Crime and Insurgency

8/7/2019 Crime and Insurgency

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Crime andInsurgencyin the Tribal Areas ofAfghanistan and Pakistan

HARMONY PROJECT

AuthorGretchen Peters

EditorDon Rassler


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Finally, I want to thank my husband and daughters, who have endured without

complaint the longhours Ihaveput into thisproject.Theyare the reason Iwant the

worldtobeasaferplace.TambienagradezcoaSocorroEspinosaJimnez.Respetomuchosu

manera

de

vivir

la

vida

con

amor

y

cario

para

todos.

GretchenPeters

Denver,CO

October2010


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LISTOFACRONYMS

FATA FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(Pakistan)

HIG HizbeIslamiGulbuddin

HQN HaqqaniNetwork

HuJI HarakatulJihadalIslami

IED ImprovisedExplosiveDevice

IJU IslamicJihadUnion

IMU IslamicMovementofUzbekistan

ISI InterServicesIntelligenceDirectorate(Pakistan)

JDQ JamaatudDawaalQuraniWalsunna

KPP KhyberPakhtunkhwaProvince(Pakistan,formerlytheNWFP)

LT LashkareTaiba

LI LashkareIslami

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NDS NationalDirectorateofSecurity(Afghanistan)

PKR PakistaniRupees

QST QuettaShuraTaliban

QZG QariZiaGroup

SIM ShuraIttihadulMujahideen

TTP TehrikeTalibanPakistan

TTS TehrikeTalibanSwat

TNSM

Tehrik

e

Nifaz

e

Shariat

e

Muhammadi

UAE UnitedArabEmirates


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY............................................ .............................................. ............................. iINTRODUCTION............................................ ............................................. ........................................... 1SECTIONI: AFGHANISTAN................................................. ........................................... ............ 11SOUTHERNAFGHANISTAN................................................ ............................................ ................... 15

Kandahar,Helmand,Zabul,UruzganandOtherAreas ............................................ .... 15SOUTHEASTERNAFGHANISTAN .............................................. ........................................... ............ 34

Paktika,Paktia,Khost,GhazniandLogar ........................................... ................................ 34NORTHEASTERN

AFGHANISTAN............................................. ........................................... ............ 39

KunarandNuristan ............................................. .............................................. ......................... 39NORTHERNAFGHANISTAN............................................... ............................................ ................... 43

KunduzandOtherProvinces............................................ ........................................... ............ 43SECTIONII: PAKISTAN ........................................... ............................................ ........................... 51KHYBERPAKTUNKHWAPROVINCE................................................ ........................................... .... 58

Swat,Dir,MalakandandBunerAgencies .................................................. ........................ 58FEDERALLYADMINISTEREDTRIBALAREAS ............................................... ................................ 69

KhyberAgency ................................................ ............................................. ................................. 70 BajaurAgency ................................................. ............................................. ................................. 73 NorthWaziristan........................................... .............................................. ................................. 79 SouthWaziristan........................................... .............................................. ................................. 82 OtherMilitantEntities ............................................... ............................................ ................... 88

CONCLUSION.................................................. ............................................. ......................................... 90APPENDIXA: SAMPLEHARMONYDOCUMENTS.............................................. ........ 94APPENDIXB: EXAMPLEOFTALIBANTAXRECEIPT ............................................ .... 98


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i

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Insurgentand terrorgroupsoperating in the tribalareasofAfghanistanandPakistan

aredeepening their involvement inorganized crime, an aspectof the conflict that atoncepresentsenormouschallengesandalsopotentialopportunitiesforCoalitionforces

tryingtoimplementapopulationcentriccounterinsurgency(COIN)strategy.Withina

realmofpoorgovernanceandwidespreadstatecorruption,antistateactorsengage in

andprotect organized crimemainly smuggling, extortion andkidnappingboth to

raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of

development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a

sustainable liciteconomy.Militantgroupsoneithersideof thefrontierfunction likea

broad

network

of

criminal

gangs,

not

just

in

terms

of

the

activities

in

which

they

engage,butalsointhewaytheyareorganized,howfundsflowthroughtheircommand

chainsandhowtheyinteractandsometimesfightwitheachother.Thereisnodoubt

thatmilitant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to

criminalprofiteering,alongwith thegrowingnumberofciviliancasualtiestheycause

onbothsidesof the frontier,havesimultaneouslycontributed toawideningsenseof

angerandfrustrationamonglocalcommunities.Throughaseriesoffocusedandshort

anecdotalcasestudies,thispaperaimstomapouthowkeygroupsengageincriminal

activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or

changingand illustratehow insurgentand terrorgroups impose themselveson local

communitiesas theyspread tonew territory. It ishoped thatacloserexaminationof

this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as

illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderateMuslim

leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better

protectinglocalcommunitieswhoarethemainvictimsofit.

MainFindings

Organizedcrimefundsthemilitantsaswellasprofitingcorruptstateactorsandregional power brokersamplifying and sustaining the conflict by spreading

insecurityandgraft,slowingdevelopmentand reinforcingperceptions that local

governmentsareweakandineffectual.


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ii

The insurgencys involvement in organized crime presents an untappedopportunitywithin thewiderCOIN campaign.While there have been laudable

efforts by the Coalition to reduce civilian casualties and to disrupt militant

violence,military forces stand to further improvecommunity relationsbybetter

protectinglocalsfromwidespreadcrime.

Coupledwith increased levelsofviolence,militant ties to crimehavepromptedgrowingnumbersof localcivilians toquestion the stated religious,politicaland

ideological motives of the insurgents. To the extent that Coalition and local

security forces and officials are seen as improving governance, they could

capitalizeonwideningdisillusionmentwithastrategiccommunicationscampaign

thathighlightsthepredatorybehaviorofthemilitants.

Aswithcriminalgangsandmobfamiliesinotherpartsoftheglobe,rivalriesovercriminalprofits create structuralweaknesseswithin and between insurgent andterror groups in theAfghanistan/Pakistan frontier. These structuralweaknesses

could be exploited in order to disrupt funds reaching militant coffers and to

degradelevelsofmilitantcooperation.

Afghanistan

TheAfghanTaliban,orQuettaShuraTaliban(QST),hasreshuffled itscommandstructure and issued a newCode ofConduct to exert control over unruly sub

commanders,streamline

the

flow

of

drug

and

other

criminal

funds

and

attempt

to

improve relationswithAfghancivilians.These initiativeshavenotbeenentirely

successful,althoughtheQSTdoesreceivewidespreadpraiseforitsshadowjustice

system,andforitspracticeofpunishingitsowncommanders.

TheQST increasingly behaves like a traditional drug cartel.Apparentlyseekinghigherprofitmargins, theQSTnowfocuses lesson taxingpoppy

farmers,havingturneditsattentiontothemoreprofitableprocessingand

exportingendofthebusiness.

Taliban leaders now demand that money earned from extortion andnarcotics flows direct into central coffers instead of being controlled bydistrictlevelcommanders.

TheHaqqaniNetwork (HQN) appears to collaborate closelywith the PakistaniTalibanandalQaida,both in termsof launching terrorattacksand, specifically

with the Pakistani Taliban, engaging in illicit activity, particularly kidnapping.


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iii

Abductionmay be theHQNs largest revenueearner. The group also protects

smugglersandextortsbusinessesinitscontrolzones.

HezbeIslamiGulbuddin (HIG)protects the smuggling of lootable resources in

theeast,competingforbusinessagainstlocalgroupstiedtoalQaida.

All three insurgent factions launchedoperations inAfghanistansnorth in 2009.Themannerinwhichinsurgentssetaboutraisingfundsandfoughtoverrevenue

streamsillustratesthefinancialmotivesbehindtheirtactics.

Pakistan

Aweb of interlocking strategic and economic bargainsprompt factions of theTehrikeTaliban Pakistan (TTP) to collaborate for the purposes of launching

attacks and engaging in organized crime. However, internal squabbles haveprevented the TTP from presenting a unified front. Many intergroup

disagreementswerereportedlyaboutmoney.

While some factions appear to command powerful criminal empires,othersseemtobestrugglingforcash.

There appears to be sporadic cooperation on organized crime betweenmembersoftheTTPallianceandothergroups,andindicationsthatsome

criminal proceeds are sent up the command chain to the TTP emir.

Moneyand

technical

expertise

also

flow

between

groups.

The Afghan Taliban has tried to manage and shape the TTPs trajectory bysupporting alliances, such as the Shura IttihadulMujahidin, yet there are a

number of indications that the TTPthrough its violent acts and criminal

activityistarnishingandthreateningtheAfghanTalibanbrandname.

EvidencethatPakistaniTalibanandAfghanactors,suchastheHaqqaniNetwork,arecooperatingoncriminalandmilitaryactivitiescontradictsPakistanieffortsto

makeadistinctionbetweengoodandbadTaliban.

AlQaidaappears tohave coopted somePakistani extremistgroupspreviouslyunderthewingofPakistansspyagency,theInterServicesIntelligence(ISI).While

there is little evidence directly linking alQaida to criminal activities there are

widespread indications thegroup isgaining influenceover localmilitantoutfits,

includingtheTTP,whichoftenrelyuponcriminalenterprisesforfunding.


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1

INTRODUCTION

Amideffortstodevelopapopulationcentricstrategy intheAfghanistanandPakistan

war theaters,NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO)commanders, localofficialsandmembersoftheinternationalcommunityworkingtostabilizetheregionroutinely

overlook the extent to which local civilians are victimized and frustrated by illicit

activitiescarriedoutbyinsurgents,extremistgroupsandthelocalgangsterswithwhich

some radical Islamistsassociate.The tribalareasofAfghanistanandPakistanarenot

thefirstconflictzonewhereorganizedcrimehasbecomeamajordestabilizing factor.

