Military Review November 1969

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ilitaryeVlew U. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas

In This Issue

+ Barge Ship+ New Planning System+ Kermit Roosevelt lecture

November 69


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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General John H. Hag, Jr.DEPUTY COMMANDANT

Brigadier General Frank B. Clay

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military ReviewProfessional Journal of the US Army

Cambodia's Borders WG CDR M. K. Chopra, Indian AF, Ret 3 Nationbullding COL Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA 10 The New Army Planning System LTC David E. Shepherd, k., USA 18 China's Petroleum Industry Niu Sien-chong 23 West Africa Searches for Stability LTC Jack R. Sadler, USA 28 NATO's Defense Strategy GEN Nino Pasti, Italian AF 39 Coercion and Fear in the Soviet Armed Forces Vyacheslav P. Artemiev 51 BargeShiP-freighter of the Future Claude O. Lanciano, Jr. 56 PW and Captured Document Doctrine COL John A. Hemphill, USA 65 Armed Forces Managers in aNew Era LTC Robert H. Drumm, USAF 72 AKermit Roosevelt Lecture: Communication as aMilitary Art LTG Sir John Mogg, British Army 80 Soviet Airpower John W. R. Taylor 89 Military Notes 97 Military Books 105 Reader Forum 110

library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 RevThe VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the

US Army Dr the Command and General Staff College.


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EdItDr II CIIItfCOL Donald J. DelaneyAmcIate EditorCOl Keith ... Monroe

Army War tollegeAssistant EdltDrLTC A. Leroy Coveyfeatures EditorLTC Robert G. MainProduction EditorHelen M. HallSpanl$ltAmlrican EditorLTC Nestor L BerriosBrazilian EditorsLTC Romero Lepesqueur

LTC Juarez A. GomesPulillcatlon otIIcerMAl Donald E. TumanArt and alsipCharles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Commend and General staff College, Fort leavenworth, Kansas, In English, Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for prInting of ibis publication hasbeen approved by H e a c f ~ r t e r s , Department of the Army, 25 July 1968.SecoI1d-eI.- postage Jl8ld at Fort leavenworth Kansas. Suliscrlption rates: $4.00 IUS currency) ayear in the United stateS. UnHed Sbltes mllitely ~ l offices. and those countries wblch are members ofthe Pan-Amerlcan Postal UnIon (IncludIng Spain); $5.00 I year in I I I other countries; single copy price50 cents. Address subscription mall to the Book Department, U. S. Army Commend and General StaffCollege, Fort leavenworth, Kanses 66027.


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:IItlttnry ittritm Amarb Anult

The Military Review announces the selection of the following articlefrom the September 1969 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARDARTICLE:"The Problem of Power"Raymond J. BarrettMr. Barrett suggests that we ignore at our peril the fact that the UnitedStates is a great power. The world cannot ignore us and we cannot escapethe responsibilities of a great power. Vietnam has been a hard lesson andis proof that we need new methods. We need new approaches and newtechniques. Nations, like individuals, must continue to learn in order tosurvive. I t is vital that we learn correctly the lesson of Vietnam.

* * * COMING:Alvin J. Cottrell, in "Soviet-Egyptian Relations," notes that the rearming ofthe United Arab Republic since June 1967 has been very costly to the Soviets.They now have a considerable military presence in the UAR and the Mediterranean. This increased involvement has heightened the possibilities of a directUnited States-USSR confrontation. The Soviets must restrain President GamalAbdel Nasser from a preemptive attack on Israel if they are to hold theirnewly won position of prominence in the Middle East.Anthony Harrigan, in "Northern Defense Frontier," sees the Arctic beingopened to commercial development on a major seale with the giant icebreakertanker SS Manhatta:/l pioneering a transcontinental, deepwater, all-season tankerroute to the Alaskan north slope via the historic Northwest Passage. This increased interest extends to strategic factors and to questions concerning defenseof land, air, and sea along a frozen frontier. This northern development posesnew challenges and demands on military professionals.


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1969


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Search for Firm BordersWing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, IndUm Air Force, Retire4

A VISITOR to Cambodia is immediately struck by two phenomena---the magnificence of itstreasures in the shape of Angkor Wat,and its air of excitement over theborder issue. The two are different, ofcourse, and yet if one looks deep intoCambodia's past, they are not unrelated.Angkor Wat is a famous temple,considered the largest religious building in the world and the greatest sin

gle work of architecture in SoutheastAsia. Constructed in the 12th century,it lies among a complex of about 600monuments extending over 60 squaremiles. I t is a memorial of the timeswHen Kambuja, as Cambodia was thencalled, was an empire, extending fromthe Bay of Bengal to the South ChinaSea. Its highly advanced civilization,then, is a matter of great pride for theCambodians today and is a mainspringof inspiration for them.

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CAMBODIA

But subsequently, Cambodia fell onevil days, and one of the causes of itsdecay was the exhaustion of resourcesthrough luxurious layouts, includingthe frenzy of temple constructionS.Angkor Wat is a landmark not onlyof the glory of Cambodia, but alsoof its decay to which its present trav-ails can be traced.Historical BacqroundTo appreciate the border predicament which has colored so much ofCambodia's national and internationalattitudes, it is useful to refer to itshistory. By the time the internsl pres- 'sures began to tear up the country,external foes also appeared. Amongthem were the Thais, originally fromYunnan in China, who launched. aseries of attacks from the north and,in 1431, sacked Angkor, the ancientcapital. On their heels came the Vietnamese from the east. For the next400 years, Cambodia was a bone ofcontention and a battleground forthese two peoples. In 1846, they foughttheir last major war on the soil ofCambodia.By then, a third force appeared onthe scen&-Franc&-which held Cambodia as its protectorate from 1864 to1941. During the greater part ofWorld War II, Cambodia was occupiedby Japan. After the war, it was at themercy of the Allied Powers. It de-

Wing Commander Malutra.i K. Chrr- pro, Indian. Air Force, Retired, is militery correspondent ffYl' the Eng lisk-language Indian. newspeper, The Indian Express. A frequ.ent con.tribft,. tor to the MUdTARY REVIEW, he is the oothor of "India on. the Eve of the Second Defent1e Pltm" which /J/PPeared in the J_ry 1969 issue. This article on. Cambodia wae written. by the authfYl' after a. 'lJiBit he made to that country in May 1969.

clared its independence in November1953 and was included in the Genevaagreement on the Indochina states inJuly 1954.Invasions by foreigners, contestsamong them for Cambodian territory,internal destruction, fear of more resourceful neJghbors, pride in the past,and hope for developing rich andbeautiful country are the factorsswaying the Cambodian mind.Cambodia's .ClaimsIn this context, the recognition ofCambodian borders is important forboth their political and their emotionslvalue. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, theChief of State, claims that his country's borders. as they existed at thetime of the declaration of independence and the signing of the Genevaagreement, should be accepted. Thisclaim. he asserts. also has a historicaland legal basis.For instance, Cambodia's frontierswith Thailand were determined as aresult of the Franco-Thai treaty of1907, confirmed. in 1937. In 1946. whenThailand returned Cambodian Provinces captured during World War II,reinforcement of the treaty of 1937was specifically mentioned. A yearlater. the Washington Franco-SiameseConciliation Commission submitted itsreport which the Thai leaders alsoaccepted. Thus, the Thai-Cambodianfrontiers should be considered fixedand settled.In actual practice, matters have notbeen that simple. and interstate disputes have occurred.The dispute with Thailand has centered mainly over the Preah Viheartemple. located on the northern Cambodian-Thai border along the DonrekMountain chain. Both countries agreedto refer it to the International Courtof Justice whose award, given in 1962,

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CAMBODIA

went in favor of Cambodia. But thatdid not satisfy the Thai leaders whoreasserted their claim and talked ofappealing the decision. However, noappeal has been filed. On the otherhand, the Thai Government now saysthat it renounces its claim for good.

But in its turn, Cambodia is notsatisfied so that the temple-easyaccess to which, incidentally, is possible for geographical reasons onlythrough Thai-Cambodian cooperation-remains a heavily guarded area.Apart from this, however, both countries acknowledge that the entire frontier between the two countries hasbeen demarcated with markers on theground.

