Meeting 3, Attachments #16-19

8/8/2019 Meeting 3, Attachments #16-19

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National Comm ission on theBP DEEPWATER HORIZON OILAND OFFSHORE DRILLING

SPILL

Attachment 16P resentation of C hris J ohns

Editor-in-Chief, National Geographic


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National Com mission on theBP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILLAND OFFSHORE DRILLING

Attachment 17Written Statement of John Barry

Author, Rising Tide, and member of Louisiana Coastal Protection andRestoration Authority


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John M . BarryTestimony before the Oil Spill Comm issionSeptember 28, 2010

Mr. Chairman and m emb ers of the comm ission. My nam e is John Barry. Im a writer andhistorian, but in the past six years have becom e actively involved in two areas that relateto home land security. Today Id like to discuss one of them, the Gulf C oast. Thank youfor the opportunity to present my view s. They are my personal views only. I am notspeaking for any of the organizations with which I am associated.Currently Im vice president of the S outheast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority East,a board w hich oversees several levee districts protecting mo st of m etropolitan NewOrleans. I also represent this board on the Louisiana C oastal Restoration and ProtectionAuthority, which is responsible for hurricane protection for the entire state. ImDistinguished Scholar at the Center for Bioenvironmental Research of Tu lane and XavierUniversities, and I serve on advisory boards and com mittees at MITs C enter forEngineering Systems Fundam entals and Johns Hopkins Bloom berg School of PublicHealths Center for Refugees and Disaster Response.Id like to step back from the spill itself and give you a som ewhat broader perspective onthe situation on the Gulf Coast.As you all know, Louisiana has lost 230 0 square m iles of barrier islands, coastal marsh,and once see m ingly-solid land on the coastal, which is an area larger than Delaware. Ifyou place Delaware between N ew O rleans and the sea, i t wouldnt need any levees. Theland loss had made p opulated areas in Louisiana and Mississippi vastly m ore vulnerablethan did nature. They are vastly m ore vulnerable than they were even 5 0-60 years ago.And that land loss is continuing; as you also have all heard by now , a football-field sizechunk of coast m elts into the ocean every 45-50 minutes, cons tantly increasing thevulnerability.I want to cover four points: How w e got here, what can be accomplished, how toaccomplish it, and what happens if w e fail.Let m e take the last point first.I. What hap pens if we fail.The majority of all domestic oil and gas off shore production occurs in Louisiana. 19refineries and 15% of the nations refining capacity is in Louisiana, all of it within reachof hurricane storm surge. The life cycle of over 90% of all fish and 98% o f allcomm ercial species in the Gulf of Mexico depend on Louisiana m arshes. By weight, 40%of all comm ercial fish caught in the US is caught in Louisiana waters. 5 of the 15 largestports in the country are in Louisiana, and 18% of all waterborne comm erce in the USpasses through Louisiana waters. 20% of all US exports go down the M ississippi River,


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and 56% of all grain exports. The G ulf Intracoastal Waterw ay (GIW W) w as built fornational security in the 1930 s and 40 s; it still serves that role in addition to generatingenormous commercial benefits.The continued erosion of the L ouisiana coast threatens all of that. The national econom y,and national security, depends on protecting and preserving the economic infrastructurecurrently in place. Proof of that assertion: after Katrina interrupted G ulf supplies andrefining, gasoline prices jump ed roughly $1 a gallon.. And, incidentally, K atrina l~aockedout access to the Strategic Petroleum R eserve. Continued erosion of land threatens all thatenergy infrastructure. Thats just the im pact on national energy supplies, not the portsystem.There is no substitute for Lo uisianas port system. Tu lsa and Pittsburgh and cities inbetween are all ports with direct access to the ocean becaus e of it. There is sim ply noother way to give the interior of the nation, the body of the nation, cheap , efficient accessto the sea. The GIW W c arries barge traffic east west connec ting other great ports fromFlorida to Texas, and the existence of that w aterway is at risk. So, whats at stake is thewell-being of the entire nation.400 years ago John Donne described what is in effect out situation: "No m an is an island,entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod bewashed aw ay by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory w ere, as well as ifa manor ofthy friends or of thine own w ere: any mans death diminishes me, because Iam involved in m anldnd, and therefore never send to know for w hom the bells tolls; ittolls for thee."

II. Ho w we got hereOur present circumstances w ere created by a com bination of geology and too-narrow aview held b y those w ho m ade political decisions. Those p olitical decisions translated intoengineering decisions w ith unintended consequences,.To understand the problem, you need first to understand the role of the M ississippi River.The G ulf of Mexico once reached north to Cape G irardeau, Missouri. Through acomb ination of falling sea level and the dep osit of sediment, the M ississippi Rivercreated almost 35,000 square miles of land in 7 states. Coastal currents carrying sedimenthorizontally from the rivers mouth m ade several thousand additional square miles of landoutside of the rivers flood plain; to the west this land goes to the Texas border. In total,river sediment created roughly 40,000 square miles, including about 8 ,000 square mileson the coast.Engineering has reversed the natural process and transformed land-making into land loss.Virtually all of this engineering benefits the entire nation. But the Gulf Coast, and mostlythe Louisiana coast, bears all the costs. Let m e give you a few lesser-known ob viousfactors.


