1

Online Anonymity in Deliberative Democracy

Disinhibition and Contestation or Deindividuation and Conformity?

ECPR General Conference, Oslo, 2017

Hans Asenbaum

H.Asenbaum@westminster.ac.uk

Centre for the Study of Democracy,

University of Westminster, London

Abstract: As the prevalence of online communication alters the dynamics of political

communication, the question arises how online anonymity affects processes of democratic

deliberation. Theoretical discussions about deliberative democracy attribute high value to

diversity and claim that contestation is necessary in the face of inequality and oppression. This

paper investigates whether online anonymity is conducive to deliberative democracy by

disinhibiting the democratic subject and thus facilitating subversion or whether anonymity

harms deliberation by amplifying tendencies of submission and conformity through

deindividuation. To explore this question, the paper draws on two opposing theses from social

psychology – disinhibition vs. deindividuation – and the respective empirical studies. The

results reveal that both subversion and submission is afforded by online anonymity

– disinhibition and deindividuation do not oppose each other. Which of the two effects comes

into play depends on the specific contextual conditions of deliberation.

1 Introduction

The nature of politics and deliberation changes in the face of the emerging digital age. Taking

into account the substantive changes brought about by social media, the internet of things,

cloud computing, and big data, democracy in the 21st century must be characterised as digital

democracy. Anonymity is a crucial factor of online communication. In placing distance

between interlocutors and obscuring some aspects of personal identity, while revealing or

constructing others, it alters dynamics in political debates online (Akdeniz 2002; Barendt 2016;

Leitner 2015). Digital communication more generally, and online anonymity in particular, has

been discussed in deliberative democratic theory (Barber 1997; Bohman 2004; Buchstein 1997;

Saco 2002; Ward 1997). These discussions mostly focus on questions of inclusion and

exclusion, with optimists seeing the potential for an inclusive public sphere free from

domination arising, while pessimists point to hate speech, bullying, and other forms of

2

discrimination on the internet. Another aspect prominent in democratic theory and a central

aspects in many definitions of democracy, the question of subversion and submission or

contestation and conformity, remain mostly unaddressed.

Contestation of unequal power structures in society (Mansbridge 1996), the subversion of

hegemonic discourses (Dryzek 2000), a rightful place for disagreement (Gutman & Thompson

1990, 1996), and a diversity of opinions rather than homogeneity (Young 1996, 2000) is of

central concern in debates about deliberative democracy. In order to generate inclusive spaces,

domination needs to be confronted. Diversity of opinion and identities is a necessary

precondition for deliberation. It is through a multiplicity of perspectives that an exchange of

ideas and arguments is possible (Young 1997b).

Just like inclusion and exclusion, the dynamics of subversion and submission are profoundly

affected by online anonymity. Two contrary interpretations are possible: On the one hand,

online anonymity might contribute to subversion and thus might be conducive to deliberation.

Through its disinhibiting effects, it liberates the democratic subject from social constraints and

facilitates the ventilation of true sentiments, thus contesting unequal power relations and

contributing to a diversity of opinions and identities. On the other hand, however, online

anonymity might amplify tendencies of submission. It strips the democratic subject of its

individuality and makes it more easy to conform to group dynamics or submit to strong group

leaders. Group identity thus overtakes individual identity. So is online anonymity conducive to

or harmful for deliberative democracy?

This paper makes a first step toward an understanding of the interplay of online anonymity and

the dynamics of subversion and submission in deliberation. By drawing on empirical research

in the field of social psychology, it explores the question whether online anonymity leads to

subversion and thus contributes to democratic diversity or to submission thus counteracting

deliberative ideals. In order to answer this question, two theses from social psychology and

their respective empirical findings are examined: The disinhibition effect (Suler 2004)

describes online anonymity as liberating and thus contributing to contestation, while theories

of deindividuation (Lea & Spears 1991, Postmes & Spears 1998; Spears et al. 1990) point to

anonymity’s conformist effects. The first part of this paper generates the theoretical outlook of

this study. It first summarises debates of contestation as value of deliberative democracy. Then

next it takes the theories of contestation in deliberation online and discusses conceptions of

subversion in digital communication. In the second part of this paper, both the disinhibition

and the deindividuation theses will be explored along empirical findings from social

3

psychology. This is followed by concluding remarks answering the question whether online

anonymity contributes to submission or subversion in deliberation.

2 Contestation as value in deliberative and digital democracy

The following sections of this paper lay the theoretical groundwork for this study. The first

section explores the value of contestation, conflict, and diversity in deliberative democracy.

The second sections takes these discussions online and situates deliberative contestation in

digital democracy.

