Military Raids

8/8/2019 Military Raids

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THE MILITARY RAID

The Military Raid

The raid has long been used by inferior forces to attack a larger, better-equipped force.The number one advantage that must be achieved is complete and total surprise, for the

benefit of causing shock, confusion and sometimes even panic among the defenders.

Besides the shock action, the raid also takes advantage of the mobility of light troops and planned escape routes to inflict a relatively large amount of damage while incurring very

little casualties among the raiding force. The purposes range from merely inflicting

damage to capturing enemy supplies for use by the light force themselves, in the best

Mao tradition.

The U.S. Army Rangers, arguably a "light" infantry force, defines it as such:

"A raid is a combat operation to attack a position of installation followed by a plannedwithdrawal. Squads do not conduct raids. The sequence of platoon actions for a raid is

similar to those for an ambush. Additionally, the assault element of the platoon may haveto conduct a breach of an obstacle. It may have additional tasks to perform on the

objective; for example, demolition of fixed facilities."

The U.S. Marines have a pretty slick manual devoted entirely to raids, MCWP 3-43.1

http://benandbawbsblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/military-raid.html

http://www.scribd.com/doc/9684832/MCWP-3431-Raid-Operations


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Historically, when World War Two began to go badly for the Japanese, they lost control

of the air and sea and their own artillery could not hope to match the increasingly

overwhelming firepower of the Allies. The raid became an often-used tactic in an attemptto compensate for their own lack of firepower. While many small raids were successful,

they could do nothing to turn the inevitable tide of the war.

Still, it is always good to look at the tactics of other nations, to see what went right and

what went wrong, to learn lessons, and to pick up little things not covered in American

manuals which could be of use.

JAPANESE RAIDS IN VARIOUS THEATERS

COMBAT METHODS OF SMALL RAIDING PARTIES

The Japs regard raiding parties as small investments that may pay big dividends.In each case the maximum damage that a handful of troops can inflict is the goal.

Increasing activity in the form of small Japanese raiding parties, which infiltratethrough Allied lines in an effort to launch surprise attacks against materiel andkey personnel, has become a decided trend in the last few months of fighting inthe Pacific.

Clearly intended as a compensation for the lack of artillery and air superiority inbattle areas, these attacks may vary from concerted raids by trained units tosmall suicide assaults executed by ordinary Jap service or combat foot soldiers.

PELELIU

Prior to the operations on Morotai and Peleliu, the Japanese have reported, raidsand surprise attacks by small groups had been carried out sporadically, for themost part, and without proper coordination. Moreover, the effectiveness of theseraids has been momentary. Methods now are becoming more systematic anduniform, the enemy states. “The Peleliu garrison knew that death awaited,”Imperial Army Headquarters goes on to say. “Each line officer, of course, andeach technical, finance, and medical officer, as well—everyone worthy of thename of officer--took his place at the head of a small band of subordinates, and

carried out training and other preparations, determined to create death-defyingfighting units.” Although this statement is extravagant, as are the claims of success made for these raiding parties by the enemy, it is true that training of small infiltration and close-combat teams was undertaken by the Peleliu garrison,and that a number of raids were attempted.

The Japanese especially recommend the use of a flexible unit of small,coordinated teams, of a type employed on Peleliu. “Although procedures must



vary, depending on the target, Allied dispositions, terrain, time, and changes inbattle conditions, it generally is best to entrust an infiltration raiding attack to asmall number of men operating under cover of darkness. This is especially truewhen each team is composed of only two or three men, who try to infiltrate Alliedpositions without being detected by searchlights and other warning equipment.”

On Peleliu it was considered that the most promising targets were Allied tanks(whether on the move or organized into a strongpoint within a bridgehead), firepoints surrounded by simple obstacles (including land mines), signal liaisoncenters, warning and searchlight installations, Allied commanders, and bunched-up troops.

