Monopoli Dan Dominasi Perusahaan
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Transcript of Monopoli Dan Dominasi Perusahaan
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Slide 12005 South-Western Publishing
Oligopoli
Struktur pasar Oligopolistik
Pandangn Perusahaan
Konsekwensinya, setiap perusahan harus
mempertimbangkan reaksi pada rival pada harga,
produksi, atau keputusdan produksi
Reaksi ini saling berhubungan
Produk Heterogeneous atau Homogeneous
Contoh -- Pasar sepatu atlit Nike mempunyai pasar 47%
Reebok mempunyai pasar 16%
Dan Adidasmempunyai pasar 7%
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Slide 2
Nokias Keunggulan(Challenge) pada telepon
selluler
Pangsa pasar berubaha pada oligopolis. Pada thn1998,
pemimpin pasar pada telepon selularpada Motoroladengan
25% pangsa pasar dan Nokia second with 20%
Pada thn 2002, kepeimpina pasarberubah: Nokia 37% pasar
Motorola 17%
Selanjutnya, perubahan teknologi pada telepon, membawa
wireless web, photos, dan kecepatan teknologi G3
Perusahaan lain dan produk baru, seperti pada Dell, Palm,
NEC serta and Panasonic merupakan ancaman pada profitmargin Nokia
Nokia harus memutuskan pada teknologi 3G ke depan.
Pada perusahaan oligopoli memimipin tidak berarti memipin
jangka panjang
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Slide 3
Saling ketergantungan:
Cournot Oligopoli
Beberapa Models terikat pada asumsi
aksi rivalspada kepuutusan harga .
Augustin Cournot(1838) menemukansuatu model yang dasarnya Anti
kebijakan -trust di US.
Asumsi Relatif: ketergantungan pada rival
Membuat pemetaan gampang
Cournot
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Slide 4
A Numerical Example:Competition, Monopoly, and Cournot Oligopoly
IN COMPETITION P = MC, so 950 - Q = 50
PC= $50 and Q
M= 900
IN MONOPOLY MR = MC, so 950 -2Q = 50
QM= 450so PM= 950 - 450= $500
IN DUOPOLY
Let Q = q1+ q2
D
PMPcournot
PC
QM QCournotQC450 600 900
$500
$350
$50
Let:P = 950 - Q andMC =50
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Slide 5
Cournot Solusi:Case of 2 Firms (Duopoly)
Asumsi setiap perusahaan
memaksimumkan profit
Asumsi setiap perusahaan percaya tiakakan berubah output. Ini disebut : Asumsi Cournot
Dihitung setiap perusahaan pada MR =MC
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Slide 6
Let Q = q1+ q2
P = 950 - Q = 950 - q1- q2 dan MC = 50
TR1= Pq1= (950-q1-q2)q1 =950q1- q12 - q1q2
and TR2= Pq2= (950-q1-q2)q2 =950q2- q2q1- q2
2
SetMR1= MC & MR2= MC950 -2q1- q2= 50
950 - q1- 2q2= 50
2 equations &
2 unknowns
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With 2 Equations & 2 Unknowns:Solve for Output
950 -2q1- q2= 950 - q1- 2q2
So, q2= q1 Then plug this into the demandequation we find:
950 - 2q1 - q1= 950 - 3q1= 50.
Therefore q1=300 and Q=600
The price is: P= 950 - 600 = $350P Q
Competition 50 900
Cournot 350 600
Monopoly 500 450
Cournots
answer is
between the
other two.
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N-Firm Cournot Model
For 3 firms with linear demand andcost functions:
Q = q 1+ q 2 + q 3
In linear demand and costmodels, the solution is higher
output and lower price
QCournot= { N / (N+1) }QCompetition
QC
N
N
PC
THEREFORE, Increasing the
Number of Firmsincreasescompetition. This is the historical
basis for Anti-trust Policies
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Example: Cournot as N Increases
If N = 3 Triopoly
P = 950 - Q &MC=50
Then, Q = (3/4)(900)
Q = 675 P =$275
If N = 5
P = 950 - Q and MC= 50
Then Q = (5/6)(900)
Q = 750
P = $200
N = 3 N = 5
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Kollusion versus Competisi?
Kadang-kadang koolusi berhasil
Kadang-kadang kekuatan kompetisi
tindakan kolektif
Manakala kollusi sukses?
