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united states cryptologic history

Operation REGAL:

The Berlin Tunnel (S-COO)

(b) (1)(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

Number 4

Operation Regal:The Berlin Tunnel (S·CCO)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

1988

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Foreword

Table of Contents

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PreIude ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1

Berlin: Challenge and Opportunity ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2

Just the Right Spot -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3

Masquerade ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5Digging In ------------------------------------------------------- u____________________________________ 6

1 1----------------------------------------------------._-._--------------------- 7Completion . .. the Work Begins -----------------------------------------------------j~K~L____ 7

Relying on a Rival ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9

Intelligence Production --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10

Some Interesting Sidelights --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11

Strategy ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12

Discovery ------------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17A Tunnel Opens to Mixed Reviews ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17

Mole in the Tunnel? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20

Summing Up: Reassurance... -.-------------------------------------------------------------------- 21

And Misgivings ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

Crescendo and Decline --------------------------------------------------------------------------------.- 23

Legacy ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------- 24

Notes -------------------------------------------------------------------------.------------------------------- 26

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Foreword.......................... \,

(U) Operation REGAL is another vOlu1neinih:~:tecIStates Cryptologie ~~torySpecial Report Series produced by the NSkHistory and Publications Division. REGALwas the codename for the Berlin Tunnel, a U.S. intelligence community operatIonconducted during the mid-1950s \Vhich was designed to intercept Soviet and EastGe~C01n1nunkatio: . . . \

(U~ IbElgan research on this subject in September 1985 while on aninternship in t e History and Publications Division. Working witb N~ 7valmaterials, oral interviews with key individuals, and CIA documents,llcompleted her study in late 1986. Concentrating on NSA involvemen , S e 0 ers anumber ofinteresting observations. She reveals that there was little cooperation initiallybetween NSA and CIA regarding the Berlin Tunnel. Although the U.S. intelligencecommunity at first considered REGAL a great success, the Soviets, thanks to GeorgeBlake, certainly knew about the operation early on, but apparently did not inform theEast Germans of their discovery. Even the Soviet military may not have known (only thetop officials of the KGB), leaving the tapped lines to be accidentally uncovered by the EastGermans. It is an intriguing story, well told. And until the KGB opens its archives,precisely what the Soviets knew and when they knew it remain a mystery.

Henry F. SchorreckNSA Historian

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Operation REGAL

T?SCl REGAL was the codename for the Berlin Tunnel, a U.S. intelligencecommunity operation tUsigned to intercept Soviet and East German communications. Itinvolued the construction of an elaborate communications intercept center in a tunnelrunning beneath West Berlin into East Berlin. The tunnel was operational from 10 May1955 until 21 April 1956 when the East Germans discovered the operation and closed itdown. Despite its short operational period, REGAL was initially considered a greatintelligence success by U.s. offr.cials because ofthe large volume ofinformation intercepted.There was also an initial feeling of accomplishment in carrying out such an elaborateintelligence scheme literally untkrneath the feet of the Soviet and East German military.Later developments led U.S. intelligence community analysts, however, to question thevalidity of the intercepted information and its importance relative to the expenseuntkrtaken in constructing the tunnel. Considered a mqior Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) operation by the American press, the National Security Agency (NSA) neverthelessplayed a vital role in the project. This is a study ofNSA', involvement in REGAL.

Prelude

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~ Due to the increased us[e=o:f:u:lt:r:a:-h:i:h:::f:re=u=e:n:c::I:in:e:~:o:f-:S:i:h=t=r:a:d:i:oJcommunications after World War II,I IleavingBf1.tis and merican 0 ICla s esperate orinformation on SOviet intentions. Before the introduction of high frequency, shortwavecommunications, airwaves could be monitored at great distances from the actual source.because long, low frequency waves bend around the earth. However, the transmitting oflarge volumes of communications beyond high frequency presented a problem for theBritish and American analysts as these waves are basically line-of-sight. Alternateintercept methods therefore had to be devised to fill the collection void. 3

CUll PIA's Office of Communications accidentally opened the wayto new intercept possibilities when he discovered a way to exploit landline messages.SIGTOT, a Bell System Cipher machine used by the United States in globalcommunications, had been rejected by the U.S. government for secure communicationsduring World War II because of its vulnerability to intercept. To their chagrin, Belltechnicians discovered that as SIGTOT electrically encrypted a message, faint "echoes"·of the plain text were transmitted along the wire simultaneously with the encipheredmessage. Refusing to accept Bell's modifications to its 131-B2 mixer, the Army Signal

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Corps abandOned SIGTOT as a veh.l.·.CI..e f,.or :(r::e eotyption. and the machine',peculiarity faded into oblivion until rediscover . .n 1951.11

(U~ ~uspectedthatSIGTOT's vulnera ilty. w ich enabled him to tap into acable CIlJ'l'Yingthe enciphered message and read the plain text wi ..

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\ll:Jbjlo.Oo,een y mterested in the intercept possibilities the CIA hoped to us~innovation to e loit Soviet landlines in East Berlil'l~ m' coincidedf-w"'""i""'th"""""th""e-

~_.....................,.....,........,.....,,......,......""=",...-..,.....,......,...-=,......,----:""""="'"----:,..,....----I Ro'oVlett had joined the CIAas aSpecial Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence.s After five years .with CIA.Rowlett returned to NSA in 1958.

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BerUn: Challenge and Opportunity

(U) Because oIthe nature of the pre-World War II communications system. Berlinwas the central circuit of East European communications. Any calls originating inEastern Europe were channeled through Berlin. including all calls to Moscow.Monitoring Berlin's communications would greatly increase the U.S. Soviet-EasternEurope collection effort. Berlin's telephone and telegraph system resembled a wheel. withtwo concentric circles spanning East and West Berlin. Switching stations. placed atstrategic locations around the circle. directed service to each city sector via lines like thespokes ofa wheel. The occupying officials divided the city after the war and disconnectedthe telephone lines from the terminals. To tap into the East Berlin system the CIAneeded to reconnect the lines and monitor the cables.8

""tm.William King Harvey. CIA Bureau Chief in Berlin. enthusiastically pursued theidea of exploiting Berlin communications. Under Harvey's direction the CIA attemptedvarious tapping method n n h"prime target circuit. ,,10

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(U) The CIA realized that Berlin inherently posed more difficulties for the tunnel­builders than had Vienna. The border area was under constant scrutiny from EastGerman guards. Without arousing undue suspicion. construction workers would have toburrow from West Berlin under the heavily guarded border into East Berlin in order totap the cables.