Wartime networks in Bosnia, for example,morphed into political criminal networks

thatwere tied to tax evasion, smuggling,andhuman trafficking,according toa2000

U.S.

government

study.1

Ties

between

the

Kosovo

Liberation

Army

and

Balkan

smuggling networks also slowed efforts to stabilizeKosovo.2 In amore recent case,

organizedcrimeinpostBaathistIraqbecametheunrecognizedjokerinthepack,as

PhilWilliamsputit,fundingalQaidaandJaishalMahdi,aswellasanumberofSunni

tribesthatinitiallyfoughtU.S.forces.3Whetheritisdrugtrafficking,kidnapforransom,

robbery, extortion, smuggling or protection rackets, organized crime not only helps

fund antistate actors across the region, it is also a key element of their asymmetric

warfarecampaign,spreading instabilityandfear.While the insurgencys ties tocrime

createmanychallenges,theysimultaneouslypresentopportunitiesfortheInternational

Coalitionand theAfghanandPakistanigovernments.4Abetterunderstandingof the

criminalinsurgentrelationshipisthereforecriticalinordertodefineandtargetenemy

networks,andtodisruptwhateverpoliticalcapitalinsurgentsgainfromthisactivity.5

1U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeinInternationalRelations,Bosnia:CrimeandCorruption

ThreatenSuccessfulImplementationoftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,TestimonybyHaroldJ.Johnson,19July

2000,pg.3.2Formoredetail,seeUnitedNationsOfficeofDrugsandCrime,CrimeanditsImpactontheBalkans

andAffectedCountries(March2008),http://www.unodc.org/documents/dataand

analysis/Balkan_study.pdf.

3PhilWilliams,Criminals,MilitiasandInsurgents:OrganizedCrimeinIraq,StrategicStudiesInstitute

(June2009),www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf.4Scholarshavecharacterizedinsurgentinvolvementinillicitactivityasbeingadoubleedgesword.See

JohnT.PicarelliandLouiseI.Shelley,OrganizedCrimeandTerrorism,inTerrorismFinancingandState

Responses:AComparativePerspective,ed.JeanneK.GiraldoandHaroldA.Trinkhunas(PaloAlto,CA:

StanfordUniversityPress,2007),3955.5QuotefromlettertotheNationalSecurityAdvisor,GeneralJamesJones,fromtheSenateSelect

CommitteeonIntelligence,seeCatherineCollinsandAshrafAli,FinancingtheTaliban:Tracingthe


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2

Perhaps the most significant challenge is that the complex relationship between

insurgentactorsandillicitactivityservestoamplifyandsustaintheinsurgencyinboth

Afghanistanand

Pakistan,

seriously

undermining

the

authority

of

both

governments.

Tounderstand the immense challenge that organized criminal activitypresents, it is

important toacknowledgearelevantandgrowingbodyofacademic literatureon the

roleoforganizedcrime inrecentcasesof insurgencyandcivilconflict.This literature

probes the effectof illicit economiesonmilitary conflictandhow thevarious factors

influencingcriminalitycanalterthetrajectoryofbelligerentgroups,suchastheFuerzas

ArmadasRevolucionarias deColombia, or FARC. There is good reason to give this

scholarship close attention and to examine themotives conflict actorsmay have for

sustaining conflict. A wellknown World Bank study by James Collier and Anke

Hoefflerprovidesreasons toquestion theassumption that insurgentactorsaredriven

solelybypoliticalgrievances,showingthateconomicmotivationsalsoplayakeyrolein

sustainingdisorder.6JamesFearons2004studyfoundthatconflictsinwhichtheactors

dependeduponvaluablecontraband lastedfivetimes longerthanotherconflictson

average.7AsthecurrentphaseofthewarinAfghanistanpushesintoitsninthyear,itis

nowmorepertinentthanevertostudytheeconomicdriversofthisconflict.

CollierandHoefflersanalysissuggeststhatgreedisacausalfactordrivingamajority

ofcontemporarynonstatearmedactors,andthereisreasontoapplythisassessmentto

theAfghanconflict.Historicalassessmentsof theTalibansrisenote thekey role that

Pashtun truckinggroupsandsmugglersplayed infirstbankrolling thegroup,andby

mostaccounts theTalibanweredeeply involved inprotecting theopium tradebefore

foreigntroopsarrivedin2001.Thisreportdocumentsthecontinuationofthosetiesand

explorestheintegratedrelationshipbetweenotherinsurgentandcriminalactorsinthe

tribal areas ofAfghanistan andPakistan.While it is not alwayspossible to separate

whethernonstatearmedactorsaremotivatedbygreedorgrievance, it isoftenclear

DollarsBehindtheInsurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistan,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePolicy

Paper(April2010). 6PaulCollierandAnkeHoeffler,GreedandGrievanceinCivilWar,OxfordEconomicPapers56,no.4

(August2004),563595.7JamesFearon,WhydoSomeCivilWarsLastsoMuchLongerthanOthers?,JournalofPeaceResearch

41,no.3(May2004),275301.ThisfindingisconcerninggiventhattheAfghanwarisalreadyconsidered

thelongestwarinU.S.history.


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3

that thebalanceshiftsover time.Onecan findvarious indications in thisbattlespace

and otherswhere an insurgent group thatwas firstmotivated to action forpolitical

reasons laterfoundbenefits in illicitenterpriseand thereforeanadditionalreason to

continuefighting.

8The

prevalence

of

organized

crime,

and

the

extent

to

which

militant

groupsappeartobedeepeningtheirinvolvementinit,raisesthepossibilitythatcertain

factionsoftheinsurgencyinAfghanistanandPakistanaremotivatedmorebyprofit

or,inotherwords,greedthanthepoliticalgrievancesoverwhichtheyclaimtofight.

Scholarshavenotedhow themotivationof insurgentactorscanaffect thedurationof

conflictandcomplicateeffortstopromotestability.9Militantgroupsonbothsidesofthe

DurandLinehavecapitalizedon legitimatepolitical,ethnicandeconomiccomplaints

heldbymembersofthelocalcommunity,andthereisscantevidencethatthelowrank

membersof insurgentand terrorgroupsoperating in theAfghanistan/Pakistanregion

takeuparms inorder toenrich themselves,orearnmuchonce theydo.At thesame

time, however, there is clear evidence that the continued state of insecurity richly

benefits a smallnumberof elites onboth sidesof thebattlefield,giving both corrupt

stateactorsandmilitantleadersafinancialincentivetosustainthedisorder,regardless

ofwhether theirwiderpoliticalandothergoalshavebeenmet.Buildingastablecivil

societyandcapablegovernmentinstitutionsinsuchcontextswillnodoubtbedifficult.

Attempts to eliminate illicit behavior often serve only to stoke the flames of the

insurgency,especiallywhenthepopulacedependsoncriminalproceedstosurvive,and

efforts tocombat the insurgencymayboostdemand forcriminalactors tosupply the

insurgentsandbribecorruptlocalofficials.Thiscycleisdifficulttobreak.

The presence of lootable resourcestypically narcotics, timber and gemstonesnot

onlytendstogeneratesubstantialeconomicbenefitsforinsurgentgroups,butalsocan

become a critical source of income for civilians in lethally uncertain conflict

8

Similar

arguments

have

been

made

about

other

terrorist

groups,

for

example

Ryan

Clarke

and

Stuart

Lee,ThePIRA,DCompany,andtheCrimeTerrorNexus,TerrorismandPoliticalViolence20,no.3

(Summer2008),376395.9Forexamplesee,Caroline Hartzell,Matthew Hoddie andDonald Rothchild,StabilizingthePeace

AfterCivilWar:AnInvestigationofSomeKeyVariables,InternationalOrganization55,no.1(Winter

2001),183208;DavidE.Cunningham,VetoPlayersandCivilWarDuration,AmericanJournalofPolitical

Science50,no.4(October2006),875892;MatsBerdalandDavidM.Malone,eds.,GreedandGrievance:

EconomicAgendasinCivilWar(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,2000);andChrisDishman,Terrorism,

Crime,andTransformation,StudiesinConflictandTerrorism24,no.1(2001),4358.


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environments.10 All of these lootable resources are abundant in different regions of

AfghanistanandPakistan,andthisreportconfirmstheirroleasanimportantsourceof

fundingforinsurgents,especiallyastheymoveintonewterritory.Somescholarshave

arguedthat

control

over

such

resources,

or

industries,

provides

insurgents

with

opportunitiestogainpoliticalcapital.11Forexample,byprotectingtheilliciteconomy,

belligerents can protect the local populations livelihood from government efforts to

suppress it.12 Such regulation can help an insurgent group to curry favor or gain

legitimacy andadditionalpopular support,particularly from thosewhobenefit from

the industries being protected. According to Vanda FelbabBrown, just how much

politicalcapitalinsurgentsacquireisdependentuponanumberofconditions,suchas

thenatureof the illiciteconomyand thegovernmentsresponse to it.Thisreportalso

finds that thequalitative characterof the insurgents involvement in these industries

canpositivelyornegativelyaffecthowthatactivityisperceivedbythecommunity.

Insurgents in theAfghanistanPakistan region rely heavily on kidnapping, extortion

androbberytosustaintheircoffersandalsotospreadfear.AsJohnPicarelliandLouise

Shellypointout,suchactivitiesareattractivetoinsurgentsandterroristsbecausethey

havelowbarrierstoentryandrequireforcebutlimitedskill.13Engaginginthistypeof

illicit activity serves to reduce their risk by diversifying their income streams and

increasing their financial liquidity.14At the same time,kidnapping,attackson supply

convoys andwidespreadprotection racketshavedramatically increased security and

other costs for the Coalition, local governments and international organizations

working in the region, slowing the pace of development and reconstruction and

spreadingtheperceptionthatlocalgovernmentsareweakandineffective. Thevicious

cycle ofdevelopmentprojects andbusinesses thatpayprotection to insurgents,who

thenusethefundstobuyexplosivesandattackCoalitiontroops,createsamoralhazard

fortheinternationalcommunityandcontributestoaselfsustainingwar.

10KarenBallentineandJakeSherman,eds.,ThePoliticalEconomyofArmedConflict:BeyondGreedand

Grievance(Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers,2003);BerdalandMalone. 11VandaFelbabBrowndefinespoliticalcapitalasbeingcomprisedoflegitimacyandpopularsupport.

SeeVandaFelbabBrown,ShootingUp:CounterinsurgencyandtheWaronDrugs(BrookingsInstitution

Press,2010). 12Ibid.,17. 13PicarelliandShelley,3955.14Ibid.


