No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011

8/3/2019 No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011

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MahaThuriya

NEWS, VIEWS OPINIONSBY YE KYAW SWA

No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011This is the combination or the continuation of the blog named

http://mahathuriya.blogspot.com/News,Views Opinions

Sunday, October 30, 2011 NO 5

QUOTATIONYou could not step twice into the same river; for other waters are ever flowingon to you.

Heraclitus,On the UniverseGreek philosopher (540 BC - 480 BC)

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Collectors Items

Briefing by Ambassador Mitchell, New U.S. Special Envoy for Burma --Washington,D.C. (October 17, 2011)

Testimony by Daniel J. Kritenbrink -- US Policy Toward the Peoples Republic ofChina PRC (April 13, 2011)

Testimony of Kurt M. Campbell - the vital importance of Asia-Pacific countries tothe United States(March 31, 2011)Testimony of David C. Williams U.S. Policy toward Burma: ItsImpact and Effectiveness (Executive Director, Center forConstitutional Democracy) --(September 30, 2009)

THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN (1947)(based on the English Edition by Government Printing Bureau)

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Its a position that essentially was intended to continue the policy that we have,

that the Obama Administration has pursued, of a dual-track approach, which talks

about both engagement and sanctions, pressure, on the regime, on the

government in Burma. But it is meant also to provide a sort of senior-level face

focusing on the issue 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, as I do. So it is, in that

sense, a new beginning. And I was able, I think, in my trip to Burma back in

September, able to establish a good baseline for the relationship. I had very, very

productive and candid meetings, and we have proceeded to have a number of

interactions since then that I think have been equally productive.

I was very, as I said, candid there. And if you all were able to see the press

statement I put out leaving Rangoon at that time, I laid out, in essence, the

gestures that we saw from the government that were welcome. And weve seen, I

think since then, even more gestures and more moves by the government that

seems to be a trend towards greater openness, as well as some of the views from

ourselves and others of skepticism, of questioning about whether, in fact, we are

seeing something fundamentally different in the country. Are we seeing a real path

to reform as they laid out their goals of democracy, human rights, national

reconciliation, and development, national development for the country?

Those who have followed Burma for many years, as I have, have seen stops and

starts. Im not sure weve seen anything necessarily exactly like weve seen over

the past several months. And in talking to people inside the country, they

themselves say that they are seeing something that is a bit different than theyve

seen before. But there are still questions about how far theyre going to go and

where this is going to lead.

And we laid outI laid out in my statement and in the dialogues that we have

privately, that if, in fact, we do see change, reform along those lines of

democracy, human rights, national reconciliation, and development, they will have

a partner in the United States; that we will be with them as a partner in that

reform effort because, in fact, that is what we have sought to pursue for many

years now.

So we have seen encouraging signs over time, andbut of course, there are

some things that havent changed, and we should be noting those. As much as

weve seen some changing of dynamics in between Naypyidaw and Rangoon

with some of the democratic opposition, we, of course, have not seen similar

progress in the relationship between the government and the ethnic minorities, the


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ethnic nationalities in the north and the east and elsewhere. Violence continues.

Credible reports of human rights abuses, including against women and children,

continue. And this remains an issue of great concern to the United States and to

others in the region and around the world. And in fact, we made it very clear that

we could not have a transformed relationship as long as these abuses and credible

reports of abuses occur and as long as there is not dialogue with these groups and

with the opposition. If violence remains, then that will be a constraint on the

relationship.

We also talked a bit about accounting for past abuses that have occurred as a step

towards reconciliation, that something that could be done to represent a credible

commitment to national reconciliation to give voice to some of whats occurred in

the past. And we also talked a bit aboutwith them about transparency in their

relationship with other nations. And particularly with North Korea, there have been

reports that weve seen of concern about that relationship, and we continue to

follow that very, very closely.

So even as we see some progress in some areas, there are other areas that we

remain concerned about.And the dialogue continues, and I think weve set a very

goodas I say, a good baseline for a very candid relationship between the two

sides that we really havent seen, I would say, in many, many years.

So with that, maybe Ill open it up for some questions, if people have particularissues.

QUESTION: Was the release of the political prisoners as part of the general

amnesty last week of a sufficient magnitude to incline the Administration to take

any kinds of reciprocal gestures toward Burma? Im not talking about peeling off

all the sanctions, but perhaps smaller steps, waivers, other kinds of gestures.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, first of all, we have taken steps and made gestures in return.

We have lifted travel restrictions for those who have traveled to New York to

UNGA to come to Washington. And at that time, we met with the foreign minister

here in the State Department, the first time in some time. I couldnt even tell you

the last time there was a foreign minister meeting here. And that was a good

opportunity to have the direct dialogue on the issues that I raised here, but also to

build the relationship and build the trust and build the confidence between the two

sides.


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Weve invited a Burmese delegation to be an observer at the Friends of the Lower

Mekong Initiative. So were bringing them into some of the international dialogues

that occur and looking at other gestures in turn. So its not as if were standing still

and were not sending signals. Of course, rhetorically, were saying we welcome

whats going on. They really value that rhetorical appreciation of what weve seen

to date. So we continue to do that. All these are steps.

But our position is pretty clear and its reflective of what we hear from inside the

country as well, which is political prisonersany political prisonersthere are too

many political prisonersand that what were looking for is a release of all

political prisoners without condition to really send the signal of genuine

commitment to democracy in the country.

The people that are of probably most concern to them, the people that have been

in the streets and maybe led some of the movements and such, some of thenames I think are known to folks here, Ko Ko Gyi, Min Ko Naing, Gambiri, and

others. I said directly to the leadership that these are the people that if youre

serious about democratic reform you would see as allies, because they actually are

seeking the same goals you are. They are seeking for a credible democratic

Burma.

So weve heard reports, weve seen reports, suggesting that they say be patient

with us, that more is to come. And we will watch for whether they, in fact, followup with action on the release of political prisoners just in total.

QUESTION: Just to be clear, none of the steps that you mentioned as gestures

took place post October the 12th, correct? I mean, the foreign minister was here

well before that, the invitation to be an observer at the Lower Mekong Delta. So is

it then fair for us to conclude, or will you say, that what they did in terms of a

prisoner release last week is not, in and of itself, sufficient to yield any actions on

the U.S. part?

MR. MITCHELL: Well, were constantly we dont were thinking in terms of how

do we develop the relationship and build the confidence between the two sides.

Its not linked to any specific action at any point like that. We obviously welcome

the release of some political prisoners and of other prisoners as part of an

amnesty. We certainly welcome that. But were thinking more broadly what other

what are the steps that we can take, whether theyre linked to a particular action

or not, but that we see them take that suggests theyre on the path to reform.


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And that means provide certain types of advice and assistance in that regard. And

we continue the dialogue. So there are things that we discuss in private that also

can be productive in terms of the relationship over time instead of simply the

public gestures.

MS. FULTON: Okay, next question.

QUESTION: Whats your understanding of how many political prisoners were

released during this previous amnesty? And also, what further sort of reciprocal

steps could the U.S. take? What would you see as the other things that you could

do looking forward that could sort of reward Myanmar, reward Burma for the steps

it takes?

MR. MITCHELL: Well, on the second I dont want to I dont think its appropriate

here to start going through hypotheticals; if they do this, then do that. Suffice tosay that if we see that kind of movement on the political prisoners released fully

and unconditionally, among other things that have been discussed as well about

potentially theres now in parliament a discussion of amending the political party

registration law that could open up the opposition, particularly the NLD, to take

part in the political process. Those are obviously very, very important moves that

would lead to American gestures, steps in return. But Im not going to get into

what for what.

