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Moreton Bay Rail Link - Independent Investigation into the Signalling System

PROJECT Moreton Bay Rail Link - independent Investigation into the Signalling System

DATE 11 August 2016

AUTHOR Rob Smith STATUS Final

COMPANY RM and HM Smith PTY LTD REVISION 2.0

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail LinkIndependent investigation into the Signalling System

Quality Information

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Moreton Bay Rail Link Project - Independent Investigation into the Signalling System

11/08/2016

RM and HM Smith Pty Ltd

Rob Smith

Revision HistoryRevision Revision

DateStatus Brief reason for update Name Role Signature

0.1 20/7/16 Draft For Review Rob Smith Author

0.2 26/7/16 Draft Formatting changes Rob Smith Author

1.0 5/8/16 Final Comments received from DTMR, DIRD and QR

Rob Smith Author

1.1 8/8/16 Final Minor punctuation and grammar update

Rob Smith Author

1.2 9/8/16 Final Minor Comments updated Rob Smith Author

2.0 11/8/16 Final Interview schedule updated Rob Smith Author

Prepared for: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Queensland Government

Prepared by: RM and HM Smith PTY LTD

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation intothe Signalling System

Contents

Table of Contents

MORETON BAY RAIL LINK - INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE SIGNALLING SYSTEM 1

1 LIST OF ACRONYMS:_________________________________________________________________ 5

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY_______________________________________________________________ 6

2.1 T h e P r o j e c t -D T M R AND Q R 62 .2 S e l e c t io n o f t h e S ig n a l l in g S y s t e m - M A c r o L o k 72 .3 S ig n a l l in g S y s t e m R is k 82 .4 C o m m is s io n in g D a t e s 82.5 Is s u e s t h a t l e d t o t h e A n n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e P r o j e c t B e in g D e l a y e d fr o m t h e p l a n n e d

“ P r e E k k a ” C o m m is s io n in g D a t e 92.5.1 S a f e t y Is su e s 92.5.2 O p e r a t io n a l Is s u e s 92 .5.3 S ig n a ll in g S y s t e m , T y p e A p p r o v a l a n d t e s t in g 102 .5 .4 G o v e r n a n c e 102 .5.5 C o m m is s io n in g Da t e s 102 .6 W a y F o r w a r d TO O p e n THE M B R L FOR P a s s e n g e r S e r v ic e 112.7 T h e In d e p e n d e n t R e v ie w F in d in g s AND R e c o m m e n d a t io n s 122.7.1 G o v e rn a n c e AND C o n t r a c t u a l P ro c e s s e s FOR M o r to n B ay R a il L in k 132.7.2 P e r f o r m a n c e a n d in t e g r a t io n o f s ig n a l l in g s y s t e m s d u r in g d e s ig n a n d c o n s t r u c t io n 142 .7 .3 In d e p e n d e n t R e v ie w R e c o m m e n d a t io n s 15

3 BACKGROUND______________________________________________________________________20

4 SCOPE_____________________________________________________________________________ 21

5 GOVERNANCE AND CONTRACTUAL PROCESSES FOR MBRL_________________________22

5.1 Is s u e s /R isks A r is in g F ro m th e D e c is io n to B r in g t h e P r o je c t U n d e r TM R 225.1.1 In t r o d u c t io n 225.1.2 G o v e r n a n c e 225.1.3 P r o je c t Ma n a g e m e n t 225.1.4 C o n t r a c t Ma n a g e m e n t 225.1.5 S t e e r in g C o m m it t e e 235.2 S ig n a ll in g S y s t e m Ele m e n t s o f t h e T e n d e r in g a n d C o n t r a c t P r o c e s s 255.2.1 In t r o d u c t io n 255.2.2 S ig n a l l in g S y s te m S e le c t io n 265.2.3 S ig n a ll in g E v a lu a t io n C r it e r ia 265.2.4 S ig n a l l in g T e n d e r E v a l u a t io n P la n 275.3 T h e R o l e A s s ig n e d t o Q u e e n s l a n d Ra il T h r o u g h o u t t h e P r o j e c t 315.3.1 P r o j e c t R e l a t io n s h ip w it h Q u e e n s l a n d Ra il 315.4 C o n t r a c t M ile s to n e Pa y m e n t s R e la t in g to S ig n a l l in g , a n d G a in s h a r e Pa y m e n t s , a n d the G r o u n d s U po n W h ic h a n y Pa y m e n t s FIa v e B een Ma d e 335.4.1 C o n t r a c t S ta t u s 335.4.2 C o n t r a c t S t a t u s - S ig n a l l in g 34

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation Intothe Signalling System

6 PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRATION OF SIGNALLING SYSTEMS DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION________________________________________________________________________ 36

6.1 T he Na t u r e o f A s s u r a n c e A c t iv it ie s by t h e P r o je c t T e a m , Q u e e n s la n d Ra il , o r O t h e r Pa r t ie s to M o n it o r , T e s t , a n d R e v ie w S ig n a ll in g S y s t e m s a n d S ig n a l l in g S y s te m In t e r f a c e / In t e g r a t io n 366.1.1 In t r o d u c t io n - A s s u r a n c e 366 .1 .2 S co p e OF W o r k T e c h n ic a l C r i t e r ia (S W T C ) 366.1.3 Ex h ib it A -S W T C - A p p e n d ix 1 5 - D e s ig n In f o r m a t io n - R a il 376 .1 .4 Ex h ib it A - S W T C - A p p e n d ix 3 3 - T e c h n ic a l S p e c if ic a t io n s 386 .1 .5 PTU S ig n a l l in g D esig n P r o c e s s V e r I - T h ie s s ( C P B ) - 09 /09 /14 386.1 .6 S ig n a ll in g R e la t e d A s s u r a n c e A c t iv it ie s : 396 .1 .7 T e stin g a n d C o m m is s io n in g 406 .1 .8 A s s u ra n c e AND H a n d o v e r 416.2 T he Na t u r e o f In t e r f a c e / In t e g r a t io n Is s u e s Ex p e r ie n c e d B e t w e e n M u lt ip le S ig n a llin g S y s t e m s on th e O ne N e t w o r k 426.3 THE A d e q u a c y o f A s s u r a n c e A c t iv it ie s , a n d L e s s o n s f o r F u t u r e R a il C o n t r a c t S e l e c t io n

AND O v e r s ig h t 436.3.1 R a il S a f e t y Na t io n a l La w 446.4 T he P r o c e s s e s b y W hich C o n c e r n s Ra is e d b y Q u e e n s la n d Ra il o r O t h e r Pa r t ie s R e g a r d in g th e S ig n a l l in g S y s t e m s o r S ig n a ll in g S y s t e m In t e g r a t io n W er e Ma n a g e d 466.4.1 OR’s D e s ig n R e v ie w F in d in g s 466.4.2 C o m m u n ic a t io n s , C o m m u n it y a n d S t a k e h o l d e r E n g a g e m e n t 506.5 T he A s s u r a n c e P r o g r a m B e in g Im p le m e n t e d b y Q u e e n s la n d Ra il in O r d e r to Ha v e th e P r o je c t C o m m is s io n e d 506.5.1 C u r r e n t S t a t u s 506.5.2 Next STEPS 526.6 Q u e e n s l a n d A u d it O f f ic e R e p o r t 2015-16 T r a n s p o r t In f r a s t r u c t u r e P r o j e c t s F in d in g s

53

APPENDIX 1: DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW. 54

APPENDIX 2: PROGRAMME OF INTERVIEWS 63

ATTACHMENT 1: OR SLA OBLIGATIONS 64

ATTACHMENT 2; PROJECT LEADERSHIP TEAM 66

ATTACHMENTS: PROJECT CHARTER 67

ATTACHMENT 4: PRINCIPLES 68


1 List of Acronyms:

CAP Contract Adjusted Price

ecu Command and Control Unit (MAcrolok)

CPA Collaborative Project Agreement

CPB Thiess(CPB) the Contractor

DDG Deputy Director General

DTMR Department of Transport and Main Roads

ERTMS European Rail Train Management System

ETCS European Train Control System

KRA Key Result Area

L2P Lawnton to Petrie

MBRL Moreton Bay Rail Link

MBRP Moreton Bay Rail Project

ONRSR Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator

P2K Petrie to Kippa-ring

PLT Project Leadership Team

PTU Permission To Use

QR Queensland Rail

SCAB Scheduled Corridor Access System

SLA Service Level Agreement

SRC Senior Responsible Owner

SWTC Scope of Work Technical Criteria

DTMR Department of Transport and Main Roads

TPL Thiess(CPB)

UTC Universal Train Control

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation intothe Signaiiing System

2 Executive Summary

In mid June 2016 a decision was made by the Minister for Transport and the Commonwealth Games to delay the opening of the planned Moreton Bay Rail Link (MBRL) due to the signalling system not meeting operational and safety standards. This action was a response to advice from Queensland Rail (QR) that raised safety and operational risks to the MBRL. Following this decision, the Minister also announced that there would be an Independent review into the project to investigate how the signalling system was selected and the costs associated with its development and implementation.

This report is the result of this independent review and has been completed as required by the brief supplied in Section 4. The review has oonsidered the performance and integration of the signalling system and the governance and contractual processes, the performance and integration of the signalling system during design and construction of the MBRL. It has considered information supplied during the interviews and documents up to and including 11* July 2016.

This independent review has also considered the issues that have contributed to the delay in the opening of the MBRL and provides findings and recommendations that can be implemented for this project and future projects.

2.1 The Project - DTMR and QRQriglnally the MBRL project was planned to be managed by QR however the Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR) were subsequently given responsibility for the delivery of the MBRL contract from 2012. It was acknowledged by DTMR that they did not have the requisite experience in the essential rail disciplines and recognised that QR would be the eventual operator and maintainor of the Moreton Bay Rail Link (MBRL). Consequently, QR was engaged to fulfil this critical technical role via a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between DTMR and QR that was established in 2012. This agreement included the supply of engineering and technical services and advice from QR from the commencement of the project. These services included the development of the technical specifications and standards for the contract.

Under the SLA QR are responsible for technical input throughout the project to DTMR on all rail systems including the signalling system.

The SLA was updated and re-signed in April 2015. This update included additional detail Including rail expert services for design review, commentary on all rail disciplines and design approval for signalling systems to ensure they are satisfactory to QR. The revised services included interface services, operational system connection to QR control centre, final testing, commissioning and acceptance, the approval of system integration processes, acceptance and due diligence/assurance process to ensure acceptance of the MBRL into QR’s network.

QR staff have been engaged by DTMR and are embedded into all levels of project governance to manage all rail related Issues Including the signallingr The independent review team was not presented with any evidence, or form an opinion, that would support a conclusion that there were adverse affects relating to risks and or opportunities that arose from the decision to change the control of the project from QR to DTMR.


2.2 Selection of the Signalling System - MAcroLokDTMR were not involved in the technical review and recommendation for the selection of the technology for the signalling system. QR originally specified Westrace Mk II as the signalling technology to be provided for MBRL. QR subsequently decided to allow select companies to tender to allow the signalling contract be competitively tendered to provide Thiess(CBP) more flexibility and better value for the project. DTMR/QR requested Thiess(CPB) to “open the technology to the market to obtain signalling process for the market”(Ref Thiess letter MBR-00-01-01-CQ-000949 of 6 May 2014). As part of this request, QR sought to be jointly involved with Thiess(CPB) in the assessment and selection of tenderers to ensure functional requirements and value for money and broader commercial considerations were addressed.

QR and Thiess(CPB) jointly conducted the assessment.

QR confirmed to DTMR during the evaluation that the Ansaldo MicroLok solution was not acceptable and that the Ansaldo MAcroLok system would be acceptable. The Microlok solution was not acceptable to QR as it precluded any future centralisation of the interlocking at the Mayne Control Centre should telecommunications infrastructure between Mayne and Petrie become available. A joint risk assessment was conducted of the technical and functional requirements of the M Acrolok system with QR, DTMR and Thiess(CPB). Following the technical acceptance by QR of M Acrolok and the rejection of the Microlok, Thiess(CPB) awarded the contract to Ansaldo to supply the M Acrolok as the signalling system for M B R l following an evaluation of relevant commercial considerations.

It was recognised by QR that the M Acrolok system had not been implemented in QR previously and there were a number of technical issues to overcome including;

Understanding of the Technology / Architecture Adaptation of Queensland Rail Signalling Principles Type Approval Database Design Process Support (Maintenance and Design)

QR's reasons for the approval of the M Acrolok technology were in part based on its assessment that although M Acrolok was an alternative product, it aligned with QR’s future needs for a centralised architecture and IA N connectivity. QR met with Ansaldo to gain a better understanding in relation to each of the technical issues listed above. QR reviewed these issues and the high-level gap analysis provided by Thiess(CPB) and ultimately concluded the technical issues could be overcome. However, QR formed a concern around the amount of time it would take to prove and implement the M Acrolok system. Critically, the decision to proceed with the MAcrolok was based on the tender teams reliance on information provided by Ansaldo and evaluated by the evaluation team as part of the tender process that indicated the M Acrolok had been used elsewhere in the same capacity that it was proposed to be used on the M BRl.

A backup contingency plan (Plan B option) to implement a M icrolok II interlocking (by the same supplier) was also considered as part of the tender discussions in relation to the type of interlocking to be used. This plan was to be implemented if the M Acrolok could not be Type Approved by QR to meet the project timeframes. This Plan B has not been implemented.


QR concluded that the main risk in accepting the MAcroLok solution was the delivery timeframe, but considered these did not seem unreasonable based on the tender information supplied and its own inquiries. As a condition on its decision, QR mandated that the delivery risk must be held by the contractor (Thiess(CPB) and Ansaldo). Although QR ensured that the time risk for the project was transferred to the contractor, QR remains responsible to provide type approval as the Accredited body required to operate and run the trains on the MBRL. In reality, the risk to the project of not achieving the opening date could not solely be transferred to the contractor to deliver the MBRL. In practical terms, it was effectively a shared interface risk between QR (and hence the Queensland Government) and the contractor that necessitated a shared and co-ordinated risk management approach.

Ultimately, the Ansaldo signalling systems (MicroLok and MAcroLok) were offered by Ansaldoand the decision to award to Ansaldo to

install MAcroLok was made by the Project Leadership (PLT) of Thiess(CPB)/QR and DTMR following the acceptance of the MAcroLok by QR.

2.3 Signalling System RiskFollowing the award of the signalling contract to Ansaldo for the MAcroLok solution, QR were made aware that the MAcroLok system had not been used in a similar application as had been provided to substantiate the cross acceptance by Thiess(CPB). Thiess(CPB) confirmed on the 1 December 2014 that the processor selected by Ansaldo for MBRL, the Central Control Unit(CCU), “has not been used fora central interlocking application ... previously”.

During interviews, QR indicated that during the technical evaluation jointly performed with Thiess(CPB), minimal technical due diligence on the MAcroLok system was performed (including verification of the contractors claims of use elsewhere) due to the short period of “a week” that was allowed due to compressed timeframes to meet project timeframes.

The risk that was involved with developing a new signalling system (MAcroLok) on the QR network was recognised by QR at the contract award although the evaluation of that risk by the tender team was largely framed by the tender information supplied by Ansaldo that indicated the MAcroLok had been used in the same capacity that it was proposed to be used on the MBRL. It was proposed to mitigate this risk by appointing a full time dedicated QR resource to meet the programme requirements for Type Approval. All design/type approval decisions were referred to QR by DTMR.

2.4 Commissioning DatesThe date to open the MBRL was initially planned for the end of 2016. Throughout the delivery of the project, the opening date was delayed as described below in Figure 2.1.

DateAnnounced

Document Dates

Qctober 2014 Executive Business Case - Commence Train PassengerServices

“TBA"

2014-2015 DTMR Fact Sheets - Public Date set for commissioning on the DTMR website

Late 2016

January 2016 Minister of Transport’s public commitment that Train passenger Services would be ready by Ekka 2016

Middle of 2016


July 2016 Current Timeline Project on track for completion 2016

Figure 2.1 - Public announced dates and dates used in Commercial Business Case

2.5 Issues that led to the Announcement of the Project Being Delayed from the planned “Pre Ekka” Commissioning Date

2.5.1 Safety Issuesin QR’s Minister’s Brief of 30/5/2016, QR outlined that they needed to verify if trains could be operated safely following QR modification of the Universal Train Control(UTC) system. The review team considered that there was a clear inference to be drawn that if the UTC is not modified then it cannot be operated safely.

QR also raised the issue in the Minister’s Brief that there was an increase of Signals Passed At Danger (SPAD) risk due to the delay of setting the routes. During this review, QR identified that there was an increase of 22% from an event ocourring 1 in 1453 years to a 1 in 1125 years. It was not oonfirmed by QR during the review if this increase changed the scoring within QR’s risk matrix.

Importantly, the risk assessment that quantified this risk had been requested many times but was not provided by QR.

2.5.2 Operational IssuesTiming: The time it takes to set and cancel a route^ for this project is much longer than existing signalling systems in the network. The maximum allowable time to set a route is not specified by QR In the MBRL specifications or in the QR standards.