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1. The Mississippi River now carries less than half its historic natural sediment load, andsom e scientists believe it carries less than 30% of that load. The river once carried closeto 400 m illion tons a year. Now it carries between 125 and 140 million tons a year. Thisdecline is a m ajor factor in land loss.The decline occurred bec ause of literally tens of thousands of engineered interventionsthroughout the entire system , from putting riprap on river banks to developm ent. All ofthese interventions benefited people far from upriver, often more than 1,500 miles oreven m ore from the G ulf. But more than half the total sediment decline is caused by justsix dams on the upper M issouri River.These six dam s in Montana and North and Sou th Dakota--the last dam sits just above theNebraska line-- provide hydro-electric power, irrigation, and, ironically, flood protectionalong the Missouri River. Construction began in the 19 40s, the first dam w as com pletedin 1952, and construction ended in 1963. According to the Corps of Engineers, aftercomp letion sediment at Om aha dropped from 1 75 m illion tons annually to 25 m illiontons.In other words, these six dam s, built entirely w ith federal dollars, alone retain 150 milliontons of sedime nt, while the entire river system currently delivers 125-1 40 m illion tons tothe Gulf.These dam s m ay well have provided tremendous benefits to people from S t. Louis to theRockies. They have produced trem endous dam age and greatly increased the danger to theGulf Coast.2. At least half the sedim ent still available to the Gu lf is now w asted, prevented fromreplenishing the L ouisiana and M ississippi coasts and barrier islands, again to benefit theentire nation. This is what happened :In the natural land-building process, when the river hit the ocean it dropped its sedimentload. This created m assive sandbars which blocked shipping. To solve that problem ,engineers built jetties extending m ore than two m iles out into the Gulf of M exico,dropping m ost of the sedim ent remaining in the river into deep water off the continentalshelf.The b enefits have clearly been enormous. For exam ple, in 1875, the year construction onthe jetties started, 6,500 tons of shipping w ent from S t. Louis out into the Gulf. Just fouryears later, the year the jetties were finished, St. Louis sent 456,000 tons out the sameroute. A sim ilar explosion of trade occurred throughout the entire M ississippi V alley, onthe Ohio, M issouri, and A rkansas rivers.Today, jetties continue to carry m ost of the sediment in the river out into the G ulf anddrop it into deep water. This w aste benefits the national economy but increased thedanger to the Gulf Coast. When m ore sediment was available in the whole system, when


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there were no other insults to the natural order, this waste w as not a major factor. Now,when eve ry particle matters, it is.3. Levees that prevent river flooding in L ouisiana and M ississippi interfere with thereplenishment of the land locally as w ell. To the extent they protect populated areas fromfloods, that is a local benefit. But the levees in the areas of greatest land loss are w elldown river from pop ulated areas, and they were not built to protect people-- much of thearea is entirely unpopulated. The levees in this region were built to help control theshipping channel; they benefit interstate and international comm erce. Again, the benefitsto the national economy have increased the danger to Louisiana.4. Benefits to the shipping industry in other areas have also caused enorm ous dam age.The M ississippi River Gulf Outlet has been m uch discussed. It never delivered thepromised b enefits. It did deliver all the damage w arned against by its opponents. Itdestroyed tens of thousands of acres of natural buffer, and it did so right on the edge of anurban area. In addition, the federal governmen t through the C orps of En gineersmaintained this channel--or, more accurately, failed to maintain it-- with recklessdisregard for life and property. A federal judge sp ent weeks listening to expert testimonyand ruled that--not even considering the impact of the lost buffer, just on the basis ofdirect engineering maintenance failures on M RG O-- the Corps w as directly responsiblefor the destruction of the homes of 90,000 people in St. Bernard Parish and the Lower 9thW ard. I might add, the C orps and the state of Louisiana are now in dispute over w hetherthe state needs to share the cost of fixing the damage to wetlands which M RG O caused.MR GO has received much publicity because of its direct role in bringing storm surge tometropolitan New O rleans, yet MRG O has not caused as much damage to coastal marshas the Gulf Intra-coastal Waterway. The G IWW was originally built to protect shippingfrom G erman subm arines, and it still contributes to national security. But it and othershipping channels have b rought mu ch salt water into coastal marsh, generating significanterosion. Are there local benefits from the GIWW? Yes, it does benefit the port of NewOrleans, but it provides far greater benefit to the ports of H ouston, Gulfport, Biloxi,Mo bile, and even Tam pa by giving them access to the Mississippi system.5. Louisiana is by far the cou ntry s largest producer of off shore oil and gas, and theextraction of oil and gas has itself contributed to subsidence. The industry has alsodredged more than 10,000 miles of canals and pipelines tl~ough the marsh to service thatproduction. Every inch of those 10 ,000-plus m iles lets salt water penetrate and eat awayat, the land. The M ineral Managem ent Service has never been accused of favoringenvironm entalists, yet even it concluded the energy industry is responsible for 60% of theland loss directly attributable to a cause. (Not 60% of all land-loss; 60% of all the losswith direct causes). These canals and pipelines have enorm ously accelerated what w as aslow degradation, transforming a long-term problem into an immediate crisis.A good analogy is that the decline of sedim ent in the river, the jetties and otherengineered factors that benefit shipping, and the levees created a situation akin to taking abig block of ice out of the freezer so it begins to melt. The imp act of the canals and


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pipelines is akin attacking that block of ice w ith an ice pick, breaking it up far rapidly.Given all these facts, there is no other po ssible conclusion but that ben efits accruing tothe entire nation have dram atically increased the danger to the Gulf C oast.

III. What can be accomplishedThe b ulk of the land lost canno t be rebuilt. Rebuilding is impo ssible because the river nolonger carries enough sediment to do it. The N ational Academy of Sciences review teamof the Corpss Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LA CPR ) study of a systemthat would protect against major hurricanes made this point, and no expert disagrees. Andunfortunately the sediment load in the river is still trending downward.Non etheless, the scientific comm unity does support the proposition that if the rightdecisions are made we can achieve no net loss of coastal lands, rebuild land in strategicplaces to protect densely populated regions, and do so in a sustainable way.W e have a chance to succeed even with rising sea level. The delta of the M ississippiRiver is a dy nam ic, living system . Its alive. Like everything living, it will fight for life.If supplied w ith sediment and fresh w ater, it will adjust to and rise with the consensuspredictions for rising sea level.Unfortunately, even in a best case, not all areas can b e protected. In some cases the costwill be too great. In others, choices will have to be m ade to sacrifice some areas in orderto make others safer. The L AC PR report recognizes this: the greatest expense in severalof their alternative strategies is not for construction; its for buy-outs for people whosehomes will become untenable. Mississippi has at least begun to address some of the buy-out issues. Louisiana has not yet done so. This is imp ortant and worth mentioningbecause, right now, people w ho have already had their lives disrupted live in the mostvulnerable areas. The disruption could m ake them receptive to a fair buy-out that mightbe good for them , good for the region, and good for the country. They should have thatoption.