In terms of the numbers, were not were still working on that. Its still being

looked at. Its some are saying its in the low 200s or 220s, some are saying 250,

in terms of political prisoners. But were still trying to figure out exact numbers,

and I think inside theyre also trying to figure out exactly what the number is. But I

cant give you a perfect number today.

MS. FULTON: Next question, Goyal.

QUESTION: Sir, thank you. Three points. One, in the past, Burmas military was

being supported by the Chinese to keep in power. SecondI mean, what role

China is playing now or will play?

And second, what role will be playing Aung San Suu Kyi, her Democratic Party

which won elections 20 years ago and shes still on and off under house arrest or

in jail and all that?

And finally, do we see now real democracy in Burma?


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MR. MITCHELL: Ill make sure I get these all down so I dont forget.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. MITCHELL: On the issue of China, Burma has an extensive border with China.

I think they make it clear that theythat all those nations in Asia want to have a

good relationship with China, and they should have a good relationship withor aproductive, constructive relationship with China. And thats between the Burmese

and the Chinese. Thats not an issue for the United States to be engaged in or to

comment on. So thats all I would say, I think, about that.

On the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, they still are relevant. As I said

when I was there, they are very relevant to the future of the country. They still

represent a substantial segment of the Burmese population. She still is looked on

as a unifying figure and as an important political figure. And they will decidethemselves how they play within the new systemor that the system that is

evolving. Whether I say its new, I would say its an evolving system there. And I

would leave that to them to determine how best to engage in that regard. But

they clearly see themselves having a future and an important part of the future in

Burma.

Real democracy; I think its too soon to tell what were seeing. I think what were

seeing areis a positive trend line, encouraging signs. I think its raising

expectations both inside and outside the country. And therefore, its incumbent on

the government, therefore, to follow up and to meet those expectations. And if so,

I think itll be a win-win. I think they will benefit from that, I think the region will

benefit from that, I think the United States will benefit from that, and the people

of Burma will benefit from that in terms of their overall development and their

come out of the shadows. I think as of, whatright now, I think there are a lot of

restrictions that make them into a pariah state; and Burma is a proud country with

a tremendous history, and they deserve to come out of the shadows and beandtake their prideful place in the region.

MS. FULTON: Okay. Next question, Lauren.

QUESTION: You said that you talked to them about how to be more transparent in

their relations with other countries, including North Korea. Did they give any

indication that they would be willing to do that, to do any information sharing? Or

if they havent, do you think they will in the future?


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MR. MITCHELL: Its an ongoing dialogue. They are they say that there is nothing

untoward going on between them and North Korea. And well continue to have the

dialogue as we go. So I would say everything is on the table in terms of dialogue.

I think that theyd be willing to engage. Whenever I raised anything when I was in

Naypyidaw, they were willing to address that subject and talk about it. And

hopefully, we can establish the kind of trust that will allow us to continue that

dialogue in a productive fashion. So Im very hopeful in that regard, and well see

simply as we go whether we can get the kinds of reactions and responses that

were looking for.

MS. FULTON: I think we have time for just one more question. Bob.

QUESTION: Does the U.S. see signs that there is resistance to this liberalizing

trend within the power structure of the country? Are there some hardliners who

are pushing back?

MR. MITCHELL: Its I cant say that were seeing them actively, but we hear

aboutI think its probably predictable that there are going to be those who think

we are moving too quickly or maybe this is not the path to go. The dynamics right

now are difficult to read entirely. We dont have a perfect sense of how its

working internally. There is a sense that probably some believe that at least it may

be going too fast in some regard, but we dont know.

What were going to follow though, what were going to respond to, are actions

and what they do. And they will work out themselves what is the best for the

future of their country. What we want to do is provide incentives and to give them

a sense of what the possibilities are if they move in a positive direction. If they

move in a reformist direction, its going to be good for the people of Burma, good

for their country; and that to go in a different direction will not be good, will not

beitll mean some more of the same in terms of their position in the world and

the region and in the relationship with the United States.

So I dont think you can I wouldnt classify people as purely hardline, purely

reformist. I think its probably more complex than that. But what were trying to do

is understand better how things work and then encourage the reform as they

move forward.

So, thank you very much. Appreciate the time.

QUESTION: Thank you.


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be done. As Secretary Clinton has said,You cannot build a relationship on

aspirations alone. We therefore are engaging with the Chinese leadership to

emphasize the steps we believe are necessary to bring us closer to our shared

goals of regional stability and increased prosperity.

U.S.-China RelationshipI would first like to comment generally on the U.S. approach to China. Contrary to

claims by some commentators, the United States is not attempting to contain or

counter Chinas rise. Our approach to China is multifaceted. We encourage China

to play a greater role internationally in ways supportive of international

development and stabilityand in ways consistent with prevailing international

rules, norms and institutions. As others have noted, U.S. global influence and our

active presence in East Asia have, in fact, helped create the stable environment for

Chinas remarkable economic transformation of the past few decades. The UnitedStates has a strong interest in continuing its tradition of economic and strategic

leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United States remaining a

dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing military influence.

The United States is an Asia-Pacific power, and there should be no doubt about

our commitment to defending U.S. interests and values in the region. But while the

United States and China will inevitably have differences from time to time, it is far

from pre-ordained that Chinas rise should lead to conflict. As Secretary Clinton hasstated, in the 21st century, it does not make sense to apply zero-sum theories of

how major powers interact. We need new ways of understanding the shifting

dynamics of an increasingly complex international landscapea landscape marked

by emerging centers of influence, but also by non-traditional, even non-state

actors, and the unprecedented challenges and opportunities created by

globalization. We believe this is especially applicable to the U.S-China relationship.

As Secretary Clinton outlined in her January 14 speech, one important element ofour policy is to work with allies and partners in Asia to foster a regional

environment in which Chinas rise is a source of prosperity and stability for the

entire region. Or, as some others have said, to get China right, you have to get the

region right. By practicing what Secretary Clinton has called forward-deployed

diplomacy, the United States has expanded its presence in the region, beginning

by renewing and strengthening bonds with our allies and partners in the region.


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At the same time, we have strengthened our engagement and cooperation with

regional and multilateral fora, which we believe contributes to regional stability

and prosperity. The Obama Administration has made a renewed effort to expand

our engagement with institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers

Meeting Plus, and the East Asia Summit, which President Obama will attend later

this fall in Indonesia. This engagement is important both because of the centrality

of the issues of Asia to our own security and prosperity, and because of the

regions increasingly global significance. The engagement with ASEAN member

states is important in its own right, but these multilateral institutions also offer a

unique opportunity for cooperation with China. Having ASEAN at the center of

each of these institutions should allow us to more effectively promote cooperation

and innovative solutions to problems.

A second critical element of our policy is focused on building bilateral trust with

China. We need to form habits of cooperation and respect that help us work

together more effectively and weather disagreements when they do arise. The

most notable of these efforts is the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, or S&ED, a

whole of government dialogue with participation from hundreds of experts from

dozens of agencies across both of our governments. The goal of these meetings is

not only to discuss an unprecedented range of subjects, but as Secretary Clinton

has said, to inculcate that ethic or habit of cooperation across our two

governments. We look forward to hosting our Chinese counterparts at the next

round of this dialogue in May in Washington.