Number of routes to be set: In May 2016, QR and DTMR were advised by Ansaldo that there would be a limit to the number of routes that can be set by the train controller simultaneously. This limitation on the routes that can be set would not allow the Train Controller to control the trains through Petrie junction as they normally would. In other areas controlled from the Mayne Control Centre, routes can be set In a pre-programmed stored sequence In UTC, reducing the number of routes that need to be set manually. This approach reduces the workload on the train controllers, particular during the morning and afternoon peaks. The limitation to the number of routes was notified very late In the project during the final testing stages. The junction at Petrie is not particularly complex and a new signalling interlocking should be able to accommodate the number of routes that need to be set simultaneously without constraint. The minimum number of routes that are required to be set simultaneously is not specified by QR in the MBRL specifications or in the QR standards

Since becoming aware of the route limitations, QR have been collaboratively working with DMTR and Ansaldo to modify the UTC so that the number of routes that can be set simultaneously Is constrained, potentially allowing Petrie Junction to be operated. However, QR operation managers were reluctant to accept the MAcroLok system until its affect on normal and degraded service modes with the restriction of the routes was fully understood.

QR has been collaboratively approving derogations to the operation of the MAcroLok signalling system. Derogations are features of the signalling system, which do not strictly meet QR’s requirements, but where the impact is minimal and/or the impact can be resolved through some temporary measure so that the commissioning of the MBRL can still proceed. These derogations will facilitate the completion of the Type Approval to allow the system to be commissioned pending later resolution.


. A Route : A signalled route is generally the section of track between two signals. Entry to and passage through the route towards the second signal In a series is controlled and authorised by the first signal in the series. The section of track that is authorised and controlled by the first signal generally Includes a length of track past the second signal in the series. This length of track past the second signal Is allocated to allow for train braking errors and is known as an overlap. In the Petrie interlocking area some overlaps are complex and contain points that require setting to secure positions. It Is understood that this overlap allowance is counted as a separate route in the M Acrolok Interlocking system. Thus there are Increased numbers of routes to be processed by the M Acrolok interlocking In the Petrie interlocking area to manage the morning and afternoon peak timetables.

2.5.3 Signalling System, Type Approval and testingThiess(CPB) confirmed in December 2014 that the Command and Control Unit (CCU) Generic Product, which is the part of the MAcroLok that performs the interlocking functions, had not been used previously as a central interlocking application. The CCU has only been used in previous applications such as platform screen doors, level crossings and object controller functions.

Interviewees advised there was significant delays in the development of the MAcroLok and the supplying of documentation from Ansaldo.

The QR Type Approval Committee supported the Type Approval of the MAcrolok Generic Product as a railway interlocking in May 2015.

It was confirmed in the MBRL update presented by QR on 28/06/2016 that “there are no safety related restrictions on the Type Approval of the M Acrolok”.

The MAcrolok system Type Approval to run revenue services for MBRL is outstanding.

Thiess(CPB) have submitted a letter requesting final type approval on 28 June 2016.

No advice has been received regarding the program for the final type approval of the M Acrolok system and the relationship to the final commissioning of the MBRL.

With any development of a new signalling system, there will be issues with the development of the software. This has been evident by the number of “bugs” that have been found throughout the testing of the project. New bugs have continued to be found within the software throughout June and July 2016 which are being worked through by the project team and QR.

2.5.4 GovernanceA clear governance structure has been created for the MBRL Project with QR/DTMR/Thiess(CPB) on the Project Leadership Team and a Steering Committee. However, it appears from minutes that have been reviewed, that serious issues associated with the signalling systems commissioning, were not adequately discussed at the Steering Committee. This led to the divergent advice given to the Minister regarding the suitability of the M Acrolok to be commissioned. It is apparent that consensus was not reached in the management forums regarding the way forward to the commissioning of the MBRL.

2.5.5 Commissioning DatesThe initial commissioning date nominated by the MBRL project team was planned within the Scheduled Corridor Access System (SCAS) in December 2015. This commissioning date was postponed by Thiess(CPB) as the signalling design was not adequately advanced. Subsequent commissioning dates were planned for further early 2016 commissioning events. These commissioning events were also not achieved.

The Minister for Transport announced in January 2016 that the Moreton Bay Rail Link would be opened for passenger service prior to the Ekka 2016 which occurs in August 2016.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail lin k Independent Investigation into 10the Signalling System

The Federal Government who are the majority contributors to the project have stated that the project was expected to be commissioned by late 2016.

2.6 Way Forward to Open the MBRL for Passenger ServiceQR are producing a ‘requirement clarification’ document and a draft has already been developed. The draft document defines maximum delays for the setting and cancellation of routes and the number of routes that are required to be set. It is understood that QR expect Thiess(CPB) to provide an updated scope, timeline and price to meet these requirements.

Both the DTMR and the QR interviewees stated that the basis for moving forward would be that if the safety and operational reviews of the MAcroLok interlocking are successful, the interlocking would be commissioned. This will require the completions of both the testing of the UTC modifications to manage the route set limit and the operational testing on whether both the route set limit and the interlocking delays can be absorbed by the timetable.

The implementation and testing of the UTC modification that allows for the number of routes required for the morning and afternoon peaks to be stored appears to have been successful up to this point.

For the operational testing, QR interviewees noted that the testing of the proposed timetable, tested to this point, has assumed all trains would run in their allocated time slots. QR interviewees expressed concern that the limitations on the routes and the interlooking delays will reduce the ability for the timetable to recover after any form of disruption and this has yet to be assessed.

The interviewees agreed that this was an interim solution only until the interlocking was updated and delivered by Contractor. The updated interlocking will be required to meet the updated requirements as described in the clarification document currently being drafted. There was some uncertainty amongst the interviewees concerning whether the requirements in this document were being drafted for Petrie interlocking only or for the interlocking technology to be implemented anywhere on the network.

The UTC modification that has been tested by QR allows for the number of routes required for the morning and afternoon peaks to be stored. This modification has been tested successfully to run the timetable if there are no disruptions. This modification, has confirmed to be able to meet the operational performance required and to ensure that the derogations are fully understood with a timeframe set to remove these derogations.

The risks associated with commissioning a new signalling system into operational service for the first time on a network are not to be underestimated. Contingency arrangements must be considered and be available for short notice implementation. A two-staged commissioning process is proposed by QR. The first stage is proposed to commission with the M Acrolok interlocking substantially in its present state (which includes the derogations). The second stage commissioning entails the M Acrolok timing delay reduced and the number of routes that can be set being increased. Before the stage one commissioning, QR and DTMR are required to ensure that the M Acrolok will meet the operational performance requirements. The final stage will remove any derogations and meet all performance (existing and new) requirements.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail lin k independent Investigation into 11the Signaiiing System

2.7 The Independent Review Findings and RecommendationsFollowing a review and on the basis of the documentation provided and the interviews conducted, it is the opinion of the independent review team that:

1. The decision by QR to delay the pre Ekka commissioning was justified in the circumstances and is endorsed by the review team. There were many issues still outstanding with the MAcroLok interlocking during May 2016 that may have materially affected the operations and reliability of the QR network. Further “bugs” are being discovered during the June/July period. The QR CEO received advice from the QR signalling team that the M Acrolok development system was unstable and may fail in service. Any such service failure that disrupts the services on MBRL, may disrupt the main line and other parts of the metropolitan system, especially during the morning and evening peak. This disruption would also cause a higher incidence of red light aspects, increasing the likelihood of Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs). The QR CEQ therefore, correctly determined that the safety and reliability issues should be assessed and where possible rectified before commissioning is contemplated.

2. QR identifying safety as a reason to delay the commissioning is not supported, as the safety issue had not been formally assessed.

3. QR’s decision process that was used to endorse the introduction of a new signalling system that is to be developed for use on the QR network was not sufficiently robust. The process failed to adequately evaluate the risks or allow adequate time for due diligence investigations on claims made for a proposed system performance. The delivery timeframe for the introduction was considered a key risk by QR. There was a delay in awarding the signalling component of the project of 11 months following the award of the Thiess(CPB) contract by DTMR that effectively compressed the timeframes with which to undertake the necessary due diligence without also altering the project delivery timeframe.

4. Appropriate risk allocation for shared or residual government risks is to be considered as transferring a risk to a private party where the risk can only be managed by or with the assistance of government.

5. Adequate time is essential to enable a robust and effective technical evaluation during tender evaluations and this Imperative must not be “pressured” due to delivery timescales.

6. Adequate risk mitigations were not implemented following confirmation being received in December 2014 from Thiess(CPB), that alerted the MBRL project team that the M Acrolok CCU tendered for MBRL had not previously been used for a central interlocking application and would be developing the interlocking as a “world first”.

7. The junction at Petrie is not particularly complex and a new signalling interlocking should be able to accommodate the number of routes that need to be set simultaneously without constraint.

8. The MBRL integrated project team which included DTMR/QR/Thless(CPB) and Ansaldo worked collaboratively and worked well together throughout the delivery of the MBRL. This coliaboration continued until the QR team expressed major concerns about readiness for commissioning due to the operational suitability and reliability of the signalling system. At this point, the project teams diverged and did not agree on the commissioning date. There was now iimited mutual understanding of the ongoing problems being experienced with the signaiiing interlocking. This is evidenced by the opposing briefs supplied to the Minister by QR and DTMR.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation into 12the Signaiiing System

9. The governance structure failed when there was disagreements on commissioning dates, with QR and DTMR reporting independently by duel briefing notes, as requested, to the Minister of Transport and the Treasurer and not using the existing governance structure where all parties are represented.

10. The proposed staged commissioning is endorsed provided that the UTC and operational testing is successful. This will involve commissioning the MBRL in the short term and a later commissioning that will meet QR’s requirements including those currently being developed. The review teams support for the first commissioning, is contingent on QR and DTMR agreeing that the signalling system is suitably reliable to run the new service timetable in both degraded and normal operations.

11.

12. Confirmation is required from the project team that the signalling system to be commissioned will meet the 3 minute headway requirement. If not, then the M Acrolok has not met the contract requirements.

2.7.1 Governance and Contractual Processes for Morton Bay Rail Link13. The relationship between QR and DTMR within the project team had worked well up to May

2016 when it was identified that the signalling issues would delay the final commissioning.

14. QR have been adequately represented throughout tender phase, project initiation, development and delivery phases of the Project.

15. At the time that the M Acrolok signalling interlocking (the Interlocking) was approved for the M B R l Project by QR, there was a significant under appreciation by QR of the development risk that was associated with the signalling system.

16. During delivery of the Project it was stated by the interviewees that Thiess/CPB Contractors (the Contractor) and Ansaldo-STS (the Signalling Supplier) made representations regarding the ability and performance of the interlocking and the history of its application elsewhere in the world that were relied on by QR and the M B R l project team that were later withdrawn by the Contractor.

17. The specification of signalling requirements produced by QR was not of a standard or detail that accurately specified the issues that are now being addressed to enable the M B R l to operate reliably and to be integrated into the QR system. The issues that were inadequately specified included QR requirements for interlocking response time and the number of train routes that can be processed by the interlocking simultaneously. These requirements are now being reconsidered and additional specification documentation is being produced by QR.

18. The inclusion of the signalling for lawnton to Petrie section increased the complexity of the interlocking that was required. Consideration should have been given to treating this area as a separate signalling package, due to the separate risk profile and expertise required to manage it.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent investigation into 13the Signaiiing System

19.

20. The weightings developed by DTMR attributed to the technical I I and non-technicalevaluation of the signalling technology during the tender did not reflect the risk that the signalling scope of works had on the overall program of works.

21. As part of the inclusion of L2P scope into the MBRL, the additional scope was to be evaluated by personnel with a higher emphasis on technical capability to address the high technical risk (e.g. the Interlocking). State technical representation (QR and DTMR personnel) is essential on the evaluation.

2.7.2 Performance and integration of signalling systems during design and construction

22. The signalling performance issues have been caused primarily by the gap between what QR expected the system to deliver and what the contract specified. The major task is to finalise the new QR requirements. System timing and the quantity of routes that are required to be set has now been defined in a clarification document produced by QR. QR must decide if they can wait for the final resolution or accept the interim solution. Acceptance of the interim solution will require commissioning of the signalling with the present issues of reliability, slower response times and limits to the routes that can be set. A rectification plan is required to be agreed to address the remaining issues before the second stage commissioning.

23. There was a significant under appreciation by Thiess(CPB), Ansaldo and QR of signalling issues to be resolved prior to implementation of the developed interlocking system. These issues included the level of product development that was required and the time required to gain type approval. A contributing factor explained by the interviewees were the representations made by the signalling supplier and relied upon regarding the prior usage of the MAcroLok interlocking in other railway systems. Interviewees also questioned the capacity and capability of the signalling supplier to manage the system development risk. Interviewees advised that dates for submissions were regularly missed.

24. There were a number of processes and forums which identified that the interlocking design was not proceeding as planned, most notably the interlocking timing and route handling, however these issues were not adequately brought to the attention of the key decision makers. These processes and forums led to the determination by DTMR that the system could still be commissioned into use, as late as the 26th May 16.

25. There is a lack of definition of how and when the fallback scenario of using a M icrolok II solution would be implemented if the M Acrolok did not achieve type approval. The contract did not include any dates for the completion of key deliverables that would allow this option to be utilised. This fall back option of using a M icrolok was under utilised and possibly overstated and overvalued for the purpose of the tender decision.

26. The QR design review and testing process has been well managed and working successfully. This has resulted in the finding of the signalling interlocking system performance issues that are currently being experienced by the project.

27. The project program did not identify additional risk or allow for contingency for unexpected delays often associated with the type approval and product development of a new signalling technology. This caused the cancellation of the planned commissioning dates from December 2015 and throughout 2016.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation into 14the Signalling System

28. The project Steering Committee did not demonstrate adequate oversight of the signalling issues that the project was experiencing to effectively address and manage these issues.

29. The affect of the derogations to the signalling system and the UTC changes on the final operation of the MBRL arrangements have not been adequately notified to the steering committee.

30. The majority of interviewees did not consider the MAcroLok system unsafe. There were various explanations provided for the safety issues caused by the timing and route limitations of the M Acrolok system.

31. The media statements attributed to QR and the safety issues claimed do not reflect the attitude of the QR project team members.

32. QR have recently taken a number of positive steps to assess in detail the impact on safety and rail operations of the interlocking constraints to determine if the Project can be commissioned with an acceptable level of risk and this is still ongoing at the time of the report.

33. There was a difference in views between QR and DTMR in relation to whether the signalling issues had been suitably and vigorously raised and debated within the governance structure for the Project at the Steering Committee for the Project. No evidence has been found where the issues were raised by the QR embedded team.

34. As the Project is nearing commissioning/completion and since the commencement of independent briefs to the Minister, it is clear that there is no shared understanding or agreement between the DTMR and QR of the status and issues to be addressed associated with the interlocking. It is not clear if, how and when any concerns were notified to the DTMR project management team once identified to QR by the embedded QR project team.

35. In December 2015, the Queensland Audit Qffice has documented the following: “the tenders for the MBRP identified a new signalling system that provided QR with an alternative to its standard supplier. The new system offers modern technology at a lower price to standard designs. This saved $7 million and provided a diversification of supplier base.” Thiess(CPB) has advised that

2.7.3 Independent Review Recommendations

Recommendations for immediate implementation

1. Recommendation: It is recommended that a project completion date is not set until the Project Steering Committee has received adequate assurance from the project team that the risks to prevent final completion and handover of the project have been assessed and are adequately mitigated.

2. Recommendation: QR and DMTR are to agree to an acceptance criteria that ensures the signalling and train control system meets QR reliability targets prior to committing to a new commissioning date. Following the announcement of the delay of the pre Ekka commissioning, it is essential that the signalling and train control system are stable and reliable to meet the on time running performance requirements.


3. Recommendation; That formal reports are produced to document the assumptions made for the UTC simulations and the Opentrack modelling, the tests performance/scenarios modelled, the outcomes and the findings. These reports should be incorporated into the material provided to the Project Steering Committee discussed in Recommendation 1.

4. Recommendation: QR are to determine the acceptable level of increased risk to safety, prior to commissioning the M Acrolok system ie QR have stated that there is an increase of 22% from existing.

5. Recommendation: The updated interlocking requirements are to be confirmed if they are intended to be suitable for a QR network-wide implementation of M Acrolok and, if so, ensure that they will support the broader network requirements, rather than just the implementation at Petrie.

6. Recommendation: Ansaldo offered the configuration of M icrolok II hot standby for 12P with M Acrolok for P2K. M Acrolok has been determined to be able to operate P2K as it has the required route setting capacity. This combination is to be considered as an option when looking at the final solution for the interlocking at Petrie.

7. Recommendation: The QR Network team managing the testing and simulations were of the view that based on the number of ‘bugs’ recently still being discovered and the significance of some of these bugs that it was likely that more issues would be found with the interlocking before it was ready for commissioning. As such, adequate time is required for full testing of the interlocking and resolution of issues is allowed for when scheduling the commissioning date.

8. Recommendation: The QpenTrack modelling considered the impact of interlocking delays on services operating on time in accordance with the timetable. It is recommended that a simulation of perturbed operations be also conducted to determine if the interlocking delay and route limit issues have increased the likelihood of minor normal delays on the system becoming unmanageable.

9. Recommendation: Develop and agree the acceptable performance criteria that is required for the M Acrolok Signalling system to allow the commissioning to proceed.

10. Recommendation: DTMR/QR to jointly develop the commercial strategy for finalising the Signalling System for the Project and seek Steering Committee (which is not to include Thiess(CPB) for endorsement.

