Military Review September 1969

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September 69


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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE FORt LEAVENWORTH KANSAS

COMM ND NT Major eneral John H. Hay Jr.DEPUTY COMM ND NT

Brigadier General rank B Clay

he Military Review is published by the United States rmy Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. t provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy nationalsecurity affairs and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the U Army

ARenaissance for Military Justice . . . LTC James A. Mounts, Jr., USA, 3and CPT Myron G. Sugarman, USA

Peacekeeping and

The Hamlet Evaluation System . . . . COL Maurice D. Roush, USA 10Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Gerhard Wettig 18The Korean Incident . . . Charles S. Stevenson 27US Offensive and Defensive Strategy LTC Joseph L. Fant III USA 31

Peacemaking . . BRIG Michael N. Harbottle British Army, Ret 43Keeping the Lid on Is Not Enough MAl Richard B. Fisher, USA 60John J. Pershing: AStudy in Paradox . Donald Smythe 66The Problem of Power . . . Raymond 1. Barrett 73Arms and Men: The Balance in Europe . . Alain C. Enthoven 80Propaganda for the PLA Richard H. Giza 89Reader Forum 96Military Notes 98Military Books 108

Library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 RevThe VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the

US Army Dr the Command and General staff College.


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Editor In ChiefCOL Donald J. Delaney '"Associate EditorCOL John B. B. Trussell, Jr.Army War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Features EditorLTC Robert G. Main

Production EditorHelen M. Hall

Actinl Spanlsll-Amerlcan EditorLuis A. MonserrateBrazilian Editors

LTC Romero LepesqueurLTC Juarez A. Gomes

Publication OfllcerMAl Donald E. TumanArt and DesignCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REYIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U S Army Command and General stall College. fort leavenworth. Kansas, In English. Spanish. and Portuguese. Usa of funds for printing of this publication hasbeen approved by Headquarters, Deoartment of the Army. 25 July 1968.Second-class JlqStage paid at rort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: 4.00 IUS currency)year in the United States, United States militarY offices. and those countries whlcb are members oftbe Pan-American Postal Union ncluding S ~ I n l 5.00 year In all other c:ountries; single copy price50 cents. Address subscription mail to tbe Book Department. U S Army Command Ind General StallCollege, fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027.


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MASTER S DEGREE PROGRAM THESESSixteen members of the 1968-69 Regular Course, US Army Command andneral Staff College. completed the requirements for the Master of Militaryand Science degree. Each student condueted research and wrote a thesis, enting his 1 I n ~ i n g s A complete list of these titles and authors follows.

O8e marked with an asterisk are classified. Additional information can be ob-the US Army Command and General Staff College library., Analysis of Command and Controlor Civil Disturbance Operations. Maor James F. McCall.Analysis of the Management Sysiem for the Concept Formulation of

lIajor Army Development Projects.lIajor Jean D Reed.Analysis of the Readability ofrAree Army Magazines. Lieutenant

:::olonel Vernard J. Smith.Communist Attempt to Con.1Jert Coombian Rural Violence Into Insur7ency During 1948 1966: Study of a

i ailure. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.i)ownen.Concept of Theater Level Supportor US Army Forces in Central Eu-ope in the 1970-1980 Decade. Majorrhomas J. Kerver.*Evaluation of the Corps of Engileer Nuclear Construction Ca.pabili

:ies. Major Edward G Rapp.F-100 Dive Bomb Delivery Tactics.lIajor Smith C Humphries. Jr US

Ur Force.Identification and Disposition oflemains in General War. Major John-. G Klose.Inquiry Into United States Defenselrrangement Cohesion Through the

Use of Ally Voting Behavior in theUnited Na.tions General Assembly.Major John D Musselis.Investigation of the Applicabilityof Management by Objectives to the

Command of Army Battalions NotEngaged in Combat Operations. Major William A Hokanson.

Military Operations on the Surfaceof an Extraterrestrial Body. MajorRichard L. Reynard.

Relationship Between the PositionalAccuracy Requirements of Mt7.itaryTopographic Products and ArtiUeryWeapons Systems Effectiveness. Ma-jor Robert A Schow. Jr.

Securing Land Lines of Communication in Insurgent War A ProposedDoctrine. Major Dale R Sweetwood.*Study of Ethnocentriasm Among

White Professional Military Officers.Lieutenant Colonel Samuel R Shalala.Study of the Army Aviator Retention Problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wil

lard C Goodwin. Jr.Study to Determine the BestMethod of Updating the Inertial NeL lligation System in Vietnam From the

Aviator s Standpoint. Lieutenant Colo-nel John P. Brown.


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UA Renaissance for

MILITARY JUSTICELieutenant Colonel James A. Mounts, r.. United States Arm andCaptsin Myron G Sugarman, United States Arm,

ON 1 AUGUST 1969, the MilitaryJustice Act of 1968, the newManual for Courts-Martial UnitedStates and a revised version of ArmyRegulation 27-10, ilitary Justicetook effect. The Military Justice Act,together with the manual and regulations which implement it, make themost significant changes in the administration of military justice sincethe enactment of the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice in 1950. The MilitaryJustice Act brings added benefits tothe military personnel accused, and,at the same time, increases militaryefficiency.The act represents a synthesis ofvarious positiOns advocated by the

armed services and by members ofCongress. The Manual for Courts artialwas drafted by a triservicecommittee of judge advocates underthe direction of the Judge AdvocateGeneral (JAG) of the Army. Thecommittee also made certain additional changes to the manual not necessitsted by the Military Justice Act.These changes implement decisions ofthe US Supreme Court and the USCourt of Military Appeals and improve court-martial procedures.The act revises military justice infive areas: Use and authority of militaryjudges. Court-martial procedures.

Septellber 889 3


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MIUrAlY JomeE Accused's right to legally qualified counsel. Release of accused from confinement pending appellate review. Appellate review.The act changes the name of thelaw officer to military judge and requires that military judges be part ofan independent judiciary. The Armyhad alresdy made these changes byadministrative r.egulation prior topassage of the ~

Militall udlesThe indepeddent judiciary conceptmeans that judges of general courtsmartial are responsible only to theJAG, or his designee, for directionand for efficiency reports. They arenot responsible to commanders convening courtsmartial. The purpose qfthis concept isto prevent commandersfrom exercising any influence over theprocedures and results of cases.The act authorizes an option oftrial by the military judge alone without court members. This provisionbenefits the military accused by giv

Lieut61l4nt Colonel James A.Mounts, Jr., s Chief of the Legisla-tion aM Major Projects Branch, Mil-ita,ry Imtice Dillision, Office of theludge Adll0c0,te General, W(1,8hington,D. C. He holds a B.A. from W(1,8hing-ton aM lefferson College, Penmyl-lIania,; an LL.B. from the Unillersityof Penmylllania,; aM a M(1,8tws de-gree n Criminology from MichiganState Unillersity. He s a member ofthe ar of Pennsylllania, and the USSupreme Court.Captain Myron G. Suga,rmGn s (1,8-signed to the Legislation and MajorProjects Branch, Military ImtiheDi llision, Office of the Judge AdllocateGeneral, W(1,8hington, D. C. He holdsB.S. a,M I.D. degrees from the Uni-lIersity of Cmifornia Berkeley, ands a member of the Cmifornia, Bar.

ing him another option within the system and increases efficiency in manycases. The accused has the right,knowing the identity of the militaryjudge, in all general courts-martial,except capital cases, to request trialby a military judge alone. This issimilar to the procedures in the Federal courts where a defendant maywaive his right to trial by jury.The accused's request for trial byjudge alone will be granted if themilitary judge approves. Both sidesare permitted to argue the appropriateness of the accused's request.The option of trial by judge alone willrelease many line officers from courtmartial duty and will speed up proceedings in cases tried ~ a judge.Power ncreased

~ d a ~ r ~ ~ ~ u ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ dto allow the military judge to assumea true judicial role. The militaryjudge will be on a par with judges ofFederal district courts in many respects, and a court-martial will closelyresemble aFederal criminal trial.The military judge has the authority to hold Article 39(a) sessionswithout the necessity of assemblingthe court-martial members. At thesessions, the judge may rule on interlocutory questions and motions, forexample, on the admissibility of evidence or a confession. He can alsohold the arraignment and take theplea of the accused. Under the old system, the court-martial had to be forma Jy assembled with the memberspresent while these procedures tookplace. During many of the procedures,however, the members were excusedfrom the courtroom, returning onlywhen the out-of-court hearing wascompleted. The new law eliminates theneed for this inefficient practice.