“In counterattacks executed under intense bombing and artillery fire,” theJapanese said, after Peleliu, “the recommended strategy is to send a largenumber of infiltration and close-combat teams to probe into the enemy lines frommany directions and along a wide front. Within the enemy lines four waves of

these teams will attack at night according to a ‘saturation plan.’ It is particularlyimportant that the enemy’s tanks and artillery, the backbone of his combat power,be destroyed. In advancing for this purpose, personnel must take all possibleadvantage of the terrain—small caves, folds in the land, shell craters, andthickets. After infiltrating, the teams should keep themselves concealed within theenemy’s lines for one or two nights, so that the enemy can be caught off hisguard by means of surprise attacks on a subsequent night.”

The Peleliu operations led the Japanese to recommend the use of smallamphibious commando teams equipped with small boats (collapsible and other improvised boats, small rafts, and at times even small landing barges), gasoline

in drums, incendiary equipment, mines, depth charges, and small arms. Theteams attempt to harass Allied landing craft under cover of darkness, while theraiding parties are launching surprise attacks in beachhead sectors. Also,amphibious commando teams may be supplemented by “suicide swimmers”.

MOROTAI

During the past winter it was discovered on Morotai that certain “fundamentalinstructions” had been given to Japanese soldiers who had been selected, or who had volunteered, to lead small raiding parties in commando operations.

Leaders were to select men who were “daring, quick, healthy, and conscientious”or were to use experienced men. Uniforms—and presumably equipment, too—were to be as light as possible. The danger of leaving footprints was stressed,and the use of rubber-soled canvas tabi was recommended.

Flanks were to be kept moving, and precautions taken not to invite air bombardment. Raising parties were not to linger in any one place. Everyone was



to be camouflaged. During the approach, parties were to take advantage of heavy rainstorms and cold weather.

Raiding parties were advised to take cover immediately upon discovering anAllied force and to make sure of their aim at close range. Allied patrols and

guards were to be engaged by surprise attacks.

The party leader was to instruct his guards to use hand grenades against Alliedgasoline and ammunition dumps. Also, hand grenades were to be tossed intoAllied officers’ quarters.

The principle of making every count was emphasized. When firing upon

an Allied patrol, the first Allied soldier in line was to be killed, and the remainder in succession. [However, an Intelligence Bulletin reader on Luzon notes that, inhis unit’s experience, the Japanese seldom fired upon the scouts, but waited for the third or fourth man in the hope that he would prove to be the patrol leader. Inall battle areas, the Japanese continue to regard small-unit leaders as primarytargets.]

It was pointed out that a raiding party might attack to advantage during anair raid.

If attacked, in turn, members of a raiding party were to observe the

strength, armament, and equipment of the Allied force—presumably so that allthis subsequently could be reported by survivors. Japanese troops were urgednot to be afraid of the concentrated mortar fire which could be expected to followtheir use of rifles and grenades.

Japanese wounded either were to be hidden, or put to death. It wasstressed that they must not fall into Allied hands. This led to mention of thenecessity of capturing Allied soldiers for interrogation purposes.

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When surrounded by an Allied force, Japanese soldiers either were tobreak through the encirclement or commit suicide. Nevertheless, provision wasmade for conduct in case of capture by Allied troops. In particular the Japanesewere warned not to divulge unit code names or the strength of units. It may benoted, incidentally, that the Japanese rarely furnish their troops with such

“instructions in case of capture”, lest the death-in-battle-or-suicide tradition beweakened.

BURMA

In Burma, the Japanese are making extensive use of so-called “materiel raidingparties”, as well as combat and reconnaissance patrols. Parties are not sent outhaphazardly, with general instructions to destroy any materiel. Most active duringperiods of Japanese attacks, the raiders try to destroy selected equipment thatmay have an important bearing on the course of the battle. Motor transportbringing forward Allied supplies, as well as artillery pieces engaged in harassing

Japanese attacks, constitute typical targets. It should be noted, too, that theJapanese avoid the willful destruction of any Allied equipment that they believethey may be able to capture later on and put to their own use.