11. Recommendation: Ensure that the existing operational readiness meetings are reinstated with full involvement of (QR and DTMR) parties that were previously involved in these meetings. Ensure that the commissioning and operational readiness meetings require the participation of all parties and the conclusions of the meetings accurately updated to match the latest test results.

12. Recommendation: Request that formal reports are produced from each of the above implementation risk assessments, present to the Steering Committee to consider these reports and make a recommendation to Government on the commissioning date. Include in this recommendation any operational risks / work-arounds that will be required

13. Recommendation: The project team and QR are to confirm that the required 3 & 6 minute headway has been has been supplied for the M B R l project.


14. Recommendation; - Investigate the option to minimise the route count. Advice was received from interviewees that the M Acrolok route count includes the route between the first and second signals in a series as one route and the overlap past the second signal is counted as a second route. Thus setting a route at Petrie will count as two routes. In order to reduce the number of routes counted to be processed by the M Acrolok the routes could be set in reverse order to the direction of travel. This process requires the UTS to set the last (farthest) route in a series of routes first. The previous route (nearer) route in the series is then set and so on till the first (nearest) route in a series is set. This approach will require the UTC to store individualroutes in a series until the final (farthest) route in a series is set. The UTC will then transmit theroutes to the M Acrolok in the reverse order as above. For example: If it were required to signal a train from Petrie 21 signal to Petrie 81 signal the routes would be set in the following order.

Set route from Petrie 63 signal to Petrie 81 Signal

Then set route from Petrie 31 signal to Petrie 63 Signal


This should require only four route set commands to be processed by the M Acro lok rather than six commands if the routes are set in the direction of travel.

15. Recommendation: Confirm QR’s standards have been met

a. GSS - Part 14 version 3.1 - Submittable Design items - timing analysis and tolerance stack showing worst case time delays (propagation time and race conditions) for time (time delay) and timing (order of operation) related functions in the system (e.g. level crossings, time of operation locking, set up/cancellation of bi-directional signalling, block circuits)

b. GSS part 18 version 1.0 Section 2 Part 2 Processor Based Interlocking - At commissioning, the PBI shall have 10% spare capacity in the hardware installed, and have 20% spare hardware capacity for future hardware expansion

16. Recommendation: Develop a Community and Stakeholder Communication and Management Plan to address issues relating to the Ministers announcement of the delay to the opening of the M BR l including the main issues of the signalling systems safety and operational performance and seek Steering Committee endorsement.

lessons learnt

17. Recommendation: Investigate the role of QR within the Project team and how the information from the project was managed through the wider QR organisation.

18. Recommendation: Review and document the willingness and ability of the M BR l Steering Committee to address and manage the signalling issues raised within the QR brief(s) of June 2016.

19. Recommendation: In a complex new multi discipline rail project where the major project costs are of a civil engineering nature, it is recommended a specialized signalling Project Manager is required to champion and monitor the production of the signalling portion of the project. The introduction of new unproven signalling system is high risk and appropriate risk mitigations are to be implemented.

20. Recommendation: Key rail systems project requirements should only be amended once an evaluation of the associated technical, program and commercial risks are understood.


21. Recommendation: Contract offers from rail systems suppliers should be cleariy understood and bound into the contract to ensure that all parties are aware of the offer and the key requirements and options that are included as part of the offer.

22. Recommendation: The technical and non-technical evaluation weightings used in the procurement of rail systems need to consider the scope, complexity and commercial risks of the project prior to assessment.

23. Recommendation: Review the acceptance of the Signalling system for the MBRL Project and develop a lessons learned paper that in particular addresses;

a. requirements for and sign-off by the State of the Contractors tender evaluation plan for high-risk sub-contracted components;

b. the process for acceptance of technology that requires significant Product Development;

c. the specification of technology including Owner’s Operational and Performance Requirements;

d. policy and governance requirements for any future Product Development projects;

e. independent Gateway reviews for all High Risk/High Value projects;

Recommendations for Future Projects

24. Recommendation: Introduce a Systems Engineering management process with appropriate assurance gates to be utilised for major projects, particularly those projects with significant integration risk.

25. Recommendation: Future contracts must mandate the use of a requirements management process to manage requirements development, traceability, verification and validation.

26. Recommendation: A structured change management process be developed and implemented for future projects to ensure that all project elements (technical, commercial, program etc.) are assessed prior to changes being implemented.

27. Recommendation: Contract documentation be updated on a regular basis (eg monthly depending on the project size and level of change) to clearly reflect the latest baseline contract requirements.

28. Recommendation: QR undertake a review of the signalling standards to ensure the route setting and interlocking capacity issues encountered by this project are addressed.

29. Recommendation: QR undertake a review of the signalling standards to ensure that they contain the required level of definition and specification that can be used by future signalling contractors to meet the QR performance, operational and maintenance requirements regardless of the signalling supplier.

30. Recommendation: Ansaldo offered to replace the M Acrolok with a M icrolok if the MAcrolok type approval failed. It appears that QR M B R l project team decided to continue with the M Acro lok type approval process. If a fall back scenario is offered, a cut off date is to be defined to trigger the fall back solution.

31. Recommendation: For rail projects with a systems or signalling components, when new technology is introduced requiring type approval, it is recommended to include representation


from the engineering group responsible for the type approval process on the Steering Committee.

32. Recommendation: Prior to any non-type approved rail systems equipment being accepted during the tender phase of future projects, it is recommended that the prior application and configuration of the equipment in a similar environment is verified by the project team to ensure this can be relied upon for the type approval process.

33. Recommendation: It is recommended that the highest rated project risks are included as a standing item on the agenda of major projects steering committees to ensure these are identified and being managed appropriately by the project.

34. Recommendation: Prepare a Project cost and budget status Report for Steering Committee endorsement which clarifies the status of Project Costings including, Costs to Date, Contract Adjusted Price, Basis and status of CAP adjustments. Forecast cost to completion. Gain Pain Share status and process to completion, and the budget status.

35. Recommendation: Ensure that all members nominated to attend MBRL and future project Steering Committees are willing and available to attend and that the Steering Committee may request a permanent suitable alternative for regular non-attendance.

36. Recommendation: Review the decision to include a contractor within the Project Steering Committee and its impact on effective consideration of issues and document findings for future projects.

37. Recommendation: For future contracts, ensure that the commercial framework and payment mechanism includes key project performance outcomes at an appropriate performance level and to a suitable level of detail that are understood by all parties to ensure that the contractor is adequately incentivised to meet the project’s key performance outcomes and the project team only awards gain share where the agreed project outcomes are satisfied.

38. Recommendation: in future projects, consideration is to be given to the most appropriate party to own the risk, i.e. in relation to the risk to the project not achieving the opening date, this risk could not solely be transferred to the contractor to deliver the MBRL. It was effectively a shared interface risk between QR (and hence the Queensland Government) and the contractor that necessitated a shared and co-ordinated risk management approach.

39. Recommendation: Review the MBRL joint project team of DTMR/QR and the contractors working relationship to determine (despite the issues with this project and the causes of those issues being unrelated to the model itself) and determine if the collaborative model was still effective for future contracts.

40. Recommendation: Review the standards and contract documentation for the integration of a new rail line into the existing network to ensure operators requirement are incorporated.


3 Background

The Moreton Bay Rail Link Project (formally the Petrie to Kippa-Ring Rail Link) was announced by the Prime Minister, Julia Gillard in 2010. The project was costed at $1.1478 and was to be jointly funded by the Australian Government, Queensland Government and Moreton Bay Regional Council.

- $742M - Australian Government

- $300M - Queensland Government

- $105M - Moreton Bay Regional Council

The project includes the construction of 12.6km of new double track railway between Petrie and Kippa-Ring, six new rail stations and a new train stabling facility at Kippa-Ring. The project includes a number of rail overpass bridges, road bridges, new roads and road upgrades.

In 2011, a Business Case (Executive Business Case) for the Moreton Bay Rail Link was completed and the project was to be delivered by Queensland Rail (QR). Qn 12 July 2012, the Queensland Government announced that the project would be delivered by the Department of Transport and Main Roads, who would also be the Principle as opposed to QR.

The Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR or the Department) released the Request for Proposal in August 2012 and in August 2013 awarded a Design and Construct contract to Thiess(CPB) Pty Ltd to deliver the project for

The project was iater combined with an upgrade of the existing Lawnton to Petrie section of track by adding a third track to provide additional track capacity for the Moreton Bay Rail Link from Petrie. Queensland Rail funds this project at a cost of $168m. Together both projects come under the Moreton Bay Rail Program (referred to in this document as the Project). The Project owner is the Department of Transport and Main Roads.

The commissioning of the Project commenced in January 2016 and the Project was planned to be completed and open for passenger operation by the ‘middle’ of 2016. Qn 30 May 2016 the Minister for Transport and the Commonwealth Games, Sterling Hinchcliffe MP (Minister for Transport and the Commonwealth Games) announced that the Project would not be operational by mid-2016 as planned, citing delays associated with commissioning the signaiiing system and that the final commissioning of the Project is postponed pending further advice from Queensland Rail.

This report will consider the Project governance, contractual processes, the technical and safety assurance processes and the processes to manage interfaces and integration of the new signalling system with the existing installations on the Queensland Rail Network.


4 Scope

RM and HM Smith have been requested by Department of the Premier and Cabinet to perform an Independent Investigation Review (the Review) of the Moreton Bay Rail Link to review:

1. Governance and Contractual processes for Moreton Bay Rail Link, including:

Any signalling system related issues, risks and/or opportunities arising from the decision in 2012 to bring the Project under the auspices of TMR;

A review of the signalling system elements of the tendering and contract process;

Whether the role assigned to Queensland Rail through contractual and/or governance documents and processes provided for appropriate involvement of the rail operator in the assurance processes relating to signalling; and

Contract milestone payments relating to signalling, and gain share payments, and the grounds upon which any payments have been made.

2. Performance and integration of signalling systems during design and construction, inciuding:

The nature of assurance activities by the Project team, Queensland Rail, or other parties to monitor, test, and review signalling systems and signalling system interface/integration;

The nature of interface/integration issues experienced between multiple signalling systems on the one network;

The adequacy of assurance activities, and lessons for future rail contract selection and oversight;

The processes by which concerns raised by Queensland Rail or other parties regarding the signalling systems or signalling system integration were managed; and

The assurance program being implemented by Queensland Rail In order to have the project commissioned.

The Review consisted of an examination of the documents received from the Department of the Premier and Cabinet prior to arrival in Brisbane and documents provided following meetings in Brisbane. The index of the documents submitted for review is included in Appendix 1 to this report.

The review of documents was supplemented by a series of meetings with the Moreton Bay Rail Link Project Team, the Department of Transport and Main Roads, Queensland Rail and CPB (formerly Thiess) staff. The list of people consulted during the period 20-31 July 2016 is included in Appendix 2 to this report.

This review was carried out independently to the work being undertaken by Queensland Rail into the future state requirements of the signalling systems in order for Moreton Bay Rail Link to open.


Governance and Contractual Processes for MBRL

5.1 Issues/Risks Arising From the Decision to Bring the Project Under TMR

5.1.1 IntroductionOn 12 July 2012, the Queensland Government announced that the MBRL would be delivered by the Department of Transport and Main Roads replacing Queensland Rail. Under the new project delivery structure, DTMR would be the principle for the project and QR would form part of the integrated project team. QR had a key role to play in the delivery of the project and would provide specialist rail systems personnel to assist through the design and delivery of the project.

5.1.2 GovernanceThe decision to instruct DTMR to lead the delivery of the MBRL has not added any governance related issues/risks to the project. Documentation reviewed as part of the review show that suitable Governance structures for a Project of this scale and complexity appear to have been agreed, developed and documented.

Interviewees advised that DTMR realised early in the development of the project that they would require technical expertise from QR especially in the signalling discipline. This is verified as QR was enlisted by the DTMR to be involved in the production of the contract documentation including the Scope of Works and Technical Criteria (SWTC). QR were a member of the tender evaluation panel with Thiess(CPB) evaluating the signalling technologies proposed by the various contractors for the project.

The QR involvement in the MBRL project was formalised in a Service Level Agreement that was signed on 8 January 2013. The agreement was further defined over a number of changes throughout the project. The changes to the agreement provided further clarifications to both parties. The final amendment to the Service Level Agreement was completed on 20 November 2014. Within this agreement the project implementation process was a co-operation between DTMR and QR teams. DTMR have advised that the QR staff on the project were embedded in the project team. DTMR advised that arrangements were made for QR signalling staff to be accommodated in the Ansaldo- STS offices for easier interface with the Ansaldo-STS staff.

DTMR also modified their design review and approval process for the signalling portions of the design to match and accommodate the QR standard approach to signalling design approval. This process was agreed with QR and implemented on the project.

5.1.3 Project ManagementInterviewees were complimentary of how the Project has been managed. It is managed within a comprehensive Project Management Plan that is considered appropriate for a Project of this scale, complexity and risk.

5.1.4 Contract ManagementA detailed review of the contract administration is beyond the scope of this Review however a consideration of contract administration as it related to signalling was considered. The Project has been managed within a Contract Administrative System referenced in the Project Management Plan

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent investigation into 22the Signaiiing System

and a comprehensive Contract Management Plan (Contract Administration Pian Rev 7 signed_Redacted.pdf). This is considered appropriate for a Project of this scale, complexity and risk. Interviewees presented evidence that issues relating to signalling had been proactively managed and the document trail includes a log of 141 pieces of correspondence and 37 Thiess(CPB) letters relating to MAcroLok.

This document trail reinforces interviewees’ representations that whilst the design and development of the M Acrolok signalling has been difficult, it has been proactively managed by the project team throughout.

5.1.5 Steering CommitteeInterviewees varied in their description of the effeotiveness of the Steering Committee (SC). Several issues that were raised and/or identified regarding Governance included:

1. The nominated member in the governance framework was the CEO of QR. The QR CEQ delegated this responsibility to the QR Executive General Manager Projects with the QR CEQ not attended any Steering Committee meetings. Interviewees consider that the vital role of the Steering Committee in a Project of this scale, complexity and risk to government was potentially impacted by the absence of the QR CEQ. A core accountability and responsibility of the CEQ, QR was to Provide high-ievei support to the SRO and the Moreton Bay Rail Program and to ensure the readiness o f QR to accept and utilise the new capability.

2. The description by interviewees of the degree of analysis and debate of detailed issues critical to the success of the Project varied. It is noted that the minutes of recent Steering Committee meetings appear to not adequately address the issues that were reported in the QR brief of May 2016. Interviewees provided various advice on this including:

The issues were discussed by the Steering Committee and not accurately recorded in the minutes

The issues were not addressed by the Steering Committee and the minutes provide an accurate record of the meeting

This Review considers that the minimal information provided in the Steering Committee minutes did not adequately address and manage the issues surrounding the signalling issues. This is particulariy noticeable for a Steering Committee whose role was defined as: (MBRL SC v4.0 updated.pdf)

The Role o f the MBRL Steering Committee includes:

providing strategic leadership and direction to the Project Team

making decisions in the best interests o f the MBRL Project

and whose responsibilities include: (MBRL_Steering Committee Responsibiiities.pdf)

Open and transparent disclosure

The Steering Committee must encourage timely, no surprises and open disclosure of project reporting (both ‘good’ and 'bad’ news)

Do not wait until the monthly meeting if issues need to be escalated for resolution through the Steering Committee.

Safeguard the reputations o f all parties


- Protect the reputation o f the Moreton Bay Rail Project and the reputations o f ali project partners.

- Operate with respect for each organisation and aii individuals

- Respect the opinions o f each committee member and respect the values and needs o f each organisation.

The Review Team noted that a member from the Contractor’s organisation was nominated and attended Steering Committee meetings. Several interviewees advised that this led to certain Issues not being addressed by the Steering Committee. It is noted that the Steering Committee was not a decision making body but was an important body in assisting and advising the Senior Responsible Owner. Having the Contractor within the Steering Committee is considered an unusual practice even within a Collaborative contract arrangement. It has the potential to impact whole of Government consideration of many issues including:

Openly considering contract/or performance;

Ability to discuss variations (proposed or actual);

Availability and use of Project contingency; and

Government considerations that should not be shared with the private sector.

Whilst the CPA is not considered an alliance contract by Project participants the words from the National Aiiiance Contracting Policy and Guidelines September 2015 available at httosi/Zinfrastructure.qov.au/infrastructure/nqpd/index.aspx are potentially relevant:

"It is important for an aiiiance contract to have a governance framework that clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities o f ali aiiiance Participants, in particular, a clear distinction needs to be made between the ‘Owner’, and the ’Owner Participants’ who are part o f the aiiiance. The Owner (who can be a Minister, the departmental head, the agency’s board, etc.) may delegate certain iimited responsibilities to their nominated representatives in an aiiiance.

Irrespective, Owners cannot delegate their accountabilities to the state for delivering agreed investment outcomes. These outcomes should be fully articulated In the Business Case and include both the longer-term delivery o f the service benefits to the community and the capital project that the Owner considers is required to enable those service benefits to be realised, it is also important for the legal framework to preserve the Owner’s capacity to assert and enforce the state’s rights."