M Ota J Revle


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The ct also permits the militaryjudge to conduct post-trial sessionswithout court members. Appellateagencies often remand issues to thecourt-martial for decision. When theseremands do not require the presenceof the court members, the militaryjudge now h e jurisdiction to handlethem at sessions without the presenceof court members.Final RullnlsThe new law makes importantchanges in the power of the militaryjudge to make final rulings. t alsochanges the way in whieh many rulings are made at special courts-martial. The military judge will rule finally the court members may notoverrule his decision on challengesto court members, on requests for continuances, on all questions of law, andon all interlocutory question otherthan the factual issue of the accused smental responsibility for the offense.The military judge will also rule finally on motions for findings of notguilty and on the accused s mentalcapacity to stand trial.The president of a special courtmartial which does not have a military judge now will have the power torule finally on all questions of law except a motion for a finding of notguilty. He will not rule finally, however, on any questions of fact. Thisnew power will require additionalpreparation on the part of the specialcourt president and additional familiarity with military law. Officers whomay be placed in the role of a president of a special court-martial canread the latest revision of Departmentof the Army (DA) Pamphlet 27-15Trial uide or the Special Court-Martial President to become betteracquainted with the subtle distinctionsbetween questions of law and of fact.Septellber 869

MILIT RY JUSTICEWhen the military judge sit.l\ alonewithout court members, he decides nquestions of law and fact, and, i f theaccused is found guilty, adjudges anappropriate sentence. The judge will

make a general finding such as guiltyor not guilty unless special findingsare. requested. Special findings mightinclude the judge s conclusions aboutvarious items of evidence or portionsof testimony, or determinations concerning particular elements of an offense. Special findings may be requested to aid in appellate review ofthe case of a trial by a military judgealone since the appellate court will nothave the benefit of the militaryjudge s instructions to the court members.Court Martial ProceduresThe new law, the manual, and itsimplementing regulations streamlinecourt-martial procedures in manyways. All counsel who are members ofthe Judge Advocate General s Corps(JAGC) and ll military judges willtake one-time oaths to serve faithfullyin all cases to which they are detailedand will not be sworn again for individual cases. Reporters and interpreters, at the discretion of the conveningauthority, may take an oath for allcases to which they are detailed. Theseoaths expire when the individual isreassigned.Additionally, convening authoritiesmay authorize the administration ofan oath to court members and to counsel who are not members of the JAGCfor all cases referred to the court towhich they are detailed. Except incapital cases, the military judge orpresident of a court-martial without amilitary judge may enter findings ofguilty without vote of the court members when the accused pleads guiltyand such plea is determined to be

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proviifent. These provisions .will speedthe procedural phases of trials bycourt-martial.Perhaps the most significant changesin militai:y justice involve the special

with a qualified, detailed lawYer without a request.Within the United States, excludingAlaska and Hawaii, there are no exceptions to this requirement for counc O I ~ r t D l i a r t i a l An accused at a special ael. f he accused requests a certified

USUnder the Military Justice Act of 1968 a general court-martial win closely resemblea Federal criminal trial and the military judge, left front wit bad< to camera, winJ Ie on a par wit judges of Federal district courtscourt-martial must now be affordedthe opportunity to be defended bylegally qualified counsel, certified bythe JAG. This, in.general, means thatan accused may be defended by a member of the JAGC. PrOvision, however,is made for the use of lawYers in otherbranches of the service who are notmembers of the JAGC and for judgeadvocates of other services, should theneed arise. This procedure differsfrom the procedure in a general courtmartial where the accused is provided

lawYer counsel and none is provided,the court-martial may not proceed.n other areas, a special court-martial convening authority who does nothave lawYer counsel will request suchcounsel from the general court-martialconvening authority which exercisessupervisory jurisdiction over his com-mand. f the supervising conveningauthority cannot supply counsel, thatconvening authority will obtain counselfrom certain designsted commands.f counsel cannot be obtained in this

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manner because of physical conditionsor military exigencies outside thecontinental United States the supervising convening authority with theconcurrence of the designated command may cause a certificate of nonobtainability to be filed with thecourt-martial and the trial may prO.ceed.t is contemplated that there will befew situations where certificates ofnonobtainability will be issued. Mereinconvenience does not constitute a

physical condition or military xi-gency and does not excuse a failure toextend to an accused the right toqualified counsel. In addition theseconditions should exist only underrare circumstances and even thencompelling reasons must be given whytrial must be held without lawyercounsel at that time and at that place.Bad Conduct DlscharelUnder the new law and regulationsa special court-martial convened by ageneral court-martial convening authority may adjudge a bad conductdischarge if a verbatim record of theproceedings is kept if a military judgeis detailed to the court and if the accused is detailed a qualified counsel.Although the Uniform ode of Military Justice has always permitted abad conduct discharge as a possiblesentence for certain offenses at a special court-martial the Army has previously required approval of the JAG.acting for the Secretary of the Armybefore assigning a reporter to take averbatim record at a special courtmartial. Prior to the act the one ju-risdictional requirement before a special court-martial could adjudge sucha discharge was a verbatim record.Authorization for a bad conductdischarge special court-martial whenconvened by a general court-martial

MILIT RY JUS ICEconvening authority should provideanother useful alternative for the -vening authority. t w ll also presenta forum for the trial of those individuals who are not felt to deserve thepossible greater punishment of a gen-eral court-martial.The Military Justice Act permits aconvening authority to detail a military judge to a special court-martial.Army regulations tequire a conveningauthority to detail a military judgewhenever a judge is available. It isclear that initially military judgeswill not be detailed to all specialcourts-martial because of a lack ofavailable personnel. Regulationstherefore specify that judges will bedetailed first to those cases involvingcomplicated issues of law or fact.Types of Judl SThere will be two typ s of militaryjudges for detail to courts martial-those of general courts-martial whocan act as military judges at both general and special courts-martial andthose of special courts-martial whocan act only as judges at specialcourts-martial. Some military judgesof special courts-martial will be assigned to the US Army judiciary justas military judges of general courtmartial are. They will be supervisedand rated as directed by the JAG.Other military judges of specialcourts-martial will be certified forduty as judges by the JAG but will beassigned to commands in other judgeadvocate roles. They will serve as military judges as an additional duty. Inorder to make absolutely sure thatthey are unaffected by command pressures their performance of duty asmilitary judges will be rated by amember of the US Army judiciary asdirected by the JAG. f a militaryjudge is detailed to special court

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martial, the accused will have thesame option as exists at a generalcourt-martial to request trial by amilitary judge alone.The Military Justice Act alsomakes significant changes affectingthe summary court-martial. An ft -cused'may object to trial by summarycourt-martial even i f he has previouslyrefused punishment under Article 15.This permits an lICjlused to be represented by a lawyer defense counsel ifhe wishes to Jitig te his case fullyevery time he is faced with the pas

s i ~ l i t y of punishm,ent.He may refuse punishment underArticle 15 and trial by summary courtmartial. In this event, the convening authority may refer the case to a special court-martial where the accusedwill be afforded the opportunity to request qualified counselor to a generalcourt-martial where the accused willbe detailed a qualified counsel. tshould be noted that the accused runsthe risk of a greater punishment byrefusing Article 15 and trial by summary court-martial.Release Pending AppealThe new law provides a method forreleasing an accused from confinementwhile his court-martial conviction isbeing appealed. A convening authorityor other authority having jurisdictionover an accused has the discretion torelease an accused from confinementpending appellate review i f the accused so requests. No bond or monetary deposit is required. When appellate review is completed, and if thesentence to confinement is aftIrmed, theaccused will then be required to servehis sentence. No credit against theconfinement portion of t h ~ e n t e n c ewill be given for the time duringwhich the accused was released.The Military Justice Act makes im-

llortant changes in appellate. procedures in the services. t constitutesone Court of Military Review in theArmy in place of the present boardsof review. Members of the court willbe known as appellate military judges.The act amends the Uniform Code tobroaden the scope of the JAG's powerto grant new trials and to reviewcases not otherwise reviewed by theCourt of Military Review. These provisions of the act became effective on24 October ,.968.Extended RevleThe review was previously limitedto general court-martial cases not involving punitive discharges or sentences of more than a year's confinement. t is now extended to all courtmartial cases. The time for filingpetitions for new trial is increasedfrom one to two years.

The JAG is given the power to review and to vacate or modify in wholeor in part the findings or sentence, orboth, in any court-martial which hasbeen reviewed finally, but has not beenreviewed by the Court of Military Review. Applications for review underthe new provisions must be based ongrounds of newly discovered evidence.fraud on the court, lack of jurisdictionover the accused or the offense, or error prejudicial to the substantialrights of the accused.

The new law and regulations alsoprovide for summarized records oftrial in certain cases and set forthnew provisions for authentication ofcourt-martial records. f an accusedreceives punishment of a minor natureat a general court-martial, the recordmay be summarized, as may the recordof trial of an acquittal. Certainchanges in court-martial orders arealso made.The Standing Committee's additions

Mllitlry R.
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to the Manual or Courts Martial arealso significant. The most importantis the change to paragraph 76 of themanual. Paragraph 76d will permitthe members of a court-martial, whena military judge is detailed thereto, toreceive additional information relevant to the sentence to be imposed.This additional information is limitedto that contained in DA Form 2 forenlisted accused, DA Form 66 for of flcer accused, and records of punishment under Article 16 required byregulations to be retained in the accused's military personnel recordsjacket (DA Form 201). This regulation will thus limit consideration ofArticle 16 punishments to those received within a reasonable period oftime.

