PreliminarycommunicationUDC1:[81+82](045)doi:10.21464/sp32207Received:May31,2017

Iris VidmarUniversityofRijeka,FacultyofHumanitiesandSocialSciences,Sveučilišnaavenija4,HR–51000Rijeka

ividmar@ffri.hr

On Literary Cognitivism from the Perspective of Difference between Literature and Philosophy

AbstractContemporary discussions over the cognitive value of literature focus on analysing the way in which literature and philosophy come close in addressing a specific class of concerns: those distinctively related to the human position and human experience in the world. In light of some stylistic methodological differences between the two practices – clear and precise language of philosophy and philosophy’s focus on abstraction and objectivity vs. semantically dense language of literature accessory to conveying that which is emotional and subjective – it is often argued that the truth pertains to the domain of philosophy and deception to the domain of literature. I take that to be wrong and misrepresentative with respect to two things: philosophy’s capacity to foster understanding and literature’s overall cognitive value. To support my claim, I first show that philosophy’s traditional methods of addressing human concerns are insufficient for the task and I then move on to explaining how literature can be cognitively valuable and better equipped to shed light on some of these concerns. I end by refuting arguments which deny literature’s capacity to engage with philosophical problems.

Keywordshumanexperience, knowledge, literary cognitivism, anti-cognitivism, literature, philoso-phy,understanding

1. Philosophy, literature, and matters of human concerns

Nuancesofformulationaside,literarycognitivismclaimsthatliteraturepro-videscognitivebenefits.Morespecificallytomyinterestshere,engagementswithliteraturecanimproveourcognitiveeconomy,enlargeourimaginativeandemotionalsensibilityandrefineourconceptualrepertoire,thusmakingitbetterequippedtodealwiththecomplexitiesoftheworld.Literaturecanalsosharpenourabilitiesforcounterfactualthinking,augmentourcapacitiesfor tracking and understanding causal relations, and in various other waysassistusinourcognitiveandemotionalendeavoursofgraspingandmakingsenseof theworldat large,andourplaceandexperiencein it.Championsof thedoctrineview the cognitivepotential of literature as contributing toitsoverall significance,although they recognizeothercomponentsof liter-aryvalue.1Toshowhowprofoundthiscognitivepotentialis,hereIexplore

1

Some literary cognitivists include:NoëlCar-roll, “LiteraryRealism,Recognition, and theCommunicationofKnowledge”,in:JohnGib-son,WolfgangHuemer,LucaPocci (eds.),A

Sense of the World: Essays on Fiction, Nar-rative and Knowledge,Routledge,NewYork2007,pp.24–41;BerysGaut,Art, Emotion and Ethics,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford2007,

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…372

oneparticularwayinwhichitismanifested–theonerevealedinliterature’sengagementwithwhataresometimesrecognizedasphilosophicalconcerns.Whetheritillustratesphilosophicaldoctrines,raisesphilosophicalquestionsorprovidesanswersonitsown,literaturecandowhatphilosophydoes–evenbetter, somewould say.AlanGoldman,MarthaNussbaum,CoraDiamondandEileenJohnarguedconvincinglythatliteraturehasprimacyoverphiloso-phyinrevealingcomplexitiesinvolvedinouroverallmoraldevelopmentandethicalinteractions–issues,inotherwords,thatareatthecoreofourhuman concerns.PhilipKitcherproposesthatliteraturecandealwiththequestionofhowtolive,concludingthatboundariesbetweenliteratureandphilosophyarenotfixedandeasilyseparated.2

Howonefeelsabouttheseclaimswillmostlydependonwhichofthemanyconceptionsofphilosphyorwhichphilosophicaldisciplineoneseesasrepre-sentativeofphilosophy.Ontheviewdiscussedhere,thehumanisticconcep-tioncaptures theessenceofphilosophers’vocation,exemplified inSellars’viewaccordingtowhichphilosophyaims“tounderstandhowthingsinthebroadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possiblesenseoftheterm”whichismeanttocover“notonly‘cabbagesandkings’,butnumbersandduties,possibilitiesandfingersnaps,aestheticexperienceanddeath”.3Inotherwords,philosophysetsitselfthetaskofdiscoveringthetruth and providing understanding about some fundamental aspects of ourhumanexperience.Admirablethoughthisaimmaybe,thestandardmethodsofphilosophyanditsinsistenceonstrict,clearandpreciselanguageseemtogeneratedifficultiesforachievingit–orsoIwillclaim.Thequestforanoverallunderstandingisnotbest servedbyphilosophers’dedication to the abstractnor is it eas-ily conveyed via the neatly packed abstract definitions philosophers offer,oftenintheformofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.IrisMurdochgivesavividimageofthisdefectclaimingthatphilosophygetsholdofaproblemanddoesnotletgo,relentlesslygoingbacktoit,reshapingit,andmodify-ing the form it had previously imposed upon it.4 Dedication to a rigorousmethod of conceptual analysis causes philosophers to bypass the concreteconcerns that originally give rise to their investigations, and to wander inanabstractsphereofreconditespeculation.Beingtoogeneralinwhattheydeliver,theycannothelpwiththeconcrete,individualhumansituation.Thesimplescenariosdescribedinthoughtexperimentswithwhichphilosopherspumpour intuitionsexemplify the trouble.Theyexclude toomany factorsandpossibilities.Forcedtochoosebetweentheoptionsphilosophersallow,itisnaturaltoprotesttheunrealityoftheimaginedsituation.This,asKitchermakesclear,resultsinatendencytomakephilosophytheexclusivepropertyofafewselectedindividuals interestedinsplittinghairsaroundissues thatremaindisconnectedfromtheproblemsofthemajority.5

Furtherdifficultiesspringfromadistinctivefeatureofphilosophicalmethodthatmanyphilosophers,particularlyintheanalytictradition,wouldagreeon.Ideally,philosophyshouldprovideprecisearguments,proceedingfromun-ambiguouspremisesviavalidinferencestoclearly-statedconclusions.Read-ersrespondingtoaphilosophicaltextshouldevaluatethepremises,scrutinizetheinferences,andexplorethewaysofrefutingthepremisesortheconclu-sion.PlatoandDescartesaremajorparadigmsofthissupposedlyoptimalwayofdoingphilosophy.TheidealisevenmoreexplicitinSpinoza,whopresentsanentirephilosophicalsysteminadeductiveform.Thesameyearningforde-ductivesystematizationisfoundintheempiricistcamp.Ratherthaninvokingthelightofreasonthatrationalistsallegetobethesolesourceofcertaintruth,

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…373

empiricistslikeHumesupposethatasurveyoftheworldwillsupplyevidenceforgeneralconclusionsabouthumannature,ignoringthepossiblyparochialnatureofsuchsurveys.Evenifweemploytheempiricalmethodandgroundourprinciplesinobservationsratherthanina priorireflection,wemight,asWittgensteinwouldputit,havelookedmanytimes(toomanyperhaps)inthewrong place. For all his criticism of abstract metaphysical research whichultimately“reducesthephilosophertoamerepeasant”,forallofhisskepti-cismabout“abstrusephilosophy”,Humehimselffailstoescapethetrapandremains liable to thesamecriticismSchiller issuedatKant’sphilosophicalsystem,whenhestatedthat“humannatureisinrealitymoreofaconnectedwhole thanphilosophers,whoaregoodonlyatdistinguishing,canmakeitouttobe”.6

doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263219.001.0001;JohnGibson,Fiction and the Weave of Life, Oxford University Press,Oxford 2007, doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299522.001.0001; Cath-erineElgin, Considered Judgment,PrincetonUniversity Press,New Jersey 1996;Cather-ineElgin,“ReorientingAesthetics,Recover-ing Cognition”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism58(3/2000),pp.219–225,doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/432103; StacieFriend,“NarratingtheTruth(MoreorLess)”,in:MatthewKieran,DominicMcIverLopes(eds.),Knowing Art: Essays in Aestheticsand Epistemology,Springer2007,pp.35–50,doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5265-0_3.