The United States engages in broad outreach to all elements of Chinese

government and society as part of our effort to gain greater trust and

understanding. This is all part of what Secretary Clinton has described as a steady

effort over time to expand the areas where we cooperate and to narrow the areas

where we diverge, while holding firm to our respective values. This approach

includes building a healthy, stable, continuous, and reliable military-to-military

relationship, which President Obama and President Hu have affirmed is an

essential part of their shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive

U.S.-China relationship. The two leaders have also agreed to expand people-to-

people exchanges between our countries and emphasized the importance of

continued interaction between our legislatures, including institutionalized

exchanges between the National Peoples Congress of China and the U.S. Senate

and House of Representatives. We have also developed ways to expand the ties


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between our governments at the sub-national level, including through launching

the U.S.-China Governors Forum. This broad interaction with Chinese society will

be increasingly important as the P.R.C. leadership turns over in 2012 and a new

group of civilian and military officials assume power.

This sort of bilateral engagement also involves managing issues over which we

have significant differences. For example, on Taiwan, we have been encouragedby the progress between the Mainland and Taiwan in terms of greater dialogue

and economic cooperation. At the same time, however, our approach continues to

be guided by our one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqus and the

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). We frequently reiterate that, while we encourage

greater dialogue and exchange between the two sides, we also seek a reduction in

P.R.C. military deployments, and remain committed to meeting our responsibilities

under the TRA.

We also continue to have significant differences over human rights. As Secretary

Clinton stated on April 8 in releasing the 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices, we remain deeply concerned about continuing reports that, since

February, dozens of people, including public interest lawyers, writers, artists,

intellectuals, and activists have been arbitrarily detained and arrested. We

continue to urge China to release all of those who have been detained for

exercising their internationally recognized right to free expression and to respect

the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all of the citizens of China.

Promotion of human rights will remain an essential element of U.S. foreign policy,

and we will continue to raise human rights in our meetings with Chinese officials,

including at the next round of our bilateral human rights dialogue.

A third critical element of our policy toward China is expanding our cooperation

with China to address common global and regional challenges, ranging from Iran

and North Korea to climate change and economic growth. Through the S&ED and

other regular bilateral engagement, as well as through work in international and

other fora, we intend to continue expanding to the maximum extent possible our

practical cooperation with China to meet a range of common global interests. I

plan to expand on these efforts further below.

hinas Diplomacy


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At this point, I would like to turn to addressing some of the specific questions on

Chinas foreign policy that the Commission would like to explore in this hearing and

that will also provide an opportunity to expand on U.S.-China cooperation to deal

with common global challenges that I mentioned above. In our view, Chinas

foreign policy continues to be driven primarily by its desire to sustain its economic

growth and maintain social and political stability at home. As part of this effort,

China has sought to develop a wide range of relationships with regional and rising

powers, as well as traditional world powers. At the same time, China has used its

growing role in global affairs to enhance its diplomatic stature.

China has played an important role in the diplomatic efforts to address the threat

posed by Irans nuclear program. We havebeen pleased with the unity that China

and other P5+1 partners have maintained in our negotiations with Iran, and we

continue to jointly insist that Iran comply with its international obligations. We

worked closely with China to pass UN Security Council resolution 1929 last June,

which placed tough new sanctions on Iran. We have called upon China to ensure

that this resolution is fully implemented and to take additional steps to restrict any

new economic activity with Iran that might provide support to its nuclear program.

Irans nuclear program was a key topic of President Obamas talks with President

Hu, and it was the also the focus of several senior-level meetings with the Chinese

in the lead-up to President Hus visit. China reiterated during the Statevisit that it

is committed to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1929 and other

resolutions on Iran fully and faithfully. We welcome that assurance and look

forward to continuing to consult with China on these subjects.

China has also been an important diplomatic player on North Korea (the

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, or D.P.R.K.), including playing a central

role as chair of the Six-Party talks, and has repeatedly stated that it shares our

goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have worked closely with China in

recent years to pass UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which

imposed additional sanctions against the D.P.R.K. and called for the international

community to take steps to curb D.P.R.K. proliferation activities. The United States

is committed to standing with our allies the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) and Japan

in the face of North Koreas threats. Our alliance was exemplified in the historic

December 2010 U.S.-Japan-R.O.K. Trilateral Ministerial in which the three

ministers affirmed that a D.P.R.K. threat to one of the countries will be met by

solidarity from all three nations.


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Our ability to work together on North Korea is an important sign that we can

cooperate to address issues of common concern. We expect China to use its close

relationship with North Korea to persuade the D.P.R.K. regime to cease its reckless

behavior. President Obama discussed North Korea with President Hu, during Hus

state visit in January. In their joint statement, the two Presidents sent an

important signal to North Korea and the region that U.S. and China agree on the

critical importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the

need for sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue, and the crucial

importance of denuclearization of the Peninsula. China also took the important

step of expressing concern regarding the D.P.R.K.s claimed uranium enrichment

program. We urge China to press North Korea to take appropriate steps to

improve relations with South Korea, to denuclearize, and to abide by its

international commitments and obligations. We also continue to work with China

on full and transparent enforcement of sanctions against North Korea adopted by

the Security Council.

Regarding Russia, in the face of Chinas remarkable economic growth of the past

decades, Russias main exports to China, energy and raw materials, are rising

rapidly. The countries share many overlapping interests and have cooperated on

political and economic matters as BRIC nations and permanent members of the UN

Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The United States

engages closely with both China and Russia on a range of issues including the

challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. We look forward to continued

cooperation on important multilateral issues such as nonproliferation, arms control,

counter-terrorism, and regional security.

China in recent years has also been active in pursuing what it sees as its maritime

rights. The United States has made clear our views on the principles of freedom of

navigation. As Secretary Clinton stated at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi last

year, the United States has enduring national interests in the South China Sea,

including continued peace and stability and respect for international law, as well as

freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce. We oppose the use of

force or threat of force by any claimant to advance its claim. While the United

States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features

in the South China Sea, the United States supports a collaborative diplomatic

process by the claimants for addressing the territorial disputes.


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Like the United States and our allies, China appears to have been watching closely

recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa. China has a strong

interest in protecting its citizens in the region and ensuring that crucial energy

supply lines are maintained. Nevertheless, we are concerned that Chinas reaction

to these events has caused it to take harsh measures to silence political debate.

Over the past few weeks, as Secretary Clinton stated last Friday, we have seen a

large number of forced disappearances, extralegal detentions, and arrests and

convictions of human rights activists, artists, writers, and lawyers, as well as

tightened restrictions on foreign journalists. We have repeatedly raised our

concerns with Chinese officials and urged them to end this crackdown. And we will

continue to make our position clear publicly and privately.

The United States respects Chinas extraordinary achievements in economic reform

and in lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty in the past 30 years. During the

recent visit of President Hu, President Obama emphasized our belief that human

rights are essential to building a stronger, more prosperous and resilient society.

For instance, freedom of expression fosters the open exchange of ideas that is

essential to economic innovation and productivity. An effective legal system can

protect citizens property and guaranteethat inventors can profit from their ideas.

And a robust civil society can help to ensure that citizens concerns about everyday

issues like food safety, the environment, and urban development are addressed.

All societies benefit from the free exchange of ideas, and all governments benefit

from the feedback of their citizens.

ConclusionIn closing, I would like to reiterate that our engagement with China is part of a

wider strategy that seeks to reaffirm the United States commitment to the Asia-

Pacific region and encourage China to reach its full potential as partner in

addressing global issues. President Obama has underscored that the rise of a

strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of

nations, and clearly this is a bilateral relationship of critical importance to the

United States, and to China.

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I welcome your questions.


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http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/04/160652.htm

.