Additional changes made by theStanding Committee include changesto the rules of evidence required byrecent court decisions, a change to instructions to court members on punishment, and one change to the tableof maximum punishments. The continued existence of the Standing Com-mittee will aid in keeping the Manualor Courts Martial accurate and up todate.

The changes in the administration

MILIT RY JUSTI Eof military justice brought about bythe act, the manual, and the regulations require study by all members ofthe Army. Courses of instruction onthe new law will be given by JAG officers and will be planned so as tomeet the needs of the member. A onehour course will be given to all enlisted men, company grade officers,and warrant officers. An additionalhour for company grade officers and atwo-hour course for field grade andsenior officers will be given.

The Military Justice Act of 1968places the judicial system of theArmed Forces ahead of most civilianjurisdiction in terms of judicial procedures and concepts of due process. Inaddition, the manual and the Army'simplementation of the act and themanual provide a judicial frameworkwhich equals or surpasses most of theminimum standards for criminal justice proposed by the American Bar s-sociation. The Army's procedural system alone can never create a properlyfunctioning system of justice unlessmembers of the Army, enlisted andofficer alike, administer the system ,with vitality, a spirit of justice, impartiality, and good faith. When thisis accomplished, the Army will have arenaissance in military justice.

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heamletvaluationSystem

Colonel Maurice D. Roush, United States rmg

T HE war in Vietnam differs from past wars in several signifi-cant aspects. The military objective in the past generally hasbeen to defest or neutralize enemy forces and, perhaps, to control'" certain terrain. In Vietnam, defeat of enemy forces and control ofterrain are incidental to the prime objective-to win for the Gov-ernmllnt of the Republic of Vietnam GRVN) the allegiance andsupport of the people.Battlefield bookkeeping in the past has been simplified by the useof the forward edge of the battle ares FEBA), the line on the maptracing our forward positions. This line, along with our intelligencesystem, told us What territory we controlled, where the enemy

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strength could be found, and what advantages we or the enemy possessedthrough control of key terrain such asobstacles and high ground. In Vietnam, the FEBA is not necessarily acontinuous line; perhaps not even aline at all, but rather an aura ofchanging hues encompassing the entire country.Revolutlonarr DevelopmentIn Vietnam, the FEBA must measure the allegiances or will of the people, and the enemy strength we mustdestroy is the control he exercisesover these people. Similarly, our highground rests among the pcople andthe moving dynamics of their willingness to be measured and counted onthe side of their government throughact and resolve.Emphasizing the difference in thiswar, our military commander has beengiven total responsibility for revolutionary development, the leading edgeof our pacification program. Revolutionary development, often considereda civilian endeavor, recognizes the integral nature of the military anddevelopment forces-social political,economic, and psychological-that are

Colonel Maurice D. Roush is theHuntington District Engineer, Hunt-ington, West Virginia. He holds aB.S. in Engineering from the US Mil-itary Academy, West Point, and anM.S. in Civil Engineering from theUniversity of Illinois. He graduatedfrom the US rmy Command andGeneral Staff College in 1968 fromthe Armed Forces Staff College in1966, and from the US rmy War Col-lege in 1968. He has 8erved with the7th Infantry Division in Korea, withthe Honoluliu Engineer District in Ha -waii, as an Engineer Advisor to theTurki8h ad rmy in Erzurum, andwith Military AS8istance CommandHeadquarters in Vietnam.Sept mb r 1989

HAMLET YALUAnO SYSTEMbeing employed to accomplish our objectives among the people.Obviously, today s commander hasmany more aspects to consider and agreatly complicated battlefield uponwhich to operate. Equally clear, hemust have a broader knowledge ofhow his varied forces are scoring inorder to be able to gauge his progressand locate the points for decision onhis battlefield. He heeds the typ ofinformation that will allow him toreach valid judgments on the mix offorces which will produce successwithout sacrificing economy. In onearea, he may have to rely predominantly on military forces; in another,social, economic, or political forcesmay be more decisive.urrent InformationThe US Militsry Assistance Com

mand, Vietnam (USMACV) J2 operates an automated system which provides the commander an amazingarray of current information on theenemy structure, from tax collectorsand political commissars to Viet Cong(VC) and North Vietnamese Army(NYA) main force units.Data on the enemy is collected by alarge, combined United States andGRVN organization that works bothwith military and governmental agencies at all levels. The data, in turn, isanalyzed and processed into timelyintelligence by combined intelligencecenters using automatic data processing techniques. The results are thensent to the field by message or printedreport. t is pertinent to note that thesystem provides countrywide, integrated intelligence information.This system, however, focuses onthe VC and NYA military structureand, therefore, does not providerounded and complete intelligence coverage of the entire battle. While

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enemy force structure informationcan serve ss an indicator in determining some pacification progress. it isbut one piece of the complex puzzle.

To round out the picture. USMACVhss the Hamlet Evaluation SystemHES)-an automated system designed to provide information onhamlet and population control. Bssicdata for HES has been provided by222 US distJ;ict senior advisors bymonthly evaluations of the non-VietCong-controlled hamlets in their districts. These evaluations are made interms of 18 significant i n d i c a ~ r snine dealing with security and ninewith development.Security FieldIn the security field, advisors ratehamlets bssed upon VC activities andcapabilities, and counterbalancingfriendly force considerations. Development ratings are established byevaluating GRVN activities and capabilities in the social, political, economic, and psychological fields. District advisors do not have substantialstaffs so they must depend upon theirown observations and informationthey can obtain from their Vietnamese counterparts. Because data from other districtsis not available for comparison andcorrelation, the evaluations by senioradvisors represent compartmentalizedintelligence information arrived at inisolation. These evaluations are sentto Saigon and tabulated on computers,with equal weight given to each of the18 indicators. Several system deficiencies become apparent immediately:

HES primarily measures VC andGRVN inputs ye t the information thecommander needs pertains to results.This is the only way he can evaluatethe efficiency of his forces and determine which of his many assets should12

be applied to a particular situation. The system tends toward historical statistics rather than providing

current intelligence. Much of the information portrayed on the H S report is over a month old before it getsdisseminated.

Weighing all indicators equallycould obscure critical trouble spotsand successes. For example, a hamletthat hss been secure for a long timehas a high security rating, but thiscould hide a lagging development program. The monthly reporting cycle doesnot fit all indicators. Some, such asVC force activities, should be kept current on a daily or hourly basis. Agricultural production figures may be better suited to a cycle related to thegrowing and harvesting periods.

While human judgment undoubtedly is best able to evaluate ,the attitudes, trends, and tendencies amongthe population, the rapid turnover ofadvisors and the complex nature of thevalue judgments required for validevaluations raise some doubt concerning the authenticity of the resultsreported.

The US district senior advisorgets nothing out of the system excepta tabulation of his own input. Reliance upon GRVN counterparts for a significant amount of therequired data, with limited verification capability by the sector advisor,could cause misleading results. No attempt is made by H S to

assess conditions among the people inVC-controlled hamlets. The system does not provide forcross-checking of H S data withthat available from other areas andthrough other sources such ss the USMACV J2.While HES may provide a yardstickMilitary Rnl


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HAMLET VALUAnON SYS EM

Advisors must depend upon their own observations and informationVietnamese counterparts and village eldersto assess progress in pacification itsdeficiencies create doubts concerningtotal usefulness and reliability. Thefailure t provide timely intelligenceon both GRVN and VC populationcontrol and the questionable ability toprovide accurate measurement resultsare serious deficiencies.How can we do better

R S goals for improvement shouldinclude: Acceleration of the system toprovide the commander and advisorwith current pacification intelIigencerather than historical statistics.

Achieve a greater capability forassessing the loyalties and aspirationsof the people both in GRVN and VC-controlled areas. Broaden the data base to includeall required information and enhancedata verification. TIle system logic and evaluationSeptember 989

methods shOUld recognize and applyemphasis to the more pertinent indi-cators and overcome problems inher-ent in the current subjective advisorevaluations.

Evaluating the VC and GRVN con-trol strength and the loyalties of thepeople in a hamlet is a long and labo-rious process. Initially indicatorsmust be selected and data gatheredboth within and outside the hamlet be-ing evaluated. Then questionable in-dicators must be identified and cor-rected or discarded and if sufficientindicators are not available to producea valid result further inquiry must bemade.

