MR 1978-6 CouldFightOffensivelyWin

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Bol d a ct i on s of t en br i n g vi ct or y t o a n um er i ca l l y i n f er i or

f o~ce. T h e A i r F or ce cr ea t es a n a i r cor r i d or 20 k i l om et er s

w i d e a n d 50 k i l om et er s d eep . E l em en t s of a n a i r a ssa u l t

d i v i si on p l u s a r t i l l er y su p por t a n d a n a i r ca va l r y com ba t

br i ga d e u se t h i s cor n ”d or by n i gh t t o p en et r a t e en em y f r on t

l i n es a n d est a b l i sh exp l oi t a t i on oper a t i on a l ba ses i n t h e

en em y r ea r . Ea ch ba se d ef en ded by a n i n f a n t r y com pa n y

m i gh t h ou se a n a r t i l l er y ba t t er y or con t a i n a FARRP t o

su pp or t t h e a t t a ck h el i cop t er ba t t a l i on s bu sy i n f l i c t i n g

m a x i m u m d am age on en em y r e8er ve8, comm a n d p ost s, l o-

g i st i cs com p l exes, a r t i l l er y p osi t i on s a n d com mu n i ca t i on

cen t er s. I f t h e cor p s l a u n ch ed a gen er a l a t t a ck a cr os8 i t w

f r on t w i t h t h e m a i n gr ou n d a t t a ck com i n g a l on g t h e a i r

cor r i d or r ou t e, t h e en em y w ou l d be f or ced t o gi ve gr ou n d . A

bol d p l a n w h i ch m i gh t w or k !

We Could Fight Outnumbered

--Offensively--and

Ma jor Ca lvin C . Seybold, U S Army Reserve

HSTORY is replet e w ith exa mples

of numerica lly in fer ior forces best -

ing their a dversa ries in ba tt le. U nfor-

t una tely , most of t hese confront a tions

a re repor t ed a s defensive a ct ions, a nd,consequent ly , t he published a ccount s

t end t o empha size the import a nce of

defensive t act ics. H ow ever , it is not t he

int ent nor purpose of t his a r t icle t o

present a hist orica l review of cam-

pa igns fough t long a go. Wha t w ill be

pm%-a yed is this

how w e, t he U S

ma ximum use of

a uthor’s concept of

Army, might ma ke”

our developed a tt ri-

but es t o fight offensively , out -

numbered—a nd w in !

The follow ing concept w as glea ned

from a review of t he la test Army lit er-a ture a va ila ble t o t he field. All refer-

ences a re da t ed in 1977. This is im-

portant . B eca use of t he ra pid

development of t echnology , milit a ry

concept s a nd procedures a re ext remely

per isha ble. Would a nyone conduct a n

exploit a t ion w it h just light in fa nt ry? I t

is not much of a n exploit a t ion a t 2%

miles per hour . How ever , how many

35



MILITARY REVIEW

would a t t empt a n exploit a t ion w it h no

infa nt ry—w ho w ould prot ect t he t a nks

or t a ke out ha rd-t o-rea ch a nt ia ircra ft

sites?

This brings us to the most im-

port a nt a spect of this concept or , for

tha t ma t t er , a ny modern milit a ry

concept—a combined a rms a pproa ch.

How ever , this combined a rms a p-

proa ch w ill fea ture a tt a ck helicopters

a nd field a rt illery suppor t ed a nd sus-

t a ined by infa nt ry , a rmor a nd the US

Air F or ce.

The concept dea ls w it h a delibera te

a t t a ck to crea t e a penet ra t ion for t hepa ssa ge of highly mobile elements in a

deep dr ive int o the enemy’s rea r a rea s,

dest roying reserve forces, a rt illery, a ir

defense posit ions, comma nd post s, lo-

gist ics complexes a n d communica t ion s

cent ers. While the concept ma y not be

n ew , t he pr oposed pr ocedur es t o a ccom -

plish the mission a re.