Testimony of Kurt M. CampbellAssistant Secretary of StateBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsU.S. Department of State

Before theHouse Committee on Foreign AffairsSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

March 31, 2011Mr. Chairman, Mr. Faleomavaega, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you

very much for inviting me here today to testify about the vital importance of Asia-

Pacific countries to the United States and for the opportunity to underscore key

aspects of our engagement strategy for the region.

I want to also use this opportunity to underscore the United States unwavering

commitment to Japan. Twenty days ago today, Japan experienced a triple blowfrom an earthquake, tsunami, and the subsequent challenges associated with the

Fukashima Daichi nuclear reactors. By themselves, any of these incidents would

have been enough to bring a country to its knees. In Japan, we have seen the

opposite. The Government and people have responded bravely and, with the help

of the United States and the international community, committed to building an

even stronger Japan in the future. Japan is the cornerstone of our strategic

engagement in East Asia, and we are committed to standing side-by-side with our

ally in its time of need.
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/04/160652.htmhttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/04/160652.htmhttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/04/160652.htm


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It is clear that Americas success in the 21st century is tied to the success of the

dynamic Asia-Pacific region. As Secretary Clinton has noted, much of the history of

the 21st century will be written in Asia. There is no question that the regions

influence is growing and holds the key to our shared future. Asian nations are vital

to the life-blood of the global economy. Their opinions and decisions have

profound influence from Latin American to the Middle East and Africa on

addressing complex and emerging transnational challenges, like climate change.

Despite the Asia-Pacific regions tremendous growth, the region still faces some of

the most pressing challenges of the 21st century. North Korea and Burma remain

outliers to the regionsprosperity and continue to be sources for insecurity and

instability. Many of todays mostcritical issues -- military competition, nuclear

proliferation, violent extremism, financial crises, poverty, weak and ineffective

governments, unresolved territorial disputes, growing competition over energy and

natural resources, climate change, and disease -- transcend national borders and

pose a common risk in the region. The rapid emergence of transnational security

risks and threats demands collective action, and it is critical for the United States

to work with our allies and partners in the region to address and meet these

significant challenges.

Essential to our long-term national interests is to make sure that the United States

remains true to its identity as a Pacific power. The Obama Administration,

following a long history of bipartisan commitment to Asia, has articulated a five-

part framework for our engagement in the Asia-Pacific: First, deepen and

modernize our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia,

(2)

Thailand and the Philippines. Second, broaden our engagement with increasingly

important partners like Indonesia, Vietnam, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore,

Malaysia, and most notably India. Third, develop a predictable, stable, and

comprehensive relationship with China. Fourth, engage and invest in the regions

burgeoning multilateral architecture. And, fifth pursue a confident and aggressive

trade and economic strategy.

Underpinning our strategy is a steadfast commitment to our belief in the

universality of democracy and our respect for human rights. The U.S. commitment


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to these values defines the unique aspect of U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific nations

and is an intrinsic and indispensable aspect of our character as a nation. It is one

of the best and most important contributions that we can offer the region. We are

working to promote fundamental human rights in the region and support the

regions own efforts to promote and protect human rights, democratic principles,

and freedom of religion and of expression.

In order to ensure that the promotion of human rights and the rule of law as well

as the development of civil society remain strong pillars of our engagement, we

will continue to adopt new and creative approaches that seize the opportunities

presented by advances created in our dynamic information age. The freedom to

speak ones mind and to choose ones leaders, theability to access information

and worship how one pleases are the bases of stability. The United States will

continue to speak for those on the margins of society, encouraging countries in

the region to respect the internationally recognized human rights of their people

while undertaking policies to further liberalize and open their states. We will

continue to work with countries to combat the scourge of trafficking in persons, to

promote the rights of women and children, and foster greater religious dialogue

among the many communities of faith in the region. We continue to press for the

restoration of democracy in Fiji, as well as to promote good governance, rule of

law, and respect for human rights in Vietnam and China. We have already seen

positive signs reflecting greater internalization of human rights with the recentestablishment of such institutions as Indonesias Bali Democracy Forum and the

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), which we

welcomed for an official visit to the United States last November. In Burma, we

have intensified efforts to promote human rights and democracy both through

diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in Southeast Asia and by delivering

our message to the Burmese government via direct engagement. At the same

time, we maintain extensive financial, trade, and visa sanctions that target regime

authorities and their cronies who thwart democracy and disrespect human rights.Our message remains clear and consistent: absent concrete progress in key areas

of democracy and human rights, our sanctions will remain in place.

I will use the remainder of my testimony to describe how we are implementing this

strategy through an aggressive forward-deployed diplomacy, and the steps we

are taking to ensure U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific.


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U.S. Strategic Framework for Engagement in the Asia Pacific RegionThe pace ofour engagement in this critical region signals the renewed emphasis we place on

developing and deepening partnerships. As Secretary Clinton has articulated, our

forward-deployed diplomacy in Asia seeks to leverage these relationships to

underwrite regional security, heighten prosperity, and support stronger democratic

institutions and the spread of universal human rights in the Asia-Pacific region.

The region offers the United States tremendous opportunities in a number

(3)

of areas, including expanding markets for U.S. economic interests and forming

new strategic partnerships.

First, our alliances remain the foundation for our strategic engagement in the

region, and the Obama Administration is committed to strengthening and

modernizing our alliances to address both continuing and emerging challenges.

Also, we must recognize that those alliances are, at their core, security alliances. .

Our alliances have underwritten peace and stability for over a half-century and

continue to provide a context for the regions tremendous economic growth and

vitality.

Our treaty alliance with Japan remains a cornerstone of our strategic engagement

in Asia. The U.S.-Japan relationship is both strong and comprehensive; it links two

of the worlds threelargest economies and is supported by our people-to-people

exchanges and our shared commitment to democracy and human rights. The

cooperation between the Government of Japan and the United States in the

aftermath of the March 11 events demonstrates the value of our security alliance

with Japan. The United States stands resolved to assist Japan in its reconstruction

efforts and to taking steps to further strengthen our alliance relationship. The

pictures on the front-pages of Japanese newspapers that show U.S. military forces

and Japanese soldiers working hand-in-hand to assist those in need is a potent

symbol of the importance of this relationship. As we help Japan in its time of need,

our two governments will continue to conduct open and direct discussions on a

number of important strategic and alliance issues, including the roadmap for

realigning U.S. forces in Japan. In addition, we are working to create a durable

and forward-looking vision for the alliance that builds upon Japans important

global role in several areas, including climate change, non-proliferation, and


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humanitarian and development assistance programs. We have intensified high-

level engagement between our two governments to address regional and global

security challenges, and Japan is a lead contributor to the efforts to bring

reconciliation and reconstruction to Afghanistan. Secretaries Clinton and Gates look

forward to hosting their Japanese counterparts this year for an important 2+2

meeting where both sides will issue a detailed framework statement for the

alliance going forward.

We are also working vigorously with our other critical ally in Northeast Asia, the

Republic of Korea (ROK), both to modernize our defense alliance and to achieve a

partnership that is truly global and comprehensive. The United States remains

steadfastly committed to the defense of the ROK and to an enduring military

presence on the Peninsula. The relationship continues to evolve from one solely

focused on peninsular challenges to an ever more global and dynamic partnership

that builds on our shared values and strategic interests. The ROK now has forces

deployed overseas in over a dozen countries, with 200-to-300-person

peacekeeping and reconstruction contingents in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.

The ROK understands that global challenges such as counter-piracy, nuclear

nonproliferation, and development fundamentally affect Koreas interests and

involve an obligation to be actively engaged around the world.