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thispathofstrifebetweenthetruthandtheeviltoobtainmaterialgoals.They

haveloftyIslamicandnationalistaims.20

Whatever

legitimacy

such

claims

may

provide,

there

are

growing

indications

that

militantinvolvementinorganizedcrime,coupledwithhighlevelsofterroristviolence,

haveunderminedpublicsupport,particularlysincelocalcommunitiesvirtuallyallof

them fellowMuslimsare themainvictims.Whilemilitantsmayprotect some illicit

economiesand,indoingso,gainpoliticalcapitalfromcommunitymemberswhoseek

toprotect their incomesourcemilitant interactionwithcivilians isalsopredatory in

nature,both in termsof the taxesandprotection fees themilitantscharge,and to the

extentthattheinstabilitytheycreatehampersthedevelopmentoflicitalternatives.Put

another way, members of the local community may at times cooperate with the

militantsforeconomicreasons,oroutoffear,butthatcooperationdoesnotnecessarily

indicate themilitants have been embraced as a popular force. Indeed, in a growing

numberofdistrictsonbothsidesof theborder,wheremembersof thepublicopenly

admit they initiallywelcomed the insurgents aspotential emancipators from corrupt

and ineffective governments, themilitants are now perceived bymany community

members as violent gangsters. Recent public surveys confirm these accounts and

indicate that approval ratings for the insurgents are dropping on both sides of the

DurandLine.Thirtypercent ofPakistanis had a favorable opinion of theTaliban in

2009,downfrom67percentin2008,accordingtoaPewsurvey.21Meanwhile,90percent

ofAfghanssurveyedinaJanuary2010ABC/BBCNewspollpreferredthegovernmentof

President Hamid Karzai to the Talibanan increase of eight points over a figure

providedayearearlierwhile69percent,anewhigh,describedtheinsurgentsasthe

nationsgreatestthreat.22Althoughsomeanalystshavequestionedthehighfavorability

ratesthattheKarzaigovernmentearnedintheABC/BBCpoll,lowanddeclininglevels

ofpublicsupportfortheinsurgentscouldbetrackedacrossseveralpollstakenin2009

20Forthefullstatement,seeTalibanDeputyAmirObamasNewStrategy,30October2009,

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaAkhund1109.pdf.21GrowingConcernsaboutExtremism,ContinuingDiscontentwithU.S.,PewResearchCenter,13

August 2009,http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/265.pdf.22ViewsImproveSharplyinAfghanistan,ThoughCriticismsoftheU.S.RemainHigh,ABCNews,11

January2010.ThispollwasconductedwiththeBBCandARDGermanTV.Pollresultscanbeseenat

http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistanabcnewsnationalsurveypollshow

support/story?id=9511961.


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in both countries, reaffirming the general accuracy of the ABC/BBC poll.23 Afghan

civilians justifiably blame the Karzai government for not protecting the populace

againsttheTaliban,andreproachKabulforfailingtoprovidejobsanddevelopment.At

thesame

time,

the

publics

hostility

towards

the

militants

was

palpable

in

dozens

of

interviewsconductedforthispaper.Risinglevelsofpublicantipathymayaccountfor

why theAfghanTalibanappear tobe trying to reduce theexploitationofcivilians in

their control zones, and could explain late 2009 denials by the Pakistani Taliban of

involvementinsuicideattacksthatclaimedhighnumbersofciviliancasualties.24

U.S. forcesand theNATOCoalitionwhichalsoremainunpopularandaresimilarly

blamed for widespread insecuritycould potentially improve levels of community

supportandcapitalizeonpublicdisgusttowardsthemilitantsbydevelopingstrategies

to protect civilians victimized by organized crime and violence.25 The Pakistan

governmentandmilitary, forexample,wasable to takeadvantageofamajorshift in

publicperceptiontowardtheTalibaninSwataspartofitssuccessfulefforttoretakethe

valley.Localgovernments,widelyperceivedascorrupt,couldalsoimprovetheirimage

bymakingeffortstostampoutcrimeandreducecorruption.Separately,rivalriesover

criminalprofitscreatestructuralweaknesseswithinandbetween insurgentand terror

groupsintheAfghanistan/Pakistanwartheater.Exploitingthoserivalriesandbreeding

distrust could serve to degrade levels of militant cooperation and disrupt funds

reachingmilitant coffers. This strategy is risky, however, to the extent that it could

23JeanMacKenzie AreAfghansReallyHappy?,GlobalPost,23January2010.Thisarticlenotesthat

thereislittleempiricalevidenceofoptimismamongmanyordinaryAfghans,suggestingthatthe

numberscouldreflectasenseofhopethingswillimprove,ratherthanexpectations.Formoredetail,see

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100118/afghanistanopinionpoll.A2009surveybythe

AsiaFoundationalsofoundAfghanstobegrowingmoreoptimistic,butbyasmallermargin.That

surveycanbeseenathttp://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2009AGpollKeyFindingsFINAL.pdf.A

2009surveybythesameABC/BBC/ARDconglomeratetrackeddroppingconfidencelevels.Thatdatais

foundathttp://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf. 24

On

17

November

2009,

al

Qaidas

video

production

arm

as

Sahab

issued

a

video

statement

by

TTP

spokesmanAzamTariqdenyingresponsibilityforrecentbombexplosionsinPeshawarandIslamabad,

whichheblamedonPakistansInterServicesIntelligenceDirectorateandtheU.S.contractingfirmXe,

formerlyknownasBlackwater. 25SixintenAfghansviewtheworkoftheU.S.andtheNATOCoalitionpoorly,accordingtotheABC

Newspoll,althoughthatreflectsa10percentimprovementoverlastyearsrate.Meanwhile,64percentof

thePakistanipublicregardstheU.S.asanenemy,accordingtoanAugust2009Pewsurvey,whileonly9

percentdescribeitasapartner.SeeGrowingConcernsaboutExtremism,ContinuingDiscontentwith

U.S..


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8

sparkinternecineviolenceandcontributetomoreciviliancasualties.

Thereasonsforthelocalpopulationsupporting,toleratingoropposingillicitactivityin

theregion

are

complex

and

varied,

but

they

remain

central

to

disrupting

the

criminal

insurgent relationship.TheworkofFelbabBrown servesan important reminder that

sometimesprogramsdesigned tostop the flowof funds to insurgents,suchaspoppy

eradication campaigns, could endup strengthening them and the local support they

derive.26 Effective solutions to these multifaceted challenges require an improved

understanding of the criminalinsurgent nexus and the landscapes uponwhich this

activitytranspires.Tothatend,andasafundamentalstartingpoint,thisreportaimsto

mapouthowmilitantantistateactors located in the tribalareasofAfghanistanand

Pakistanengage inandearnfromcriminalactivity.27Thismonographdoesnot intend

to present an encyclopedic or empirical catalogue of how insurgents and extremist

groups engage in organized crime, but rather aims to provide brief anecdotal case

studies that are representative of key organizations operating in areas of strategic

concern.Leveraging firsthandaccounts, this reportexamineshow theseactivitiesare

perceived by local communitymembers who live in these areas. Lastly, using the

northernAfghanprovinceofKunduzandPakistansSwatValleyandBunerDistrictas

minicasestudies,thisreportexploreshowlocalTalibanandothermilitantsestablished

theircriminalenterprisesandbegan toearnoff localcommunities immediatelyupon

pushing into new territory. It is hoped that this studywill bring some clarity to an

extremely complex phenomenon and prove useful to those developing policies and

plansfortheAfghanistan/Pakistanregion.

26FelbabBrown.27Foradditionalperspectives,seeCatherineCollinsandAshrafAli,FinancingtheTaliban:Tracingthe

DollarsBehindtheInsurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistan,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePolicy

Paper(April2010);ArabindaAcharya,SyedAdnanAliShahBukhari,andSadiaSulaiman,Making

MoneyintheMayhem: FundingTalibanInsurrectionintheTribalAreasofPakistan,StudiesinConflict

andTerrorism32,no.2(2009),95108;ThomasH.Johnson,FinancingAfghanTerrorism:Thugs,Drugs,

andCreativeMovementsofMoney,inTerrorismFinancingandStateResponses:AComparativePerspective,

ed.JeanneK.GiraldoandHaroldA.Trinkhunas(PaloAlto,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2007),93114.


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9

MethodologyandCaveats

Informationpresented in thisreporthasbeencompiledmainlyfrom localcommunity

members inareaswhere insurgentsandextremistsoperate.Thereareadvantagesand

drawbacksto

field

based

research

in

aconflict

zone,

and

there

are

particular

challenges

associated with the Afghanistan/Pakistan border areas, many parts of which are

inaccessibletoforeignandlocalresearchersalike.Membersofthecommunityareable

toprovidealevelofimmediacyandintimacythatfewoutsiderswouldbeabletoattain

on theirown,but relianceon their largelyanecdotal informationalsomakes thedata

presentedhereinharder tocorroborate.Given this limitedaccess, it isalsodifficult to

establish how representative the views expressed by those interviewed are of the

broader population. Complicating matters further, examining illicit activity is a

challenging prospect in any environment, since most crime goes unreported and

criminalactorstendtolie.

Thereisnowaytocompensatefortheseissuesentirely,buteachcasestudypresented

inthisreporthaseitherbeencorroboratedbyAfghan,PakistaniandWesternofficialsor

themediaandotheropensourcereporting,orwasrecountedbyenoughsourcestobe

consideredgenerallyaccurate.Despite thefactthat tendifferent localresearchers,few

ofwhomhadanycontactwitheachother,interviewedciviliansacrosstheconflictzone

intwocountries,theyfoundastrikingsimilarityinresponses,bothintermsofthetypes

of criminal exploitation civilians suffered, as well as their quiet state of rage and

frustrationabouttheproblem.

TheU.S.Militaryalsosharedwiththeauthoraraftofdeclassifieddocumentsseizedin

Afghanistan and stored in theHarmony database,which also served to corroborate

localreporting.Readersshouldbeawarethatanalyzingsuchdataisfraughtwithrisk.

Documents intheHarmonydatabasewerecollectedonthebattlefieldunscientifically.

ThereisnowaytoknowhowrepresentativedocumentscapturedbyU.S.forcesareof

the largerbodyof informationproducedbytheTalibanorother insurgents.Likewise,

the vast database inwhich they are stored is imperfect and virtually impossible to

search systematically.Readers and researchers should therefore bewary of drawing

conclusionssolelyfromthesedocuments.


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10

OrganizationoftheReport

This report isdivided into twomain sectionsAfghanistanandPakistanwith each

beingfurtherorganizedbysubgeographicareaandthemilitantgroupspredominately

activein

those

specific

regions.