Such raiding parties have not hesitated to launch aggressive surprise attacksagainst Allied personnel operating, or bivouacked, in the vicinity of equipmentthat the Japs have selected for destruction. On one occasion, for example, araiding party attacked a vehicle park, drove the defending troops into thesurrounding hills, and then destroyed the vehicles by the simple expedient of bayoneting the gasoline tanks and igniting the escaping gasoline. On another occasion, a raiding party succeeded in working its way among some British

artillery gun crews while they were firing at night. The Japs destroyed some of the equipment by means of magnetic antitank mines, and killed some of thecrews before they could comprehend exactly what was happening. But thesurviving gunners—by rallying and killing most of the raiding party, and driving off the remainder—prevented the Japs from achieving large-scale damage.

The Japanese also have been known to try to slip through the perimeter defenses of airstrips, in the hope that they could place bombs—either of themagnetic type or equipped with short delay fuzes—in front of aircraft radiators, inair scoops, in the baggage compartments of aircraft, and so on. Raiding partiesattempting missions of this



In most instances a three-man group was considered sufficient for an attack on aheadquarters, a signal station, an assembly point, or a fuel or ammunition dump.Only explosives which could be carried easily were to be used, and a largequantity of incendiaries was recommended for the attacks on the dumps.

LEYTE

During the fighting on Leyte U.S. troops in some areas had to deal frequentlywith raiding parties bent upon attacking and destroying heavy artillery weapons,tanks, and bridges.

An average raiding patrol of this type consisted of approximately 20 men under the leadership of a Jap officer. Each man was armed with a rifle with only tenrounds of ammunition, and each carried a magnetic armor-piercing mine.Apparently, these raiding parties carried very little food with them, and dependedfor rations upon what they could forage. Because their mission was to attach

their magnetic mines to vehicles and guns, these raiding troops would notengage U.S. troops in combat except in self-defense, or to further their mission.

A distinction must be made, of course, between suicide assault units and smallaiding parties that are expected to return, is possible, to a parent unit.

It is well worth noting that the Japanese in the Philippines have found suicideattacks by small raiding parties unusually costly in the loss of key personnel.Recognizing that such a trend is likely to affect the subsequent conduct of battleadversely, at least one Japanese army has directed that privates, rather thanofficers or noncoms, be assigned to lead suicide patrols consisting of two or

three men.

RAIDS BY SKI TROOPS

In addition to surprise and shock action, light forces also take the mostadvantage from sheer mobility. In jungles, mountains and, increasingly, in largeurban areas, light infantry type insurgents enjoy a great advantage when itcomes to mobility in places where not even armored vehicles can go, whichprovide cover and concealment from aircraft, and which allow them to use their fleetness to outrun or out-maneuver heavily laden modern infantry of industrialized nations. Ski troops in mountains or areas of deep snow, such as

Finland and Russia, enjoy unbelievable mobility compared to regular lineinfantrymen.

From the German Gebirgsjaeger Manual

Because of its mobility the ski patrol is particularly fitted to execute,besides reconnaissance, minor combat missions to disturb and harass the



enemy. Detachments on skis which are organized for the sole purpose of executing limited combat missions are designated as ski assault troops.

A raiding party is used chiefly for the demolition or destruction of distantobjectives or for missions behind enemy lines. It must be able to accomplish

combat missions independently, fighting for several days without relying on thesupply installations of the main unit. In particular, raiding parties may beemployed:

a. To conduct reconnaissance in force over large areas;

b. To destroy enemy artillery positions, to annihilate troops and reservesseparated from their units, and to raid command posts;

c. To destroy shelters, supply installations, and transport facilities;

d. To intercept and destroy food or ammunition supply columns and to cut off andinterfere with enemy supply and communication lines;

e. To protect wide sectors against enemy guerrillas, paratroops, and airbornetroops.

