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![Page 1: On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks ---- An Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and Cryptographic.](https://reader030.fdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022020319/56649f145503460f94c28e97/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and
Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
---- An Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and Cryptographic Techniques
Authors: Sheng Zhong, Li(Erran) Li, Yanbin Grace Liu, Yang Richard YangPublished on MobiCom 2005,
Aug. 28 - Sep.2 2005Presenter: Xia Wang for CS610jw
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Outline
• Introduction • Main contributions of this paper• Ad-hoc VCG routing protocol
(MobiCom03)• Cooperation-optimal protocol design• Evaluations• Conclusion and future work
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Introduction
• Cooperation between nodes in wireless ad-hoc network can not be assumed in an environment with selfish nodes.
• Routing protocol has to address incentive issue to stimulate intermediate nodes to forward data.
• Classic game theory VCG (Vickrey-Clark-Groves) mechanism has been applied in network routing protocols. But a direct application (Ad-hoc VCG) has flaws.
• Ad-hoc VCG is not applicable on a lossy links.
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VCG Mechanism
• Assume each user has a private type. • A user declares its private type to a social
planner• The social planner decides the outcome to
optimize a social objective and a payment to each user.
• The outcome and the payment are determined in such a way that reporting the type truthfully is a dominant action and the outcome is socially optimal.
• Example: The second-price auction
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Main contributions
• Show that no forwarding-dominant protocol exists.
• Design a cooperation-optimal protocol called Corsac, a Cooperation-optimal routing-and-forwarding protocol in wireless ad-hoc networks using cryptographic techniques.
• The protocol can be extended to a practical radio propagation model where packet reception is probabilistic.
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Ad-hoc VCG Routing Protocol(1)
• Source S = V0 wants to communicate with a destination D=Vn.
• S → * : (REQUEST, s0,n, 0, n, ,c0)
• Every node Vj (not S and D) receives the ROUTE REQUEST from a node Vi do the following:
– Check whether it is a new ROUTE REQUEST– Determine the received power:
– Estimate the minimum power for Vi to reach Vj
• Replace with in the ROUTE REQUEST packet; append its own identification j and the emission power.vj → *: (REQUEST, s0,n, 0, n , ,c0, 1, , c1 , …, j, Pemit
j ,cj)
emitP0
recjiP,
recrecji
emiti
ji PP
PP min
,
min,
emitiP
min, jiP
min1,0P
min2,1P
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Ad-hoc VCG Routing Protocol (2)
• Destination D:– Compute the SP and |SP|– Calculate the VCG-payment for each
intermediate node
Where is the shortest path from S to D that doesn’t contain node , is the cost.
DVVS k ,,...,, )()1(
)(iV
min)1(),()(
)()(
iiii
i PCSPSPM
)(iSP )(iV
)(iSP
}){),((cos));,((cos iDSLCPtiDSLCPtpi
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Ad-hoc VCG Routing Protocol (3)
– Send ROUTE REPLY with route sequence and the corresponding minimal required transmission power as well as the VCG-payment for each intermediate node.
vσ(j) → vσ(j−1) : (REPLY, sk,0, σ(1),… , σ(k), . . . , ,…, , Mσ(1), . . . , Mσ(k) )
min)2(),1( P
min)(),1( kkP
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Ad-hoc VCG Routing Protocol(4)
DvvSSP ,,, 32
325 SP
DvvSSP ,,, 412
144372 SP
DvvSSP ,,, 423
124353 SP
6210142 M
5310123 M
An example network with edge-weight
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Ad-hoc VCG Routing Protocol(5)
• Ad-hoc VCG is claimed to be cost-efficient and truthful against one node cheating.
• What if more than one nodes cheat?
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Notations and definitions
• ai : action of node i • a-i : action of all nodes except node i• a = (ai, a-i) action profile for all nodes• A node i’s utility: ui = -ci + pi (ci is the cost, pi is
the payment)• In a non-cooperative strategic game, a
dominant action of a player is one that maximizes its utility no matter what actions other players choose. Specifically, ai is node i’s dominant action if, for any ai’!= ai and any a−i,
ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(ai’, a−i).
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Example of ad-hoc VCG fails • Pemit = 5• R = 5• B doesn’t cheat,
B gets utility 0;• If B cheats by
claim R = 15, B gets payment 12-6 = 6, its utility of 2
• Ad-hoc VCG Fail!
•Fail with more nodes cheating because of mutually-dependent types.
recrecji
emiti
ji PP
PP min
,
min,
rec
recji
emiti
P
PR
R
P
min
,,
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A cooperation-optimal Protocol
• Def: A routing protocol is a routing-dominant protocol to the routing stage if following the protocol is a dominant subaction of each potential forwarding node in the routing stage.
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A cooperation-optimal Protocol
Extensive game model
Each vertex – node
Edge – possible decision
Each subtree – subgame
Each path from root to a leaf – a possible set of decision by the wireless nodes.
