Natural Resources, Conflict,and Conflict Resolution

8/3/2019 Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution

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Natural Resources, Conflict,and Conflict Resolution

UNCOVERING THEMECHANISMS

Macartan Humphreys

Mohsin Ayub 10566


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Background

The author links the peace/conflicts of a region withthe availability of natural resource

The relation among the civil war, resource conflictsand resource dependence is proven through rebelgreed hypothesis

Rebel Greed Hypothesis is dependent upon any oneor combination of plausible mechanisms


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Initiation

The conflict onset is more impact of past naturalresource production than potential for futureproduction

Natural Resource conflicts and weak state

Agricultural dependence

Natural resource wars


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Chad and the Oil Reserves

Tombalbaye in April 1975 was killed from successfulcoup detat.

Reasons lay with the oil in the Doba fields in the

South For almost 30 years after Chad had allowed U.S.

corporations to prospect for oil in the ex-colony Relations with France have weakened

People are against the government Control of oil revenues has been central to Chadian politics

Up to 2003, not a single drop had been pumped


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Natural Resources And Civil Wars

Countries whose wealth is largely dependent on theexportation of primary commodities are highly proneto civil violence

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank

Conflicts may occur due to

Greed

Grievances

Marginalization


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The Six Rival Families Of Mechanisms

The GreedyRebels

Mechanism

The FeasibilityMechanism

The WeakStates

Mechanism

The Sparse

NetworksMechanism

The GrievanceMechanism

The Greedy

OutsidersMechanism


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The greedy rebels mechanism

Domestic groups may engage in quasi-criminalactivity

Natural resources increase the prize value of

capturing the state Natural resources are concentrated groups may

become dissatisfied

Example: Sierra Leone, where control of thediamond areas sufficiently weakened the state as tomake state capture appear easy


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The greedy outsiders mechanism

The existence of natural resources may be anincentive for third parties

States

Corporation

Example: the escalation of the civil war in Congo hasresulted in part from the involvement of neighboringstates seeking raw materials


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The grievance mechanism

Countries with middling levels of dependence onnatural resources may be experiencing transitoryinequality as part of the development process

Economies that are dependent on natural resourcesmay be more vulnerable to terms of trade shocks

The process of extraction may produce grievances

Natural resource wealth may be seen as moreunjustly distributed than other wealth

Example: In Sierra Leone and Nigeria


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The feasibility mechanism

The conflicts due to natural resources are permissivecause and not root cause

because motivations for conflict are foundeverywhere

And these motivation are contingent


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The weak states mechanism

Citizens are untaxed by governments, they have lesspower over them

Governments that rely on natural resources ratherthan taxation have weakened incentives to createstrong bureaucratic institutions


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The sparse networks mechanism

The importance of natural resources may lie in theirimpacts on the daily economic activities of thecitizens of an economy

The weakness of the manufacturing sector and thefragmentation of an economy into independentenclaves of production may raise conflict risks

Good cross-national measures of the density ofinternal trade or the sparseness of internal networksdo not exist


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NATURAL RESOURCES AND DURATION

The feasibilitymechanism

The sparsenetworks

mechanism

The militarybalances

mechanism

The fragmentedorganizational

The possibility ofpork mechanism

The internationalconflict premium

mechanism

The domesticconflict premium

mechanism


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The feasibility mechanism

Natural resource financing creates longerwars byenabling rebel groups to keep fighting

Angola conflict is good example for this as bothsides had access to natural resource financing tosupport their combatants

Similarly in case of Niger and Mali, the countrieswere not wealthy enough to support a protractedstruggle as the regions were occupied by insurgents


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The military balances mechanism

The natural resources financing helps in keeping thecombatants alive and fighting, thus leads to ultimate

victory in war

Wars with financial asymmetries are likely to lastless long, balance makes for longer wars

Researchers however suggest that balance in naturalresources facilitates negotiated settlement


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The fragmented organizational structuresmechanism

Organizational effects may matter for war duration.

Researchers have suggested, for example, that we

should expect a positive relationship between thecohesiveness of a rebel organization or its degree ofhierarchy and the duration of a conflict.


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The possibility of pork mechanism

If resource exploitation depends on peace, then thepresence of natural resource endowments shouldmake negotiation more likely to succeed

But third party involvement is necessary

Both parties should be willing


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The domestic conflict premium mechanism

Groups that benefit during conflict may prefer tofight than to win and therefore act as spoilers topeace processes

The fighters in these conflicts may not have aninterest in the success of negotiations

The link between the benefits of war and a conflictsduration can be clear from the fact that individualsbenefit in Wartime more than they would in times ofpeace


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The international conflict premium mechanism

Insofar as third parties can bring pressure to bear onthe resolution of conflicts, their incentives can helpdetermine the duration of conflicts

Neighbouring states can provide sanctuary for rebelbases within their borders, and they can providelogistical support to one side or another


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The sparse networks mechanism

Sparse network explains the duration of war moreclearly

The dense linkages within economies may prevent aconflict from breaking out, so may they help resolvethem.


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MECHANISMS AND ESTIMATION

Two different waysreferred to as

systems with Type B

systems with Type A mechanisms by Elster

(1998)in which rival mechanisms may relate toeach other.


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SYSTEMS WITH TYPE B MECHANISMS

System with Type B mechanisms is one in whichmultiple mechanisms may work simultaneously,possibly with opposite effects.

Type B mechanisms use more fine-grained data. Twoapproaches stand out.

Disaggregating the Explanatory Variable

Disaggregating the Dependent Variable


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SYSTEMS WITH TYPE A MECHANISMS

Type A mechanism problem as one where theindeterminacy concerns which (if any) of severalcausal chains will be triggered.We can consider twocases.

Type A Mechanisms Where the Sorting Procedure IsKnown

Type A Mechanisms Where the Sorting Procedure IsNot Known

RESULTS MECHANISM


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RESULTS: MECHANISMIDENTIFICATION

The most common measure that has been used is thevalue of primary commodity exports as a share ofGDP or of total exports

Singapore appears as one of the most natural-resource-dependent economies

Sudan and Burma feature as countries with amongthe lowest levels of dependence on natural resources.


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Conclusion

Countries dependent on agricultural commoditiesare at risk

Weak state structures and grievance hypotheses

Natural resource conflicts are more likely to endquickly and are more likely to end with military

victory

There are interventions of third parties among 85%

of the conflicts that arise over natural resources


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Thank You

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Natural Resources, Conflict,and Conflict Resolution

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