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Deliberation Within and Across Enclaves

Kimmo Grönlund, Åbo Akademi University, kimmo.gronlund@abo.fi

Kaisa Herne, University of Tampere, kaisa.herne@uta.fi

Maija Setälä, University of Turku, maija.setala@utu.fi

Paper prepared for the 7th

ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, France

Section 19 “Four Decades of Democratic Innovation Research: Revisiting Theories, Concepts

and Methods “, Panel 366 “The Quality of Deliberation”

Abstract

When like-minded people discuss with each other, i.e. engage in ‘enclave deliberation’, their

opinions tend to become more extreme. This is called group polarization. A population based

experiment with a pre-test post-test design was conducted to gauge whether the norms and

procedures of deliberative discussion interfere with the mechanisms of group polarization.

Based on a survey, people with permissive or restrictive attitudes toward immigration were

identified, invited to the experiment, and randomly assigned to like-minded and mixed small

groups. Each like-minded group consisted of only permissive or restrictive participants,

whereas the mixed groups gathered both permissive and restrictive participants. The like-

minded treatment represented enclave deliberation, and the mixed treatment a ‘standard’

deliberative mini-public design. Our results suggest that deliberative norms curb group

polarization. More precisely, people with anti-immigrant attitudes became more tolerant even

when they deliberated in like-minded groups. Moreover, similar learning curves were

observed in both treatments.

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Introduction

Theories of deliberative democracy provide normative criteria for the evaluation of

processes of political discussion (Delli Carpini & al. 2004; Dryzek 2000). The epistemic and

normative quality of public decisions can be expected to depend on the quality of democratic

deliberation which precedes decision-making. Deliberation can be defined as free and equal

communication based on the merits of arguments, such as the sophistication of justifications

and the generalizability of moral principles (e.g. Steenbergen et al 2004). Recently, broader

definitions of deliberation have been put forward. These definitions include other forms of

communication such as rhetoric and narratives along with rational argumentation (see e.g.

Mansbridge & al 2010). Despite these developments, the idea of public reasoning among free

and equal individuals remains in the core of the concept of deliberation. Moreover,

deliberative democrats agree that deliberation involves both intersubjective processes of

exchanging of arguments and internal processes of reflection based on these arguments

(Goodin 2001).

One of the key features of deliberation is the inclusion of different viewpoints in the

process of exchanging arguments. Indeed, the presence of conflicting viewpoints is often

regarded as a necessary condition for deliberation. For example, Thompson (2008, 502)

argues as follows: “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before

they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation”.

However, the term ‘enclave deliberation’ has been increasingly used to refer to discussion

among like-minded people. Cass Sunstein (2002; 2007; 2009) has emphasized the problems

and risks related to enclave deliberation, most importantly group polarization. Other scholars

(e.g. Karpowitz & al. 2009; see also Sunstein 2007, 76-77) have pointed out the importance of

enclave deliberation for political articulation and mobilization, especially for those in

disadvantaged positions. Indeed, Mansbridge (1994, 63), who was probably the first to use

the term ‘enclave deliberation’, called for ‘enclaves of protected discourse and action’ as an

element of a just society.

In this paper, we study how the outcomes of deliberation vary depending on whether the

deliberative discussion takes place among like-minded people or among people who disagree

on a political issue. Our analysis is based on an experiment where citizens drawn from a

random sample deliberated on immigration. The experiment was held in Finland in the spring

of 2012. We analyze the development of participants’ opinions and knowledge during the

experiment in order to test hypotheses on group polarization. The paper is organized in the

following manner. First, we discuss the idea and mechanisms of enclave deliberation and

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formulate hypotheses based on this discussion. Second, we describe the experimental

procedure and analyze the data gathered in the surveys during the experiment. Finally,

conclusions are provided.

Theory and hypotheses

Cass Sunstein (2002, 2007) has raised the question of the future of democracy if people

only listen and speak to the like-minded. He addresses the problems of ‘group thinking’

which may arise when like-minded people discuss among themselves. Sunstein analyzes the

negative outcomes of discussions among the like-minded, namely group polarization and the

amplification of cognitive errors. Group polarization occurs when deliberation in a group of

like-minded reinforces those attitudes and opinions which prevail in the group at the outset.

Sunstein (2009, 3) defines polarization as follows: [...] “members of a deliberating group

usually end up at a more extreme position in the same general direction as their inclinations

before deliberation began”. Sunstein (2007, 80-95, 140-143) points out that ‘group thinking’

does not only lead to the polarization of attitudes but it may also affect people’s factual

beliefs. According to Sunstein, enclave deliberation may lead to the amplification of cognitive

errors which means corroboration of biased or erroneous epistemic beliefs. He also points out

that large-scale misconceptions, or ‘informational cascades’ may come up in enclave

deliberation because people just follow the cues provided by others in the absence of contrary

evidence.

There are different mechanisms which contribute to polarization when opinions in a group

are biased at the outset. Overall, two different types of mechanisms behind group polarization

have been identified; namely social comparison and persuasive arguments. (Farrar & al 2009,

616; Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 2002, 179-180). Social comparison refers to various ways in

which individuals’ act in order to win social acceptance from other members of the group. In

order to be accepted, individuals need to process information of how other people present

themselves and adjust their own behavior accordingly (Isenberg 1986, 1142). Individuals may

act in different ways in order to be perceived favorable by other group members. First, they

may try to adjust their opinions according to the view which seems to dominate in the group.1

Social psychological experiments have also demonstrated that group pressures work in the

way that people tend to conform to the views of the majority (Asch 1948). Second, social

comparison may also make people to emphasize their difference from others to the valued

1 The so-called ‘spiral of silence’ means that, in fear of social isolation, people who think that their

political views are unpopular remain silent in the group (Noelle-Neumann 1984).

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direction (Isenberg 1986, 1142). In other words, individuals may take positions which are

more extreme in comparison to views dominating the group at the outset.