The penet ra tion envisioned w ouldbe the result of a n ext ensive sup-

pression of enemy a ir defense (SEAD)

opera t ion a nd would, in a ctua lit y , be

a n a eria l penet ra t ion . This a eria l pene-

t ra t ion , or a ir corr idor , w ould be the

responsibilit y of t he Air Force sup-

por t ed by the ground forces. B eca use of

the coordina t ion a nd a sset s required

for this joint opera tion, t he opera tion

should not be conduct ed below corps

level.

This penet ra t ion of enemy a ir de-

fense ca pa bilit ies w ould require a t

lea st tw o da ys, a nd possibly a s long a s

a week, in order to crea t e a n a ir cor-

r idor of a t lea st 20 kilometers in w idth

a nd 50 kilometers in depth . I t is under-

st ood tha t it w ould be virt ua lly im-

possible t o neut ra lize a ll enemy a ir

defense in the a eria l penet ra t ion; .

however , sufficient degra da t ion of

en emy a ir d efen se a r tiller y ca pa bilit ies

could be obt a ined to a llow a night

pa ssa ge of element s of a n a ir a ssa ultdivision a nd a n a ir ca va lry comba t

br iga de (ACCB ) w ith minima l losses

(see F igure 1).

Once the Air Force comma nder ha d

forced t he a eria l penet ra t ion , he w ould

ha nd off t he opera t ion t o the Army

comma nder. At this t ime, t he a ir ca v-

a lry element s of t he ACCB would

scout t he a eria l penet ra tion corridorcrea t ed by the SEAD opera t ion t o

est a blish the sa fest rout es t hrough.

The ACCB scout s t hen would guide the

a ir a ssa ult element s t hrough to secure

exploit a tion opera tiona l ba ses deep in

the enemy rea r , proba bly betw een the

ma in a nd second defensive belt s (see

F igure 2.)

Major Calum C. Seybold, US Army Re.serve, M a student m the 1977-78 USACGSCRegular Course. He recetued a B.A. from theVwgmta Mdrtary Institute, an M.A from theUmvemwy of Oklahoma and an M, Ed. and aPh.D. from the Unwerslty of Utah, He hasserued with the 193d Infantry Brigade m theCanal Zone and uvth thd US Army SpecialForces m the Repubkc of Vwtnam.

36



FIGHT OUTNUMBERED AND WIN

b

AIR CAVALRY COMBAT BRIGADE*

,x

nm

I 1 I I

““T SPr

BN

t I 1 I

““, @’:Ry

r I I I I 1 1

: ,,.s . . . . / MEL SW : ~&T ~A,NT ,...s ,s,, SP

!, ’0,AC,, ME,

L. ..., L.-__. J

r

I 1 .~~~~~~I A“GM, NTA,,oN

- FM 17.47, AI. Cw.air” Combm Br,g.ade Department .1 the Arm”L---.’

. Washington. D C 1977, D 3.2

Figure 1

This ent ire a irmobile opera t ion Wha t a bout t he rema inder of t heshould be init ia t ed a t night a nd con- corus forces dur ing this uer iod? Their

t inue unt il t ermina t ed by the com-

ma nder . As Field Manua l 71-2, The

Tank ,and Mechan ized In fan try Ba t-

ta l ion Task Force, su ccin ct ly st a tes:

The extra prob lems crea ted by ex.

t remely l im ited visib i l i ty shou ld not

d iscou rage planners, for each can be

overcome. Remember too, th e enemy

has the same prob lems and more. H e

does not k now w hen and from w here

the a ttack w il l come and any factor

w h ich lim its th e range of w eapons

fa vors the a t ta ck er . Ad d i t iona l ly , i t

w il l tak e the enemy longer to concen -

t ra te rein forcem en ts agains t the

a ttack . Lim ited visib i l i ty w il l of ten

crea te the cond i t ions necessa ry for a

su ccessfu l a tta ck . I

mo~ t effect ive us: w oul~ be t hrough

night -suppor t ing a t t a cks a long the’

ent ire corps front . E ven if t hey a re

out numbered, t hey should press t he

a t t a ck beca use, a t a min imum, they

w ill con fuse the enemy tempora rily a s

t o their int ent ions a nd fix him in pla ce.