2.1 The place of conflict and contestation in deliberative democracy

Deliberative democracy is often perceived as communicative praxis aiming at consensual

decision making. This has lead agonistic democratic theorists to criticise deliberation for its

homogenising and conformist tendencies, which prove especially problematic in the context of

structurally disadvantaged social groups (e.g. Mouffe 1999). While there is some truth to this

claim, as some theorists, especially in early discussions of deliberative democracy, idealised

consensus seeking, deliberative democratic theory has come a long way. Agonistic theory has

had its influence on conceptions of deliberative democracy externally, and discussions of

difference democracy (Gould 1996, Mansbridge 1983, 2012; Young 1990, 2000) have

influenced it from within. Deliberative democracy, even in its original meaning, is built on the

premises of a diverse society, in which multiple stand points and various identities enter into

discussion. The notion of diversity is at the core of deliberation as a deliberative exchange of

ideas is only possible if different perspectives come to bear. And an exchange of different view

points in political debates inevitably entails normative disagreement and conflict (Gutman &

Thompson 1995). Today the role of conflict and contestation is an acknowledged part of

deliberation. John Dryzek, for example, develops “a conception of democracy that emphazises

the construction of public opinion through the contestation of discourses” (Dryzek 2000, p.4)

and Archon Fung calls for “airing of conflict and tension” (Fung 2003, p.344) as part of

deliberative democracy.

Most notably, the significance of contestation in deliberative democracy has been developed

by difference democrats. This feminist strand in and around deliberative democratic theory

thoroughly elaborates the value of contestation for democracy. Counterintuitively, allowing for

conflict to emerge in deliberation aims at equality among participants. Confrontation appears

necessary to draw attention to inequality:

4

Both in a public forum and in everyday talk, there are justifiable places for

offensiveness, non-cooperation, and the threat of retaliation – even for raucous,

angry, self-centred, bitter talk, aiming at nothing but hurt… These uncivil forms of

talk are also often necessary as means to the end of approaching both liberty and

equality in deliberation. Sometimes only intensity in oppositions can break down

the barriers of the status quo. No one always listens attentively to everyone else,

and members of dominant groups are particularly likely to find they do not need to

listen to members of subordinate groups. So subordinates sometimes need the

battering ram of rage. (Mansbgridge 1999, p.223)

According to this argument, not only in deliberative settings themselves, but also in society at

large – or, in Mansbridge’s terms, in the deliberative system – subordinate groups need to

engage in disruptive action, in performative communication of discontent, in order to challenge

structural inequality. To develop a notion of justified conflict in discursive terms, Mansbridge

draws on Foucault’s concept of resistance as a necessary struggle against domination, which

results in the creation of communities of resistance (Mansbridge 1993, p.365). From these

considerations emerges an image of deliberative democracy characterized by conflicting

communities in the context of domination and resistance: Subordinate groups “oscillate

between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an environment of mutual

encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which they can test those

ideas against the reigning reality” (Mansbridge 1996, p.57).

This image bares clear resemblance with Nancy Fraser’s subordinate counterpublics.

Interestingly, Fraser ties the notion of conflict as the challenging of the dominant by the

subordinate class to competition. She claims that “contestation among competing publics

supposes inter-public discursive interaction” (Fraser 1990, p.68). Similarly, Iris Marion Young

calls for the “contestation of the constituency with itself about the content of a decision-making

agenda” (Young 1997a, p.359). And Mansbridge sees elements of adversary democracy like

voting and party competition as an essential part of the deliberative system. Mansbridge argues

that these competitive modes are necessary to overcome the conformist tendencies of

consensus decision making in deliberation. Where no consensus can be reached on the grounds

of fundamental disagreement, voting needs to be employed to break the deadlock (Mansbridge

et al. 2010; Mansbridge 1990; Mansbridge 1983). The ideal of consensus masks conflicts.

Everyday talk and emotive expression on the other hand help to identify conflict (Mansbridge

1999a, p.226). This problem is explored empirically in the study by Karpowitz and Mansbridge

5

(2005) comparing a consensus oriented and an adversary discursive setting in participatory

urban planning. They find that in the case of consensus oriented deliberation conflicts were

supressed and dissenting voices marginalized. In the adversary process, consisting of public

hearings, citizens aired their anger and conflicts took centre stage.

Difference democrats reconcile deliberative norms with notions of conflict and contestation.

Young addresses one of the defining elements of deliberative democracy – reason giving –,

which is often seen in opposition to contestation. The rational argument appears in opposition

to emotive modes of subversion. Young argues, however:

Especially under circumstances where there are serious conflicts that arise from

structural positions of privilege and disadvantage, and/or where a subordinated,

less powerful or minority group finds its interests ignored in public debate,

members of such groups do not violate norms of reasonableness if they engage in

serious disruptive actions, or express their claims with angry accusations.

Disorderliness is an important tool of critical communication aimed at calling

attention to the unreasonableness of others. (Young 2000, p.48f)

In her much quoted essay “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Young (2001)

engages in a fictive dialogue between an activist and a deliberative democrat. Young constructs

ideal positions of the deliberative democrat, who strives to change the system from within by

persuading those in power to go a path of progressive reform, and the activist who criticizes

the deliberative democrat for affirming the system through cooperation and calls for disruptive

action, open conflict and civil disobedience. In conclusion, Young calls for an alternative,

critical conception of democracy, encompassing both cooperation and conflict.

2.2 Contestation and conflict in digital democracy

The notion of conflict and contestation as necessary part of deliberation developed by

difference democrats, is also prevalent in current discussions on digital democratic subjectivity.

The literature on current social movements engagement on and through the internet observes

the creation of collective identities (Gerbaudo 2015; Kavada 2015, 2012) and emotive populist

strategies (Gerbaudo 2017) to contest neoliberal hegemony.