The other mechanism behind group polarization, persuasive arguments, is simply based on

the idea that individuals are convinced by the contents of arguments put forward in the group.

Consequently, if arguments heard in a group are biased in one direction, there is likely to be a

further shift to this direction. Group polarization is likely to be reinforced by biases in

information processing. ‘Confirmation bias’ is a well-established phenomenon which means

that people are inclined to seek information confirming their prior beliefs and to disregard

information which is against them (Mercier & Landemore 2012, 251). More generally,

motivated reasoning refers to a variety of cognitive and affective mechanisms which lead

individuals to arrive at conclusions they want to arrive at (Kunda 1990). In a group of like-

minded people, individual biases in information processing and reasoning are not checked by

arguments put forward by individuals supporting conflicting views. Opinions are likely to

polarize because individuals only hear arguments which support their own prior position – in

fact, they may even hear new arguments in support of it.

The negative consequences of enclave deliberation have been confirmed by social

psychological studies which do not, however, evoke the circumstances of deliberation.

Sunstein himself (2007, 60-62) provides some experimental evidence on group polarization.

He puts forward a summary of social psychological studies showing that groups tend to move

towards the direction of the position which dominates the group initially (Sunstein 2009, 161-

168). The discussion topics of the described experiments range from jury decisions to risk

taking and militarism and pacifism. In a recent study on political discussion, Jones (2013)

founds evidence on polarization of opinions, especially among the Republicans, in a partisan

workplace environment.2 Some studies on group polarization have not even involved proper

discussion. For example, Lee (2007) shows that group polarization is correlated to group

identification in a study with computer-mediated communication not involving actual

discussion between the group members.

Sunstein’s account for group polarization emphasizes the original dispositions of those

who discuss and the biases in the argument pool which follow from it. However, as pointed

out above, the studies he discusses do not represent experiments on deliberative talk.

Experimental evidence on so-called deliberative mini-publics (Goodin & Dryzek 2006)

provides an entirely different picture: groups de-polarize rather than polarize (e.g. Luskin &

2 Mutz and Mondak (2006), on the other hand, use survey evidence to demonstrate that commonly the

workplace provides an environment for cross-cutting political discourse.

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al. 2002; Setälä et al. 2010). The evidence from deliberative mini-publics also suggests that

people learn during the deliberative discussion and that their misperceptions are corrected

(e.g. Grönlund et al. 2010). Moreover, people learn about facts supporting views which they

disagreed with (Andersen & Hansen 2007). These results may be due to the fact that the

inclusion of different viewpoints is ensured in deliberative mini-publics which therefore do

not represent deliberation only among the like-minded. This explanation suggests that group

composition is a crucial determinant of the outcome of deliberation (Mendelberg &

Karpowitz 2007). However, Farrar et al (2009), who focus on group composition effects in

deliberative polls, observe contrary evidence. More precisely, they study the influence of the

distribution of opinions in the group, but do not find much evidence of its effect on individual

post deliberation opinions. In other words, participants of deliberative polls do not seem to

conform to the mean opinion of their small group contrasting the earlier findings on group

influence in psychological studies.

Sunstein (2009, 48) argues as follows: "When groups contain equally opposed subgroups,

do not hold rigidly to their positions, and listen to one another, members will shift toward the

middle; they will depolarize. The effect of mixing will be to produce moderation". Mercier

and Landemore (2012, 253) argue that in genuine deliberation, the biases present in individual

reasoning are checked by biases in arguments of individuals representing different

viewpoints. Moreover, without a clearly dominant view in the group, people are likely to

accommodate their arguments in ways which could appeal to people representing conflicting

viewpoints. Indeed, Mercier and Landemore argue that collective processes of deliberation are

likely to be the most effective remedies for biases in information processing and reasoning.

In this article, we analyze the impact of group composition on the outcomes of

deliberation. More specifically, we compare deliberation in like-minded groups and in groups

where the participants’ opinions are divided. The analysis is based on an experiment where

citizens were invited to deliberate on immigration policy. Based on earlier theoretical and

empirical findings, we test the following hypotheses which concern the development of

opinions at the aggregate level. At the same time, we expect similar developments at the

individual level.

Hi Deliberation in like-minded groups leads to a polarization of opinions.

Hii Deliberation in mixed groups de-polarizes opinions.

Hiii Deliberation in like-minded groups amplifies cognitive errors.

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Hiv Deliberation in mixed groups corrects cognitive errors.

While group composition was subject to manipulation in the experiment, otherwise we

applied the ‘standard’ procedures of deliberative mini-publics. Deliberative mini-publics

involve certain procedural features, such as information shared by all participants and the use

of moderators that can encourage deliberation, understood as a process where people are

exposed to different arguments and reflect on their own position in relation to them. Our aim

is thus to look at the effects of group composition while holding the deliberative context

constant. In this experiment, participants were provided with unbiased information on the

issue and they discussed the issue in moderated small groups. Our study therefore follows the

recommendation made by Mutz (2006, 61) as we aim to disentangle the effects of group

composition from the other aspects of the deliberative ‘package’.

We are interested in finding out whether the procedures of a deliberative mini-public can

restrain the negative consequences of enclave deliberation. Although we assume that the

dynamics and outcomes of deliberation differ depending on the group composition, it should

also be acknowledged that the set-up of deliberative mini-publics may foster deliberative

forms of communication even in groups of like-minded people. For example, Farrar & al

(2009) found little impact of the group composition on deliberative outcomes in their

randomized experiments. The authors point out several factors which can neutralize group

composition effects, including the types of topics discussed and the presence of varying

viewpoints.