The organization and equipment of the ski assault unit are based on therequirements of the mission. The strength of the unit varies between a squad anda platoon. The strength of a raiding party ranges from a platoon up to a company.As a rule, heavy weapons and antitank weapons are attached. The mobility of the raiding party, however, must not be impaired thereby.

In selecting equipment to be taken along, the aim must be to achieve thegreatest possible economy in weight. The equipment which will permit theindividual soldier to maintain his fighting strength must be based on the tacticalrequirements of the contemplated action. Written orders or maps with overlayswhich may be of value to the enemy must not be taken along.

Maximum fire power and mobility are decisive factors in determining thetype and number of weapons with which the individual ski trooper should beequipped. Therefore, the men must be equipped with the largest possiblenumber of automatic weapons, rifles with telescopic sights, and a

correspondingly large supply of ammunition.

EMPLOYMENT OF A RAIDING PARTY

General Combat Principles

Skill in outwitting the enemy, courage, and a ruthlessly aggressive spirit areprime requisites for the success of ski patrols, assault units, and raiding parties.



Fast action, in which the element of surprise is utilized, secures superiority, evenagainst a far stronger enemy. In a surprise engagement with the enemy, to attackis almost always the right thing to do.

The main principles of combat procedure are:

(1) To get off the roads into the snow, and approach the enemy cross country.

(2) To get out of the villages and march through woods.

(3) To remain mobile.

If the mission leads behind enemy lines, it is advisable to utilize the nightor foggy weather in order to penetrate the outposts of the enemy. Through earlyreconnaissance it must be determined where openings in the enemy's defensesare located and where his flanks may be by-passed.

A meeting with numerically superior, equally mobile enemy units must beavoided, if the mission can be accomplished without combat. Envelopment or surprise by the enemy must be prevented by increased watchfulness. Everycommitment demands the exact formulation of an operational plan by the leader.The plan and mission must be known to every member of the ski patrol, assault

unit, or raiding party.

In general, the plan must cover the following phases of the mission: routeof march, main track, conduct if contact is made with the enemy, execution of thespecific mission, rendezvous after the mission has been accomplished, return tothe main body.

The Approach March

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The approach march requires careful husbanding of strength in order toenable the unit to reach its objective in good physical condition. The return routewill be designated during the approach march and will be marked whennecessary. Ski patrols of squad strength break their own trails. They generallysend scouts ahead. Raiding parties send out one of several trail-breaking details,

which also provide security during the march. Marching on several parallel setsof tracks reduces the depth of the column and at the same time increasespreparedness for combat. To save strength, it may be advantageous, in certainareas, to tow ski patrols and raiding parties behind horses or motor vehicles.

Tracks of unknown origin must be treated with the greatest suspicion. They mayhave been prepared by the enemy and may be mined or may lead to an ambush.Small detachments may prevent accurate estimation of their strength by theenemy by ordering all men to insert their poles in the same places as thepreceding men, or by keeping their poles raised in certain areas. Consequentlythe enemy will be unable to make an accurate count of the pole marks in the

snow.

The manner of carrying the weapons depends on the degree of readinessfor combat which is necessary, and will be ordered by the unit commander. Theapproach is made by bounds from observation point to observation point, usingcovered routes. If it is necessary to pass places which are subject to observationand which are particularly dangerous during daylight, parts of the unit will bedeployed to provide protection until the unit has passed. Then they will rejoin theunits as soon as possible. At night, silence in all movements is an importantfactor. The direction of the wind may be decisive in selecting a route of approach.In moonlight the march should follow a shadowed route as much as possible in

order to provide concealment from the enemy.

Within range of the enemy, it is necessary to decide whether skis shouldbe kept on or stacked, how far hand sleds may go, and whether snowshoesshould be put on. In order to obtain cover and concealment, it is often necessaryto use detours or terrain unfavorable for skiing. The troops then march on foot or on snowshoes. An attempt must be made at all times to gain, under cover,heights from which it will be possible to make a rapid descent through terrainwhich is under fire or observation.