2

PhilipKitcher,Deaths in Venice, The Cases of Gustav Von Aschenbach, Columbia Uni-versity Press, NewYork 2013, doi: https://doi.org/10.7312/kitc16264; Alan Goldman,Philosophy and the Novel, Oxford Univer-sityPress,Oxford2013;MarthaNussbaum,“PerceptiveEquilibrium:LiteraryTheoryandEthicalTheory”,in:GarryL.Hagberg,WalterJost(eds.),A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature,Wiley-Blackwell,NewYork2010,pp. 241–267, doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444315592.ch13; Cora Diamond, “HenryJames, Moral Philosophers, Moralism”, in:G.L.Hagberg,W.Jost(eds.),A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature,pp.268–284,doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444315592,ch.14;EileenJohn,“LiteratureandtheIdeaofMorality”,in:G.L.Hagberg,W.Jost(eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature,pp.285–299,doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444315592.ch15.

3

I am not stating this is all that philosophyis doing. Given diversities among variousphilosophical enterprises, it is plausible toseesomeofitsbranchesasclosertonaturalsciences. Sellars himself, strictly speaking,iscloser todefendingonesuchalliance(forSellars’view,seetheopeningchaptersofhisWillardSellars,Empiricism and the Philoso-phy of Mind, Routledge&KeganPaulLtd.,

NewYork 1963).However, I take his claimquotedaboveasrepresentativeofoverarchingaimofphilosophy,tounderstandthingsgener-ally.Thisis,inmyview,sufficientlyinclusiveof thoseaspectsofhumanexperienceIwanttofocusonhere.Consequently,myuseoftheterm“humanistic” in thispaper is lessat theserviceofrelatingphilosophytothehumani-ties (though I strongly embrace such a rela-tion)andmoreattheserviceofemphasizingthat aspect of philosophy and the questionsit asks that has to do with the philosophicalenquiry into humans, human experience andthe human position in the world. Such en-quriesaremostevident inmoralphilosophy,where the conceptsunderdiscussion includerightandwrong,reasonandemotions,duties,freedom,blame,sin,agencyandthelike.Giv-en the extent to which philosophers concernthemselveswiththesequestions,theyarecon-sidered as distinctly philosophical questions,and in light of philosophy’s aimof reachingtruth,itisarguedthatphilosophydeliverstruthaboutthem.Myconcernhereistoshowthatliterature isequallydedicated to these issuesandsometimesbetterequippedtosolvethem.

4

InterviewwithBryanMageeavailableathttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m47A0AmqxQE(accessed onMay31, 2017), and with slightmodifications, inherExistentialists and Mys-tics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature,ThePenguinPress,NewYork1999.Irelyonbothandreferencesaregiventothepagenum-berswhenthequotationistakenfromthewrit-tenversionoftheInterview.

5

PhilipKitcher,“PhilosophyInsideOut”,Meta-philosophy42 (3/2011),pp.248–260.doi:ht-tps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01684.x.

6

Schiller’scitationistakenfrom:CharlesLar-more,“HolderlinandNovalis”,in:KarlAme-riks(ed.),The Cambridge Companion to Ger-man Idealism, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 2000, pp. 141–160, p. 145. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521651786.008.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…374

Schiller’s criticism is powerful because it points to what is really at issuewiththewayphilosophersaddresshumanconcerns.Taketheiraccountsofa struggle between reason and passion. Descartes gives us detailed, vivid,mechanisticdescriptionsofwhathappenswhenanimalspirits triggeredbyreasonandbyemotionsfightforsupremacyinaperson,pushingthepertinentglandindifferentdirectionsuntilonesidecomesoutasawinner.Thus,oneactseitherintelligentlyoremotionally.Hiscomplexstoryendswithadisap-pointingly simple moral: those who have strong will and make judgmentsbasedonknowledgeofwhatisgoodwillmanagetoovercometheinvasionofemotionalurges.7Hume’snarrativeofferstheoppositeview–theintellectal-ways(rightly!)remainspowerlesswhenconfrontedwithemotionsthatswaythesubject’sdecisionsandactions.8Butthisisstilldisappointinglytheoreti-cal.Mattersareneverasstraightforwardasthepowerstrugglepicturessug-gestandregardlessofhowdetailedrationalistorsentimentalistaccountsare,neithergivesusavividandrevealingpictureofoursubjectiveexperience.Why?Becauseabstractphilosophyneglectsthedistinctivephenomenologicalfeelingofwhathappens,whatitfeelslike,whenwehavetomakedecisionsbutareunabletoresolvethestrugglebetweentwocompetingaspectsofourpsychology.Asawayofcontrast,considerthewayliteraryworksprobesuchphenomena.IndescribingAnna’seventualdecisiontoexpressherloveforVronsky,Tol-stoybringsreaderstothepointatwhichtheycanseeclearlywhatisinvolvedin abandoning any attempt to balance reasons and surrendering oneself totheforceof theemotions. ItwouldbeshallowtoclaimthatTolstoyvindi-catesHumeandrefutesDescartes–compareKarenin’sdetachedcomposure,neither plainly inferior nor plainly superior toAnna’s impulsive decision.BecauseTolstoy’sportrayalgoesbeyond the theoretical accounts andcap-turestheexperientalfeeloftheseepisodes,heenablesustoacknowledgehisprotagonistsandtheirpsychologicallivesasakintoourown.Philosophicalaccounts, with their abstract, precise, and almost surgical analyses, fail toachievethisandthusfailtoprovidethesortofunderstandingSellarssearchesfor.Ontheotherhand,literature,richindescriptions,sensitivetoindividual’sperspectives,imbuedwithaccountsofemotionalexperiences,withitspresen-tationsofcasualrelationsandpatternsofinteractionsamongdifferentkindsofagentsindifferentsortsofcircumstances,providesuswitharicherandamoredevelopedregisterofexplanationsof“howthingshangtogether”.Thefactthatmanyphilosophershaveattimesresortedtosuchliterarystruc-tureslikemythsandstoriesordetailedautobiographicalaccounts–thinkofPlato’sdialoguesorDescartes’Discourse on Method – indicatethatnoteventhephilosophersmostadmiredfortheirgeneralityandabstractioncanalwaysforegothehelpofliteraryforms.Theseliteraryexcursionsthenindicatead-ditionalmethodsforaskingandansweringthesortsofquestionsphilosophersraiseregardingtheworldandhumanbeings.Itisnotamatterofchoosingonemethodovertheother,butofrecognizing,toputitinWittgenstein’sfavouritemetaphor,different tools inour toolbox that canbeused forphilosophicalinvestigation.9Thisisneithertoinstrumentalizeliteraturenortoneglectitsliterary values, but to acknowledge a profound cognitive richness that im-buesit.Literaturehasadistinctivewayofrespondingtoourcognitiveneeds.Anti-cognitivistsoftenfailtorecognizethisbecausetheypresupposearadi-callyimpoverishedviewofthewaysinwhichliteraturecandelivercognitivebenefits.OneaspectofSteinHaugomOlsen’scritiqueofcognitivismdem-onstratesthis.10