In deliberative mini-publics, information provided to participants can be expected to widen

the set of arguments put forward in discussions. It may also create a common pool of

arguments which may lessen polarization (see e.g. Isenberg 1986, 1148). Moreover, the use of

moderators and the application of specific rules for discussion are likely to enhance a free and

equal exchange of viewpoints as well as an evaluation of arguments based on their merits. As

pointed out by Kunda (1990), individuals’ tendency towards motivated reasoning is

constrained by their ability and willingness to construct reasonable justifications for their

conclusions. The set-up of a deliberative mini-public which emphasizes processes of

reasonable justification as ‘the name of the game’ can be expected to encourage reasoning and

arguing about pros and cons concerning the issue. This type of reasoning can be enhanced

further if participants adopt argumentative strategies which help to compensate the biases in

the argument pool, for example, by acting as ’devils’ advocates’.

Experimental procedure

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The topic of the deliberation experiment was immigration policy, a contested and debated

issue in Finland. The main purpose of the experiment was to compare deliberation in two

types of small groups: 1) groups consisting of like-minded people, and 2) groups consisting of

people who have different opinions relating to immigration. The participants of the

experiment were randomly assigned to like-minded groups, mixed groups, and a control

group. Subjects in the first two took part in the deliberation event, whereas the control group

only filled in three mail-in surveys. The main comparisons are made between like-minded and

mixed groups, but comparisons between the experimental group and the control group are

also made.

Participants’ opinions were measured before and after deliberation. This means that we are

looking at differences both between subjects (the comparison of like-minded and mixed

groups) and within subjects (pre-test and post-test measures of opinions). The experiment was

not completely randomized because we stratified people into two enclaves based on their

initial opinions regarding immigration. Respondents with negative attitudes to immigration

formed a con enclave, whereas respondents with a positive view on immigration formed a pro

enclave.

A short survey (T1) was first mailed out to a simple random sample of 12,000 adults in the

Turku/Åbo region. Of the addressed sample, 39 percent (n = 4,681) responded to the survey.

T1 consisted of 14 questions whose aim was to measure the respondents’ attitudes about

immigration. The questions were first pilot tested with students at two universities in order to

measure their appropriateness for the purpose of the experiment. All survey items worked

well both in the pilots and in the actual survey conducted among the random sample (T1). In

the surveyed sample, all 14 items loaded on one single factor and Cronbach’s Alpha of the

sum variable reached 0.94. Therefore, we were able to construct a sum variable of the 14

items. Each item was first recoded into a scale from 0 to 1 so that 1 indicates the most

immigration friendly attitude. The questions are listed in Appendix A. Figure 1 shows the

initial dispersion of attitudes among those respondents (n=3,232) who allowed further contact

from the research group.

Figure 1 about here

The histogram shows that the initial opinions almost followed the normal distribution.

Thus, we felt confident to use the sum variable as a ground for creating the con and pro

enclaves. Since the design of the experiment required people with clear views on the

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immigration issue, we excluded moderates, i.e. respondents whose opinions on immigration

were close to the middle on the 14 item scale (n= 631)3.

The second survey (T2) with 37 items and an invitation to take part in a deliberation (and a

separate debriefing) event was sent to 2,601 people who qualified as members of either the

con or the pro enclave. At this point, it was clearly stated that the deliberation event was an

integrated part of the research project and that a response to the survey meant a preliminary

agreement to take part in it. Further, it was clarified that only a part of those who volunteered

could be included in the deliberation event and that the choice would be made by lot. Each

participant who completed all stages of the project was compensated. A gift certificate worth

90 euros was given to each participant of the deliberation and debriefing events and fifteen

euros to those whose task was only to fill in surveys (i.e. the control group).

Eventually, 805 people volunteered, and 366 were invited to take part in the deliberation

event. The final target sample was 256 participants, which would have allowed for 32 small

groups of eight participants (eight pro like-minded, eight con like-minded and sixteen mixed

groups). Stratified sampling was used in order to guarantee representation in terms of the pro

and con enclaves as well as age and gender. Random sampling was used within strata.

Unfortunately, the target of 256 deliberators was not achieved and only 207 people showed

up.4 Especially people in the con enclave tended to abstain at this final stage, even though

there were no indications of this kind of a bias at the earlier stages of the recruitment process.

Figure 2 shows the phases of the recruitment process.

Figure 2 about here

Since invited participants with anti-immigrant attitudes dropped out at the final recruitment

stage, we wanted to check if the sample of people turning out to deliberate was skewed when

it comes to attitudes. In table 1, comparisons between the preliminary invited sample

(n=2,601), the initially volunteered respondents (n=805), the invited (n=366) and the actual

participants (n=207) are made within the two enclaves. It can be seen that the participants in

the con enclave were slightly more moderate, i.e. less anti-immigrant, compared to the whole

enclave at earlier stages. In fact, the difference in opinions in the con enclave between the

participants (n=86) and the ones who did not show up (n=97) is statistically significant at the

3 Those whose value for the sum variable was > 8.3 were included in the pro enclave, and those whose

value was < 6.7 were included in the con enclave. 4 A more thorough analysis of the attrition process can be found in Karjalainen and Rapeli (2013).

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0.01-level. Put in other words, it was harder to attract people with the most anti-immigrant

opinions to present their views in a deliberative event. In the pro enclave, the participants

were slightly more liberal than the mean of the whole enclave at earlier stages. This difference

is not, however, statistically significant.

Table 1 about here

At the deliberation event, the small groups were randomly formed within the con and pro

enclaves yielding ten pro like-minded groups, five con like-minded groups and eleven mixed

groups.5 The control group consisted of 369 people who were initially willing to take part and

who returned each of the surveys T1, T2 and T4. The socio-demographics of the participants

and the control group are represented in Appendix C. Table 2 displays the assignment into

small groups.6

Table 2 about here

The deliberation event took place during one weekend, 31 March and 1 April 2012. Each

participant took part only during one day, either on Saturday or Sunday. Each day, the event

followed the same procedures and lasted from 9.30 am until 3 pm. The day started with a

short 15-item quiz measuring knowledge related to immigration issues and general political

issues. After the knowledge quiz, the participants were shortly briefed about some basic facts

related to immigration in Finland. The briefing was designed to be unbiased and focused on

basic facts, and was presented as a slide show in an auditorium with all participants. A copy

of the information material was also handed out to each participant.