Such

territorial

boundaries

are

in

no

way

confining

in

actuality,sincethesphereofoperationsofmilitantgroupscanneverbeconfinedtoone

specificagency,districtorprovince.Casesofoverlappingmembership,foreignadvisors

whooperatewithinlocalinsurgentfightingunitsandthecrossborder,intraprovincial

relationsbetween thevariousmilitant factions furthercontribute to thecomplexityof

the subjectmatter.This report isnotanexhaustiveexplorationofallmilitantgroups

operatinginAfghanistanandPakistan;forthesakeofbrevityandanalyticalfocus,the

report intentionallydisregardssmallerandlessactivemilitantentities.SectionIofthe

report explores the criminal activities of the three main factions of the Afghan

insurgency:theQuettaShuraTaliban(QST),theHaqqaniNetwork(HQN)andHizbe

slamiGulbuddin(HIG).Itpaysparticularattentiontothesignificantwaysinwhichthe

QSThasrevamped itscommandstructureandstreamlined thewaymoneyflows into

centralcoffers.SectionIIreviewstheactivitiesofanumberofmilitantgroupsalongthe

easternsideoftheDurandLine,includingthefivemainfactionsoftheTehrikeTaliban

Pakistan,knownbyitsUrduacronymtheTTP.Toalesserextent,italsoexaminesother

local,regionalandinternationalextremistgroups,includingTehrikeNifazeShariate

Muhammadi (TNSM),HarakatulJihadalIslami (HuJI), theQari Zia Group (QZG),

LashkareIslami (LI), the IslamicMovement ofUzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad

Union(IJU),alQaidaandLashkareJhangvi.

NoteonTransliteration

TransliterationoftheshortvowelefollowsEncyclopaediaIranicaguidelines.28

28Forreferenceseehttp://www.iranica.com/pages/guidelines.


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11

SECTIONI: AFGHANISTAN

In parallel to U.S.led efforts to reshape NATO strategy in Afghanistan,29 Mullah

MohammedOmar,

the

leader

of

the

Quetta

Shura

Taliban

(QST)

also

altered

his

tactics,

orderinghis commanders to avoidkilling localsordamaging theirproperty inwhat

could be seen as a populationcentric approach, Taliban style. Central to this new

approachwasthe2009releaseoftheTalibansthirteenchapterCodeofConduct,which

instructed its subcommanders to treat villagers fairly, broadened its shadow

government and its Sharia court system that settles local disputes, and appointed

provinciallevel commissions where civilians could bring complaints about local

commanders.30TheCodeofConductrepresentedatacitacknowledgementbytheQST

leadership that itsviolent tacticshadbecome a strategic risk for the insurgency.But

whilethepopulationcentricaspectsoftheQSTsshadowgovernmenthavereceived

attentionfromacademicandmilitarycircles,aswellasfromthemedia,therehasbeen

lessfocusonaseparatemotivationMullahOmarmayhavehadforrevampingstrategy

andtighteninghisgriponthesometimesfractiousinsurgencyhecommands.Asmuch

astheTalibanCodeofConductcouldbeinterpretedasaheartsandmindscampaign,

itcanalsobeseenasaneffortbyMullahOmartoincreasehiscontroloverfundsraised

through illicitactivity. Indeed, inaddition toattempting tobringunrulyvillagelevel

Talibancommanders into line, thenewstrategygives lowerranking insurgents fewer

opportunities toearnmoneyat theground level, thusmaking thecommandersmore

dependenton theTalibans tenmanrulingcouncil,orShuraMajlis (referred toas the

Quetta Shura), for funding.Various chapters of thedecree appear aimed at limiting

localcommandersfromtaking theirowndecisionsorearningfundsat the local level,

instead ceding all authority to the provincial commissions and the Taliban supreme

leadership.These initiatives appear to have been effectivedespite theFebruary 2010

arrests of key Taliban officials in Pakistan,which briefly led to conjecture that the

Talibansshadowgovernmentwouldbesignificantlydisrupted.Itisworthnotingthat

theTalibans influenceandreachhasspreaddramatically in thepast18months,with

30AnEnglishlanguagetranslationoftheCodecanbefoundat:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf.


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12

some80percentofAfghanistanwitnessingatleastsomeinsurgentactivityandasmuch

asonethirdofthecountryundertightTalibancontrolformuchof2009.31

Inaddition

to

evaluating

the

Talibans

streamlined

system,

this

section

also

examines

howvariouscomponentsof theQST,aswellasotherAfghan insurgentgroups,raise

funds through organized crime. The three separately commanded factions of the

Afghan insurgencythe QST, the Haqqani Network (HQN), and HizbeIslami

Gulbuddin (HIG)appear to bewellfunded, and the array of criminal activities in

which their fighters have participated in recent years have widened as fresh

opportunities to raise funding presented themselves.While the opium trade likely

provides the largest percentage of income for the QST in southern and western

Afghanistan,wherethebulkofthecountryspoppycropiscultivatedandlaterrefined

intonarcotics,insurgentsalsoappeartohavedeepenedtheirinvolvementinotherillicit

activities,mainlykidnapping, taxing the trafficof legal commodities and extorting

localbusinessesanddevelopmentprojects.InpartsofAfghanistanwherethereislittle

ornopoppygrown,insurgentsseemtorelymoreheavilyonkidnapping,shakedowns

andprotectingother smuggledgoods, ranging from timberandgemstones topeople

andlegalgoodsliketiresandcookingoil.

TheHaqqaniNetwork,basedinsoutheasternAfghanistanandnamedforthelegendary

mujahidin leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, appears to depend heavily for funding on

kidnapping schemes run incollaborationwith factionsof thePakistaniTaliban.32The

HizbeIslami Gulbuddin, which operates mainly from eastern and northeastern

Afghanistan, collaborates with traffickers and traders to protect licit and illicit

commodities smuggled from its control zones, but there are fewer reports of HIG

commandersengaginginabductionforransomschemes.33Insomeareas,theHQNand

31PersonalinterviewbyauthorwithDavidKilcullen,WashingtonD.C.,27October2009.32

Authors

interviews,

Arlington,

VA,

26

October

2009

and

by

telephone,

10

November,

2009;

Ashraf

Ali,

PakistaniCriminals,TalibanSeeEasyCashinKidnapping,SanFranciscoChronicle,13July2008.Fora

detailedaccountofanabductionontheAfghansideoftheborder,inwhichthevictimsweretakento

PakistanandshiftedamongcompoundsbelongingtothePakistaniTalibanandtheHaqqaninetwork,see

DavidRohde,HeldbytheTaliban,NewYorkTimes,17November2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html.33ForabreakdownofHQNandHiGspheresofinfluenceinsoutheasternAfghanistan,seeSebastien

Trives,RootsoftheInsurgencyintheSoutheast,inDecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghan

Field,ed.AntonioGuistozzi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),89100.


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13

HIG factions seem to operate alongside theQSTestablished shadow regime, neither

opposing itnorworkingwithin it. Inotherareas, therearesignsof rivalryandcases

wherethefactionshaveopenlybattledeachother.

Partly in response to thearrivalof thousandsofU.S. troops insouthernAfghanistan,

local and foreignmilitants have become active in greater numbers in the countrys

northparticularly in provinces like Kunduz and Badghiswhere they have

immediately set to earning from the localpopulation and collaboratingwith existing

smuggling networks.34 The manner in which QST, HIG and HQN militants began

interacting with the local communitycollecting taxes and extorting traders and

businessesprovides awindow into how they operate, and also illustrates how the

threefactionsinteract,cooperateandattimescompetefordominance.

34Accountsofthenumbersofforeignfightersoperatinginthenorthvary.TheKunduzgovernor,for

example,estimatedtherewereaboutfifteentotwentyUzbekfightersoperatinginhisprovince,but

civiliansputthenumberatmorethanonehundred.Therewasnowaytoverifytheseparateclaims.


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14

Map1:GeneralBreakdownofTaliban/InsurgentAreasofActivityinAfghanistan


24/107

15

SOUTHERNAFGHANISTAN

Kandahar,Helmand,Zabul,UruzganandOtherAreas

Overview: The strongest militant force in southern Afghanistan, the Quetta Shura

Taliban, increasinglybehaves likea sophisticated criminalcartel,controlling complex

extortionandprotectionracketsandexertinginfluenceoveranenormoussupplychain

ofillicitnarcotics.Apparentlyseekinghigherprofitmargins,theQSThasalsoturnedits

attention to themoreprofitableprocessingandexportingendof theopiumbusiness.

Recently,theQSThastakennumerousstepstomanageitsimageandimproverelations

with localcommunitymembers,mostnotably through the2009releaseof itsCodeof

Conductand theestablishmentofprovincialcommissionsacrossmostof thecountry.

Whiletheseinitiativesareviewedpositivelybysomelocals,theycanalsobeinterpreted

as an effort by the leadership to gain control overmoney flow and key aspects of

strategicdecisionmaking.

Inthefirsthalfof2009,theQuettaShuraTalibanappearedtobeshoringupitspolitical

position andmaking strategicpreparations for the surge ofU.S. troops. In the early

monthsof theyear,MullahMohammadOmar, the reclusiveoneeyed founderof the

movement,namednewregionalcommandersandshuffled the lineupof itsexecutive

council.Later,inJune,heissuedanewCodeofConductinanapparentattemptbothto

exert control over unruly Taliban subcommanders and to improve relations with

ordinary Afghans by establishing a civilian shadow government at the local level.

Underthenewstructure,theTalibanalsocreatedprovinciallevelcommissionswhere

Afghans could present their requests or complaints to a local council of religious

scholars,who thenansweredback to theexecutivecouncil.36Theoverhaulappears to

TheactivitiesandinfluenceoftheQuettaShuraTalibancannotbeconfinedtoseveralprovinces,one

geographicareaorregionalcommand,butinsteadarepervasivethroughoutAfghanistan. Atthesame

time,whiletheQSTisthemostprominentandimportantactorinsouthernAfghanistan,itisnottheonly

militantactoroperatinginthisarea.

36TheQuettaShuraissonamedbecausetheTalibanleadershipiswidelybelievedtotakeoperatefrom

thewesternPakistanicityofQuetta,inBaluchistanprovince.Inrecentmonths,therehavebeenopen

sourcereportssuggestingthattheTalibanleadershiphasshiftedtothesouthernportcityKarachioutof


25/107

16

havebeenbothtacticalandfinancialinmotive.Thereasontheychangedtheirtacticsis

thattheywanttoprepareforalongtermfight,andforthattheyneedsupportfromthe

people; they need local sources of income, saidWahidMuzhdah, a formerTaliban

officialwho

now

tracks

the

insurgency

on

the

Internet.