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…375

Olsendeniesliterature’sclaimstoknowledgebycontrastingitwithwhathecalls “informative types of discourse”, namely those that aim rationally toinfluenceone’sbeliefsbyofferingtruepropositionsabouttheworldandareconstrainedbyclearlydefinedcriteriaofwhatisrightandwhatiswrong.InOlsen’sview, thesecriteriadonotapply to literaturesowearenot to takeliteratureasinformativeandshouldnotuseitasatoolforenhancingourcog-nitiveeconomy.Wecanalwaysdecidetodosobutdoingsowouldmistreatliterature’sliteraryvalue.Literature’scognitivepowercanbemisrepresentedinanotherway.IrisMur-dochhasarguedthatliteratureandphilosophyareboth“truth-seeking”and“truth-revealingactivities”butthewayshecharacterizesthistruthinconnec-tiontoliterature,as“organisedvision”,isproblematic.11Literarycognitivistsdonotneedtoinvokeanysui generis,metaphysical,ormetaphoricalkindoftruth inorder toground literature’scognitivevalue.Thatwould imposeanadditionalobligationinthatwewouldhavetoshowhowthisparticularkindoftruthconnectstoourideathatliteraturetellsusabouthowthingsareintheworld.Isuggestthatliterarycognitivismisbestunderstoodasaclaimrelatingtotheimpactofliteratureonourcognitiveeconomy.Whiletherearemanyprop-ositional truths that can be found in literature (thus making it informativediscourseafterall,eveniftheintentiontoinformdoesnotnecessarilyorpri-marilyfigureamongtheintentionsonthepartoftheauthor),whatliteratureismostcapableofprovidingconcerns its indirect influencesonourmean-ing-makingcapacitiesandcognitiveandemotionalprocessesofgraspingthecomplexities of our situatedness in the world, as indicated in the openingsentencesofthispaper.Inowturntoprovidinganepistemologicalgroundingforhowsuchinfluencesarepossible.

2. How literature yields knowledge: a lesson from contemporary epistemology

Oneproblemwithanti-cognitivismisthatitasksustoignorethecognitivebenefits literature provides in order not to lose sight of its literary values.Manyhaveattackedthisdemand,butnot,asIintendhere,fromtheepiste-mologicalpointofview.12Whenwe recognize that thecognitivedemandsputinfrontofusarefarmorecomplicatedthanacknowledgedbymostanti-cognitivists, itbecomes lessproblematic to seehow literature serves thesedemands.First of all, our cognitive endeavors cannot be captured by the oppositionbetween knowing and not knowing. Various activities figure in the route

7

RenéDescartes,The Philosophical Works of Descartes,CambridgeUniversityPress,Lon-don1975.

8

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,1739.Available at:http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a-treatise-of-human-nature(acce-ssedonMay31,2017).

9

Ludwig Wittgensten, Philosophical Investi-gations,Wiley-Blackwell,NewYork2009.

10

SteinHaugomOlsen,The Structure of Liter-ary Understanding, Cambridge UniversityPress,Cambridge1978.

11

I. Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics, p.11.

12

Foramostrecentcriticismsee:A.Goldman,Philosophy and the Novel.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…376

fromignorancetoknowledgeandmanyothersfollowourcomingtoknowsomething.Cognitiveprogressisnotapiecemealaccretionofseparatelyes-tablished facts but a dynamic interplay of novel proposals and entrenchedcommitments.13Integrationofnewmaterialoftenrequiresreconfigurationofcommitmentsalreadyinplaceandrevisionorrepudiationofearlieradoptions.Whatmattersisthatcognizersareactiveintheirsearchforknowledge.14Weinquire,wemakejudgments,wereflectonwhetherweknow,wepostponejudgmentswhenwesuspectourlackofevidence,wereevaluateandreorgan-izeourentirebodyofbeliefs.Sometimeswerealizethere’smoretoknowingsomethingthanweoriginallythought,oftenweneedguidancefromothers,moreexperience,differentperspectivesandevenoppositeviewstochallengeusandmakeusquestionourselvesandourwaysofcoming toknow.Thislistisbynomeansexhaustive,butitshouldshowtheinsufficiencyofaviewpresupposedbyliteraryanti-cognitivists,whoaremostoftenfocusedontherelationbetweentruthandliterature,attheexpenseofothercognitivelyvalu-ableactivitiesliteratureinspires.All this cognitive labour manifests our ability to ponder things and try tomakesenseofthem.Cognitivelifedoesnotboildowntoknowingdiscrete,unrelatedpropositions.Havingalargecorpusofknownpropositionsisim-portant,butthereareotherwaysofimprovingourcognitiveeconomythanaddingafewmore.Wemaycometounderstandhowtodeploysomeofthepropositionsinourcorpus,enhancingourskillsatapplyingthemtothesitu-ationsweencounter.Subsumingonepieceofinformationundersomemoregeneralrule,andthusreorganizingourcorpus,mayaidinthisincreasedskill,andmayleadustonewinquiries,andultimatelymorepropositionalknowl-edge.Bundlinganumberofdifferentvirtuesunderauseful term,wemaycontrastthemeresizeofsomeone’scorpuswiththeperson’sunderstanding.Literarycognitivistshavealwaysinsisteduponaspecialrelationbetweenlit-eratureandunderstanding.Mycursorysketchofsomemodesofunderstand-ing may help us appreciate the cognitive benefits anti-cognitivists such asOlsenoverlook.Understandingdifferesfromknowledgeinthatitisnotpiecemeal.Itconsistsofhavingacleargraspofthecomplexitiesofagivensituation,particularlywithrespecttocausal,inferentialandexplanatoryconnections.Lackofunder-standingmaybemanifestinone’shastyjudgments,particularlyinthemoraldomain.Understandingamoralprinciplemeansbeingabletoapplyitandactuponitinsituationswhicharesimilarinalltherelevantsalientfeatures.Inotherwords,understandingsomethingimpliesthatonecansuccessfullyusepropositions one knows, making the relevant connections between experi-encesandsituations.Thepersonwhounderstandsdeploysawiderframeworkto make the experience of a world, of himself and others, more coherent.AboveIclaimedthatthiskindofinsightcanbegainedfromliterature.NowIwillshowhowliterature’scognitivebenefitscanbeaccommodatedwithinthis wider epistemological framework which makes room for one’s activeinvolvementinthecognitivepursuitsthatculminateincomingtounderstandthecomplexwaysofbeinghuman.Animportantobstacletoacknowledgingthisistoseeliteratureasprimarilyanentertainingactivity.BeforePlato’sfamousattackonit,itsprimaryfunctionwaseducational,andvariousinstancesofdidacticliteraturestillbeartracesofthat.15Amongvariousandcomplexfunctionstowhichliteraturewassubjectwemustincludespiritualupliftorreligiouseducation,whereauthorsproposeatheodicyorquestionGod’sways.16Literaturesometimesexplorespoliticalorsocialcircumstances,usuallyaimingtoincitereactionsorchangeofattitudes.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…377