After the briefing, facilitated small group discussions began in each group’s own location.

Each small group consisted of eight participants and a moderator.7 The group discussions

lasted for four hours, including a lunch break of 45 minutes. The group discussions ended

with a survey (T4) repeating the questions in T1, T2 and T3, apart from socio-economic

background variables. It also included questions related to the participants’ experiences of the

5 One of the mixed groups was a Swedish speaking group allowing participants to talk in their mother

tongue. 6 See Appendix D for the socio-demographics of the participants according to enclave and treatment.

7 Because some individuals did not show up three groups consisted of nine participants, two of seven

participants and one of six participants. All mixed groups, however, had eight participants, four from

both enclaves.

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deliberation event. The phases of the experiment are listed in Table 3. In each small group,

trained moderators facilitated the discussion. A written description of the rules of the

discussion was handed out to the participants in the beginning. It emphasized respect for other

people’s opinions, the importance of justifying one’s opinions and openness to others’ points

of view. The moderators also read aloud these rules.

In the beginning of the group discussion, each group member put forward a theme related

to the immigration issue which they wished to be discussed. The moderator wrote these

themes down on a blackboard. The proposed themes covered issues such as , work-based

immigration, humanitarian based immigration, acculturation, multiculturalism,

unemployment, crime and security, language and education, immigration attitudes, and the

costs of immigration. There were no major differences between the themes put forward by the

pro and con immigration participants, except that none of the con participants suggested the

immigration attitudes, referring to prejudices and racism, as a theme to be discussed. After

this, a free discussion on the themes followed. The moderators interfered only if any of the

group members dominated or completely withdrew from the discussion. Further, the

moderator could put forward a theme for discussion from those written down on the board in

case the discussion paused, and interfere if crude or disrespectful utterances were made.

Table 3 about here.

Results

The statistical significance of potential differences and changes is determined through t-

tests.We also look at multivariate regressions in order to gain a better understanding of the

determinants of opinion change at the individual level. We compare both the development of

opinions and knowledge according to the four groups achieved by the combination of enclave

and treatment (see Table 2). The comparisons are mainly done within samples (pre- and post-

test), and through between samples testing when applicable.

First, we test the hypotheses on the effect of treatment on opinions. Hi states that a

polarization of opinions occurs in the like-minded groups, whereas Hii assumes that the

opposite occurs in the mixed groups. Figure 3 demonstrates the development of opinions in

the course of the experiment. We compare opinions before (T1) the event, after deliberation

(T4) and in the follow-up survey (T5) three weeks after the event.

Figure 3 about here

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There were three statistically significant opinion changes during the experiment. All of

these were in the direction of a more liberal attitude towards immigration. The most

prominent change occurred among the participants of the con mixed groups. Here, the initial

mean on the sum variable was 4.33, and it increased to 6.12 after the experiment. The increase

of 1.8 units is significant at the 0.001 level and corroborates Hii. On average, the pro mixed

group participants did not, contrary to Hii change their opinions when deliberating with “the

other side”. Thus, depolarization in the mixed treatment was unilateral, only persons with

anti-immigrant attitudes shifted towards the mean. Those initially permissive towards

immigration did not alter their opinions.

Moving on to the like-minded treatment, figure 3 shows that the con like-minded groups

did not polarize in comparison with their initial opinions. On the contrary, these people

became more permissive toward immigration as a result of deliberation. The change of 0.67

units is not as large as among the con participants in the mixed groups, but still significant at

the 0.01 level. This development works against Hi. In the pro enclave, only the like-minded

groups show a barely statistically significant (0.05) mean change of opinions. These groups

polarized slightly, according to the assumption in Hi 8.

How persistent were the opinion changes? Looking at the follow-up survey T5, we can see

that the only statistically significant change between deliberation and the follow-up survey

was a continued tendency among the con like-minded groups to become more tolerant

towards immigration. This, again, is contrary to hypothesis i). The results show a somewhat

unclear picture. There is a clear de-polarization of opinions among the anti-immigration

participants who were subject to the mixed group treatment, but also their peers in like-

minded groups show a more permissive post deliberation attitude. Moreover, the latter

continued to become more tolerant after deliberation. Among the participants in favor of

immigration, there were almost no opinion changes at the aggregate level..

8 The non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test repeats the result about the opinion changes, T1 – T4,

in the four groups (for con like-minded p = 0.005; for con mixed p = 0.000; for pro like-minded p =

0.032; for pro mixed p = 0.899). Likewise, the Man Withney test repeats the overall pattern about the

differences between treatments at T1 (for the difference between con participants in the like-minded

and mixed groups p = 0.021; for the pro participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.087),

and at T4 (for the difference between con participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.294;

for the pro participants in the like-minded and mixed groups p = 0.002). Furthermore, the overall

patterns found at the aggregate level were confirmed in a separate group-by-group analysis. It turned

out that none of the small groups behaved in a deviant manner. In 9 (out of 11) of the mixed groups, in

4 (out of 5) of the con like-minded groups, and in 7 (out of 10) of the pro like-minded groups the

change was positive from T1 to T4.

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Figure 3 also shows a comparison within enclaves at T1which helps to trace possible initial

differences between the subjects that were randomly allocated into the two treatments within

both enclaves. Despite random allocation, the participants in the like-minded treatment were

in both enclaves closer to the middle point than the participants who deliberated in mixed

groups. In the con enclave the difference was 0.73 and in the pro enclave 0.48, both

statistically significant at the 0.05-level. This means that the participants in the like-minded

treatment were more moderate than the participants in the mixed treatment. It is impossible to

establish if this initial division had any influence on the outcome within the treatments.