IV. How to Accomplish the GoalDo I believe the dams on the M issouri should come do wn, oil production in the Gulfshould cease, and international shipping interrupted? No, of course not. I do not believeany of those things. The nation needs the bene fits it gets. But I do b elieve that educatingthe nation about the trade-offs and unintended consequences w hich have created dangerson the Gulf Coas t is essential. Otherw ise restoration efforts will not get sustained support


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from the C ongress in future years. If people in the Dakotas, Nebraska, and M issouriunderstood that their profits and even their safety have endangered the lives and p ropertyof people in the G ulf, they would support rather than oppose national policies to help theGulf. They w ould see them as a responsibility, not a hand-out.There is urgency. Tw o years ago a group of highly respected coastal scientists stated thatif within a decade m ajor steps werent taken to restore the coast, it would be too late, thatwe w ould pass a tipping point. We have already started, but we need to scale up ourefforts dramatically, and soon. So what should we do?The easy part is to identify specific policies and legislation that need to be acted upon. Togive just one example, let m e describe some of the issues associated with dredging, andthis is by no m eans are they an inclusive list even regarding dredging:... The Corps s interpretation of current law requires them to w aste some sediment theydo dredge from the river; we have to absolutely maxim ize the beneficial use of dredgedmaterial.... Foreign dredges operate on an entirely different scale than U.S. dredges; it may benecessary to change the Jones A ct to use their capabilities.... River diversions---cutting the levee to let some of the river run where nature put it--will be necessary to get sedim ent where needed , but diversions also create dredging coststo keep the shipping channel open. The C orps seem s to want the state to pay a full costshare for this, just as it wants the state to pay to restore the marsh de stroyed by M RG O.Franldy, I consider the idea of requiring local cost share for such dredging ludicrous. Itslike having a tractor trailer drive over your lawn and crash through your living room, andthen having the trucking com pany send yo u a bill to fix not only your lawn and house b utthe truck too.But identifying a few specific things which need to be done is the easy part. The harderpart is to devise a governance structure that can accomp lish the goal, that can restore asmu ch of the coast as can be restored, and to get the money for it.Governance needs to operate in a decisive, flexible, disciplined, and science-basedmanner. T hose last two p oints--it has to be disciplined and science-based-- are crucialbecause sediment is m ore important even than money. W e can at least in theory alwaysget more m oney. But even in theory we cannot get m ore sediment. There is a saying thatwhen you m ix religion and politics you get politics. Its also true that when y ou m ixscience and politics you get politics. Only science can determ ine the best use of sedim ent.And the structure m ust have the discipline to, as m uch as p ossible, insulate science frompolitics.The governance structure has to do three things:1. First, it has to coordinate efforts of many federal agencies and get rapid response.


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2. Second , it has to involve the states, local government entities, and po ssibly non -profits. Each state sh ould be able to identify its priorities, and considerable deferenceshould be g iven to those choices, but I dont think they should autom atically be accededto. The federal government should also define certain priorities which m ay or m ay not bethe same as a governors.I think whatever governance structure is set up, it should function like the grant process atthe National Institutes of H ealth, or perhaps the Sm all Business Innovation and ResearchAct, with p rojects scored and prioritized. If the idea is good, it shouldnt m atter where itcom es from. N ot only the states but counties, parishes, municipalities, levee districts, andpossibly non-profits should be able to com pete for funds. This should generate maximumspeed and m aximum activity, with projects fully integrated in concept and wh encomp leted and underway simultaneously, not sequentially. The Coastal ImpactAssistance Program gives m oney directly to counties and parishes, for example, and thatmon ey has been w ell spent. Similarly, the flood protection authority with w hich I amassociated has som e coastal restoration projects identified and ready to go, but no moneyto spend.An assessm ent is not an excuse for delay. And we do not need to reinvent the w heel. Imfamiliar only with planning in Louisiana, and we have spe nt nearly 20 years planning.W e created a Coastal Protection and R estoration Authority which has written a masterplan, and every entity in the state has to conform to that master plan. Right now themaster plan is conceptual, but it is an im portant and quality first step. CPR A h as alsoidentified a num ber of projects already authorized by the Congress and engineered; theseprojects lack only funding for construction to start. The state should get the funding.

3. Third, the governance has to foster scientific research and integrate both existingand new science immediately into projects. Senator Landrieu has propose d creating ascience institute. That is an excellent idea. Too m uch of what needs to be done involvesscience that is not yet fully worked out, or engineering that has never been app lied to thescale now needed. For example, we dont know the best way to maxim ize benefits ofriver diversions, and to com pensate for the decline of sediment in the river, we need toimprove our ability to harvest what remains. We also need to m aximize benefits from anytechnical advances. There m ay be a m odel in me dicine, where in the last decade or so anentire field has develop ed called "translational medicine." This is designed to m ovelaboratory advances to patient care as rapidly as possible. There m ay be a m edical modelthats useful.The best means to accomplish these things is to use an inter-agency and inter-governmental group-- several now exist that could be adapted to the task-- headedby a single chair person with accountability, as much authority as an executiveorder can provide, legislation to augment the chairs authority, and direct access tothe president. Once a decision is made, OM B and other agencies should no t be able tore-litigate it. In other w ords, I believe w e need a czar. The post-Katrina federal effort