In this Project the Owner was a combination of Federal, State and Local Government and the presence of a contractor at the Owner’s consideration of important Project elements is questionable:

The Project nominates a single point of accountability for the success of the program as the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). The SRO Is the Deputy Director-General (DDG) Translink and is nominated as the Chair of the Moreton Bay Rail Program Steering Committee. It is noted that the SRO has not been chairing the Steering Committee as the Director General DTMR and Others has been chairing the Steering Committee.

It is unclear to the Review Team if the TMR Steering Committee Charter, draft MBRL SC v4.0 updated.pdf has been reviewed and endorsed.

The inclusion of the contractor on a government Steering Committee is to be reviewed to determine if this is considered “best practice” for future projects due to the potential conflicts of interests that arise between that contractors obligation (and the Steering Committee’s reasonable expectation) that the


contractor will openly admit critical risks and issues that impact on the project vs the commercial interest of that contractor to protect itself financially and to present with an ‘optimistic bias’.

Recommendation: Ensure that all members nominated to attend MBRL and future project Steering Committees are willing and available to attend and that the Steering Committee may request a permanent suitable alternative for regular non-attendance.

Recommendation: Review and document the willingness and ability of the MBRL Steering Committee to address and manage the signalling Issues raised within the QR brlef(s) of June 2016

Recommendation: Review the decision to Include a contractor within the Project Steering Committee and Its Impact on effective consideration of Issues and document findings for future projects.

Recommendation: In future projects, consideration Is to be given to the most appropriate party to own the risk, I.e. In relation to the risk to the project not achieving the opening date, this risk could not solely be transferred to the contractor to deliver the MBRL. It was effectively a shared Interface risk between QR (and hence the Queensland Government) and the contractor that necessitated a shared and co-ordinated risk management approach.

Recommendation: Review the MBRL Joint project team of DTMR/QR and the contractors working relationship to determine (despite the Issues with this project and the causes of those Issues being unrelated to the model Itself) and determine If the collaborative model was still effective.

5.2 Signalling System Elements of the Tendering and Contract Process

S igna lling System; Selection, Design, Developm ent and Current Status

5.2.1 IntroductionMoreton Bay Rail Link was originally tendered using a ‘Dual Early Contractor Involvement’ (DECI) model. The scope included all elements of the Moreton Bay Rail Link scope but did not include the scope required for the new interlocking at Petrie for the Lawton to Petrie project. The Request for Proposal was released on 24 August 2012. During the tender process the scope of the project was amended to include the Lawton to Petrie works, which included the signalling scope. Thiess(CPB) were awarded the contract on 1 August 2013.

At the time of tendering for the Project the signaiiing technical and operational requirements defined within the Scope o f works and technical requirements App 15 - Design information rail included:

"The interlocking technology chosen for the project must be Westrace fdK II with Hot-Standby processing and duplicated i/0 . Any distributed object controllers must be designed to minimise the amount o f logic required in them. ”

These requirements were subsequently replaced in February 2014 with the following paragraph in the interlocking section from Clause 15.3.4 Signalling.

“The interlocking technology shall be selected from the following list and the core interlocking controller located as per the preferred installation site for the respective technology:

Interlocking Type Preferred Installation Site

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation Into 25the Signalling System

Westrace M kll Kallangur

MicroLok II Kallangur

Westlock Mayne

The 'Master' interlocking for Lawnton to Petrie and a separate 'Master' Interlocking for MBRL must be located at Mayne. The boundary between the two interlockings must enable the Lawnton to Petrie interlocking to operate in isolation while the MBRL interlocking Is powered down causing no impact to North Coast Line operations, e.g Shutdown o f MBRL for maintenance. The interlocking technology for the project and all other technical requirements relating to the interlocking shall be applied to both the Lawnton to Petrie and MBRL interlockings."

And;

"6 minute headway for MBRL and 3 minute headway for North coast line from the Petrie interface through to central"

5.2.2 Signalling System SelectionPost tender, the MBRL scope was extended to include the Lawnton to Petrie project, which included the Petrie Interlocking scope. At contract award, in August 2013, it was anticipated that the signalling for the MBRL and Lawton to Petrie would be based on Siemens’ Westrace Mk II technology, however in February 2014 TMR advised Thiess(CPB) that an alternate processor based Interlocking technology would be considered to provide more flexibility and better value for the project.

The Contractor was informed: "Please note that as part o f this reiaxation, QR requires that it is Jointiy involved with Thiess(CPB) in the assessment and seiection o f the tenderers to ensure functional requirements and vaiue for money."

It is understood that this decision was taken primarily to ensure that an open tendering process was undertaken to ensure value for money for the project. During the review it has not been demonstrated that a considered view of the technical, program and commercial risks was undertaken prior to reaching this decision. The tender process that was subsequently undertaken took 11 months to complete and Ansaldo-STS was engaged on 3 June 2014.

Recommendation: Key rail systems project requirements should only be amended once an evaluation of the associated technical, program and commercial risks are understood.

5.2.3 Signalling Evaluation CriteriaOnce the decision was made to tender the signalling scope, the State relied on the Contractor to tender for the Interlocking scope post-award with technical input from QR. The evaluation plan for the original Moreton Bay Rail Link Project had a strong emphasis on price rather than technicalcapability . The weightings used for the MBRL were carried over and used for the signalling tender. Whilst this may have been appropriate for the original largely civil focused scope, this strong price bias was not appropriate for the signalling scope which included the extended scope to cover Lawnton to Petrie (with greater interlocking system development, interface and integration challenges).

Recommendation: The technical and non-technical evaluation weightings used in the procurement of rail systems need to consider the scope, complexity program and commercial risks of the project prior to assessment.

It was not evident that the technical risk and complexity associated with including the Lawton to Petrie scope (including the additional complexity to the MAcroLok) with the MBRL project was considered.


The technical risks that were not evidenced during the review when considering the inclusion of the Lawton to Petrie Scope were

retain the signalling for Lawnton to Petrie as a separate package, given the separate risk profile and expertise required to manage It; or

extend the existing MicroLok interlocking at Petrie to accommodate the new arrangements. It is understood this was a fall-back option at one stage; or

QR to develop a more detailed signalling specification that takes into account the technical complexity and brownfield interfaces that the scope included.

Requiring the Contractor and QR to develop a structured evaluation plan with a higher emphasis on their technical capability for the new sub-contracted components with increased technical risk, brownfield interface to ensure that (e.g. the Interlocking) and ensure State representation on the evaluation.

Ansaldo offered to replace the MAcroLok with a MicroLok if the MAcroLok type approval failed. The QR MBRL project team decided to continue with the MAcroLok Type approval.

Ansaldo also offered the combination of MicroLok II hot standby for the Lawton to Petrie (L2P) interlocking with MAcroLok for Petrie to Kippa Ring(P2K). MAcroLok has been determined to be able to operate P2K as it has the required route setting capacity. The route setting limitation in the MAcroLok affected train service operations in the Lawnton to Petrie (L2P) area.

Recommendation: Ansaldo offered the configuration of MicroLok I! hot standby for L2P with MAcroLok for P2K. MAcroLok has been determined to be able to operate P2K as it has the required route setting capacity. This combination is to be considered as an option when looking at the final solution for the interlocking at Petrie.

Recommendation: Ansaldo offered to replace the MAcroLok with a MicroLok if the MAcroLok type approval failed. It appears that QR MBRL project team decided to continue with the MAcroLok type approval process. If a fall back scenario is offered, a cut off date is to be defined to trigger the fall back solution.

5.2.4 Signalling Tender Evaluation PlanThere does not appear to be a structured evaluation plan and process for assessing the different signalling systems commercially and specifically the trade-off between the commercial and technical evaluation. The determination of how the ( commercial / technical) split for the tender has not been determined in this review.

The commercial evaluation was sufficiently high to overcome the low technical rating of MAcroLok leading it to become the preferred system.

Recommendation:

A structured evaluation plan based on an assessment of the risk, complexity and nature of the project should be developed for future rail system procurement.


It is understood that Thiess(CPB) was given approval to proceed on the Project in August 2013 and began work in January 2014. The contract was signed by the Parties between April and October 2014.

In May 2014 Thiess(CPB) opened the technology to the market to obtain signalling prices for the project. Thiess(CPB) worked with QR to determine the selection criteria to be used. Several sessions with the Thiess(CPB) Signalling Technical team together with QR were held to score the individual submissions.

Based on the bid received from 3 proponents, product offerings from ~offered compliant and functional offers.

In April 2014, Ansaldo responded to the tender and proposed MicroLok and MAcroLok systems for the L2P and P2K sections. The proposal also included an offer for MicroLok II at L2P and MAcroLok for the P2K section. The MAcroLok interlocking system was noted as not currently a system that had been implemented in QR and therefore would require a number of technical issues to be overcome. These included;

Understanding of the technology/Architecture/Adaption of QR rail signalling principles.

Type approval

Database design process

Support Maintenance and Design

Integration with the QR systems


However, from a strategic perspective, QR considered that it was an alternative product that aligned with future need of centralised architecture and LAN connectivity. QR met with Ansaldo to gain a better understanding of these issues. QR reviewed a high level gap analysis of what signalling principles have been implemented in the system and the additional signalling principles will be required by QR. QR determined that this did not identify any technical issues that could not be overcome however QR had concerns regarding the amount of time it will take to prove and implement. Ansaldo offered resources to perform the additional signalling work and QR was agreeable with the offer.

Following further meetings documentation indicates that QR considered that MAcroLok had the ability to fulfil the technical and functional requirements with the risks listed below:

Type approval timeframes - QR approval review - QR will produce a final report- it was discussed that a MicroLok II solution could be Implemented as a fall-back plan In the event that MAcroLok did not get type approval.

Time and process to adapt the system to QR's Signalling Brisbane principles, one dedicated QR person to undertake the Interpretation o f the principles and would be done jo intly with QR

In May 2014 DTMR formally asked Thiess(CPB) to provide an evaluation of the signalling supplier and the Interlocking alternatives proposed, taking into account the benefits of each system.

On 20 May 2014 a paper describing the outcomes of this evaluation was presented to the Project Leadership Team (PLT) and the decision was made to proceed with the Ansaldo STS MAcroLok system. The paper noted:

From the review undertaken, it is unclear to the review team how the Information was assessed to determine that the MAcroLok system was “more reliable, with greater capacity for future expansion and is future proofed through being ready for interfacing to ERTMS”.

Interviewees on the tender evaluation panel advised that limited information was supplied on the MAcroLok to verify these statements during the tender evaluation.


Recommendation:

Contract offers from rail systems suppliers should be clearly understood and bound into the contract to ensure that all parties are aware of the offer and the key requirements and options included as part of the offer.

Following advice from QR to TMR, the Contractor was advised of the approval of MAcroLok on 3 June 2014, Letter E22004 - Signalling Technology Approvai.pdf.

- the Ansaldo MicroLok II solution Is not acceptable as an alternative option;

- the on-tlme delivery risk remains with Thiess(CPB) and Ansaldo;

Thless(CPB) and Ansaldo are responsible for the type approval process and the provision o f the resources to develop the system and data structure (In conjunction with Queensiand Raii);

the deveiopment o f the architecture against Queensland Rail signalling principles Is based on the entire Brisbane Suburban Area network and not only for L2P and MBRL;

a simulator (details o f this to be confirmed by DTMR) is to be provided as part o f the handover package;

design and maintenance training is included in the delivery o f the system.

interviewees and documentation reviewed reveal that at the time of this approval there was significant under appreciation of signalling issues to be resolved prior to implementation, including:

Product development risk that was associated with the system;

Time required to gain type approval;

Much of the design and the product development work would occur in Italy;

- The product had not been proven in other installations elsewhere worldwide; it appears that the status of this was not adequately communicated by Ansaldo or investigated by QR at the time of approval;

Expertise that is required for complex Development Projects;

The SWTC requirements and associated QR standards did not fully define the performance and specification that is required for a new non-type approved signalling interlocking;

The inclusion of the Petrie interlocking that provided further complexity to the interlocking system;

QR standards did not contain the definition of requirements to enable system developers to fully comply with QR signalling and operational requirements;

The functions of the MAcroLok system were developed on other rail authorities principles and therefore required development to QR principles.

Recommendation:

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent Investigation into 30the Signalling System

Review the acceptance of the Signalling system for the Project and develop a lessons learned paper that in particular addresses;

Requirement for and sign-off of the tender evaluation plan by the State for high-risk sub-contracted components

The process for acceptance of technology that requires significant Product Development

- The specification of technology including Owner’s Operational and Performance Requirements

Policy and governance requirements for any future Product Development projects

Independent Gateway reviews for all High Risk/High Value projects;

Recommendation: Review the standards and contract documentation for the integration of a new rail line into the existing network to ensure operators requirement are incorporated.

5.3 The Role Assigned to Queensland Rail Throughout the Project

5.3.1 Project Relationship with Queensland Rail

QR were adequately represented throughout the project initiation, development and the delivery phase of the Project.

For the MAcroLok development periods, the project members of the QR signalling team were imbedded into the project team and continue to fulfil this role. It is considered that the full extent of the development process was not fully understood by QR . There were anumber of elements within the internal processes of the MAcroLok that were different to the processes within existing QR interlockings. There are still derogations outstanding at the time of writing. It is understood that these derogations will be agreed and rectified after the commissioning.

The documents reviewed demonstrated that QR was working collaboratively with DTMR, Thiess(CPB) and Ansaldo. QR signalling staff appear, in most cases, to be dealing directly with Ansaldo on signal design and the MAcroLok development on behalf of the DTMR MBRL project team. Advice has been received that the QR team members embedded in the project team were supplied with both QR and DTMR computers and systems. Advice was received that arrangements were also made for the QR team members to be able to have desks in the Ansaldo offices which demonstrates full visibility within the Project Team.

QR's involvement included:

Being represented in the project team via an ongoing Agreement with the Department of Transport to provide services through a Service Level Agreement (SLA) originally executed in 10 January 2010 and varied in April 2015. The SLA commits QR to activities as detailed in Attachment 1.

Being represented by the CEQ as a member of the Moreton Bay Rail Program Steering Committee and attendance at the SC by the Project Director and Project Manager - Lawnton to Petrie Brownfield Project (QR).

Within the MBRP Governance Framework the Core accountabilities and responsibilities of the CEQ, QR is to “Provide high level support to the SRQ and the Moreton Bay Rail Program.” And “Ensure the readiness of QR to accept and utilise the new capability.”

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent investigation into 31the Signalling System

Being one of two senior representatives of the Principal on the Project Leadership Team (PLT) of the Collaborative Project Agreement (CPA). Together with two senior representatives of the Contractor (PLT Members) the PLT is established with an overall responsibility to administer the CPA and provide guidance and leadership to each of the Parties with respect to the Work under the CPA. The duties and accountabilities of the PLT are significant and are detailed in Attachment 2.

Review of the draft brief developed by DTMR, to guide the Contractor on the procurement of the Signalling Supplier.

Representation on the Commissioning and Operational Readiness (C&OR) monthly meetings.

Receiving all reports from the Signalling Supplier covering the status of the interlocking design, the remaining bugs and the processing delays.

The duties and accountabilities of the PLT include the requirement to ensure that ail actions, decisions and behaviours are consistent with Project Principles.

Being part of the Project Charter (refer Attachment 3).

QR technical team being co-iocated in the office of the Ansaldo development team in Brisbane.

Having QR and DTMR computers providing full access to both systems.

Based upon the above involvement, the governance processes appear to have provided appropriate involvement of the rail operator.

Information was received from the QR project team members that they were unable to provide information to the DTMR management team. To date the review team were unable to find documentary evidence to support this.

However, given the limited discussion at the Steering Committee of risks associated with the interlocking, it appears that the /nfra-organisation communication and governance processes may not have been effective, in that:

The QR Project team may have not been adequately briefed by the QR Project signalling engineering team of the emerging issues associated with the testing and assurance of the Interlocking;

The Contractor may not have been adequately informed by the Signalling Supplier of the same issues.

Recommendation: Investigate the role of QR within the Project and how the information from the project was managed through the wider QR organisation.


5.4 Contract Milestone Payments Relating to Signalling, and Gain share Payments, and the Grounds Upon Which any Payments Have Been Made

5.4.1 Contract Status


Recommendation: For future contracts, ensure that the commercial framework and payment mechanism includes key project performance outcomes at an appropriate performance level and at a to a suitable level of detail that are understood by all parties to ensure that the contractor is adequately incentivised to meet the project’s key performance outcomes and the project team only awards gain share where the agreed project outcomes are satisfied.

5.4.2 Contract Status - Signalling

At the time of the Review, interviewees confirmed that the Project faced a number of challenging contract issues regarding the signalling including:

The Contractor considers that it has completed the signalling works to the standard specified in the Contract and intends to manage the contract on that basis. Any Requirements that are developed by QR will probably be treated as a variation.

- . QR consider that a contractor acting “reasonably” could be expected to provide a “fit for purpose” signalling system that would include many of the requirements that are now being documented by QR.

The management of the contract and the complex current contract issues is complicated by recent Ministerial communications that leave some Project Participants that were interviewed believing that QR has assumed “control” of the Project. The status of this issue must be clarified immediately if the commercial position of the Government is not impacted.