Once sufficient valid indicators areavailable they must be weighed andcombined to produce hamlet evalua-tion. This evaluation then can be en-riched and verified by consideringexternal indicators such as the loyal- 3


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H MLET EV LU TION SYSTEM

ties of surrounding hamlets, the presence of R V ~ ~ r j t y forces capableof reinforcing the hamlet, and thepotence of VC umts operating in thevicinity. Each of these operations, initself, may not be complicated, but,taken together and applied to the12,650 hamlets in Vietnam, they represent a formidable task for our district advisors.The computer, with its speed andability to call up and consider vastamounts of data, is ideally suited toperform the complete pacilication evaluation task. A full-time HES computer in Saigon could bave access tothe intelligence produced by the USMACV J computer complex and couldmake use of data available from otheragencies such as civilian elements ofthe US mission and the GRVN Ministries, as well as that furnished byfield advisors. Furthermore, full-timeoperation would allow production ofcurrent intelligence rather thanmonthly reports. For esse of reference, the system could be called theAutomated Pacification EvaluationSystem APACE).Computer Programing

The program for ,APACE wouldhave to provide for indicator validation and weighing and for determination of adequacy of indicators, as wellas for production of evaluations. Also,the program must be compatible withother existing computerized systemsin Vietnam to allow cross-referencingand sharing of data.Indicator validation could be accomplished by comparison with previouslysubmitted data of the same categoryfor the hamlet in question and bycomparison with similar data fromneighboring hamlets. Validity prerequisites could be developed for mostindicators. In the case of indicators

judged to be questionable, the computer could be programed to querythe source and assign a deflated valueto the indicator in question pendingresolution.Standard weights cannot be assigned to indicators because they takeon varying significance under differing circumstances. For a hamlet beingsecured, security indicators must predominate over development indicators,and, in a VC-controlled hamlet, a to-tally different set of indicators mustreceive emphasis. Development indicators, such as proportion of arableland under cultivation, warrant more. weight in a well-secured hamlet. Thecomputer itself would have to beprogramed to assign appropriateweights to indicators.Models

Thresholds for adequacy or sufficiency of indicators would be established and included in the computerprogram. A number of models couldbe designed, and the computer couldbe programed to select the model mostnearly approximating the hamlet being evaluated.For each model a number of specified indicators and a fixed percentsgeof the remaining indicators would beconsidered mandatory in order toproduce a valid evaluation. The com-puter could be programed to queryappropriate sources for missing information. Meanwhile, the computeroutput would indicate that it lackedsufficient information for valid assessment, hence focusing the attention ofthe commanders and advisors on areasof deficiency in the reporting system.

Our experience in rating the effi-ciency of our own and the enemy sforces provides a firm base and precedent for selection of the best indicators for these two variables. SimilarMilitary Review4


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techniques could be adopted for evaluating GRVN and VC governmentalefficiency. However selection of indicators for evaluating the loyalties andattitudes of the people poses quiteanother problem.Years of buffeting have taught theVietnamese peasant to answer officialquestions with the answers he believes

alty of the people are more plentifulthan might be expected. Tax collections savings in GRVN institutionsproportion of arable land under cultivation number of able-bodied malescontinuously in hamlet residencequantity of informant reports fromthe people number of defections fromthe Viet Cong of people native to a

A hamlet that has been secure for a long time may have a high security rating butcould be lagging in its development programwill please the questioner. One hardlycould expect a peasant to tell a GRVNofficial that he does not enthusiastically support the GRVN. Clearly wemust try another approach. Alongthis line it is said that the thousandsof VC who defect to the GRVN andthe refugees who of their own volition move from VC to GRVN-controlled areas are voting with theirfeet. This type of vote--overt actionthat risks VC reprisal and demonstrates faith in the GRVN-sure1y isthe soundest indicator of popular attitude and loyalty for which we couldhope.Quantifiable indicators of the loySepte.ber 1969

hamlet numbers of residents competing for local elective offices consumption of luxury items and amount ofharvests marketed through officialchannels are but a few of the host ofquantifiable indicators available. Theproblem here is to determine thosewhich are most significant.n the development field it may benecessary to select different indicatorsfor measurement as hamlets progressin order to focus on specific problems.Also a varied pattern of indicatorsprobably would yield more comprehensive evaluations of the aspirstions ofthe people and the GRVN accomplishments in meeting these aspirations.

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Varying indicators would help guardfurther against spoofing the system.A comparison of our newly selectedindicators with existing informationassets undoubtedly would show additional reports to be required and someof the reports currently required tobe unnecessary or redundant. Bssically, the system would require threetypes of reports: cyclic, spot, andquery.The cyclic reports would be required on that type of data whichrequires updating at regularly recurring periods such as agricultural output. Establishment of realistic reporting periods actually could decreasereport volume as compared to that experienced in the current across-theboard monthly reports.Spot Reports

Spot reports would be submittedfor the more perishable informationsuch as VC and friendly armed forceactions. The query or one-time reportwould be levied by the computer whenit hss insufficient data or when it hasquestions relatiye to the cyclic andspot reports; Overall, reporting requirements probably would increase,but not as significantly ss initiallymight be expected. Certainly, -CE would spread out the reportingrequirement, thus eliminating themonthly humps. Added to this, thetype of data required would be basicin nature, requiring little or no evaluation by the reporter.Essential to the reporting requirement would be the installation of automatic data processing read-in andread-out substations throughout Vietnam to provide reporting speed.Equally essential, these substationswould have to e connected to thecentral computer in Saigon by communications circuits to insure ready

access. Where possible, these substations would e located to provide amaximum of a one-day time gap between the central computer and theusing and reporting commanders andadvisors.APACE ServicesThe primary service to e performed by APACE would be the provision of current and thorough intelligence on pacification progress. Thesystem would utilize the reportingsubstations and communications system.. to prbvide on a routine bssis, atUtl-Cl level, CIIl l Cnt graphig and tahu-lar dillplays of pacification intelligencedesigned to assist the commander andadvisor. The system also would respond to user requests for additionalin-depth information and trend analyses.

While the basic intelligence displayed would pertsin to the sspirations, loyalties, and attitudes of thepeople, information on friendly andenemy forces also could be displayedin order to provide a complete picture.Intelligence in graphic or tabularformat could e displayed either byindividual element or in combination.APACE like most systems, wouldhave its problems. Need for constantinput, possibility of error, and costare among the foremost difficulties.Advisors will have to supply a largeportion of the input to the system,and reporting requirements probablywould increase. This system, however,would differ from H S in that the

advisor would receive useful currentintelligence in return for his input.His reports would e combined withinformation from other sources andprocessed to provide him with theintelligence information needed toimprove his own operations. This factor should prove to be an effective

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H MLET EV lUlnON SYSTEMincentive for prompt and accuratereporting:

The possibility of system error,particularly in logic, represents thegravest p r o b l e ~ Computer programs,once designed, are inclined to take onan aura of perfection that is neitherearned nor necessarily valid. Furthermore, if a few of our advisors applyfaulty logic under HES only a por-tion of the country is afflicted. How-ever, with APACE a logic fault couldextend countrywide. This problemcould be made manageable, though, byusing several continuous checkingmeans.

Periodic changes of indicators andconstant reevaluation of indicatorswould guard against faulty input. Thegreatest danger would be compla-cency, and, as in any other operation,command supervision alone could sup-ply the essential impetus and sense ofurgency needed to assure system ef-ficiency.

Cost, perhaps, is the least of theproblems. As it stands today, we haveno system to locate the FEBA and the

high ground on a current basis in ourpacification war. At the same time,we are pouring millions of dolIarsinto that war. The expenditure en-tailed in establishing P CE wouldbe minuscule in comparison with totalexpenditures, but it could result insubstantial savings by enhancing theeffectiveness of our efforts.Any system such as HES-whichattempts to measure the attitudes, as-pirations, and loyalties of the people-will be subject to error because itdeals in what is now an inexactscience. Complete application of au-tomatic data processing techniquescould provide us with a system re-sponsive to the needs of the com-mander and advisor for timely pacifi-cation intelligence.The type of system visualized in

P CE would allow consideration ofthe myriad indicators available, thusincreasing the reliability of resultantevaluations. P CE could help focuson the real essence of the war-thewinning of the people-and could as-sist us in insuring that our assetswere applied to that end.

ZIP CODEPostal regulations require the use of Zip codes in mailing the Military Reviewto United States subscribers. Please include your Zip code in all SUbscriptioncorrespondence.

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~ " I t ' ) ~rom Orbi

Soviet Policyon ~ p r o l i f e r a t i o nGerhard Wettig

RESENT Soviet policy towardthe West operates on two distinct levels: the European level andthe United States-USSR level. In thefirst case, the central concept is European security ; in the second case,nonproliferation plays the decisive

role.t is striking that the Soviets hailEuropean security as an application of the ideological doctrine ofpeaceful coexistence between statesof different social orders, but theyo not associate nonproliferation withthat doctrine. Another conspicuousfact is Soviet reluctance to voice the

only argument that can provide moraljustification for a nonproliferationtreaty-namely that the spread ofnuclear weapons threatens the worldwith the prospect of uncontrollablenuclear conflict.Until April 1968, only slightly more

than one percent of all Soviet statements had mentioned the nonproliferation argument. In these cases, eitherthe international public or, more often, an exclusively Anglo-Saxon audience was addressed. The nonproliferation argument seemed to be alien tothe thinking habits of the Soviet elite.Moreover, the top leaders carefullyavoided giving publicity to the subject at home and in the Communistworld. No message directed to a domestic or Communist audience alludedto it.One concludes that Soviet leadersdid not want their followers to regardnonproliferation as an important objective--an inference confirmed bySoviet unwillingness to link nonproliferation to peaceful coexistence.Communists are to view nonproliferation as a matter of temporal expediency, not as a matter of high principle

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as they would were an ideological concept associated with it.Since May 1968, the Soviet propaganda line has undergone somechanges. The arguments in favor ofnonproliferation were repestedly publicized in statements not only for foreign, but also for domestic, consumption. This seems to contradict theconclusion of the previous paragraph.However, a closer scrutiny of thestatements for the domestic publicreveals that the nonproliferation argument is never employed in generalterms, only as a specific foreign policyobjective of the Soviet Union.PolHlcal WeaponA nonproliferation agreement isusually deemed necessary in order toneutralize the dangers emanating fromthe most aggressive members of theimperialistic camp -that is, mainlyWest Germsny. Thus, nonproliferation is regarded not as a universalprinciple, but as a political wesponwhich serves in the struggle againstspecific opponents.Soviet citizens were warned to regard the nonproliferation treaty not

This article was ctmdensedfrom the original, a PPearing inORDIS No. Winter 1969, published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Univer8ityof Pennsylvania, under the title,Soviet Policy on the Nonproliferation of Nuclea.r Weapons,1966-1968. Copyright 1969by the Trustee8 of the Univer8ityof Pennsylva.nia.Mr. Wettig is a apecialist inthe foreign policy of the Sovietbloc a t the Federal Institute forEastern nd Interna.tiona.l Studies, Cologne, Germa,ny, a.nd theauthor of Entmilitarisierung undWiederbewatfnung in Deutschland, 1948-1955.