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dem onstrates that a "coordinator," even one personally close to the president, lacks thepow er to do what was necessary and what he seemed to want to do.I am not convinced that the various review processes of projects, for example ofenvironm ental impacts, need to be scrap ped, but restoration projects do need to be fast-tracked. They need to jum p to the front of the line in various agencies. This is w hereWhite House leadership is essential.Finally, where should the money com e from? T here are two obvious sources: BP and offshore oil revenues.W e need both.The Natural Resource Dam age A ssessment process w ill generate billions of dollars.Norm ally that process takes years. BP should provide funding up front for restoration andsimply deduct this from any final agreement. EPA fines w ill generate billions more. Theadm inistration has already stated 80% of this money sh ould go to restore the coast. Butthis requires legislation. Ob viously, I believe Congress should accept thisrecommendation.Ano ther source is off shore oil revenues. Since the 192 0s national policy has recognizedthat oil and gas production com es at a price. To "relieve social or economic impactsoccasioned by" this production, the federal government gives inland states 50% ofrevenues from such activities on federal land. Last year Wyom ing alone received $1.3billion from this source.Louisiana has suffered imm ense dam age from oil and gas production on off-shore federalland, and the federal governm ent has received $1 65 billion in off-shore drilling revenuesover the years. Yet until 200 6 the federal government gave Louisiana nothing. AfterKatrina, Congress did give Alabam a, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, the Gulf stateswhich allow off-shore drilling, a 37.5% share of revenue from new off-shore wells. Butit capped the total at $500 million divided by those four states and delayed anysubstantial money until 201 7; this year Louisiana, which passed a state constitutionalam endm ent requiring all this money to go to coastal restoration or flood protection, willget only $400,00 to 600,000 from this source. Congress should treat all states the sam eand lift the cap, cancel the delay, equalize the revenue share, and give it on existing wells,not just new ones. O ff shore oil and gas production has contributed greatly towardcreating the problem ; treating coastal states the same as inland states would provide therevenue to address it.There is also a third source, although its im possible to say at this point how much

mon ey it would generate. This involves the private sector. Some investm ent bankers arelooking at ways to m onetize mitigation banks. If building marsh in the G ulf could turn aprofit for someone besides comp anies building it, it would be useful both politically--bringing the private sector in--and substantively in building land.Thanks for your attention. I welcome any questions.


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National Com mission on theBP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILLAND OFFSHORE DRILLING

Attachm ent 18Written Statement and Presentation of Dr. John W. Farrington

Interim Dean and Professor, School of Marine Science and Technology,University of M assachu setts-Dartmou th and Sc ientist Em eritus,

W oods H ole Oceanog raphic Institution


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WR I T T EN T EST IMONY OFJOH N W F AR R I N GT ONINT ER I M DEAN AND PROF ESSO RSCHOO L OF MAR I NE SC IEN CE AND T ECH NOL OG YUNI VERSIT Y O F MASSACH USET T S-D ART MOU T HANDSCIENTIST EMERITUSWO ODS HO LE OCEANOGR APHIC INST ITUT ION

AS SUBM ITTED SEPTEMB ER 24 , 2010T O T H ENATIONAL COM MISS ION FO R THE B P DEEPW ATER HORIZON O IL SP ILL ANDOFFSHOR E DRILL ING(corrected f inal version October 1, 2 010)Good morning Senator Graham, A dministrator Reil ly , and Commissioners. My name is John W .Farrington. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony to the Commission and contribute toour nations efforts to minimize loss of li fe due to acc idents related to Ou ter Continental Shelf (O CS ) oilexploration, production, and d ecomm issioning, and to minimize econom ic hardship to p eople andecological dam age to marine ecosy stems as a result ofoil spil ls. I have served as Interim D ean andProfessor of the School of Marine Science and Technology, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth sinceAugust 2009 whi le a search has proceeded for a D ean. I am also a S cientist Emeritus at W oods H oleOceanographic Institution from which I retired after a career there beginning as a postdoctoralinvestigator in 1971 and lasting until my retirement in 2006. From August 1990 until November of 2005served as D ean of the Institution. My research has focused on the biogeoch emistry of organic chemicalsin the coastal and ocean ecosystems with about fifty percent of the effort focused on oil pollution andconcerns with other chemicals of environmental concern such as PCBs. Among my service at thescience-p olicy interface, I have participated in various cap acities in the prepa ration of the three U.S .National Acade my o f Sc iences reports (1975, 1985, 2003) reviewing oil pollution in the marineenvironment. I Chaired the National Academy of Sciences Committee that reviewed the MineralsManagement Service Environmental Studies Program, issuing six reports between 1986 and 1993.I have been asked to testify today on: (1) scientif ic f indings in the aftermath of the IXT OC I oil wellblowout spil l of 1979-1980 in the Gulf of Mexico and subsequ ent resilience of the Gulf M exico based onmy participation in a research c ruise to that event, (2) research on other ap plicable oil releases and (3)direct experience related to and scientific recommendations regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.My testimony represents my own point of view, conclusions and recommendations and does not reflectan official statement by either the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth or Woods HoleOceanographic Institution. However, I acknowledge with gratitude that my understanding of inputs,fates and effects of oil in the marine environment has benefited substantively from cooperativeresearch and discussions with several col leagu es, students, and co workers at these institutions andseveral other institutions and organizations in the United States and elsewhere in the world. I haveappended a list of references that are mentioned in my testimony.Before addressing the specific issues stated above, I note for the record that one of your Commissionmem bers, Professor D onald Boesch, co-ed ited(with Professor Nanc y Rabalais) an excellent review of the"The Long Term Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas Development" in 1987. More recently, that review hasbeen updated and broadened to all aspects of oil inputs, fates and effects in the marine environment bythe National Acad emy of Sciences rep ort "Oil in the Sea II1" published in 2003. This report provides an


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excellent review supported by extensive scientific references. Using the knowledge c ontained in thatreport and our own experience, mv c olleague Dr. Judith Mc Dowell and I wrote an article for the generallay person aud ience "Mixing Oil and Wate r " published in Oce a n u s magazine in 2004. W hile there hasbeen progress since 2003-2004 in und erstanding the inputs, fates and effects of oil in the marineenvironmen t, I believe the O c e a n u s article and the 2_003 National Academy of S ciences report areacceptable starting points with respect to the state of knowledge about oil pollution in the marineenvironment. I have appended a cop y of the Farrington and McD owell O c e o n u s article in the hope thatit may be helpful to the Commission and its staff as background literature.