Our respective alliances with the ROK and Japan, as well as increasing trilateral

coordination, play an essential role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast

Asia, including responding to the destabilizing policies and provocations of North

Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic ofKorea, DPRK). The DPRKs sinking of the

ROK corvette Cheonan in March 2010, its (4) November 2010 disclosure of a

uranium enrichment program, and its November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyong

Island underscore the threat that the DPRKs misguided policies and provocations,

including its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and proliferation activities, pose

to regional stability and global security. Effective trilateral engagement in the wakeof these provocations demonstrated to North Korea that its belligerent actions will

be met with collective resolve. During an important U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral

Ministerial meeting in December 2010, the three countries jointly declared that the

DPRKs belligerent actions threaten all three countries andwill be met with

solidarity. The three countries jointly condemned the DPRKs uranium enrichment

program as a violation of the DPRKs commitments under the September 2005

Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under UNSCR 1718 and

1874.


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We have also worked closely with Japan, the ROK, and our other partners in the

Six-Party Talks to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in

a peaceful manner. We are working closely with our partners and allies to make

clear to the DPRK that its uranium enrichment program violates its commitments

and obligations. We continue to urge the international community to fully and

transparently implement UNSCR 1718 and 1874 to curb the DPRKs conventional

and WMD-related proliferation efforts, as well as its illicit activities.

Australia remains a strategic anchor for regional stability and plays an incredibly

important role in maintaining global security. U.S. and Australian forces fight side-

by-side, extending a legacy of cooperation that goes back a century, and Australia

is the largest non-NATO contributor to the coalition effort in Afghanistan. The U.S.

commitment to Australia was on clear display during the visit of Prime Minister

Gillard to Washington last month. Prime Minister Gillard had a very productive

meeting with President Obama, in which they reviewed the many areas in Asia and

around the world in which our two countries work together. She demonstrated

Australiasrespect for our past joint efforts through a generous contribution to the

new Vietnam Veterans Memorial education center here in Washington. In addition,

Secretaries Clinton and Gates visited Australia for the 25th Australia-U.S.

Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) in November. That meeting was essential to

our objective of modernizing and deepening our alliance, and our two

governments announced the launch of the Australia-U.S. Force Posture Review

Working Group, which is now exploring the potential for expanded U.S.-Australia

military cooperation to optimize our U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

We are also working to invigorate the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with Japan and

Australia, as well as to deepen security partnerships throughout the region. Our

alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, our long-time Southeast Asian treaty

allies, continue to evolve to meet modern challenges from violent extremism toinfectious disease. We are working closely with our Philippine partners to improve

maritime security and disaster response capabilities. In January of this year, we

launched the first ever joint State-DOD strategic dialogue with the Government

of the Philippines to help create a framework to enhance our alliance partnership.

In Thailand, our oldest treaty ally in East Asia, we partnered to deploy Thai naval

vessels, with U.S. Navy personnel aboard, to join Combined Task Force-151 to

combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. Thailand has also provided a full battalion of

peacekeepers to Darfur to assist with UN humanitarian relief operations. Our


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robust and mutually beneficial military relationships with both allies include joint

exercises, ship visits, information sharing, logistics assistance, and a (5) broad

slate of training and capacity-building activities in such areas as peacekeeping and

antipiracy operations.

Second, the Obama Administration is committed to broadening our relations with

growing powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore,

Vietnam, and most notably India.

- India: The Administration has taken significant steps to enhance our engagement

with India, which is playing a key role in the Asia-Pacific. We have launched a

dialogue on Asia-Pacific strategic issues, and I will travel to New Delhi next week

to have further discussions and consultations. As a growing international player,

engagement with India on a wide array of global issues is increasingly in the

strategic interests of the United States.

- Indonesia: Our engagement with Indonesia continues to mature. The Presidents

historic trip to Jakarta last fall highlighted the broadening and deepening of the

U.S.-Indonesia relationship. The launch of the Comprehensive Partnership by

President Obama and President Yudhoyono will further boost our growing

partnership on bilateral, regional, and global issues. We look forward to working

with Indonesia this year in its role as ASEAN chair and host of the East Asia

Summit and value its emerging, positive voice on global topics, such as democracy

and climate change.

- Malaysia: In addition, the Administration is working hard to enhance our bilateral

relationship with Malaysia. We are in the process of launching a major English-

language initiative that will place more young Americans in Malaysia to teach

English and expose primarily rural Malay students to American culture. The

Malaysian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Najib, has also

taken a number of steps to create more stringent export controls and play a

constructive role in the international non-proliferation regime. Medical personnel

from the Malaysian Armed Forces are currently deployed to Afghanistan. Our two

countries are also working together closely in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

negotiations.

- Mongolia: Recently, I visited Mongolia, an ancient country yet a relatively young


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democracy on the verge of an economic boom that offers opportunities for

American companies. According to some estimates, Mongolia has about $400

billion worth of minerals in the ground. Mongolia provides 190 troops to the

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and hosts training for

peacekeeping operations. Mongolia also cooperates closely with us in international

organizations such as the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency. And,

Mongolia will chair the Community of Democracies starting this year. Mongolia is a

reliable, democratic partner with a bright future.

- Vietnam: Over the last several years, we have broadened and deepened our

engagement with Vietnam on a wide ranges of issues, including trade, security,

nonproliferation, health, education, and the environment. Vietnam is also among

our eight negotiating partners in the TPP talks. During their meetings in Hanoi last

year, Secretary Clinton and Prime Minister Dung agreed to elevate the relationship

further by moving toward a strategic partnership. However, we remain deeply

concerned about the lack of progress in the human rights front. We continue to

make it very clear to the Vietnamese government that political freedoms are not a

source of instability but of strength.

(6)

- New Zealand: Last fall, Secretary Clinton visited New Zealand where she

launched the Wellington Declaration. This visit effectively culminated the thaw in

our relationship with New Zealand, after a 25-year freeze since the mid-1980s.

New Zealand is an important friend and partner of the United States, especially in

the South Pacific, and the Wellington Declaration establishes a framework for a

new United States-New Zealand strategic partnership that will enhance our

practical cooperation and political dialogue. Likewise, the United States and NewZealand are working to deepen our economic relationship through the TPP

negotiations. In response to the tragic earthquake that struck New Zealand earlier

this year, the United States deployed a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team

(DART) that included the Los Angeles County and the Fairfax County Urban Search

and Rescue teams (USAR), transferred equipment and supplies, and committed

more than $1 million for humanitarian assistance to support relief and recovery

efforts.


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- Singapore: The Administration is also taking steps to enhance our bilateral

engagement with Singapore. In addition to being a strong partner on non-

proliferation and other regional security matters, Singapore has participated in

global security operations, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gulf of Aden

counter-piracy efforts for which Singapore will chair the International Contact

Group in July. Singapore is hosting the sixth round of TPP negotiations this week.

Third, an important component of our efforts in the Asia Pacific is an approach to

China that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and

interests. Through this approach, we are pursuing a positive, cooperative, and

comprehensive relationship with China. As Secretary Clinton has said, the U.S.-

China relationship is at a critical juncture; how we manage the relationship today

with its elements of both competition and cooperationwill have a large impact

on the future of the region.

Over the past year, we have taken solid, tangible steps to translate these words

into action. Through steady diplomacy, we worked with Beijing to move the

relationship in a positive direction, with President Hu attending the Nuclear

Security Summit in April and China voting in favor of strengthened sanctions on

Iran at the UN Security Council in June. The success of our approach is most

clearly illustrated by President Hus January state visit to Washington.