Ada 6 faktor mempengaruhi suksesnyakolluisi:
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Factors Affecting Likelihood of Successful Collusion
1. NumberandSize Distribution of Sellers. Collusion ismore successful with few firms or if there exists a dominant firm.
2. Product Heterogeneity. Collusion is more successful withproducts that are standardized or homogeneous
3. Cost Structures. Collusion is more successful when thecosts are similar for all of the firms in the oligopoly.
4. Sizeand Frequency of Orders. Collusion is moresuccessful with small, frequent orders.
5. SecrecyandRetaliation. Collusion is more successfulwhen it is difficult to give secret price concessions.
6. Percentage of External Orders. Collusion is moresuccessful when percentage of orders outside of the cartel is
small.
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Oligopolies & Incentives to Collude
When there arejust a few firms,
profits are
enhanced if all
reduce output
But each firm has
incentives tocheat by selling
more
MC MC
P
q
D
QM
incentive
to cutprice
MR
Representative firm Industry
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Examples of Cartels Ocean Shipping-- maritime exemption from US
Antitrust Laws
DeBeers-- diamonds
1950s Electrical Pricing Conspiracy-- GE,
Westinghouse, and Allis Chalmers
OPEC- oil cartel, with Saudi Arabia making up
33% of the groups exports
Siemens and Thompson-CSF-- airport radarsystems
NCAA- intercollegiate sports, also Major League
Baseball
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Kepemimipnan Harga
Barometric: One (or a few firms) sets the price
One firm is unusually aware of changes in cost or
demand conditions
The barometer firm senses changes first, or is the first
to ANNOUNCE changes in its price list
Find barometric price leader when the conditions
unsuitable to collusion & firm hasgood forecastingabilities or good management
B arom etric P rice L ead er D om in an t F irm P rice L ead er
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Barometric Price Leader Example:
Citibank & Prime Rate Announcements
Banking: 6,000 banks and
falling, but there are still many
banks. New York, center of Open
Market activities of the Fed
Reserve
Citibanks announcement
represents changes in interest
rate conditions to other banks
tolerably well.
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Slide 16
Dominant Firm Price Leadership
Dominant Firm: 40%share of market or more.
No price or quantity
collusion Dominant Firm (L) expects
the other firms (F) to
follow its price and
produce whereMC F= PL
DT
MC F
DL
Net Demand Curve: DL= DT- MCF
leadersdemand
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Slide 17
Find leaders
demand curve,
DL = (DT- MC F)
Find where
MRL= MCL
DT
MC F
DLMRL
Graphical Approach toDominant Firm Price Leadership
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Slide 18
At QL, find the
leaders price, PL Followers will
supply the
remainder of
Demand:(QT- QL) = QFD
MC F
DLMRL
MCL
PL
QL
Graphical Approach toDominant Firm Price Leadership
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Slide 19
Followers will
supply theremainder of
Demand:
(QT- QL) = QF
D
MC F
DLMRL
MCL
PL
QL QT
Graphical Approach toDominant Firm Price Leadership
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Slide 20
Implications ofDominant Firm Price Leadership
Market Share of the Dominant Firm Declines
Over Time
Entry expands MCF, and Shrinks DLand MRL Profitability of the Dominant Firm Declines
Over Time
Market Share of the Dominant Firm is
PROCYCLICAL
rises in booms, declines in recessions
TIME
profits
l E l f
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Slide 21
Numerical Example ofDominant Firm Price Leadership
Aerotek is the leader, with 6 other firms, given the following:
1. P = 10,00010 QTis the market demand
2. QT= QL+ QFis the sum of leader & followers
3. MCL = 100 + 3 QL and MCF= 50 + 2 QF
What is Aeroteks price and quantity? From 2 above, QL= QTQF and From 1, QT= 1,000 - .1P
Since followers sell at P=MC, From 3, P = 50 + 2 QF, which rearranged
to be QF= .5P - 25
So, QL= (1,000 - .1P)(.5P - 25) = 1,025 -.6 P, which can be
rearranged to be P = 1,708.31.67 QL
MRL= 1,708.33.34 QL
And MR L= MCLwhere: 1,708.33.34 QL= 100 + 3 QL
The optimal quantity for Aerotek, the leader is QL254
P = 1,708.31.67 QL = 1,708.31.67(254) $1,284.
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Slide 22
Historical Example:U.S. Steel (USX)
In early 1901 negotiations
among J. P. Morgan,
Elbert Gary, Andrew
Carnegie, and Charles M.
Schwab created UnitedStates Steel.
66% market share in
1901
46% market share by1920
42% share by 1925
profits in adominant firm
modelnormal
profits
profits
when
using a
lower price
Coke
ovensin. 1912
inGary, IN
Time
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Slide 23
Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve
Belief in price rigidityfounded on experience of
the great depression
Price cuts lead toeveryone following
highly inelastic
Price increases, no onefollows
highly elastic
everyone
follows
price cuts
no one follows
a price increase
a kink at the price
P
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Slide 24
A Kink Leads to Breaks in the MR Curve
Although MC rises, theoptimal price remains
constant
Expect to find pricerigidity in markets with
kinked demand
QUESTION: Where would we morelikely find KINKS and
where NOT?