Evenwhenthesevariousfunctionsarecombinedwithliterature’spleasuregiv-ingfunction,theabilitytoentertainisrarelysufficienttoconfergreatvalue.Becauseliteraryworksaremultifaceted,theyinspiremultiplereadings–afactmostanti-cognitivistsdonotconsider.Werereadondifferentoccasions,pur-suingdifferentinterests,attendingtodifferentaspectsoftheworkandgain-ingdifferentbenefits.Withsomeworksthisinterestwillbepurely(oralmostpurely)aestheticorartistic–onemightthinkofsuchgreatwritersasJoycewhotakesgreatdelightinplayingwithlanguageandmakingpartsofhistextsdifficult(butrewarding!)topenetratethroughlinguisticinnovationorsyntac-ticcomplexity.Yet,thatdoesnotimplythatreaderscannotalsotakeintocon-siderationwhatliteraturetellsusaboutourselvesandourworld.ManycriticsseeJoyce’sworks,includinghismost“difficult”onesasportrayalsofDublin’sculturalandsociallifethatbearonbroadaspectsofthehumancondition.Re-peatedreadingsofferthepossibilityforappreciatingwhatwasmissedandforrearrangingepisodesofaworkinnewways,whichrevealnewpossibleinter-pretations.Readerscometoworksequippedwithdifferentbackgroundbeliefsacquired throughvariousexperiences (including literaryones)whichmighthighlightsomeaspectsoftheworkthatwerenotpreviouslysalient.Theyat-tendtopassagestheyhadnotreflectedoninthepreviousreadings.Thinkofthe haste with which young readers see Karenin as a stereotypical bureau-cratic,anemotionallydistancedandcoldhusbandwhodoesnotunderstandAnna’spassionatenature.Yet,anolderreadermayrecognizehimasamatureandreflectivehumanbeing,committedtosocialnormswhodoeshisbesttobalancehisrolesofastatesman,ahusbandandafather.Wemaynotrelin-quishthejudgmentthatAnnawasjustifiedinleavinghim,butanawarenessofthediscrepanciesbetweentheircharactersdeepensoursenseofacomplexityofhumanrelations.Itexpandsourabilitytotakeintoconsiderationdifferentcharactertraitsandbeliefsthatgiverisetohowonebehaves.Thatisusefulforourattemptstounderstandhumanbehaviourinoureverydaylife.Toappreciateliterature’swaysofbeingcognitivewealsoneedtoabandontheideathatcognitivebenefitscanonlybedeliveredifpropositionalclaimsarepoured,asitwere,intoone’shead.Whiletherearemanyfactualdescriptionsin literaryworkswhichare informative, literarycognitivists insistonmuchstrongercognitivegains.Literarydescriptionshavethecapacityto“letusinto”theirworldssowecometoappreciatewhatisinvolvedinaparticularsituationinwaysthatothertypesofdescriptionscannotachieve.Weknowmanythingsatthefactuallevel,butwedonotunderstandwhatitfeelsliketoexperience

13

See:C.Elgin,Considered Judgment.

14

There are of course instances of knowledgethat,skepticismaside,requireaminimumen-gagementonthepartofthecognizer,suchasknowledge that there is a computer in frontof me now. But this should not be taken asacounter-argumenttomyclaim.Theknowl-edgethatliteratureimpartsisfarmorecom-plexandcannotbecomparedtosuchsimpleinstances.

15

It is worth keeping in mind that throughoutThe RepublicPlatomakesseveralreferencestothethingsthatcanbelearnedfromHom-er.Hedoesnotdeny literature’seducational

powers,onlyclaimsthatbecauseofthewaysinwhichitcaninfluencepeople,itshouldbesubjecttostrictpaternalisticcensorship.Thatkindofcensorshipwouldbepointless if lit-erature lacked the power to educate. For ananalysis of Plato’s views on art, see: NivesDelijaTrešćec,Platonova kritika umjetnosti [Plato’s Critique of Art],NakladaJurčić,Za-greb2005.

16

ThinkoftheopeninglinesofMilton’sPara-dise Lost,wherethepoetexplicitlystatesthathisintentionistoexplainGod’swaystomen.Think also of such poems as John Donne’sIf poisonous mineralsorBatter My HeartorGerard Manley Hopkins’ Thou Art Indeed Just, Lord or The Windhover.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…378

them,whichmakesusunabletoappreciatethemotivationalforcethatreac-tionstocircumstanceshaveinone’sactions.Literaturemayleadustoreflectonourtendenciestosnapjudgments.ThinkoftheparticularlycomplexmoralsituationofKateCroyinHenryJames’The Wings of the Dove.Notonlydoesshehavetochoosebetweenmarryingamanshelovesandsavingherdecrepitfather,shealsohastofindawaytohelphersisterandevadeheraunt’scal-culatedschemes.Byacknowledgingalltheaspectsofhersituationwecometorecognizeandfeelherentrapment:thesnapjudgmentgiveswaytoamorenuancedassessment.WhilewemaycriticizeKatefortheplanshedesigns,wecanneverthelessfeelthataparticulardomainofhumanbehaviour–theonethatmightseemmorallygray–ismadeintelligible.Wecometounderstand,evenifwedonotjustify,whypeoplesometimesdothingswefindmorallyblameworthy.WeknowKantwouldobjecttothewaysheusesMilly,butwefeelalltheforcesthatpullherindifferentdirectionsandweunderstandthatonlybyopposingKant’simperativedoesshestandanychancetoresolvetheforces,andbenefitthosearoundher.Ontheotherhand,wecannotbehappywithaHumeanreassurancethat,inactingonheremotions,herloveforMer-tonanddespairoverherfamilysituation,shehadnootherwayofactingandhasthereforeactedwell.Wecanneithercondemnhernorvindicateher.Theblackandwhiteofmoralsystemsdevisedbyphilosophersprovesinadequate.Mostofthehumanisticconcernsonwhichliteraryworksfocusinvolvecon-ceptsWittgensteindescribedasopen.Suchconceptsresistbeingcapturedbydefinitionsorbeinginsertedinsharpnormativeprinciples.Henceliteratureoftenexposesprecisephilosophicalaccountsasradicallyimpoverished.Con-sider theconceptofsin.Is thisconceptonlyintelligibleagainstareligiousbackground?Ifso,issomeonesinfulbecauseGodmadehimsoorbecauseAdamandEvehadfreewillandexerciseditineatingtheapple?WhatisrightandwhatissinfulwhenCreoncondemnsAntigone?DidHesterPrynnesinagainstsocietyoragainstGod’slaw,andwhatremainsofhersinwhenshere-jectstheguiltsocietywantstoimposeuponher?ShouldKateCroybefoundsinfulbecausesheviolatedKant’scategoricalimperative?Howwecometothinkofsincanbeinfluencedbyvariousliteraryworksthatpresentdifferentmanifestationsofsupposedsinfulness,whicharetypicallyricherandbroaderthanthosedepictedinphilosophicalaccounts.Somegenressuchaspoetrytypicallyembodyavisionoftheworldwhichmightreinforceourideasorchallengethem,triggeringusthereforetoconsiderpos-sibilitieswemighthavemissedbeforeorbringingustothepointfromwhichwecanseefamiliarthingsfromadifferentangle.ManyofthepoemsbyRobertFrostarebuiltupfromcommon,everydaymaterialbutonthethematiclevel,theydealwithcrucialissuesofhowtheworldis.ConsiderhispoemDesign.Adesriptionofamothcaughtonaspiderwebonaflowerdevelopsintoameta-physicalreflectiononnatureanddesign,goodandevil,freechoicesanddeter-minism.Yet,theoveralltoneofthepoemisrhetoricalratherthanassertive,thusinvitingthereadertoreflecton,notsimplytoaccept,aparticularperspectiveoraworldview.Thisreflectionmightcauseachangeinhowareaderthinksofhisownmoralactionsagainstthebackgroundofreligiousbeliefshemighthave.Themoraltobetakenfromtheseexamplesisthatliteraturecanhelpusprofitcognitivelybyenrichingourcognitiveeconomyandbydevelopingourcogni-tiveskills.Suchenrichmentmightconsistingainingunderstanding,aware-nessorafullergraspofrealphenomenatowhichthematteroftheworkscanbeconnected.Wemightthusacquireamoredevelopedconceptualschemeorevenacompletelychangedperspectiveonlife.Wemightdevelopamoralandemotionalsensibilityorbetterimaginativecapacities,whichcanhelpus