Through that visit, China for the first time expressed concern about the DPRKs

uranium enrichment program; we also gained Chinese agreement to respect the

results of the referendum in southern Sudan, and strengthened cooperation with

the Chinese on Iran through both the P5+1 process and enforcement of UN

Security Council Resolutions. We also held firm to the principles that are important

to us as Americans, making strong statements in both public and private about our

concerns on Chinas human rights record. President Hus visit was a success in

large part because of our concerted effort since the beginning of the

Administration to get this relationship rightin a manner that ensures U.S.interests are protected and advanced.

Related to our interactions with China is our consistent approach to Taiwan. As

Secretary Clinton has noted, we are encouraged by the greater dialogue and

economic cooperation between the Mainland and Taiwanas witnessed by the

historic completion of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement last year. Our approach continues to be guided by our One China

policy based on the three joint communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act. In the


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period (7) ahead, we seek to encourage more dialogue and exchanges between

the two sides, as well as reduced military tensions and deployments, and we have

and will continue to meet our responsibilities under the TRA.

We will continue to make clear our views on the principles of freedom of

navigation in the South China Sea. Recent events in China, including the forced

disappearances of rights lawyers and crackdowns on Chinese and foreign

journalists, have only further increased our concerns about human rights. And we

continue to press China for further action on the DPRKs actions inviolation of the

September 2005 Joint Statement and UN Security Council Resolutions, as well

as the need to more tightly enforce sanctions on Iran.

On the economic front, we continue to make lowering trade barriers a high priority

in all our engagements with China, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue

(S&ED), the U.S.- China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), and

the G-20. Our embassy in Beijing and consulates throughout China reinforce the

importance of maintaining a level playing field for U.S. companies on a regular

basis and at all levels of the Chinese government. The State Department also

works closely with other federal agencies to monitor China's compliance with U.S.

and international trade rules. In 2010, the Department of Commerce initiated six

investigations against imports from China (three antidumping and three

countervailing duty) in order to provide relief for U.S. companies from unfair trade

practices. Moreover, following consultations with the State Department and other

Executive Branch agencies, USTR initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings

against China in three separate cases.

As a result of these efforts, during the December 2010 meeting of the JCCT and

the January visit of President Hu, China made significant commitments on key

trade issues, agreeing to ensure that Chinese government agencies use legitimate

software, delink innovation policies from government procurement preferences,

and include sub-central entities in its revised offer to join the WTO Government

Procurement Agreement. China is a key export market for U.S. goods and services

and a focus of President Obamas National Export Initiative that calls for doubling

U.S. exports in five years to support millions of American jobs. In 2010, exports

from the United States to China approached $92 billion, an increase of 32 percent

from 2009. An important element of our engagement with China is the S&ED,

which brings together cabinet members and agency heads across both of our

governments, not only to discuss a range of issues critical to our bilateral


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relationship, but also to inculcate the habit of cooperation across our two

governments. Secretaries Clinton and Geithner will host the third S&ED in

Washington in May and will build on the successes of the second S&ED last May,

including cooperation in addressing the global economic crisis in the framework of

the G20. In our preparation for the next S&ED, the U.S. Government will continue

to press China for demonstrable progress on economic issues, including further

advancements on trade and investment and full implementation of commitments it

made during President Hus visit on trade, investment, andeconomic rebalancing,

including exchange rate reform.

Fourth, the Obama Administration is committed to enhancing engagement in Asia-

Pacific multilateral organizations. In her speech in Hawaii in January 2010,

Secretary Clinton highlighted the importance of the United States involvement in

the development of the regional institutions and architecture. APEC remains the

premier economic organization in the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States

remains committed to it. We have also taken a series of (8) steps to deepen U.S.

engagement in regional institutions such as ASEAN, which the Secretary Clinton

calls the fulcrum for the regions emerging architecture, the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (Plus), the East Asia Summit

(EAS), and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).

U.S. membership in the EAS will allow us to work with ASEAN and other EAS

members to foster engagement on pressing strategic and political issues of mutual

concern, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security, and disaster

assistance. Last year, Secretary Clinton attended the EAS as the first-ever U.S.

representative to the organization. This year, President Obama will attend the EAS

in Indonesia and will focus on steps the organization can take to advance regional

maritime security, capacity of countries to respond to humanitarian and natural

disasters, and non-proliferation. In addition, we will seek to work with ASEAN to

identify ways we can supports its Plan of Action. The President will also co-hostthe third U.S.-ASEAN summit, a regularized feature of our bilateral engagement

with ASEAN.

Regional engagement can also be an effective way to enhance our efforts to deal

with transnational security challenges such as climate change, pandemics, or

environmental degradation, and disaster management. Humanitarian assistance

and disaster preparedness will continue to play a role in the regions economic

well-being. With the cooperation of the ARF, we supported the ARF Disaster


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Exercise in Indonesia earlier this month. We are looking at ways for the ARF to

strengthen its capacity in managing crises, which is critically important in light of

the spate of recent natural disasters that have battered the region. Another

regional effort is the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), one of Secretary Clinton's

signature priorities for U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia. Over the last year, the

Secretary convened several meetings of the LMI with her counterparts from Laos,

Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam to chart the way forward to advance shared

goals for the region in environment, education, health, and infrastructure.

In August 2010, I led the largest-ever U.S. delegation to the Pacific Islands Forum

Post-Forum Dialogue in Vanuatu. The delegation included not only Department of

State officials, but also key defense and development personnel. We plan to take

an even larger delegation to the 2011 meeting this September in Auckland to

demonstrate our whole-of-government approach to addressing shared concerns in

the Pacific. Building on the urgent request for support from the Pacific Small Island

States, we have committed funds specifically for climate adaptation projects and

related programs in Pacific Island countries. To help administer these new

programs, USAID is finalizing plans for a new office in Port Moresby, Papua New

Guinea this year. Funding to address climate adaptation will be an essential

component of our strategyand a critical element in the regional effort both to

meet increasingly severe climate-related challenges and to maintain American pre-

eminence in a region wooed by other suitors with deep pockets.

In this regard, the Compact of Free Association between the United States and

Palau is a vital component of our growing presence and engagement in the

Western Pacific. Our existing defense arrangement with Palau makes a valuable

contribution to U.S. and international security. The Administration has submitted to

the Congress legislation covering the results of the recently concluded fifteen-year

review of the Compact. Enacting the proposed legislation will uphold our

partnership under the Compact, underscore the United States renewed(9)commitment to the region, and keep Palau allied with the United States at a time

when other, international interests are aggressively courting Pacific Island

countries.

Fifth, we are pursuing an aggressive economic and trade agenda in Asia. 2011 is a

year of consequence for the United States to demonstrate economic leadership in

the region and shape the agenda for future years to accelerate regional economic

integration. We are taking a three-pronged approach to driving successful


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engagement with the region: securing ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade

Agreement, achieving milestone progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership

negotiations, and concluding a successful APEC host year.

Today, the 21 APEC economies, with approximately 2.7 billion consumers,

purchase almost 60 percent of U.S. goods exports. Seven of the United States top

fifteen trading partners are in APEC. Strong Asian participation in APEC, the WTO,

and the G-20 reflects the increasing importance of Asian economies and their

centrality to strengthening the multilateral trading system and sustaining our own

economic recovery. We must ensure our competitiveness in this vital region and

promote continued integration of the U.S. economy with APEC economies, which

will benefit workers, consumers, and businesses in the region and create jobs back

here in the United States.