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"($.. Never having undertaken such a project, the CIA enlisted British aid in itsdevelopment, recognizing British expertise in the "highly specialized art of verticaltunneling."13 The trick entailed digging through soft soil without collapsing the roof.Harvey negotiated with the British and devised the following divisions of responsibility.The CIA was to "(1) procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel to apoint beneath the target cables; (2) be responsible for the recording ofall signals producedat·die·poiJit·where·the··'lead-away'.tapping.cableiJ..entere<l.t~e installation; and (3\\-Dlt:QC:WL.,in 'Ou. •• All nf thp.· • . . • .• from If! "'1

Just the Right Spot

~BeforeHarvey laid out his final plans for Washington's approval, an appropriatesite had to be selected. The tunnel had to originate in either the U.S. or U.K. zones inBerlin, with a path in range of the targeted cables. The farther from the border the cablestarted, the less East German curiosity would be aroused; however, a longer tunnel wouldalso greatly increase the amount of dirt to be excavated and disposed of. Both theoperators and the equipment required fresh air, which also set a limit on the length of thetunnel because of the maximum capabilities of the air pumps. The small CIA REGALplanning team finally decided on a spot originating in the U.S. zone where land could bepurchased to build the above-ground compound and from which the tunnel length wasfeasible. Collateral information on the site was also available, identifying the targetcable plan, aerial photographs, and utility lines. Geological maps indicated that the areawas predominantly flat, with soft soil but uneven drainage. The permanent water tablewas deemed to be 32 feet below ground. Because of the importance of isolating theelectronic equipment from damp areas, the supposedly low water table would aid theengineers by eliminating requirements for watertight construction. 15

"f$. Armed with technical data, William Harvey returned to Washington to obtainofficial approval for REGAL. He briefed CIA Director Allen Dulles, Clandestine ServicesChielFrank Wisner, and Deputy Clandestine Services Chief Richard Helms concerninghis meetings with the British and the blueprints for the tunnel's construction andoperations. Dulles approved Harvey's plans, directing, however, that "in the interest ofsecurity as little as possible should be reduced to writing."UI The U.S. side followedDulles's stipulation scrupulously, but the British retained extensive notes of theproceedings. Minutes 01 the initial meeting between Harvey and the British were kept byan MI-6 agent, George Blake.17 However, CIA officials decided not to inform the rest ofthe intelligence community of the project, not even NSA.~ The tunnel operation got underway in 1954 with the construction of a two-story

warehouse in West Berlin over the area chosen to be one terminus of the tunnel.Although the construction workers would not comprehend the purpose of a two-storywarehouse with a basement requiring a 12-foot ceiling, its large size was required to holdthe expected 3,000 tons of dirt excavated from 1,476 foot long, 6t foot wide tunnel. Themain floor housed the electronic equipment. 18

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Berlin. the Divided City.The tunnel lies in the southeast corner or the U.S. sector.

~ While the warehouse in West Berlin was under collsttuction, simultaneousoperations were underway in rid Richmond, Virginia. Army engineers ledby Lieutena . . ~Elririf Crops began building a testtunnel at the 19 The ~ersion was 450feet long and ug at a ept 0 eet, WIt ee tween the roof and ground surface.Meanwhile, equipment for the Berlin job was assembled in Richmond. Among thesupplies were 125 tons of steel liner plates which when joined created the tunnel's walls.The plates were specially treated with a protective rubber coat to sup~ress noise duringconstruction. The gathered supplies then went by ship ~ Iand by train to Berlin and the completed warehouse near Altglienecke.

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The site in enlargement, detaiIJng the West Berlin suburban area from which the tunnel began.

Masquerade

(U) The East German border guards probably felt they harbored few illusionsconcerning the U.S. "warehouse." The building was surrounded by two barbed wirefences, powered by a diesel generator, equipped with a large parabolic antenna, andstaffed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. For all intents and purposes the area appeared tobe a poorly concealed radar intercept station.

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'tm. The overall CIA concept for the area called for observer confusion. In devisingthe engineering plans for the tunnel, the CIA devoted a great deal of thought to anappropriate "c()ver"for the project. A two-tiered solution was reached. The "warehouse"itsel1'\1Vas deemed sUfficientlyJlUlocu.0\1s to hide U.S. intentions during construction. Toobfuscateactivitv durinll the tunnel's oDerational oeriod the CIA decided to cover the site

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(U) Americans and Germans in the western sector were also curious about the area,and their interest was fed by a series of unusual incidents. A civilian engineer originallyheading the construction project quit after publicly protesting the need for such animmense basement. Civilians actually constructing the building were required to wearArmy Signal Corps uniforms without explanation.22 Speculation was abundant, but littleof substance was learned as the few actually cognizant of the intricacies of the operationwere not talking.

t$...By 17 August 1954, the German contractors had completed their work, and theU.S. had possession of the compound. All supplies, shipped under disguise and strictsecurity, were in Berlin awaiting the start of construction. Simultaneously, a tunnelgroup at the CIA's Office of Communications designed the "unique equipment" requiredto process the expected telegraphic material. A great deal of care went into the selectionof components for the taps and electrical equipment. All pieces were scrupulously testedfor reliability and constructed of the best materials.2S

Digging In

(U) Construction of the tunnel was a laborious, time-consuming task, complicatedby surveillance and security risks. Beginning in the basement's easternmost point, theengineers

sank a verticalahaft 18 feet in diameter to a depth of20 feet, then drove pilings halfway into thefloor ofthe ahaft. Next, a ateel rin,6t feet in diameter and fitted with hydraulicjacka around itacircumference waa lowered into place. Braced a,ainat the n:poaed aection of the pilings, therin,. or "ahield," waa fitted flush againat the tunnel'a face.u

is). Three-man shifts using picks and shovels worked on the tunnel's construction 24hours a day. Gains were small: the team excavated two inches, shoved the shieldforward, and then repeated the process. After they had excavated an entire foot, theengineers bolted a steel liner plate onto already bolted plates to form the tunnel wall.They lined the tunnel with steel so that the walls would not implode due to the largepercentage of sand in the soil. 25 The plates each contained small holes which theengineers unplugged and filled with cement to pack any space left between the dirt andthe wall. After six feet had been completed, the existing wall was secure enough to bracethe jacked-forward shield, and the engineers removed the hydraulic jacks from theproceu.-

