wally Fikd 05/2K/2013 (M:58:39 Pli ET

RECE]VED. 5/2'v201.1 17 01 E I homas D. Ela]L Clerk. Supremc Court

[N THE SUPREMECOURT OF FLORIDACASE NO.: SC13-459

On Appeal from the First District Court of AppealLT Case No.: 1D11-3407

AMEC CIV[L, LLC,

Petitioner,

PTG CONSTR L:CTION SERVICES COMPANY and PARSONSTRANSPORTATION GROljP, [NC., d/b/a PARSONS

TRANSPORTATION GROUP,

Respondent,

PTG CONSTRUCTION GROl:P, INC. ANDPARSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP'S BRIEFON Jt:RISDICTION

LILES, GAVIN& GEORGE, P.A. WRIGIIT, l'ULFORD, MOORHEADR.KYLEGAVIN,ESQ. . &BROWN,P.A.Florida Bar Noa 747076 CURTIS L. H ROWN, ESQ.Email: kgayi.n@lilesgavin.com . Florida BarNo.: 856312JOHN A. CA RLISLE, ESQ. Email: chrown@wfmblaw.comFlorida Bar No.: 0626716 DEN[SE M. H A MMOND, ESQ.Email:jgglisle(adilesgavEn.com Florida BarNo.: 348562225 Water Street. Suite 1500 Email: dhammondraiwfmblaw.comJacksonville, Florida 32202 505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000Telephone: (904) 634-1 100 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701Facsimile: (904)634-1234 Telephone: (407)425-0234AttorneysforPTG Construction Facsimile: (407)425-0260Services Company Attorneysfor Parsons

Transportation Group

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................ iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ................................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........................................................................2

ARGUMENT....................................................................................................3

I. AMEC II DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSIDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE ONEACTION IS IN TORT AND THE OTHER INCONTRACT; THE CASES CITED BY AMEC AREDISTINGUISHABLE..................................................................3

II. AMEC II DOES NOT HOLD THAT "INDEMNITYOBLIGATIONS ALONE ARE SUFFICIENT TO FINDIDENTITY OF PARTIES"..........................................................6

III. AMEC'S INITIAL SUIT AGAINST FDOT, WHICHPROCEEDED TO TRIAL AND JUDGMENT, IS AJUDGMENT ON THE MERITS BARRING AMEC'SCLAIMS AGAINST PARSONS ................................................. 7

IV. CONFLICT JURISDICTION IS NOT THE PROPERVEHICLE TO ARGUE AN "EROSION OF REQUIREDINDENTITIES" ........................................................................... 10

CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 11

CERTIFICATE OF RULE 9.210 COMPLIANCE ........................................... 12

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dept. ofTransportation,41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1" DCA 2010).................................................................... 2

AMEC Civil, LLC v. PTG Constr.,106 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), reh'g denied (Feb. 14, 2013)............... 3,6

AMEC Civil, LLC. v. State Dep't ofTransp.,41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2010),review denied, 63 So.3d 748 (Fla. 2011).......................................................... passim

Cole v. First Dev. Corp. ofAm.,339 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla.2d DCA 1976)...................................................... 5

Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,452 U.S. 398, 401 (1981).................................................................................. 9

FordMotor Company v. Kikis,401 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981) ..................................................................., 7

Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co.,244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S. Ct. 506,507, 61 L.Ed. 1148 (1917).......................... 9

Kimbrell v. Paige,448 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984) .................................................................... 5,8,9

Kincaid v. World Insurance Company,157 So.2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1963)........................................................................ 4

Massey v. David,831 So.2d 226, 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)......................................................... 6

N&L Auto Parts Company v. Doman,117 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1960) ........................................................................ 4

Persaud v. State,838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003)........................................................................ 7

111

Philip Morris USA, Inc. vs. Douglas,No.SC12-617 (Fla. March 14, 2013)................................................................ 9

Pipkin v. Wiggins,526 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)................................................................ 5

Reaves v. State,485 So.2d 829, fn.3 (Fla. 1986)........................................................................ 3,7

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Industrial Contracting Company,260 So.2d 860 (Fla.4th DCA 1972)................................................................... 3

Topps v. State,865 So.2d 1253, (Fla. 2004) ............................................................................. 9

Other Authorities

Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3 (b)(3).............................................. 1

Trawick, FL. Prac. & Proc. Sec. 25.15 (2011 Ed.)........................................... 9

1V

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDACASE NO.: SC13-459

On Appeal from the First District Court ofAppealLT Case No.: 1D11-3407

AMEC CIVIL, LLC,

Petitioner,

PTG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES COMPANY and PARSONSTRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC., d/b/a PARSONS

TRANSPORTATION GROUP,

Respondent.