The region is essential to the success of President Obamas National Export

Initiative, and our goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015 to create new American

jobs. In the first year of the National Export Initiative, U.S. exports to APEC

members grew much faster than U.S. exports to the rest of the world (non-APEC

member economies). U.S exports to APEC economies last year totaled $774 billion,

up 25 percent from 2009, while U.S. exports to non-APEC member economies

grew only about 15 percent to reach $503 billion. We are working with

governments in the region to ensure an environment in which this trend can

continue.

As we seek to achieve the Presidents goal of doubling exports over the next five

years, a tremendously important concrete step toward reaching this goal is the

U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). In December the Administration

achieved important new commitments from the Koreans on outstanding issues

that will level the playing field for U.S. automakers and autoworkers, and the

Administration will submit the agreement to Congress soon. This agreement

represents a major accomplishment for both countries and is an historic

opportunity to boost exports, create jobs, and bolster our economy. It eliminates

tariffs on 95 percent of U.S. consumer and industrial exports to Korea within five

years and significantly reduces tariffs on our agricultural exports to Korea. KORUS

is expected to increase exports of American goods by up to $11 billion based on

the tariff cuts alone of KORUS and to support at least 70,000 additional jobs on

the U.S. side alone. In addition, this agreement will support many more American

jobs by opening Koreas $580 billion services market to U.S. companies in express


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delivery, telecommunications, insurance, and other services industries. The

economic benefits for the ROK are also considerable. This trade agreement will

deliver immediate, significant economic benefits, but will also deepen our

engagement and strengthen our partnership with a central ally in a volatile and

rapidly growing region. In strategic terms, it will underscore our commitment to

prosperity and security in the Asia Pacific and fortify our leadership role and

influence in the region.

Another important pathway to expanding U.S. economic engagement in Asia, and

increasing U.S. exports to dynamic Asian markets, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership

agreement, or TPP. The nine (10) APEC economies involvedAustralia, Brunei,

Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States

represent almost 40 percent of APECs total goods and servicesexports. With

these economies we are negotiating a new template for a high-quality, high

ambition, 21st century trade agreement. This is a strategic agreement that is

central to enhancing the 21stcentury supply chain and new economies of IT and

green growth, and one that supports high labor standards and the environment.

We have now had a number of rounds of TPP negotiations, and we look forward to

working in partnership with Congress as we continue towards realizing this

important agreement.

And, in 2011, the United States is hosting APEC for the first time in 18 years,

providing us with unique opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to and

engagement in the region and to shape the organizations agenda in ways that

reflect our values, promote regional economic integration, and create opportunities

for U.S. businesses and workers in this dynamic region. The first round of Senior

Officials Meetings took place here in Washington earlier this month, and we will

have a busy APEC schedule as we build to the APEC Leaders Meeting, which

President Obama will host in Hawaii in November. We have set an ambitious

agenda that challenges APEC to maximize tangible, practical results, particularly inthe area of removing trade barriers, promoting green growth, and building

regulatory convergence among APEC economies. To that end, the President has

laid out three priority areas to guide APECs agenda in 2011 to build towards a

seamless regional economy: (1) strengthening regional economic integration and

expanding trade; (2) promoting green growth; and (3) expanding regulatory

cooperation and advancing regulatory convergence. We are looking to conclude

specific and ambitious initiatives in each of these three priority areas this year. We

want to ensure that APEC will continue to benefit American businesses, especially


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small and medium size enterprises, and will remain focused on specific, practical

outcomes. Through APEC, we can continue to advance regional economic

integration, and by reducing barriers to trade and investment in the region, we can

increase U.S. exports and support jobs at home at the same time.

Conclusion

American leadership in the Asia-Pacific is essential to our long-term national

interests. The Administration is committed to investing in and playing an engaged

and active role in the region.The shift of geopolitical forces from the West to the

East is a defining feature of the 21stcenturys international landscape and Asia

will be the main stage for these transformations. These changes will present both

tremendous challenges and opportunities for the United States. We are committed

to meeting these challenges and seizing opportunities through high-intensity and

comprehensive engagement. We have demonstrated to the region that as a global

power, we can walk and chew gum at the same time. We can, and will continue

to be forced to, juggle multiple challenges at once. We are committed to taking

steps to further strengthen our linkages to the Asia-Pacific region to ensure the

preservation and promotion of our interests.

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and with Members of this

Subcommittee and Congress to seek opportunities to influence positively the future

direction of the region to deliver more benefit to more of our people. Thank you

for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this vitally important issue.

I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.

http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/cam033111.pdf

N.B., Numbers in brackets are referred to original pages.
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Page 1 of 7

U.S. Policy toward Burma: Its Impact and Effectiveness

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific AffairsSeptember 30, 2009 Hearings

Testimony of David C. Williams

Executive Director, Center for Constitutional DemocracyJohn S. Hastings Professor of Law

Indiana University Maurer School of Law


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Page 2 of 7

Chairman Webb, Senator Inhofe, I thank you for the opportunity to testify during this

second anniversary of the Saffron Revolution. Chairman Webb, please let mecongratulate you on your trip to Southeast Asia. I am grateful that you want to consider

the many ways that the US might promote democracy in Burma, beyond just the issue of

sanctions. Finally, and on a more personal note, please let me thank you for trying tosecure the release of Le Cong Dinh, who is the secretary general of the Democratic Party

of Vietnam. I advise the DPV on constitutional reform. Dinh hosted my family for a two

week visit in the spring, and on the day we left, he was arrested and remains in prison.We pray for his well-being and thank you for your efforts.

But we are here to talk about Burma, not Vietnam, which is a very different place. And

when thinking about US policy toward Burma, it is important to focus on the realities,even when they are uncomfortable. I would like to highlight two realities that I know

from personal experience.

Here is the first reality: the SPDC is committing mass atrocities against the ethnicminorities. I know this because I advise many of the ethnic groups on constitutional

reform, and Ivespent a lot of time with them, witnessing conditions on the ground.

Here is the second reality: even if the 2010 elections are free and fair, which they wont

be, they wont bring about civilian rule because the constitution does not provide for it--a

partially civilian government, yes, but civilian rule, no. I teach constitutional law, and Iconsult in a number of countries, and this is one of the worst constitutions I have ever

seen. The SPDC has done a good job of disguising what theyve done, but underneath

the attractive labeling, there is a blueprint for continued military rule.

Regarding the ethnic minorities, when you leave Rangoon and get up into the hills, things

seem very different. I work a lot with the Karen, who are the Scots-Irish of SoutheastAsia.1 They are a hill people, musical, clannish, and tough. They have long been

dominated by a distant government, which they have learned to distrust. As a group, they

are the gentlest and most loving people I know. But all of them were born fighting,because their government is slaughtering them as we speak. And they need our help.

Burmas problems began in ethnic conflict, and they will continue until the underlying

issues are addressed. Some people seem to think that Burmas struggle is between one

woman, Aung San Suu Kyi, who wants democracy, and one man, Than Shwe, whodoesnt. But even if democracy comes to Burma, the troubles will not end until the needs

and demands of the minorities have been answered. The resistance groups are not strong

enough to overthrow the regime, but the regime is not strong enough to crush the

resistance.

Conditions in central Burma are bad, but in the ethnic areas there is suffering on a

biblical scale, in every way comparable to Darfur. The military is making war on a

1 For more on the Scots-Irish, see James Webb, Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America

(2005).


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civilian population, and its actions likely constitute crimes against humanity. The UnitedNations has found that soldiers routinely commit rape with impunity, and rape appears to

be a policy for population control.2

By one UN estimate, officers commit 83% of these

rapes, and 61% are gang rapes.3

When outsiders try to investigate, officers commonly

threaten to cut the tongues and slice the throats of any villager who speaks to them.4

But these bald statistics cannot tell the human dimension of the suffering; reading the

individual accounts is excruciating. As just one example: Ms. Naang Khin, aged 22,

and her sister, Ms. Naang Lam, aged 19, were reportedly raped by a patrol of SPDCtroops . . . when they were reaping rice at their farm . . . Their father was tied to a tree.