37The

command

overhaul

also

appeared aimed at stamping out rivalries over local sources of funding, and

streamlining howmoneymade its way back to the Quetta Shura, thus giving the

leadership more control over subcommanders and other lowerranking fighters

(discussed further below). Money is not a problem for them, said an Afghan

provincialgovernor,buttheyarerealizingthattheyneedtocontrolitbetter.38

AKinder,GentlerTaliban?

Certainpassages in the 2009Code ofConduct, aswell as theupdated 2010version,

provideguidelines thataim tominimize thevictimizationofordinaryAfghans.The

Talibanmust treat civiliansaccording to Islamicnormsandmorality towinover the

heartsandmindsof thepeople,says thenewsixtyninepageTalibanbooklet,which

waspublished shortlybefore the topNATO commander in the country,Gen.David

Petraeus, issued guidelines that also urged soldiers to avoid civilian casualties. All

effortsmustbemade to avoidharming civilians in attacks.39While the hearts and

mindspassageof theCodeofConducthas receivedwidespreadattention, therehas

been less focusonaparallelmotivation for thenewTaliban rulebook:TheCodealso

lays out strict instructions for field commanders on money matters, literally

institutionalizinghowprofitsearnedfromorganizedcrimearetobedistributedwithin

thecommandchain.Forexample,theCodesaysthatTalibansoldiersarepermittedto

keepupto80percentofwhateverbootytheycapturefromaninfidelcombatantor

Coalition base. But it says that onefifth of the value or property seized must be

transferred to the shadowprovincialgovernor, inmuch the samewaymobstersand

gangmembersmustkickaportionof theirearnings to theirboss.TheCodesimilarly

fearthatanintensiveU.S.leddronecampaignintheFATAwouldbeextendedtoBaluchistantotarget

QSTleaders.Seeforexample:ImtiazAli,KarachiBecomingaTalibanSafeHaven?CTCSentinel,

January2010,p13.TheQSTnumbertwo,MullahBaradar,wascapturedinKarachiinFebruary2010,

followedshortlythereafterbyasmanyasfourotherTalibanofficialsinotherpartsofthecountry.37AlissaRubin,TalibanOverhaulTheirImageinaBidtoWinAllies,NewYorkTimes,21January2010. 38Afghanofficial,inpersonalinterviewwithresearchassistant,LashkarGah,July2009.39MatiullahAchakzai,TalibanCodeofConductSeekstoWinHeart,Minds,AssociatedPress,3August

2010.


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17

outlineshow tohandleshakedownsandextortionfees,banningprovincialordistrict

level Taliban commanders from directly making deals with local businesses and

companies.Disputesonissuesrelatedtobusinessesandcompaniesshouldbereferred

tothe

leadership,

the

Code

insists.

This

would

suggest

the

QST

is

evolving

into

an

organization that more openly functions like a traditional mafia, with strict rules

governing criminal earnings, and where the Shura has final say in all matters of

collectingprotectionmoney.

One of the architects behind these reformswasMullahAgha JanMutassim, a close

confidantofMullahOmarwhochaired theTalibanspowerfulFinancialCounciluntil

hewasarrestedbyPakistaniofficialsinthesouthernportcityofKarachiinMarch2010.

According to local sources, it wasMutassim, along with the Taliban number two,

MullahBarader(alsoarrestedbyPakistaniauthoritiesin2010),whoconvincedMullah

OmaroftheneedtoreducethefinancialexploitationofthelocalpopulationbyTaliban

fighters, arguing that the insurgents risked losing the cooperation of the civilian

population.40Afghanofficialsand tribalsourcesclose to theTalibansaybothBarader

andMutassim worried that internecine fighting between Taliban subcommanders,

particularlyovermoneyandresources,hadbecomedetrimentaltotheoverallstrength

and unity of themovement.41 ApparentlyMutassim feared a return of the kind of

violence that occurred in the early 1990s,when rivalmujahidin commanders turned

theirgunsoneachotherandterrorizedlocalcommunitiesacrosssouthernAfghanistan.

Before his capture, Mutassim also pressed Omar to purge unruly commanders

(discussedfurtherbelow)andtosplitfromthuggishcriminalgangswhocooperatewith

the Taliban at the village level.42 Perhaps even more significantly, Mutassim

implementedaseriesof reforms (discussed furtherbelow) thatstreamlinehow funds

collectedatthelocallevelreachtheTalibanscentralcoffers,meaninghestandstohave

significant intelligencevalue in termsof theTalibans finances.He is like theAshraf

Ghani of the Taliban, said an Afghan official who tracks the Taliban leadership,

referringtotheformerAfghanfinanceministerwhoranforpresidentonacampaignto

stamp out graft and who was instrumental, until he resigned from the Karzai

40Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistant,Kabul,JulyandAugust2009. 41Afghanofficials,inpersonalinterviewswithresearchassistants,KabulandKandahar,July2009. 42Ibid.


27/107


28/107

19

The Taliban field commander also carried a document naming two insurgent

commanderswhohadbeengiventheresponsibility tocollectdonations fromall the

peoplethat

have

gardens

Stay

away

from

this

job,

otherwise

you

will

be

in

trouble.

46

Inanothercase, theTalibancommission inHelmandcastigateda judge inMusaQala

whomtheTalibanhadappointed.OnejudgewasfoundtakingabribeandtheTaliban

putblackalloverhis faceand tiedhim toa tree,businessmanEitadullahKhanwas

quotedassayingbytheAssociatedPress.47Whenhewasreleased,hewasfired.48

Such behavior stands in stark contrast to theKarzai government,which has largely

refused to investigate accusations ofwidespread corruptionwithin its ranks. Local

community members interviewed for this paper praised the insurgents for their

willingnesstodisciplinetheirownfighters.Butsomeciviliansalsosaidtheydecidedto

utilize the Taliban justice system partially out of fear, apparentlyworried about the

potential consequences of local Taliban finding they had turned to the local

government.

The provincial commissions are also a significant development from a financial

management standpoint, having the power to issue decrees using the stamp of the

IslamicEmirateofAfghanistan,theofficialtitleoftheTalibangovernment.49Theyhelp

theQuettaShuramaintaincontroloverfundsraisedatanddispatchedtotheprovinces.

Eachcommissionhasapoliticalandeconomiccommittee,accordingtolocalswhohave

dealtwiththem,andeachgetsasetbudget,decidedbyandnegotiablewiththeQuetta

Shura.Wardakprovince, for example, receivedabudgetofabout$36,000permonth

through2009,whilemoreactivecombatzoneslikeGhazniandZabulreceivedasmuch

as$107,000monthly,according toasenior InteriorMinistryofficial inKabulwhohas

seeninterceptedTalibandocumentsoutliningthequantities.50Thecommissioncontrols

46Ibid.47KathyGannon,TalibansShadowGovernmentPosesChallengetoElection,USTroops,Associated

Press,18August2009. 48Ibid. 49Afghanofficials,inpersonalinterviewswithresearchassistant,Kabul,July2009.50Interviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,August2009.Thisinformationwascorroboratedinpartbyan

AfghanmilitaryintelligenceofficialinGhazniwhoconfirmedthatTalibancommandersinhiszonewere


29/107

20

howmoney is earnedat thevillage level in eachprovince,yet theQuetta leadership

shuffles commissionmembers on a frequent basis, inwhat appears to be a bid to

preventanyoneindividualorgroupfrombecomingtoopowerful.Itremainstobeseen

howthe

February

and

March

2010

arrests

of

key

members

of

the

ruling

Shura

and

provincialTalibanofficialswillaffectthisprocess.

TalibanCommandPurge: BringingIndividualsinLine

MullahOmaralsopurgedanumberofcommanders,mostnotablyMansoorDadullah,

whowerenotfollowingorderssentdownbytheseniorleadership,andaccordingto

somesourcesforpocketing too largeashareof themoney rather thansending it to

Quetta.51 Several years ago, Omar also disciplinedMansoor Dadullahs notoriously

violentelderbrother,MullahDadullah forsimilar transgressions.TheelderDadullah

waskilledina2007firefightinHelmand,amidrumorsthatrivalriesovermoneyledto

hisdeath.52AspokesmanfortheTalibancalledthemediainlate2007toannouncethat

MansoorDadullah,whohadassumedmanyofMullahDadullahsresponsibilities,had

beenfiredbecausehedisobeyedordersoftheIslamicEmirate.53

The QST leadership also attempted to deal with was the fact that Taliban sub

commanders routinely bickered among themselves over operational issues and

competedforfundsraisedthroughorganizedcrimeatthevillagelevel.Researchersfor

this paper heard ofmultiple cases where QST commanders across the south were

disciplined, demoted, and shifted to new regions, or even pushed out of the group

entirelyiftheywerefoundtobecollectingfundsinareasoutsidetheirassignedcontrol

zones,oroverexploiting the localpopulace.Insomeareas, theTalibanalsodistanced

itself from localcriminalgangsduring2009,although localsandgovernmentofficials

alikesaythat insurgentscontinuetosubcontract localcriminalgangsonanasneeded

basisinregionswheretheinsurgentsarelessdominantorwheretheyareattemptingto

establishwidercontrol.

receivingbudgetsworthmillionsofPakistaniRupeesmonthlyandbyaprovincialofficialoftheNational

DirectorateofSecurity,whoconfirmedthe$36,000budgetforWardakprovince. 51Interviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,August2009.52Formoreonthisepisode,seeGretchenPeters,SeedsofTerror(NewYork:StMartinsPress,2009),127.53TalibanSacksKeyRebelCommander,AgenceFrancePress,29December2007.