While conflict and contestation appear as evident elements of digital activism, Engin Isin and

Evelyn Ruppert (2015) characterize the democratic subject as digital citizen challenging the

given order through rights claims. In Being Digital Citizens Egin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert share

6

the focus on citizenship in and through the internet with Papacharissi (2010, p.80ff) and

Dahlgren (2009, p.57ff). They thoroughly elaborate and expand the concept, however, in terms

of conflict and contestation. Digital citizens come into being through the performative act of

rights claims in and through the internet as digital space enmeshed with analogous space. By

claiming “I, we, or they have the right to”, marginalized groups who are currently not the

bearers of the according rights, demand inclusion. The concept of citizenship, however, does

not afford contestation only, but rather it is defined by a dichotomy of submission and

subversion; citizens are subjects to power (submission) and simultaneously subjects of power

(subversion). In order to make right claims, subjects need to submit – or in other words, are

subjected – to a discursive constructs of existing rights and hegemonic discourses. By

contesting specific exiting norms, the normative context surrounding this norm needs to be

accepted – at least to a certain degree.

Isin and Ruppert’s understanding of citizenship as submission and subversion is built on Judith

Butler’s (1993) theory of performativity. Performance is only possible within a hegemonic

discursive structure by citation and repetition. This only leaves certain spaces for contesting

this structure from within by resignification. Thus, discourses constructing and surrounding

citizenship, need to be accepted to demand inclusion and challenge the system from within.

Digital citizens perform their selves online through digital acts like sharing, tweeting, liking,

messaging, blogging, coding, downloading, posting, following, friending etc. These acts result

in callings upon others as activists, participants, friends or adversaries. They also create

openings to resignify meaning through hacking, communing, and whistleblowing and closings

through filtering and tracking by private enterprises and state governments. In this context of

contestation, the citizen comes into being as both empowered and restrained by means of digital

communication.

The perspective of digital contestation is also at the core of Lincoln Dahlberg’s (2011, 2007a,

2007b) extensive work, which aims at a radicalization of deliberative public sphere concepts

through the employment of agonistic (Mouffe 2000) and difference democratic (Fraser 1990)

perspectives. Online public spheres are framed as site of discursive struggle. Mainstream media

and elite actors dominate the political discourse creating a hegemony. Digital media, however,

give marginalized groups new opportunities to organize in counterpublics, develop counter-

discourses, connect to other subjugated groups, and contest discursive hegemony (cf. Downey

& Fenton 2003). These counterpublics, or “communities of resistance” as Mansbridge (1993,

p.365) calls them, can be recognized in websites of fat, anorexic, and trans people developing

7

alternative body images (Daniels 2009; Gies 2008; Monaghan 2005). They are also reflected

in Marianne Franklin’s work on postcolonial cyberspace where Pacific Island inhabitants and

their overseas diasporas form digital communities to articulate a common identity (Franklin

2007, 2003). In her more current writing, Franklin explores how homeless people, despite their

restricted access to the internet, create digital communities (Franklin 2013, p.93ff).

As Dahlberg mentions, these counterpublics can serve mobilization for analogous action or for

new forms of online engagement like electronic civil disobedience and online sit-ins. These

participatory modes can best be exemplified by the online collectivity Anonymous, which

assaults its opponents by Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS), consisting of website

requests in such high numbers that servers cannot respond and websites become unavailable,

often compared to sit-ins or occupations. Defacing as another method of attack consists of

hacking opponents’ websites and putting an alternative image or message on it mostly mocking

the opponent (Asenbaum 2017, p.10; Jarvis 2014, p.12ff; Klein 2015, p.9). Anonymous can,

however, not only be perceived as challenging hegemony through its obvious confrontational

acts, but also through its dramatic performance of anonymity, resisting the hegemonic

discourse of identification, authentication (clear names), and competition (number of likes,

retweets, followers etc.) on social media (Cambre 2014, p.305; Halpin 2012, p.19; McDonald

2015, p.979).

3 Disinhibition vs. deindividuation: Psychological explanations and empirical findings

After having elaborated the value of contestation, conflict, and diversity in deliberative and

digital democracy, the question arises whether online anonymity contributes to acts of

subversion or might lead to submission. The study of social psychology can provide valuable

insight into deliberative interaction. Two contradictory psychological models exist explaining

anonymous online behaviour. John Suler’s (2004) heavily cited disinhibition effect explains

the function of online anonymity in setting free users’ individual desires, fears, and

aggressions, which in the light of deliberative democracy’s ideal of diversity and subversion

opens up promising perspectives. At the same time, however, Russel Spears and Tom Postmes

(1998) formulated the deindividuation thesis: online anonymity contributes to conformist

behaviour in groups, who rather follow group dynamics and salient group identities than

express individuality. This section will explore both theses theoretically and empirically.

8

3.1 Subversion through disinhibition

John Suler’s (2004) disinhibition effect has become one of the most cited essays in research on

online anonymity. Suler does not primarily focus on anonymity, but on online communication

more generally. The observed disinhibition effect is explained along six factors: anonymity,

invisibility, asynchronicity, solipsistic introjection, dissociative imagination, and minimization

of authority. Not coincidentally, it seems, is anonymity prime among them. The lack of

identifiability affords users to express deep emotions, which can have both positive and

negative effects on their interlocutors.