In order to understand the scope of opinion change at the individual level , table 4 shows

people who changed sides as a result of deliberation. The threshold for changing sides is set at

7.5 on the sum variable, i.e. in the middle of the cut-off points for the con and pro enclaves. If

a person in the con enclave moved above 7.5 after deliberation, (s)he is considered to have

changed sides; a person in the pro enclave should have moved below 7.5 in order to have

changed sides concerning opinions on immigration. Table 4 compares the participants’ pre

and post deliberation attitudes. Moreover, the post deliberation attitudes are analyzed both at

the end of the deliberation event (T4) and in the follow-up survey (T5).

Table 4 about here

Changing sides occurred almost exclusively among persons who were initially critical

towards immigration. This corroborates further the finding that major opinion changes took

place among the participants with anti-immigration attitudes. At the end of the deliberation

day (T4), 20 persons belonging to the con enclave had become permissive towards

immigration; the sum variable for immigration attitudes had for their part exceeded the value

of 7.5 on the 0 to 14 point scale. A majority of these, 14 people, were subject to the mixed

treatment. When people with anti-immigrant attitudes faced counter arguments, many of them

became clearly more positive toward immigration. However, also six people in the con like-

minded groups changed sides at T4. No one in the pro enclave became restrictive toward

immigration as a result of deliberation.

Moving on to the follow-up survey, the trend to more permissive attitudes continues

among the participants of the con like-minded groups. In the period between the experiment

and the follow-up survey, five additional people in con like-minded groups had become

supporters of more immigration. To sum up, 14 out of 44 con participants in mixed groups

changed sides as a result of deliberation (13 at T5 as one person shifted back), and 11 out of

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the 42 anti-immigrants deliberating in like-minded groups had changed sides at the follow-up

survey. Altogether 24 of the total of 86 participants in the con enclave changed sides as a

result of the experiment. More than every fourth participant with anti-immigration attitudes

became clearly permissive toward immigration as a result of deliberation.

Table 5 shows how the control group performed during the same time period. It can be

seen that within the control group, attitudes toward immigration changed as well. The con

enclave became slightly more permissive, whereas the pro enclave became slightly more

critical. Put in other words, participation in a three wave panel study on immigration led to a

de-polarization of opinions among the control group. It may be the case that people who

responded to the survey became more aware of the immigration issue and probably reflected

upon it even though they did not participate in deliberation event. They may have, for

example, sought more information on their own and reflected on it. It is notable that there is a

clear difference between the experimental and control groups in terms of their opinion

changes. This gives further confirmation to our observations about the influence of the

deliberative discussion on opinion changes. It is also important to notice that the experimental

and control groups were formed randomly from those willing to participate in the deliberation

event indicating that a self-selection bias cannot account for the differences observed between

the two groups.

Table 5 about here

Next, in order to test Hiii and Hiv we analyze knowledge change in the course of the

experiment. Hiii suggest that deliberation in like-minded groups amplifies cognitive errors,

whereas Hiv anticipates that deliberation in mixed groups corrects cognitive errors. The

knowledge questions were grouped in three subsets. First, there were six questions pertaining

to immigration on which information was given in the beginning of the deliberation event.

Second, there were four questions on immigration on which information was not given by the

organizers. Third, there were five questions measuring general political knowledge. In figure

4 we look at the learning effects by treatment and enclave. The table only includes the ten

items related to immigration knowledge (for a detailed development of all knowledge items,

see appendix B).

Figure 4 about here

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All participants learned a lot during the experiment. The learning effects were large and

similar in all four groups. Neither treatment nor attitudes toward immigration had an effect on

the learning curve. In fact, the pre-event knowledge shares were quite similar across the four

groups as well. For all participants, the mean share of correct answers increased from 43 per

cent to 63 per cent, and the information gains were recorded for questions on which

information was given at the event (see Appendix B). This indicates that the correction of

erroneous beliefs occurred both in mixed and like-minded groups to a similar degree, backing

up hypothesis iv) but working against hypothesis iii). Initially, there were small differences

within enclaves between the subjects who were randomly assigned to the like-minded vs.

mixed treatments. These differences were not statistically significant, neither were the

differences within enclaves at T4.

Within the set of questions relating to immigration where no information was provided by

the organizers there were two open-ended questions (questions 9 and 10 in Appendix B)9.

They can be used to examine the hypothesis concerning cognitive errors. These questions

pertained to the level of unemployment among immigrants (correct answer 27 per cent) and

the level of a social security benefit received by an unemployed immigrant per month (correct

answer 757 euros). It can be assumed that negative attitudes towards immigration are,

especially, related to people’s perceptions of social problems and costs caused by

immigration. Therefore, it may be assumed that those who have negative attitudes towards

immigration might overestimate both the level of unemployment and social security benefits,

and the opposite could be the case among supporters of immigration.

Whereas the coding of the open-ended questions in table 6 followed the binary logic of

‘correct’ and ‘non-correct’10

answers, we also examined the distance of the respondent’s

answers from the correct answers. When looking at the responses to the open questions before

deliberation (T3) it turns out that both those for and those against immigration tended to

underestimate the unemployment rate and the level of social security. Among the participants

in the con enclave, 42.2 per cent underestimated the unemployment rate. In the pro enclave,

the share of people underestimating the unemployment rate was even higher: 53.3 per cent.

The level of social security benefits for unemployed immigrants was underestimated by 67.5

percent in the con enclave and 68.1 percent in the pro enclave. However, overestimation was

more common among those against immigration than among those for immigration as 33.7

9 All other knowledge items were put forward as multiple choice questions with four alternatives.

10 The intervals of acceptance for correct answers were defined as follow: 24-30 per cent for the

unemployment rate, 700-800 EUR for the integration assistance.

15

per cent in the con enclave overestimated the unemployment rate (23.3 per cent in the pro

enclave) and 21.7 per cent overestimated the level of benefits (10.1 per cent in the pro

enclave). This gives some support to the assumption that attitudes towards immigration are

related to the perceptions of the costs of immigration. However, the responses to the open-

ended questions in T4 do not support the hypotheses on amplification of cognitive errors. The

differences in the under- or overestimation of the unemployment rate and the social security

benefit are not statistically significant, when comparing the four groups of enclaves and

treatments with each other.