With Vietnam, the dispute is twofold. First, it concerns small areas in

the vicinity of Kampot, Chau Phu,Mimot, and Lomphat along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. Embracing only a few villages, the total territory involved is extremely small.Second, it involves certain islands inthe Gulf of Siam. There are a numberof these, but even the largest, calledHon Antay and Hon Doc, aroundwhich the rest are clustered, are onlyan acre or two in size and practicallyuninhabited. Their importance lies notso much in size as in the fact that theymean an addition to territorial waters.The largest and most important is-land in the gulf is Dao Phu Quoc. Itspresent value is in its fishing facilities. I t is one. of the two places in Vietnam where there is found the rarefish yielding the popular sauce called

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mwcmom, heavily in demand through-out Vietnam. Phu Quoc could be con-verted into a naval or airbllSe, fromwhich the southern coastal arellS ofCambodia, lIS well lIS Vietnam, could bedominated. While Cambodia does ex-pre118 apprehension on this point, itdoes not seem to dispute the owner-ship of the island which maps nor-mally show lIS lying within Vietnameseterritory.OIfer WItIIdrawIiCambodia's l border with Laos iscomparatively small_bout 200 mileslong. Early this summer, the RoyalLao Government made an ofter to ac-cord it recognition, but later the ofterWIIS withdrawn. Neither with Laos norwith Vietnsm have the frontiers beendemarcated on ground, but, shouldthis be done, not much territory islikely to be involved in dispute. Infact, the size of territory is not at theheart of the border problem amongthe Indochina states-the rub liessomewhere else.Prince Sihanouk says that, despitetreaties, Thailand invaded Cambodiaand seized Cambodian territory dur-ing World War II. He also says that,Khmer Serei, a militant oppositionbody, hIlS its bllSes in Thailand.Against LaOs, the allegation is thatthe Lao population along the borderreceives moral and military aid fromthe other side to subvert the PhnomPenh authority. .With Vietnam, the problem is fur-ther complicated. The government ofNorth Vietnam, lIS well lIS the VietCong of the Republic of Vietnsm(RVN), both state that they recognizeCambodia's sovereignty within theexisting borders. Since Cambodia con-siders these two bodies lIS the rulingauthorities of North Vietnsm and theRepublic of Vietnam respectively,

technicallf, it should have no borderproblem with V i ~ But while ig-noring the Saigon Govermnent, Cam-bodia expects it to declare recognition.That its frontiers should be recog-nized and respected by all partiespoint

Cambodian troops keep watch alomg thefrontiersof Cambodia's demand. I t feels thishIlS not been conceded all round. Forthis and other ressons, it does not havediplomatic ties with many countries.Until recently, there was a misunder-standing with the United States alsoon this issue which hIlS apparentlynow been removed and may lead to theresumption of their diplomatic rela-tions.

Besides interstate feuds, rootedlargely in history, recent events havealso had their impact upon Cambodia'sborder problem. Of these, the wars,insurgency, and civil strife in thestates of Indochina have obviouslyexercised powerful in1luence.IIOItIIJ InInI


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Developments since the Geneva accords of 1964 are well known. By theseaccords, all hostilities were to cease,foreign troops were to be withdrawn,and the states of the region were to beallowed to live in peace. The contraryhas happened. Both Vietnam and Laosare engulfed in war, and Thailand isinvolved in the efforts to establish security. Fortunately enough, Cambodiahas not developed into a war theater,but, at the Slime time, the conftarration around has heightened tensionsand has made Cambodia all the moreborder conscious.Two AspectsIn this perspective, the border problem has two faces as viewed from theside of the Communists and of the allies. In the course of their fighting,the troops of North Vietnam and theViet Cong have both violated Cambodian territory. Part of the supplyroute from Hanoi to Saigon passesthrough Cambodia-the so-called "Sihanouk trail." Toward the end of lastyear, the situation became seriouswhen the North Vietnamese began tooccupy parts of the two eastern Provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri,and the Viet Cong established theirown pockets in the southeast.When in Cambodia last May, Ilearned that complaints to this effecthad been made to the InternationalControl Commission. But for quitesome time, the commission had beenrendered ineffective by war conditions,and, in any case, the Cambodian Gov-ernment could give it little help incarrying out investigations. To ridCambodia of inftltrators to the satisfaction of all concerned would thus beone of the points of negotiations 'inParis.While the Communists do not admittheir own presence, the allies have. . . . . .111. .

CAIIOIIIA

admitted the action taken by them inthe pursuit of war. Their aircraft,they say, have undertaken overftightsacross the Cambodian territory, andRVN troops have had to chase theViet Cong occasionally to their encampmentS in the Cambodian borderregions. The United States is understood to have sent a team to find outthe damage, if any, caused by itsbombera to local population and property and to consider ~ m p e n s a t i o n asCambodia claims.Pow.r CeafroItltlonIn addition to accentuating localconfticts, wars also have hardenedgreat power confrontation in the region, with powerful impact upon Cambodia. During the last few years, therehave been numerous moves and countermoves which baffle an outsider, butsome trends are unmistakable.

Red China has sought to make itspresence felt by offering financial aid,establishing factories, building an imposing stadium, and, in general, creating an air of confidence and friendship. Until the end of 1967, it was themain supplier of small arms to theCambodian Army. But this benevolence has been compounded with theimposition of Mao Tse-tung's thought,pressurization through North Vietnam, and encouragement of the Communist elements in the country. At onestage, Prince Sihanouk reacted violently, closing down some of the Chinese institutions and expelling someof its nationals.The supply of Chinese arms hasnow apparently ceased, and, thanks to"cultural revolution" and other causes,Red China seems to be rather on thesidelines than in the arena of Cambodia. But its shadow across the country, deep and long, is alI too visible.Since the arrival of the new Soviet

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Ambassador at the end of 1967, thenature and tempo of Soviet relationship have undergone a change. Fromnegligible assista1lCe, and that in thecultural field, there have been extensive exchanges of dillegations.The supply of MiG-J.7's to the Cambodian Air Force last yesr was hailedheartily by Cambodian authorities.More Soviet aid is expected whichPbuom Penh needs badly, partly because of t h ~ stoppage of arms fromRed China alld partly because of themcrease in ' the Cambodian armedforces from 80,000 to 40,000 over thelast two years. The Soviets hold another trump card m the shape of theirinfluence over Hanoi which might beused at the Paris peace talks or. tohelp in the expulsion of North Vietnamese infiltrators.Emblssles Established

By and large, it appears that Com-munist powers have done well in thiscountry. Pbuom Penh is one of thosefew capitals of the world where theViet Cong have a full-fiedged Embassy. Last May, an Esst German Embassy was also established. In thepress 'of North Vietnam and the VietCong, Cambodia is generously applauded. Compared to this, WesternPowers do not have much to show.Cambodia's relations with the FederalRepublic of Germany, for instance, areall but broken and, with the UnitedStates, have only recently shown somesigns of improvement after a break offour years.All this does not mean the triumphof communism, but it does indicate anorientation toward the Communistpowers. Yet this agam should not beconsidered a permanent phenomenonin Cambodia's intemationallife. "Wesurvive by our maneuvers m the fieldof diplomacy," Prince Sihanouk once

remarked, adding that he did not mindbeing called Machiavellian-''to savethe ekin of my race."Cambodia's search for firm frontierscontinues, but a few undeniable factshave already emerged. Border disputeswith the neighbors do not involve'much territory and, given the appropriate climate of peace, could besettled without much ado. In thisconnection, considerable ground hasalready been prepared.The violation of Cambodia's frontiers is largely a tragic consequenceof the wars in Indochina and shouldnormally cesse after a proper peacesettlement. Above all, during the last16 years of its independence, Cambodia has emerged ss a state with awell-defined identity in all respects,i1lCluding frontiers within which theCambodians bave becn able to establish soverl!ignty.11Ir.. LlSS8IIsIn the process of this search, certain lessons have becn prOjected whichare beneficial for Cambodia, the otherstates of Indochina, and the worldcommunity interested in the region.First, much of the solidarity ofCambodia is due to a vital decisiontaken by the Geneva Conference in1954-that there shall be only one indisputable authority in the country.The proposal that the Vietminh, described as "Khmer Resistance Forces"and "Vietnamese Military Units" inthe agreement and which formed therebel element, should be aIlocated aseparate zone in the country vis-a-visthe Royal Cambodian Government wasrejected.As a result, the kind of situationthat has arisen m Laos between theRoyal Lao Government and the Pa.tketLao, each allocated a separate zone,wss avoided. True, there has been opo

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position in Cambodia, but Phnom Penhhas been able to deal with it effectively.Liquidation of dual control and establishment of single authority shouldthen be one of'the primary objectivesof peace settlement in Indochina.Having thus come to the helm ofaffairs, the Cambodian statesmen began to build and develop the infrastructure of their political and ec0-nomic life. This included a constitution, a political party, and a planningapparatus.The Cambodian Constitution is ablend of authoritarianism and democratic freedoms under which a stablegovernment has functioned, sustainedby the personality of the Prince, aswell as the loyalty and intelligence ofthe Ministers. This is, perhaps, thenorm more suitable to the countriesof the Orient than unbridled democracy.Cambodia has sought and receivedforeign aid and still needs it to exploitits rich resources, improve agriculture,establish industry, learn teehnicalknow-how, and extend communications. But by and large, it has depended upon self-help rather thanforeign help. Throughout the country,roads, schools, dispensaries, small industrial plants, and minor irrigationworks have come into being throughlocal resources. The Cambodians are

CAMBODIA

intelligent, hard-working, honest pe0-ple, readily responsive to dynamicleaderihip.Self-reliance, then, is the foundation of the strength and stability ofCambodia, unlike some developingcountries where foreign assistance isreckoned as the mainstay and is frequently wasted.In treading the dangerous path ofindependence, enveloped by the clouds

of war and under the shadow of globalconflicts, Cambodia has had to resortto special devices. I t has shunned alliances. It does not swear by any particular ideology of which one hearsso much elsewhere. I t does appear tolean toward this or that power blocnow and then, but that has not meantpermanent affiliation.It is the constant refrain of PrinceSihanouk that his country is nonaligned, that he wants to be friendlywith all countries. He is by no meansa complete success, but Cambodia un

der him presents the image of a statewhich will allow no interference inits internal affairs, which wants tolive and progress peacefully withinrecognized, stable frontiers, and whichis neutral. This might well be thepattern of settlement and peace notonly for Cambodia, but for all thestates of Indochina.