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…379

whenwetrytounderstandothersandourinteractionswiththem.OnereadingofDesignmightmakeuswonder,orsuggest,thatsomemoralcategoriesweemploy–likeblameorresponsibility–maynotbeapplicableinaworldinwhicheverythingunravelsaccordingtoGod’sdesign.KateCroy’ssituationmightmakeussensitivetowardstheinterplayofcircumastancesandcharac-tertraits.Thesekindsofcognitivebenefitscannotbecashedoutproposition-ally.Theycannotbeaseasilyprovidedbyothersources,evendiscoursesthataretruthorientedandcognitivelyrich.Anti-cognitivistsoftenfailtoappreciatethecharacterofthebenefitsliteraturebrings.When inapieceof literaturewecomeacrossasentence that reads“Humanbehaviorispredeterminedinprincipleinalmostallofitsactionsandoffersfewchoices,ofwhichfewerstillaretaken”,areaderisnotsupposedtotakethisasafactualclaimfortheauthortodefendwitharguments.17Afterall,philosophershavebeentryingtodothatforagesandhavenotsucceededinprovingor refuting it.Rather,given theoverall settingof thenovel, theclaimservesasaninvitationtoconsideraperspectiveonaworldthatleavesnoroomforfreewill.WesawhowthisquestionwasraisedbyFrost,andhowitmightserveasthebasisforvaluablereflection.Iclaimedthatitiswrongtoseethecognitivedeliverancesofliteratureassui generis.Literatureisnotaseparatesourceofknowledgeifthatimpliesthatit is disconnected fromother sourcesofknowledge at ourdisposal or thatweneedsomespecialskills–inadditiontohavingasubstantialreal-worldexperienceandtobeingfamiliarwithaspectsofdifferentgenres–inordertoassessitwhenconsideringitsreliabilityinepistemicterms.Olseniswrongtosupposethatacceptingaperspectiveofferedbyliteratureisnotgroundedinreasonsorinrationalmethodsofdeliberation.Readerswillevaluatehowwhattheauthorsaresayingfitswiththeirbackgroundandunderlyingsetofbeliefs,andtheywillreflectivelyconsiderwhetherornotthesuggestedper-spectiveisworthembracingorshouldberejected.18Atthemostfundamentallevel,readerscanrecognizetheepistemicmeritoftheperspectivespresented–itsufficestocomparethepsychologicalinsightthatnovelsbyDostoyevskyorJamesdeliverwithauthorswhoarelesssuccessfulindoingso.Thinkof“beachliterature”wherecharactersremainone-or-twodimensional,flatandmostimportantly,unbelievableintheirconductsandmotivations.19

Theevaluationofthecognitivestrengthofliteratureisnotdifferentfromtheevaluationofothertypesofdiscoursesandafailuretoseethatmakesanti-cognitivistsblindtothecognitivepowerofliterature.Theywillclaimthatlit-eratureseducesusintoacceptingsomethingduetoitselaborate,poeticallan-guage,orduetoitsemotionalimpact,neglectingthefactthatothertypesofdiscoursearenotmanipulationfreeorvoidofemotionalimpact.Discussions

17

MichelHouellebecq,Atomized, VintageUK,London1998.

18

PhilipKitcherdevelopsasubstantialaccountof the psychological processes and changesthattakeplaceintheprocessofreading,seeP.Kitcher,Deaths in Venice,pp.179–191.

19

Mystery novels and pornographic literatureare often criticized for the flatness of char-actersandsimplicityofactionsinvolved.Al-thoughbothofthesegenrestackleimportant

humanconcerns–propensitytowrongdoingandevilandvariousformsofsexualinterac-tionsandbehavior–themannerinwhichtheydoso isoftennot supportiveofdeeperpsy-chological portrayals of characters. Becauseofthat,whilethenovelsmightbeinterestingfromthepointof thestoriespresented, theyarenot reliable forwhat they say abouthu-manbeingsandtheirbehavior.Thefactthatwe can make such judgments with respectto the reliability of different literary worksshowsoursensitivity to theirepistemic reli-ability.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…380

surroundingclimatechange,moralaspectsofabortionoreuthanasia,thesta-tusofcreationismwithrespecttodarwinism,tomentionafew,areconductedin discourses Olsen considers informative, yet exhibit traces of manipula-tionandrelyonorincludeemotional,ratherthan,strictlyspeaking,rationalpersuasion. Olsen could still claim that these are instances of malpractice,seriousdefectsinwhatareotherwisenonmanipulative,unemotional,value-freediscussions,whileliteratureisinherentlymanipulativeandemotionallycharged.Butthatisanotherhastygeneralization.Evenifscienceshouldbe,itisnotvalue-free.Ontheotherhand,evenifitisoftenassumedthatemotionalresponseisanineliminable,evenessentialelementofthereadingexperience,thatinitselfdoesnotmeanthatbecauseofit,theaudiencecannottrackpoten-tiallycognitiveelements.Afterall, imaginativeandcognitiveengagementsareequllyimportantfortheproperunderstandingofcomplexissuesinvolv-inghumanagents–issues,inotherwords,thataremyconcernhere,andthatliteratureandphilosophybothaddress.Thereareliterarygenres,suchasthesentimentalistnoveloftheearly19thcen-turyorpoliticallyengagednovelsopposingordefendingslavery,thatreliedonmanipulativetacticsofarousingsympathy,butmostliteraturedoesnotattempttotriggerspecificemotionalreactionsviamanipulation.20Noris it truethatthereaderswillnotrecognizemanipulativetechniquesbyemployingthesamemechanismstheyusewhentheyevaluatewhattheyaretoldineverydayprac-ticesofknowledge-acquisition,suchastestimonialexchanges.Wesometimeslackdefinitivemeansforevaluatingthetruthofwhatwearetold,yetweacceptitbecausewerecognizethatourinformantsarereliableorthattheinformationwearebeinggivenseemsreasonableenough.21Oftenthisisamatterofunder-lying,subconsciouspsychologicalprocesses,andwecanassumethatthesamegoesonwhenitcomestoevaluatingliteraryworks.WhenOlsendivorceslit-eraturefrominformativediscourses,hedoessobydemandingthatitconformstocriteriaotherinformativediscoursessometimesfailtomeet.Onceparametersofgenrearetakenintoconsideration,cognitiveengagementwithliteratureisnotradicallydifferentfromcognitiveengagementwithothertypesofdiscourses,orwithexperiencegenerally.22Intheprocessofreadingandmakingsenseofcharactersandtheiractions,werelyuponourabilitytomakesenseoftheworldatlarge,thatis,onourskillstointerpretrealpeople’sbehaviour.Therearemultiplestepsonetakesduringthereadingprocessitself.Tryingtomakesenseofaworkofteninvolvesconsideringhypothesesabouttheactionsofcharacters,formingjudgmentsaboutthem,makingeffortstounderstandthem,deliberatingonwhetherornottheywerejustifiedinwhattheydid,consideringthecircumstancesinwhichtheyactedandeventuallyreachingamorecomprehensivewayofputtingthingstogether.Readingvari-ous literaryworks,whichpresentconflictingor incompatibleworldviews,invitesevaluationofdifferentperspectives.Manyanti-cognitiviststreatthisincompatibilityasaproblem,claimingthatthecontradictoryviewsputfor-wardbydifferentworksonlytestifytoliterature’soverallepistemicunreli-abilityandalackofclearcriteriaastowhatisrightorwhatistrue.Butmanyquestionswehaveaboutourselvesandtheworldcannotbegivendefinitiveanswersandcanonlybeunderstoodproperly ifall thatmatters to them istakenintoconsideration.Differentliteraryworksrevealdifferentaspectsofthesequestionsandthatiswhydiversetreatmentswefindinliteraturemattertohowwecometothinkofthem.Inthatway,literatureenhancesourconcep-tualrepertoirebyenablingustobroadenourunderstandingoftheconceptsweemploy.Inthatwaywereachabroaderunderstanding,asSellarswouldputit,ofhowthingshangtogether.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…381