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21

There are tantalizing indications that efforts to reshuffle Taliban commanders and

impose more control over their ability to earn funds independently has partially

backfired for the QST leadership, possibly exposing a strategic weakness of the

organization.Sources

close

to

the

movement

told

researchers

that

some

QST

commanders had rebelled against efforts to rein them in, sometimes violently. In a

December 2009 Kabul press conference, Afghanistans National Security Council

appearedtocorroborateatleastonereport,sayingtheKabulgovernmenthadreceived

intelligenceindicatingthatMullahOmarhadsackedtwomoreTalibancommandersin

the poppyrich districts ofArghandab inKandahar andGereshk inHelmand. Jamil

Bahrami, director of strategy at the National Security Council said some of the

command changes have triggered differences and oppositions among local Taliban

commanders,accordingtoalocalnewsreport.54ThepossibilitythatQSTcommanders

areresistingorevenrevoltingagainsteffortstocutthemofffromlocalfundingsources

may indicate those specific commanders weremore driven by profitmotives than

political allegiance to the Taliban, and that the new streamlined system could be

threatening,ratherthanstrengthening,theShurasstrategiccontroloveritsnetworkin

someareas.That said it is alsoa sign that theQST leadership ispositioning itself to

governAfghanistan,andinsomepartsofthecountrymaybedoingamoreeffectivejob

thantheKabulgovernment.

AMixedRecord: LocalPerspectivesandEnforcementoftheCode

WhileordinaryAfghanscomplainaboutcriminalvictimization,manynotethatcorrupt

actors in the Afghan government engage in the same activities. In someways, the

Talibanwinpraise from local communities,particularly for itsvillage justice system

anditspracticeofpunishingitsownmembers.Yetitisimportanttorecognizethatthe

Talibanhasneitherbeenentirelysuccessful in implementing itsCodeofConduct,nor

entirely innocenton the chargeof attacking civilians. Indeed, theTalibans efforts to

reachouttocivilianswereunderminedbyanincreaseinsuicidebombings,Improvised

ExplosiveDevice(IED)attacksandtargetedkillingsbyinsurgentsthatwerecreditedby

theUnitedNationswithcausing67percentof theciviliandeaths inAfghanistan that

year.55Moreover,manyAfghanscontinuetofaceoratleastperceiveatangiblelevel

54DarzHaBaineSofoofeTalibanGushaadTarMigardand,ArmaneMelli(inDari),23December2009. 55AJanuary2010reportbytheUNAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)saidtheTalibankilled

2.73timesmoreciviliansin2009thanprogovernmentforces.UNAMAblamedTalibaninsurgentsfor


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22

of threat if they do not abide by Taliban decrees. There seems to be no let up

whatsoever, for example, in the vicious punishments handed out by the insurgents,

withlocalsinthesouthsayingQSTcommanderscontinuetoholdpublicexecutionsof

anyonesuspected

of

spying

for

the

Coalition.

56People

cooperate

with

the

Taliban

outoffear,saidAbdulGhani,directoroftheAfghanNationalPolicesantiterrorism

departmentinGhazniprovince.IftheTalibansensetheslightestwhiffofespionageby

local individuals, they instantly kill those peoplewithout anymercy.57When U.S.

Marinespushed intoMianPosteh inHelmandprovince,villagers initially refused to

frequentthebazaartheAmericantroopscleared,sayingtheTalibanhadthreatenedto

chopofftheirheadsiftheydid.ThereareTalibaneverywhere,villageelderHajiFada

MohammedtoldtheMarines.IfItellyouwhotheyare,Iwillbeindanger.58

ManagingtheirImage: TheTalibanasImpoverishedHolyWarriors?

Tomanagepublicperceptionsandtominimizeassociationwithillicitactivity,Taliban

membersroutinelycastthemselvesaspoormujahidin,livingoffthealmsofthepeople,

withnoambitionotherthandrivingoutforeigninvadersandestablishingSharialaw.

Inonestatement,postedona jihadiwebsiteinJuly2009,anallegedTalibanfighter in

thesouthclaimed:Ifthepeoplefromthevillageswouldnothavefeduswewouldnt

have the money to feed ourselves.59 This deliberate strategy may be intended to

facilitatedonationsfromtheGulfandalsotodisguisemilitantinvolvementincrime.It

isalsolikelygearedtogivetheperceptionthatpoliticalandideologicalgrievances,and

notprofit,are themaingoalsof theresistance.Closer inspectionof theQSTactivities

would appear to indicate greed plays a strong role in determining Taliban activity,

however.

The Taliban ferociously rejects any suggestions it is receiving funding from foreign

1,630civiliandeaths(67percentofthetotalrecordeddeaths)in2009,a41percentincreaseon2008,when

1,160

deaths,

or

54

percent,

were

attributed

to

the

insurgents.

For

detail

see

Afghanistan:

Over

2,400

civiliandeathsin2009UNAMA,IRIN,13January2010,

http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87716. 56Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistant,LashkarGahandKandahar,July2009.57Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,July2009. 58AnnScottTyson,InHelmand,CaughtBetweenU.S.,Taliban,WashingtonPost,15August2009. 59Forthefullstatement,seeJihadiDiscussionForumPostingClaimsTalibaninDesperateNeedof

Money,NEFAFoundation,7July2009,

www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_talibanmoney0709.pdf.


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23

governments,suchasPakistan,IranandGulfnations.Despitetheclearevidenceofthe

QSTs close ties to drug smugglers in southern Afghanistan andwestern Pakistan,

Talibanleadersalsopubliclydenytheirinvolvementinthecountrys$4billionpoppy

trade.When

asked

by

aWestern

interviewer

about

massive

opium

stockpiles

that

were

seized inMusaQala afterNATO forces retook the town from the Taliban in 2007,

spokesmanZabiullahMujahidresponded:

TheTalibanarenot trading inopium.TheTalibanwant to fight theirenemy

anddefeat them.Thosewhoaredealing inopiumareothers,smugglerswith

nothing todowith theTaliban.As tothosewhowerekeeping theopium,the

Talibandidnothaveanyauthorityover them.TheTalibanareagainstdrugs.

DuringtheTalibanregime,thewholeofAfghanistanwasdrugfree;atthetime,

nobodywoulddaretokeepevenamon[7kilograms]ofdrugsintheirhouses.60

Mujahidwaspartiallyaccurate.TheTalibanasanorganizationdidnotatfirsttradein

opiumper se, but commanders haveprotected, taxed, and collaborated closelywith

smuggling groups that do since the Taliban first emerged in the early 1990s. The

spokesmansstatementalsoobscuredthefactthattheTalibanpermittedandtaxedthe

cultivationand trade inopiumpoppy from1996 to1999,onlybanning farmers from

growingpoppy in theyear2000.61Thatyear,Talibanofficialscontinued to taxopium

marketssellingstockpilesofopiumgumandalsocollectedrevenueatdrugrefineries.

QSTIncreasinglyEngagedinProcessingandExportingNarcotics

Western estimates of theQSTs annual earnings fromnarcoticsvary byhundreds of

millionsofdollars.Althoughmost analystsagree that it isnotpossible todetermine

preciselyhowmuch theQSTearnsfromopium,norestimatewhatportionof its total

budgetcomesfromnarcotics,seniorU.S.militaryintelligenceofficialsandmembersof

theAfghanThreatFinanceCell,an interagencybody trackingTalibanfinance,believe

theAfghan insurgency is now selffinanced and that narcotics likely represents the

60Forthefullstatement,seeExclusiveInterviewwithTalibanSpokesman,NEFAFoundation,4January

2008,www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefatalibanintvu0108.pdf. 61Forfurtherdetail,seeUnitedNationsInternationalDrugControlProgram,AfghanistanOpium

Survey2001;Peters,Ch.3.


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largestportionofQSTfunding.62TheTalibanprofitsfromtheopiumtradeinfourmain

sectors:bytaxingpoppyfarmers10percent(ushr)oftheirfarmoutput;bychargingfees

toprotectopiumshipmentsandheroinrefineries;bytaxingand,increasingly,running

theirown

drug

labs;

and

by

collecting

large

cash

payments

made

to

the

Quetta

Majlis

bymajor traffickinggroups.Of thesesums, taxcollected from the farmersappears to

representthesmallestportionofthe insurgentstake,andtheseearningsbyand large

remainatthevillagelevel.Subcommandersoftencollectopiuminkind,laterreselling

whattheycollecttolocalagentsinordertocovertheirownoperationalcosts.

Following the arrestsof anumberof leadingAfghandrug traffickers, seniorTaliban

commandersinthesouthappeartobetakingabroaderroleinthedrugtrade,moving

intothemoreprofitableprocessingandexportingendofthebusiness,andshiftingtheir

focusoffoftaxingpoppyfarmersanddrugconvoys.Thisshiftinfocusfromfarmlevel

taxationtotheprocessingandexportingendofthedrugtradeindicatesthattheQSTis

behavingmore likeadrugcartel.U.S. lawenforcementandmilitaryofficialsarenow

trackingmorethanthreedozenseparatesmugglingoperations,manyofwhichappear

toanswerdirectlytotheQST.63Toseparatethedrugsmugglersfromtheinsurgencyin

thesouth isnowalmost impossible,saidaU.S.officerwhoclosely tracks theopium

trade.64

Large,Pakistanbased smuggling rings thathave long collaboratedwith theTaliban,

known collectively as theQuettaAlliance, appear to have lost adegree of influence

following the arrests of a number of key drug kingpins. The Quetta Alliance has

historicallyincludedfourclanrunsmugglingorganizations.HajiJumaKhan(HJK)ran

thelargest,knownastheKhanOrganization,untilhisOctober2008arrestinIndonesia.

HajiBashirNoorzai reportedly commanded another clanbased groupuntil his 2005

arrest.The 2009 capture ofHajiBaghChagul, a.k.a.HajiBajcho,who arrived in the

United States in June 2009, was another significant interdiction that illustrated the

financialscaleofthesmugglingoperations.WhenU.S.agentsraidedBajchoslairthey

found logbooks indicating that$169millionhadpassedthroughhishands inthepast

62Personalinterviewsbyauthor,Washington,DC;seealsoAfghanistansNarcoWar,14. 63PersonalinterviewsbyauthorwithU.S.lawenforcementandmilitaryintelligenceofficials,Washington

D.C.andbytelephoneAugustandSeptember2010.64Personaltelephoneinterviewbyauthor,September2009.