Afterwards, the two sisters were taken to a forest by the troops. Their dead bodies were

found by villagers some days later dumped in a hole.5

The Tatmadaw also uses forced labor6

and is probably the greatest conscriptor of child

soldiers in the world.7

The military does not generally attack the armed resistance forces;

instead, it burns or mortars villages, over 3000 villages since 1996.8

And this has been

going on for years, creating one of the worst refugee crises in the worldone millionplus between 1996 and 2006 and one half million still displaced today.9

One woman had

to run for days through the jungle immediately after giving birth, carrying her baby in her

arms. That baby grew up, got an American law degree, and she is now a research fellowin my Center. And she is a miracle of survival.

China cannot ignore the ethnic minorities, because it has had to deal with a wave of

refugees, driven there by the SPDCs attacks. Beijing publicly rebuked the regime forcreating regional instability, which of course would be grounds for Security Council

intervention. In other words, on this point, China and the US appear to be on the same

page with respect to Burma: we all want the attacks to end.

So what policy recommendations follow from this reality?

First, the US should supply humanitarian aid not just through Rangoon but also across theborders to the ethnic minority areas. The programs in central Burma cannot get out into

the hills, and as a result, the people who are suffering the most are receiving the least.

Second, the State Department has told us that the regime wants closer relations and willappoint an interlocutor. But if we are going to enter dialogue with the junta, we must

2

See Crimes in Burma: A Report by International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School at 51-64. This definitive report analyzes and synthesizes the United Nations reports documenting human rights

abuses in Burma.3

See id. at 59.4 See id. at 60.5 See id. at 55.6 See id. at 15-16.7 See Human Rights Watch, My Gun was as Tall as Me:Child Soldiers in Burma (2002).8 See Crimes in Burma,supra note 1, at 40.9 See id.


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first demand an immediate end to the attacks on civilian populations. Otherwise, we willbe directly dealing with murderers still in the midst of a killing spree.

Third, Burma will never know peace or justice until there are trilateral talks between the

SPDC, the democracy forces, and the ethnic minorities. The international community has

long known this truth, but the regime has proved unwilling. If we are going to opendialogue with the regime, we must insist that they engage not just with the NLD but also

with the minorities.

My second subject is the 2010 elections. We all would like to hope that they will usher

in a new era of possibility. But in fact, they wont bring peace or civilian rule. The run-up to the elections has already brought more violence, not less. Overwhelmingly, the

resistance armies have rejected the SPDCsdemand that they become border guard units

after the elections, and the SPDC has responded by attacking the Kokang. The conflict

will only increase when the regime moves against larger groups: we will soon see

fighting with the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and others.

We know for a fact that the Burmese military is gearing up for offensives around thecountry and that the resistance groups are getting ready to resist attacks. The mountains

will run with blood.

So the elections wont bring peace; they also wont bring civilian rule. Some think that

we should try to ensure that the elections are free and fairbut that really matters only ifthe elections will actually lead to civilian rule, which they wont. The constitution allows

the Tatmadaw to keep however much control it likes.

I clerked for Ruth Bader Ginsburg years ago, and she always taught us to read laws veryclosely. This constitution bears particularly close reading, because it is much worse than

is generally reported. A lot of people worry that the Tatmadaw will dominate the

government because they will appoint 25% of the various legislative bodies. But theres

a much bigger problem: under the constitution, the the Tatmadaw is not subject to

civilian government, and it writes its own portfolio. It can do whatever it wants.

The Constitution guarantees the power of the Tatmadaw in its section on Basic

Principlesa clear sign that the framers thought the role of the Defence Services to be

fundamental. Article 20(b) provides that the military will run its own show without being

answerable to anyone: The Defence Services has [sic] the right to independentlyadminister and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces. The constitution defines the

affairs of the armed forces so broadly as to encompass anything that the Tatmadaw

might want to do. Article 6(f) provides that among the Unions consistent objectivesisenabling the Defence Services to participate in the National political leadership role ofthe State. Article 20(e) further assigns the Tatmadaw primary responsibility for

safeguarding the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of National

solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty. This regime has frequently found a threatto National solidaritywhen people merely disagree with it; it is prepared to slaughter

peacefully protesting monks. There is no reason to think that after 2010, the Tatmadaw

will think differently.


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Because the Tatmadaws responsibilities are so broadly and vaguely defined, the question

of who will have the power to interpret their scope is critical. The constitution answers

that question clearly: the Tatmadaw will have the power to determine the powers of the

Tatmadaw. Article 20(f) assigns the Tatmadaw primary responsibility for safeguarding

the Constitution. But if the military is the principal protector of the constitution, thenthe military will presumably have the final authority to determine its meaning, so as to

know what to protect. And indeed, Article 46 implicitly confirms this conclusion: itgives the Constitutional Tribunal power to declare legislative and executive actions

unconstitutional, but it conspicuously omits the power to declare military actions

unconstitutional. In other words, the Tatmadaw has the final authority to interpret thescope of its own constitutional responsibilities. Most first year law students have read a

famous portion of Bishop Hoadlys Sermon, preached before the King in 1717:

Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who

is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first spoke or

wrote them.10

And under the Burmese constitution, the Tatmadaw will be truly the

lawgiver,

not the people elected in 2010.

The Constitution further ensures that the Tatmadaw will have the power to control the

citizenry on a day-to-day basis. Under Article 232(b)(ii), the Commander-in-Chief will

appoint the Ministers for Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. The militarys

control over home affairs is especially ominous because it gives the Defence Servicesbroad power over the lives of ordinary citizens in their daily lives.

The militarys control over Home Affairs (as well as Defence and Border Affairs) will

constitute a military fiefdom, not part of the civilian government in any meaningfulsense. The Commander-in-Chief will have power to name the ministers without

interference from any civilian official. The President may not reject the Commander-in-

Chiefs names; he must submit the list to the legislature. See Article 232(c). Thelegislature may reject those names only if they do not meet the formal qualifications for

being a minister, such as age and residence. See Article 232(d). Theoretically, the

legislature could impeach those ministers under Article 233, but the Commander-in-Chiefwould merely re-appoint a new minister acceptable to him.

In addition, these ministers will continue to serve in the military, so they will be under

orders from the Commander-in-Chief, not from the President. See Article 232(j)(ii). Inother words, the Commander-in-Chief will be administering home affairs, immune from

interference by the civilian government. Theoreticallyagainthe legislature might try

to pass statutes controlling the Tatmadaw, but recallagain--that under Article 20(b), the

Tatmadaw has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of thearmed forces.

The independent power of the Tatmadaw over ordinary citizens includes the power to

impose military discipline on the entire population. Article 20 provides: The Defence

10 See Choper, Fallon, Kamisar, and Shiffrin, Constitutional Law: CasesCommentsQuestions,page

1 (Ninth Edition 2001).


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Services has the right to administer for participation of the entire people in Union securityand defence. In other words, the military may forcibly enlist the whole citizenry into a

militia so as to maintain internal security. And, again, the civilian government has no

control over the militarys operations. After the elections, Burma will be a military

dictatorship just as much as now.

In short, during normal times, the Tatmadaw has constitutional power to do anything it

wants without interference from the civilian government

No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011

Documents

Transcript of No 5 - Sunday, October 30, 2011