3.) IXTOC I O il well blowout spil l .The IXT OC - I oi l well was an exploration well being d ri lled by P EM EX (P etroleos Mexicanos) in 51.5meters water depth in the Bay of Cam peche, M exican waters of the Gul f of Mexico at192429.418"N;921936..690"W, about 80 km NNW of Ciuad del Carmen, when it suffered a blowoutwith resulting fire and collapse of some of the drilling platform to the sea floor and eventual towingaway o f the hulk of the remainder of the d ri ll platform as desc ribed by S . L. Ross et al (1980). A detailedaccount of the IXTO C I event through Novem ber 1979 is avai lable in test imony before the U.S. S enateDe cem ber 5, 1979 Congressional Record 1980 S erial No. 96-66 -Campec he Oil Spil l: Joint Hearingsbefore the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and the Committee on Energy andNatural Resources. Eventually the IXTOC I oil well blowout was stopped by completion of two relief wellsand cementing in March of 1980 after spil l ing 475,000 metric tons (tonnes) according to Jernelov andLinden (1981).Oil from the IXTOC I spill was transported by normal water circulation for that season of the year aroundthe Gulf of Mexico to the west, northwest, and then north, entering U.S waters and coming ashore onthe coast of Texas by late July- early Aug ust. Shortly after that time, the United States governm entdecided to seek permission from the Mexican government to send a NOAA research vessel on a cruise tothe oil spil l site, along the coast of M exico, and then along the c oast of Texas and into port in Galveston.This cruise was part of NOAAs and other federal agencies(e.g. BLM-D OI, EP A,) and state agenciesoverall response to the oil spill. This involved over 200 scientists from a number of federal and stateagenc ies, academic insti tutions, and private companies.The efforts along the coast of Texas are d ocumented in a report (Hooper, ed., NO AA, 1981). Since I wasnot directly involved in those efforts, I will not comment in d etail other than to state that, in my opinion,from read ing the report and related docu ments, the efforts were predominantly "state of the art-knowledge" efforts for that time or, in some instances, innovative and at the forefront of oil spillresponse from a scientific perspective. These efforts included:

numerical m odeling of sl ick trajectories, classification of sensitive shoreline areas in need of protec tion, deployment of oil containment booms where possible to protect sensitive areas, testing of dispersants in laboratory cond itions with a resulting decision not to use

dispersants because they were ineffective for dispersing the oil-water emulsions andsomewhat weathered sl icks coming to the Te xas coastal areas,

assessmen t by physical and chem ical observations and m easurem ents of the oi l that didcome ashore in Texas,


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biological assessmen t of effects of the oi l on biota and e cosystem s of the Texas coastala rea.

NOAA Ship Resea rch e r cruise to the IXTOC I oil spill. The NOAA ship Researcher was chosen for thecruise and its research cruise schedu le was altered to accomm odate the need for the oil spill cruise. Asecond vessel, the Tracor Marine Inc. vessel G. W . P ie rce (a keel-cooled vessel) was contracted toaccompany the Researcher becau se (i) it had been determ ined early in the IXTIC I oil spill that the oil-water/water-oil emulsion type mixtures near the spill could block or reduce flow through the enginecooling systems for the type of power plant of the Resea rch e r , and (i i) the desire to keep theResea rch e r free from oil contamination to sample control stations. Portable laboratory vans were placedon the G. W. Pierce to expand av ailable laboratory space on that vessel.The specific mission of this combined two-ship expedition, officially labeled Researcher/Pierce Ixtoc-ICruise, was l imited to conducting research on the biogeochemistry (i.e. the transport, chemical andmicrobial alteration/degradation and fate) of the spilled oil at or near the well site and along a cruisetrack in the western Gulf of Mexico up to the coast of Texas. Along the Texas coast sediments atsamples of surface sediment at stations previously analyzed as part of the Bureau of LandManagements OCS studies program were obtained for purposes of assessing if IXTOC-I oil could bedetected in sed iments at these study sites.The M exican g overnment did not grant permission for biological ef fects studies. A d etailed physicaloceanography study was not possible because of insufficient time to secure appropriate equipment forthe cruise and also concerns about the irreversibility ofoil damage to sensitive instruments or inabilityof the instruments to operate in the oil contaminated environment.In addition to the two vessels, a four person contract helicopter from Crescent Airways was onboard

Researcher for flight operations to facilitate surveillance of the slick and the locations of sampling by thevessels relative to the slick. The Resea rch e r operated as the command center and provided moreextensive laboratory space for analytical instruments and microbiology experiments. A U . S. Pu blicHealth Service MD w as aboard Resea rch e r and p rovided oversight for safety precautions for exposure topetroleum fumes for scientists and crew of both Resea rch e r a n d Pierce. This was especially importantfor those on the G. W . Pierce since they ope rated frequently inside the oi l slick and sam pled close to theactually blowout site.Dr. Donald C. Atwood, Head of the Ocean Chemistry Division of NOAAs Atlantic Oceanographic andMeteorological Laboratories {now retired) was Chief Scientist for the cruise. Dr. Randolph Fergusson ofthe National Marine Fisheries Laboratory, NOAA, Beaufort, North Carolina was Senior Biologistonboard. I served as Senior Chemist on the cruise and was supported in this effort by the Office of NavalResearch grant I had for marine organic geochemistry research. A complete l ist of all scientif icpersonnel and g roups can be found in the report "Proceedings of a Sy mposium on Prel iminary Resul tsf rom the S eptember :~979 Researcher/Pierce IXTO C-I Cruise, June 9-10, 1980."(NOAA, D ecember, 1980,591 pp). The report is available as a pdf at http://www.noaa.aoml.~ov/ocd/ocdweb/petroleum.html.My testimony here will refer to the results of research and dedicated efforts of these people.The cruise track for both ships and the sampling locations are detailed in figures I and 2. NOAA shipResea rch e r , vessel 6. W. Pierce, and the Crescent Airways h elicopter ope rations are e xempli f ied in