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Maintenance Personnelin Nafionbuilding

Colonel Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, United Bttdes Arm.

T HE developing world has from60 to 80 percent of its population engaged in agriculture. The improvement of agricultural productionis not only the key to economicgrowth, but is the initial step toward increasing the living standardsof this vast majority.Although agricultural productioncan be increased in the initial stages

without mechanization, later a sustained rate of growth cannot be maintained without it. I t is in the preparation for mechanization, and duringit, that the United States and, moresPecifically, the US Army can makea unique contribution as a part ofits stability operations and nationhuilding mission. The ski1ls of itsmaintenance personnel may assist ma-

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terially in maintaining and repairingthe equipment and machinery essentialto growth and expansion of agriculture.

A major objective in the economicdevelopment of emerging nations isto increase the individual earnings ofthe mass of the people and thus increase ,available capital. Regrettably,the inhabitants of the poorer countries must spend most of their earnings on merely surviving. The amountof income that remains for investment is so small it cannot provide thestimulus essential to the developmentprocess. Additionally, with the bulkof the population engaged in agricultural production, any increase in earnings must come primarily from higheragricultural productivity.Roles of AlrlcuHure

Actually, agriculture plays threemajor roles in the transition from atraditional society to that periodmarked by economic takeoff. First,it must supply more food for homeconsumption by the increasing population, for transfer to urban areas wherethe 'population growth is disproport i o n ~ t e during the transition, and forexport where it will earn foreign exchange credits.

Colonel Lawrence E. Van BUBkirkis Commanding Officer of the RedRiver Army Depot in TelW8. He holdsa B.S. from Wayne State University,Detroit, Michigan, an M.B.A. fromthe University of Chica.go, and is agraduate of the US Army Commandand General Staff College and the USArmy War College. He has 86f'11ed mG1iad4lc4nal, Germany, OkinaWIJ, madKorea. Other 48BignmentB ineludB dutywith the AugUBta Arsenal in Georgill,with the Detroit Ordnance District inMichigan, and with the Office of theDeputy Chief of Staff for Logisticsin W48hington, D. C.

unONBUILOINSSecond, agriculture operates on thedemand side of the economy. Therising real incomes, created by higherproductivity, serve as a stimulus to

consumer goods production. The industrial sector development also canbe oriented toward prodUction of capital items for agriculture such aschemical fertilizers, farm machinery,and diesel pumps. The rising rural incomes are available for taxation bythe government to help finance thesocial overhead capital required bythe modem economY.The third role of agriculture duringthis period is the investment of asubstantial part of its surplus incomein the industrial sector.If the investment is not done voluntarily, tbe government must accomplish it either through a redistributivetax system or by actual land ownership reform. Japan initially used thelatter method to finance its industrialgrowth. The government purchasedlarge holdings witb industrial bondsand resold tbe land in smaller unitsto farmer-operators. Payments madeby these peasants were used to provide capital for industry and socialoverhead.A&rIcuHur. Sets PaceMost economic takeoffs have oc-curred immediately after or concurrently with radical changes in agricultural techniques. The changes havegenerally occurred when the individuallandowning farmer recognizes thatthe new techniques, landholding a r ~rangements, and marketing systemmay provide him a greater income.The adoption of the new methods andorganizational arrangements, togetherwith the resulting increase in productivity, set the pace of economic progress, particularly in the early stagesof development.

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An accelerated growth in agricultural productivity will make a greaterquantity of food and raw materialavailable at relatively lower prices.Wage earners will spend less of theirincome on food, thus increasing thee1fective money demand for othergoods. This rising demand will makeit profitable for entrepreneurs to invest in the production of a greaterquantity of Consumer goods. Thus,the demand for, more workers in theseindustries can be met by the releaseof agricultural workers which is madepossible by the productivity increasein that sector.Food CastsThe declining food costs also provide a higher real income and offsetpressure to raise the workers' moneywagea. This insures the continuedprofitability of industrial investmentand encourages further expansion.Domeatic food supplies must keep pacewith the population expansion andrising demand for food. If they failto do so,' increased food costs willslow down or halt economic growth.The country with heavy populationpressures and slow growth of domesticfood production must purchase foodfrom abroad. As a result, it utilizesfunds required for capital investmentin industry or for social overheadcapital. As food deficit pressures increase, more resources will be divertedfrom investment in growth areas ofthe economy.The ,production of agricultural surplus is critical to continued economicgrowth. It is a source of both foreigncredit earnings through export of thesurplus and industrial capital derivedfrom savings.As an example, during the first 25years after the Meiji Restoration,Japan depended upon land taxes and

special agricultural levies to provideits local and national revenues. Thesereceipts were used for both currentexpenditures and for social overheadcapital. Savings from the agriculturalsurplus were transferred from theagricultural sector through the fiscalsystem to investments serving industrial and service sectors. Profits fromindustry were relatively untouchedand available for reinvestment in industry.Industrial GrowthThe role agriculture plays in providing foreign credits and its linkagewith industry can be seen in developments in Thailand. 'In response to asteady downward trend in rice prices,the Thai farmer shifted to productionof new crops. Corn and kenaf havebecome important cash crops and havedeveloped into leading export products.Since the Thais grow corn primarilyfor export, an entire processing andmarketing system had to be developedto move the corn to its overseas markets.Numerous new plants have beenbuilt in response to agricultural cropprocessing requirements. In this forward linkage category are a cornflour plant milling 60 million poundsannually for export, a rice-bran-oilfactory producing vegetable oil frombran, a sugar refinery representing a3.5 million-dollar investment, and atapioca flour mill producing 40,000pounds daily for export. A multimillion-dollar bag plant uses kenaf grownin Thailand to produCe bags which itsells to the Thai farmers for haulingand storing their crops.'The rapid development of commercialized agriculture has provided a

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stimulus to light industry, and substantial domestic capital is being invested. As commercial growing increases, the agricultural-related industries are also "expanding. Because ofthe more complex tecbnology involvedin manufacturing the products, newfertilizer and insecticide plants have

improved tools and machinery mustbe introduced to obtain further increases in productivity.This concept was followed by theUnited Nations team and the LibyanAmerican Technical Assistance Service in the preparation of the development plan for Libya. In the first stage,

This Colombian road was eonstrneted to link agricultural areas with markets for Increased production of farm products been constructed with foreign capitaland technical assistance.

A developing country characteristically has an absolute overpopulationin agriculture. The number of workerscould be reduced, yet the same outputwould be obtained. Another characteristic is the exceedingly low level ofagrarian tecbniques associated withtools and equipment which are limitedin quantity and primitive in nature.Under these conditions, productivitycan be increased initially by improving tecbniques without resorting tocapital expenditures. At a later stage,

agriculture was to be improved bytraining farmers, improving techniques, and increasing acreage undercultivation. Only in the second andthird stages were laborsaving innovations planned for agriculture.'

Agricultural productivity can beincreased through the use of improvedplant strains, by application of chemical fertilizers, and through the adoption of improved plowing, weeding,and harvesting tecbniques. However,the introduction of improved equip Benjamin H. Bimrlna. EeotlOtJdc Dft'elopm.ntc:Pro_. Pri...."'" ood Polklu. W. W. Norton4 Co.. Inc., N. Y . 1959, p 705.

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NATIONBUILDINBment and special machinery is ultimately required to increase individualproductivity so that labor can bereleased to meet industry's demandsand sustain economic growth.WIly Mechanization?The primary purpose of machineryis to increase the output of each man,not to make each acre more productive.However, improvements in equipmentcan make an appreciable contributionto raising cropl yields per acre. Thisis accompliohed through better per-formance of various operations andby more timely completion of activities. A more thorough preparation ofthe seedbed with its concurrent increase in weed destruction is possiblewith mechanical equipment. Invariably, it will produce a greater yield.Timeliness of operations is i m p ~ r -tant because there is only a shortperiod between the time soil can firstbe worked and the optimum plantingtime for the growing season. Betterequipment means soils can be workedearlier and faster than with primitivetools, thus assuring planting at thebest possible time. Rapid harvestingwith improved implements insuresthat the operation can be completedduring the peak quality period a,ndbefore losses occur. Any improvementof equipment which speeds plowing,weeding, and harvesting gives thefarmer more control over the elementsand results in better yields.

In those nations having large landareas available for exploitation, theuse of tractors and tractor-drawnmachinery will facilitate expansion ofthe cultivated area. In other countrieswhere small-scale agriculture predominates, there is room for substantialtechnological progress in equipment,even though the degree of mechanization would be far from that of the

United State!!. In recent years, considerable progress has been made inadapting farm machinery to the requirementa of small-ecale agriculture.Small garden tractors are extensively used in Europe. In Japan, theiruse has increased until over 1.4 million were in use in 1961, and the increase continues at a fast pace. Taiwanhas established a power tiller manufacturing industry in competition withJapan, and the conversion from buffalo power to gasoline-driven tillersis proceeding rapidly.