NONPROLIFER TIONas an end in itself, but as a meanswhich will improve the conditions ofthe struggle against the imperialistsand, consequently, also the perspectives of a success in this struggle. 1The notion of nonproliferation asa political means instead of a politicalobjective, surprising as it may seemto the Western mind, is a logical outcome of Soviet doctrine. Since thedays of V. I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin,peace has been accorded no moral andpolitical preference in comparison towar. Peace and war are good and justin quite the same manner, providedthey promote social progress andliberation of mankind. That Sovietleaders actually have preferred peaceto war in most cases (although notalways) is due to their perceptionthat war involves serious risks.Peaceful Coulstence

t is in t is context that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, proclaimed in 1956, can best be understood. The risks of modem warfarehave become so great that an interstate war, possibly involving the nuclear-weapon powers, must be avoidedin principle. Other forms of warfare,such as liberation wars outside thezones of nuclear armament or civilwars with no possible interstate confrontation, may still be supported as''progressive.''A similar pattern of ressoning applies to the choice between nuclearproliferation and nonproliferation. Itis not by chance that Soviet statements never indicate any interest inuniversal nonproliferation-that is, ina nuclear armsment ban to thosecountries which are not viewed asactual or potential opponents. Thefunction of the treaty is to bind thehands of specific enemies.

1 CommeDt 17 o Baril Pavlov, RadIo Moscow(R. . . .lan . 10 Inno 1968.19


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NONPROLIFER DONThe objectives the Soviet leadersseek to attain by means of the nonproliferation treaty can be discernedfrom their interpretations of it anddemands regarding ita provisions.Until 1967, United States-Soviet negotiations were largely focused on theissue of whether nuclear-weapon powers had the right to transfer nuclearweapons or know-how to alliance organizations.US authorities lield the view thatthis did not amount to proliferationbecause substituting a nuclear alliance for a nuclear power did not enlarge the number of entities controlling nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union maintained, in diplomatic notesand PU9lic statements, that the USstandpoint would open loopholes toproliferation by indirect means.Contrary to the United States, the

USSR has been completely unwillingto share its nuclear capabilities withits allies. Moscow does not even allowthem to develop major civilian nuclearfacilities.oscow VictoryIn 1967, Washington bowed to Soviet objections and eliminated thealliance option from its draft. In subsequent Soviet public statements, thisUS backdown was depicted as a greattriumph. Indeed, it was a great vic

tory for Moscow The Kremlin acquired a voice in determining howthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be armed, and it received anassurance against the possibility thata West European nuclear defensecommunity might be created as anintermediate step toward an evolvingunited Western Europe.Several ambiguities inherent in thenonproliferation treaty affect politicaland military problems of the Westernalliance. The treaty is not clear re

garding the meaning of indirect control over nuclear weapons which anonnuclear-weapon state may not exercise. On this basis, Soviet commentators frequently denounce even thelimited consultation in matters ofnuclear strategy realized through thetwo planning bodies of NATO, callingit a wicked device designed to circumvent the treaty and proliferate nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic.Weapons StorageAnother target of Soviet propagandists is the presence of nuclear-warhead stockpiles in West Germany.They stress that nonproliferation doesnot permit storage of nuclear weaponson the territories of nonnuclearweapon states. That the West Germans fulfill their alliance obligationsby allowing Western troops, especiallyUS nuclear-armed troops, to be stationed on their soil is interpreted asa violation of nonproliferation policy.Western assurances that the nucleararsenals are under strict US controlare dismissed as insincere or as unrealistic.

t is obvious that the soviet aim isto induce the West Germans to op-pose the Western military presenceon their soil and to create as muchtrouble as possible for the stationingof US troops in central Europe -which, after all, is still the hard coreof US security guarantees to theEuropean members of NATO. A denuclearized NATO defense posture inWestern Europe would have no chanceof success in case of a military conflict, for the Soviet armies in EastGermany, Poland, and the USSRwould be qualitatively superior byvirtue of their nuclear armament.One of the principal deficiencies ofthe nonproliferation treaty is that itdoes not distinguish between military

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nuclear technology (which shall notbe allowed to the nonnuclear-weaponstates) and civil nuclear technology(which must not be hampered in anrway). Soviet representatives give assurances that no one, including theWest Germans, shall suffer underthe pretendedly different interpretations of the wordings of the treaty,provided, however, that the West Germans do not attempt: to seek loophol s in the inter-pretation o the articles to the treatywhich would allow them to acquiren clear weapons in one way oranother. ,This sounds fine, but it leaves openthe crucial question as to which kindsof nuclear activity should be regardedas opening loophoies for nuclear armament.Public StatementsThe record of Soviet public statements makes it abundantly clear thatSoviet leaders are willing to denouncea wide variety of West German nuclear activities as steps toward nuclear weaponry. The Federal Republicis regularly accusea of preparing oreven initiating production of nuclearweapons inside and outside its borders. All kinds of national or international civil nuclear programs arequoted as evidence for this. Allegednuclear cooperation between the Federal Republic and .other countries-notably South Africa, Israel, andCommunist China-is condemned asespecially dangerous.

In their messages to foreign audiences, however, the Soviets argue thatthe treaty will open the way to greaterassistance by the nuclear powersto the less-developed countries, thusstarting a new era in the peaceful

1I llPROUFERAnOil

use of the atom. Moscow's strategy isto appeal to the states of the thirdworld to support the treaty and inthis way to pressure reluctant Westem Nations into signing it. In practice, however, the Soviet record ofpeaceful nuclear assistance to othernations, even to the East European

A ,. N F8GhH UA US rmy Ser letmt miselle preparedfor lauuch duritlg a NATO exercise.Both the Sergetmt and the logger rangePer ing miselles have een furnished toWest Germany, but nuden warheadsremain under US control.allies, has been poor, especially compared with the efforts of the UnitedStates and Canada.Another issue raised by the nonproliferation treaty has to do withthe controls to insure treaty compliance. In accordance with the longstanding Soviet policy of favoringpublic declaratory agreements without effective control, Soviet leaders

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originally rejected nonproliferationsafeguards. In order to overcome So-viet opposition, Britain and the UnitedStates then conceded that controlsshould be applied only to the nonnuclear-weapon states as these were theparties which were to assume the realobligations under the treaty.The idea of controls only for othernations was acceptable to MoscowControls applied t other countriesseemed to be a real bargain since theymight open doors to Soviet inspectionand inftuence abroad without requiring any Soviet compromise in return.oncession oubtfulSoviet leaders had to consent tocontrols in the Communist East European countries, it is true, but whetherthis amounted to a concession is doubtful. The civil nuclear equipment ofthe area is rather scarce as the Soviet

Union has reserved full-scale development for itself. Moreover, with theKremlin's apprehension of emancipatory tendencies in the people's democracies, international checking procedures with Soviet participation maywell become a means of strengtheningSoviet supervision over the wholearea.The controls envisaged by the treatyare viewed by Soviet leaders as highlyfavorable to their interests. They demand that those states harboring excessive nuclear ambitions, most notablyWest Germany, submit to the mostrigorous of controls.After the Americans acceded to theSoviet demand that nuclear powers beexempted from the inspection safeguards, Moscow raised a new issueon the control procedure to be appliedto the nonnuclear-weapon states. Thereare three generally recognize4 models:

The RomamaDJ so deep y committed t independence from Moscow. have vigorously oppoaedthe nonproliferation treaty.

