Neighboring Insurgency

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Neighboring Insurgency: How are the Syrian Crisis and International Responses Driving Lebanon to Fragility Trap? Leila Nicolas, PhD [email protected] www.leilanicolasr.com www.leilanicolas.com

Transcript of Neighboring Insurgency

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Neighboring Insurgency: How are the Syrian Crisis and International

Responses Driving Lebanon to Fragility Trap?

Leila Nicolas, PhD

[email protected]

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In this paper, I assume that the effects of the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the international responses are deeply and negatively affecting the Lebanese State's existence, leading Lebanon to "fragility trap".

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Is Lebanon a fragile State?

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Is Lebanon a fragile State?

Actually, Lebanon is a middle income country, which was not really a ‘fragile state’ before Syrian crisis ,but had "Situations of fragility“.

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The Syrian War ( March 2011- …)

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Lebanon: Open border policy

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Syrian Spillover Consequences

• Violent conflicts, terrorism and organized crime increased in Lebanon:

• Sunni Radicals called for supporters to back Syrian opposition thus sending arms and fighters from Lebanon to Syria , while Hizbullah (Shia) intervened in Syria to back Asaad regime, this escalated more sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

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Stability and Security effects

A- Fighting in Tripoli between the Alawites who support Syrian regime and Sunnis supporting Syrian opposition.

B- Several terrorist attacks and suicide bombers blew in Tripoli, Beirut and Bekaa.

• Jihadist groups frequently claim responsibility for those.

C- crimes increased dramatically.D- Weapons are being smuggled in both directions

between Lebanon and Syria.

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Demographic stress

• UNHCR have registered around 1.1 million Syrian refugees.

• Lebanese officials: more than 1.3 million Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon by May-2014 (37% of Lebanon’s pre-crisis population)

• 500,000 Palestinian refugees• 50,000 Iraqi refugees

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Economic and Social Stress• 5.7 billion $• lost economic activity till Summer 2013• 170,000• Lebanese expected to fall into poverty by 2014, in addition to

the current 1 million poor• 10%• increase in unemployment rate in Lebanon• 340,000 Lebanese • expected to join the ranks of unemployment • $348-$434 millionneeded by Lebanon's public education system to accommodate all

the additional Syrian students

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Economic and social Stress• 1.1 billion $• The grow of total budgetary spending by the Government alone• 2.6 billion $• The deficit of public finances has widen• 1.5 billion $• Is the estimated to cut in revenue collection• 589 million $• the fiscal cost on infrastructure• 1.1 billion $• required for stabilization of infrastructure • including 258 million$ for current spending

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Political and Institutional Effects

A – Tensions among LebaneseB- Increasing tensions between refugees and

host communitiesExample: Ersal province, has 40,000 Lebanese

inhabitants, hosts 120, 000 Syrian refugees.C- Crises of state legitimacy and authority• Postponing parliamentary elections from May 2012 to Nov.

2014.• Presidential void started at 25th of May 2014.

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WHY?

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Work, Settle freely, International Aid

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Donors' Policies

• Western donors countries as well as Gulf states have been reluctant to disburse substantial funds to the Lebanese government.

• As a result, the international aid was managed around the Lebanese government in direct cooperation with non-state actors on the ground or the refugees themselves… leading to increased burdens on Lebanese institutions.

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WHY?

• More than 40% of the 1.1 million registered refugees (UNHCR) came from non- conflict areas in Syria.

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Direct cash programs

• In Lebanon, Cash delivered via ATM card has become the preferred modality used by international donors for:

• food, non-food needs, winter assistance etc..• the experience in Lebanon prove that "giving

cash directly had some benefits, however it affected negatively the host communities and put pressure on Lebanon.

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Disadvantages of Direct Cash

• Discriminated between refugees …Caused tensions among them , and the hosting communities.

• Caused 100% raise to the prices of food and suppliesA small refugee family gets an average cash of 280 $ per

month, while the average wage in Syria for a non- skilled person is about 68 $ and a “university graduate” employee wage is 115$ (2013- 2014)

officials say: 20% percentage of registered refugees, pass the Lebanese- Syrian border at the end of each month to collect their vouchers or Cash money…..then go back to Syria.

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Solutions

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Suggested Solutions

First- Keep the current policies and let the Lebanese State collapse.

Second- Pragmatic Approach:Doing things differently; e.g. doing things

outside traditional expertise in dealing with refugees’ crisis.

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Pragmatic Approach

• Step ONE- Classify Refugees: Category 1- who are really in need for humanitarian assistance, those

should be on the top of assistance priority.Category 2- who came from prior conflict- now safe areas; but may

have no homes or places to live. This category should be encouraged to return, on condition that aid and assistance be delivered by UN in Syria.

Category 3- Economic refugees should be encouraged to return to their homelands, the aid assistance in Lebanon should be stopped.

Category 4 –Syrian workers previously working in Lebanon, and registered as refugees to benefit from aid. Those should never benefit from any aid program, as they are exploiting the funds.

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Pragmatic Approach-2

Step TWO- Help the Lebanese government to develop a new strategies to preserve both the Lebanese state and Syrian refugees.

Step Three- Long term projects targeting three dimensions:• A. Enhancing the security of both refugees and Lebanese

citizens; providing humanitarian relief based on humanitarian needs only.

• B. Contributing to a legitimate government with sufficient capacity;

• C. Creating a peace dividend.

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Syrian refugees voting in Lebanon

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Future- oriented dilemma It has been accepted that:• When governments are unwilling or unable to protect

their citizens, the international community then steps to take this responsibility.

But, what if practicing this international responsibility becomes a cause to depriving another state's citizens from their rights?

what if taking this responsibility is leading another state to the edge of civil war, or to collapse?.