Power SourcesThe development of the small, general purpose power tiller has made asource of power available to the smallscale farmer for tilling, water pumping, spraying, milling, and transporting. Japan is probably the farthestalong the road toward mechanizationof the smail producer. Electric motorsfurnish the power source for stationary equipment BUch as irrigationand drainage pumps, huskers, andthreshers. Gasoline engines serve asa mobile power source for tillers,plows, spraying equipment, and dusters.Taiwan is following the Japanesepattern of equipment usage, but it isstill in the early stages of mechanization. In Thailand and Vietnam, gasoline-powered irrigation pumps arebeginning to compete with the traditional water wheel and basket lift.Processing equipment for agricultural products is one of the first areassuitable for mechanization. Smallgasoline engines provide the powerto operate rice mills, grind fiour, shellcorn, and press sugarcane. While theseactivities have been accomplished inthe large, central market centers bymechanical means, the local villagelevel operation has been by primitive,

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US At. ."Skills required to support an agricultural development program are similar to thoserequired of a soldier-mechanichand-operated equipment. The eurrent trend is toward development ofsmaller units which can be operatedin the village marketing area.The types of equipment which willbe used in agricultural production inthe emerging nations are not necessarily complex. However, they do require a degree of familiarity withmachinery not currently available ina culture where implements generallyare wooden and either hand operatedor animal drawn.Introduction of mechanical equipment will require the concurrent development of fundamental maintenance skills in the agricultural sector.Additionally, certain technical skillsmust be developed in sufficient quanHen_If 1869

tity to provide repair capabilities atconvenient locations for the equipment users.The AgencY for International Development has the primary responsibility for providing assistance inagricultural development. However,the US Army can make a substantialcontribution to a training programdesigned to provide mechanical skillsin support of the agricultural development programs. The Army has beenteaching mechanical skills to soldiersin many Asian nations and SouthAmerica since the end of World WarII. While the skill level required fora soldier-mechanic is considerablyhigher than the level needed in theagricultural sector, the same instruc

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NAnDNBUILDIN8tional skills and techniques can beemployed.

The type of personnel required forsuch a training program are engineerequipment sptclausts, automotive mechanics, welders, and machinists. Thepersonnel inventory contains largen u m b e ~ of highly competent noncommissioned officers in all of thesecategories. Although the Army cannotafford to conduct training simultaneously in all of the countries requiringassistance, 'it could provide trainingteams to a number of countries.Such a program would not be thepermanent responsibility of the Army.Instead, the Anny's task would be toestablish the programs, provide theinitial instruction team, and teach thelocal country's military personnel tooperate the program. As soon as theprogram was functioning properly, theAnny's team would be withdrawn andmade available for assistance in another area.Training ProgramThe program to train farmers inthe skills required for operation ofrelatively simple machinery should bedesigned to meet the needs and availability of the current farmer, as wellas training young men who intendto, farm. The operating farmer cannqt spend an extended period of timeaway from his land. Therefore. asystem of training centers located totake advantage of road networks, providing easy access from the villages,and operated similsrly to agriculturalextension courses, would be more ef-fective than a central training point.

Tbe young men Who have not entered upon a career can beat be giventheir initial training while living ata central school where they are available for full-time instruction. Becauseof the nature of the training. the me

chanic-artisan can best be taught ata central location where the teachingtalents and technical equipment canbe concentrated: Therefore, the training system should consist of both acentral school for full-time instruction in either operating skills or tradeskills and a series of training centerswhere operating skills are taught ona part-time basis.Such a system would be developedin conjunction with local army personnel as a part of the nationbuildingprogram. Some of the basic skills required in agricultural maintenance arebeing taught at local army schools bypersonnel trained by the US Army.It would be a relatively easy matterto develop the lower skill level coursesrequired for the agricultural training.With the local army stationed throughout the country, some of the postscould serve as either a regional training center or a control point for centers located in their vicinity.Sauree af TraineesStudents for the central schoolwould come from three sources: Servicemen receiving their prerelease training in agricultural-oriented occupations. Graduates of primary and secondary schools who plan to work inthe agricultural sector. Implement makers and woodworkers from the villages.These men are currently engagedin agricultural repair work; they areready to accept change; and they arenot resistant to new ideas. By theirknowledge and experience, they arethe most likely to shift easily to theuse and repair of engines and machinery. Unlike the first two sources whomust find a job and suitable locationafter receiving their training, thethird group would be able to return

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to their jobs in their native villages.In many countries, the army's prerelease training in vocational skillsis an integral part of the over-alleducational and economic developmentprograms. In Colombia, for example,the armed forces contribute to thesupport of the Apprenticeship Institute in Bogota and send their servicemen there for the last months of theirservice. The Peruvian Army built itsown prerelease training establishments where conscripts receive threemonths of compulsory training inspecific skills. Israel's Nahal Programis a complete integration of vocational agricultural training with military training for specially selectedyoung men and women.'The central school program foroperators could be patterned afterthe mechanical trade courses of theUS high schools' vocational agricultural courses. A basic knowledge ofmechanics, electric power, plumbing,and metalworking will provide thebasis for understanding the operation of equipment to be introducednow and in the future. The CongoCenter for Mechanized Agricultureat Kinshasa is an example of thistype of school. Students come from aUareas of the country to learn theproper operating and maintenancetechniques for farm machinery.'The central school program formechanic-artisans should develop basic skills in automotive maintenance,electrical equipment repair, welding,and metalworking.

The regional training center shouldconcentrate on development of a hasicknowledge of simple mechanical skills

NAnONBUILDINIl

required for operation and maintenance of uncomplicated farm machin-ery. I t should include an understanding of the equipment's limitations, aswell as its advantages. Demonstrating locally available equipment is themost effective teaching technique.Pakistan's experiment at Comillacould serve as a basic concept forregional training center operations.Individuals from' the surroundingareas come to the academy at Comillafor classes once a week. Model farmersfrom each village or cooperative learnnew farming techniques, then returnto their respective villages and spreadtheir knowledge through actual demonstration on their farina. They alsoconduct classes in their village.'Such a program can be readilyadapted to teaching, operating, andmaintenance of equipment. The farmers would not be taken away fromtheir work for long periods; theycould develop their knowledge over aperiod of time; they would be workingin their own village area where instruction could be adjusted to localconditions; and they would receiveinstruction on equipment and techniques adaptable to their needs.

In most of today's emerging nations, agriculture is the key to successful economic development. Large numbers of the soldiers from these countries come from the countryside andreturn there after their service. Theprerelease training in up-to-date agricultural techniques, particularly inthe mechanical skills required to support mechanization, will provide thousands of efficient farmers. Trainingsuch as this by our mobile trainingteams could inject a new and dynamicforce into economic development.'Lou" Dapree, Tlu! ComiI/4 B",,,.mn...c: ASc:Mmw: for VillBge D 8 1 1 ~ t in Eut PaJriItan,.American Universities Field Staft, N. Y. 19S.,p 18.

NIVlmber 1869 17
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The New Army Planning System

Lieutenant Colonel David E. Shepherd, Jr.. Ulfitelf Stlllelt Arm.

C ULMINATING a year and ahalf of study, the Army has recently announced a new family ofArmy strategic plans. The new planning system prescribed in Army Regulation 1-1, The Army Planning Sys-tem, brings Army practice in linewith current procedures of the JointChiefs of Stafi' (JCS) and the Officeof the Secretary of Defense (OSD).The Army had for some time recognized that its planning system hadnot evolved with changes in the decision-making environment. At the outset of the study. two points significantly inftuenced the review of theArmy's planning system. First, thebasic goal was to strengthen and improve the existing objectives and resource planning systems. A radicallynew system was not desired, and newprocedures would he introduced onlywhere a void had developed. Second,emphasis was placed on strengtheningthe force objectives and resource requirements planning systems as opo

posed to contingency and capabilitiessystems.The study analyzed Army input requirements for the joint strategicplanning system and OSD planning,programing. and budgeting documents.It concluded that Department of theArmy plans did not meet the requirements of the JCS and OSD systems.In addition. they were not consistentlyeffective in presenting Army views tothe Secretary of Defense arriving atmajor decisions.The revised Army planning documents reftect the principal force objectives and resource requirements ofthe Army staff. More specifically. theyprovide an Army analysis of worldwide threats. They plan the effectiveuse of forces and resources currentlyavailable and give the appropriateArmy commanders responsibility forexecution of the capabilities plan.They develop recommended militarystrategy. objective forces. and relatedresources required to support those

Milltlly Review8


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PWINING SYSTEM

ARMY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (ASOP)

ARMY FORCE DEVD.OPMENT PLAN (AFIIP)

ARMY STRATEGIC ~ A B I I . I I 1 E S PLAN (ASCII)

ARMY PLANNING DOCUMENTS

ARMY ANAl.YSIS OF INTELUGENCE (AAO

Figure 1.forces. Finally, they structure approved Army forces and resources inorder to execute the strategy and toachieve the military objectives (Fig-ure 1).The lead document of the series isLieutenant Colonel David E. Shep-herd, Jr., i8 with the Ofliee of theDeputy Chief of Staff for MilitaryOpera,tiOflB, War PZa.1I8 Division,WCI8hington, D. C. He holds a MCI8ter'sdegree and a B.A. in Interna.tionalReZa.tiOflB from the University ofOklahoma, and WC18 graduated fromthe US Army Command and Genera.ZStaff College in 1961. His Cl8Bignmentsinclude duty with the BId AirborneDivision, Fort Bra.gg, North Carolina,;the ,.th Missile Command in Korea;the Oklahoma Military District; Spe-cial Warfare Center, Fort Bra.gg;Headquarters, Army Southern Com-mand, Pana,ma; and with the Agencyfor Interna.tiona.Z Development inVietna,m and India from 196,. to 1966.