The controls administered by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna which includechecking all relevant documents andblueprints, site inspections, and approval of installations and technicalprocesses. The safeguards practiced by theEuropean Community of Atomic Energy (Euratom) that do not requirenations to divulge technological secrets, but are based largely on inputoutput checks of fissionable material.Such controls are much less prone to/ industrial espionage and to foreigninterference with a nation's decisionsin civil nuclear technology. A still less interventionist formof control advocated by some scientists who believe that there is hardlyany need for specific control devicessince a modern and effective nuclearweapon system must consist of somany components that their existencewould be detected early.Soviet PosHiOllThe IAEA controls in their presentform are highly unpopular with theindustrially advanced nations, especially the members of Euratom, due tothe opportunities for espionage andintervention they open to the controllers and their increasing costswhich, according to some experts,may amount to 10 percent of the civilnuclear product. The Soviet positionis quite clear: The present IAEA controls are to provide the standard.They are the only ones stringentenough to bar the West Germans andothers from access to nuclear armaments. In their opinion, one of thecrucial features of the IAEA safeguard system is the inspectors: . ri ht not only to examine aUdocumenmtion -elating to cont -oUednuclea - installations and materials

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but lso to carry out on-the-spot inspections.Western, especially West German,advocacy of input-output checks as areliable control procedure that wouldnot be prone to misuse provoked asharp retort from Moscow. Bonn wasaccused of wanting to keep open loopholes for the uncontrolled accumula

denounced as a worthless selfcontrol arrangement designed toprevent detection of military nuclearpreparations by the West Germanswho are alleged to be in full commandof Euratom. The Soviet line of argument is that there must be one and thesame control arrangement for all nations concerned. The IAEA is pre-

Soviet soldiers prepare a for not providestrategic or tactical missiles with a nuclear capability to any Warsaw Pact nations.tion of nuclear explosives and to protect its nuclear centers from theeyes of all those not taken into confidence One of the, questions of the controlprocedUre is 'whether the IAEA is tobe the sole and direct agent enforcingnonprOliferation safeguards. The fivenonnuclear-weapon members of Euratom have made their accession dependent on a verification agreement whichwould leave the controls to Euratomand entrust only subsequent verification to the IAEA.This has provoked great hostility inMoscow. The Euratom controls are

Septell\ber 889

sented as. the only body which canenforce the. safeguard system envisaged in the nonproliferation treatyand be responsible for checking treatycompliance.In addition to the problems createdby the ambiguities of the treaty, thereare some issues related to nonproliferation that are largely ignored bythe treaty. The nuclear-weapon powers claim for themselves a permanentmonopoly of the crucial means ofdestruction, putting all other statesinto a position of lasting relativeweakness. They do so in the name ofinternational security-that is, reducing the chances of a world war between nuclear-armed powers.The nonnuclear-weapon states have

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a more comprehensive notion of theirsecurity. They do not want to be exposed to nuclear threat and blackmailany more than to nuclear warfare.Fears of being blackmailed into dependency or surrender have been theprincipal incentives for going nuclear. .Some nuclear have nots, especiallyseveral of the more advanced coun

tries in the nonaligned world, regardboth the good will and the deterrenceassurances of thJ nuclear-weaponpowers as utterly unreliable sourcesof .security. United States-8ovietmutual deterrence was of no useto Czechoslovakia in 1968. Variousstates, currently under an effectivenuclear-weapon power guarantee, areconcerned that changing super,powerinterests and commitments or changing nuclear-power ratios in the futuremight undermine their security.Redefine ProblemIn the early phases of negotiationon a nonproliferation treaty, theSoviets were reluctant to mention thesecurity issue at all. When it becameimpossible to ignore the matter, theymade various attempts to redefine theproblem to meet Soviet needs. TheWest Germans were told that the decreased danger of nuclear war to beachieved by a nonproliferation treatywas, in itself, a sufficient securityguarantee. Notions of insecurity aredismissed as absurd allegations fabricated by the West Germans.

Meanwhile, Moscow is careful toavoid any commitment. When a WestGerman memorandum called for anunequivocal assurance from the nuclear weapon-states never to resort tonuclear blackmail, Moscow replied thatthis was but an attempt to spreaddistrust to the objectives and inten

tions of those signatory powers whichpossess nuclear weapons.'A serious deficiency of the nonproliferation treaty is the lack of clearcriteria for treaty compliance. Mainly,but not exclusively, with regard to theFederal Republic of Germany, Soviet

NatlThe RefJenge Britain's fourth PfJlsrissubmarine at ita launch in 1968 There isno NATO organization covering strategicnuclear forces, but both Britaiu and theUnited States have committed Polsrissubmarines to the planning control of theSupreme Allied Commander, Europe.spokesmen have advanced criteriawhich allow almost anything pertaining to nuclear matters to be declaredmilitary in nature and, as such, contrary to the treaty.

One can foresee that, if the treatyenters into force, Moscow will raisecharges of military nuclear activityagainst certain countries and demand 'l Broadeut of Radio Moscow (German).18 lay 1967. The Issue ' t i l l vital to Bonnbecaue on the b t of Articles 68 Bnd 107 ofthe United Natlolll Charter, Moscow formallydafmI the right of interference in the intemalmatters of the Federal RepubUc

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. NONPROUfER noNthat the supply of fissionable mate

o rials to those countries be halted at. once. Such demands with regard toUS uranium supplies for Euratom, would give Soviet leaders another op-ortunity to intervene in United. States-West EUropean relations.r As long as the United States-Sovietnegotiations on the nonproliferationf agreement were underway, Moscow, sought to exploit all kinds of Westernt differences which arose over the issue!: Anglo-Saxon audiences were warnedt of alleged aggressive intentions onthe part of the West Germans-intentions partly deduced from the factthat Bonn was understandsbly reluctant to support nonproliferation insome of the forms under consideration.

nDther VersionThe West Germans received anotherversion of the Soviet line. The UnitedStates, according to Moscow dictatedits will to its European allies and didnot heed its allies' interests. TheAmericans were depicted as indifferent to the issue of reunification, reluctant to support West German policiesin general, tired of their NATO com

mitment, and alresdy embarked onananti-Bonn, nonproliferation course.This kind of argument was meant toconvince the West Germans that theywere losing their crucial backing inWashington and, therefore, would bewell advised to initiate a new policyoutside NATO, especially one thatwas more friendly toward the USSR.When agreement on the nonproliferation treaty was in sight, Soviet strategy gradually changed. Moscow hadsecured what it wanted. Therefore,principal Soviet concern had to be directed toward making sure that the~ o m i s contained in the agreementwoUld be fulfilled through treaty

implementation. The first indicationof the shift in Soviet policy was thestress placed in late 1967 on the absolutely binding character of thetreaty. Any provisions which mightgive the nonnuclear-weapon states achance to withdraw in case of nationalemergency were attacked as evasionclauses that would nullify the entiretreaty.

relt ImpactSoviet occupation of Czechoslovakiahad a great impact on their nonproliferation treaty strategy. Westernreactions to the military interventionconvinced Soviet leaders that their action had seriously dimmed the prospects for treaty adoption.There must have been considerableembarrassment over this fact in Mos-cow. Until mid-September, Sovietcommunicators, obviously lacking instructions on how to deal with thenew situation, remained, silent on thenonproliferation issue. When the topicwas finally taken up again, the Soviets tried in various ways to counteract the trend.They warned Americans that achange of attitude might render therelations between the greatest worldpowers as bad as they were duringthe first days of the cold war. Forthe first time, the mutuality of interest .in United States-Soviet cooperation (the existence of which had beenpreviously denied) was stressed.Western apprehensions aroused by Soviet action against Czechoslovakiawere denounced as mere pretexts forscuttling the treaty.The United States was informedthat Bonn was exploiting the Czechoslovakian events in order to justifyits unwillingness to sign the nonproliferation treaty, and that Bonn nolonger considered itself a vassal of

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Washina1;on. Discontented with theEuropean course of the Americanreactionaries, West German leadersallegedly desired to forge their ownpolitical and military hegemony inWestern Europe, a course that required possession of atomic and hydrogen bombs.'

From the beginning, West Germany has been the focus of Sovietnonproliferation polemics as it is formany other issues. Moscow has repeatedly stated in unambiguous termsthat the principal importance of thenonproliferation treaty lies in the:Bituatioo o Central Eur Ypewhere the nuclear ambitiom o theWest Germam, militl1lT'1l gang dictatemost 'Vigorously mea.sures which areapt to pre'Vent equipment o theBunde8Wehr with nuclear weapons in

any form directly or indirectly.What are the reasons for Sovietpreoccupation with West Germany?The Soviet leaders must be fully awarethat Bonn has no chance in the foreseeable future to acquire nuclearweapons, for the United States, France,and Britain are opposed to the FederalRepublic's acquisition of them.Analysis of Soviet public statements yields other motives for selecting the Federal Republic as the maintarget of attack. Alleged West German opposition to a nonproliferationtreaty is frequently linked to Bonn'sNATO orientation. The West Germanshave been told repeatedly that their

compliance with the treaty can be accepted as a sincere contribution topeace only if NATO ties are cut andAtlantic nuclear strategy rejected.Moscow regards West Germany asthe backbone of NATO and of the USa cut by BeIobtoV. RadIo Iloecow (Eug-Dab). 10 Ootober 1968 v. lIIatve7ev. Shu vpered, 1 t1ut JIG 27t 1987.

presence in the European Continent.Deprived of West Germany, NATOwould be reduced to an emptynotion. 10 Thus, the Soviet Union istrying to loosen the Federal Republic'sNATO ties in the expectation that, ifWest Germany proves to be a vulnerable target, the Atlantic alliance andthe European position of the UnitedStates can be mortally wounded.