PTG CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC. ANDPARSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION

LILES, GAVIN & GEORGE, P.A. WRIGHT, FULFORD, MOORHEADR. KYLE GAVIN, ESQ. & BROWN, P.A.Florida Bar No.: 747076 CURTIS L. BROWN, ESQ.Email: kaavin@lilesgavin.com Florida Bar No.: 856312JOHN A. CARLISLE, ESQ. Email: cbrown@wfmblaw.comFlorida Bar No.: 0626716 DENISE M. HAMMOND, ESQ.Email: icarlisle@lilesgavin.com Florida Bar No.: 348562225 Water Street, Suite 1500 Email: dhanimond@wfmblaw.comJacksonville, Florida 32202 . 505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000Telephone: (904) 634-1100 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 .Facsimile: (904) 634-1234 Telephone: (407) 425-0234Attorneysfor PTG Construction Facsimile: (407) 425-0260Services Company Attorneysfor Parsons

Transportation Group

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................ iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ................................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........................................................................2

ARGUMENT....................................................................................................3

I. AMEC H DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSIDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE ONEACTION IS IN TORT AND THE OTHER INCONTRACT; THE CASES CITED BY AMEC AREDISTINGUISHABLE..................................................................3

II. AMEC II DOES NOT HOLD THAT "INDEMNITYOBLIGATIONS ALONE ARE SUFFICIENT TO FINDIDENTITY OF PARTIES"..........................................................6

III. AMEC'S INITIAL SUIT AGAINST FDOT, WHICHPROCEEDED TO TRIAL AND JUDGMENT, IS AJUDGMENT ON THE MERITS BARRING AMEC'SCLAIMS AGAINST PARSONS ................................................. 7

IV. CONFLICT JURISDICTION IS NOT THE PROPERVEHICLE TO ARGUE AN "EROSION OF REQUIREDINDENTITIES" ........................................................................... 10

CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................... 11

CERTIFICATE OF RULE 9.210 COMPLIANCE .......................................... 12

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dept. ofTransportation,41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1" DCA 2010).................................................................... 2

AMEC Civil, LLC v. PTG Constr.,106 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), reh'g denied (Feb. 14, 2013)............... 3,6

AMEC Civil, LLC. v. State Dep't ofTransp.,41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2010),review denied, 63 So.3d 748 (Fla. 2011).......................................................... passim

Cole v. First Dev. Corp. ofAm.,339 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla.2d DCA 1976)...................................................... 5

FederatedDept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,452 U.S. 398, 401 (1981).................................................................................. 9

Ford Motor Company v. Kikis,401 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981) .................................................................... 7

Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co.,244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S. Ct. 506,507, 61 L.Ed. I 148 (1917) .......................... 9

Kimbrell v. Paige,448 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984)1.................................................................. 5,8,9

Kincaid v. World Insurance Compäny,157 So.2d 517, 518 (Fla. 1963) ........................................................................ 4

Massey v. David,831 So.2d 226, 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)......................................................... 6

N&L Auto Parts Company v. Doman,117 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1960) ........................................................................ 4

Persaud v. State,838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003) ........................................................................ 7

111

Philip Morris USA, Inc. vs. Douglas,No.SC12-617 (Fla. March 14, 2013)................................................................ 9

Pipkin v. Wiggins,526 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)................................................................ 5

Reaves v. State,485 So.2d 829, fn.3 (Fla. 1986)........................................................................ 3,7

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Industrial Contracting Company,260 So.2d 860 (Fla.4th DCA 1972)................................................................... 3

Topps v. State,865 So.2d 1253, (Fla. 2004) ............................................................................. 9

Other Authorities

Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3 (b)(3).............................................. 1

Trawick, FL. Prac. & Proc. Sec. 25.15 (2011 Ed.)........................................... 9

1V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

AMEC seeks conflict review of the decision of the First District Court

ofAppeal pursuant to Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3 (b)(3) which

confers discretionary jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review:

"[A]ny decision of a district court of appeal that..... expresslyand directly conflicts with a decision of another district courtof appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.