Nne_... '881

the Army Analysis of Intelligence(AAI). The AAI will be produced inthree volumes to cover the long-range(10 to 20 years), midrange (two to 10years), and short-range (zero to twoyears) planning periods. The AAI provides finished intelligence to satisfythe specific needs of Department othe Army users. The AAI strengthensthe Army planning system by providing a vehicle for developing contributions to the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) ; by analyzing the threat for specific applicationto Army plans; by providing threaanalyses for Army studies and wagames; and by reducing the number of "case-by-case" threat analysesrequired to support the Army staff.The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence is responsible for preparinthe AAI.

The second document in the set isthe Army Strategic Objectives Pla1


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PLANNING SYSTEM

(ASOP). This is, perhaps, the mostimportant document of the set andprovides single-purpose and directionto Army force objectives and resourcerequirements planning. The ASOPdeals with midrange and long-rangeperiods, and provides the basis fordeveloping Army contributions to theJoint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the Joint Long-Range StrategicStudy (JLRSS), and the Joint Research and Development ObjectivesDocument ~ J R D O D ) . I t is also thebasic docuntent for developing Armycomments on tentative decisions announced by the OSD. Primary emphasis in the ASOP is on the midrange planning period.Volume I of the ASOP is developedin parallel with volume I of the JSOPand c o n ~ r i b u t e s the Army views onnational military strategy. For Armyplanning, volume I provides the recommended military concept, strategy,

and objectives and guides the developmimt of ASOP volume II, analysesand force tabulations.Volume II of the ASOP analyzes,develops, and presents alternativeforces, associated resource requirements for each force, costs and risksassociated with each force, and arecommended Army objective force toexecute the recommended militarystrategy. This volume of the ASOPdevelops the Army portions of volumeII of the JSOP and supports the Secretary of the Army in developing hiscomments to the OSD decision-makingprocess.Among the alternative forces in theASOP is a force approved during theprevious year by the Secretary of Defense in his force and resource deci-.sions. The ASOP analyses of thisforce will project costs and risks associated with those decisions. Onlyreasonably attainable objective forces

RELATIONSHIP OF ARMY-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PLANS

Figure 2.Military Rnlew20


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PlANNINS SYSTEM

PlANNING SEQUENCE_1tMJ9&J _I tMJJ1O _1 tM1 !1 IIASOID I F A I I A S 0 I 0 IF . A I I A S o 0 I

P . - ~ i i . -' Uj.!I " . ! - I " ' ! . ! ~ ~I All I'lL I :II ~ ..,........1 ~ , l ! t ! - 3 1~ . rf'ri

~ . ~ ~ ..115 I ! O P I ' I L . ~I _* ' :11 1sT 1-. I - ' ~_I ' lL I

'1I ..I.. lP_*...!.. r,JI ),.II'ILI 3\I iiiiP l i JI ~ r r : t BPI'lL I 1... 1- .... I,~ 3 \ I ~ "31t.

~

"rl~ N D ~ = - ~ =j jTIT --- .....- - - - - ....-- ~ .. - - - t - - - - - - ~ - - - wIOOlIIIIIJIT' III'IISIIIIIS _ IIl'II1lIIIIIIT III'IISIIIIIS --- . . . ftNIIM:;--..OIIrIlTBllGllll:fImMIERJII"-UIIJ') JlIIIl SlIAItSIC _ lUll UICPI__ I1ISIIIII!II1ICIJIClIIAI) _ SlIAItSIC_!1M IASI:IIJlIIIl__ SlIAItSIC S1IIDY WSSI JlIIIlII5fMQI__ tI.BIMl__JlIIIl SlIAItSIC tI.BIMllUII USOfI

___ IWI__ tI.BIMllUII \I!II'J --- FIlICE_ lUl l !.VIII') ___ 1IGIfIIFigure S.and resource requirements will becontained in the ASOP.The ASOP will strengthen theArmy planning system by assemblingand concentrating all objective forceand resource requirements planninginto one effort and one document atthe time when it can most persuasivelyinlluence the OSD and JCS decisions.Responsibility for preparation of theASOP is assigned to the Deputy Chiefof Staff for Military Operations withsupport being provided by other Armystaff agencies.The third document of the revisedArmy planning system is the ArmyForce Development Plan (AFDP).The AFDP develops the approvedforce structure of the Army. I t is in-tended to assure the systematic at-tainment of an army with a balancedstructure of combat, combat support.

Nove.ber 18&9 21


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PLANNING SYSTEM

and combat service support forces. Itwill facilitate achieving a proper balance and effectiveness in using resources to support the forces and toexecute the strategy.The AFDP is prepared in two volumes with volume I- the force development p l a n ~ o n c e r n i n g the baselineforce, and with volume II-the Armyforce program-addressing the budgetyear force which includes the baselineforces plus temporary forces.The new AFDP will improve theArmy planning system by separatingthe structuring of the approved forcefrom the development of the objectiveforces. It provides the approved forcestructure and the unit readiness objectives in detail compatible with. theintegrated readiness measurementsystem and with the requirements ofthe programing and budgeting activities. Responsibility for preparation ofthe AFDP is assigned to the AssistantChief of Staff for Force Development.The last document in the Armyplanning system is the Army StrategicCapabilities Plan (ASCP). The ASCPretains substantially the same formand content of previous editions. I tprovides guidance to the Army stsff,Army agencies, and commands, andArmy component commands of theunified commands. It discusses employment and support of Army forces

during the short-range planning period. I t reftects specific objectives tobe attained within existing programsand budget limitations. The twice-annual publication of the new ASCPinsures that it is in phase with theJoint Strategic Capabilities Plan(JSCP) and produces timely guidanceto Army staffs and commands. TheDeputy Chief of Staff for MilitaryOperations remains responsible forpreparing the ASCP. The relationshipof Army plans is shown in Figure 2.The time-phased production schedule for the Army family of plansshown in association with the corresponding OSD and joint documentsappears in Figure 3. .The primary objectives of the revised Army planning system are designed to: Provide timely Army data to theplanning and decision-making activities of the Secretary of Defense to ob-tain major force and resource decisions. Contribute to the formation andpresentation of joint military strategy, force objectives, and other matters of the joint strategic planningsystem. Provide integrated and timelydirection, guidance, and pUrPOse toArmy staffs and commanders.

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Chino's

Niu Bien-chong

T HE real situation regardingCommunist China's oil resourcesis still a riddle. Indeed, since 1949,China's main petroleum effort has beenconcentrated in the search for oil deposits. In the course of the First FiveYear Plan (1953-57), Peking claimedto have explored about 112,000 squaremiles of territory and to have located11 crude oil deposits. After 1957, sta-tistics became scarce and increasinglyunreliable; however, it would appearthat the pace of exploration wasstepped up during the Second FiveYear Plan and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62).The following regions have beenproved to contain rich oil reserves:the Chiuchuan Basin of Kansu, theTsaidam Basin of Tsinghai, the Dzungaria and Tarim Basins of Sinkiang,the central area of Szechwan, and the",Ylllbr 1869

Sungari-Liao Plain of Manchuria. I tis alleged that the oil reserve regionshave a total of about 1.5 million squaremiles, nearly equal to 40 percent ofthe total area of China. In addition,there is a remote possibility of drillingfor oil under the sea on the continentalshelf.There are also large reserves ofcombustible shales in China. Thesearch for oil shales has been pursuedeven more vigorously through thewhole country. The most importantshale deposits are found at Fushunin Liaoning and Moming in Kwangtung,

I t is difficult to estimate accuratelythe oil reserves of Communist Chins.Figures range from several billiontons to tens of billion tons. For acomparatively accurate measurement,however, mineral reserves would be

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II A N el1lMEIt

eLANCHOW '* CBIUCBVAN BASINt F8AIDA. _.I8lN a.TS INGHA Ic HI. A


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classified into three grades: grade A:reserves which are definitely exploitable; grade B: reserves which can beexploited at a reasonable cost; andgrade C: those reserves exploitableonly at great cost. According to thisclassification, the petroleum reservesof Communist China may be tabulatedas shown in the chart.Important 011 Complel

The most famoua oilfield in Chinawith a proud tradition is Yumen fieldin Kansu. I t was discovered by Nationalist geologists in 1936. Production began in 1938 and rapidly increased through the period of theSino-Japanese War. The Communistshave expanded facilities considerablyin this region. The total reserve is estimated as 300 million tons, with a current annual output of over 1.7 milliontons. Output is expected to reach 2.3million tons in 1970. At present, theYumen region should be regarded asthe most important oil complex in RedChina although the most promisingresources appear to lie farther west-the Karamai field in Sinkiang and theTsaidam Basin of Tsinghai.

The Karamai field is situated alongthe northwestern perimeter of Dzungaria Basin. I t is the largest oilfield inChina, covering an area over 1,700square miles with a reserve estimatedat 2.2 billion tons. Present output isreported at three million tons per year.Based on geological investigation, the

Nill Sien-clwng iB with the NationalDefBfUle Plan.n.ing Bureau of the Republic of China. Governmen.t in. Til"'"wan.. He 8erved in. the Chin.e8e ArmyiMring World War 11, and hol4s aBachelor of ScillflCe degree from theUniversity of Nanking. HiB article,"World Revolution and People's War,"a'jYJHJfJ,red in. the March 1968 iB8ILe ofthe MILITARY REVIEW.Nn....., 1969

PETROLEUM INDusmTsaidam Basin seems to be the mostpromising field for future exploitation.However, the development has beenseriously hampered by difficult ge0-graphical conditions and the shortageof transportation. Current productionis probably nQt over one million tonsa year.