Tactics

Combat and tactical measures depend on the mission and the enemysituation. The missions of ski assault units and raiding parties generally requirebold and sudden execution. The aim must be to give the enemy no rest at anytime and to weaken and paralyze his fighting power without enabling him toutilize his numerical superiority.



Skillful and versatile leadership may annihilate a much stronger enemy or at least inflict heavy losses on him. In woods and at night small detachments mayshake the morale of the enemy tremendously through mobile and surpriseattacks. Careful preparation and lightning action are the basis for success of allmissions of this kind.

The strength and location of the enemy as well as the terrain he occupiesmust be carefully reconnoitered before entering battle. Strict care must be taken,however, to see that the contemplated action is not guessed by the enemy. Anengagement will always be opened by surprise fire. The more suddenly it hits theenemy and the less he is able to take quick defensive measures, the moreeffective it will be. Opening fire too early often means saving the enemy fromcomplete annihilation.

To deceive the enemy with regard to the strength of the attacking unit, itmay be practical to stage the attack on a broad front or with several detachments

firing simultaneously from several directions. If possible, the combat position willbe established in terrain which is unfavorable for hostile counterattack but whichpermits the ski unit to shift or withdraw under cover.

Ski patrols, assault units, or raiding parties are not suited for a prolongedengagement, because of their usually limited ammunition supply. They detachthemselves from the enemy after forcing a decision, or complete his destructionin close combat.

Night is generally best for carrying out harassing missions. It facilitatesdisengaging from the enemy after completion of a mission in order to increase

his confusion by attacking him again elsewhere. The attack should be made froma direction that will facilitate the cutting of the enemy's communications with hisrear. If sufficient forces are available, total encirclement of the enemy is mostlikely to succeed. If a mission has failed or only partially succeeded, the leader decides whether or not the mission will be continued, repeated at another point,or abandoned.

Viet Cong Raids in Vietnam

In traditional set-piece conventional open battles between two armies, Viet Congand later North Vietnamese Army forces tended to be immediately stomped flat

by Western firepower. Seeing no survival in following that route, the Vietnamesechanged their tactics. Again, light forces enjoyed mobility, concealment, and localknowledge operating in jungle terrain. It was hard even for air assault troops tocatch a sizable number of them to do battle with.

The raid provided these light, poorly-equipped forces to utilize their mobility andthe elements of surprise to hit back at much superior enemy forces in staticpositions. Although these raids actually inflicted little damage in the grand



scheme of things, they provided huge propaganda and morale victories,especially when they destroyed aircraft, the largest and most visible symbol of American might.

Small Unit Raids in Vietnam

It is important to know how the tactics recommended by Giap are practiced byVC/NVA today. They embody two principal features. First, grind down the enemyby a series of harassing actions and small scale attacks, and then entrap him in asituation not of his own choosing.

They are guided by the “Four Quicks and One Slow.” That is, quickadvance, quick assault, quick battlefield clearing, quick withdrawal, and slowpreparation. Emphasis is placed on detailed planning (sand table models areoften used), thorough reconnaissance, and rehearsals. Rarely do theydeliberately risk their resources, except when they believe the probability of

success is high.

Photographs of the destruction of American aircraft such as this C-130 were disheartening on the Home Front.

Another successful Viet Cong offensive tactic is the raid. Careful selectionand reconnaissance of the target is important. Since the conservation of VCforces is a paramount consideration, the most vulnerable targets are usuallysought; e.g., isolated villages, security posts, paramilitary organizations or government offices. A raid is often coordinated with an ambush of the relievingforce.

The VC raid force consists of the following:

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1. Specialized elements (bangalore torpedo teams, demolition teams, grenadeteams, and ladder teams).