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f igures 3, 4 and 5. The observations, sampling, and resu lts of analysis and interpretations for samplesfrom this cruise are detailed in the NOAA Symposium report.I will highlight here and illustrate those findings that are the most germane to the Deepwater HorizonM C 252 spi l l and response. Du ring August and early S eptember 1979 there had been several tropicalstorms and a hurr icane in the area of the spi l l or passing through contiguous areas. D uring our t imesamp ling in the well area, tropical storm Henri cam e close to the area. W e believe that this explains whywe observed, during helicopter survey fl ights, various types of oil sl ick containment booms andmoorings in various states of intense snarls and disarray sp read throug hout the Bay of Campe che area.W hen we arr ived in the Bay of Campeche area on September 15t" the slick was headed aboutnortheast, away from the M exican coast and not west and northwest along the coast of M exico towardsthe Texas coa st. This situation prevailed in a genera l sense throughou t our time at the well site untilSeptember 18th when the slick began to bend around toward the east and east-southeast during our lasttwo days and over f l ights on September 20t" and 21st, after which we d eparted the w ell site area for theremainder of the cruise (Figure 1).The situation in the immed iate area of the well blowout site is shown in figu re 6. Gas w as bubb ling tothe surface along with an oil/water mixture. The gas was burning with flames varying from about 2 to 7meters in height. Around this was a turbulent area of about 50 meters diameter in which the oil/watermix was com ing to the surface. There was a bout a 1 knot current transporting an oil sl ick away from thisarea to the northeast.A com posite salinity transect to the northeast away from the w ell site alongside the slick measured byCTD (Conductivity, Temperature, Depth) instrumentation at several stations (Figure 7) documents asalinity of be tween 35.90 to 35.60 I unti l about 35 to S O km a long the transect w here there is anincursion of less saline water of 35.00 At 80 to 90 km along the transect, there is a relatively abrup tincrease ins salinity to typical open ocean G ulf of M exico water of 36.00 to 36.50. We believe that theless saline water incursion was the result of runoff from the coast which had received heavy rains fromtropical storm Henri and previous tropical storms passing through nearby areas prior to the cruise. Thishypothesis is supported by surface salinity measu rements ma de du ring the cruise (Figu re 8).A Gas and Oil Plume u nderwater..(Data from Brook s et al, Texas A& M U niversity; Bo ehm et al,Energy Resou rces Comp any, Inc.; Payne et al, Science Applications, Inc.; Overton et al, University ofNew Orleans; all detailed in NO AA, 1980)Com posites of measurem ents of methane, benzene, and an estimate of total oil by U V-fluorescence insamp les along a transect to the northeast taken from the G. W. Pierce in the slick and R e s e a r c h e routside the slick in "control" stations document an underwater excursion or "plume" of gas, benzene (avolati le petroleum chem ical), and oil extending northeast und er the slick to the less saline waterincursion. We interpreted these observations and data as follows. The 1 knot current was transportingthe gas and oil underwater to the northeast away from the main vertical plume. As this horizontal"plume" was transported away from the well site, gas and oil "bubbles" continued to rise to the surfaceand were incorporated into the overlying oil slick. An important point to consider is that the"backg round " or "control" sample conc entrations for stations away from the slick and w ell site shouldnot be considered as "pristine" ocean water concentrations because there were other oil and gasplatforms operating at th is time in the Bay of Cam peche and discharging co-produced waters and mudas was clearly evident in visual observations from the helicopter over flights. It is probable that thesechronic releases contribute methane and oi l chemicals to the Bay of Campeche waters and ecosystems.

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Figure 2. IXTOC-I Campeche oil spill cruise, 11-27 September 1979, expandedwellhead region.


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Figure 3. NOAA SHIP R E S E A R C H E R I X T O C I C r u is e .


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Figure 4. T racor Marine Inc. Vessel G.W.PIERCEI "

Figure 5. Crescent Airways H elicopter aboard R E S E A R C H E R


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Figure 6. J. W . Farrington photograp h of Ixtoc I oil well blowout from helicopter flightR E S E A R C H E R /P I E R C E I X T O C I C R U I S E September, 2979. Facing S outhwest with oil slick coming toward

the viewer to the northeast. Platforms had been constructed by P EM EX for eventual test of an invertedcone "cap ping" proc edure. Note relatively clean, oil-slick free surface water behind p latforms.

These transects of data are c omposites and state of the art for the time of the cru ise. However, they d onot provide synop tic, three-dimensional assessments of underwater conc entrations of methane and oilchemicals in the spill area. It is probable that the actual situation had more m eanders and heterogeneityin the underwater horizontal "plume", similar to that observed for the surface slick.Several days after arriving at the Bay of Camp eche well site general area, and despite operating welloutside of any visible slick area, the drinking water on the Researcher became c ontaminated withvolatile petroleum c hemicals as first detected by taste and then verified by U V-fluorescencemeasurements. The most likely cause was co-distillation of the volatile chemicals out of sea water intothe drinking water as the ship made its drinking water from evaporative distillation of sea water.


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SALINITY % o ALONG A TRANSECT ORIENTED TO THE NORTHEASTOF THE IXTOC-I BLOWOUT, SEPTEMBER1979

2O

DISTANCE FROM Z~LOWOUT(km) NE40 60 80 1 O0

Rtl P7 P5 P|O P 1 t PI 5 Pl2 R7 PI3 P14 Ri O R6 R5 P2 R4R 8 P9 P8Station Designation ~ind Position on Transect,

Figu re 7. Salinity Transect to northeast from the w ell site.22

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9:5 92 91Figu re 8. Surface w ater salinities.18 94- 90

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CONCENTRATIONS OF METHANE ALONG A TRANSECTTO THE NORTHEAST OF THE IXTOC-I BLOWOUT, SEPTEMBER9"~9SW DISTANCE FROM BLOWOUT(kin)-20 0 20 40 60 800 I I I

O. 1 - O.5 H_I/L

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Figu re 9 . Data from B rooks et a l (1980) Texas A & MCONCENTRATIONS OF BENZENE

.... oo ~ 1~. o/ - - , o . o . o % , o o -0-- 50/J-g/L(CONTOURS IN

Figu re 10. Data from Bro oks et a l (1980) Texas A & M and Payne et al (1980) SAIC

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CONCENTRATIONS OF OIL ALONG A TRANSECT ORIENTEDTO THE NORTHEAST OF THE IXTOC-I BLOWOUT, SEPTEMBER 1979DISTANCEFROM BLOWOUT (km)60 80 IOO

O IL C O N C EN T R AT IO N S (ppb)I I IIR6 R5 P2 R4

Figu re 11. F iest and Boehm (1980) , Boehm and Fiest , (1982) .