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25

ninemonths.65Meanwhile,Haji JumaKhansgangdominatedamajoropiummarket

out ofMarjah, a town in theHelmand River floodplainswhere Coalition forces in

February 2010 launched amajor operation to clear out the Taliban, andmaintained

multiton

storage

depots

and

drug

refineries

in

Baram

Chah,

adusty

outpost

that

straddles the AfghanPakistan border. His organization appears to have continued

functioningunderthecommandofKhansnephewandformerchiefofoperations,Haji

HafizAkhtar,althoughTaliban commanders in somedistrictsofHelmandappear to

havemuscledinonhisgroupsoperations.66

TheimmensescaleofTalibandrugoperationsbecameclearinMay2009,whenNATO

andAfghantroopslaunchedamajoroffensivetoclearmilitantsoutofanopiummarket

based inMarjah ahead of a suspected assassination plot being launched from there

againsttheHelmandgovernor.67Afterthreedaysof intensefighting,sixtyTaliban lay

deadand the troopshadseizedastaggeringninetytwometrictonsofheroin,opium,

hashish and poppy seeds, as well as hundreds of gallons of precursor chemicals,

makingitthesecondlargestdrughaulinglobalhistory.Indicatinghowcloselyopium

merchants and insurgents now work, themarket also housed a Taliban command

center, completewith elaborate communications systems, suicide vests and a large

weaponscache.68

Reliablelocalmediareportshavealsoindicatedthatwiththedecliningfarmgateprice

of raw opium, therehas been adramatic increase in thenumber of refineries inside

Talibanheld regions of southernAfghanistan capable of refining opium into crystal

heroin,thehighvalueandmostpotentversionofthedrug.AnOctober2009drugraid

onaTalibanbase inHelmandrecoveredfortyfivemetrictonsofopium,alongwitha

stunning 1.8metric tons of processed heroin, according to a press release from the

65MichaelBraun,formerDrugEnforcementAgencyofficial,inpersonalinterviewwiththeauthor,

August

2009.

66U.S.militaryintelligenceofficials,inpersonalinterviewwiththeauthor,October2009andSeptember

2010. 67Foradetailedaccountoftheoffensive,confirmedbymilitaryofficialswhotookpartinit,see

AfghanistansNarcoWar:AReporttotheCommitteeonForeignRelations,U.S.Senate(Washington,

DC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,10August2009),19,http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi

bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:51521.pdf.68Personalinterviewsbyauthor,byemail,July31,2009andSanDiego,August21,2009.HeidiVogt,

TroopsMakeLargeDrugSeizureinAfghanistan,AssociatedPress,23May2009.


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27

role in ensuring that drug and other illicit shipments get through, supported by an

elaboratewebofpayoffsmadeby thesmugglersdirectly toprovincialofficials,police

andborderguards tomakesure that the roadsareclearand thatvehiclesdonotget

intercepted.A

colorful

dispatch

published

in

the

December

2009

issue

of

Harpers

Magazine illuminates the linksbetween theAfghanborderpolicecommanderand the

drugtradeintheKandaharibordertownofSpinBoldak.74Studiesofotherpostconflict

zoneshavefoundthattryingtotransformrebelswhoengagedincrimetosupporttheir

wareffortintolawenforcementofficers,notsurprisingly,oftenresultsincorruptpolice

operations.75

OtherFeesCollectedbytheTaliban

VillagelevelTalibansubcommandersdonot justcollectafarmtitheonpoppycrops,

butdemandmonthlypaymentsfromvariousmembersof thecommunity,whichthey

define as taxes or donations, butwhich are rarely amatter of choice.TheTaliban

collect aportionofall farmoutput,whether licitor illicit,usually in the rangeof10

percent,butnegotiabledependingonthewealthofthefarmerandthelevelofinfluence

theTalibancommandsinagivenarea.Researchersforthisreportheardstoriesofpoor

farmershanding the localTalibansubcommanderas littleasabagoffruitfromtheir

annual harvest, but there were also reports that large landowners had to pay a

significantlyhigheragriculturaltithe,asmuchas20percentincertaindistrictsofFarah

province,forexample.Insomevillages, theTalibansubcommanderhas tosplitwhat

hecollectsfifty/fiftywiththelocalMullah,andinmostzones,hemustsend10percent

of his take to his provinciallevel commander.When villagelevel subcommanders

collectacommodityforwhichtheyandtheirtroopshavenouse,theywilloftensellit

toalocalbroker,knownasajalabinPashto.Althoughthispracticeisnotuniversal,in

someareastheTalibanhavebegunhandingouttaxreceiptstoensurethatvillagersand

shopkeepersarenotchargedmorethanonce(seeAppendixB).Thispracticehasbeen

implemented in northern Kunduz province, where the QST has made significant

inroads in thepastyear.76Localperceptionsof the taxation systemvary.While some

74SeeMatthieuAikins,TheMasterofSpinBoldak,HarpersMagazine(December2009),

http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/12/0082754. 75JeremyMcMullin,OrganizedCriminalGroupsandConflict:TheNatureandConsequencesof

Interdependence,CivilWars11,no.1(March2009),93. 76InformationforthisparagraphwascompiledbysixresearchersacrossAfghanistaninJulyandAugust

2009.


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28

privatelycomplainthattheydonotwanttohandovermoneytotheinsurgents,many

alsogripeabouthavingtopayoffcorruptlocalofficials,sayingthatatleasttheTaliban

have standardized their rates. In some areas, the Taliban does provide some

rudimentarygovernment

services,

including

its

shadow

justice

system

and

other

conflictresolutionservices.Italsoprovidessecurityforpoppyfarmersinsomeareas.

Inruralareaswherethereislittleuseforhardcash,andwhereopiumisoftenusedasa

form of currency, Taliban fighters often collect tax in kind, literally carting off 10

percent of a farmers crop.This is one reasonwhyCoalition troops often find large

opiumstashesatTalibanbases.Inadditiontothereceipts,recentseizuresindicatethat

that Taliban and traffickers keep careful books to document their activities. It bears

mentioning that when NATO forces capture or raid a Taliban hideout, the most

valuablepieceofevidence in thatcompoundcouldverywellbe thegrubbynotebook

full of numbers, which ordinarily might seem quite unimportant. One logbook,

obtained byCoalition troops in 2009, appears to catalogue localmeasurements and

values of opium either collected frommembers of the community or traded.77 It is

unclearifthelogbookcamefromalocaltraffickerorrepresentsataxcollectionrecord,

but the accountbooknoteswhen individualshad arrears topay off, and appears to

havebeenupdatedincaseswhenanindividualpaidoffhisbalance.

Coalition forces in Kandahar in 2009 captured another set of documents fromHaji

Abdul Ghani Mohammad, a known Taliban financier and drug trafficker, which

includeordinaryreceiptsforagriculturalequipment,fuel,motorcycles,and,inonecase,

349bagsofopiumseed.78InadditiontoordinarycustomsreceiptspaidtotheAfghan

government,Mohammadwasfoundwithalogbooklistinghisopiumsales,alongwith

adetailed recordof thezakat,an Islamic tax, thathepaid to theTaliban.Whilesome

logbooksmeasure quantities in kilograms, many employ traditional rural forms of

measurementincludingchaharak(about1kilo),mons(about7kilos)andkharwars(about

560kilos).TheysometimescomputethevalueusingPakistaniRupees,whichareoften

referredtoasKaldars.OthertimesvalueiscalculatedinAfghani,theAfghancurrency,

77HarmonydocumentAFGP2009K0000640.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe

viewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu. 78HarmonydocumentAFGP200939722613.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe

viewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu.


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or inTomans,an informal termforanIraniancurrencyunit.Some logbooksappear to

incorporatecrudecodesorlocalslang,referringtoheroin,forexampleaspowderor

simplywhite,andinsomeinstancesreferringtodrugsasgroceries.

ExtortingLocalBusinessesforCommodities,notCash

Shopkeepers and other small businesses, including pharmacies, teashops and

automotive repair stations, are required to hand over a portion of their monthly

proceedstotheTalibanusuallyintherangeof10percent,althoughthisfigureisoften

dependent on total earnings. In many cases, Taliban will ask the shopkeepers for

suppliesusefultotheirwareffort,ratherthanmoney.OnegrocerinGhaznidescribed

having to supply local insurgents with cooking oil and rice in lieu of a monthly

payment,andsaidhereceivedareceipt.79ResearchersforthispaperfoundthatTaliban

fighters routinely requested tobepaid in the formof telephonehandsetsand topup

cardsforairtimecredit,apparentlywanting tochange theirphonesregularlytoavoid

surveillance.Shopkeepersalsoreported thatTalibanwillresellcommodities that they

havecollectedastaxorconfiscatedfromlootedconvoys.Theywillcallupandsay,

wehavesometelephonesorgeneratorsorwhatever,ifyouwanttobuythem,saida

localbusinessman.80Shopkeepers interviewed for this reportalsodescribedhaving to

onpassmessagesfortheTalibanastheymovedthroughtown.Someclaimedtheydid

notwant toserveasmessengers,norhandoveramonthlyshareoftheirrevenue,but

feared the consequencesofnothelping the insurgents.The apparent resentment that

villagersharbor towards the insurgentscould representanuntappedopportunity for

theCoalition,ifNATOforceswereabletoprotectlocalbusinessesfromthispractice.

SeekingtoControltheProtectionRacket

AlthoughQSTsubcommanderscontinuetotaxfarmersandsmalltimebusinessesat

the local level, there isalsoevidence that theShuraMajlishasmoved toregulatehow

protectionmoneyiscollectedfromlargerbusinesses,aidanddevelopmentprojects,as

wellasthetruckingfirmsthatoperateonthebusyKandaharQuettacorridorandother

southernhighways.Sourcesclose totheQST leadershipsaythisdecisionwasdirectly

tiedtoMullahMutassimsconcernofareplayoftheanarchythatexistedontheroads

insouthernAfghanistanintheearly1990s.Ahalfdozentruckdriversandtheowners

79Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,August2009. 80Telephoneinterviewbyauthor,November2009.


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oftwolargetruckingfirmsinterviewedforthispapersaidthatQSTforcesinthesouth

no longer collect payments on theQuettaKandahar highway, for example. Instead,

under a system Mutassim developed, trucking firms now must deposit protection

paymentswith

specified

moneychangers

in

Quetta

and

Kandahar.

The

moneychangers

record the licenseplatenumbersof the trucksanddetailsaboutwhatcargo theywill

carry,andthemoneyishandedoverdirectlytoMutassimsFinancialCouncil.81Drivers

reported receiving a code that they couldgive to armedmenwho stop themon the

road.Thetigeriswoundedbutalive,wasacodeonedrivergaveasanexample.