AMEC contracted with the Florida Department of Transportation

(FDOT) to construct the new interchange at I-95 and I-295. Early in the

project, AMEC asserted FDOT breached its contract by failing to provide

permits allowing AMEC to work at night. AMEC filed suit against FDOT

and proceeded to trial and judgment in AMEC's favor. In the meantime,

other disputes arose between AMEC and FDOT gnd FDOT's privies,

Parsons and PTG. Before trial in the first AMEC/FDOT suit, AMEC filed a

second suit against Parsons/PTG on the newer breaches; at the same time,

AMEC's claims against FDOT on the exact same newer breaches were

pending in the contractually required Dispute Review Board (DRB). After

trial on the first AMEC/FDOT suit, AMEC filed a third suit against FDOT

on the newer issues as asserted in the second lawsuit against Parsons/PTG.

FDOT's attempts to consolidate all claims prior to trial were rebuffed by

AMEC, and despite judicial warning that the subsequent suits might be

1

barred by res judicata, AMEC nonetheless prevailed upon the trial court to

allow the first matter to proceed to trial without joinder.

The court's warning proved prescient when FDOT, Parson's and PTG

each sought summary judgment on the later claims against them because of

res judicata. In each instance, the lower tribunal and the appellate court

found the judgment in the initial AMEC/FDOT action barred AMEC's

subsequent suits against FDOT and its privies.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Review of the decision below is not justified on conflict grounds

because the barebones opinion of the First District Court of Appeals does

not conflict on itsface with any decision of the Florida Supreme Court or the

other District Courts of Appeal. Petitioner's Brief improperly invokes facts

outside the four corners of the decision below and outside the text of the

allegedly conflicting decisions. Petitioner also adopts facts from the First

District opinion in the second AMEC/FDOT suit i The First DCA opinion

mentions only two facts: (1) PTG and Parsons "are privies of the Florida

Department of Transportation"; and (2) "[fjurther," PTG and Parsons "had

i The decision [on appeal] is attached as Appendix A to Petitioner's Briefand is referred to herein as "AMEC IL" AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dept. ofTransportation, 41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1"' DCA 2010) will be referred to hereinas "AMEC L"

2

indemnity obligations to the Department of Transportation." AMEC Civil,

LLC v. PTG Constr., 106 So. 3d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), reh'g denied

(Feb. 14, 2013). This narrow factual discussion is insufficient for the court

to discern conflict with other case law.

ARGUMENT

I. AMEC II DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS IDENTITY OFCAUSE OF ACTION WHERE ONE ACTION IS IN TORT ANDTHE OTHER IN CONTRACT; THE CASES CITED BY AMECARE DISTINGUISHABLE

AMEC asserts there can be no identity of cause of action where one

action sounds in tort and the other in contract. AMEC argues conflict with

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Industrial Contracting

Company, 260 So.2d 860 (Fla.4'h DCA 1972). But AMEC II does not

mention that the AMEC/FDOT action was in contract while the

AMEC/Parsons action was in tort. The opinion does not leave this issue

open for review as there are insufficient facts statedsin the opinion for the

court to discern conflict.

[T]he "only facts relevant to our decision to accept or reject such

[conflict] petitions are those facts contained within the four corners of the

decisions allegedly in conflict." Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, fn.3 (Fla.

1986). Moreover,

3

[I]n those cases where the district court has notexplicitly identified a conflicting decision, it is necessary forthe district court to have included some facts in its decisionso that the question of law addressed by the district court inits decision can be discerned by this Court." Persaud v.State, 838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003).

The purpose of conflict review is to maintain consistency among the

laws of the state of Florida. The measure of the Florida Supreme Court's

conflict jurisdiction 'is whether the decision of the district court on its face

collides with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or another district court

on the same point of law so as to create an inconsistency or conflict among

the precedents. Kincaid v. World Insurance Company, 157 So.2d 517, 518

(Fla. 1963).

Whether the supreme court has conflict jurisdiction depends upon

whether the decision to be reviewed answers a principle or principles of law

in conflict with a principle or principles of law announced by another district

court of appeal or the supreme court, and the reviewing court will not look

into the facts to determine whether such conflicts exists. N&L Auto Parts

Company v. Doman, 117 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1960). '

Although not stated in the opinion below, the facts of this case are

simply that AMEC's second suit against FDOT alleged defective design

prepared by PARSONS; AMEC's suit against Parsons asserted the exact

same allegedly defective design. This Court previously declined to review

4

the First DCA's decision affirming res judicata in AMEC's second suit

against FDOT. AMEC Civil, LLC. v. State Dep't of Transp., 41 So.3d 235

(Fla. 1st DCA 2010), reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2010), review denied, 63 So.3d

748 (Fla. 2011). A finding of no identity of cause of action under these

circumstances would negate this Court's earlier holdings that "[a] judgment

on the merits rendered in the fbrmer suit between the same parties or their

privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court of competent jurisdiction,

is conclusive..." Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So.2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984).