In classic game theory, such a path is said to be a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium for every subgame
An example game tree
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A cooperation-optimal Protocol
• Def: A forwarding protocol is a forwarding-optimal protocol to the forwarding stage under routing decision R if all packets are forwarded to their destinations in this protocol and following the protocol is a subgame perfect equilibrium under routing decision R in the forwarding stage.
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A cooperation-optimal Protocol
• This routing protocol addresses two components: – routing stage: determines a packet
forwarding path from a source to a destination;
– Forwarding stage is to verify that forwarding does happen.
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Routing Stage• Source node’s test signals
– Source S starts a session of M packets. – divides the packets into blocks, where b
is the number of packets in a block.
– S picks a random number r0.
– Let H be a cryptographic hash function. S computes
r = )( 0
/ rH bM
bM /
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Routing Stage
– For each power level l ∈ P (in increasing order), S sends out• (TESTSIGNAL, [S, D, r], [S, hl]) at power level
l, where • r is a random number used to distinguish
different session with source S and destination D.
• hl contains an encryption of [S,D, r, l, αS] using key kS,D and a MAC of the encryption using the same key.
• kS,D is a shared key between S and D using Diffie-Hellman key exchange in cryptography.
• αS is a cost-of-energy parameter representing the cost of unit energy at node i. (In ad-hoc VCG, it is ci)
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Routing Stage• Upon receiving (TESTSIGNAL, [S, D, r], [P, h])
from an upstream neighbor P, an intermediate node i does the following :– Node i sends out (ROUTEINFO, [S, D, r], [P, i, h]) at
power level Pctr (where Pctr is a power level for control messages such that the communication graph is connected when all links use power level Pctr for transmission).
• h is computed by encrypting h using key ki,D. For integrity, this message is protected by a MAC using key ki,D.
– If the TESTSIGNAL is the first one i receives for session (S, D, r), then for each l ∈ P (in increasing order), node i sends out (TESTSIGNAL, [S, D, r], [i, hl]) at power level l, where hl contains an encryption of [S,D, r, l, αi] using the key ki,D and a MAC of the encryption using the same key.
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Routing Stage
• Upon receiving (ROUTEINFO, [S, D, r], [P, i, h]), an intermediate node j does the following:– If this ROUTEINFO is new to node j, then
node j sends out
(ROUTEINFO, [S, D, r], [P, i, h]) at power level Pctr
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Routing Stage
• Destination D maintains cost matrix for each session (S, D, r). – Upon receiving (TESTSIGNAL, [S, D, r], h) from
neighbor P, D decrypts h, verifies the MAC using the key kP,D, and “translates” h to the corresponding power level l and cost-of-energy parameter αP . D records (l, αP ) in the cost matrix’s entry for link (P,D).
– Upon receiving (ROUTEINFO, [S, D, r], [P, i, h]), D decrypts h, verifies the packet’s MAC using key ki,D, and “translates” h to the corresponding power level l and cost-of-energy parameter αP . D records (l, αP ) in the cost matrix’s entry for link (P, i).
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Routing Stage
• After collection all link cost information, D check, for each link, that the cost-of-energy parameter does not change.
• Computes LCP(S, D) and the unit payment for each intermediate node i.
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Packet forwarding stage
• After the routing discovery phase, the destination D sends the routing decision([S,D, r], LCP(S,D), PS,{(Pi, pi) | i is an intermediate node on LCP(S,D)}) with digital signature along the reverse path of LCP.
Pi is the power level for node i
pi is the payment for node i
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Packet forwarding stage
• The source node sends out packets in block. Together with the last data packet in the m-th block, the source sends out =
• For each block, the intermediate node waits for a confirmation after it forwards the block and before it start sending the next block.
• The destination decrypts all packets in a block, it decrypts , and sends it back along LCP(S, D) as a confirmation.
• Each intermediate node verifies that r =
)( 0/ rH mbM mbMr /
mbMr /
)( / mbMm rH
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Evaluations
• Simulation using GloMoSim Simulation package.
• The scenario consists of 30 nodes that are randomly distributed in an area of 2000 by 2000 meters.
• Each node has transmission power level at 7 and 14dBm.
• is set to 1 for every node
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Topology of simulation setup
A network with 30 nodes. The ID’s of the nodes are
labeled. A link between two nodes indicates that they are neighbors.
The credit balance and forwarding energy
cost at the end of 15 minutes are represented by the sizes
of the circles.
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Evaluation Resultsthe credit balance of the nodes (the total credit received by forwarding others’ traffic
minus the total credit paid in order to send one’s own traffic)
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Evaluation Results (2)
forwarding energy cost
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Effects of Cheating
Credit balance for node 3 with four different settings
After 30 minutes’ simulation
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Effects of Cheating(2)
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Conclusion and Future work
• Conclusion– Design the first incentive-compatible,
integrated routing and forwarding protocol in wireless ad-hoc networks.
– Combine incentive mechanisms and security techniques to address link cost issue.
• Future work – This method can be extended to congestion
price in network with limited capacity.– A general model to integrate incentive issue in
different layers: MAC layer and application layer.
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Question?