2. Firepower units (automatic rifles, light and heavy machineguns, and mortars)

3. Assault troops (one or two infantry assault units).

4. Liaison, communications, reconnaissance and command.

Captured VC documents and information gained from prisoners and defectorsseem to bear out the fact that two types of raids exist. In one document they arecalled “overt and cover” raids. In mother, they are known as “superior strength”raids and “secret and surprise data” raids. A third document uses thenomenclature “power tactics and limited tactics.” Whatever names are chosen todescribe them, these two tactics are defined as follows:

1. Power Tactics: The Viet Cong employ forces and firepower more than tentimes greater than that of the adversary in order to overpower enemy positions.

2. Limited (or surprise) Tactics: The VC approach the target secretly andattempt to breach enemy fortifications and security without being discovered.This has been a favorite tactic of the VC.

The power raid makes the maximum use of firepower and shock action todemoralize and paralyze the enemy from the very beginning. With support fromthe firepower units, the specialized elements move in first. They clear lanes for the assault troops by blasting fences and wire, exploding mines, uncovering traps

and underground defense systems, and bridging ditches or moats.

As one member of the specialized element falls, another immediately replaceshim in a human wave type breaching operation. Once the lanes are cleared, thetwo assault units begin advancing toward the target, one behind the other, withthe rear unit providing a base of fire. If the lead unit falters, it is replaced by thesecond unit. When the assault units overrun the target, the results of the battleare determined and quick withdrawal is effected.

During the withdrawal phase, all dead and wounded VC, valuable equipment,and prisoners of war are carried away. The firepower element withdraws first

under the cover of a rear-guard team, which withdraws last. Because it is usuallynecessary to begin fighting at a distance, more VC casualties are incurred inpower raids than in surprise raids.

The surprise raid depends primarily upon stealth, not power. First, the firepower units quietly advance close to the target. The specialized elements go about their work quietly, cutting fences and wires rather than blasting them, removing mines



rather than exploding them and discovering traps by hand rather than byinspection.

The involved nature of the task accounts for the specialized element being larger than is required by the power raid unit. Once the raid is discovered, remaining

obstacles are blasted and “power” tactics are resorted to. Because the surpriseraid attacks an unsuspecting and unprepared enemy, it usually results in fewer Viet Cong casualties than does the power raid. However, since the surprise raidrequires a relatively great amount of time to breach fortifications, an alert defenseposes a serious obstacle.

Mujahideen Raids in Afghanistan

Raids against Soviet air bases in Afghanistan also proved to be a morale blow tothe folks back home, and also took out some of the worst threats to Mujahideenoperations. Often their main goal, however, was to supply themselves from the

enemy's larders with arms, ammunition and other supplies.

Long before Chairman Mao ever uttered the words, "Replenish our strength withall the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army'smain sources of manpower and materiel are at the front." lightning Confederateraids during the American Civil War by commanders such as Mosby, Forrest, andStuart liberated huge amounts of Union supplies...even entire wagon trains...for use to supplement the CSA's always fragile and often insufficient supply lineswhile at the same time also cutting the well-equipped Union's own supportsystem.

Mujahideen Raids

Raids served several purposes. Such high profile attacks as those on the Sovietembassy and the DRA KHAD (secret police) headquarters and MoD in Kabul,and on district HQs demonstrated the ability of the Mujahideen to strikeanywhere, with consequent effects on the morale of both sides. They were usedto destroy enemy facilities and/or to draw government or Soviet troops intoambush. Raids on security outposts undermined enemy morale. Above all theywere a primary source of arms and ammunition for the guerrillas.

Like ambushes, raids depended for success on good intelligence (often

coming from within DRA/militia ranks), careful recce, covert deployment andconcentration, flank and rear security, surprise and careful co-ordination. Firesuppression of supporting posts, quick execution and withdrawal were usuallyimportant to negate enemy reactions.

The Mujahideen generally preferred quite large raiding parties, fromscores to a few hundreds of fighters, rather than the dozen or so used by specialforces. In part, this was due to the need for manpower to carry off spoils and



casualties. Late afternoon and, more commonly, night were the times of choicefor raids as darkness generally inhibited enemy reactions and rendered artilleryand air support ineffectual.