'lSt The tedious process was slowed because of the security demands placed upon theeBlineen. A lookout kept watch around the clock to observe any signs of undue suspicionOr CUl'6leity on the part of the East Germans. Whenever German guards walked over thewaft·.... the team halted construction. Building plans called for as quiet an operationU ltee1 and hydraulic jacks could allow. The U.S. team fmished the tunnel shell on 28

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February 1955, complete with a steel and concrete "anti-personnel" door on the EastBerlin side to prevent East German officials from storming the tunnel upon discovery.27

Completion••• the Work Begins

1$.The finished tunnel was 1,486 feet long, with the first half sloping downward andthe second half sloping upward. To keep the equipment and the cables dry, the Armyengineers installed pumps on both sides and panelled the section adjoining the tapchamber with "marine-type plywood" for insulation.sa

~ While the engineers completed the tunnel, CIA personnel fabricated acontingency plan to be effected upon discovery of the tunnel by the East Germans. TheU.S. would publicly deny all knowledge of the tunnel. Secretly, the operatives were todefend against forced entry, activate the anti-personnel door, and if necessary, demolishthe tunnel with charges mined at the border.se

~ REGAL became operational on 10 May 1955, and from the beginningcollected a vast amount of information. According to Colonel Russell Horton, an ArmySecurity Agency officer stationed in Berlin at the time, the collectors were "turning outthat stufTby the car loads."37 Another analyst stated that they "used to haul three or fourmailban back from Berlin" to Frankfurt at a time for initial processing.38 I

~----::-:--:-::~--:,_,:",",::,"":"":",,__",,,,,:,," ...JI U.S. personnel monitored thetunnel inside and out 24 hours a day.

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A Soviet photograph laken from just beyond the cham her where the land line taps were applied. Interceptedsignals were relayed w the U.S. sector through the cables shown at tbe lower right corner oftbe passageway.

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Relying on a Rival

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~ccording to CIA officials interviewed after the termination of the operation, thebiggest problem with the tunnel concerned the "quantity and content of the materialavailable from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed."" CIA officialskept strict control over who had access to tunnel information, using the same standards asthose for Special Intelligence (SI).45 It was especially difticult to find adequately trainedlinguists cleared for SI to process the traffic. The CIA tested all its personnel with anyknowledge of Russian or Getman for possible assignments as translators,4e but CIAresources were strained to the limit. Onlv then was materiallliven to NSA linllUists

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~8-660) CIA and NSA fought over a great deal of the exehanged materfal.CIAwas reluctant to give up its jurisdiction over the intelligence and refused to releasecertain information to NSA due to CIA rules and regulations concerningcompartmentation of information. NSA, on the other hand, wanted to know everythingconcerning the CIA o~ration. Nielson recalled that when/he would report back to\NSA,General Burgess and I t.vould debrief him on everything h, saw at CU\ toensure that NSA received all REGAL report. Two for....r NSA anaJYsta~ ~I

I eadedthe CIAL Btiildirig operation and these two "smooth num.ers"were otten '!:;Iow'to 'live" un REGAL intelligence I I

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E'f8e~ On 6 June 1955 the Washington REGAL Center nyRC) issued the firstintelligence report based on the1\. \.IThe WRC aperiodicreports were classified "TOP SECRET REGAL" and occasionally contained the codeword"EIDER." The Main Processing Unit in London issued aperiodic intelligence reportsunder the title JMTRS. which expanded to Joint Military Translation and ReportingService.~The intelligence reports issued by the WRC and the.JMTRS usually contained

several unrelated items in a format similar to a weekly activity summary. Previouslyreported items were often referenced as new information became available. Major topics

I ISome Interesting Sidelights

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(':FS ceo) As stated earlier, most of NSA's involvement in the tunnel operationoccurred after the tunnel was discovered. Only James Nielson and a handful of otherhigh-level NSA analysts were aware of the existence of the covert CIA operation until itwas exposed. Although the CIA realized that the tunnel would be discovered eventuallyand the collection operation shutdown, no one could have foreseen the circumstances thatled to its disclosure.

Discovery

(TS-CCO) On 21 April 1956, eleven months and eleven days after the U.S. firstbegan monitoring Soviet and East German communications, an East German repair crewuncovered the tapped cables. Dr. Nielson recalled going to work one morning and beingtold "It's all over."99 Several days of heavy rainfall had flooded the low-lying areas, andwhile the pumps on the U.S. side of the tunnel were powerful enough to keep the electricalequipment dry, the pumps on the East German side were not strong enough to do so,resulting in an electrical short.1°O Between 17 and 22 April, all of the cables wereinoperable at some point. 101

1St On 22 April, the telephone lines for Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko,Commander, GFSG, and four of his generals, failed. A fault on cable FK150 eliminatedall communications between Moscow and East Germany. Communications for the SovietAir Warning Control Center also went down and Soviet Signal Troops and East GermanPost and Telegraph technicians were under enormous pressure to repair the damage.While digging to reach the cable on 22 April, the technicians uncovered the tap chamberat about 0200 hours. The tap chamber microphone at that time picked up theconversation and activity going on around it. Unaware of the significance of theirdiscovery, the technicians continued to dig, finally leaving the site at 0330 to report theirfindings. It was not until 0630 that the microphone picked up the announcement that"the cable is tapped." Soon afterwards, the East German telephone operators refused toplace any outgoing telephone calls, saying that it was against "orders.',102 The interceptoperators realized that the end was imminent.

A Tunnel Opens to Mixed Reviews

~ The entire chamber was uncovered and entered around 1300, when pictures andmeasurements were taken. The East Germans expressed "wonder and admiration" at thetechnology and ingenuity involved. The last interesting phone calls were placed in the0800 hour, and the teletype traffic stopped at 1530 when the tap wires were cut. The

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A dose-up view of the tunnel's receiver bays and watertight casing.The sandbags along the sides pro,,;ded sound proofing and insulation.