“The ground a tt a ck follow ing t he a eria l

penet ra tion rout e should be w eigh t eda s hea vy a s possible a nd funct ion a s a

follow a nd suppor t element of t he corps

ma in a tt a ck.

The ma in a t t a ck would be a n a ir-

mobile opera t ion tha t w ould be com-

posed of t he ACCB a nd a t lea st tw o a ir

a ssa ult in fa n t ry br iga des w it h tw o

ba t t a lions of field a r t illery a nd re-

quired comba t suppor t a nd comba t

37



.

MILITARY REVIEW

x

CORPS AERIAL PENETRATION/ENVELOPMENT

(SCHEMATIC) SUPERIMPOSED ON AN ENEMY

COMBINED 4RMS ARMY DEFENSE BELT CONCEPT

8 @

Third Defense Belt

@ @

@@

Second Defense Belt

@Exploitation Operational

x

:

x x

Main Defense Belt x

; x

x

00

0

Follow

and

1

Support

Attack

Figure 2

38



FIGHT OUTNUMBERED AND WINf,

service support element s. We should

think in t erms of field a r t illery ba t -

t er ieein a direct support role toa tt a c~

helicopt er ba tt a lions a nd the infa nt ry

t a sked w ith prot ect ion of the forw a rd

a rea rea rm/refuel point s (FARRP s)

loca t ed in t he exploit a tion opera t iona l

a rea .

The exploit a t ion opera t iona l a rea

w ill consist of a t lea st 18 sepa ra t e

ba ses, ea ch w a rded by a compa ny of

infa nt ry , a nd no ba se closer tha n 2

kilometers t o a ny other . Opera ting in a

ra ndom sequence from these ba ses w ill

be six a rt illery ba t t er ies a nd four

FARRP s. At lea et tw o ba t t eries a nd

one FARRP w ill be opera t iona l a t a ll

t imes. E a ch a r t illery ba ttery a nd ea ch

FARRP w ill rot a t e betw een the 18

exploit a t ion opera t iona l ba ees (EOB S)

a t lea st four t imes per 24-hour per iod.

S tored a t ea ch EOB w ill be sufficient

fuel a nd ammunit ion to rea rm a nd

refuel a compa ny of a tt a ck helicopt ers

a nd a ba sic loa d of ammunit ion for a

field a rt iller y ba t ter y.

E a ch EOB w ill be under the pro-

t ect ion a nd cont rol of the infa nt ry

compa ny commander . He is respon-

sible for request ing a resupply of fuel

a nd ammunit ion to redelivered by t he

Air F or ce.

No a rt illery ba t t ery or FARRP

would opera t e from the same EOB a t

t he came t ime. I t w ould be the respon-

sibilit y of the a ir a ssa ult division G 3 t o

a pprove a nd cont rol the rot a t ion se-

quence for the a r t illery a nd FARRP s.

The a ir a ssa ult division a via t ion a eset s

w ould be required t o ineert t he infa nt ry

to secure the EOB S init ia lly a nd t o

rot a t e the field a r t illery a nd FARRP

a sset s. The resupply of the EOB S , a s

st a ted ea rlier , w ould be the responsi-

bilit y of t he Air Force. H elicopt er ma in-

t ena nce problems a nd ca sua lt ies w ould

be eva cua ted through the a er ia l pene-

t ra t ion corr idor to a id a nd ma inte-

na nce sta t ions loca t ed in a forw a rd

division rea r a rea .

I t is felt tha t rot a t ion of the a rt illery

a nd FARRP s would grea t ly increa se

their a bilit y t o survive while st ill a l-

low ing them to eupport a nd susta in the”

exploit a t ion mission of the ACCB .