When people have the opportunity to separate their actions online from their in-

person lifestyle and identity, they feel less vulnerable about self-disclosing and

acting out. Whatever they say or do can’t be directly linked to the rest of their lives.

In a process of dissociation, they don’t have to own their behavior by

acknowledging it within the full context of an integrated online/offline identity.

The online self becomes a compartmentalized self. (Suler 2004, p.322)

Other factors in Suler’s model – invisibility, asynchronicity, dissociative imagination,

and minimization of authority – are closely associated with anonymity: They explain a

subjectively perceived distance between interlocutors as crucial for explaining their

altered online behaviour. Anonymity appears as primarily liberating, which contributes

to the expression of both aggressive and benign sentiments. The logic describing a

sequential connection between liberation to contestation facilitated by anonymity has

been affirmed in various empirical studies.

Various qualitative studies attest to a feeling of liberation and empowerment experienced

by participants interacting anonymously. Chester and Gwynne (1998) conduct a

university class online and observe student interaction. In an exercise of self-reflexion

students of the Asian minority, making up 20% of the class, report that they feel freer to

participate. Moreover, identity play, changing ethnic markers by choice of alias and

accent, is observed. Bowker and Tuffin (2003) confirm these results through interviews

with physically impaired internet users who experience more equal opportunities for

participation communicating anonymously. Johnson (2010) analyses interaction of

students in an anonymous asynchronous online forum of a university. Focus groups and

qualitative interviews show that users of the forum feel empowered to utter grievances,

they would cover up in face-to-face communication.

9

These qualitative findings are confirmed by a wealth of quantitative studies. In a survey

experiment Joinson (1999) finds significantly higher levels of self-esteem and lower levels of

social anxiety under the condition of anonymity compared to face-to-face interaction. In an

experiment comparing anonymous online discussions with face-to-face discussions, Jong et al.

(2013) find that under the condition of anonymity the word count is distributed significantly

more evenly among participants. Dubrovsky et al. (1991) find that while higher status

participants (graduate students) dominate by length of word count and by initiating more new

ideas over lower status participants (freshmen) in face-to-face discussions, this inequality is

mitigated in anonymous synchronous online conversations. In an experiment comparing

anonymous discussion groups with groups whose participants are identified with clear names,

Clark et al. (2015) find significantly higher levels of participation and expression of opinion

under the condition of anonymity. These effects are stronger for female participants. In

qualitative follow up interviews female participants state that they feel freer and less judged by

others. Higher levels of participation are also found in Ruesch and Märker’s (2012) analysis of

discussions in the participatory budgets in Gütersloh, Germany. In contrast to the anonymous

participation process of 2011, participation decreased in the new participatory budget

discussion that required identification in the following year from 1.7 to 0.4% of the population.

Many other experimental studies confirms higher levels of participation under anonymity

(Fredheim & Moore 2015; Haines et al. 2014; Hiltz et al. 1989; Jessup et al. 1990; Leshed

2009; Rhee & Kim 2009; Wilson & Jessup 1995). Moreover, Yu and Liu (2013) find that 78%

of students in an online learning environment prefer anonymity, opposed to 13% favouring

clear names.

These liberating aspects of anonymity contribute to disinhibition which lets participants reveal

their true sentiments and alternative ideas. In a survey experiment participants reported lower

levels of social desirability, thus acting more autonomously and expressing more of their true

opinions under the condition of anonymity than under clear names (Joinson 1999). In another

experiment comparing online discussions under pseudonyms with face-to-face discussions,

Joinson (2001) finds that under anonymity participants shared significantly more personal

information about themselves. These findings are confirmed and extended in another

experiment by Bargh et al. (2002) differentiating between the “actual self” – the publicly

performed persona – and the “true self” consisting of the qualities and aspects participants feel

they have but cannot reveal in public. In a reaction time task participants reacted faster to and

associated more of their “true self” qualities with themselves after an online anonymous

10

discussion, compared to those completing the task after a face-to-face discussion. A follow-up

experiment showed that even their interlocutors associated more of their “true self” qualities

with them after anonymous online discussions. This inhibition and self-disclosure effect does

not only apply in artificial experimental settings. In a content analysis of 154 personal journal

blogs Hollenbaugh and Everett (2013) found that bloggers without clear names (pseudonyms

or no names) shared more personal information than identified bloggers.

Honesty leads to revealing a greater variety of alternative opinions and identities and contesting

hegemonic discourse. In three different experiments with Group Decision Support Systems

(GDSS) comparing anonymous discussion groups with those identified with clear names

Jessup et al. (1990), Wilson and Jessup (1995), and Reinig and Mejias (2004) found that

anonymous participants generated more original ideas and contributed more critical and

probing comments: “By disassociating individuals from their comments and buffering group

members from one another, anonymity appears to have reduced behavioral constraints on

group members and led them to contribute more freely, and less inhibitedly to the group

discussion.” Moreover, “[they] felt they could more safely make critical comments or ask

questions about proposed solutions than identified group members” (Jessup et al. 1990, p.318f).