AMEC also asserts conflict with Cole v. First Dev. Corp. ofAm., 339

So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla.2d DCA 1976) and Pipkin v. Viggins, 526 So.2d

1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), but both of those cases are easily distinguishable.

The Cole court refused to find res judicata, where the first suit was in breach

of contract and the second alleged fraud and deceit, stating "[the] obvious

difference between the facts essential to each of these two causes of action

precludes the application of the doctrine of res judicata. " Id. at 1131. Res

judicata also is inapplicable where the facts giving rise to the second suit

occurred after conclusion of the first suit. Pipkin v. Wiggins, 526 So.2d

1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). The AMEC II decision only concludes that the

5

four identities for res judicata are met,2 without analysis or discussion.

Impermissible review of the record on appeal would be required for this

court to fmd conflict.

II. AMECII DOES NOT HOLD THAT "INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONSALONE ARE SUFFICIENT TO FIND IDENTITY OF PARTIES"

AMEC asserts that the. First DCA opinion holds that indemnity

obligations alone are sufficient to find res judicata. i The sole statement in

the opinion about indemnity gbligations is: "Further, identity of parties

exists if the third parties [PTG & Parsons], as here, had indemnity

obligations to the Department of Transportation." AMEC II, 106 So. 3d at

456 (emphasis added). The First DCA did not hold that indemnity

obligations alone satisfied the "identity of parties" element. Rather, the

court held that "there is an identity of the parties here because appellees are

privies of the Florida Department of Transportation" and, "[ffurther," the

appellees had indemnity obligátions to the Departmënt. The First DCA's

finding that PTG and Parson had indemnity obligations to FDOT was only

one of the factors it considered to determine that they were privies of FDOT.

2 The four identities are recited as "(1) identity of the thing sued for; (2)identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) identity ofthe quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made. AMECCivil, LLC v. PTG Constr., 106 So. 3d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), reh'gdenied (Feb. 14, 2013).

6

AMEC asserts the First DCA ignored the alleged prerequisites of

notice, demand, "vouching in", and participation in the prior suit to invoke

indemnity obligations. But this is only one reading of the opinion. The

other, equally rational reading is that the First DCA concluded those issues

had been satisfied, waived, or were not applicable. In any event, they did

not discuss it in the opinion and it is not preserved for this Court's review.

Where the district court has not explicitly identified a conflict, it is necessary

for the decision to include some facts "so that the question of law addressed

by the district court in its decision can be discerned by the court." Persaud

v. State, 838 So.2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003), citing, Reaves v. State, supra and

FordMotor Company v. Kikis, 401 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 1981)).

III. AMEC'S INITIAL SUIT AGAINST FDOT, WHICH PROCEEDEDTO TRIAL AND JUDGMENT, IS A JUDGMENT ON THEMERITS BARRING AMEC'S CLAIMS IN THE INSTANT CASE.

There were two separate AMEC suits against FDOT. The first

AMEC/FDOT suit proceeded to trial and final judgment in favor of AMEC.

The first suit barred the second AMEC/FDOT suit under a theory of res

judicata. That decision was affirmed on appeal by the First DCA; this court

denied review. AMEC I, 41 So.3d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), reh'g denied

(Aug. 5, 2010), review denied, 63 So.3d 748 (Fla. 2011).

7

The gravamen of these collective holdings is that AMEC should have

brought all of its claims in the initial AMEC/FDOT suit. And, because

privies are bound by the earlier suits, AMEC should have included its claims

against FDOT's privies in the same suit.

Sound policy reasons support trying these cases in one tribunal and at

one time. The doctrine of res judicata makes a judgment on the merits

conclusive "not only as to every matter which was offered and received to

sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might with

propriety have been litigated and determined in that action." AMEC I, 41

So.3d at 239 (citing Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1984)).

This Court has said that res judicata

[IJs founded upon the sound proposition that there should bean end to litigation and that in the interest of the State everyjusticiable controversy should be settled in one action in orderthat the courts and the parties will not be pothered [sic] for thesame cause by interminable litigation." AMEC II, 41 So.3d at243.

The AMEC court continued "there is no injustice in the learned trial

judge's decision not to give AMEC two bites of the apple". Id. at 243.

Because Respondents relied on the first AMEC/FDOT judgment3 as

res judicata for the current actiòn, this court is not being asked to determine

3 Parson's did argue below, in the altemative, that the second FDOT/AMECjudgment was a "judgment on the merits" "The doctrine of merger, res

8

if a judgment barring a claim because of res judicata can be the "judgment

on the merits" for barring yet another claim.