The strategy for managing the

o finalisation of technical issues surrounding the Signalling System

o commercial issue surrounding the QR requirements that are currently being developed

o acceptance criteria for QR acceptance (including any interim acceptances that may be required to open the line) of the signalling system

o commissioning program up to the final commissioning

o opening of the line for revenue service

o variations

Treatment of the “clarifications” (in the form of a revised specification) that QR are developing to allow the Contractor to understand the obligations they accepted when they nominated a signalling system which required substantial product development. It is likely that neither QR, DTMR, the Contractor and potentially even the signalling supplier fully appreciated the risk they undertook when selecting the MAcroLok system. Notwithstanding this, finalisation of the signalling elements of the Project is likely to involve substantial cost that will have to be borne by someone.

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent investigation into 34the Signalling System

If “Additional Work” is required as a result of QR clarifications and it is a variation the Government will have to develop an attitude regarding the willingness to provide for the increased scope and related additional funds.

These issues are commercially and contractually complex and it is unclear how they will be managed and who will lead the negotiations.

Recommendation: DTMR/QR to jointly develop the commercial strategy for finalising the Signalling System for the Project and seek Steering Committee (which is not to include Thiess(CPB)) for endorsement.


6 Performance and integration of signalling systems during design and construction

6.1 The Nature of Assurance Activities by the Project Team, Queensland Rail, or Other Parties to Monitor, Test, and Review Signalling Systems and Signalling System Interface/Integration

6.1.1 Introduction - AssuranceIn evaluating the nature of assurance activities, a definition for assurance that is applicable to rail transport systems is required to set context and help identify the appropriate activities.

A simple definition of assurance is:

- A set o f structured and planned activities conducted through the asset life cycle providing progressive justified confidence that objectives are being achieved and that the asset is or will be fit for purpose. (Asset Standards Authority - TfNSW)

The assurance activities should be part of an integrated framework that covers the entire lifecycle from concept through procurement, design, test, commission, operations and disposal. Justified confidence is obtained through well-defined gates at each stage of the lifecycle. Fit for purpose relies on a well-managed set of requirements and the appropriate verification and validation evidence. The following sections provide an assessment of the nature of the assurance activities based upon this definition.

6.1.2 Scope of Work Technical Criteria (SWTC)The SWTC Exhibit A sets out the requirements for the overall Quality and Project Verification. Section 3.3 outlines the requirements for the review of Drawings and Scheme Documents to be addressed in the contractors Design Plan. Design documentation demonstrating compliance to the SWTC requirements is required at the following stages:

Concept Design

Preliminary Design

Detailed Design

Permission to Use

The most relevant process for assurance of the signalling design is the permission to use process. This is examined in a later section.

Testing and commissioning activities and detailed requirements are identified in section 2.5 and Appendix 12 “Handover and Disengagement.”

From a signalling assurance view point, the SWTC does not mandate the requirements for a suitable technical and safety assurance framework for assuring the design and delivery of the signalling against the specified requirements in the SWTC appendices. There are no requirements for a formal requirements management process that includes requirements development, traceability, verification


and validation. The project plans do not state that a Systems Engineering Management Plan or Verification and Validation Plan are required for systems based elements such as signalling.

Recommendation: Future contracts must mandate the use of a requirements management process to manage requirements deveiopment, traceability, verification and validation.

6.1.3 Exhibit A - SWTC - Appendix 15 - Design Information - RailSWTC Appendix 15 Section 15.3.4 summarises the signalling implications of the operational requirements specified in section 15.2.4. From an assurance viewpoint this section represents the baseline high level requirements for the signalling design. The SWTC contains numerous edits to clarify or update requirements in the form of Requests For Information (RFI’s). This approach to requirements management makes it very difficult to establish the current baseline fo r the requirements set and does not lend itself to a good requirements management process. It is difficult to establish a single source of truth with respect to the requirements and the approach to document requirements changes via RFIs does not lend itself to a good change management process or provide the requisite traceability. For example, the original requirements for interlocking technology were updated as follows:


In the above example it is difficult to determine \what the new requirement baseline is and there is no reference to any impact assessment or change management process and the RFI responses references another RFI M1B-485. An effective assurance process needs a stable and accurate baseline and the Scope of Works and Technical Criteria (SWTC) Appendices do not provide this.

Recommendation: A structured change management process be developed and implemented for future projects to ensure that all project elements (technical, commercial, program etc.) are assessed prior to changes being Implemented.

Recommendation: It Is recommended that contract documentation be updated on a regular basis (eg monthly depending on the project size and level of change) to clearly reflect the latest baseline contract requirements.

6.1.4 Exhibit A - SWTC - Appendix 33 - Technical SpecificationsAppendix 33 - Technical Specifications provide a comprehensive list of Queensland Rail Signalling Specifications, Standards and Technical Requirements. These form the basis for the review of signalling designs by QR via the Permission To Use Signalling Design Process agreed between Thiess(CPB), DTMR and QR. From an assurance point of view these form the detailed requirements for the review of the signalling to QR specifications and standards to ensure that a signalling design will conform. The concern is that QR’s operational requirements for route set timing, route capacity have not been flowed down in the design and hence the Permission To Use(PTU) process will not correct this gap.

Recommendation: It Is recommended that QR undertake a review of the signalling standards to ensure the route setting and Interlocking capacity Issues encountered by this project are addressed.

Recommendation: It Is recommended that QR undertake a review of the signalling standards and to ensure that they contain the required level of specification that can be used by future signalling contractors to meet the minimum QR performance, operational and maintenance requirements regardless of the signalling supplier.

6.1.5 PTU Signalling Design Process Verl - Thiess(CPB) - 09/09/14The Permission To Use (PTU) Signalling Design Process was developed to review the signalling designs against QR specifications, standards and technical requirements. Ansaldo prepared the signalling designs, forwarded them to Thiess(CPB) who then created the comment sheets and the package was forwarded to the DTMR Signal Lead for format checking before forwarding to QR. QR performed the reviews and comments were sent to Thiess(CPB) via DTMR. Review comments and agreed actions were addressed in a joint ATAS/Thiess(CPB)/DTMR/QR meeting and resolution was


either through an updated comments sheet for agreed actions or raised to an Escalation Team for resolution.

The PTU package was then updated by ASTS with comments addressed and Pass & Approve signatures were added from QR prior to forwarding to Thiess(CPB) and issuing to DTMR. DTMR would check the package and issue a PTU - Granted Pending or Granted unconditional. In an interlocking and signalling system there are components of the system that require wiring. Wiring diagrams and layout plans etc. are required to be produced and reviewed as part of the design. The design review process is defined in the QR standards. The DTMR Design Manager developed the requirements of the QR standards into the design submission and review flowchart (PTU Signalling Design Process). During interviews no adverse comments were received about the submission and review process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project.

From an assurance point of view this process is sound and normal practice for the detailed review and checking of a signalling design. The potential gap however was the link between the QR specifications and the MBRL high level operational requirements and the flow down of key operational requirements for route set timing and route setting capacity.

Recommendation (as per above); It is recommended that future contracts mandate the use of a requirements management process to manage requirements development, traceability, verification and validation.

6.1.6 Signalling Related Assurance Activities;There are several assurance activities that take place within signalling projects. The process is an iterative process with each part supporting the next to eiiminate or mitigate issues. Interviewees commented on the assurance processes as follows:

Type approval

The major problem with the assurance activities that has been raised by interviewees on the MBRL project is the type approval process. The type approval process used by QR is defined in GSS-part-16 type approval Process Version one. This process is the base requirement for the introduction of any new equipment into QR. Interviewees stated that the type approval process was delayed due to late responses from Ansaldo. Interviewees considered the type approval process was not clearly defined in the standard. Interviewees considered that the supporting standards should contain further definition of timing and route setting requirements. Although the type approval process has been protracted and has delayed the commissioning it has not been the subject of recent communications from QR to the Minister.

Review of design

The design review process defined in the QR standards that require wiring diagrams and layout plans to be produced and reviewed were developed by the DTMR Design Manager to allow for the requirements of the QR standards into a design submission and review flowchart. During interviews no adverse comments were received about the submission and review process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project.

Review and testing of interlocking data

This process is again defined generically in the QR standards. It is understood that the QR process was used and determined issues and problems during the testing and review process. These issues were listed and noted and either rectified or formed the subject of derogations. This process is ongoing at the time of review. During interviews no adverse

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent investigation into 39the Signalling System

comments were received about the review and testing of interlocking process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project

Audit of the construction of the signalling system

The construction of the signalling system is audited on site and in supplier’s facilities to ensure that the product complies with QR standards. Experienced persons from QR carry out this function. No adverse comments were received about the construction audit process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project.

Installation testing

As the installation of the signalling system is completed further cable, wiring integrity and correspondence tests are carried out. This process is defined in the QR Standards. No adverse comments were received about the testing process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project.

Review and testing of the interlocking and its data

As the interlocking data is produced it is reviewed and if necessary modified. After the data is reviewed it is submitted for a functional test on a simulator that is required to connect to the UTC control centre. The functioning of the interlocking is then tested. The functional testing determined and defined the timing and route capacity issues. No adverse comments were received about the interlocking data review and test process defined in the QR standards and carried out on the project.

6.1.7 Testing and CommissioningThe Testing and Commissioning Management Plan - Rail and Rail systems outlines management, procedures and processes involved in the testing and commissioning of the entire route from Petrie to Kippa-Ring inclusive of the construction outputs from all disciplines. The scope of the plan applied only for QR asset elements on the Moreton Bay Rail Link (MBRL).

This plan had the following high-level scope description.

“The testing and commissioning o f the works will be carried out in four distinct phases as outlined in section 12.5 part C o f the Scope o f Works and Technical Criteria Appendix 12 - Handover and Disengagement (for completeness the responsibility o f the testing and commissioning by organisation has also been added). These phases and responsibilities are listed as:

1. Phase 1 - Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) - Thiess(CFB)

2. Phase 2 - Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) - Thiess(CFB)

3. Phase 3 - Final Integration Testing (FIT) - Thiess(CFB)- QR

4. Phase 4 - Trial Running - QR

From a signalling point of view there was however significant demarcation in scope and responsibilities between Thless(CFB)ar\d QR.

The following testing is included within the scope of the Thiess(CPB) contract;


Exclusions in this plan for signaiiing inciuded:

J6.1.8 Assurance and HandoverThe Assurance and Handover Moreton Bay Rail Program MD-15-121 Version: 1.0 Updated plan was produced by QR and first released on the 15* September 2015. The purpose of the plan is outlined below:

“This Assurance and Handover Plan sets out the assurance framework and processes Queensland Rail will Implement to ensure the designed, constructed and/or commissioned Infrastructure for the Moreton Bay Rail Programme Is safe to operate and maintain as a part o f the Queensland Rail network. Further, this Plan describes the processes which must be followed with regards to assurance activities required to be undertaken during project lifecycle from Scope Definition to the handover and disengagement o f a third Party Contractor following the design, construction and commissioning o f railway Infrastructure for or on behalf o f Queensland Rail.”

The requirement of the plan are outlined in section 4 and summarised below:

The Assurance Procedure document MD-11-27 provides guidance on assurance activities. Section 8 o f this plan Is focussed on the 1st line Assurance activities related to Due Diligence. Section 9 o f this plan describes the 2nd line Assurance activities. It Is not envisaged 3rd line Assurance activities will be required for Moreton Bay Rail.

Section 8 o f this plan describes th e ls t Line Assurance work In the following broad phases:

- O Definition o f Requirements;

- O Tender and Evaluation;


- U Design;

- D Construction;

- D Testing and Commissioning;

- D Handover and RIM Transfer; and

- D Operation and Maintenance.

The plan addressed the key components of a good assurance process covering the appropriate lifecycle from definition of requirements through to handover and Rail Infrastructure Manager(RIM) transfer then finally Operations and Maintenance. The plan was produced late in the project life cycle -w e ll after the original requirements definition and Tender Evaluation and late in the design stage.

There is no evidence of compliance for the definition of requirements as reflected in the SWTC.Section 4.8 presents a table demonstrating evidence of compliance at each project phase.

For the design phase the table in section 4.10.2.1 lists the following responsibilities for QR:

- Review the design deiiverables provided by DTMR for review

- D Assess derogations to Queensiand Rail standards

- O Provide Technical assistance to DTMR for rail related issues

- D Type approval o f new safety critical components

- D Raise scope change requests when SWTC changes were required- D Participate in Safety in Design Workshops and review meetings

- D Provide staff to fuifii the integration roles within the DTMR team

- D Participate in risk review workshops

- D Signaiiing Design - pass and approve design, type approval o f new signaiiing equipment

The document however also states:

“The design review process was not a verification o f the design, it provided a peer review by experienced technical experts to check the design conformed to the performance requirements o f the SWTC and Queensiand Raii standards." The statement regarding verification appears to be at odds with the design responsibilities of QR as listed in the plan table 4.10.2.1.

6.2 The Nature of Interface/Integration Issues Experienced Between Multiple Signalling Systems on the One Network

As most signalling systems have their own communications protocols and data constructs it is very difficult to provide suitable translation of functions to directly connect the various Interlocking systems across the interface. In order to avoid complex interface and integration issues the rail authority would have to purchase the entire signalling system from one supplier. This system would include the control system, communications and the interlocking. It may also include such items as point machines and track circuits. Under these circumstances the Rail authority would be commercially bound to one supplier.

Within most signalling projects there is a requirement Interface with other signalling interlockings and control systems. To simplify interfaces between the signalling interlocking systems an Interface point is chosen that is outside the complex interlocking areas. At these points the number of signalling interface functions are reduced. These cross boundary functions will include aspect sequence


functions, track circuit functions and bidirectional block functions. These functions maintain the signal colour sequence, block and track circuit controls that are required across the boundary.

The cross boundary interface is therefore usually facilitated using a vital system that can accept outputs and inputs from both interlocking systems. A common method for interfacing systems uses vital relays. Within the MBRL project the interlocking interfaces take place on the main line north and south of Petrie.

There is a further interface between the control centre and the interlocking. On the MBRL project the interface is between the Mayne UTC control centre and the Petrie and Kallangur interlockings. Interviewees advised that there was a communication issue involving the communication interface between the MAcroLok interlockings and the Mayne UTC control centre. Interviewees advised that this issue was overcome using a component from the Ansaldo MicroLok system.

It is understood that this unit is not in use in other MAcroLok system installations that are in operation elsewhere. There was no information regarding the affect this modification had on the system performance. Modifications have been required to the Mayne UTC control centre to facilitate interface to the MAcroLok interlocking. These modifications are required to mitigate the timing issues and the limits on the number of routes within the MAcroLok interlockings.

6.3 The Adequacy of Assurance Activities, and Lessons for Future Rail Contract Selection and Oversight

As detailed previously, the assurance processes employed by the MBRL project team have facilitated the progress of the testing and acceptance of all parts of the signalling system towards the final commissioning. The Standards that have been applied on the project have identified the functional issue with the MAcroLok. These issues have been determined during the functional testing of the MAcroLok.

The major problem impeding the progress of the project to final commissioning has been the duration of the type approval process for MAcroLok. During the tendering process the MAcroLok was initially assessed to determine its ability to be accepted by QR. This assessment included determination of the ability of the MAcroLok to be type approved.

Interviewees informed the team that details of previous use of the MAcroLok as an interlocking were provided by Ansaldo. Information included in the RGB Assurance Report from February 2016 noted that, “on 26 November 2014, ASTS informed us that CCU has not been used previously as an interlocking.”

Thiess(CPB) confirmed that the MAcroLok product in the configuration proposed for MBRL had not been used elsewhere in the world previously. The failure of the evaluation team to investigate the existing MAcroLok installations worldwide prior to accepting the MAcroLok product for MBRL has led to considerable product development risk being borne by the project.

Recommendation: equipment being accepted during the tender phase of future projects, it is recommended that the prior application and configuration of the equipment is verified by the project team to ensure this can be relied upon for the type approval process.

Recommendation: For rail projects with a systems or signalling components, when new technology is introduced requiring type approval, it is essential to include representation from the engineering group responsible for the type approval process on the Steering Committee

These submitted details showed that the MAcroLok interlocking had been used in several countries. Interviewees also stated that numerous claims were made about the performance of interlocking and


its capacity to handle route setting. Interviewees stated that the submission was not checked or verified during this evaluation period. | ~|I ~ jThese factors caused a considerable under estimation ofthe duration and complexity of the process required to type approve the interlocking. The type approval process appears to have been underestimated by both QR and Ansaldo.

This situation was exacerbated because critical interlocking performance requirements for timing and route setting capacity are not fully defined in the QR signalling standards. The standards are to be updated to include minimum timing and operational requirements.

Recommendation (as above): It is recommended that QR undertake a review of the signalling standards to ensure the route setting and interlocking capacity issues encountered by this project are addressed.

QR standards describe a technical and safety assurance framework to be developed for the Project that covers the entire lifecycle from concept definition through to test commissioning and handover.

Key elements of such a structured systems engineering approach would include:

- A set of defined assurance ‘gates’ at which the design or delivery of the works would beassured against the requirements;

The management of requirements in a database to determine any change to the requirementsand the flow-on effects which can then effectively be tracked and managed;

A clear linkage of the Project requirements back to the business requirements;

A configuration control board that would ensure that technical and safety considerations arising from changes to the requirements and scope are identified and managed.

If a technical and safety assurance process using Systems Engineering principles had been utilised for this project it is considered that the risk of the current issue with the interlocking would have been reduced, through the following key mechanisms:

The insufficiency of the Project requirements (as documented in the Scope of Works and Technical Criteria) to cover interlocking delays, route setting limits [and ETCS compatibility] would have been identified through a gap analysis between the business requirements and project requirements. This gap analysis would have occurred as part of a formal assurance process (Gate X - XXX).