Truckscarryinggoodsforthelocalmarket,ortransitingacrossAfghanistan,canexpect

topayabout10percentofthevalueoftheirshipment.Convoyscarryinggoodsforthe

Coalitiongetchargedahigherrate,whichcanrangefrom25to40percentofthetotal

valuebeingcarried,accordingtotruckersandofficialsattruckingfirms.82Amemberof

theAchakzai tribe,whichhas longdominated the transport business on theQuetta

Kandahar route, said he paid the Taliban between $95,000 and $130,000 every six

months toprotect convoyshe sends to supply theKandaharAirField.This isvery

organizedbetweenthe[Taliban]fightersandtheShura,hesaid.Yougivethenameof

thedriverandthelicenseplate,andyourtruckissafe.LowrankingTalibanwhoply

theroadsbetweenKandaharandthePakistanbordercontinuetohituppassengercars

forprotectionpayments,butthelargesumsnowgodirecttoQuetta.83

TheAfghan Taliban appear to rely on an elaborate network of informantsthe so

calledvillageundergroundtohelp themdeterminehowmuch theycanchargeeach

truckingfirmtheytarget,aswellasfamilies,businessesandaidgroups.Theinformants

getpaidofffortheinformationtheyprovide,andlocalsourcessaytheybelievebusand

taxidriversandmerchantswhohaveexcusesforleavingthevillageonaregularbasis

areroutinelypartoftheinformationnetwork.Truckingfirmswhotrytoavoidpaying

theTalibanusuallyenduppayingahigherprice.OnetruckerinKandaharrecalledthe

storyofatraderwhoimportedsparepartsfromPakistan,andwhomadethemistakeof

81Personalinterviewsbyresearchassistants,KabulandKandahar,August2009.82Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kandahar,August2009.83Sofar,thissystemseemstooperateonlyinKandaharandHelmand.InotherpartsofAfghanistan

wherethereisamixofinsurgentfactionsandcriminalgangs,truckerscanexpecttobehitupforcashon

theroads.


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bragging ina teashopat theborder thathedidntplan topayoff the insurgents.His

four vehicles barelymade it outside the governmentcontrolled border town of Spin

BoldakbeforeTalibangunmenovertooktheconvoy,anditcosthimcloseto$200,000to

buyhis

equipment

back.

84It

is

not

always

clear

if

such

tales

are

actually

true.

The

importantthingisthattheyarewidelybelievedamongthetruckingcommunity,which

doesnottakechances.TherehasbeendocumentedevidencethattheTalibanhastried

toregularize itstaxcollectionsystem.In2009,theTaliban inHelmand issued its local

representativewithanoticetoallKajakishopkeepersandtruckdriversThebearer

ofthisletterisournewrepresentative.Pleasecooperatewithhimlikeeverbefore.85

TheQuetta Shura also collectsprotectionmoney from larger businesses, notably the

telecommunications sector and construction projects funded by international aid

organizations and theCoalition. SargonHeinrich, aKabulbased businessman in the

construction and service industrieswas quoted in a September 2009 Time Magazine

reportassayingthat16percentofhisgrossrevenuewenttopayingfacilitationfees,

mostly to protect shipments of valuable equipment coming from the border.86 The

reportaptlydescribesthecircularnatureoftheproblem:theU.S.governmentprovides

money to local contractors to build roads, schools and bridges as part of the

counterinsurgency campaign, but the contractorsmust pay off insurgents to avoid

having those projects attacked. The insurgents then spend themoney they raise to

purchaseweaponsandexplosives,whichinturngetusedtokillAmericansoldiers.It

becomesaselfsustainingwar,saysanadvisertotheAfghanMinistryofInterior.A

selflickingicecream.87Inpartsofthecountrywherethereislittleornopoppygrown,

especiallyindistrictswherethereismajorconstructionworkorcentralroadwayspass

through,extortionisbelievedtobethelargestsourceofincomefortheinsurgents.This

creates a moral hazard for the international community, which seeks to stabilize

Afghanistan but inadvertently ends up financing the insurgency and the explosives

rebels use to kill Coalition troops and Afghan civilians. The U.S. Agency for

InternationalDevelopmenthasopenedan investigation intoallegations that its funds

84Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kandahar,August2009.85Harmonydocument,AFGP2009B0000598.ThisdocumentandanEnglishlanguagetranslationcanbe

foundinAppendixAandviewedanddownloadedfromtheCTCswebsite,www.ctc.usma.edu.86ArynBaker,HowCrimePaysfortheTaliban,TimeMagazine(7September2009).87Ibid.


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33

protectingthecommunityfromtheircriminalactivitiesandworkingwithlocalofficials

toimprovegovernance.

Cooperation

with

Other

Insurgent

Groups

The QST appears to have made deals with the other two factions of the Afghan

insurgency, theHQNand theHIG, tooperatealongsideeachotherand todivide the

proceeds they earn in some zoneswheremore than one faction operates.A senior

investigator with Afghanistans National Directorate of Security says that

representatives of theQST,HQN andHIGmet at the beginning of 2009 to resolve

differences that existed between them and [to settle on] the appointment of

governors and other Taliban authorities.90 BothHaqqani andHekmatyarwere told

theycouldoperateunder thebannerof the IslamicEmirateofAfghanistantheQST

flagbut could no longer maintain their own command, according to Afghan

intelligenceofficials.91Thisdealappearstohaveheldinsomeareas,buttherehavebeen

reportsofsquabblingoverearningrightsamongthevariousfactionsoftheinsurgency

in thenorthernprovinceofKunduz,andMarch2010 reportsof fightingbetween the

HIG and QST forces in Baghlan province. In one particular instance, the Pashto

languageAfghannewspaperHewadWrazpanareportedthatHIGandQSTfightershad

battledover thecollectionoftaxfrom thepopulace.ThereportquotedMohammad

AmeenMangal,aseniorpoliceofficer,assayingthatfortyfivemilitants,thirtyofthem

fromHIG,werekilledinthefighting.92

90Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Ghazni,August2009.91Personalinterviewbyresearchassistant,Kabul,July2009. 92WeekendFightingBetweenHizbiIslamiandTaliban,UrduPashtuMediaProject,SpecialDispatch

2850,9March2010,http://memri.convio.net/site/R?i=2N5cMLtXbM5P8QPlWdupeA.


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SOUTHEASTERNAFGHANISTAN

Paktika,Paktia,Khost,GhazniandLogar

Overview:Therearesigns theHQN isbecomingcloser toalQaidaand thePakistani

Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani, in terms of launching tactical

operations and attacks and, specificallywith the TehrikeTaliban Pakistan (TTP), in

smuggling, extorting protection money from local and regional businesses and

kidnappingwealthyor influential individualsaround theKhostregionandnorthwest

Pakistan.TheHQNcommandsasprawlingministateextendingfromPaktika,Paktia

and Khost in southeast Afghanistan to its rear base in NorthWaziristan,where it

appearstodependongoodrelationswithPakistansInterServicesIntelligence(ISI),or

atleastanoninterferencepact.Althoughthegroupdoesnotappeartohavedeepties

to the narcotics trade, the HQN behaves inmany ways like amafia organization,

engaginginwidespreadsmuggling,abductionandshakedownstoraisefunds.

TheHaqqaniNetwork,whichmainlyoperatesinthesoutheasternprovincesofPaktika,

PaktiaandKhost(P2K),hasamuchcloserrelationshiptoforeignjihadistelementsthat

theQST.Led by the ageingmujahidin commander JalaluddinHaqqani, a legendary

fighter during the Soviet resistance, the HQN also maintains a close working

relationshipwith the Pakistani Taliban and appears to collaboratewith the TTP in

holdingkidnapvictimssnatchedonbothsidesoftheDurrandLine.

With the elderHaqqani in poor health, his son Sirajuddin has assumed daytoday

commandoftheHQNandisbelievedbyU.S.militaryintelligencetohaveeclipsedhis

fatherintermsofbrutalityandreach.TheHQNhasbeencreditedwithmasterminding

a series of sophisticated attacks inAfghanistan in the past two years, including the

April2008assassinationattemptonPresidentHamidKarzai,theJanuary2009attackonthe SerenaHotel inKabul, the July 2009 car bomb attack on the IndianEmbassy in

KabulandamultistagesuicideattackataU.S.militarybaseinKhostinAugust 2008.

Although there has been no concerted effort to improve relations with the local

community,aswiththeQST,theHQNisknowntopayitsoperatives,aswellaslocal


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peoplewhotakeuparmsorlaunchattacksonitsbehalf,forsuccessfulmissionsagainst

theAfghangovernmentandNATO.SecurityforcesinKhostsaylocalscanexpecttobe

paid several hundred U.S. dollars to destroy a bridge or school or kill an Afghan

policemanor

soldier.

Killing

asenior

provincial

official,

aU.S.

soldier

or

destroying

a

Coalitionvehiclecanbring in$5,000ormore.Thefeesarenormallypaid inPakistani

Rupees,andcangohigher if theattackersmanage tovideo theevent.93Thenetwork

also issuesNightLetters instructing localsnot to collaboratewith theCoalition, and

warningofdireconsequences if theydisobey. Inone2009NightLetterdistributed in

Paktika,which carried the name of the Islamic Emirate but the logo of the former

Haqqanimadrassa, thegroupprohibitedmembersofthe localcommunityfromusing

roadsbeingbuiltbytheCoalition,barredcommunitymembersfromsendingtheirkids

toschoolandsaidtribalmeetings thathavebeenestablishedby thegovernmentare

alsoprohibited.94

FamilialandTribalCommandStructure

TheHQNcommandstructureremains looserandmore familial than thatof theQST,

withmostmemberscoming fromHaqqanisownZadran tribe.Unlike theQST, there

hasbeennodocumentedevidenceofaneffortbytheHQNleadershiptoassertcontrol

over upward money flows over the past year. Afghan officials and locals in the

southeastandinNorthWaziristansaytheorganizationdoesnotappeartosufferalack

offunding.95NewYorkTimesreporterDavidRohde,whowaskidnappedandheldby

theHQN formore than sevenmonthsalongwith twoAfghan colleagues,described,

both in a newspaper series and in a conversationwith the author,Haqqaniswell

suppliedoperation inNorthWaziristan,therearoperationsbaseforthenetwork,asa

Talibanministate.96NarcoticsdonotappeartoplayamajorroleinHQNfinances

since little if any poppy is cultivated in southeast Afghanistanand the network

appearstodependfarmoreheavilyonkidnapping,protectionracketsandextortionto

raisefundslocally,accordingtoWesternan

Crime and Insurgency

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