The Taching oilfield in southwesternHeilungkiang has been exploited on aClilaa Petroleum Raene.

Metric Tons(billions)Grade A .78Grade B 1.12Grade C 6Totsl 7.90

large scale since 1962. Peking claimedthat, by the end of 1966, the annualoutput would be three million tons.It is doubtful that the goal has beenreached, however. Another importantoil source in Manchuria is the oil shaleof Fushun. According to estimates ofJapanese experts, the total reserve isabout 5.4 billion tons. The development of this resource was begun bythe Japanese in 1930.

Maximum wartime output of shaleoil was 550,000 tons a year. Currentproduction has been over one milliontons annually. Besides shale, Fushunis also rich in coal which can be usedas raw material to produce syntheticoil. Today, Fushun ia one of the mostimportant industrial complexes inManchuria.

With the exception of the Tachingfield, all the important natural oil deposits are concentrated in westernChina. In contrast, the major shaledeposits are in the coastal regions-25


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PE1ROLEUM INDUSTRY

Manchuria, Kwangtung, and Hopei.I t appeal'll that too much attention hasbeen given to the production of shaleoil and synthetic oil. Although theshale deposits are relatively rich andtheir distribution is rather widespread, their value is not as high asoriginally expected. Oil produced fromthe coal also is losing ground becauseof high cost and low quality. In thelong run, therefore, China will placegreater r e l ~ n c e on natural crude oil.ModtratI Production

Despite the feverish search for newfields and the building of many smallplants to produce oil from shale andcoal, the total output of petroleum hasremained moderate. At the end of1967, annual oil production was about15 million tons. Technological b a c k ~wardness and transportation difficulties have obviously slowed down thespeed of development. These formidable obstacles must be overcome before the bottleneck can be cleared. Inthe light of conditions in CommunistChina, however, great progress inthese spheres seems unlikely in thenear future.All the major Chinese oil productioncentel'll have their own refineries andother extracting facilities althoughcapacities are varied. For instance, therefinery in the Yumen region possesses a capacity of about 900.000tons. but that at Lenghu in Tsinghaipossesses only 100.000 tons.The Lanchow refinery is consideredthe largest in China. After severalstages of expansion, current annualcapacity has reached 2.3 million tons.Major products include high-gradeaviation fuel, as well as ordinary gasoline. diesel oil. and lubricants. Thefinal planned target is five milliontons.The Tushantze refinery, situated

near Wusu in northwestern Sinkiang,is the largest refinery in the Sinkiangregion. Although the Tushantze oilfield was the earliest in Sinkiang, itsoutput is limited, and its importancehas been drastically reduced since thediscovery of Karamai field. Therefore,the Tushantze become an

reftnery workers to greateroutputindependent unit and has begun touse crude oil from Karamai as itsprincipal raw material. Its presentcapacity is one million tons a year.In addition, the refinery at Karamaialso has a capacity of 600,000 tons.Thanks to the foundation built bythe Japanese, 14anchuria has been developed as an important complex of theoil industry. Independent refineriesare situated at Chinghsi. Chinchow,and Dairen, with a combined capacityof 1.5 million tons. In addition, the refinery located at Taching field can alsoprocess 600,000 tons 'a year.

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The refinery in Shanghai is an exception to the general rule that majorrefineries are situated close to theoilfields. Its annual capacity in thepre-Communist period was 200,000tons. With the expansion by the C o m ~munists, its capacity has now increased to two million tons. Anotherlarge petro-ehemical plant has beenbuilt in Nanking which uses the crudeoil produced in Szechwan. Its currentcapacity has reached 300,000 tons ayear, and may increase to three million tons after completion.The Pelting regime has consistentlymade great effort to expand its refinery capacity. However, it is moredifficult to establish a refinery thanto exploit an oilfield. At one time, theSoviet Union was the main supplierof technology and equipment toChina's petroleum industry. Totalsales of refinery equipment in 1960were' about six million dollars, butthey Idropped to a mere $800,000 in1964. Since 1965, Romania has beenfar more active in lending a hand toPeking's oil industry. In addition,some refinery and other equipmenthave been imported from western Europe and Japan.In October 1964, the Peking reigndeclared that China was ''basicallyself-sufficient" in oil production. Current crude oil production is about 15million tons, with annual consumption not over 13 million tons. In thissense, Communist China has attainedits goal of self-sufficiency. However,the consumption of liquid fuel andother petroleum products is closely

pmOLEUM INDUSTRYcontrolled. If the Communists shouldease their controls or if their industryachieves further progress, oil consumption would increase immediately.

In short, the meaning of so-called''basic self-sufficiency" is ambiguous.On the other hand, China's main problem is not the supply of crude oil, butrather a lack of highly refined petroleum products. This shortage has beengrave enough to influence the technicalstandards of China's air force.Communist China is relativelywealthy in oil resources. Even i f thefigures published by Peking are notentirely reliable, Chinese oil reservesstill should be regarded as considerable.The geographical distribution ofChinese oil resources, however, is extremely uneven. The principal depositsare concentrated in the northwesternand northeastern parts of the country.This factor determines the location ofChina's petroleum industrial centersand puts heavy drain on the alreadyoverloaded Chinese transportation system. Furthermore, these regions areclose to the frontier of the SovietUnion. Henee, they are highly wIner-able to ground and air attack. Thisfact presents a difficult problem toCommunist China's strategic planners.Petroleum and its products are today not only the foundation of modernindustry, but also of military power.At present, Communist China is notable to afford any large-seale war,either conventional or nuclear. Thesituation of its petroleum industryseems to be a controllinf factor.

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West Africa

Searches for StabilityLieutenant Colonel lad!: R. Sadler. United Slate. Armg

M ILITARY coups have rockedAfrica in nation after nationfor more than a decade. No fewerthan 29 of the 39 independent Africanstates have experienced attemptedcoups, and, of these, 14 have been suc-cessful. West Africa has shared inthese upheavals. Since December 1965.the governments of six of the 13

former British and French colonies inwest Africa have been taken over bythe army. In one of these-Nigeriaa bloody civil war still rages.The colonial history or the particu-lar pattern of government adopted bythe new states evidently has made lit-tle difference. Instant democracy hasnot worked. In each country, the only21


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institution with discipline, organiza-tion, and the ability to enforce lawand order hae proved to be the army.To the surprise of most Western ob-servers, these coups have been wel-comed with relief by a people tired ofgraft and inept politicians.Rnsons for InterventionsThe news of people dancing in thestreets following the military takeoverin Ghana in 1966 no doubt seemedbizarre to Western intellectuals. How-ever, an experienced African reporternoted:

. in 'Virtually aU matters thatliberals value, almost any group ofWest African officers is far superiorto the average one-party eabinet ofprofessional politicians who have beenrunning the countries.'

There have been a variety of rea-sons for these interventions, with eachstate having its own unique set ofcircumstances. Tribalism, religioussplits, economic problems, and a hostof other difliculties contributed to theevents that triggered the coups in~ u r Lewb. 'Afrlea'. OtBeen Take Com-mand,"' D e B.porter. 2& Karch 1986,. p 86.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Sadler iswith the Office of the IJeflUty Chisf ofStaff for Military Operations, Department of the Army. A graduate of theUS Army Command and General StaffCoUege and the US Army War CoUege,he received his B.A. from VirginiaMilitary Institute, Lezington. Heserved with the 1st Cavalry Divisionduring the Korean War; gradtuJ.tedfrom the Army's Foreign Area Specialist Program (Hindustani) ; heldassignments in the Office of the As-sistant Chief of Staff for InteUigence,Department of the Army; served onthe staff of the Commander in Chief,Pacif/e Command; and eommantled anartillery battalion in the 9th InfantryDi'lliBion in Vietnam.11m..... , .

WEST AFRICA

west Afriea, but rampant, flagrant .corruption and political stagnationbelong at the top of the list.The reasons for this lie in the area'sdistinctive colonial history. The statesof east and central Africa had to fighta long and sometimes bloody battle fortheir freedom. Before independence,the p e o p l ~ of the area had had tofight for economic and political rightsin a society in which white settlershad entrenched themselves and thrownup the barriers of racial discrimina-tion. This type of struggle producesmen of ability and character. In westAfrica, on the other hand, indepen-dence had come virtually without astruggle as the colonial powers recog-nized and accepted the drive for in-dependence that swept Asia andAfrica in the 1960's and early 1960's.

The result was a conglomeration ofnew states born into a big andcomplicated world, and woefully ill-equipped for nationhood either ge0-graphically, economically, or politi-cally.Seo_leal BarriersGeographically, west Africa haesome of the most illogical boundariesin the world. The British and French,as they carved out and divided uptheir west African colonies in the late1800's, did so without any preciseknowledge of either the terrain ortribes involved. Many of the interiorboundaries are merely geometric lines.The most serious problem created,however, relates to human geography.In every state in the area, these ar-bitrary borders either cut tribes intwo or grouped together those thatwere mutually hostile. As indepen-dence came, these ancient rivalriessurfaced and soon led to political frag-mentation and regional separatism.