3. Literature’s philosophical engagement

Istartedoffbyclaimingthatphilosophymaynotalwaysprovideuswiththebestmodesofgaininginsightsintothoseissuesthatareatthecoreofconcernswehaveashumanbeings,mostlybecauseofitsaspirationsfortheabstrac-tions,generalizationsandausteredefinitions.Theseare,Iclamed,toosteriletobeapplicableto thecomplexitiesofoursituations.I thensuggestedthatliterature,inlightofitslovefordetails,richnessofdescriptions,dedicationto individualperspectivesand its focusonconcrete situations, experiencesandattitudes(asrepresentedbythecharactersandexhibitedinthestoryline),isbetterequippedtoaddressthoseissuesthatremainunderradarofabstractphilosophy. By sketching how literature satisfies criteria of epistemic reli-ability,Iofferedreasonstodoubtanti-cognitivist’sargumentsagainsttakingitasreliableinaddressingourcognitiveconcerns.Iwillendbychallengingonelineofthoughtmuchdebatedincontemporarydebatesonthenatureofliteratureandphilosophy,namelythatofthepossibilityofdoingphilosophyinliterature.Giventhecomplexityofthisdebateandthelimitationofspace,Iwillfocusononeparticularclaim,whichnegatesthefactthatthecommongroundbetweenthetwo,subsumedhereunderhumanisticconcerns,sufficestoadvanceakindofbondingthatGoldman,Diamond,JohnandNussbaumadvocate.Attackshavecomefromboth,cognitivistssuchasMurdochandanti-cogni-tivistssuchasOlsen.Mostlytheyrelyonthedifferencesinstyleandstruc-tureofphilosophyandliterature,andonthesupposedlydifferentaimsthesetwodisciplinesaretofulfil.Philosophyshouldbeclearandprecise,Murdochclaims, and its role is primarily to clarify things, while literature is denseandambiguous,fullofhiddenmeaningsandmystification,aimingtoenter-tain. Philosophy is about reasons, analysis and constant revisions of one’ssolutionstotheproblemsoriginallyidentifiedbyPlato.Ontheotherhand,literature as an art form isprimarily a storytellingactivity, andas such, is

20

Amy Mullin has argued that art is less sub-ject tomanipulation,given that “supposedlyexpertscientificknowledgemayitselfbein-fectedbysharedsexistorracistbiasesoftheexperts,particularlywhenthecommunityofexpert knowers is neither itself diverse notopen to criticism from without”. See: AmyMullin, “Art, Understanding, and PoliticalChange”,Hypatia15(3/2009),pp.113–139.doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2000.tb00333.x. See: Heather Douglas, Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal,UniversityofPittsburgPress,Pittsburg2009,foradiscus-sionovervalue-freeidealinscience.

21

See:ElizabethFricker,“CriticalNotice:Tell-ingandTrusting:ReductionismandAnti-Re-ductionism in theEpistemologyofTestimo-ny”,Mind104(414/1995),pp.393–411,doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/104.414.393;Elizabeth Fricker, “Testimony and Epis-temicAutonomy”,in:JeniferLackey,ErnestSosa (eds.),The Epistemology of Testimony,Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, pp.225–250, doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:

oso/9780199276011.003.0011; Robert Audi,“Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity”, in: J.Lackey, E. Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony, pp. 25–49, doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276011.003.0002.Forananalogybetweenliteraryfic-tion and testimony, see: Iris Vidmar, ElvioBaccarini,“Art,Knowledge,andTestimony”,Synthesis Philosophica25(2/2010),pp.333–348;SnježanaPrijićSamaržija, IrisVidmar,“Fikcijsko svjedočanstvo”, Prolegomena 11(1/2012),pp.65–82.

22

Needlesstosay,makingsenseofwhatishap-peningdependson taking intoconsiderationfeatures of the genre and literary norms. Areader who, upon reading a science fictionnovel concludes that one can change one’sappearance at one’s volition, has radicallymisunderstood the norms of science fiction,butthefaultheredoesnotliewiththeauthor.Fortheroleofgenreinestimatingliterature’sreliability,see:IrisVidmar,“Plato’sIonintheContextofLiteraryCognitivism”,Glasnik za društvene nauke4(2012),pp.111–152.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…382

nothospitabletophilosophy.WithoutdenyingthatMurdoch’sviewcaptureswhatisforsureoftenunderstoodastheessenceofphilosophyandliterature,Iwillofferarundownofargumentsaimingtofindaplaceforphilosophicalexpressioninliterature.23

“Ifeelverystrongly thatoneshouldkeep[literatureandphilosophy]apartfromeachother”,Murdochsays,adding,“Iamveryconscious…ofwhenI’m writing philosophy and when literature”. She rejects the insertion ofphilosophicalthemesintoliteraryworks,explainingthistendencyascritics’attempttomakenovelsmoreinteresting.Writersarewelleducatedandin-fluencedbythecultureoftheirtime,whichexplainswhysomeworksseemphilosophical,butdespiteappearances,theamountofphilosophythatwritersmanagetoexpressinnovelsis“likelytobesmall”.24Ultimately,shestipu-lates(echoingasimilarclaimbyOlsen,whichIaddressbelow),whenphi-losophyentersanovel,itceasestobephilosophy.Beingasuccessfulliteraryauthorandanacclaimedphilosopher,Murdochmightbetakenasanauthorityontheissueofclosenessanddistanceofthetwoprac-tices.However,Idonotthinkthatherexperiencecansoreadilybetranslatedintoconclusiveargumentsforkeepingthetwoataradicalopposition.Notonlyisitatleastpossiblethatamongotherwriterswhoengagewithliteratureandphilosophysomewillnotsharehersenseofacleardivision,butsheiswrongtopresumethatthekindoftransparencyshereliesonisavailabletoreaders.Anauthorcannotpredicthowherworkisgoingtoresonatewiththeaudience,orhowphilosophically richtheaudiencewillseeit.ItsufficestothinkofCamus,whoisstillconsideredaphilosopherregardlessofhisrejectionofthattitle.DespiteMurdoch’snegativeviewonliterature’streatmentofphilosophy,sheisinstructiveontheissueoftheepistemicreliabilityofauthors,apointfre-quentlycontestedbyanti-cognitivists.Thefictionaldomainabsolveswritersfromtheobligationtotellthetruthandremainfaithfultohowthingsare.Liter-arycognitivistshavetorenderthislegitimateworrymuteiftheyaretosustaintheirposition.Murdochprovidesausefuldirectioninwhichsuchadefensecango,insistingontheembeddednessofliteratureinawiderintellectualcon-textinwhichitpursuesthesamequestionsaswritersfromotherdisciplines.Tomentionbutoneexample,considertheextenttowhichRomanticliteraturewasinfluencedbyGermanIdealisminspiredbyKantanddevelopedbypost-Kantians.FromKanton,aclearlineofphilosophersdealingwiththeproblemofmind–worldrelationshipwassuccessfullycriticizedinthewritingsofHöld-erlin,himselfaphilosopherdisatisifedwithphilosophy’swaysofaddressinghumanconcerns.Literaturethuscontinuesthephilosophicalline.25

Murdoch’smostthreateningclaimconcernstheallegedimpositionofphiloso-phyonliterature.Ifphilosophicalinterpretationsofliteraryworksareofferedinordertomakeworksinterestingratherthanbecausetheworksthemselvesinspiresuchinterpretations,thenanypossibilityofliteratureseriouslyengag-ingwithphilosophyhastobeabandoned.However,giventheextenttowhichhumanconcernsareattheheartofliterature–andnegatingthatwouldraiseseriouschallengestohowliteraturehastraditionallybeenunderstoodandap-preciated–Murdoch’sdiagnosishastoberejected.Philosophyissomethingthatiseitherintheworkitself,orinthewayreadersrespondtoawork(where,as suggested, this might be captured by her coming to a more thoughtful,morerevisedworldview),anditcannot(andshouldnot)beimposedincaseswheresuchanimpositionisnotgroundedintheworkitself.Doingso,whichaccordingtoMurdochiseffectiveinallormostoftheinstancesofliterature’sphilosophicalengagement(except,sheclaims,forSartre’sLa Nausee),runstheriskofrenderingtheconnectionbetweenphilosophyandliteraturetrivial.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…383