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microphone was dismantled at 1550, and REGAL could no longer intercept intelligence. 103The monitors immediately halted operations and prepared for the backlash.~ The Soviet reaction was totally unexpected. C.S. intelligence experts assumed

that the Soviet Union would not advertise the fact that its communications had been sototally compromised.104 However, the commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, MajorGeneral losif Leontovich Zarenko, was away from Berlin at the time, and the ActingCommandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, decided to expose U.S. "perfidy and treachery"to world opinion. On 23 April Kotsyuba called a press conference to elucidate on U.S. spyactivity. Expressing "righteous indignation,"105 the Soviets apparently hoped to exploitthe situation to their advantage and curtail Allied activities to Berlin. lOe With the U.S."warehouse" looming as the obvious endpoint of the tunnel, the Soviets accused the U.S.of tapping "important underground long-distance telephone" lines linking Berlin withother nations. 107 They conducted official tours of the tunnel and allowed Western pressmembers to cross underground into West Berlin. Exploitation of this "iIIegal andintolerable action"108 led to carnival-like enterprise on the East Berlin side, complete withsnack bar, as about 90,000 East Berlin citizens toured "the capitalist warmongers'expensive subterranean listening post. ,,109~ The U.S. and West German reactions to the accusation and notorietv were

subdued and guarded. The U.S. Army denied knowledge of the tunnel but promised toundertake an immediate investigation. 110 Little doubt existed among the press that itwas a joint U.S.-British operation - the electrical equipment found in the tunnel wasstamped "Made in England," while the tunnel pumps were determined to be of C.S.manufacture. ll1 However, the operation amused and delighted the general public in theWest. Even Soviet technicians expressed admiration for a tap chamber that resembledthe "communications center of a battleship,',u2 and American journalists consideredingenious its construction literally underneath the feet of the Soviet and East Germanmilitaries. lls The Western press considered it quite an intelligence coup.

(U) The Soviet propaganda effort, undertaken in satellite countries as well as theWest following the tunnel's discovery,m appeared to backfire, giving the U.S. and the CIAvery favorable publicity. Even the later East German claim that the tunnel idea had beenoriginated by Eleanor Dulles, sister of the Secretary of State and at the time SpecialAssistant to the Director of the Department of State's Office of German AtTairs,l15 failed toelicit sympathy. The press and the general public assumed that Soviet and f~ast Germancommunications had been compromised for almost a year without detection.

(8 eeO) Although the uncovering of the tunnel had come about sooner thanexpected by Western intelligence officials, they considered the East German discovery"purely fortuitous"u8 and the unpredictable result of poor weather and bad luck. Thefailed cable had been known to be in poor condition, and the British had therefore delayedactivating the tap until 2 August 1955, more than two months later than the other twotaps.117 Howe"ero," pinions soon began to emerge as to the reasons behind thepremature demis' '. ···Privately··some··{J;S;··officials··believed··that··orilj"a"seniorofficial could have e REGAL operation at such an early time. Frank Rowlettfelt that the Soviets "very clumsily put on an act of discovery."ll6 However, no hardevidence was obtained until the 1961 revelation of the Soviet spy activities of MI-6 agentGeorge Blake, the very official who had taken such careful notes in the British-Americandiscussions concerning the tunnel.

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George Blake. a Soviet double agent within British Intelligence (MI·6).had intimate knowledge or Operation REGAL.

Mole in the Tunnel?

(U) Born the son of an Egyptian Jew in Rotterdam, George Blake escaped from theNetherlands to Spain on a forged passport during World War II. From Spain he went toBritain where he joined the British Navy and served heroically with ~aval Intelligenceduring the war. Initially recruited by the British Secret Service in 1944, Blake studiedRussian at Cambridge in 1947 and was appointed a Vice-Consul with the British ForeignService the following year. Assigned to Seoul in 1948, Blake. along with the other BritishEmbassy officials. was captured by North Korean Communists in 1950. It may have beenduring his three years of incarcerlltion that Blake's political opinions were influenced tosuch an extent that he volunteered to work for the Soviets. Released in April 1953, Blakerejoined British intelligence as an MI-6 secret agent in 1954.119 The fact that his cousinHenri Curiel was one of the founding members of the Egyptian Communist Party was

UNCLASSIFIED 20

DOCID: 3962741"Fep SEERE"F l:JMBRA

apparently not taken into account in his appointment. When arrested in 1961 after beingunmasked by a Polish defector, Blake pled guilty to the espionage charges, saying thatsince 1953 he had given every important document with which he came in contact to hisSoviet contact. 120 Charged with "communicating information that might be directly orindirectly useful to an enemy power"121 and three violations of the Official Secrets Act,122Blake was sentenced to the maximum 42 years in prison because of his determination "towreak maximum vengeance" on Britain and its allies. ::.13

t'fS-OOOl Officially, the U.S. reacted rather calmly to the news of Blake's spyactivities. The Department of State held a press conference to state that Blake hadapparently not compromised any U.S. secrets. L24 t:nofficially, however, there was a greatdeal of consternation among the officials involved with the tunnel operation. FrankRowlett remembered Blake's presence at a U.S.-British meeting on tunnel details in

Britain in 1951 and believed that Blake ..was ..w.....e...l...l.•war: OfW:t we w~e doing" and musthave passed the information on to the Soviets.125 I ICIA's Office ofCommunications said that Blake "kfl~:wevery detail of t e tunne operation. 1:.16 Inretros ect the CIA realized that Bla.ke had a arentl also reviousl com romised the

American intelligence now had to"----"""'T-:---:"lr--:~--r-~:T"""""'"'---.r"""':"'""'T""""'T"""'T......-T"'9'I"I"l":"'AL to operate for almost a yearl28 in

t 11' 1:.19or er 0 oro ec elr va ua e source 10 rl IS In e 12'ence.b)(1 )b)(3)GA

CIAI I

Summing Up: a....urance... ........