Nigeria is such a case. Moslem21


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WEST AFRICAHausa of the Northern Region mistrust the Torok of the ,Wl!Btj!m Re-gion, and both the Rausa and Yorubafear and resent the lbos of theEast-ern Region for their superior aeeom-pliBhmenta in education and commerce. This antagonism led ultimatelyto civil war as the lbos attempted to

tion generally limited to one or twoexportable products. Dahomey, for example, derives 80 percent of ita foreign exchange from palm products andpsanuta. Guines, Togo, and the IvoryCoast are dependent on coffee andcocoa: Mali on peanuta and dried fish:and Sierra Leone on diamonds. Excep

secede and establish their own state-Biafrs.Perhaps the most absurd geographic creation of all is Gambia.This former British colony is nothingmore than the banks of a river, 800miles long and roughly 20 miles wide,totally surrounded by French-speaking Senegal, with a population of285,000, and whose sole cash crop ispsanuta.Economically, the colonial legacywas one of a largely agricultural, subsistsnce-type economy, with virtuallyno industry and a foreign trade posi3D

tions to this general penury at thetime of independence were Ghana andNigeria, but inefficiency and corruption gradually wrecked the economiesof both these states.Politically, the west Africans inherited from France and Britain manyof the manifestations of nationalism,even if the substance of nationhoodeluded them. They sought the samestatus symbols and marks of respectfor themselves and for their nationsthat their colonial masters had displayed. The apparently compellingneed to show the colors was seen in

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WEST AfRICAthe outsize delegations to the UnitedNations, the imposing new state buildings, and the uneconomic national airlines that soon appeared.PerIls of H a t l G I I ~ ' o d

I t is dilIlcult and expensive, at best,to get a new government started, andnational pride can compound the problem. Mauritania, for example, bad aDirectorate of Forests and Waters although it has no forests and only oneriver: Upper Volta calls its onlyquarter-mile of dual highway theChamps Elysees: and Dahomey, witha per capita annual income of 70 dollars, boasts a six million-dollsr presidential residence that is larger thanBuckingham Palace. Even so resolutely independent a nation as Malihas gone each year to persuade somecountry to fty its paratroops so that a''mass'' drop illIn be the piece de reaMa1lCe of the Army Day Parade.', When such pomp and strutting areaccompanied by blatant corruption, adownhill economy, political disorder,and deep ethnic and religious animosities, parliamentary democracy's daysare numbered. I t is not surprisingthat the armies-which are the mostdisciplined, honest, and, paradoxically,most democratic elite in their nations-were the group most disturbed bythe signs of corruption and failure.Political leaders in the newly independent states invariably painted abright future for the people and thenation, and they were soon in troublewhen the better life did not materialize. For most west Africans, independence came to mean prosperitymainly for the politicians while theirown standard of living improved little,if any, and, in some countries, actuallydropped. Developments in Ghana and

IImIUII/' 1881

Nigeria were typical of the economicand political decay that took placethroughout much of west Africa.The government of Gbana's President Kwame Nkrumah, a popularleader at the time of independence,grew steadily more autocratic until itbecame virtually a dictatorship. Nkrumah built a personality cult thatrivaled that of Joseph Stalin, andreveled in such titles as "The Re-deemer" and ' ' M ~ i a n i c Majesty."Free speech was suppressed, opposition political psrties were eliminated,and political opponents were confinedwithout trial.Villi of BaabupfcJWhen the army took over, it found1,100 political prisoners in jail. Corruption was staggering. Tens of millions of dollars went into the pocketaof Ghana's Ministers. Six monthsafter the army's takeover, they werestill trying to estimate the totalamount that Nkrumah and his cohortstook from their gaudy empire.' Menwho claimed to he democrats behavedlike emperors.

In addition to this individual selfenrichment, Nkrumah's regime dissipated an estimated 560 million dollars in foreign exchange on prestigeprojects and unrealistic schemes suchas construction of a Palace of AfricanUnity, built for a one-week conferenceat a cost of more than 10 million doldars. The nation's cocos crop wasbartered for Czech suede shoes, Chinese Communist canned goods, andSoviet Volga cars while serious shortages developed in such staples as ftour,tea, cheese, and matches. By the endof 1966, the country was on the vergeof bankruptcy.In Nigeria, the situation just priorto the coup was as bad, i f not worse

LewU. ...,. cit.. p Ia .31


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When the army took over, it discovered that the. Finance Miniater hadexpropriated an estimated 80 milliondollara in graft by such devieea aaraiaing tariffs to protect his ownprivate shoo factory and doing thesame for others for a price. 'On thepolitieal side. rigging of federal andregional elections had become soshameless that the voters, in effect,were disenfranchised. This led eventually to sucIi dissatisfaction that

materialized simply because one orboth armies were not able to get tothe point of dispute.In addition, the officer corps weretraditionally apolitiesl and even thesenior military leaders were virtuallyunknown outside army circles. I t waathe politicians, not the soldiers, whohad brought independence. No military leader in any west African stateesme close to matching the presidentor party leaders in prestige or cha

\ARMY S1REIISlII (1984r

lIIauritania .Senegal .lIIaIl . .Guinea .

6002,5008,1004,800

Sierra Leone 1,800Ivory Coast 4,000Upper Volta 1,000Niger . 1,000

DahomeyTogo .GhanaNigeria ,

800200

9,5009,100

violence broke out following the October 1965 general elections in whichan eatimated 200 people were killed!In both Ghana and Nigeria, corruption had reached gigantic proportions, constitutional government hadbroken down, and a state of lawlessness waa approaebing rapidly. Thearmies watched with growing concern.Despite the warning signs, almostno one expected the army leaders tomove. There were good reasons forthis. In the first place, the armies, al-though well organized and eftieient byregional standards, were small (seechart) and poorly equipped. Becauseof limited transport and a generallaekof' interior roads, logisties posed anespecially perplexing problem. Morethan once since independence, armedclashea over border disputes have not

risma. In the move for independence,it waa the politician who organizedsociety and disciplined its msmbers.The military men, on the other hand,usually were inactive or even played anegative role because of their membership in the colonial army.

The French tended to view the roleof the colonial army, aaide from itssecurity function, essentially aa ameans of giving the African soldierthe ehaJlce to assimilate French culture. Although a few clearly outstanding young Afriesns were sent toSaint-Cyr for training, the vast majority of the natives were not permitted to rise above noncommissionedofficer rank. As a result, the majorityof the men who beesme senior officersin the new states had not led a unitlarger than squad or platoon size, andheld to no particular politiesl ideology,if they thought about polities at all.The British followed a policy ofrecruiting among the rural groups

32


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WEST AFRICA

and, where possible, from groups witha martial tradition. In Ghana andNigeria, for example, the enlisted personnel were recruited mainly from thenorthern, mostly illiterate Moslemtribes. The officer trainees, on theother hand, came primarily from thesouthern, better educated, Christiandominated communities.A few promising young men,weresent to the Royal Military Academy at

National pride led Mauritania to form a Directorate ofit has no forests and only one riverSandhurst each year (Ghana had 47Sandhurst graduates in its officercorps in 1962), but most of the seniorofficers in all four of the former British colonies came from the noncommissioned officer ranks of the colonialarmy. At the time of independence in1957, only 10 percent of Ghana's officers were Ghanaians.'The British, even more than theFrllDcb, imbulld tbll African officercorps with B spirit of political noninvolvement. Even in Ghana and Nigeria, which had by far the largestarmies in west Africa, the army lead~ L. Vall Den Bershe. "The Role af theAnny In CoutemporaD' Africa: AlrieG R8PO"t"t.~ = ~ r l . p . ~ ~ l ~ r : : 8 ! l t h : O ~ i ! ~ 1 ' 8 ~of Natal, South Africa.Nlnmbar 1889

era were considered to be staunchlyapolitical rlght up to the eve of theircoups.The majority of the west Africanstudents who attended college beforeindependence studied liberal arts orlaw, and this is still the case. Theresult was an educated elite skilled inpolitical theory, but lacking in technical or economic "know-how and totally ignorant and

its uses. Major General Henry T.Alexander, the last British officer toserve as Ghana's Chief of DefenseStaff, commented that no civilian official in Ghana, including PresidentKwame Nkrumah, really understoodthe difference between a company anda division.

The gulf between civil and militarygroupa in the ex-French colonies waseven Wider. 'l'hc Frcnch-1lducatcd leaders of tbe independence movementshad adsorbed an ideology that was expressed largely in Marxist terms. Asstudents, they had found that it wasthe leftist lP,'0ups in France that weremost sympathetic to African aspirations, and, therefore, were most ap

33


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WEST AFRICA

pealing to the yowig Africans. Theyfound their. niches later in politicalorganizations, law oftIees, and laborunions-almost never in the army.It is not surprising that such men,when they became the political leadersof their nations not many years later,viewed the army mainly as a "partymilitia." Ghana's Nkrnmah sPOke forthe majority of west African politicians when he said: "The most im-portant role of our army is to 888istin the exec\ution of projects of national development."Mali's President Modibo Keita toldhis army that its first job was to increase its work in political education.Such views carried in them the seedsof conftict. Assignments to villagewell-digging or weed-chopping projects or to political indoctrination cam

paigns were hardly more appealing tothe professional officers and men ofthe armies of west Africa than theywould be to those of the US Army.Armies Bqfn to Mov.In what has been called "the winterof coups," west Africa's armies, disillusioned and bitter, began to move. Inthe classic domino pattern, four governments fell in rapid successionfrom December 1966 to February1966. One year later, a ftfth takeoveroccurred, and, in March 1967, a sixthregime yielded to military rule.The first government to go wasDahomey's. In December 1965, thecommander of the 8OO-man army, General Christophe SOlllo, intervened toend rampant political dissension. Hedissolved all political parties and tookpersonal control of the state. GeneralSoglo had led an earlier coup in 1963and had Immediately turned control toa coalition of politiCians, but bitterfactionalism had persisted.