Notallliteratureisphilosophicalbutagreatamountofitis,notbecauseoftherichphilosphicalimaginationonthepartoftheinterpreterwhoimposesphi-losophyonotherwisenon-philosophicalworkbutbecauseitisinthenatureofmuchliteraturetoconcernitselfwithphilosophicalissues.26

MurdochandOlsenbothclaimthatphilosophystopsbeingphilosophywheninsertedintoliterature.Whileliteratureandphilosophysharethesamecon-cernsandworkwiththesamethematicconcepts–namely,thosethatweusetomakesenseofhumanexperienceinthewidestsenseoftheterm–Olsendoesnot see this as literary treatmentof philosophical issues, nordoesheseetheseconceptsandconcernsasphilosophical.Instead,heclaims,whenconceptsfromcontextsoutsideofliteraryonesaretakenoverbyliterature,theyshouldbeunderstoodandinterpretedinthelightoftheliterarytradition.Wheninterpretingaliterarywork,“thecriticofteninvokesliteraryprecedentsasjustificationfortheapplication,butheneverinvokesnon-literaryusesofthetermsasthiswouldnotbehelpful”.27Giventhattheprimaryfunctionofthesetermshastodowithliteraryaims,

“…thisvocabularythereforegainsasortofautonomyfromtheidenticalvocabularywhichisusedasabodyofinterpretativetermsinphilosophy,religionandscience;anautonomyduetothefactthatasinterpretivetermsthetwoidenticalclassesareusedtointerpretdifferentphe-nomena.”28

Aminorissueinthisargumentisthefactthatnotallphilosophicalusageofconcepts isatoddswitheverydayusage–what itmeans toknoworwhatitmeanstoactfreelyaresomeofthequestionsthatsometimesproceedbyexaminingthewayconceptsofknowledgeandfreedomareusedinourordi-narydiscussions.ThecrucialproblemisOlsen’sclaimthatthematicconceptschangetheirmeaningoncetheyarecontextualized.Ifthatwerethecase,notonlywoulditbeunclearwheretheinterpretiveconceptscomefrom,buthewouldalsohave toexplain thecorrectuseofcriticalvocabulary, if in factit isnotgroundedintheextra-literarypracticestowhichtheconceptsusu-allybelong.IfOlsenwererightandtheconceptschangemeanings,itwouldbeimpossibletounderstandanythingbeforelearningthemeaningthattheseconceptsacquireoncetheyarecontextualized.29Neitherphilosophersnorlit-

23

For a more developed discussion of thesearguments, see: Iris Vidmar, “Challenges ofPhilosphical Art”, Proceedings of the Eu-ropean Society for Aesthetics 8 (2016), pp.545–569.

24

I.Murdoch,Existentialists and Mystics, p.19.

25

See:CharlesLarmore,“HolderlinandNova-lis”,in:K.Ameriks(ed.),The Cambridge Com-panion to German Idealism, pp.141–159,doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521651786.008;Rolf-PeterHorstmann,“TheEarlyPhilosophyofFichteandSchelling”,in:K.Ameriks(ed.)The Cambridge Companion to German Ideal-ism, pp.117–139,doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521651786.007. Larmore agues that“Hölderlin’s main thesis is that, contrary toFichte,subjectivitycannotfunctionasthefirstprincipleofphilosophy,foritcannotbeunder-stoodinitsownterms”(p.146).

26

Alitraryworkcanalsobephilosophicalbe-causetheauthorhadtheintentionsofwritinga philosophically-ladden work. This optionraises a set of issues in its own right, but Icannotdebateithere.

27

S.H.Olsen,The Structure of Literary Under-standing,p.114.

28

Ibid.,p.115.

29

Oncealiteraryauthoremploysphilosophicalconcepts,hedoesnotchangethemeaningandconnotationsthesewordshave–ifhedid,itwouldmakenosensetoemploytheminthefirstplace.WhenMichelHouellebecqwritesin Atomised: “Individuality, and the senseof freedom that flows from it, is thenaturalbasisofdemocracy.Inademocraticregime,relationsbetween individuals arecommonly

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…384

eraryauthorshavetheabilitytobringnewmeaningsintoexistencesimplybyinsertingwordsintoaspecificcontext.Whattheydoshareisthecapacitytoshedlightonthenuancesofconcepts(seethediscussionofsinabove),whichiswhatliterarycognitivistsargueallalong.Thenotionof“the”literarytradition,which,onOlsen’saccountdeterminesand justifies theuseofconcepts, raises furtherworries forhis theory,as itishard tounderstandhowsuchamonolithic traditioncouldoperate in theisolatedwayheinvokes.Ontheonehand,plentyofauthorsresisteasyclas-sificiation– thinkofSartre,CamusorStanislawLem.On theother hand,understanding literaryworkswouldbe impossible if literary traditionweresomehowcreatingitsowndomainofknowledge,divorcedfromotherintel-lectualdomains.Toappreciate apoemsuchasDesign, readerneeds somefamiliaritywithDarwinismandCreationism,withthenotionoffreedomanddeterminism, with the conecpts of moral culpability and blameworthiness.Theseareallconceptspertainingtodomainsotherthanliterature,butitisonlyiftheyarebroughtintothereadingexperiencewiththemeaningstheyhaveintheseextra-literarycontextsthatthepoemcanbeunderstood.TheundeniablelinkwithWilliamBlake’sTyger islesshelpfulforcomingtotermswiththechallengesthatFrostissuesatone’sconceptionoftheworld,althoughit isimportantforappreciatingdistinctivelyliterarywaysinwhichthesetwopoetsapproachanddevelopthemesofgoodandevilintheirpoetry.

4. Conclusion

Myaiminthispaperwastomitigatesomeofthechargesissuedatliterature’scognitivevalue,andtodosobyshowinghowitcanbeusefulinhelpinguswiththoseconcernswehaveashumanbeings,concernswhichdevelopoutofoursharedexperiencesandcircumstances.Iarguedthatliteratureindeedmanagestoaddressmanyoftheseconcernsinwaysthatremainoutofreachofphilosophy,asitisusually–andnarrowly–conceived.Ifliterarycognitiv-ismisnotfocusedonestablishingadirectlinkbetweenliteratureandtruth,butinsitsinsteadonembracingawideraccountofcognitivegains–deeperunderstanding,morenuancedappreciation,developmentofsensibility–thereisnoreasontoexcludeliteraturefromcognitivelyrelevantdiscourses.Thisisnottodiminishliterature’sartisticvalueorliteraryaccomplishmentsoftheauthor;itissimplytoacknowledgeoneaspectofliteraryexperience.Withatleastsomeworksofliterature,wefeelcognitivelyenriched.My brief and sketchy criticism of the strictly rigid styles of philosophicalwritings was meant to show that, even if traditionally desired as a tool ofphilosophicalexplorations,plainandclearphilosophicallanguageisnotthebesttooltoaddressandunderstandourhumanexperience,imbuedwithemo-tional,psychologicalandethicalcomplexities.Iwouldalsosuggestthatplainand clear philosophical language is not in itself resistant to confusion andmisunderstanding,evenfalsity.Themyriardofinterpretationsofoneandthesamephilosophical claim issuedbyKant,Platoor anyotherphilosophicallegendshouldsilencethosewhoclaimthatphilosophicallanguageisbyde-faultclearanditsmessagetransparent.Achallengecanbeissuedtomyclaimthatliteraturecanreliablytracepartic-ularaspectsofourexperienceIindicatedabove,giventhatthestorieswereadaboutaremostlyfictional.However,convincingargumentsshowthatnothinginthelanguageofliteraryfictionitselfmakesitinconvenienttodescribeourexperience.Fiction isabout themodeofpresentation,notabout thefalsityofthatwhichispresented.30Anna’smisery,passionandlovearenolessreal