The difficulties that occurred during the design phase of the interlocking with achieving the business requirements would have been clearly identified and communicated at key decision making forums as the system would not have passed the preliminary design assurance gate (Gate X - XXX).

6.3.1 Rail Safety National LawWith the Qld safety regulator coming under the Rail Safety National Law in mid 2017 the expectations of the QNRSR would be relevant in considering any improvements in the assurance particularly safety


assurance in the future. The expectations of the ONRSR are in-line with the recommendations in this report is that major projects will adopt a good systems engineering practice and requirements management process as shown below.

ONRSR - Major Projects Guideline - System SafetyRobust processes need to be implemented to enable major projects to manage change safely.

Good practice dictates that effective risk-based system engineering and safety assurance processes shouid be impiemented.

Such practices support safety risks being eiiminated or reduced So Far /As Is Reasonably Practicable In the design phase and the continuity o f achieving safety requirements throughout the project iifecycle.

Major projects often have the opportunity to control safety risk through elimination or the introduction o f engineering controls in accordance v/ith the hierarchy o f controls. Further Information on this topic Is contained within the Meaning o f duty to ensure safety so far as Is reasonably practicable guideline.

As a minimum, the ONRSR expects:major projects to adopt good practice system engineering principles that are relevant to the nature o f the change, for example:

o safety requirements management; and o ‘V-Modei’ principles: ISO/IEC 15288;

major projects to adopt good practice safety assurance principies that are reievant to the nature o f the change, for exampie:

o I EC 61508; o iSO EN 50126/8/9;o the Internationai handbook for engineering safety management (iESM); and o the European Raiiway Agency's Common safety method on risk evaluation and

assessment;major projects to document ali safety requirements and any associated conditions;major projects to provide traceabiiity from risk anaiysis to safety requirements to finaiverification and vaiidation;to receive the integrated safety risk register used by the major project;major projects to consider elimination o f safety risk and the adoption of engineering controis in accordance with the hierarchy of controis;major projects to undertake verification and vaiidation o fa ii safety requirements;major projects to document the basis o f the safety change being implemented and Itssupporting justification; andmajor projects to demonstrate that residual risks have been appropriately transferred, assessed and controls Implemented by the O&M RTO.

Recommendation: introduce a Systems Engineering management process with appropriate assurance gates to be utilised for major projects, particularly with significant integration risk.

Recommendation: For rail projects with a systems or signalling component where new technology is being introduced requiring type approval include representation from the engineering group responsible for the type approval process on the Steering Committee.


6.4 The Processes by Which Concerns Raised by Queensland Rail or Other Parties Regarding the Signalling Systems or Signalling System Integration Were Managed

The processes by which QR’s signalling related concerns were raised is addressed throughout this report particularly within Section 2.5.6, Governance.

6.4.1 QR’s Design Review FindingsThere were a number of issues with the interlocking data that were identified by the QR review and assessment team that were embedded within the DTMR Project team. These included:

- The interlockings internal functions were different to those expected by QR. These differences were noted and recorded during demonstration testing that took place between 1 4 - 2 7 Qctober 2014. This was because internal functions had originally been developed to comply with the requirements of other railways.

When data was reviewed and functional testing were in progress a number of issues were noted and logged. It is understood that QR considered these issues to be of a greater quantity than was anticipated.

In their October 2014 progress report the company engaged to conduct the technology review to inform the type approval process (RGB Assurance Pty Ltd) stated that “the original plan assumed that the complete set of documents would be available when we started our work in August 2014.” As of the end of October, a significant amount of information still needed to be provided and a number of key issues remained including that the “MAcroLok Generic Product documentation does not appear to anticipate use as an interlocking”.

The [report / minutes of 3 Nov 2014] states that “currently there are significant issues identified during the testing, some o f which may require change to the products inherent safety principles”.

In a letter from DTMR to the Contractor on 21 November 2014 a range of incomplete information required for the type approval process was listed as being yet to be provided by the Signalling Supplier. This included information that demonstrated that the core product (the Generic Product) had been previously used as an Interlocking elsewhere.

In January 2015, representatives from RGB Assurance, QR and Thiess(CPB) travelled to Genoa, Italy to conduct an audit of the MAcroLok system and the development of the supporting assurance documentation. The audit report stated that “none of the formal documentation, except for the Development Project Management Plan (DPMP), is yet finished.” and that “As such, the audit as planned could not be performed. Instead we spent the time to understand the process that ASTS intend to perform.”

By February 2016 a large number of significant bugs (110) were still being identified by the Principles Testers based at the Signalling Suppliers office in Brisbane. As parallel testing was occurring at the site in Italy, and that the Signalling Supplier was unable to demonstrate that these bugs would have been discovered at the primary testing site.

Also as of February 2016, the System Requirements Specification which contains, amongst other things, the Signalling Supplier’s interpretation of Queensland Rail’s signalling principles (and as such is an important document for safety) was not approved by Queensland Rail, and still included defects in the document. As such principles testing, performed by experts in Queensland Rail’s signalling principles in Brisbane was seen as a suitable mitigation to the risk of misinterpretation of the signalling principles by the Signalling Supplier.


There were also a number of other forums which identified that the Interlocking design was not proceeding as planned and where fall-back options were being considered:

On 7 December 2015 at the Go No Go decision point review meeting “A backup plan for MicroLok commission of the existing MicroLok with connectivity to MBRL is being assessed as a fallback for readiness”.

On 9 February 2016 the PLT were advised of “the Lawnton to Petrie signalling finishing in late March” and that “The program required another three cycles of data and principal’s testing.” The PLT also noted that “in the past this activity has always taken longer than allowed by Ansaldo and to date Ansaldo has not hit any of the agreed deadlines.”

It appears that the increasing risk around the MAcroLok Interlocking timing and route handling determined during functional testing as discussed above was not adequately brought to the attention of the key decision makers (most notably the members of the Project Steering Committee).

In addition, the option to ‘fallback’ to a MicroLok system (as also mentioned above) did not appear to be considered within the senior governance forums (Project Leadership Team or Project Steering Committee) once difficulties began to occur. I

I The QR and signalling contractor’s project teamspressed on with the protracted type approval process. This may have occurred, as there did not appear to be any real imperative date for the commissioning of the system. Interviewees advised that a final date for commission was introduced by comments from the Minister of Transport that the line would be operating in time for the Ekka in August 2016. It is understood that the original date for completion of the project was December 2016.

Recommendation: it is recommended that a project completion date is not set until the Project Steering Committee has received adequate assurance from the project team that the risks to prevent final completion and handover of the project have been assessed and are adequately mitigated.

The MBRL Project Risk Register included a number of risks associated with the design, testing and commissioning of the Interlocking. These included risk 7, 8b, 45a and 49a. However, these risks were not updated post mid 2015 to reflect the increasing difficulties with the design and testing of the system and the consideration of these and other key risks does not appear to have occurred in the key governance forums (see section on governance).

Recommendation: It is recommended that the highest rated project risks are included as a standing item on the agenda of major projects steering committees to ensure these are being managed appropriately by the project.

Recommendation: In a complex new multi discipline rail project where the major project costs are of a civil engineering nature, it is recommended a specialized signalling Project Manager is required to champion and monitor the production of the signalling portion of the project. The introduction of new unproven signalling system is high risk and appropriate risk mitigations are to be implemented.

An experienced project manager will ensure that:

• The schedule for the production of the signalling system is maintained to the best of the contractor’s ability

• Where contractors do not achieve the schedule the affects are mitigated.


• Where the lack of progress from the signaiiing contractor is evident this will be notified to project management so that realistic commissioning and other dates can be achieved.

• Will act as and educated customer to identify where QR signalling standards and operational requirements are not being met.

The lack of an effective Signalling Project Manager on the MBRL has caused the following:

• A realistic schedule for the type approval production and installation has not been established.

• Where schedules have been established they have not been realistically statussed and outcome projected with a number of planned possessions missed.

• Where QR technical and operational requirements were not being met this was not effectively notified to the Steering Committee.

• The affect of missing signalling on the commissioning date was also not notified to the Steering Committee.

• The affect on the final operation of the new arrangements have not been adequately notified to the Steering Committee.

Safety Issues Raised

Interviewees had many reasons for the safety issues that were raised by QR. The majority of interviewees did not consider the MAcroLok system dangerous. There were a number of theories about the safety issues that were caused by the timing and limitations of the MAcroLok system. Further details or clarification were provided by interviewees regarding the items in the QR briefing were as follows:

1. Interviewees confirmed that there is a concern that the timing delays and limitations of routes within the MAcroLok that may cause an increase in the red signals that will be exhibited to train drivers and the incidents of signals passed at dander. Interviewees also confirmed that there was a concern that when trains passed a signal at danger (SPAD) there would be an additional 4-second delay in the controller receiving the alarm that the SPAD had occurred when compared with other systems in use with QR. The concern expressed was there would be delay in the controller advising the train driver that a signal had been passed at danger.

It was stated by interviewees that QR’s investigations have discovered the 48% of drivers that had passed a signal at danger did not realize they had passed the signal at danger. The risk of train collision at this time is 1 in 1453 years and with the MAcroLok is one in 1125 years. Interviewees confirmed that although it does increase the risk by over 22%, interviewees stated the risk for QR would be in the same group and that it hasn’t changed the risk level of QR.

2. Interviewees advised that there is a limitation of 15 routes that can the managed at one time by the MAcroLok interlocking at Petrie. Their concern is that the peak a.m. and p.m. services could not be managed by the MAcroLok system as the peaks will require more than 15 routes to be set. Interviewees confirmed that there was no concern on the Petrie to Kippa Ring section.

Interviewees from QR advised that the am and pm services had been simulated with suitable timing delays and route limitations however not under failure perturbations. It was advised that that these simulations have shown that the am and pm services could be managed under normal running. Interviewees also advised that the traffic flow in the Petrie area would be enhanced by the additional tracks that have been installed under the MBRL project.


3. Interviewees advised that tests were carried out on the developing MAcroLok System. These tests determined that within the MAcroLok there was a longer period of time taken for a signal controller cancelling (replacing to red) a signal and the signal exhibiting a red aspect to an approaching train. If a signal controller replaces a signal to red due to an obstruction on the track there is a concern that the driver may not observe the change in the signal aspect due to the train passing the signal before the signal aspect reverts to red. This is due to the delay in the MAcroLok responding to signal controller’s request.

4. Interviewees confirmed that under emergency replacement conditions described above a simultaneous radio call would be made to all trains in the area that will require them to stop. Interviewees understood that a risk analysis had been undertaken to quantify the risk associated with this issue.

Interviewees advised that there is a concern that the timing delays and route limitation within the MAcroLok may cause confusion and errors in the actions of the signal controllers. Interviewees from QR considered that this would be managed with modifications to the UTC train control system at Mayne Control Centre and suitable training. Interviewees stated that system operational time delays, considerably longer than the time delays in the MAcroLok system have been experienced and managed within the other interlocking systems. The delays in previous interlocking systems do not exist now.

Recommendation Develop and agree the acceptable performance criteria that is required for the MAcroLok Signalling system to allow the commissioning to proceed.

Recommendation: The project team and QR are to confirm that the required 3 & 6 minute headway has been supplied for the MBRL project.

Recommendation: Investigate the option to minimise the route count. Advice was received from interviewees that the MAcroLok route count includes the route between the first and second signals in a series as one route and the overlap past the second signal is counted as a second route. Thus setting a route at Petrie will count as two routes. In order to reduce the number of routes counted to be processed by the MAcroLok the routes could be set in reverse order to the direction of travel. This process requires the UTS to set the last (farthest) route in a series of routes first. The previous route (nearer) route in the series is then set and so on till the first (nearest) route in a series is set. This approach will require the UTC to store individual routes in a series until the final (farthest) route in a series is set. The UTC will then transmit the routes to the MAcroLok in the reverse order as above. For example: If it were required tosignal a train from Petrie 21 signal to Petrie 81 signal the routes would be set in the followingorder.

Set route from Petrie 63 signal to Petrie 81 Signal



This should require only four route set commands to be processed by the MAcroLok rather than six commands if the routes are set in the direction of travel.

Recommendation: Confirm QR’s standards have been met

a. GSS - Part 14 version 3.1 - Submittable Design items - timing analysis and tolerance stack showing worst case time delays (propagation time and race


conditions) for time (time delay) and timing (order of operation) related functions in the system (e.g. level crossings, time of operation locking, set up/cancellation of bi-directional signalling, block circuits)

b. GSS part 18 version 1.0 Section 2 Part 2 Processor Based Interlocking - At commissioning, the PBI shall have 10% spare capacity in the hardware installed, and have 20% spare hardware capacity for future hardware expansion

6.4.2 Communications, Community and Stakeholder EngagementRecent media regarding the Project has been negative and potentially raised a concern that the line is “unsafe”. This, of course is an unsatisfactory situation for any public infrastructure and particularly for a public transport facility. There is a need to ensure that communications and community engagement for the ongoing commissioning and commencement of services is managed if benefits arising and acceptance of the Project is to be maximised.

Key stakeholders at this stage include:

Affected residents including potential customers

Wider Brisbane Community

Locai government

Unions

Federal Government

Local Government

A strategy should be developed to manage issues arising regarding the Signalling system foliowing recent media coverage. Issues that require management include recent reporting regarding the safety of the system.

Recommendation: Develop a Community and Stakeholder Communication and Management Plan to address issues relating to the Ministers announcement of the delay to the opening of the MBRL including the main issues of the signalling systems safety and operational performance and seek Steering Committee endorsement.

Recommendation: QR are to determine the acceptable level of increased risk to safety, prior to commissioning the MAcroLok system i.e. QR have stated that there is an increase of 22% from existing.

6.5 The Assurance Program Being Implemented by Queensland Rail in Order to Have the Project Commissioned

6.5.1 Current StatusThe completion of the project is subject to the resolution of the issues raised to the Minister by QR. Interviewees and subsequent documentation show the current status as:

Thiess(CPB) have submitted a letter requesting final type approval on 28 June 2016.


There are ongoing simulations to fully define the issues and in some cases mitigate the timing and route capacity issues.

It is understood that Ansaldo are still working on resolutions to the timing and route capacity issues.

The external installation and testing activities are proceeding as equipment is supplied.

QR have signed off on some but not all derogations that they can accept in order to commission the system. Some are required to be resolved post commissioning.

A final possession and commissioning date to be set following confidence in the performance.

QR have recently taken a number of steps to assess in detail the impact on safety and rail operations of the interlocking constraints to determine if the Project can be commissioned with an acceptable level of risk. This includes:

Conducting a quantified risk assessment of the impact on safety of interlocking delays.

Conducting UTC simulations to determine the impact of the Interlocking delay and route set limits on train control functions. It is unclear if a formal report is expected from this process.

Implementation of UTC modifications to ensure the route set limit can be maintained automatically by UTC without placing undue work-load on the train controllers.

Engaging an independent expert to provide advice on the operability of the Interlocking with the UTC modifications by July 2016.

Assess the impact on system punctuality arising from the interlocking delays and route setting limits. The outcomes of this are expected to be presented on Friday 1 July 2016.

The outcomes of the quantified safety risk assessment, the UTC simulations and the OpenTrack modelling were presented to the review panel on Friday 1 July. Flowever, it is unclear if formal reports are expected from these processes. Given the criticality of these assessments to the viability of the existing interlocking it is recommended that formal reports are produced that document the assumptions made, the tests performance/scenarios modelled, the outcomes and the findings.

The OpenTrack modelling considered the impact of interlocking delays on services operating otherwise on-time in accordance with the timetable. It is recommended that a simulation of perturbed operations is also conducted to determine if the interlocking delays have significantly increased the likelihood of minor normal delays on the system becoming unmanageable.

The QR Network team managing the testing and simulations described above were of the view that based on the number of ‘bugs’ recently still being discovered and the significance of some of these bugs that it was likely more issues would be found with the interlocking before it was ready for commissioning. As such, it is important that adequate time for full testing of the interlocking and resolution of issues is allowed for when scheduling the commissioning date.

Interviewees noted that since the submission of the Ministerial briefs and the decision for QR ‘to take the lead in finalising the commercial, technical and legal arrangements required to be put in place’, TransLink’s involvement in ensuring operational readiness for the commissioning has reduced. This was considered by the Independent Review Team to add further risk to the commissioning.

Recommendation: The outcomes of the quantified safety risk assessment, the UTC simulations and the OpenTrack modelling were presented to the review panel on Friday 1 July 2016. However, it is unclear if formal reports are expected from these processes. Given the criticality of these assessments to the viability of the existing interlocking, it is recommended


that formal reports are produced to document the assumptions made, the tests performance/scenarios modelled, the outcomes and the findings. These reports should be incorporated into the material provided to the Project Steering Committee.

Recommendation: The OpenTrack modelling considered the impact of interlocking delays on services operating on time in accordance with the timetable. It is recommended that a simuiation of perturbed operations be also conducted to determine if the interlocking deiay and route iimit issues have increased the likelihood of minor normal delays on the system becoming unmanageable.

Recommendation: Ensure that the existing operational readiness meetings are reinstated with full involvement of (QR and DTMR) parties that were previously involved in these meetings. Ensure that the commissioning and operational readiness meetings require the participation of ali parties and the conclusions of the meetings periodically and accurately updated to match the latest test results.