Compared to these artificial experiments, a survey of Wikipedia editors comparing those

contributing under pseudonyms or entirely anonymously with those writing under clear names

found that non-identified editors stated more alternative opinions and thus resisted to conform

to group opinion (Tsikerdikis 2013). Similarly, a field experiment comparing the Huffington

Post’s online forum before and after a clear name requirement was introduced found that when

anonymity (pseudonyms) was allowed, users articulated more disagreement. Moreover,

discussions shifted from political to non-political topics like sports and fashion (Fredheim &

Moore 2015a, 2015b).

Disinhibition does not only reveal alternative ideas but also lets participants perform alternative

identities, engage in identity play, and contest hegemonic identity constructions. In a

qualitative analysis of an online sexual diversity forum Atkinson and DePalma (2008) observe

how participants contest heteronormative identities by constructing queer online personae

outside common stereotypes. In their observations of students’ interaction on an online learning

platform Chester and Gwynne (1998) report high playfulness and observe the creation of online

personae through various self-defined pseudonyms combined with different accents: “For

example, Just Another Wolf opened many of his messages with ‘Grrday’ or ‘Howlo’ and sent

11

his journals as text wrapped around elaborate ASCII figures of a wolf. Tiger and Cougar joked

about eating Rabbit for dinner” (Chester & Gwynne 1998).

3.2 Submission through deindividuation

While the studies cited above have promising implications for online deliberation, another

theoretical model emerging in psychology explains anonymity as leading to the opposite effect:

Anonymity deindividuates and depersonalises internet users and thus affords conformist

behaviour. The discussion of deindividuation through anonymity predates the internet and

originally revolved around the anonymising effects of large crowds. Group dynamics in

combination with diffused responsibility and a lack of identifiability of individuals in large

crowds affords anti-social and sometimes inhumane behaviour as exemplified by lynch mobs

and the like. Early discussions of deindividuation – emerging in the context of the totalitarian

movements of the 1930s in Europe – focused on anti-normative, irrational, and emotionally

driven actions by crowds in which individuals submerge and render to group dynamics or

strong leaders (e.g. Le Bon 2009 [1896]).

Current models clarify that it is neither only negative behaviour, which is emulated, nor are

crowds always deindividuating, but can have the opposite effect. Stephen Reicher (1987, 1984)

argues that whether individuals conform to group dynamics under the condition of anonymity

depends on the salience of identity aspects that both the individual and the group have in

common. In other words, anonymity leads individuals to submit to a group if that group is

defined by a strong group identity. These ideas, developed for large crowds, were then adopted

for online anonymity by Russell Spears et al. (1990), Martin Lear and Spears (1991), and

further developed by Tom Postmes and Spears (1998) resulting in the SIDE model (Social

Identity model of Deindividuation Effects). Empirical studies in accordance with this model,

show that online anonymity can have clear deindividuating effects, leading to conformity and

submission in groups. A lack of multiple identity markers in anonymous online communication

can contribute to stereotypical thinking – both regarding others and oneself.

In an experimental study, Coleman et al. (1999) compare anonymous online with face to face

small group discussions. A post-experimental questionnaire and conversation analysis showed

that participants in the anonymous group were less concerned about being judged by others,

felt less concerned about personal evaluation, felt less viewed as an individual, submerged in

the discussion more, and thought of their group more as a team than individuals. The authors

12

explain this by a greater focus on the task at hand when interlocutors are not physically present

and identifiable:

Perhaps with the common thread of the discussion being more salient than

identifying personal information, a sense of self developed more slowly than when

individual differences are noticeable. With the task as the object of attention, strong

ties to a state of deindividuation become evident: individuality is tacitly devalued

in the name of a common purpose. (Coleman et al. 1999, p.61)

The study by Coleman et al. (1999) points not only to deindividuation by focusing on content

rather than other participants, but also as building a group identity that gains salience in contrast

with individual identity. Other studies point to a similar effect consisting of stereotyping of

others and oneself. In the study of the sexual diversity forum mentioned above, not only the

contestation of hegemonic identity construction and identity play was observed, but also that

participants perceived each other in more stereotypic terms (Atkinson & DePalma 2008). It

appears that the absence of a complex set of identity information provided in face to face

communication results in stereotyping along the few identity markers available in anonymous

online communication.

In an experiment actively evoking national identity, British participants conducted online chats

with supposed German participants. These discussions were framed as international dialogue.

While half of the small groups were visually anonymous and only interacted via textual chats,

the other half could see their interlocutors in a silent live video additionally to the textual

exchange. As a result, British participants perceived their supposedly German interlocutors in

more stereotypical terms under the condition of visual anonymity. What is more, visually

anonymous groups also developed greater group cohesion, thus identifying with their British

group members more than participants in groups who saw each others faces via video (Lea &

Spears 2001). In a comparable experiment, Postmes and Spears (2002) find that men tend to

dominate discussions only under the interplay of anonymity, a priming treatment evoking

gender stereotypes, and when the discussion topic is connoted with masculinity (introduction

of a car free zone). Again, stereotyping did not only affect others. Men categorised themselves

in more stereotypical terms under conditions of anonymity, thus conforming to dominant

gender identities. In another experiment Postmes et al. (2001) show that participants in

anonymous online chats primed for certain behaviour conform to the priming to a greater extent

than participants identified with pictures. In a follow-up experiment, non-primed participants

followed the lead of primed participants only under the condition of anonymity.