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…385

thanthatofyouandme,evenifsheisonlyacreationofTolstoy’sbrilliantmind.Whatweneed,butareunlikelytoget,isanaccountofwhatmadeTol-stoy,orotherliterarygiants,soinsightfulinportrayinghumanconcerns,notalistofargumentsinvitingustoturnawayfromtheinsightstheyprovide.Finally, Iwas concernedwith refutingviews according towhich literatureandphilosophyshouldbekeptapart.Thetwomightdifferintheiraims,butmanyofourgreatestliteraryworksareconcernedwithissuesthataremostoftenaccommodatedwithinphilosophicalparadigms.Itisanadditionalques-tionhowoneistoapproachtheseworksandhowwearetoevaluatethem.Whatmattersthough,andIwillfinishwiththisthought,istorecognizethatthesimilarityofthemesorcognitivepotentialofboth,literatureandphiloso-phy,shouldnotinspireaninamicable,rivalryrelationbetweenthetwo.Ourcognitiveaimsarecomplex,diverseandhardtoaccomplishandweshouldtakeallthehelpwecangettofulfilthem.Withrespecttothem,literatureandphilosophyarebothimmenselyhelpful;andtheyshouldbothbepraisedandvaluedforthat.

Acknowledgments

Apreviousversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheconference25th Days of Frane Petrić,Cres,2016.Iamverygratefultotheaudiencefortheircom-ments,totwoanonymousreviewers,andtoLjudevitFranJežićforhistech-nical help regarding the paper. Special thanks go to Philip Kitcher for hiscommentsonanearlierversionofthispaperandforhissupportduringmyresearchonthistopic.

Iris Vidmar

O književnome kognitivizmu iz perspektive razlike između filozofije i književnosti

SažetakSuvremene rasprave o kognitivnoj vrijednosti književnosti usredotočene su na analizu sličnosti pristupa književnosti i filozofije kada je riječ o specifičnoj domeni pitanja: onih koja se na jedin-stveni način odnose na položaj čovjeka i njegovo iskustvo u svijetu. S obzirom na neke stilističke i metodološke razlike između ovih dviju praksi – jezik filozofije jasan je i precizan, a filozofija je usredotočena na apstraktnost i objektivnost; tomu nasuprot, književni je jezik semantički gust, posvećen tomu da prenese ono emocionalno i subjektivno – često se tvrdi da istina spada u domenu filozofije, a obmana u domenu književnosti. Smatram da je takav stav pogrešan i da na pogrešan način ocrtava kako sposobnost filozofije da doprinese razumijevanju tako i kognitivnu vrijednost književnosti općenito. Kako bih potkrijepila svoju tezu, najprije pokazujem da su me-tode koje filozofija tradicionalno koristi kada nastoji objasniti ljudsko iskustvo neadekvatne za taj zadatak. U središnjem dijelu okrećem se književnosti; pokazujem u čemu se temelji njezina kognitivna vrijednost i na tim temeljima tumačim prednost koju ima nad filozofijom kod tuma-

regulatedbyasocialcontract.Apactwhichexceeds thenatural rightsof theco-contrac-tors,orwhichdoesnotcorrespondtoaclearretraction clause is considered de facto nullandvoid”(p.89),heusestheconceptsofper-sonalfreedom,democracyandsocialcontractinthesamesenseaspoliticalphilosophersdo,otherwise itwouldnotbepossible for theseconceptstocontributetothethemeshedevel-ops in thenovel.See I.Vidmar,Challenges

of Philosophical Art,foradiscussionofsuchexamples.

30

See Richard Gaskin, Language, Truth and Literature,A Defense of Literary Humanism,OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford 2013. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657902.001.0001.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(371–386)

I. Vidmar, On Literary Cognitivism fromthePerspectiveofDifferencebetween…386

čenja aspekata ljudskoga iskustva. U završnom dijelu pokazujem u čemu griješe oni koji tvrde da se književnost ne može baviti filozofskim problemima.

Ključne riječifilozofija,ljudskoiskustvo,književnikognitivizam,anti-kognitivizam,književnost,razumijevanje

Iris Vidmar

Über den literarischen Kognitivismus aus der Perspektive der Differenz zwischen Philosophie und Literatur

ZusammenfassungZeitgenössische Diskussionen über den kognitiven Wert von Literatur zentrieren sich um die Analyse der Ähnlichkeit der Herangehensweisen von Literatur und Philosophie, wenn es um eine spezifische Domäne von Fragen geht: jenen nämlich, die in einzigartiger Weise mit der Position des Menschen und seiner Erfahrung in der Welt zusammenhängen. Angesichts einiger stilistischer und methodischer Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Praktiken – die Sprache der Philosophie ist klar und präzise und Philosophie ist auf Abstraktheit und Objektivität kon-zentriert; demgegenüber ist die literarische Sprache semantisch dicht und der Übertragung von Emotionalem und Subjektivem gewidmet – wird oft behauptet, die Wahrheit gehöre zur Domäne der Philosophie und die Täuschung zur Domäne der Literatur. Ich finde, eine solche Haltung sei falsch und umreiße inkorrekt sowohl die Fähigkeit der Philosophie, dem Verständnis einen Beitrag zu leisten, als auch den kognitiven Wert der Literatur im Allgemeinen. Um meine These zu untermauern, demonstriere ich zunächst, dass die Methoden, die Philosophie traditionell verwendet, wenn sie die menschliche Erfahrung zu erklären sucht, für diese Aufgabe inadäquat sind. Im zentralen Teil wende ich mich der Literatur zu; ich zeige auf, worauf deren kognitiver Wert beruht, und deute auf diesen Grundlagen ihren Vorteil gegenüber der Philosophie bei der Auslegung der Aspekte der menschlichen Erfahrung. Im Schlussteil zeige ich, worin diejenigen fehlgehen, die behaupten, die Literatur könne mit philosophischen Problemen nicht umgehen.

SchlüsselwörterPhilosophie,menschlicheErfahrung,literarischerKognitivismus,Antikognitivismus,Literatur,Ver-ständnis

Iris Vidmar

Sur le cognitivisme littéraire à partir d’une perspective de la différence entre la philosophie et la littérature

RésuméLes débats contemporains sur la valeur cognitive de la littéraire se concentrent sur l’analyse de la ressemblance des approches en littérature et en philosophie lorsqu’il est question d’un domaine spécifique d’interrogations : celui qui se rapporte de manière spécifique à la situation et à l’expérience de l’homme dans le monde. Au vue de certaines différences d’ordre stylistique et méthodologique de ces deux pratiques – le langage de la philosophie est clair et précis, la philosophie étant centrée sur l’abstraction et l’objectivité ; au contraire, le langage littéraire comporte une densité sémantique, il s’attache à transmettre l’émotionnel et le subjectif – il n’est pas rare d’affirmer que la vérité appartient au domaine de la philosophie, et l’illusion au domaine de la littérature. J’estime qu’une telle approche est inexacte et qu’elle représente faussement autant la capacité de la philosophie à contribuer à la compréhension que la valeur cognitive de la littérature de manière générale. Afin d’étayer ma thèse, je montre premièrement que les méthodes dont la philosophie se sert traditionnellement pour expliquer l’expérience humaine sont inadéquates pour cette tâche. Dans la partie centrale, je me penche sur la littéra-ture ; je montre quel est le fondement de sa valeur cognitive, et j’interprète, sur la base de ces fondements, sa supériorité face à la philosophie en ce qui concerne l’interprétation des divers aspects de l’expérience humaine. Dans la partie finale, je montre quelles sont les erreurs de ceux qui affirment que la littérature ne peut pas traiter des problèmes philosophiques.

Mots-clésphilosophie,expériencehumaine,cognitivismelittéraire,anti-cognitivisme,littérature,compréhension