Further, the decision below does not preserve the "judgment on the

merits" issue for review:

The Florida Supreme Court has explained that "[a] judgment onthe merits rendered in a fonner suit between the same parties ortheir privies, upon the same cause of action, by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction is conclusive....

AMEC I, 41 So.3d at 239-40 .(citing Kimbrell v. Paige, 448 So.2d 1009,

1012 (Fla. 1984).

No facts giving rise to the courts decision are included. In these

circumstances, conflict cannot be found.

The bottom line is that both of AMEC's suits against FDOT and

AMEC claims against Parsons and PTG should have been brought together

judicata and estoppel by judgment are a part of substantive law." Trawick,Fl. Prac. & Proc. § 25:15 (2011 ed.). "We have stressed that 'the doctrine ofres judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from amore technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantialjustice, of public policy and of private peace, which should be cordiallyregarded and enforced by the courts...' "Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v.Moitie, 452 U.S. 398, 401 (198.1) (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co.,244 U.S. 294, 299, 37 S. Ct. 506,507, 61 L.Ed. 1148 (1917)). In light of thesupreme couit's ruling in Topps v. State, 865 So.2d.1253, (Fla. 2004) andPhilip Morris USA, Inc. vs. Douglas, No.SCl2-617 (Fla. March 14, 2013),that supplemental argument is withdrawn.

9

in one suit. Had AMEC proceeded in that manner, res judicata would have

never been an issue.

IV. CONFLICT JURISDICTION IS NOT THE PROPER VEHICLE TOARGUE AN "EROSION OF REQUIRED IDENTITIES"

AMEC argues that the decision below is a vast expansion of res

judicata which will lead unjustifiably to dismissal of loosely related actions.

This argument has no place when seeking conflict jurisdiction. The parade

of horribles cited in the AMEC's brief did not occur in this case, and even if

they did, the First DCA opinioñ does provide sufficient facts for this Court

to review.

Even if the Court decides these issues need to be reviewed or

clarified, this is not the case. AMEC is not a victim here. As AMEC I

noted, the initial AMEC action against FDOT (FDOT I) proceeded to trial

over FDOT's objection. AMAC II @ 237. FDOT repeatedly sought

continuances to have all of AMEC's claims' against FDOT tried in one suit.

AMEC persuaded the trial court to allow it to proceed in the first action,

leading predictably to these consequences.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there are insufficient facts cited in the decision sub

judice, for this Court to discern conflict. AMEC's Petition for Discretionary

Jurisdiction should be denied.

10

Respectfully Submitted this 28th of May, 2013,

/S/ R. KYLE GAVINLILES, GAVIN & GEORGE, P.A.R. KYLE GAVIN, ESQ.Florida Bar No.: 747076Email: kgavin@lilesgavin.comJOHN A. CARLISLE, ESQ.Florida Bar No.: 0626716Email: icarlisle@lilesgavin.com225 Water Street, Suite 1500Jacksonville, Florida 32202Telephone: (904) 634-1100Facsimile: (904) 634-1234Attorneysfor PTG ConstructionServices Company

/S/ D. FRANK WRIGHTWRIGHT, FULFORD, MOORHEAD& BROWN, P.A.CURTIS L. BROWN, ESQ.Florida Bar No.: 856312Email: cbrown@wfmblaw.comDENISE M. HAMMOND, ESQ.Florida Bar No.: 348562Email: dhammond@wfmblaw.com505 Maitland Avenue, Suite 1000Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701Telephone: (407) 425-0234Facsimile: (407) 425-0260Attorneysfor ParsonsTransportatioë Group

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this PTG

Construction Services Company and Parsons Transportation Group, Inc.'s

Brief on Jurisdiction has been furnished this 28th day of May, 2013, via

email delivery to:

F. Alan Cummings, EsquireS. Elysha Luken, EsquireSmith, Currie & Hancock, LLP101 N.E. Third Avenue - Suite 1910Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301facummings@smitheurrie.comseluken@smitheurrie.comftlpleadings@smitheurrie.com

R. Kyle Gavin, EsquireJohn A. Carlisle, EsquireLiles, Gavin & George, P.A.225 Water Street, Suite 1500Jacksonville, Florida 32202kaavin@l.ilesgavin.comicarlisle@lilesgavin.comiostwald@lilesgavin.com

11

CERTIFICATE OF RULE 9.210 COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this request complies with the

requirements of Rule 9.210, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/S/ D. FRANK WRIGHTDenise M. Haminond, Esq.

12