I I

((o

b) (1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-18 USC 798(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

21 Tap SECRETUMB~

DOCID: 3962741) (1)

(3)-50 USC 403( (3)-18 USC 798(b) )-P.L. 86-36

.0P S!ERET YMIRA

(b)(1 )(b){3)OGA

CIA

(b)(1)(b)(3)-P.L.86-36(b)(3)-50 USC 403

Ie. concentrate on spec IC, tec mca I ormahoniJa.lfi~ romintercept, REGAL satisfied other obj~ctivesfol"theCIATheCIAcaIJedR..n,r"'lr'T""""::"a-....I"unique sourceofc\jrrelltinteUigence of a kind and quality which hil9not been availablesince 1948;" and the primary source on Soviet intentions in E\lrope.1S6 In the politicalsphere, REGAL informed the U.S. and Uk:I.iet de~igrts for Berlin and the "truestory"behiridoffidallyreportedactivityilltefcept also established that theSoviets were determined to maintain t elr sp ere of influence vis-a-vis the otheroccupying powers in Berlin, despite East ~rmanattempts at sovereignty. 137

"i&.. REGAL intercept/aHowed ttieUnited States to notify its representatives at the1955 Foreign Ministers Conferellce in Geneva that the Soviets had decided to establish anEast German Arllly,andtbeREGAL account of the attempted implementation of theSoviet 20th Party Congress decisions indicated that dissent among Soviet nuclearscientists,afous~dbythe denunciation of Stalin and the era of collective leadership, wasbeing suppressed. The intercept also followed Marshal Georgiy KonstantonovichZhtikov"sd w 11 s h at m t r h w r f vi rm F r r iofficers. 1SS

... And Misgivings

t'fSC' After George Blake's conviction, the question of the validity of REGAl.intelligence was combined with doubts concerning its intelligence value. Americanintelligence officials could not ignore the possibility of a massive disinformationcampaign mounted by the Soviets. Although they determined that it was highly unlikelythat the Soviets and East Germans had the time, funds, and inclination to undertake suchan immense effort,140 speculation continued on possible precautionary measures theSoviets may have taken. Because the evidence presented at Blake's trial was never madepublic, it is not known when (and/or whether) he actually informed the Soviets about thetunnel. To protect himself, Blake may have delayed presenting the information, realizingthat he might be suspected if the Soviets "discovered" the tunnel immediately upon its

leI' 'ECREll::lMBRA 22

DOCID: 3962741

'f8P SEERE'f tJM11tA

becoming operational. On the other hand, the Soviets themselves may have deliberatelypostponed exposing REGAL in order to protect Blake.

('fS-660~ The cause of REGAL's exposure has not been, and probably never will be,ascertained. Frank Rowlett believed that the Soviets deliberately exposed the tunnel on21 April 1956 for their own unknown reasons. At the time, the CIA determined that itwas the unpredictable result of bad luck. Perhaps only a few Soviet officials and GeorgeBlake ever knew for sure. However, the presence of bad weather, flooded cables, andelectrical shorts are indisputable facts. Despite Soviet knowledge of the interceptoperation and unanswered questions concerning the validity of the information, it is veryprobable that REGAL's exposure was the unexpected result of poor weather rather thanany deliberate Soviet initiative. To understand possible Soviet motives concerning thetunnel, the two types of monitored communications - telephone and teleprinter wires ­must be examined se aratel .

Based on the confused GSFG reaction to the tunnel discovery, the CIA concludedthat the East Germans happened upon REGAL by chance. Subsequent revelations aboutBlake did not provide sufficient evidence to refute this determination. If Blake diddisclose REGAL, it seems he'd have no problem providing sufficient information for theSoviets to find the approximate location.

Crescendo and Decline

T e combined U.S.-U.K. effort, when viewed in terms of sheer volume, was aclear success. TheDJ:Ilo?itored cables "containedDetallic pairs capable of

b) (1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-18 USC 798(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 23 19p '&CAEl YMBAA

(b)(1)(b)(3)OGA

CIA

DOCID: 3962741"'(b)(1)(b)(3)OGA

TOP SI!C:RI!T tlMBIb\ CIA

(b)(1:;(b)(3)OGA

CIA

transmitting a tot~lofa,pl>~~ximat~lylleolllmunication channels," with up tOnuse ataIlyonetiIIl(!.141On the averag~monitorsrecordec:r--lelegraphic circuits and

r-lvoice cir~uits continuously, resulting in abou~ ~eets'otmagnetic tape totaling~Ot()ns.142

-tSt- The personnel who processed REGAL material were spread out among several0.rganiza.tiQlls.....M:f»lJ.in..1.(m9QI'l..Elmploye4:Jpersons,who,transcribe~viet two­

(b)(f)"""""hourY()il:e'r~l1>c()lltain.in~ """ '" """,~conversations;MPUprocessed~~~:~ell(b)(3) German voice reels received, fully transcribing I Iconversations. Many~OGA transcribers remained with the organization after it became the London Processing GroupCIA (LPG), working under James ~ielson when he served as the first U.S. LPG Deputy

Branch Chief. 144~ In Washillgton,Deople at~~lJPl"ocessedllsix-hourSoviet teletype

reels~n~1 Isix-ho~r(}erTllanteletypereels. Some~r~els~8.~asTllanyasD~eparate circllitswhich used tirne-dillisiolllJlllltiplexingtoereate additional circuits. The~I.t\sta.tion~dasmaHerewoftwo to four persons in Berlin for immediate monitoring ofcrucial intelligence and maintaining security. 145 The number of NSA employees includedin the TPli figures has been impossible to ascertain as NSA was not mentioned in theofficial CIA history of REGAL. The exact number of NSA analysts, supervisors, andclerical workers processing REGAL material is also unknown because the numberschanged monthly due to varying requirements and part-time personnel. GENS-14 keptthorough records of NSA REGAL personnel in the beginning of the operation, but lessinclusive documentation as time progressed. As of December 1956 REGAL processingemployed aboutr--NSA personnel either at AHS or Fort Meade. 148

Ibl Ii 1IbI131-P.L. 86-36

Legacy

lQ){llIbl1:31-5QU,';C403I b 1 131,'1.8 USC 798.I b 1 I 3 1- p,L 86 - 3 6

lTset-Operation REGAL involved various intelligence community members - CIA,~SA, Army, and GCHQ - between its planning stage in the early 19508 and the end ofREGAL intercept processing in 1958. Vast amounts of information of varying degrees ofintelligence interest were intercepted. ~umerous engineers, monitors, processors,analY!3ts, managers. and linguists aided the ostentatious and expensive effort Inretrospect; I I

I I As .1result - or, perhaps, as a weak justification for an expensive and not overwhelminglysuccessful undertaking - the CIA asserts that REGAL's most valuable legacy was not theintelligence derived, but the morale boost it gave the U.S. intelligence community at theexpense of the Soviet Cnion and the sense of security inherent in the realization thatEurope could not be the subject ofa Soviet attack without l".S. foreknowledge.