Soviet nonproliferation policy isparalleled by Soviet European security policy. The actions under theheading of European security aregeared to mobilize West Europeansagainst the United States and theFederal Republic (depicted as ananti-European US instrument). Sucha course, however, increases the danger that the dreaded ''WashingtonBonn axis will grow firmer.To prevent this, by separating theAmericans from the West Germans,is the function of Soviet nonproliferation policy. Lesser Soviet objectivesare to undermine the Federal Republic's position as an integral part ofWestern Europe and as an indispensable component of any future WestEuropean integration, to disrupt the

West European communities by weakening Euratom, and to thwart WestGermany's new East European policyof conciliation and bridge-buildingwhich may affect the obedience andmilitancy of Moscow s allies.In 8um, Soviet nonproliferationpolicy does not aim at internstionaldetente but at generating tensionsthat win help the Soviets in theirstruggle to remove US power fromEurope, to spread Soviet influenceover a disunited Western Europe, andto restore Soviet rule over EasternEurope.

10 sDUtak BeaIov, What Is Behind the s_e a BelatlODlhlp/ Itl ticmd Ail .' (Mos-eow). 1968. Number 8 p

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The Korean IncidentCharles S. Stevenson

T HE capture of the ueblo is notthe first time the US Navy hashad trouble in Korea. In fact, Koreanships attacked both US merchantships and naval vessels in Far Eastwaters over a century ago.The General Skerman an Amer-ican merchsnt ship was fired uponand burned in Korean waters in 1864.Presumably on an unofficial tradingmission for spices, herbs, and selectedartifacts from such nations as thePhilippines, Taiwan, Japan, and analmost unknown Corea, as it wasspelled then, the ship grounded in theTatunII River just south of Seoul. n

current maps, this is identified as theToedong River.As members of the General Sher-man s crew, mostly of Malayan andChinese extraction, attempted to comeashore, a strong confrontation tookplaee between them and Korean na-tives. The crew of the US vessel wasmassacred and the ship set afire. NoAmericans were captured and littlenavigational equipment was salvagedby the Koreans. It was reported sev-eral years later by French seamenthat the Koreans thought the USventure was O e to rob the graves ofthe nation s ancient kings.


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KORE N INCIDENTIt h s been recorded that the Koreans got their courage to attaCk theeneral Sh6f 11Ul,n from the fact thatthey had earlier defeated a French

naval attempt against Seoul followingthe persecution and death of someFrench Catholic missionaries.The eneral ~ n attack wasresented quietly by official US navalauthorities, but before an investigation was held and facts made available, all they couid do was to fret overthe possibility of' retaliation.Political MR. However, the then Secretary ofState, William H. Seward, made apolitical move to get a discussion withthe Korean Government, not onlyabout the General Sh6f 11UI,n inCident,but also ab()ut the possibility of atreaty concerning the treatment ofseaman shipwreCked in that area.There also was some hope of startingtrade relations with the distant Ko-reans.

The move was in the form of a request to France in 1866 to join in anexpedition to Korea. In what must bedescribed as extraordinary perception,it was Seward's feeling that the tinynation would eventually be divided insome way.

The invitation, as it was so worded,was sent to France because it wasthought that the French were on reasonably good relations with the Chinese who were, in turn, supposed toClw.rZes S Stevenson served with

the 81- th Engineers of the 89th Division during World War 1. He is a retired Vice President of HaJlmarkCllrtlB Incorporated, KanBt1.8 City,Missouri, lind the Ci1lili4n Aide to theSeoreta.ry of the Army from westernMissouri. Following trips to 71. fill -tions, he Iw B written IIrticZes for llllri-0U8 publiCtl.tions.

have some kind of influence with Korea. The reasoning was that a goodword to the Koreans by the Chinesewould ease the way for an Americandiscussion with the Koreans. Nothingcame from this probably becauseNapoleon III was still rankled by theopposition of the United States to hisMaximilian adventure in Mexico.Immediate RejectlooWith this failing, the United Statesturned to the Chinese in its effort tomeet with the Koreans. Anson Burlingame, the US Minister to China at thetime, brought the story of the deathsand destruction of the General Sher-man fracas to the attention of theChinese foreign office hoping for itshelp in beginning negotiations withthe Koreans. He received an immediate rejection with the word thatChina had no control over the internalaffair of Korea. The Chinese plainlystated that their relationship with theKorean Government was one of ceremony only, and not one of rule.

Burlingame at once informed RearAdmiral H. H. Bell of the AmericanAsiatic Squadron of the Chinese re-fusal to help. Shortly after this, theadmiral moved the Wa;chusett and theShlJfUl.ndoa.h of his fleet with 10 gunsand nine guns respectively-into therivers near Seoul where they tooksoundings. This time, the US shipswere not challenged. Admiral Bell'svessels were reasonably well armedwhile the General ShBf 11lMl, had onlyenough arms to ward off pirates. Thisended the episodes of the late 1860's.A few years later, in 1870, theUnited States again sought Chinesecooperation in attempting to secure atreaty for the protection of BailorsshipwreCked on the Korean coasts,with a slight hint for opening of trade.The negotiations were entrusted by

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Hamilton Fish, the then Secretary ofState, to a diplomatic officer, Fred-erich Lmv, US Minister to Chinarather than to a naval officer. Thiswas done because it was deemed desirable to establish a diplomatic ratherthan a military relationship with theKoreans. Then, too, it was hoped toadvance the general American causewith the Chinese.eate TalksAfter some correspondence between

Low and the KiUg of Korea throughthe Chinese, Low announced thatthere was indication that the Koreansat last might talk with the Americans.As a result, Rear Admiral John Rodgers, Commander of the AsiaticSquadron, was directed to go to Korea. Along with his tlagship, his tleetincluded the CoUwado, two corvettes,the AlaBka the Benicia and gunboatsMonocacy and Palo8. The BotiUa ar-rived near the mouth of the HanRiver with a total of 85 guns andsomewhat over a thousand sailors andmarines. This was in May 1871.

After minimum amenities had beenobserved, the Americans asked for aninterview with the King, continuing,meanwhile, to move slowly up the HanRiver toward Seoul. After recognitions by the King that the Americanswere at least in the area, two emissaries boarded Admiral Rodgers tlag- .ship and carried on a desultory andfragmentary conversation. The Americans were soon convinced that the Ko-reans had limited authority and thatlittle would come from the talk. Thevisit ended with Admiral Rodgersadvising the two Koreans that it washis plan to continue up the river totake some soundings and to 1ind a better place to anchor the balance of histleet.Two days later, on 2 June 1871, Ad-

KORE N IIICIDEJIT

miral Rodgers started the Monot:GC Iand the Palos with howitzers promi-nently dispiayed imd _ ama1Iervessels inward. Wh11e one cannot readthe minds of Koreans, this may haveprovoked them. n any event, as theAmericans passed the 1irBt of the defenses, the Koreans opened ire withwhat has been described as severalhundred cannons of. small caliber. TheAmericans responded with their 8inch guns, causing the Koreans to runfrom the fort which had been firedupon. They did not even pick up theirdead or wounded. The American casualties were two injured and no damageto any of the ships.While it would have been a good opportunity to press an offensive andcontinue up the river, Admiral Rodgers chose to return to the main bodyof his Beet. However, he sent somemen ashore with instructions to leavea note tied to a stake on the island. tread that, if he did not get an apologywithin 10 days, he would exerciseforce. No apology came, and on 10June, the Monocacy, the Palos andfour smaller vessels began to move upthe Han.Korean efensesThe Korean defense along the riverconsisted of a series of forts locatedfor the most psrt on the island ofKonghug. They were made of woodand concealed in the marshes andswamps of the Han. As the small USBeet approached the forts, the Americans began shelling. Following only alittle resistance, they began to land inthe swamps and marshes to take possession of the forts. Suddenly, the Koreans went into action, and a severe,tough, hand-to-hand ground strugglebegan. At a fort called the Citadel-because of its location at the top of a150-foot hilI the 1ighting was espe

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1ORE N IN IDENT IeWJy hllr\i for thll.Amllricans l S thIIy to press an oft'ensive, Admiral RodgersaM:empted:w:"forcetheir way upthll chose:not to do so. He turned hi, fieet ~

: i m l ~ J l l d r h i l k m : E I 3 ' : ~ : : c ; ; : : _ ,amund .and . sailed back to the mouth. J: ~ U r W ~ e t ~ - _ t h l l Koreans ofptbe.Han:River':lIl1re, be anchored, 4gave up not only their poBitions, but hoping for some word from the Koalso about 500 estimated dead and an reaDS. When Done had come by 3 July 1unknown number of wounded. The the entire fieet left the area, leadingAmericans had three dead and 10 the Koreans to believe that anotherwounded. Western nation had been forced to reAgain, while it would have been ad treat under the p r ~ s s u r of Koreanvantageous from a military viewpoint force

Korea is ,one of the world's Dlsjor testing grounds for the principlesupon whieh the United Nations was founded: coUedive _urity, peaceful settleDlent, and self-deterDlination. What happens to this country is of grave

neem to aU nations interested in keeping those principles alive; and therefore itis inlperative for the United Nations to make clear to aU that itspresence in Korea will be Dlaintained, also that the responsibilities of theinternational coDlDlunity toward this area DlUst and will continue.