Finally, we analyze immigration attitudes in a multivariate setting. For this purpose, table 6

shows results of three separate regression models. The dependent variable in each model is

the sum variable measuring attitudes toward immigration in the course of the experiment. The

first model analyzes the baseline determinants of immigration opinions (T1), whereas the

second column looks at the post deliberation attitudes (T4), and the third measures the

attitudes at the follow-up survey (T5). In each model, the dependent variable is the sum

variable (varies between 0 and 14) for immigration attitudes. At T4 and T5 the baseline value

of each person’s attitudes at T1 is included in the model as an independent variable. We only

list parsimonious models with significant variables. The non-significant variables which are

not included in the models in table 6 are listed under the table11

. The results of the displayed

OLS regression models in table 6 were verified through generalized linear models with

Hubert-White estimators for robust standard errors. The obtained results were identical.

Table 6 about here.

First of all, looking at the baseline attitudes, we can see that the most powerful predictors

are external political efficacy, generalized social trust and education. They are all positively

associated with liberal attitudes toward immigration. Considering the scale of the dependent

variable (0 to 14), we see that a person with a master’s degree, who is trustful, and has a high

level of external political efficacy, is at the very liberal end of the scale concerning

immigration attitudes. He scores almost 11 points higher than a person without these

characteristics. Values and ideology have an impact too. The more right a person places

himself on the left-right scale, the less tolerant he is of immigrants. The difference between

the extremes on the scale is 2.6 points on the dependent variable. Religious persons are also

11

For the model at T5 we replicated the significant independent variables from T4 in order to see how

persistent they are.

16

less liberal than non-religious persons, the coefficient being -1.53. When we look at the socio-

demographic and attitudinal control variables, we see that many are not related to immigration

attitudes. Gender, age, marital status, political interest nor interest in immigration policy

explains how the participants’ view about immigration. 12

.

Moving on to the post deliberation event attitudes at T4, we see that only social trust

prevails as a predictor, controlling for the baseline attitudes of each respondent. The model

itself performs much better than the first model, but this is naturally explained by including

the T1 attitudes in the model. We first controlled for 18 additional variables pertaining to

knowledge, treatment and enclave as well as attitudes regarding the participants’ views on

discussion in general and the small group deliberations in particular. Only four of them were

statistically significant in a stepwise regression. People, who claim to be are ready to

understand the other side, i.e. agree with the statement that a person who disagrees with them

on immigration might have good arguments for their view, are more permissive after the

deliberation. Also participants in groups where at least one of the participants had an

immigrant background, have a slightly higher (0.40) level of post-deliberation opinion.

Regarding the items that measure how the participants evaluate the discussion in their group,

dominance becomes significant. Participants, who, regardless of treatment or enclave, felt that

some individuals dominated the discussion in their group too much, score almost one point

lower in their post-deliberation opinions toward immigration. Even more negative (-1.47) was

the effect of a feeling of dominance among participants who belong to the con enclave and

were in the like-minded treatment.

The final model, where the follow-up survey at T5 provides the dependent variable

includes the independent variables of the model at T4. This is done in order to control for how

persistent they are in explaining attitudinal change at the experiment. Expectedly, the baseline

attitudes from T1 still explain most of the opinions at T5. Besides it, only generalized social

trust (positively) and the interaction between the feeling of group dominance and con like-

minded groups (negatively) remain statistically significant. The importance of social trust has

increased compared to T4, whereas the feeling of some participants dominating has

diminished in the almost three weeks between the event and the follow-up survey. Also the

positive effect of having an immigrant in the small-n group vanished during this time.

Conclusions

12

The results obtained for the immigration attitudes at T1 are very similar to those in a recent

comparative European study on attitudes towards immigration (Arikan & Ben-Nun Bloom 2012).

17

The results from the experiment do not show systematic patterns of group polarization in

the like-minded groups. Hypotheses i) and ii) concerning attitude changes gain only partial

support. Those people in the con enclave who deliberated in like-minded groups did not

become more extreme. On the contrary, they became more permissive towards immigration.

In this respect our results are similar to those received by Sanders 2012. In the mixed groups,

participants in the con enclave became more permissive, whereas people in the pro enclave

did not become more critical towards immigration. Depolarization therefore occurred to some

extent in the mixed groups but it concerned the con enclave only. It is also notable that we did

not find any indication of the amplification of cognitive errors. Overall, participants who were

assigned to mixed groups did not learn more than participants in like-minded groups. All

participants learned to a substantial degree but this was mostly a result of the information

given to them in the beginning of the deliberation event. There were no differences in the

average learning curves between the two enclaves and treatments. It is worth pointing out that

some of the opinion changes within the control group were significant suggesting that people

may reflect on an issue just because they are participants in a panel study. However, the fact

that the opinion changes in the control group did not follow the same patterns as the opinion

changes in the experimental group suggests that deliberation as an intersubjective process has

logic of its own.

Our results support the view that deliberation is different from other forms of talk. For

students of democracy in general and deliberative democrats in particular, the implication is

that discussion procedures can have a strong impact on outcomes. The results of the

experiment suggest that polarization is not by any means an ‘automatic’ consequence of

biases in group composition or, more precisely, in the initial dispositions of the group

members. In our experiment, the group composition had an impact on the development of

attitudes, but this impact was asymmetric. Arguments in support of immigration were more

influential in the course of deliberation since all significant opinion changes were to the

direction of more permissive attitudes towards immigration. The follow-up survey indicates

that the development of the opinions to this direction continued even after the experiment.

The regression analyses suggest that opinion changes during the experiment were at least

partially driven by arguments put forward in the groups. However, also other group dynamics,

such as group tensions (in a negative manner) as well as the presence of an immigrant in the

group (in a positive manner), affected the development of attitudes.

