit of justice is patently discriminatory.

30. Equal protection requires that all persons or things

similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights

conferred and responsibilities imposed (Quinto vs. Comelec, G.R.

No. 189698, December 1, 2009). Similar subjects should not be

treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly

discriminate against others (City of Manila vs. Lagio, Jr., 455 SCRA

309).

31. In order not to violate the equal protection clause, a

classification must be reasonable and is deemed reasonable where:

(1) it is based on substantial distinction which make real

differences; (2) these distinctions or differences are germane to the

purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present

conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially


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identical to those of the present; and (4) the classification applies

only to those who belong to the same class (City of Manila vs.

Lagio, Jr., supra).

32. Executive Order No. 1 defies all of the foregoing

standards:

(a) There is definitely no substantial distinction between thegroup of officials and employees of the Arroyo

administration and other groups or persons who abused

their public office for personal gain under other

administrations. Executive Order No. 1 singles out for

investigation and eventual prosecution solely those

connected with the Arroyo administration as if graft was

unique to them and corruption was their species.


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(b) Classifying officials and employees of the Arroyoadministration as a distinct category is not germane to the

purpose of the executive issuance because stamping out

graft and corruption must ensnare all possible respondents

from all administrations past, present and eventually

future regimes.

(c) The classification does not even refer to presentconditions, much more to future conditions, with specific

relevance to the commission of graft and corruption, as it is

limited to a particular past administration, not even to all

past administrations.

(d) The classification does not apply to all of those belongingto the same class because graft and grafters prior and

subsequent to the Arroyo administration do not come under

the purview of the jurisdiction of the Truth Commission.


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33. The search for truth is universal, not parochial. It must be

timeless like eternity and limitless like the horizons. If truth is to be

achieved, justice served and corruption eradicated, then the Truth

Commission is an aberration. In the language of the Honorable

Supreme Court, it is like an outlaw which must be slain at sight.

1.C. EXECUTIVE ORDERNO. 1 SUPPLANTSTHE CONSTITUTIONALLYMANDATED POWERSOF THE OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN ASPROVIDED IN THE1987 CONSTITUTION

AND SUPPLEMENTEDBY REPUBLIC ACT NO.6770 OR THE

OMBUDSMAN ACT OF1989.

34. The Office of the Ombudsman as the countrys graft

buster was created by the 1987 Constitution under Section 5 of


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Article XI which provides for the following powers, functions, and

duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or oncomplaint by any person, any act or omission ofany public official, employee, office or agency,when such act or omission appears to be illegal,unjust, improper, or inefficient.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Request any government agency forassistance and information necessary in thedischarge of its responsibilities, and to examine,if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency,red tape, mismanagement, fraud, andcorruption in the Government and makerecommendations for their elimination and theobservance of high standards of ethics andefficiency.

35. In his sponsorship remarks in the Constitutional

Commission, Commissioner Nolledo said:


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x x x the creation of an Ombudsman x x x is inanswer to the crying need of our people for anhonest and responsive government. The office ofthe Ombudsman x x x is really an institutionprimarily for the citizen as against the malpracticesand corruption in government.

36. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 13646, which was

eventually enacted as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 reads: Article

XI of the 1987 Constitution creates the independent Office of the

Ombudsman as the guardian of public accountability and the public

trust. To ensure success of the Ombudsman, this bill is proposed.

37. The Constitution and RA No. 6770 vested quasi-judicial

powers to the Office of the Ombudsman.

38. The improvident creation of the Truth Commission has

duplicated and supplanted the constitutional mandate of the Office

of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints or reported cases of


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graft and corruption with respect to alleged misdeeds of the

previous Administration.

39. Likewise, the statutory power of the Office of the

Ombudsman under RA 6770 to initiate the prosecution of graft and

corruption cases has also been usurped by the Truth Commission.

40. The late President Corazon Aquino upon signing the

Ombudsman Act of 1989 said: I have always been unrelenting in

the campaign against graft and corruption and supportive of

measures to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corrupt practices.

She added: By my signature, I hereby take this opportunity to

affirm anew my vow against graft and corruption.

41. There is no mistaking therefore that the Office of the

Ombudsman is the constitutionally and statutorily authorized quasi-

judicial body to investigate and prosecute cases of graft and


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corruption. Executive Order No. 1 has allowed the Truth

Commission to usurp the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman

in clear violation of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. The

investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman have

been derogated and invaded by the Philippine Truth Commission of

2010 in complete disregard of the constitutional independence of

the Ombudsman.

II. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THERELIEFS PRAYED FORBECAUSE THEIMPLEMENTATION OFEXECUTIVE ORDER NO.1 AND THE CREATIONOF THE PHILIPPINETRUTH COMMISSIONOF 2010 WILL RESULTTO (1) GRAVE INJUSTICE

AND IRREPARABLEINJURY TO PETITIONERS;AND (2) VIOLATION OFTHE RIGHTS OFPETITIONERS ASMEMBERS OF CONGRESS.


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42. The Honorable Supreme Court in Province of North

Cotobato vs. the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel of Ancestral Domain (GRT), G.R. 183591, October 14,

2008, citing Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation, 400 Phil. 307, and Philippine Constitution Association,

Inc. vs. Mathay et.al., 124 Phil. 890, ruled that in the case of a

legislator or Member of Congress, an act of the Executive that

injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but

nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators.

A member of the House of Representatives has a standing to

maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by

the Constitution in his office.

43. In Senate of the Philippine vs. Ermita (488 SCRA 1), the

Honorable Supreme Court reiterated that Indeed, legislators have

standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and

privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed


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to sue the validity of any official action which they claim infringes

their prerogatives as legislators.

44. Verily, the usurpation by Executive Order No. 1 creating

the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 of the powers of Congress

to create public offices and appropriate funds inflicts irreparable

injury on the Congress of the Philippines resulting to a derivative

irremediable and substantial damage on the petitioners as Members

of the House of Representatives.

45. Moreover, the violation of the equal protection of the laws

clause and the supplanting of the quasi-judicial powers of the

Ombusdman as vested by the Constitution and by RA 6770 further

violate the rights of petitioners as legislators who are sworn to

uphold the law.

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