(tps-oom ~SA's motives for its REGAL participation distinguished it from CIA,and its goals and expectations were correspondingly distinct. ~SA did not receiveaccolades for its part in the operation for several reasons. It was the CIA whichingeniously engineered and constructed the tunnel and equipment, while NSA officially

24

DOCID: 3962741

TO'SEERET

(b) (1)(b) (3)

OGA

CIA

included only about a dozen individuals in the actual covert intercept operation. NSAconducted its endeavors predominantly in the 18 months following the interceptshutdown, by which time the tunnel's color and appeal had waned. CIA operativesdeserved credit for their glamorous operation, despite REGAL's probable exposure byBlake. NSA did not want public recognition, but wanted instead what the agencybelieved was more valuable - its acceptance by G.S. intelligence community members as aviable and equal contributor to the intelligence effort. There was a great deal ofcompetition between the CIA and NSA at the time, and NSA, as the less established of thetwo, felt compelled to prove its worth. REGAL provided an opportunity CIA, unable toprocess REGAL material adequately, reluctantly recruited NSA assistance, therebyformally reco..~. jzjDg NjA analytic skills. Consequently, in addition to the intelligence itobtainedfrOin NSA benefited immeasurably from its collaboration on theREGAL effort with the CIA and GCHQ because of the contacts made, the officialexchanges, and the respect extended by the other collaborators for the NSA effort.

(b) (1)(b) (3) -50 USC 403(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

25Ih\NBLI!! YIA €aMmy €UMmPHJ6 am::

T9PSEERE'f

DOCID: 3962741

SECRET

SOTES

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)(b) (3)-18 USC 798(b.)(3)-SO USC 403(b)\(3)-P.L. 86-36

1. I{JJI ~rank Rowlett. "The Berlin Tunnel Operation: 1952-1956," 24 June 1969,~landestineservices History, Ffo. ISO, CIA. IS)2 I..U. I David c~rtJn, WilderMIS ofMirrors INew York: Harper and Row, Publishers,1980), p. 73. lUI3. lUll .JRowlett, "Tunnel."ISI4. lUi Martin, i derMSs, p. 74. lUI5. lUi Martin, WilderMSS, p. 74. lUI6. lUI Martin, Wildernes" p. 74. Il:'7. lUI Martin, WilderMIS, p. 74. lUI8. IU) Interview Philip Dibben, 10 May 1985 by Robert D. Farley, OH 09-85, NSA. ITSC SENSlLIMDlS)9. lUI Martin, WilderMSS, p. 75. (til10.(1]1 ~wlett, "TunneL" ,SI11. (l; !Rowlett, "Tunnel." lSI12. IV> Martin, Wilderne88, p. 76. 'l"l13. IU) Martin, Wilderness, p. 76. lUI14;fllj twwlett, "Tunnel." lSI15. IU1 Jtowlett, "Tunnel." ,SI16. IU) Martin, WilderfUlss, p. 78. Il:l17. lUI E. H. Cookridge, The Many Sides of George Blake Esq.: The Complete Dossier (Princeton:

'B.',ra"ndlDlSvstems prpt,lnc., 19701 p. 158; Martin, p. 100. IU)18. IU wlett, "Tunnel." ,S)19.IU wlett, "Tunnel." lSI2.0. It;') Martin, Wilderness, p. 79. IV>2LIl"J! Rowlett, "Tunnel."(5)22. fl")I"WoDderfll! T'\rmel," Time, 17 May 1956)67:42. Ill)23. lUI JRowlett, "Tunnel." lSI

24. (l:) :B~n :rne18,p.80.1U)25. unl IRowlett, "Tunnel." IS)~6;CU) ~amn, rneB8, p. 80. (\j)

.2.7. 'till IRowlett, "TunneJ."IS,28.fU! IRowlett, "Tunnel." (8)

29. CUI Martin, Wilderness, p. 82. Ill)30.1U) The U.S. intelligence community obtained order of battle information during the tunnel constructionthrough the close watch kept on the highway: analysts were able to ascertain the relative importance ofvisitorsto East Berlin by the security measures implemented between the airport and the city.3Ltml IRowlett, "Tunnel."IS)32. (\j) Marlm, Wdderness, p. 83. lUl33.IUD'M18,p.83.1U134.~U wlett, "Tunnel." (S)35. III wlett, "Tunnel." IS)36. IU wlett, "Tunnel." (S)37. IU) Interview Colonel Russel Horton, 24 March 1982,8 April 1982, 23 Apri11982 by Robert D..Flirley, OH06-82, NSA. ITSC)38. IU) Dibben intervil!w, OH 09-85. ITSC SENSlLIMDIS) ~ , ...39. (0) Interview Dr. James R. Nielson, 21 July 1986 by Robert D. FarleOH. 20-86,NSA. (TS-CCOI

..... 40.IU~·terview,OH06-82.ITSCI ".'. '" "'4C(U) ········ ntercept:~eCables in East Berlin," 1 April 1957,Series VI, 1.3.5, Historical Colletti·on,

NSA. erem r cited as'L-..Jlntercept." ITSC)4 I M in Wi r 8 . 84.n:1

(b){1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403(b)(3)-P.L.86-36

CIA

(SICl)(b) (3)

OGA

CIA

"(il;l)t1 )(biNIOGA

"'lll,i~~;~~~~~~~~~;;;;""

(b)(1}(b)(3)OGA

CIA

44dU45;(U~!l:p~ec=:I'='ar-l!"::nT:"l~lg·encerefers to a category of sensitive compartmented information requiring specialcontrols for restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation isestablished. Compartmentation is a formal system of restricted acce88 to intelligence activities, such systemsestablished by and/or managed under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect thesel1sitive as ect ofsources, methods, and analytical procedures offoreign intelligence programs.46. (U wlett, "Tunnel." IS)47. lUI Ie n interview, OH 20-86. ITS-CCO)

SEERET 26IIANQI>.S VIA E3SMUff Slh\NNBLS SUM"

DOCID: 3962741SECRET

(b) (1)(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

," (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

"jb) (1)

0j:J) (3)O@;A

CIA

48. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86.ITS-CCOI49. CU) Nielson interview. OH 20-86.ITS-CCOI50. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. CTS-CCOI51. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. CTS-CCOI52. <UQWilderM'IJ, p. 84. (UI53. (U Illtercept." (TSC)54. (U n rvlewJanel!:~Dunn,29June 1981 by RobertD. FarleY,OH 05-81,NSA. (TSC" I55~./CU) GENS was one of four major operational divisions of NSA's Production Organization; it combined laterw.ith ADVA (Advanced Soviet) into~ Group.56. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86.lTS-,CCOI57. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. ITs-ceo I58. cU) Interview Dr. James R. Nielson, 14 May19~0 by Robert D. Farle)' and Henry Schorreck, OH 18·80.NSA. CS-CCO)59. ~X~.D,nDn iDjrVie:,~H 05-81. ITSCI .