The development of more permissive opinions in mixed groups may be explained by the

established mechanism that exposure to differing political views increases “awareness of

18

rationales for differing viewpoints and thus increases political tolerance” (Mutz 2006, 68).

However, the increase in tolerance in con like-minded groups can still be regarded as

somewhat surprising. Our experimental treatment which included two elements of what Mutz

(2006, 61) calls deliberation ‘package’, i.e. information and discussion procedures, was not

designed to disentangle their respective effects. However, the fact that knowledge gains do

not explain post deliberation opinions in the regression model does not lend support the view

that information provided in the briefing material was crucial.

Sunstein (2002, 180-181) points out the importance of “affective factors, identity and

solidarity as factors which might increase or decrease group polarization”. Affective ties can

be expected to diminish dissent in groups. When people identify themselves as members of a

group with a degree of solidarity, they are likely to reinforce the initial tendency prevailing in

the group and, consequently, the group becomes more extreme. The participants of our

experiment were subject to random allocation into small-n groups, and no affective ties

should have been eminent. The (seemingly) ad hoc nature of the groups made it difficult for

the participants to develop a within-group solidarity based on some common denominator

(e.g. being anti-immigrant) in the given time frame of four hours.

Perhaps the most likely explanation for our results is the nature of deliberation. Despite the

initial ‘like-mindedness’ of the con enclave groups, there seems to have been a sufficient

degree of disagreement on the issue to trigger deliberation where arguments are assessed by

their merits. Following Sunstein (2002, 180), polarization may have not taken place in the con

like-minded groups because the participants who defended the prevailing tendency of the

group were ‘particularly unpersuasive’, and the outliers (in the con like-minded groups,

people with the most liberal immigration attitudes) were especially convincing. Furthermore,

because individuals in the con like-minded groups did not know the composition of their

group, they may have tried to argue in ways which would appeal also to people with

conflicting viewpoints As pointed out by theorists of deliberative democracy, all arguments

should not have an equal weight in processes of public reasoning. Most notably, reasonable

arguments appealing to generalizable moral principles should be powerful whereas arguments

based on attitudes such as prejudice should be ‘laundered’ in the course of deliberation (see

e.g. Goodin 1986).. Liberal tendencies may have been reinforced in our experiment because

certain arguments against immigration were such that they could not be put forward or

sustained in the deliberative process.

19

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23

Figure 1. The dispersion of initial attitudes on immigration among the respondents.

24

Figure 2. Recruitment and attrition

T1 survey sent to a random sample of 12 000 adults

4 681 completed survey T1

3 232 allowed further contact

Enclaves formed

2 601 preliminary invited

with survey T2

805 completed T2 and volunteered (415 con, 390 pro)

366 were invited to deliberations

(á 183)

207 took part

86 con

121 pro

25

Table1. The mean of immigration opinions at T1

Comparisons between the participants and the sample at different stages.

N Sum of immigration opinions at T1

All Con Pro Con Pro

Preliminary invited 2601 1304 1297 4.28 10.15

Initially volunteered 805 415 390 4.25 10.17

Invited 366 183 183 4.33 10.24

Participated 207 86 121 4.68 10.26

Table 2. Group formation

Randomization

Like-minded Mixed

Stratification

Con Con like-minded

(n = 42)

Con mixed

(n = 44)

Pro Pro like-minded

(n = 77)

Pro mixed

(n = 44)

Table 3. The phases of the experiment.

Pre surveys (January 2012)

1. Short survey to form enclaves (T1)

2. Second survey with invitation (T2)

The deliberation event (March 31 – April 1, 2012)

3. Quiz measuring knowledge (T3)

4. General instructions and briefing on the immigration issue

5. Small group discussions (4 hours, incl. 45 min lunch break)

6. The fourth survey measuring opinion and knowledge changes and

experience of the event (T4)

Debriefing (April 20, 2012)

7. A follow up survey measuring the stability of opinion changes (T5)

8. Participants debriefed about the experiment and given their reward

for participation

26

5.1

4.3

10.4

10.0

5.7

6.1

10.7

9.9

6.16.3

10.6

10.0

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.5

8.0

8.5

9.0

9.5

10.0

10.5

11.0

Con like-minded Con mixed Pro like-minded Pro mixed

Figure 3. Opinion changes according to enclave and treatment

Before (T1) After (T4) Follow up (T5)

27

Table 4. Did the participant change sides during deliberation (compared to T1)?

At T4 Con Pro

Like-minded Mixed Like-minded Mixed Total

Yes 6 14 0 0 20

No 36 30 77 44 187

Total 42 44 77 44 207

At T5 Con Pro

Like-minded Mixed Like-minded Mixed Total

Yes 11 13 1 0 25

No 31 31 76 44 182

Total 42 44 77 44 207

Table 5. Attitude changes in the control group

Before After Change Sig St.dev. St. dev. N

(T1) (T4) Before After

Con 4.21 4.7 0.5 *** 1.76 2.02 194

Pro 10.06 9.55 -0.51 *** 1.34 1.54 175

Diff. 5.85 4.84

Sig *** ***

Sig. * < .05 **< .01 ***< .001

28

43

37

46

43

62

59

65 65

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

Con like-minded Con mixed Pro like-minded Pro mixed

Figure 4. Knowledge gains according to enclave and treatment. Shares of correct answers.

Before (T3) After (T4)

29

30

Table 6. The development of immigration attitudes at the experiment. OLS regression.