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"Rafts" of emu lsified oil and w ater.Another important and unexpected findin~ from the cruise was a distribution in various areas outsidethe main slick of conglomerates of emulsified oil and water or "mousse" as it is commonly designated inthe oil spill l iterature becau se of its similarity in app earance and consistency to the c hocolate mou ssedessert. W e desil~nated them "mou sse rafts" - rangin~ in size from about that of an ordinary zodiac raftto sometimes ten times as big. A picture of several of these "rafts" taken from an helicopter over flight(Figu re 11)and then com parison of one of those rafts with a zodiac at the bottom for sc ale (figu re 12)provides examples of several we noted durin~ the over flil~hts. The zodiac raft from the Researcher wentinto one of the rafts of mou sse to samp le the interior, and analyses o f this sample by I~aschromatography and com puterized I~as chromatography-mass spectrometry doc ument a chemicalcomposition that indicated that the oil in the interior of the "mousse raft" was not extensivelyweathered. These "m ousse rafts" can be as much as 0.5 meter thick in the center and some had theappea rance of being ag glomerations of smaller lumps or "balls" of mou sse, e.g. see Fi l~ure 13.The exact m echanism of formation was not discerned d urin~ our observations. These rafts of mou ssemay p rovide a m eans for transporting only sl ightly weathered oil Ionl~ distances becau se of theprotection from dissolution, volatilization, and microbial degradation afforded to oil at the center of the"raft". Amos (1980) in a report from the University of Texas M arine Science Institute, Port Aransas,Texas noted a few instances of mousse comin8 ashore in Texas, although the predominant form of oil inTexas c oastal waters seemed to be tar balls, windrows of tar balls and oil slicks. Similar observationswere reported in Hooper (ed. NO AA, 1981).

Figure 12. "Mousse Rafts". Several indicated by black arrows. P hotograph taken from hel icopter about800 ft. by Jo W. Farr ington. RESEARCH ER/PIERCE IXTOC I C RUISE September, 1979.

Outside the oi l sl ick, Bay of Camp eche.

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Figure 12. Large raft of "mousse" (black arrow) and Zodiac raft (bottom) for size comparison.

Figure 13. Close up of edge of a "mousse raft" f rom Figure 12. J. W. F arr in l~ton photograph fromhelicopter. RES EARCH ER/PIERC E IXTOC I CRU ISE Sep tember 1979. Note clumps around the edge and

clump app earance of the surface.

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Microbiological Studies. (Atlas et al, University of Louisville, and Pfaender e t al U niversity of NorthCarolina-Chapel Hill).The stud ies of Professor Atlas and his group at the University of Louisvil le and those of P rofessorPfaender and his group at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill provided valuable insights into themicrobial community and its activity in the spill area as reported in their papers in the report from theSym posium on RES EARCH ER/PIERC E IXTO C I Cruise (NOAA, 1980). In summary, the microbial commu nityin the spil l site waters changed in community structure and function compared to control sites. Thenumbers of hydrocarbon degrading bacteria increased in the oiled areas but the total microbial biomasswas not a simple function of the presence or absence of oil. There was sufficient oxygen for microbialdegradation of the oil, but onboard experiments suggested that there were insufficient nutrientspresent in the water column in the oil slick area to promote extensive oil degradation at the time of theResearcher/Pierce research cruise.Other interesting Findings. Time and space for this testimony does not permit more extensivediscussion of other aspe cts of the research findings such as those related to weathering of the oil --including p hotochem ical reactions; diff iculty in detecting any oil deposition to surface sed iments in theBay of Campeche area due to prior contamination of the sediments from drilling and productionoperations; and research to use acoustic methods to detect subsu rface oil and g as in the water column.Al l of these are discussed in the NOAA (1980) report. One of our conc lusions was that we w ere notprepared to adequately sample the various physical chemical forms of the oil-water and water-oilemulsions present in the wel l si te area and we recom mended research to develop sam pl ingmethodology for these forms of oil during future oil spills.Overviews. Waldichuk (1980) and Jernelov and Liden (1981) provide overviews of the Ixtoc I oil spillfrom their perspectives as scientists with extensive experience in marine environmental qualityassessments for various United Nations organizations. Waldichuk (1980) provides quote andcommentary."It has been stated by oil-well drilling experts: "the damage to lives, equipment, and the environmentcan be of great magnitude. Yet this risk must be accepted if we are to extract the energy we need fromthe depths of the earth.(see Rhodes, A. F. 1979. The ultimate control problem - a wild oil or gas well.Mechanical Engineering, June, 1979, 21-26). One wonders, nevertheless, why the oil industry does notput higher priorities into developing a fully fool proof blow-out prevent ion system."

Jernelov and Linden(1981) reviewed the biological resources and ecosystem s of the Bay of Cam pechearea and noted the importance of economically valuable shrimp and oyster fisheries. They then went onto state:"Thorough studies of the long-term bio logical effects of the spi l l have ei ther not bee n carr ied out inM e x i c a n wa ters, or the resul ts of such studies are not yet avai lable. "To my knowledge , the situation remains the same today .