"Look mom! See what we got?"...Russian GAZ jeep, RPG's, a PKMmachine gun, and Kalashnikovs.

Two major problems beset raiders. Protective minefields were effectiveagainst fighters lacking mine detection and clearance means more effective thana nearby flock of sheep to drive into the obstacle or the use of boulders asstepping-stones. And lack of radio communications often hindered coordinationof fire support, assault, logistic support and security groups.

Night fire raids were also a popular tactic. The bombardment of outposts,bases, airfields and city targets with rockets, mortars, recoilless anti-tankweapons and sometimes howitzers was a daily event. The aim was to destroymateriel, harass the enemy, deprive him of sleep and demonstrate thedepressing ubiquity of the Mujahideen. Multiple, pre-surveyed fire positionswould be established to enable weapons to "shoot and scoot", avoidingretaliatory counter-bombardment.

Soviet and DRA failings usually contributed to the success of raids. DRAand militia posts were always preferred targets as the defenders would usually

run away or give up after token resistance. Both government and Soviet troopswere operating blind as they lacked intelligence, and both, partly for this reason,suffered from a "bunker mentality", preferring to hole up in their field works rather than dominate the surrounding countryside.

The Mujahideen owned the night, a precondition for successful approachmarches and withdrawals. Often, fearing ambush if they sallied forth, Soviet/DRAforces near enough to intervene actually confined themselves to speculative

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artillery fire. Counter-attacks were rare and never appeared to be pre-planned,and withdrawals were not followed up immediately.

These partisans no doubt received detailed intelligence from localinhabitants.

Although reconnaissance is stressed in preparing for a raid, Americanreconnaissance depends heavily upon electronic surveillance from itstechnological wizardry. On the ground, a scan from a distance through binocularsor night vision equipment by the patrol leader and an assistant or two is all too

often the only ground reconnaissance available. As George Washington said,and military leaders like Patton and Rommel adhered to, "No reconnaissance ata distance will suffice."

Third World forces, lacking firepower, use carefully gathered intelligence, oftencollected over long periods of time, not only through careful observation but evenacquired inside the enemy bastion itself, through civilians, turncoats and sappers.

Although dated, this WWII Partisan Leader's Manual provides a detailed list of just some of the important things to look for when preparing a raid on an enemyoutpost.

RECONNAISSANCE OF ENEMY FORCES

The points on which you should get information are:

a. Strength of the detachment, number of officers, NCO’s, etc.

b. Who commands the detachment?

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c. Are the troops active or reserve? Are they old or young men? To whatregiment or district do they belong.

d. What arms and equipment do they carry? Have they machine guns?

e. Is there a reserve of arms in the post? Where are they kept?

f. What are the orders for safe custody of arms? Are they locked up?

g. What means of communication has the post got? Can any of these bedestroyed when necessary?

h. What sentries does the post provide—

a. On the railway, bridge, or store it is guarding?

b. On the post itself?

i. At what hours are sentries relieved—

a. By day?

b. By night?

j. How is the relief carried out?

k. Is there a group of men in the post always ready for immediate action?

How strong is it?

l. How long is each sentry’s beat? What are its limits?

m. What places can these sentries not see except by going to them.

n. Are any civilians allowed to approach or enter the post, selling food,papers, etc? Can you use any of these civilians to get information?

o. Are there any searchlights in position?

p. Is the post protected with barbed wire? Is this wire electrified? How dosoldiers get in and out?

q. Where does the post get its water supply from? Can the source of water be destroyed?

r. How often is the post and its guards inspected by someone fromoutside?



s. How far away is the nearest re-enforcements and how long would it taketo come? Can it be ambushed on the way by another party?

t. Can your destructive work be undertaken while the post is being fired on,or must the post first be destroyed completely?

u. Can the post be blinded by smoke bombs for long enough to allow thedestruction to be done?

v. Are there watch-dogs, alarms, traps, etc?


Military Raids

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