Presentation - Chief Justice Sereno (Oral Arguments in Poe v COMELEC) (2 February 2016)

7/25/2019 Presentation - Chief Justice Sereno (Oral Arguments in Poe v COMELEC) (2 February 2016)

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COMELEC Second Division,Omnibus Resolution dated

1 December 2015,page 24

As a sitting Senator, and well educated at that, respondentknew or can be reasonably expected to know, that our 1935,

1973 and 1987 Constitutions have consistently adhered to

the jus sanguinis or citizenship by bloodline principle

wherein natural-born Filipino citizenship is solely and

exclusively determined by a bloodline to a Filipino father

(1935 Constitution) and by bloodline to a Filipino father or

mother (1973 and 1987 Constitution).

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SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time

of the adoption of this Constitution.

2.

Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to

public office in the Philippine Islands.

3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,

upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine

citizenship.

5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article IV, Section 1, 1935 Constitution


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SECTION 15. Effect of the Naturalization on Wife and

Children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be

married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself

be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the

Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who

have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens

thereof.

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Roa v. Insular Collector of Customs (1912)

A reading of article 17 of the Civil Code, above

copied, is sufficient to show that the first paragraph

affirms and recognizes the principle of nationality by

place of birth, jus soli. The second, that of jus

sanguinis; and the last two that of free selection, with

the first predominating.

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Torres v. Tan Chim (1940)

In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and

making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the

determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did

not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the

Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its adoption.

If on the strength of the Roa decision a person was considered

a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV, sec. 1, No. 1) on thedate of the adoption of the Constitution when jus soli had been

the prevailing doctrine, he cannot be divested of his Filipino

citizenship.

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Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration (1948)

After the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a

Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso

facto confer Philippine citizenship, and jus

sanguinis instead of jus soli is the predominating factor

on questions of citizenship, thereby rendering obsolete

the decision in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.,

and U. S. vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil., and similar cases on

which petitioner's counsel relies.

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Talaroc v. Uy (1952)

In abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case and

making jus sanguinis the predominating principle in the

determination of Philippine citizenship, the Constitution did

not intend to exclude those who were citizens of the

Philippines by judicial declaration at the time of its

adoption. If on the strength of the Roa decision a person

was considered a full-pledged Philippine citizen (Art. IV,sec. 1, No. 1) on the date of the adoption of the Constitution

when jus soli had been the prevailing doctrine, he cannot be

divested of his Filipino citizenship.

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Tecson v COMELEC (2004)

Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship

- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis

had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus

sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-

born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.

Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the

adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roain Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis

or blood relationship would now become the primary

basisof citizenship by birth.

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Article 6.The following are Filipinos:

1.

All persons born in the Philippine territory. A vessel of

Philippine registry is considered, for this purpose, as part

of Philippine territory.

2. Children of a Filipino father or mother, although born

outside of the Philippines.

3. Foreigners who have obtained certification of

naturalization.

4. Those who, without such certificate, have acquired a

domicile in any town within Philippine territory.

xxxx

/


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Article 6. xxx

It is understood that domicile is acquired by

uninterrupted residence for two years in any localitywithin Philippine territory, with an open abode andknown occupation, and contributing to all the taxesimposed by the Nation.

The condition of being a Filipino is lost in accordancewith law.

/


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Article 26. No foreigner who has not been

naturalized may exercise in the Philippines anyoffice which carries with it any authority or

jurisdictional powers.

/


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Sec. 4.

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to

reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of

April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in thePhilippine Islands, and their children born subsequent

thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine

Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,

except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance tothe Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty

of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris

December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

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Sec. 6. That whenever the existing insurrection in the

Philippine Islands shall have ceased and a condition of

general and complete peace shall have been establishedtherein and the fact shall be certified to the President by the

Philippine Commission, the President, upon being satisfied

thereof, shall order a census of the Philippine Islands to

be taken by said Philippine Commission; xxx

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xxx such census in its inquiries relating to the population

shall take and make so far as practicable full report for all

the inhabitants, of name, age, sex, race, or tribe, whether

native or foreign born, literacy in Spanish native dialect, or

language, or in English, school attendance, ownership of

homes, industrial and social statistics, and such other

information separately for each island, each province, and

municipality, or other civil division, as the President and saidCommission may deem necessary: xxxx

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Section 2.!Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were

Spanish subjectson the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred

and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their

children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held

to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall

have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain

in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace betweenthe United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,

eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as

have since become citizens of some other country:

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xxx Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein

provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the

acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the

Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoingprovisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the

United States, and such other persons residing in the

Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or

who could become citizens of the United States under thelaws of the United States if residing therein.

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There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during

the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanishsubjects." In church records, the natives were called

'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the

archipelago.

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Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima

Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to

whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be

the subject of differing views among experts; however, threeroyal decrees were indisputably made applicable to Spaniards

in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August

1841, the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining

the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,

and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870,

which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the

Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.


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The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the

Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,

according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this

country was included, would be governed by special laws.

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this

jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first

categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born

outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled

inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.


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The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11

September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could

thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when

the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that

Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from

1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in

the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise

failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same

period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be

San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,

it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the placeof residence of a person at the time of his death was also his

residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records

Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all

residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.


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Facts:

A three-day old child was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley

Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by

Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez received the infant

from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal

her (the mother's) identity, and instructed her to look for a suitable

couple who will adopt the child.

The spouses Duncan filed a petition for adoption of the child, with

Atty. Velasquez giving the written consent required by law as the de

facto guardian of the child. The trial court, however, denied the

petition, on the ground that the mother did not grant the consent

required by law.

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The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman

legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and

harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt

application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children,

however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less

severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for

adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly

those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in

their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care

and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may growfrom cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and

become serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude

of sympathy, encouragement and assistance.

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Facts:

Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan

Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose

left her with the Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed

mothers and their babies stating that she (the mother) could

not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the

mother's family.) Petitioners Marvin G. Ellis and his wife Gloria

C. Ellis petitioned for the adoption of Rose. Both are citizens of

the United States and permanent residents of the Philippines.


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Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that

jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by

the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we havejurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen

of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who

are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after

the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted

the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, isdetermined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the

domiciliary xxxx


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Presentation - Chief Justice Sereno (Oral Arguments in Poe v COMELEC) (2 February 2016)

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Transcript of Presentation - Chief Justice Sereno (Oral Arguments in Poe v COMELEC) (2 February 2016)