13

4 Conclusion

Empirical findings on anonymous online communication support both theses: online

anonymity leads to both, disinhibition and subversion on the one hand, and deindividuation

and submission on the other. How is this possible? I contend, that the contradiction of the

disinhibition and the deindividuation theses rests on a false binary. Disinhibition and

deindividuation are not opposed to each other, but go hand in hand. It is only through

disinhibition – through the elevation of the pressure to be individual, compete for recognition

and respect, and stand out through individual achievement – that deindividuation and

submission to group dynamics come into effect. Anonymity thus liberates in both cases. It

liberates from social constraints and lets people speak their mind, contesting hegemonic

discourse. It also liberates to give in to group dynamics and follow strong leaders, which often

proves more comfortable than fighting for what is right. Submission as effect of anonymity has

not only been found in the empirical studies in social psychology cited above, but has also been

observed in social movements, which provide anonymity either through online communication

or simply by their large size. Often individuals participate for the social benefits of community

and friendship while political goals might appear less important. Anonymity makes it easier to

go with the flow of group think in crowds, swarms, and collectives.

If anonymity can lead to both, subversion and submission, the question arises, in which cases

which of the effects come to bear. One explanation for the apparent contradiction could be

found in the contextual conditions of the specific deliberative setting interacting with

anonymity. Reicher, Spears, Lea, and Postmes argue that the salience of group identity is

crucial. Drawing on multiple identities, individuals’ behaviour results from creating

associations with one of these, in the experiment achieved through priming and/or through their

visibility. So, in cases where democratic contestation took place, there was no salient group

identity available. This explanation has some credibility not only taking into account the

empirical results of experiments using the SIDE model but also looking at the those studies

finding subversion as a result of online anonymity. However, it is quite likely that the salience

of group identity is not the only explanatory factor. Other contextual conditions remain to be

explored.

Anonymity’s disinhibition effect proves liberating in any case, whether it frees democratic

subject to contest hegemony and thus contributes to diversity in deliberation or it affords

individuals to go with the flow of group dynamics. The effects of these liberating qualities of

anonymity for others is more ambiguous, however. While disinhibition can contribute to more

14

honest discussions, the airing of deep emotions, and diversity, it can also facilitate attacks on

marginalised groups in society. Anonymity thus proves to be a deeply contradictory

phenomenon, which provides both benefits and obstacles to deliberative democracy.

References

Akdeniz, Y. (2002). Anonymity, Democracy, and Cyberspace. Social Research, 69 223–237.

Asenbaum, H. (2017). Cyborg Activism: Exploring the Reconfigurations of Democratic

Subjectivity in Anonymous. New Media & Society,1–21.

Atkinson, E. and DePalma, R. (2008). Dangerous Spaces: Constructing and Contesting

Sexual Identities in an Online Discussion Forum. Gender and Education, 20 (2), 183–

194.

Barber, B. (1997). The New Telecommunications Technology: Endless Frontier or the End of

Democracy? Constellations, 4 (2), 208–228.

Barendt, E. (2016). Anonymous Speech: Literature, Law and Politics, 1st ed. Oxford: Hart

Publishing.

Bargh, J., McKenna, K. and Fitzsimons, G. (2002). Can You See the Real Me? Activation

and Expression of the ‘True Self ’ on the Internet. Journal of Social Issues, 58 (1), 33–

48.

Bohman, J. (2004). Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for

Transnational Democracy. Sociological Review, 52 (1), 131–155.

Bowker, N. and Tuffin, K. (2003). Dicing with Deception: People with Disabilities’

Strategies for Managing Safety and Identity Online. Journal of Computer-Mediated

Communication, 8 (2). Available from

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2003.tb00209.x/full.

Buchstein, H. (1997). Bytes that Bite: The Internet and Deliberative Democracy.

Constellations, 4 (2), 248–263.

Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. New York:

Routledge.

Cambre, M.-C. (2014). Becoming Anonymous: A Politics of Masking. In: Venkatesh, V.,

Wallin, J., Castro, J.C., et al., eds. Educational, Psychological, and Behavioral

15

Considerations in Niche Online Communities. Hershey: Information Science Reference,

297–321.

Chester, A. and Gwynne, G. (1998). Online Teaching: Encouraging Collaboration through

Anonymity. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 4 (1), .

Clark, C., Bordwell, D. and Avery, P. (2015). Gender and Public Issues Deliberations in

Named and Anonymous Online Environments. Journal of Public Deliberation, 11 (2),

Article 2.

Coleman, L.H., Paternite, C. and Sherman, R. (1999). A Reexamination of Deindividuation

in Synchronous Computer-Mediated Communication. Computers in Human Behavior,

15 (1), 51–65.

Dahlberg, L. (2011). Re-Constructing Digital Democracy: An Outline of Four ‘Positions’.

Media & Society, 13 (6), 855–872.

Dahlberg, L. (2007). Rethinking the Fragmentation of the Cyberpublic: From Consensus to

Contestation 9 (5), 827–847.