T1 (baseline) T4 T5 (follow-up)

B t p B t p B t p Education 2.22 3.89 ***

Ideological self-placement left-right -2.61 -3.44 ***

Religiosity -1.53 -2.66 **

Generalized trust 4.26 4.13 *** 1.04 2.11 * 1.63 3.30 ***

Internal political efficacy 1.53 1.69 ¤

External political efficacy 4.11 4.64 ***

Immigration attitudes at T1 0.74 23.22 *** 0.69 21.67 *** Understands the other side 1.38 2.13 * 0.57 1.05

"Some participants dominated the discussion too much" -0.92 -2.80 ** 0.11 0.32

"Some participants dominated"*Con like-minded groups -1.47 -2.72 ** -1.07 -1.97 *

Immigrant in the small-n group 0.40 2.40 * 0.14 0.84

Constant 3.32

*** 1.55 2.77 ** 1.72 3.07 **

F 21.9

*** 151.73

*** 131.3

***

Adjusted R square 0.384

0.818

0.795

N 207 207 207

Significant < ¤ .1, * .05, ** .01, *** .001. Two-tailed test.

Unstantardized coefficients. All independent variables were coded into a scale from 0 to 1.

Non-significant control variables (not included in the models above):

T1 and T4: 1) Gender, 2) Age, 3) Age squared, 4) Employed, 5) Married, 6) Political interest, 7) Interest in immigration policy,

T4: 8) Mean of correct immigration knowledge T3, 9) change in immigration knowledge T3 to T4,

10) Con enclave like-minded groups, 11) Pro enclave like-minded groups, 12) Con enclave mixed groups,

13) I prefer to discuss politics and societal questions with like-minded people,

14) Interaction mixed treatment and prefers to discuss with like-minded,

15) Interaction between con enclave and prefers to discuss with like-minded,

16) Other participants interrupted when it was my turn to speak, 17) Other participants took my views into account,

18) I found it difficult to listen to people who disagreed with me,

19) The discussion showed that also opinions that differ from mine can be motivated,

20) Interaction found dominance and pro like-minded groups, 21) interaction found dominance and con mixed groups.

Understands the other side: "Someone who does not agree with me on immigration may have good arguments for his/her view."

31

Appendix A. The main items measuring attitudes on immigration.

1. Finland should take more immigrants. Do you think this is a bad or a good suggestion?

2. Migration of foreigners into Finland should be restricted as long as there is unemployment in

Finland. [r]

3. Do you think Finland will change into a better or a worse place to live when people from other

countries move to Finland? (Questions 1 to 3 were presented on a scale from 0 to 10).

4. It is good for the Finnish economy that people from other countries move to Finland.

5. Immigrants take away jobs from native Finns. [r]

6. Immigrants should have the same right to social security as Finns even if they are not Finnish

citizens.

7. The state and the municipalities use too much money to aid immigrants. [r]

8. Immigration poses a serious threat to our national originality.

9. Everyone who wants to come to Finland to live and work should be allowed to do so.

10. Immigration policy should primarily favor Christians instead of other religions. [r]

11. Generally speaking, immigrants adapt well into the Finnish society.

12. I would be happy to have an immigrant as a co-worker.

13. I would accept an immigrant as a family member.

14. I would accept immigrants in my neighborhood. (Questions 3 to 14 were presented as a

standard Likert scale with four values).

[r] = Reversed coding in the sum variable

32

Appendix B. Knowledge gains within treatments (shares of

correct answers)

Like-minded N=119 Mixed N=88

Item Before After Change sig. Before After Change sig.

1. Who decides on residence permits? 93 100 7 ** 94 98 3

2. The share of foreigners in Finland 61 83 23 *** 55 73 18 **

3. From which continent most immigrants to Finland? 63 88 25 *** 48 90 42 ***

4. Who decides the size of the refugee quota? 40 66 27 *** 41 64 23 ***

5. The size of the Finnish refugee quota 40 86 45 *** 26 86 60 ***

6. Most common reason to apply for residence permit 19 89 70 *** 19 84 65 ***

Mean of correct answers (Info package items) 53 85 33 *** 47 82 35 ***

7. The number residents of foreign origin in Turku 48 42 -6 39 36 -2

8. Foreigners' share of sentenced crime 40 40 -1 39 40 1

9. Unemployment among immigrants 24 24 1 23 28 6

10. The amount of integration allowance in EUR 19 20 2 15 21 6

Mean of correct answers (Items not in the info package) 33 32 -1 29 31 3

11. The name of the foreign secretary 88 91 3 84 85 1

12. Who are eligible voters in Finland 72 71 -1 69 66 -3

13. The definition of parliamentarism 71 63 -8 61 52 -9

14. Fourth largest party in the Parliament 56 58 3 56 55 -1

15. The name of the Lisbon treaty 41 44 3 33 38 5

Mean of correct answers (General political knowledge) 66 65 -1 61 59 -2

Mean of correct answers (all 15 items) 52 64 13 *** 47 61 14 ***

Significance (one-tailed t-test) *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001

33

Appendix C. Socio-demographics of the participants and control group

Participants

(n = 207)

Control group

(n = 369)

Gender

Male

Female

52.2

47.8

48.2

51.8

Age

18-34

35-49

50-64

65-

22.2

16.4

27.5

33.8

16.3

15.2

33.6

35.0

Education

Primary or Secondary

Vocational or Upper

secondary

Polytechnic or Bachelor

At least Master’s Degree

10.7

33.5

34.0

21.4

14.7

37.0

35.1

13.3

34

Appendix D. Socio-demographics of the participants according to enclave and treatment

Con

like-minded

(n = 42)

Con

mixed

(n = 44)

Pro

like-minded

(n = 77)

Pro

mixed

(n = 44)

Gender

Male

Female

50.0

50.0

47.7

52.3

44.2

55.8

52.3

47.7

Age

18-34

35-49

50-64

65-

11.9

9.5

21.4

57.1

13.6

20.5

31.8

34.1

31.2

15.6

27.3

26.0

25.0

20.5

29.5

25.0

Education

Primary or Secondary

Vocational or Upper secondary

Polytechnic or Bachelor

At least Master’s Degree

14.6

34.1

34.1

14.6

20.5

47.7

15.9

15.9

6.5

26.0

37.7

29.9

4.5

31.8

45.5

18.2