P
D
D
MR
MC2
MC1
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Slide 25
Which industries are likely to have kinks
and which have no kinks?
The GREATER the number of
firms, likely more kinked
Prices Likely More Rigid
The more
HOMOGENEOUS, likely
more kinked
Prices More Rigid
N = 10
N = 2
homogeneous
heterogeneous
E i i l E id
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Slide 26
Empirical Evidencevs.
Predictions of the Model
Oligopolies with few
firms were more rigid
in FACT
Oligopolies with
homogeneous products
were MORErigid in
FACT 2 2
N
prediction
FACT
heterogeneous homogeneous
prediction
FACT
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Slide 27
Are these Empirical Findings Surprising?
A kink is a barrier to profitability Firms are in business to make profits and
avoid barriers.
Simple Alternative Explanations Exist: More firms are more competitive
More homogenous products act more
competitively
Collusion leads firms to fix prices. The rigid
prices seen in oligopolies are signs of collusion.
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Slide 28
Price Rigidities andEmployment Impacts
Price rigidity will make business downturns
worse
Employment will be more volatile over the
business cycle if there are price rigidities
D BOOMSD BUSTS
A rigid price
OUTPUT
if price changes
with shifts in demand
Q3 Q2 Q1
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Slide 29
Oligopolistic Rivalry & Game Theory John Von Neuman & Oskar Morgenstern--
Game Theory used to describe situations where individuals
or organizations have conflicting objectives
Examples: Pricing of a few firms, Strategic Arms Race,
Advertising plans for a few firms, Output decisions of an
oligopoly
Strategy--is a course of action
The PAYOFFis the outcome of the strategy.
Listing of PAYOFFS appear in a payoff matrix. A Strategy Gameinvolves decisions with
consciously interdependent behavior of two or more
participants.
T P G
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Slide 30
Two Person GameTable 12. 4 page 537
Each player knows his andopponents alternatives
Preferences of all players are known
Single period game
Each player can invade the territoryof the other (Maraude) or Guard his
own territory Kahns payoff is given first,
Randles payoff is second.
Randle ranks Guard above Maraude.
Randle has a Dominant Strategy: adecision that maximizes welfare
independent of the other playersstrategy choice
Knowing what Randle will do, Kahndecides to Guard as well.
An Equilibrium--none of theparticipants can improve their
payoff
ASSUMPTIONS
Randle
Kahn
Guard
Maraude
Guard Maraude
Better, 1st Worst, 4th
Worse,2nd Best, 3rd
We will get to{Guard, Guard}which is an Equilibrium
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Slide 31
Six or Seven Territories?Table 12.5 on page 538
Sharp and Xeroxcompete in copiers.Payoffs for Xerox are inthe lower triangle
The payoffs depend onthe number of territoriesin which they compete
Sharp has a dominantstrategyof 6 territories.
What should Xerox do? We see we get to {6, 6}
as the iterated dominatestrategy.
Sharp
Xerox
6 territories 7 territories6territ
ories
7terr
itories
$40 $70 $35 $55
$30 $60 $45 $45
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Slide 32
Other Strategic Games
These are viewed as single period, but businessestend to be on-going, or multi-period games
These are two-person games, but oligopolies often
representN-person games, where N is greater than 2 Some games are zero-sum gamesin that what one
player wins, the other player loses, like a game ofpoker
Other games are non-zero sum gameswhere thewhole payoffs depend on strategy choices by all
players.
Th P i Dil
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Slide 33
The Prisoners Dilemma Often the payoffs vary
depending on the
strategy choices
The Prisoners
Dilemma
Two suspects arecaught & held
separately
Their strategies are
either to Confess (C) orNot Confess (NC)
a one period game
Suspect 1 in lower
triangle (Bold Red)
Noncooperative Solution
both confess: {C, C}
Cooperative Solution
both do not confess {NC,NC}
Off-diagonal represent a Double
Cross
suspect 2
suspect 1NC
C
NC C1 yr 0 yrs
15 yrs 6 yrs
1 yr 15 yrs
0 yrs 6 yrs
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Paradox?
The Prisoners Dilemma highlights thesituation where both parties would be best off
it the cooperated
But the logic of their situation ends up with anon-cooperative solution
The solutionto cooperation appears to be
transforming a one-period game into a multi-
period game.
The actions you take now will then have
consequences in future periods.