~~:~~e:ween~~~e~~~I;~~~(;IA.laUnChed several hundre~~~li\.l.tnbIlJloonsequipped with observation.cameras for travel over Eastern EuropeandJ;he~vietUnion. Although several balluons produced valuableinformation, many more fell or were shot down over the Soyiet l;'nion, triggering official.,rotests to Washingtonand alienating President Eisenhower. See Donald E. Welzenbach...Ob!lf!fvatio..n.....B....a...I..I.O...o.. nsan~~e...c...o...n.naissanceSatellites," Studies in Intelligence cSpring 1986) 30:21-28. IS)62. (U) Washington REGAL Center Intelligence Report. 28 May 1956. Cryptologic ArchivalHoldingArea,NSA.ITSC)

~::~~~~:;~:;i.~(~~)86. (TSCI

~~: ~m·Ui6~~~~:~~~~~!85.I~SE~SlLI~~ISI67. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. (TS-CCOI68. (UI GENS-I43 Monthly Oijal::a.ti·IlD..SWDDl.a.cr....I.1.L1.f 1956. Accession Number 10243. CryptolC/g"ic ArchivalHolding Area. NSA. (TS EIDE69. (U) GENS-143 Monthly Op:e:!:ra=l::;n:""l:!:u':':m~m=r::::-T':':u=us·t 1956~Accession ~umber 10243, Crypl.ologic ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. (TS ElDE70. (U) GEfliS-143 Monthly O;.jR""e"'r""'u""o""'n.....""um=m""'a=....,.,u""-- 1956, Accessi()nN\lmberl0243.Cryptologic ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. CTS ElDE ..................................................//71. (UI GENS-I43 Monthly Operation umma mb r 1956. Accession.Numberl0243~CrYPttl19gjcArchival Holding Area. NSA. (TSEIDE//''''" (b) (1)

J:~I~Y~~~~;~A~~~rD~~[B~iQnS"mm8ry~!!17rt1956.A.CCE!Sfilio~~~lllberlO~43.CryPtologiCArchival (b) (3) - P . L . 86- 36

73. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Opera 1 n S mm r U tob r 1956.,A.ccessionNumber 10243, Cryptologic Archival

Holding Area, NSA.ITS EIDE -1i:mi:[sWiiiiiiiiLa:::JJi:liil~74. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Ope! r 1956,Acce,9llion Number 10243, Cryptologic HoldingArchival Area, ~SA. (TS EIDE:l1iIi:iiii::siiiiiiiiiiii:6:ii~75.lU) GENS-143 Monthly O~ t UJ56,.J\:ccession ~umber 10243, Cryptologir ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. (TS EIDE'_-~Wiii:Siiiiiiiiii:ti::1JijWi~76. (UI GENS-14 Monthly Oper, er1956,A!=cessionNumber 10243, Cryptologic ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. (TS EIDEl~~~~al~:~~~~r:~~t~~(:;.lTS~p~eE~r~~~~1~~nRf~~um=~m~a--:~,...,.,.-Ptembetll~6.~ccesSion:UrnllE!rl0243,Cryptologic

78. (UI Nielson interview, OH 20-86. ITS:"'CT'C....O")-..~>----....79. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. cTS-CCQ)

80 (l!) GENS-14 Mo~!t~ OperationSummarv, January 1957. AcCeSSiOnN'UJnberl0243.u(;ryptoIO.J~.i.•.c.•.•.•.Al'ch.i.•.V.~~!'"Holding Area, NSA. rfsq _ J>(b) (1)81•. CU) Nielson interview, OH20-86. ITS-CCOI (b) (3) -P.L. 86-3682.\(U) GENS-14 Monthl r' n m March 1957. Accession Num!:lerl0243, Cryptglogic ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. (Sa. (tT) GENS-44 Montb'J\pri.U957,Accession :'-iumberl0243~CryptologicArchival".Old.!~Ar:NSAdT .84..(Ul lntercep.//85~ (JJ) GE U MonthlyOperational Summary, April 1957. Acce,9llionNumber 10243, Cryptologic ArchivalHol~.'. Area, NSA.. ;G-ENS-44 ~jhly Operational Summ~r)',MIl:Y1957, Accession Number 10243, CryptologicArcbt::Ji'Area, NSA.(!~ I86. ( ntercept." (TSC) -------87. (U Monthly Operational Summary, May 1957, Accession Number 10243. Cryptologic ArchivalHoldillg Area, NSA. )88. CU) vietREGALSummaries~IFebruary1957;ITSCJ

89. (U) wlett. "Tunnel." (S)90. (U onthly Operational Summary. September 1957, Accession Number 10243. CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA. (TSC)91. (U) Nielson interview, OH 20-86. (TS-CCOI

27 SECRET

(b) (3) - P . L. 86- 3 6

DOCID:

(blHI(bl (31OGA

(bTlH(b) (3)