Recommendation: The QR Network team managing the testing and simuiations were of the view that based on the number of ‘bugs’ recently still being discovered and the significance of some of these bugs that it was likeiy that more issues would be found with the interlocking before it was ready for commissioning. As such, adequate time is required for fuli testing of the interlocking and resoiution of issues is allowed for when scheduling the commissioning date.

6.5.2 Next stepsQR are producing a ‘requirement clarification’ document of which a draft has already been developed. It is understood that QR expect the Contractor to provide an updated scope, timeline and price to meet these requirements.

Both the TMR and the QR interviewees stated that the intent moving forward would be that if the safety and operational reviews of the existing interlocking are successful, the interlocking would be commissioned with the UTC modifications to manage the route set limit and with the interlocking delays absorbed by the timetable.

However, the interviewees agreed that this was an interim solution only until an updated interlocking was delivered by the Contractor which met the updated requirements as described in the clarification document currently being drafted. There was some uncertainty amongst the interviewees as to whether the requirements in this document were being drafted for Petrie Interlocking only or for the interlocking technology to be implemented anywhere on the network.

Recommendation: QR and DMTR are to agree to an acceptance criteria that ensures the signalling and train control system meets QR reliability targets prior to committing to a new commissioning date. Following the announcement of the delay of the pre Ekka commissioning, it is essential that the signalling and train control system are stable and reliable to meet the on time running performance requirements.

Recommendation: The updated interlocking requirements are to be confirmed if they are intended to be suitable for a QR network-wide implementation of MAcroLok and, if so, ensure

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent Investigation into 52the Signalling System

that they will support the broader network requirements, rather than just the implementation at Petrie.

6.6 Queensland Audit Office Report 2015-16 Transport Infrastructure Projects Findings

Old Audit Office; Transport Infrastructure Projects; Report 8: 2015-16

DTMR has managed the MBRP effectively as a program. The program was set up with a delivery team with the required skills and experience in infrastructure project management. The integration of the delivery team, through managing the two projects as a program, improved communication and reporting at all levels.

DTMR has adopted a gateway review process aligned to the Queensland Government’s Project Assessment Framework (PAP) and Value for Money (VfM) framework to examine the projects at key decision points in their life cycle. This review did not confirm if this process was followed for the MBRL.

The Audit Office nominated a $7M saving from the selection of a new signal system ___

The $7M price difference stated by the QAO,


Appendix 1: Documents Submitted for Review.

Document Detail

MBRL Project - Operational Systems Concept Design Operational Systems Engineering Interface SpecificationConstruction drawing number QRAIL00024-04 titled ‘NTI / EDAP Stainless Steel U n it- Assembled Elevations’Civil engineering drawing number 10116 D titled ‘Speed Boards - General Arrangement & Locating Details’Civil engineering drawing number 10116 titled ‘Speed Boards - Details’Civil engineering drawing number 10116 issue D, titled 'Speed Boards - Details’Signal engineering drawing number AS0003, titled ‘Kippa-Ring Signalling and Cable Plan’Signal engineering drawing number AS004, titled ‘Moreton Bay Rail Link Signalling and Cable Plan’Signalling Design Requirements Moreton Bay Rail Line, version 1.0a, dated 3 July 2012 Signal Engineering drawing number D 1657, titled ‘Legend for Signalling Layouts’Signal and Operational Systems drawing number D6000, titled ‘Typical Undertrack Crossing Section’Word version of document produced by the Department of Transport and Main Roads, titled ‘Moreton Bay Rail Link Scope of Works and Technical Criteria; Appendix 16 - Reference Documents’PDF version of document produced by the Department of Transport and Main Roads, titled ‘Moreton Bay Rail Link Scope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 16 - Reference Documents’Oueensland Rail Specification, titled ‘Asset data handover specification’Queensland Rail Procedure, titled ‘Asset Review and Acceptance Procedure’Queensland Rail Standard MD-11-1322, titled ‘Asset Management’Department of Main Roads document, titled ‘Road Safety Audit Policy Supporting Guidelines’ Department of Main Roads document, titled ‘Main Roads Policy’Briefing Note MBRL signalling - Minister for Transport Briefing Note MBRL Signalling and SCAS Word Doc Briefing Note MBRL roles An index to the GSS, titled ‘Index of GSS’Queensland Rail Specification GSS-Part 1, titled ‘General Specification for Signalling Projects Part rQueensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 2, titled ‘Design Requirements for Traction Immunisation & Equipment Surge Protection Part 2’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 3, titled ‘ Signals and Level Crossing Protection Part 3’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 3A, titled ‘LED Signal Module Specification Part 3A’ Queensland Rail Procedure GSS - Part 3B, titled 'Risk Assessment & Mitigation Strategy for Metal Signal Ladders Part 3B’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 4, titled ‘Points Part 4 ’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 5, titled ‘Track Circuit, Bonding, AxleCounters & DEDs Part 5’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 6, titled ‘Cable Route Construction, Cables & Cable Installation Part 6 ’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 7, titled ‘Housings for Signalling & Associated Equipment Part 7’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 8, titled ‘Power Supply Design & Equipment


Requirements Part 8’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 9, titled Telecommunications Part 9’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 10, titled 'Scope of Telemetry Requirements Part 10’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 11, titled 'General Construction, Equipment & Materials Part ITQueensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 12, titled ‘Installation Requirements for Wiring, Surge Protection and Earthing Part 12’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 13, titled ‘Testing, Inspection & Commissioning Part 13’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 14, titled ‘Design & Drawings Part 14’Queensland Rail Form GSS Part 14A, titled ‘Data Approval Form’Queensland Rail Form GSS Part 14B, titled ‘Technical Query Form’Queensland Rail Form GSS Part 14C, titled ‘Certificate for Bell Testing’Queensland Rail Form GSS Part 14D, titled ‘Certificate for Function Testing’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 15, titled ‘Spares & Test Equipment Part 15’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 16, titled ‘Type Approval Part 16’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 17, titled ‘BR Type Solid State Interlocking Part 17’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 18, titled ‘Processor Based Interlocking Part 18’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 19, titled ‘Spares & Test Equipment Part 19’ Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 20, titled ‘Training of Staff Part 20’Queensland Rail Specification GSS - Part 21, titled ‘Tramway Lifting Bridges Part 2T Document number M.07.4211.19, titled ‘Protocol Converter Programming Guide’Document number P.07.4211.10, t Document number P.07.4211.12, t Document number P.07.4211.14, t

tied ‘Power Calculations’tied ‘Requirements Specifications for Signalling Schemes’ tied ‘Signal Engineering Design Process’

Document number P.07.4211.16, titled ‘Use of Test/Design Report Logs & Circuit Data Modification Sheets’

itled ‘Processor Based Interlocking/Control Centre Integration’ tied ‘Signal Design and Checking Procedure’ tied ‘Drawing Control’ tied ‘Type Approval’tied ‘Management of Signalling Contracts’ tied ‘Bonding and Track Clearance Points’ tied ‘Drawing Mark Ups’tied ‘Reliability Monitoring & Assessment during the Defect

Document number P.07.4211.17, t Document number P.07.4211.19, t Document number P.07.4212.01, t Document number P.07.4214.01, t Document number P.07.4230.05, t Document number S.07.4211.20, t Document number S.07.4211.22, t Document number S.07.4211.23, t Liability Period’Document number S.07.4211.24, t Document number S.07.4211.28, t Document number S.07.4211.29, t Document number S.07.4212.02, t

titled ‘Signalling Equipment Numbering Standard’ titled ‘Surge Reduction Filter Requirements’ titled ‘Cable Specification’titled ‘Signalling Principles - Brisbane Suburban Area’

Document number S.07.4216.01, titled ‘Signalling Test and Commissioning - Code of Practice’ Safety Management System SAF/STD/0024/SIG, titled ‘Signal Positioning Principles’Safety Management System SAF/STD/0072/SIG, titled ‘Train Operations - Spatial Directions’ Safety Management System SAF/STD/0113/SIG, titled ‘Change Management of Signalling and Operational Systems Infrastructure’Related Document RD/0150/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Track Circuits’Related Document RD/0151/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Electric Points Machines’Related Document RD/0153/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Signal Heads and MountingStructures’Related Document RD/0154/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Train Protection’Related Document RD/0156/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Signal Cable’Related Document RD/0157/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Interlocking Maintenance’Related Document RD/0158/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Signal Equipment Housings’Related Document RD/0160/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Relay Acceptance Test and


Replacement’Related Document RD/0165/SIG/NET, titled ‘Maintenance Module - Batteries’.Executive Business Case (MBRL and L2P)Moreton Bay Rail Link Business CaseScope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 15 - Design Information - Rail Scope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 37 - Electrical Systems - Rail Scope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 33 - Technical Specifications - Rail Scope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 38 - Signalling and Cable - Rail Scope of Works and Technical Criteria Exhibit A Final VersionTim Ripper email endorsing Macrolock solution, signalling approval and Ministerial approval for delivery modelKPMG audit MBRL report May to September 2014 KPMG audit MBRL report October to February 2015 KPMG audit MBRL report March to July 2015 KPMG audit MBRL report August to December 2015 Go No Go Reviews (17 in total)RIM change readiness Checklist (15 in total)RIM change Risk assessment final plan and report (3 documents)Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings (12 in total)Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings Contract Execution Tag Collaborative Project Agreement Service Level AgreementCollaborative Project Agreement - TMR and Thiess (now CPB)Auditor General Report—Transport Infrastructure Projects Report 8: 2015-16 Moreton Bay Rail Program Governance Framework—August 2014 Moreton Bay Rail Project Steering Committee Charter— February 2012 Original project factsheetMoreton Bay Rail Project Steering Committee Responsibilities Moreton Bay Rail Link Organisational Chart— May 2016 Service Level AgreementScope of Works and Technical Criteria Appendix 15 Design informationScope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 33 - Technical Specifications - RailScope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 37 - Electronic Systems - RailScope of Works and Technical Criteria: Appendix 38 - Signalling and Cable - RailMoreton Bay Rail Link evaluation plan signed- redacted.pdfMBRL_PLT Minutes 19_200514_Final.pdfLetter from Thiess regarding signalling technology 6 May 2014Type Approval Process Meeting Minutes (5 documents) 2014Email -1 9 Dec 2014 S Lee email with MAcrolok Italy Trip Agenda plus agenda (2 documents) Email - 100616 P2K Re Commissioing Confirmation 2016Email - 220514 email confirming outcomes of Tender Techncial Workshop.msgEmail - 230516 email Re MBRL - Operational Readiness Period - Coordination Meeting plus attached Dynamic Test Plan (2 documents)

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent Investigation into 56the Signaiiing System

Email - 260515 email request QR approval of MAcroLok GP Type Approval Letter (3documents)Email - 260515 G Nikandros email approving letter for MAcroLok GP Type Approval.msg 270614 S Lee email confirming QR advice that TMR is to engage Type Approval Assurance Advisor.msgMAcroLoK Application Software Commissioning Flow Diagram V2.pdfTransport_Rail Safety_Regulation.pdfDCA-xxx PTU Assessment Checklist_V1.1 .xlsExample QR Comments on Final AS plans and close out.pdfPTU Signalling Design Process Ver1.pdfSafety in Design Report Redacted.pdfSignalling Review Tracker Ver 9.pdfLetter E12447 - Signalling Technical Requirements Specification for L2P and Letter E17787 signalling technology (2 documents)MBR-00-01-01-CQ-000949 - Moreton Bay Rail Project - Signalling Technolog....pdfMBR-00-01-01-CQ-000985 - T&C Mgmt Plan - Rail and Rail Systems.pdfMBR-00-01-01-CQ-002759 - Submission for Practical Completion - Separable....pdfMBR-03-00-06-MP-000001-01 - T&C Mgmt Plan - Rail and Rail Systems.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA- Rev 3.pdf20130731 - MBRL Stage 2 LQA.PDFLetter 00754 - signalling technology.pdfLetter 01166 - Macrolok Type Approval Sub to DTMR.PDFLetter 01248 - Signalling Technology.pdfLetter 01287 - Signalling Technology.pdfLetter 03089 Macrolok Type Approval.pdfLetter 04246 RIM Transfer Obligations.pdfMBRL-TA-0001-REP Progress Report - August 2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - September2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - Qctober 2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0008-REP Progress Report - Dec 2014 - Jan 2015.pdfMBRL-TA-0009-REP Progress Report - Feb 2015 - Mar 2015.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to support TA of MAcroLok GP.PDFMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 2.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA- Rev 3.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 4.pdfMBRL-TA-0007-REP Audit Report - MAcroLok GA - January 2015.pdfMBRL Project Management Plan v1.9 Signed_RedactedContract Administration Plan Rev 7 signed_RedactedPLT Governance Plan Revi 26 Feb 2014 - redactedMoreton Bay Rail Program governance framework_02MBRL CPA V18 21Aug14 - wSigns_signatures redactedIGA - signed copy 031210Note s_Q n_Ad m i n_M I P_R IF Apri l_2 012 [ 1 ]Q LD JP National Partnership Agreement no MBRLMBRL_PLT Minutes 19_200514_FinalMonthly Project Report May and June 2014 (2 documents)TMR Monthly Report February - May 2016 (4 documents) -MBRL_Steering Committee Minutes_May, June 2014, October 2015, February and May 2016 (5 documents)Executive business case_31032015 CIC Moreton Bay Rail Link_Business Case_Full_v2.8 20141015_MBR_Risk Management Plan V I 20141210_MBR Risk Report November 2014_Final 20150420 MBR Risk Report February 2015 final


20150515 MBR Risk Report April 2015 Final - Full Report20150701 - MBR Risk Register July 2015 Report 8 - Workshop v1 - Full20150701_MBR_Risk July 2015 Report 820150701_MBR_Rlsk September 2015 Report 9 FINAL20150902 - MBR Risk Register September 2015 Report 9- Workshop v120151125 Update - MBR Risk Register November 2015 Report 10 - Workshop Final20151125_MBR_November 2015 Risk Report 1020160215 Update - MBR Risk Register February 2016 Report 11- Workshop Final20160215_MBR_February 2016 Risk Report 11MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - December 2014MBRL C&OR Status Update Dec 2014MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meetign Minutes - 090215MBRL C&OR Status Update Feb 2014OPERATONAL READINESS Group Summaries - TranslinkAtatch 2 - Translink OPERATONAL READINESS Group SummariesAttach 1 - MBRL C&OR Status Update Mar 2014Attach 3 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update Mar 3 DraftAttach 4 - Service Commencement Flow ChartAttach 5 - RRL-RS-lnfographicMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 090315Attach 1 - MBRL C&OR Status Update Apr 2014Attach 2 - Translink OPERATONAL READINESS Group SummariesAttach 3 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update April 2015Attach 4 - Service Commencement Flow ChartMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meetign Minutes - 160415Atatch 5 - Testing and Commissioning OutputsAttach 1 - MBRL C&OR Status Update Apr 2014Attach 2 - Translink UpdateAttach 3 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update May 2015 Attach 4 - Service Commencement Flow Chart MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 210515Attach 1 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 120615Attach 2 - Testing and Commissioning Outputs 18_6_15Attach 3 - Translink UpdateAttach 4 - Go No Go UpdateMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 210515Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 270715 Attach 2 - Testing and Commissioning Outputs 27_7_15Attach 3 - Translink OPERATONAL READINESS - Meeting of 22 July 2015 - re...Attach 4 - Go No Go UpdateMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meetign Minutes - 270715Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 270715 Attach 2 - Testing and Commissioing OutputsAttach 3 - Translink OPERATIONAL READINESS - Meeting of 24 August 2015_redactedAttach 4 - Go No Go UpdateMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meetign Minutes - 240815Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 280915Attach 2 - Go No Go Update 140915MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 280915Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 261015 Go No Go Update 231015MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 261015Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 231115 MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 231115


Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 141215Easter Duration Summary ProgramMBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes -141215Attach 1 Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 010216MBRL - CO&OR Monthly Meeting Minutes - 010216MBRL-TA-0001-REP Progress Report - August 2014MBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - September 2014MBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - October 2014MBRL-TA-0008-REP Progress Report - Dec 2014 - Jan 2015MBRL-TA-0009-REP Progress Report - Feb 2015 - Mar 2015MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to support TA of MAcroLok GPMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 2MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA- Rev 3MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 4MBRL-TA-0007-REP Audit Report - MAcroLok GA - January 2015Email FW MBRL & L2P Signaiiing solution - Commercial in ConfidenceMBRL_PLT Minutes_200514_FinalSignalling Decision Summary of CorroMBR-03-30-10-DG-230010-SI-DMBR-03-30-10-DG-230012-SI-DMBR-03-30-10-DG-230013-SI-CMBR-00-06-30-RP-033010-RP-EMBR-03-30-10-DG-230008-SI-BMBR-03-30-10-DG-230009-SI-BMBR-03-30-10-DG-230010-SI-CMBR-03-30-10-DG-230011 -Sl-CMBR-03-30-10-DG-230012-SI-CMBR-03-30-10-DG-230013-SI-BMBR-00-06-30-RP-033020-RP-AMBR-03-30-20-DG-230016-SI-BMBR-03-30-25-DG-230016-SI-AMacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve MacroLok Type Approve