Dahlberg, L. (2007). The Internet and Discursive Exclusion: From Deliberative to Agonistic

Public Sphere Theory. In: Dahlberg, L., and Siapera, E., eds. Radical Democracy and

the Internet: Interrogating Theory and Parctice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 128–

147.

Dahlgren, P. (2009). Media and Political Engagement: Citizens, Communciation, and

Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daniels, J. (2009). Rethinking Cyberfeminism(s): Race, Gender, and Embodiment. Women’s

Studies Quarterly, 37 (1&2), 101–124.

Downey, J. and Fenton, N. (2003). New Media, Counter Publicity and the Public Sphere.

New Media & Society, 5 (2), 185–202.

Dryzek, J. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestation.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dubrovsky, V. et al. (1991). The Equalization Phenomenon: Status Effects in Computer-

Mediated and Face-to-Face Decision- Making Groups. Human – Computer Interaction,

6 (2), 119–146.

16

Franklin, M. (2013). Digital Dilemmas: Power, Resistance, and the Internet. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Franklin, M. (2007). Democracy, Postcolonialism, and Everyday Life: Contesting the ‘Royal

“We”’ Online. In: Dahlberg, L., and Siapera, E., eds. Radical Democracy and the

Internet: Interrogating Theory and Parctice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 168–

190.

Franklin, M. (2003). I Define my Own Identity: Pacific Articulations of ‘Race’ and ‘Culture’

on the Internet. Ethnicities, 3 (4), 465–490.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually

Existing Democracy. Social Text,(25/26), 56–80.

Fredheim, R., Moore, A. and Naughton, J. (2015). Anonymity and Online Commenting: The

Broken Windows Effect and the End of Drive-by Commenting. In: WebSci ’15

Proceedings of the ACM Web Science Conference., Article 11.

Fung, A. (2003). Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and their

Consequences. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (3), 338–367.

Gerbaudo, P. (2017). The Mask and the Flag: Populism, Citizenism, and Global Protest.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gerbaudo, P. (2015). Protest Avatars as Memetic Signifiers: Political Profile Pictures and the

Construction of Collective Identity on Social Media in the 2011 Protest Wave.

Information, Communication & Society, 18 (8), 916–929.

Gies, L. (2008). How Material are Cyberbodies? Broadband Internet and Embodied

Subjectivity. Crime Media Culture, 4 (3), 311–330.

Gould, C. (1996). Diversity and Democracy: Representing Difference. In: Benhabib, S., ed.

Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 171–186.

Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press.

Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (1995). Moral Disagreement in a Democracy. Social

Philosophy and Policy, 12 (1), 87–110.

17

Gutmann, A. and Thompson, D. (1990). Moral Conflict and Political Consensus. Ethics, 101

(1), 64–88.

Halpin, H. (2012). The philosophy of Anonymous: Ontological politics without identity.

Radical Philosophy,(176), 19–28.

Hiltz, S.R., Turoff, M. and Johnson, K. (1989). Experiments in Group Decision Making, 3:

Disinhibition, Deindividuation, and Group Process in Pen Name and Real Name

Computer Conferences. Decision Support Systems, 5 217–232.

Hollenbaugh, E. and Everett, M. (2013). The Effects of Anonymity on Self-Disclosure in

Blogs: An Application of the Online Disinhibition Effect. Journal of Communication, 18

283–302.

Isin, E. and Ruppert, E. (2015). Being Digital Citizens. London: Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers.

Jarvis, J.L. (2014). Digital image politics: The networked rhetoric of Anonymous. Global

Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary

Thought Publication, 4 (2–3), 1–24.

Jessup, L. and Connolly, T. (1990). The Effects of Anonymity on GDSS Group Process With

an Idea-Generating Task. MIS Quarterly, 14 (3), 313–321.

Johnson, M. (2010). Anonymity in Online Discussion Forums: Does it Promote Connections?

In: L., D.-H., V., H., C., J., et al., eds. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference

on Networked Learning., 198–206.

Joinson, A. (2001). Self-Disclosure in Computer-Mediated Communication: The Role of

Self-Awareness and Visual Anonymity. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31

177–192.

Joinson, A. (1999). Social Desirability, Anonymity, and Intemet-based Questionnaires.

Behavior Research Methods, 31 (3), 433–438.

Jong, B.-S. et al. (2013). Effects of Anonymity in Group Discussion on Peer Interaction and

Learning Achievement. IEEE Transactions on Education, 56 (3), 292–299.

Karpowitz, C. and Mansbridge, J. (2005). Disagreement and Consensus: The Need for

Dynamic Updating in Public Deliberation. Journal of Public Deliberation, 1 (1), 348–

364.

18

Kavada, A. (2015). Creating the Collective: Social Media, the Occupy Movement and its

Constitution as a Collective Actor. Information, Communication & Society, 18 (8), 872–

886.

Kavada, A. (2012). Engagement, Bonding, and Identity Across Multiple Platforms: Avaaz on

Facebook, YouTube, and MySpace. MedieKultur, 52 28–48.

Klein, A. (2015). Vigilante Media: Unveiling Anonymous and the Hacktivist Persona in the

Global Press. Communication Monographs, 82 (3), 1–23.

Le Bon, G. (2009). The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. Auckland: Floating Press.

Lea, M. and Spears, R. (1991). Computer-Mediated and Group Decision-Making. Man-

Machine Studies, 34 (2), 283–301.