OGA

3962741

92. IUl GEl'iS·44 ~onthly OperationaJ Summary, November 1957, ACC8S8ion Number 10243, CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA. (TSCI93. IU) GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, December 1957, Accession Number 10243, CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA.ITSCI94. (U) GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, January 1958, Accession Number 10243, CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA. cTSCI95. (U) One channel day represented a continuous piece of hard copy containing the traffic transmitted in onedirection on one circuit for a 24-hour period.96. (UI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, December 1957, Accession Number 10243, CryptologicArchival Holding Area, NSA. (TSCI97. lUI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, April 1958, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic Archivalholding Area, NSA. (TSCI98. CUI GENS-44 Monthly Operational Summary, June 1958, Accession Number 10243, Cryptologic ArchivalHolding Area, NSA. (TSC)99. CU) Nielson interview, 01-1 20·86. ITS-CeOI100. IUID'.' w,OH09-85.ITSCSENSlL1MDlS)101~CU) wlett, ~Tunnel,"Appendix A: Discouery by tM Souiets ofPBJOINTLY. CSI102. Cm wlett, ~Tunnel,"Appendix A. lSI103. lUI wlett, ~Tunnel,"Appendix A. lSI104. IGI ,artin, I rness, p. 87. cGJ105. IGI ~Great Berlin Tunnel Mystery," Life, (7 May 19561 40:48. IU)106. IU) Walter Sullivan, "Russians Say U.S. Taps BerJin Wire: They Show Tunnel Allegedly Dug from WesttoListen inon Eastern Phones," The New York Times, 124 April 19561 1:5.CU)107. IU) "East Germans File a Wiretap Protest," The New York Times, 126 April 1956) 1:5.'UJ108. lUI SuJlivan, "Russians."CUJ109. tV) Cookridge, Gl'orgeBlake, p. 158.CU)110. CU) Walter SuJlivan, "u.S. Investigates Wiretap Tunnel: Aides in Berlin Say They Are Looking into SovietCharge ofPhone Espionage," The New York Times, (25 April 19561 8:3. ~UJ111.~ccording to an NSA engineerustationeduinElerlil1uQ.UhetimelI LSeeulnte.....r.~ie~tumumum 117 JuJy 1986 by Robert D,:~~I~YU~~dUih~III~~JOhn;n,()nl~_lftj,NSA.il I112. (l;ISuJlivan,"RWIsians." (L"I113~CUJ Martin, Wilderness, p. 87. lUI114. cUl "Reds Play t:p Berlin Tunnel," TM New YorkJ'imes;C29 April 19561 29:3.ml115. m I "Reds Blame DuJles' Sister," Th:e N'ewYotk Times, (11 May 19561 2:6 (UJ116. cUI Martin. Wilderness,p.S7.CU)117. CUll ~wlett, "Tunnel."cSJ118. (ul InterView hank B. Rowlett, 14 May 1985, by Robert D. Farley, Henry Schorreck, and Gerald K.Haines,OH 10-85, NSA. cS-CCO)119. (UI Cookridge, George Blaie. CUI120. 11:1 Seth S. King, "Briton Sentenced as Spy for Soviet," TMNew York Times, 14 May 19611 1:8.IU)121. cm "Ex·British Aide Held on Security Charge," The New York Times, 119 April 1961 I 16:6. lUI122. IU) "Briton Accw;ed as Spy," TM New York Times, .25 April 196U3:6.lU)123. lUI Martin, Wilderness, p. 100. George Blake served time in Wormwood Scrubs Prison. Althoughoriginally pJaced on the escape list and allocated a special security cell, the "model prisoner" was removed fromthis list in October 1961. He escaped from prison on 22 October 1966 with the help of fellow prisoner SeanAlphonsus Bourke ofthe Irish Republican Army. They arri\"ed in Moscow several weeks later, where Blake wasawarded the Order ofl.enin. For more information see Sean Bourke, TM Springing ofGeorge Blake CNew York:The Viking Press, Inc., 1970', and E, H. Cookridge, The Many Sides of George Blake Esq. CPrinceton:BrandonJSystems Press, Inc., 1970l.lU'124. lUI "Spy Had So U.S. Data," The New York Times.c6 M'ay 196U22:6.cUI125. Cm Rowlettinterview,OH 10-85.18-CCOI126. (UI Martin, Wilderness, p. 100. According to Sean Bourke, Blake boasted that "the KGB knew about thetunnel before the first spadeful ofearth was dug out of the ground. I saw to that." See Bourke, The Springing ofQeorge Blake, p. 275. This account has not been substantiated. (L')

L~IM='p 101.lLl

ISee nterview,OH 19-86. cTS)129. (0) Of perhaps minor significance to the compromise of the tunneJ was the presence of Kim Philby whodefected in 1963, confirming his involvement in spy activities first suspected in 1951 with the defe.ctions ofDonald MacJean alld Guy Burgess. Philby had been the ~I-6 representative in Washington in 1949, Serving as aliaison between the U.S: and U.K,intelligence organizations. Although he remained in British intelligence until1963, he was under sufficient suspicion tolimitltis ...a.....c... c.eC'n sensitive materials. Alth..O....Ugh it is quiteprobable that he had some knowledge of the existence ia official or unofficial channels, he did notmention the Berlin tunnel in the autobiography: he later pu IS e from Moscow. (UI

(bl (1 I(bl (31OGA

CIA

(b) (1)(b) (3) -50 USC 403(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

28(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36(b) (1)(b) (3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-18 USC 798

DOCID: 3962741

C9NFlBENliAl

(b) (1)(b)(3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

,11 .. ~+'~ft U ..ft),.. 19821.CL'1) ~,.."Jn'+ '''1'''""0' " • . n. f"-l

> I1 Rowlett, "Tunnel." IS>J I{..)wlt·tt, "Tunnel.",SII Rowlett, "Tunnel." cSIJ iew, 01120-86. as-ceo>j Rowlett, "Tunnel." IS)) t.E:"S-143 Munthlv () erAti"nal !':ummApl Oecember 1956, Ac(·p.ssion :'Il"umber 1024~.

I:JO. lUI Dibben interview,OH 09-85. <TSC SENSfI..lMDlS>13\. I v) Allen Dullt's, The Craft o(lntelligence (New York: Harper and How. Publi~hers, 19631, pp. 206-7. (l'l132. (V 1 ~ieISl>n intervit'w, on 20-86. ITS·CeO)133. ct;l Martin.lVilckrness, p. 88. lU>134. II.:' . terview,OH20-86.ITS-CCOI13S;tt: ntercepL" (TSC>136.JU lwlett, "Tunnel," Appendix B: Recapitulatinn Il(the lnteLligence Deriz:ed.ISl137. IU> uwlett, "Tunnel," ApPl'ndix B: Recapitulation o(the Intelligence DeriL'ed. lSI138. IeIe, I ater obtained additional inlhrmation concerning Zhukov's fall from power frum OleKI'enko\'skiy. a Soviet defector who had served all a high-ranking member of Soviet military intelligel1t:l". SeeOI~g I'enkovskiy. The PenkolJskzy Papers. trans. Peter Deriabin, with an introduction by \>'rank Gibney 1:--;ewYork:.B139. cV1;10. (U141.eu142. It;143>.1l:144. It:145. III146.1.L'" , P Cryptol'JgicArchil'al Holding Area :"8A. (fSC147. cUi IRo'W!l'tt, "~un""n""p"""'. ""I......---....,J

'(",I H)(b)«3)OGA

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36(b) (1)(b) (3)-50 USC 403(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (1)(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

29 eONFIBENllAl