Closeout List 060815 Remaining Issues 030915 Remaining Issues 060815 Remaining Issues 070815 Remaining Issues 100915 Remaining Issues 130815 Remaining Issues 200815 Remaining Issues 230715 Remaining Issues 270815

L2P Final Commissionig - To do Action List 030516 - type approval update... L2P Final Commissionig - type approval update 13052106 L2P Final Commissionig - type approval update 26052106 MAcroLoK Type Approval Close Out Issues 19/9/14 - 19/11/14 (7 documents) MacroLok Type Approval Closeout List 12/2/15 - 24/6/2015 (16 doouments) MacroLok Type Approval Status 6/3/15 - 17/6/15 (9 documents)MBR Ansaldo Sote Visit Action List 2015 01 23 and 2015 01 23 (2 documents)MBR Minutes of Type Approval Meeting 11/12/14- 11/02/15 (6 documents)DCA-xxx PTU Assessment Checklist_V1.1Example QR Comments on Final AS plans and close outPTU Signalling Design Process VerlSafety in Design Report RedactedSignalling Review Tracker Ver 9MBRL - Type Approval Meeting 1 - Minutes


MBRL - Type Approval Meeting 2 - MinutesMBRL - Type Approval Meeting 3 - MinutesMeeting 2 - Type Approval Status Summary -17102014Meeting 3 Type Approval Status Summary -041214Email -1 9 Dec 2014 S Lee email with MAcrolok Italy Trip AgendaMacroLok GA Audit Schedule_QR_TMR (Jan 2015) QR with ML and AA modsEmail - 100616 P2K Re Commissioing ConfirmationEmail - 220514| I email confirming outcomes of Tender Techncial WorkshopEmail - 230516 email Re MBRL - Operational Readiness Period - Coordination Meeting Dynamic Test PlanEmail -260515 email request QR approval of MAcroLok GP Type Approval LetterEmail - 260515 G Nikandros email approving letter for MAcroLok GP Type Approval Email - 270614 S Lee email confirming QR advice that TMR is to engage Type Approval Assurance AdvisorMAcroLoK Application Software Commissioning Flow Diagram V2Transport_Rail Safety_Regulation.pdfDCA-xxx PTU Assessment Checklist_V1.1 .xlsExample QR Comments on Final AS plans and close out.pdfPTU Signalling Design ProcessVer1.pdfSafety in Design Report Redacted.pdfSignalling R eviewTrackerVer9.pdfGo No Go Update 14/9/5 - 26/5/16 (17 workbooks)Rail Safety Accreditation Meetings 5 /8 /1 4 - 13/11/15 (12 meetings)MBRL-TA-0001-REP Progress Report - August 2014MBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - October 2014MBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - September 2014MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 2MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 4MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA- Rev 3MBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to support TA of MAcroLok GPMBRL-TA-0007-REP Audit Report - MAcroLok GA - January 2015MBRL-TA-0008-REP Progress Report - Dec 2014 - Jan 2015MBRL-TA-0009-REP Progress Report - Feb 2015 - Mar 2015Copy of MBRL Risk Register (7x7)-Final IssueRIM Change Risk Assessment Plan - Final for IssueRIM Change Risk Assessment Report - Final IssueRIM Change Risk Assessment Report - Final lssue_redactedLetter E22004 - Signalling Technology ApprovalEmail - 290514 Tim Ripper email endorsing Macrolock SolutionMBRL-TA-0001-REP Progress Report - August 2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - Qctober 2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0002-REP Progress Report - September 2014.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 2.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA - Rev 4.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to inform QR re MAcroLok TA- Rev 3.pdfMBRL-TA-0003-REP Report to support TA of MAcroLok GP.PDFMBRL-TA-0007-REP Audit Report - MAcroLok GA - January 2015.pdfMBRL-TA-0008-REP Progress Report - Dec 2014 - Jan 2015.pdfMBRL-TA-0009-REP Progress Report - Feb 2015 - Mar 2015.pdfMBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiatlon Monthly Consultation Meeting 1 - MinutesMBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiatlon Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 1 - 050814Meeting 1 - Attacli 1 - Scope Demarcation L2PMeeting 1 - Attach 2 - Approach to AccreditationMeeting 2 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiatlon Monthly Consultation Meeting 2 - Minutes

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation into 60the Signaiiing System

Meet ng 2 -Meet ng 2 -Meet ng 3 -Meet ng 3 -Meet ng 3 -Meet ng 4 -Meet ng 4 -Meet ng 4 -Meet ng 5 -Meet ng 5 -Meet ng 6 -Meet ng 6 -Meet ng 7 -Meet ng 7 -Meet ng 7 -Meet ng 8 -Meet ng 8 -Meet ng 9 -Meet ng 10Meet ng 10Meet ng 11Meet ng 11Meet ng 12

:ing 2 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiatlon Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 2 - 090914 :ing 2 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 080914.xlsx :ing 3 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 3 - Minutes

RL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 2 - 090914 ;ing 3 - Service Commencement Summary Program - Status Update 171014 :ing 4 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 4 - Minutes ;ing 4 - MBRL - RIM Change Process:ing 4 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 4 -151214 ;ing 5 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 5 - Minutes :ing 5 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 5 - 120215 :ing 6 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 6- Minutes ;ing 6 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 6- 120315 :ing 7 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 7- Minutes ;ing 7 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 7- 230415 ;ing 7 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 8- 040615 ;ing 8 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 8- Minutes :ing 8 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 8- 040615 :ing 9 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 9- Minutes :ing 10 - Attach 2 - MBRLRIM Change Readiness Checklist 150615.xlsx :ing 10 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 10- Minutes :ing 11 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 11- Minutes :ing 11 - MBRL- Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting Agenda 11 -091015 :ing 12 - MBRL - Rail Safety Accreditiation Monthly Consultation Meeting 12- Minutes

160316 P2K Commissioning Certificate Letter 03089 Macrolok Type Approval Letter from Qld Rail re MBRL RIMMBR-00-01-01-CO-002714 - Accreditation - Moreton Bay Rail ProjectMBRL-TA-0003-REP RGB Report to inform QR Generic Product Type ApprovalTMR Ltr_Control of MBRL Corridor_Executed 25-2-2016mbri eval plan signed pwd - redactedTender Evaluation Report - redacted 16062016Appendix 16 Final VersionExhibit D Final VersionRichard Alexander Response in RedMBN18776 MO noted \with comments 19052016_RedactedL2P Final Commissioning - To do action list excel sheet cannot be printedOriginal Project FactsheetContractor media release July2013.docEstimates 2014 GOOD NEWS - Moreton Bay Rail Link.docEvent Alert_MBRL contract award.docMBRL Major Milestone Poster May 2016.pdfTMR Major Milestone Report 15 Dec 2015.pdfTMR_Major Milestone Report 02December2013.pdfTMR_Major Milestone Report 26August2014.pdfTMR_Major Milestone Report_19February2015.pdfTMR_Major Milestone Report_19June2015.pdfG4 20140526_lncoming Ltrfrom responsible Ministers_Lawnton to Petrie Ra....pdf G4 Responsible minister approval - L2P.PDF S3 SAE041_12_15 NOG - Moreton Bay Rail Link.pdf T1 MBRL operation readiness plan_20151209.pdfMBRL Auditor Information Requested on 200616_recommend OR to provide (VI).xlsx 0R-P2K TT SA Acceptance Report 1 -A 160606 v1119.pdf C0128A Macolok Hardware - P2K update.pdf C0129A Macrolok Application - P2K GA 22a.pdf

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent investigation into 61the Signaiiing System

QR-020701-ITR-1A 160606 Macrolok P2K 22a.pdfQR-020701-PAP-V2 Macrolok.pdfQR-020701-PiP-v2.pdfInterlocking Times.xisxPetrieTimings.xIsxds1030_Braking Map BSA.pdfds1032_Braking Map Petrie.pdfCT00408 - MBRL Problem Definition v2.pdfMS6480 - Electrification of the MBRL lines 120116January media statements.qld.govRedcliffe rail line 100 years in the making to be running by Ekka 2016 (Brisbane Times, 13 January 2016MBRL Signalling System Build Report-v2.1-MultipleTestTrainRunning signed...MBRL Signaiiing System Build Report-vl .2-signed MD-15-121Document 1 - Current letter to DTMR requesting Type Approval for L2P based on current Contract Requirements and confirmation of when a final possession will be available Document 2 - List of Derogations for L2P software and Type approval Document 3 - Acceptance by DTMR and QR to use MAcrolockDocument 4 - Changes by DTMR/QR of alternative signalling options to that nominated in ContractDocument 5 - Joint scoring outcomes based on integrated team reviews including QR Document 6 - Document confirming price from Ansaldo being the same for MAcrolock and MicrolokDocument 7 - Document tabled at PLTMoreton Bay Rail Program_DTMR Summary_160628Moreton Bay Rail Program_DTMR Summary_160629_FINAL

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link Independent Investigation Into 62the Signalling System

Appendix 2: Programme of Interviews

As part of the review the Independent Review Team met with the following personnel between 20th June and 15th July 2016:

Name Organisation TitleGavin Soward DTMR Project ManagerSherrina Lee QR Interface Manager RailCameron Sharp DTMR Design Verification ManagerBrett Haynes-Loveli QR Chief Signalling Engineer

DTMR Raii AdvisorMichael O’Conner QR Diligence InspectorSeaton Ellick DTMR Executive Director Rail Performance, Contracts and

OperationsRichard Alexander DTMR Contract Administration ManagerLiam Gordon QR Executive General Manager Infrastructure ProjectsSimon Cook DTMR General Manger Passenger Transport ServicesGreg Rooney QR Senior Manager OperationsChris Keye QR Group Asset Manager NetworkGreg Fill QR General Manager Safety, Assurance and EnvironmentAmita Trivedi QR A/Executive Director Rail Regulationr ’ RGB Assurance Requirements and Assurance Manager QR/DTMR -

Independent ReviewerRGB Assurance Requirements and Assurance Manager QR/DTMR -

Independent ReviewerDuncan Roots DTMR Rail AdvisorGraham Kerr DTMR Project ManagerSteve How Lum DTMR Director Infrastructure Procurement

1Rail, Tram & Bus Union

Branch Organiser (Southern)

Jeremy Bennett QR Rail Integration ManagerCPB Project Director

Bob Long QR Test & Commissioning CoordinatorMatt Schlotterbach DTMR Director Planning ProgramsArthur Stamatoudis QR General ManagerNeil Scales DTMR Director-GeneralJohn King QR Major Projects Lead

Wabtech Wabtech representativeHelen Gluer QR Chief Executive OfficerRichard Wood DIRD General ManagerTim Ripper QR Executive General Manager NetworkSpiro Conomos QR Senior Manager Asset Strategy and Monitoring Systems

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail LinkIndependent investigation into the Signaiiing System

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Attachment 1: QR SLA Obligations

Extract from document: signed MBRL - SLA Deed o f Variation - acceptedredacted.pdf

TMR will provide technical and engineering support to the MBRL project for all civil, structural and other disciplines from the Engineering and Technology Branch of TMR.

This Agreement relates OrHv to the construction commissloninc, and handover phase of MBRL and will not cover the delivery of sensfruotion . -ermaintenance works or any ongoing post-handover service.H by Queensland Rail.

TMR has requested Queensland Rail’s assistance through the participation of key Queensland Rail staff to eeser-efacilitate ■■ -■■■-■ ■s^Bt^L-aBd-phvslcalconnection of the assets to Queensland Rail's existing infrastructure at Petrie theprovision of new infrastructure for the MBRL. the co'^-'missioninq and handover of the MBRL and as Queensland Raii is intended to be the RIM and RSO for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure post handover.-ooGur&&ttk><enltv.

For this to be managed efficiently, TMR also requested the provision of key Queensland Rail personnel to be tfMeefatedparticipate as Queensland Rail representatives onin TMR’s overall MBRL Project Delivery team These personnel will perform the interface management roles between the two organisations for the MBRL project.

i) providing a brief monthly report which details:

• summary of activities

• key risks for resolution

• cost to date against budget


Interface and rail expert services including:

I) coordinate early contractor involvement in the procureti-.enl process

m) provide inputs and review of the scope of works and technical criteria’

n) provide technical assessment of proponents’ submission:

o) design review and comments on all rail svslen^sdisciDlmes.

p) design approval for signalling systems for MBRL provided sucfi systems are satisfactory to Queensland Rail:

q) proyide interface service to MBRL project delivery team:

rj staqe verification and assessment of rail --vsl€?n»disciplinese during construction:

s) operational system connection of MBRL spur Stations and stabling yard to Queensland Rail control centre and any changes required in thie control centre to facilitate the operation of MBRL-

U final testing, commissionlnq and acceptance of MBRL line in conjunction withTMR's MBRL contractor and 6TMR:

system integration and acceptance due diligence / assurance process in relation toacceptance of MBRL infrastructure into Queensland Rail's netvyork:

y I operational readiness / driver training;

QR commissioning and acceptance activities for ftflBRL, including

vi the com;)letion of conm issioning and acceptance activities that are determined as QR responsibilities in the:

li iProiect Commission Plans developed by the project and approved bv QR

(ii)the QR Rail Safety Change Management and

(lii)the QR Assurance and Handover Plan.

zl the completion of operational readiness activities that detailed in the Queensland Rail Operational Readiness Plan for the project.

Queensland Rail will provide the services under this Agreement as and when reouested tbv TMR.

The schiedule for performance by Queensland Rail of the connection works referenced in clauses 2.1 shall be agreed by ttie parties


Attachment 2: Project Leadership Team

Extract from MBRL CPA V18 21Aug14 - wSigns_signatures redacted.pdf.

5.3 Duties and Accountabilities of the PLT

5.3.1 Furtherto Clauses 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 the duties for which the PLT is accountable areto:

(a) set policy and give philosophical and strategic direction for the Project within the boundaries set out in the CPA;

(b) provide the leadership and| resources necessary for the project team to achieve project objectives;

(c) ensure a transparent governance framework is developed and deployed across the Project and documented in a Project Governance Plan;

(d) ensure obligations under the CPA are delivered or performed;

(e) ensure all work health and safety duties under the WH&S Act and the CPA aredischarged;

(f) ensure the Commercial Framework is implemented so that it is transparent and defendable;

(g) ensure reporting to the Principal is timely, accurate and comprehensive;

(h) initiate or approve the commitment of resources to the Project and providecorporate support as necessary;

(i) ensure unanimity is reached on all issues to be determined by the PLT;

(j) ensure a culture necessary to achieve all KRAs is created and sustained;

(k) ensure directions from the Principal's Representative (under the CPA) areimplemented;

(I) appoint persons to the PMT, monitor the performance of the PMT and implement appropriate measures to correct undesirable trends;

(m) issue various directions, approvals and decisions as required by the CPA;

(n) resolve any Differences that are referred to it;

(o) provide leadership and an example for all to follow of the Project Principles in action at a senior level; and

(p) ensure all actions, decisions and behaviours are consistent with Project Principles.


Attachment 3: Project Charter

Extract from CPA Agreem ent.

PROJECT CHARTEROCTOBER 2013

I one tean I O N TRACK

OUR MISSIONHow w e vjcxk logcthei to achieve our objocllves

One Team On Track

OUR BEHAVIOURAL COMMITMENTS

In ofdo* lo o i 'one tecim*. wc* com m it to fhvtotiowiAg behQvioort’

• SalC'ty it, ioooc it. Wo U■ Listen to tVKl fespect aB teem meriTbefs■ Com m unicato with ooch otnor opofVv. honostty

ond m a Hmoty and otticient marsner• Think, before you talk folk before you wrtii?• Bo fosnonsiblo tfust<ng and tfLKtworthy• Toko ownotsfTlp and bo occoun iab lo■ Holp oQCh other fo achiove pfO;oct obiecHvcs -

ce icbra to success• AckrTowtedgo proWemv - ho cfentive rind bnno

solutions

OUR OBJECTIVES

As a leant our objectives o»h :

• Evoryono vafo everyday• A f-t tor pvtfposo. qua lity solution ftsot leaves o

positive le g o c y for oR• Eatfy dcHvery ond unde< budget• Minimiso d ryup tion Jo stoketsotdofs in c ivd io a roil

servtces. roods, com m u n ity o n d uhkty sefv»cei• ffespoct i t ‘c community and cnvlronrrKjnf• Fotief on intogroted. positive and pfoduclrvo

Ato'k ofiv.fonmoni• Provide eniptoymeni opportunities ond dovetoo

siciir in local industry

MorVtCtfTBO ^ Q u ee n s la n d R a il THIESS OUreCOn ATCOM

RM and HM Smith - Moreton Bay Rail Link independent Investigation intothe Signalling System

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Attachment 4: Principles

Extract from CPA Agreement.

1.3 Principles

1.3.1 In performing the Works under the CPA, the Parties will use the following principles as a guide to their actions and behaviours:

(a) a primary focus on satisfying project objectives and delivering desired outcomes;

(b) a peer relationship where all parties have an equal say;

(c) having responsibility for performance its obligation is to provide a successful outcome;

(d) [Not Used]

(e) full access to "best in class" resources from all parties;

(f) encouragement of innovative thinking with a commitment to achieve outstanding results;

(g) clear responsibilities within a "no blame" culture;

(h) open, straight and honest communication between all parties;

(i) each party will provide unconditional support to the project;

(j) all transactions are fully open book; and

(k) all decisions will be made in accordance with these Project Principles


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