Zartman. "". cit., p 188.

The following month, Upper Volta'sArmy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule LamiMllS, seized powerfollowing a long period of politicaltension capped by three days of riotsin the capital. The deposed civilianPresident said thet he welcomed thecoup and rejOiced at the results.Also in January, the Nigerian Armytook over in the wake of months ofpolitical and tribal violence that hadleft mors than 1,000 people dead." Inan exception to the generallY bloodlessjwest African coups, Nigeria's PrimeMinister and two regional governorswere killed during the takeover.In February, Ghana's governmentwas toppled by the army, and Nkru-mah fted into exile to Guinea.In January 1967, Togo's ArmyChief, Colonel Etienne Eyadema, led acoup and established a mixed, civilianmilitary National Committee of Reconciliation to run the country.In March 1967, the army of SierraLeone, led by Sandhurst-trained Brigadier Andrew T. Juxon-Smith, tookover. He cited the familiar charges ofcorruption and mismanagement andthe need to unite the country.Military Rale"It is easy to seize power, difficultto surrender it--snd perhaps most difficult to use it effectively."Once in power, west Africa's military leaders obviously faced the question of how to use it and for how long.The first priority in each countryclearly was to establish order and insure internal security. Thereafter, thegeneral lines on which the new military governments conducted affairsfollowed a similar pattern. All cameout for economy in public expendi

"_ Africa, F!oe. But lIMp In TroubJ....u.s. N.., . t W ~ R-. It October lat6. p100 Claude E. Welch. Jr.. "n-. A11thorIt3r Inwest ~ ..."C_t BIItorw. _ 1966. p 15S.


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p -et 11'1.1""'_'" PAo","Dahomey broke relations with Peking and reestabUshed relatlol1ll with Taiwan

tures, and exposed and publicized thecorruption of the politicians. Theyplaced civilian experts iii departmentsrequiring special knowledge such asforeign affairs, and there was an immediate switch away from an attitudesympathetic to the Communist bloc.Dahomey broke relations with Peking and reestablished relations withNationalist China. Ghans called homeall its trainees in the USSR and Eastern Europe, began phasing out itsSoviet advisors, closed the CubanEmbassy, and ousted the ChineseCommunist diplomatic mission. Ineach state, a foreign policy position

of neutrality was reaflirmed, but withan angling toward understanding withthe West. Political parties werebanned, and many politicians who hadbeen particularly corrupt were triedand jailed.

The military leaders have not found

their task easy, and there have beenserious failures as well as successes.The Nigerian civil war, touched off inMay 1967 when the military governorof the Ibo-dominated Eastern Regiondeclared the area independent (Biafra), continues. Casualties from thefighting and from starvation alreadynumber in the hundreds of thousands.

Despite some initial Biafran successes, the Federal Nigerian Armynow controla all but a fraction of Biafra's territory, including its ClIpitalof Enugu. Barring the introduction ofmercenaries or other substantial outside support for Biafra, the superiorstrength of the federal armed forceseventually should be decisive.

In Dahomey, rival factions soon developed along tribal lines within thearmy. In December 1967, the government, headed by General 8011'10, wasoverthrown by a junta of younger of


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WESlAFRICA

leers. .The i m m ~ i . t e cause wl'I' astrike'by the country's civil servantsa n a , ~ o o l teachers to protest salaryc u t l h ~ e by.the 808'10 regime as partof an austeritY program to ease thestate's ~ o n e y problems.The major factor behind the coup,however, was a growing split betweennorthern and southern factions in thearmy. The six-man junta is dominatedby northern Widji-Widji officers; General SoglOi is a Mon tribesman fromthe south.lronically, Soglo had singledout regionalism and tribalism as major faults of the politicians he hadremoved from office.April Mutiny

In Apri11968, Sierra Leone's juntawas overthrown in a mutiny led byarmy noncommissioned officers whocalled in two former officers to head anew National Interim Council. Thecouncil restored civilian rule in May,and political maneuvering by thecountry's two tribally based p o l i t ~ c a lparties began immediately. The army,also spli t by tribal factions, reportedlylacked elrective leadership as a result.of the arreat or exile of many of itssenior officers following the Aprilmutiny. Continuing political and tribaltensions and the undisciplined stste ofthe army olrer the prospect of moretrouble ahead.Ghana's military government appears to be a suceess story. The rulingjunta headed by Lieutenant GeneralJoseph A. Ankrah has rescued thecountry from the brink of bankruptcyand virtual]y given the nation a newstart. Ankrah has cut government expenses sharply and reversed the hugetrade deficit that existed when he tookover.Although most Ghanaians praiseAnkrah, many are chafing for a return to parliamenury rule. Recogniz

ing this as a natural desire, Ankrahhas appealed for political restraintduring a period of intensive activitypreparatory to the return of civilianrule. When political parties and elections are allowed, Ankrah no doubtwill be a leading candidate for thepresidency.Perhaps the most encouraging signin allot the countries which have hada coup is this: In not one state has a\ military regime shown a desire to establish a permanent system of military government. Without exception,the military rulers have used theirpower to sanction the authority ofcivil servants-sometimes with andsometimes without the assistance ofselected politicians-to devise newpolitical institutions.Prospective Coups

What are the prospects for furthercoups in west Africa? It is highlyprobable that more will occur-insome states that already have hadthem and in others that have not. InDahomey and Sierra Leone, for example, the original coup leaders already have been ousted by rivalmilitary factions. In many of thestates that have not experienced a 'military takeover, the symptoms oftribalism, regionalism, corruption, p0 -litical abuse, and economic decay existin the same pattern that promptedmilitary intervention in neighboringstates.

I t has been ssid that Africa's struggle for independence only started withthe achievement of release from colo-nialism, and that Africans are onlynow beginning to think deeply abouttheir societies and institutions. Thisclearly applies to west Africa. As leaders of the new states, both civilian andmilitary, seek to find the makings ofa nation in their own cultures and

MllitIrJ Rnl1
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f

traditions, and to shape some of theold values into modem ones, they nodoubt will make some profound mistakes. This almost inevitably will bereflected in new coups.Experienced officials indicate thatno government in Africa can be regarded as secure, and that it mighteasily take 20 years before the African revolution has run its course anda meB8ure of stability has beenachieved: No one can predict whereAfrica will end up in terms of eitherinternational alignments or the kindsof governments that will emerge. Inthe context of current realities inwest Africa, it is difficult to arguewith this assessment.US Roleus civilian and military leadershave had several encounters with thetasks and costs inherent in trying toassist faltering governments (the Do-minican Republic, Congo, Laos, theRepublic of Vietnam). In each case,there were compelling reasons for USinvolvement.Does the situation in west Africaportend similar involvement for theUnited States, perhaps in the nextfive years? Probably not, since theproblems that have caused, and willcontinue to cause, instability andstrife in west Africa are internal do-mestic issues that relate to ethnic andregional rivalries. shaky economies,and a dearth of experienced, responsible leadership. No state is threatening to invade its neighbor, and, despiteaggressive efforts by the USSR andCommunist China, they have failed sofar to gain a solid foothold in the area.Despite the Socialist orientation ofmost west African politicians andlarge-scale aid to severalststea (Mali,Guinea, and Ghana each has receivedmore than 100 million dollars in loans

WEST AFRICA

and grants from the USSR), Sovietand Chinese Communist in1luence andprestige have declined since 1961. Attempts at subversion such as resultedin Guinea expelling the Soviet Am-bassador in 1961 for involvement ina plot to overthrow the government,a poor record of deliveries coupledwith the shabby quality of Sovietgoods, and Chou En-lsi's often quotedobservation in 1964 that "Africa isripe for revolution:' in the words ofa Ghanian official have given Africansan inoculation against communism.forelp InfluenceBritish and French ties with theirformer west African colonies, althoughsubject to periodic strains, continueto be by far the strongest foreign intluence. The senior west African military officers, most with extensive service in the colonial armies, have retained the habits and many of thepersonal friendships developed duringthese years. Promising young menstill go to Sandhurst, Saint-Cyr, andother militsry schools in Britain andFrance.

Barring development of a threatened Communist takeover in one ofthe states. which now seems an improbable eventuality, it is unlikelythat a US military presence in westAfrica will be required or desirable.This would not exclude limited quantities of military equipment such astrucks or radios which might requiretransient delivery and training teams,and obviously it does not exclude eco-nomic aid which is desirable. Thereclearly is a growing US interest inwest African affairs, and this ismatched by the west Africans' awareness of this interest.US press coverage of the Nigeriancivil war, fo

Military Review November 1969

Documents

Transcript of Military Review November 1969