Once the a irmobile element s suc-

cessfully negot ia t e the a er ia l pene-

t ra t ion a nd est ablieh exploit a tion oper -

a tiona l ba ses, t he ACCB ehould go into

a n exploit a t ion mission immedia tely .

S ince the ACCB ha s vir tua lly no ca pa -

bilit y t o hold ground, it must a t t a ck by

firez w it h tw o ma in purposes: t o

dest roy enemy forces a nd to depr ive

t he enemy of resources, demora lizing

him a nd dest roying his w ill t o cont inue

t he ba t tle.

The most obvious t a rget e for t he

ACCB w ould be enemy reserve forces,

a rt illery , a ir defense posit ions,

comma nd post s, logist ics complexes

a nd communica t ion centers. Theee

t a rget s a re idea lly suit ed for the a tt a ck

helicopters, a nd their dest ruct ion

should ha ve a n immedia t e impa ct on

t he enemy’e a bilit y t o prevent even anumerica lly in fer ior foe from ma king

gaine.

I f only one a t t a ck helicopter ba t -

t a lion of the ACCB wa s commit t ed to a

maximum-dest ruct miesion a t a t ime, ,

a nd the FARRP e were loca t ed a nd

survived in the exploit a t ion opera -

t iona l ba ees, t hen efficient disrupt ion

should be genera t ed w ithin t he

39



MILITARY REVIEW

enemy’s rea r to ca use him to give

ground a long the ent ire corps front .

The Air Force w ould ma int a in loca l

a ir superior it y a nd enga ge enemy a ir

defense a r t illery , field a r t illery a ndcomma nd post a rea s, in tha t pr ior it y ,

unt il t he opera t ion t ermina tes.

Int elligent specula tion would

predict 30 to 40-percent losses a mong

the ACCB . Is tha t t oo high a price t o

pa y? Only t he comma nder in such a

situa t ion could make tha t determi-

na t ion. However , one fa ctor is

preeminent—the vict or in w a r must

a tt ack. Alt hough defensive opera t ion

ma y w ea ken the enemy a nd prevert

him from obt a ining his object ives, it M

the a t t a ck which brings decisive re-

Suits.j t ,

This a r t icl,e ha s a t t empted to con-

cent ra t e on tw o cent ra l themes for

fight ing offensively , out numbered: mo-

bilit y a nd concealment—mobility,

t hrough the a ir a sea ult divieion a ndthe a ir ca va lry comba t br iga de, a nd

con cea lmen t, ~ t h rou gh n igh t oper a tion s

a nd cont inua l displa cement s. H ere, ”

a lso, t he Air Force is responsible for

crea t ing t he penet ra t ion, a nd t he

a tt a ck helicopter ba tt a lions, w ith their

direct support field a r t illery , a re t he

ma in corpe a tt a ck element s. The a rmora nd in fa nt ry element e conduct a follow

a nd support miesion for t he ma in

a t t a ck. E lect ronic w a rfa re a nd field

a r t illery element s w ould ha ve prime

roles in this concept of offensive opera -

tions.

Obviously , noth ing new ha s been

st a t ed in mission or terminology.

How ever , t he rea lignment of t a sks

w ithin the t ra dit iona l comba t element s

of the Army could give us t he comba t

pow er neceesa ry to fight offensively ,

out numbered—an d w in !

NOTES

1 Freld Mamal ,FM, 71 2 The 18”, and &fech,”,z?O /nf.9”,r”

B.!,,!,.” le,h force Dewart,nent of the Army W,,h,ngton. D C

1977 P 4.47

2 FM 17.47 Arr Cava/r, Combat E?<,g#de.Demrtment al the

Awn, W. S”WJ,O” D C %977. D 3 1

3 FM 71 Z The Twu anti Mechwrzed In fantr, .9Wtat,on Task

Force. w c,t P 4 T

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MR 1978-6 CouldFightOffensivelyWin

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