Lea, M., Spears, R. and Groot, D. De (2001). Knowing Me, Knowing You: Anonymity

Effects on Social Identity Processes Within Groups. PSPB, 27 (5), 526–537.

Leitner, J. (2015). Anonymity, Privacy, and Expressive Equality: Name Verification and

Korean Constitutional Rights in Cyberspace. Journal of Korean Law, 14 (June), 167–

212.

Leshed, G. (2009). Silencing the Clatter: Removing Anonymity from a Corporate Online

Community. In: Davies, T., and Gangadharan, S.P., eds. Online Deliberation: Design,

research, and Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1–9.

Mansbridge, J. (2012). Conflict and Commonality in Habermas’ Structural Transformation of

the Public Sphere 40 (6), 789–801.

Mansbridge, J. (1999). Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System. In: Deliberative Politics:

Essays on Democracy and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 211–239.

Mansbridge, J. (1996). Using Power/Fighting Power. In: Benhabib, S., ed. Democracy and

Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 46–66.

Mansbridge, J. (1993). Feminism and Democratic Community. In: Chapman, J., and Shapiro,

I., eds. Democratic Community: NOMOS XXXV. New York: New York University

Press, 339–395.

Mansbridge, J. (1990). Self-Interest in Political Life. Political Theory, 18 (1), 132–153.

Mansbridge, J. (1983). Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

19

Mansbridge, J. et al. (2010). The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative

Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18 (1), 64–100.

McDonald, K. (2015). From Indymedia to Anonymous: Rethinking action and identity in

digital cultures. Information, Communication & Society, 18 (8), 968–982.

Monaghan, L. (2005). Big Handsome Men, Bears and Others: Virtual Constructions of ‘Fat

Male Embodiment’. Body & Society, 11 (2), 81–111.

Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? Social Research, 66 (3),

745–758.

Papacharissi, Z. (2010). A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age. Cambridge: Polity

Press.

Postmes, T. and Spears, R. (2002). Behavior Online: Does Anonymous Computer

Communication Reduce Gender Inequality? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,

28 (8), 1073–1083.

Postmes, T. and Spears, R. (1998). Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-

Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 123 (3), 238–259.

Postmes, T. et al. (2001). Social Influence in Computer-Mediated Communication: The

Effects of Anonymity on Group Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,

27 (10), 1243–1254.

Reicher, S. (1987). Crowd Behaviour as Social Action. In: Turner, J., Hogg, M., Oakes, P., et

al., eds. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Cambridge,

MA: Basil Blackwell, 171–202.

Reicher, S. (1984). Social Influence in the Crowd: Attitudinal and Behavioural Effects of De-

Individuation in Conditions of High and Low Group Salience. British Journal of Social

Psychology, 23 (4), 341–350.

Reinig, B. and Mejias, R. (2004). The Effects of National Culture and Anonymity on Flaming

and Criticalness in GSS-Supported Discussions. Small Group Research, 35 (6), 698–

723.

Rhee, J.W. and Kim, E. (2009). Deliberation on the Net: Lessons from a Field Experiment.

In: Davies, T., and Gangadharan, S.P., eds. Online Deliberation: Design, research, and

Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 223–232.

20

Ruesch, M.A. and Märker, O. (2012). Real Name Policy in E-Participation: The Case of

Gütersloh’s Second Participatory Budget. In: Parycek, P., and Edelmann, N., eds.

CeDEM12 – Conference for E-Democracy and Open Government. Krems: Edition

Donau-Universität Krems, 109–124.

Saco, D. (2002). Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet. Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press.

Spears, R., Lea, M. and Lee, S. (1990). De-Individuation and Group Polarization in

Computer-Mediated Communication. British Journal of Social Psychology, 29 (2), 121–

134.

Suler, J. (2004). The Online Disinhibition Effect. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 7 (3), 321–

326.

Tsikerdekis, M. (2013). The Effects of Perceived Anonymity and Anonymity States on

Conformity and Groupthink in Online Communities: A Wikipedia Study. Journal of the

American Society for Information Science and Technology, 64 (5), 1001–1015.

Ward, I. (1997). How Democratic Can We Get? The Internet, the Public Sphere, and Public

Discourse. JAC, 17 (3), 365–379.

Wilson, J. and Jessup, L. (1995). A Field Experiment on GSS Anonymity and Group Member

Status. In: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System

Science., 212–221.

Young, I.M. (2001). Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy. Political Theory, 29 (5),

670–690.

Young, I.M. (2000). Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, I.M. (1997). Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication. In: Bohman,

J., and Rehg, W., eds. Deliberative Democracy – Essays on Reason and Politics.

Cambridge: MIT Press, 383–406.

Young, I.M. (1997). Deferring Group Representation. In: Shapiro, I., and Kymlicka, W., eds.

Ethnicity and Group Rights. New York: New York University Press, 349–376.

Young, I.M. (1996). Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy. In:

Benhabib, S., ed. Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the

Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 120–135.

21

Yu, F. and Liu, Y. (2009). Creating a Psychologically Safe Online Space for a Student-

Generated Questions Learning Activity via different Identity Revelation Modes. British

Journal of Education Technology, 40 (6), 1109–1123.