What, the world has been witnessing ever since North Korea eDl-barked on a policy of stepped-up violence-is not a mer" succession of minor ,incidents, rather a systeDlatic campaign to export revolution into the Souththrough violence and terrorism.

U enator tuart ymington

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u Offensive and Defensive StrategyLieutenant Colonel Joseph L Fant DI, United State. Arm

ThiB article WIt8 taken from atheBiB prepared while the authorWIt8 a 8tudent at the US Army WarCollege. The view8 ezpre88ed andconclusions drawn by Colonel Fantwhile in an academic environmentare not to be construed as ezpre8-8ions of official US GO IIernment orDepartment of Defense policy -Editor.ONE goal is fundamental t USfulfillment of its national purpose the preservation of this country as a viable national entity. Thepossibility of nuclear war poses a real

threat to the achievement of this goal.To safeguard our national security,w must be capable of deterring a deliberate nuclear attack. But even if weshould absorb a surprise attack, wemust be able to intlict in retaliationan unacceptable degree of damageupon the attacker. In addition, wmust be capable of limiting damage tour population and industry.Strategic oft ensive forces providean assured destruction capability andhence the necessary deterrent t suchan attack by either of our likely adversaries-Communist China or theUSSR. Strategic defensive forces con-

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US STRATEGY

tribute directly to limiting dal l&ge,but they can also serve as a deterrent by successfully intercepting anddestroying the enemy s offensive weapons before they reach our strategic offensive forces. Less directly,these defensive forces may contributefurther to the deterrent should theybecome so effective as to underminethe enemy s confidence in his offensivecapability. ,A mixture of both strategic offensive and defensive forces is essentialif we are to be prepared for the threatof nuclear war. Within each force, weshould strive for variety. The greaterour options, the more the enemy tasks compounded, for he must prepareresponses to resulting broader capabilities. On the other hand, simplification of our options may tempt him toundertake a surprise attack.

Sb'ate ic DeterrentTo fulfill ita purpose, a strategicoffensive force must be in being andshould be frightening, inexorable, persuasive, inexpensive, foolproof, andcontrollable. To meet such characteristics, US strategic offensive forcesconsist .of a mix of missiles andmanned bombers. Eaeh can do thingsthe other cannot. Together, they are

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. FantIII is with the Ofjice of the DeputyChief of Staff for Personnel Wash-ington D. C. Other assignments in-clude duty with the Capitol MilitaryRegion in Vietnam with the 11thAirborne Division and the 50-6th TV-fantry in Germany and with the -6othInfantry Division in Korea. He holdsa B.S. in Engineering from the USMilitary Academy West Point anM.A. in English from the Universityof Pen1l81llvania and is a graduate ofthe US Marine Corps Command andStaff College I/l ia the US rmy WarCollege.

prepared for instantaneous retaliationagainst an aggressor at any level ofconflict. Under a second-strike con-eept, they also must be able to sustainan initial enemy attack and still becapable of launching crippling blowsagainst preselected enemy targets.

In addition to missiles and mannedbombers, the force includes long-rangereconnaissance aircraft, associatedsupport forces, and command and control systems. The capability of suchweapons, supported by a national resolve for their use, provides the deterrent to an aggressor s military action. But if the deterrent posture ~not avert general war, strategic offensive forces must be able to concludethe conflict on terms favorable to theUnited States.Assurln Survival

The purpose of strategic defensiveforces is to assure the survival ofthe United States as a viable nationin the event of attack by limitingdamage to a nominal, acceptable level.Such forces may also enhance thecredibility of our nuclear deterrence.Their mission is to detect and destroyenemy missiles and aircraft enrouteto targets in the United States.While the United States has hadan effective defense against mannedbombers since the early 1950 s, it hasnot yet deployed an antiballistic missile (ABM) system.The USSR s present policy s ostensibly a policy of peaceful coexistence.There appears to be no immediatedanger of it launehing a preventivewar. ut in the event of nuelearwar, it will strive to win by employing multiple systems and damagelimitation. Although the USSR doesnot possess the capability to destroyall US retaliatory forces in a firststrike, it does have the capability to

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us STR lESYretaliate and assure destruction of UStargets beyond acceptable limits. tcontinues t strengthen its air defense system, extend civil defenseprograms, and strive for competencein its military forces which have hadno recent combat experience.It is clear that the USSR has developed the scientific-technologicalbase capable of producing sophisti

resented a substantial increase 15percent in projected defense expenditures. It seems reasonable that thisjump refiected a shift in -prioritieswithin the defense establisbment anda quest for strategic superiority.The Soviet arsenal of nuclear delivery vehiclea s formidable, consisting of a creditable manned-bomberforce, an increasing ,number of sophia-

U A , , ~The Bear a Soviet turboprop aircraft can reach any target on the North AmericanContinent on a two-way mission without refuelingcated weapon systems and challengingthe United States in any field of military research, development, testing,and engineering. This base, combinedwith its ability to concentrate quicklyon priority programs, poses gravequestions for US planners in a periodof North Atlantic Treaty Organizationdisarray, heavy US commitment inVietnam, and pressures for defenseeconomy at llome.According to the Soviet publishedbudget, defense expenditures in 1966rose about five percent. The eightpercent increase announced for 1967did not represent an increase in theproportion of national income devotedto defense. But the 1968 budget rep- eptember 969

ticated intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM s) with great range andpayload capabilities, and more andmore submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBM s).The inventory of Soviet intercontinental bombers has not increasedduring the past year. Yet the approximately 155 aircraft represent a mixof relatively high-performance subsonic bombers. The ear is a fourengine, turboprop aircraft capable ofreaching any target on the NorthAmerican Continent on a two-waymission without refueling infiight.The adger is a twin-engine plane ofrelatively short range. To be effectively used in an attack against this


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UnJIATECYcontinent, it must be refueled inflight,but the Soviets do have an operationalin-flight refueling capability. Last isthe Buon, a four-engine jet similar insize and capability to our B-5 . Likethe Ba.dger, it can be refueled inflightto cover most North American targets.The Soviets have been doing re-search and development in the field ofsupersonic bombers, and one is intheir inventory the Blinder. It is aswept-wing, medium bomber withtwin-jet engines'mounted externallynear the tail. They also are developing a new Mach 3 interceptor thatwill greatly increase the threat to theUS manned-bomber force.Balllstic Missn. Fore.Over the past year, the Soviets havecontinued their buildup of hardenedand dispersed land-based missiles. Atpresent production rates, the USSRwill surpass the United States innumber of ICBM's this year, and, by1974-75, could have as many as 2,500compared with 1,054 currently planned for the United States.Another factor directly affectingdeterrent superiority is US confirmation of Soviet claims of a mobileICBM. Such a self-propelled missilehas been viewed in Moscow parades.Mobility makes an ICBM difficult todestroy because it cannot be targeted.The other type ballistic missile ofspecific interest is the SLBM. As ofJuly 1967, the Soviets had about 330conventionally powered and 50 nuclear-powered submarines. About 30of the former and 10 of the latter cancarry and fire an average of threeballistic missiles each, so 130 is areasonable estimate of their SLBMstrength as of that date. The fact thatsome of the other submarines in beingcan be converted to carry ballistic missiles, coupled with the estimated pro

duction rate of six to eight new nuclear submarines each year, m ke thefuture threat from SLBM's the moreominous.

Of even greater concern, however,is the evidence that the Soviet Unionis developing a new class of nuclearsubmarines with 16 missile tubeseach. This is the same as the USPolaris submarine.BM SystemSoviet ABM defense is presentlybased on the Galosh. This multistage,

solid-fuel antiballistic missile is deployed in limited numbers aroundMoscow. t is believed to have a rangeof several hundred miles and to carrya nuclear warhead in the one to two-megaton range. t is, therefore, suitable for interception at high altitudeand for area defense. At present, thisABM defense would not materiallyaffect US assured destruction capability. Future increases in the system may well require adjustment,however, in our offensive forces.The Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System FOBS), developedin 1967, is more of a deterrent weaponsystem than a pinpoint system capableof successfully attacking such hardened targeta as a missile silo. It does,however, present a threat to soft tar-gets such as bomber bases and largeUS cities.Although the system can c rry lesspayload than an ICBM powered bythe same size booster, and it is notsufficiently accurate to eliminate orappreciably reduce US retaliatory capability, it will add flexibility andversatility to the Soviet nuclear strikeforce. Because FOBS is not on a ballistic path, it is difficult to track andthen predict its target area. As a reBult warning time is cut from about15 minutes to five

Military Review September 1969

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Transcript of Military Review September 1969