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Jernelov and Linden (1981) provided som e valuable comm ents about the potential for biological effectsusing sound reasoning based on laboratory studies of toxicity and field m easurements of theconcentrations ofoil in the water colum n,"Laboratory experiments exposing larvae and adults of other crustaceans, inc lud ing shr imp, to c rudeoil show the acute toxicity levels are in the range of 0 .1 to 10 ppm to ta l o il . I f we assum e 0 .1 ppm w asthe acute toxicity concentration (Ixtoc I oil is particularly rich in the highly toxic, low boiling aromaticfraction); a mixing depth of 25 m; a five day persistency of the toxic oil fractions in the water so lu tion;and a required concentration of O.1 ppm to cause damage to shrimps: then an area of15,000 kmz canbe regarded as poisoned by the Ixtoc I oil. This is equal to 2.5 percent of the Mexican part of the Gulf."Jernelov and Linden (1981) go on to note the diff iculties in assessing long term effects on fisheries andecosystems - a fact of the current state of the art and knowledge repeated in 2003 by the NationalAcadem y of S ciences Report "Oil in the Sea II1" (NAS, 2003).

2. Research on O ther Appl icable Releases

I believe that the NAS (2003) report and the Farrington and McDowell (2004) article accurately portraymy view of the current lessons learned from other oil releases. I note in particular that in Farrington andM cD owel l (2004) we stated in the next to last paragraph:"W e also need to expand research on oil pollution in deeper waters. Most concerns and research havetraditionally focused on co asta l waters . Yet new concerns ar ise as oil production moves oHshore. Wecan on ly speculate on the impact of oil explorat ion and production in deeper waters until we havemore detailed knowledge of the biological organisms in these habitats and the biogeochemicalprocesses tha t govern their fives."

I chaired the National Research Council Committee on the OCS Environmental Study Program 1986 to1993. We noted in our last of six reports that with Congressional and Executive Branch Moratoria inplace for several years, there was a "window of opportunity" to quote our report, to gain essential newknowledge about O CS environmental concerns. This would have al lowed the United States to moveforward with wise management and use of O CS oi l and g as resources, including appropriateenvironmental protection with continued moratoria in some areas if warranted. Instead, both theExecutive Branch and Congress reduced funding to the Environmental Studies Program of MM S. In myopinion, stated in my letter of July 15, 1993 to the late Senator R obert C. Byrd , then Chairman of theSubcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, "By reducing theEnvironmental Studies P rogram funding, Congress jeopardizes wise use and m anagement of the nationsOC S oil and gas resourc es by deny ing orderly and co st effective acquisition of vital new knowledge. "I recognize that there are many competing priorities for federal funding. However, I would be remiss inmy duty to my scientific colleagues and, through them, to our nation, not to note that carefully thoughtout and peer reviewed sc ienti fic advice som etimes g ets shunted aside in the pol i tical process because ofpolitical and f inancial conce rns and c omp eting priorit ies. The n some c risis emerg es, and science is askedto respond on an em ergenc y basis. Such respon ses are often less cost effective and less eff icacious thanwould be the case if there had been steady attention to the potential of problems to be encountered.Hav ing stated this, I realize that there is a delicate balance of co mp eting priorities that has to be takeninto account within the Executive Branch and the Cong ress.

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Important Lesson Learned from other Oil Spil ls from 1960s to the present: Each oi l spil l is unique in several ways: type of oi l spi lled, receiving eco system, wea ther

conditions, season of the year, clean up and c ontainment attempts. If oil gets into low energy marshy or muddy environments (sub tidal or inter-tidal), thenpersistence and longer term impac ts are more l ikely than for high energy environm ents such as

a rocky inter-tidal coastal ecosystems. Volatile components will evaporate. Soluble com ponents dissolve in sea water and are su bject to dispersion. Certain oil comp ound s such as n-alkanes are more su sceptible to microbial deg radation.

However, the degradation of these compounds does not mean that the oil is being totallydegraded. Other oi l compounds such as the cycloalkanes and certain of the polycycl ic aromatichydrocarbons (PAH)can persist for long periods of t ime - decades in some cases.

Oil comp ounds c an be taken up from water by marine organisms ac ross gil ls or by feeding onpart iculate matter and contaminated prey. Conc entrations of a few p pm in sea water can bebiomagnified by marine organisms by factors of 1,000 to 100,000. Thus low concentrations insea water shou ld not lead to conclusions that there wil l be no adv erse effects on m arineorganisms.

Bivalves such as mu ssels and oysters have l imited capac ity to metabolize petroleumhydrocarbons.

PAH can be m etabolized by f ish, crustacean, marine mam mals and birds. In some instances themetabolites are excreted. In other instances they may cause harm to the organisms.There is a large rang e of toxicity and long term su b lethal effects/responses to vary ingconcentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons in given ecosystems.Large oil spills attract media attention and attention ofthe public, and various branches offederal, state, and local governments. There is a burst of initial interest and funding, or promiseof research funding.

O nce an oil sl ick goe s away, attention/interest of most people d ecreases d espite the fact thatpetroleum hy drocarb ons may sti ll be present in the sediments and biota of an ecosystem. Insome respects this is the old cl ich~ "O ut of sight, out of mind".

3. Direct Experience related to and scienti fic recommendations regarding the Deep W ater Horizon Oi l

I participated in the May 19th White House S cience Summ it convened by the Off ice of Science,Tech nology and P olicy and hosted by the Environmental Protection Agency that identif ied the sciencethat should be addressed in the DW H M C 252 oil spil l. I also participated in the Deep water Horizon OilSp ill Scienti fic Sym posium at Louisiana State University June 3, 2010 and p resented a lunch sem inar,"Condu cting Oil Spil l Research in a Reg ulatory Fram ework." I am not a paid consultant to anygovernment agency, private organization or industry with an interest in this DWH MC252 oil spill. I haveprovided ad vice to col leagues at the W oods H ole Oceanographic Inst i tut ion regarding their research atsea and in the laboratory with respect to the DW H M C252 spi l l. I have also provided com ments whenasked about a NOAA Joint Analysis Group report. I have responded to numerous news media requestsfor background information and interviews.

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The fac t that there is a P residential Comm ission speaks to the seriousness of the matter. I believenumerous academic, government, and industry and consulting company scientists and engineers havebeen exerting substantive effort to stop the sp ill , contain and c lean up the spil led o il, assess the fate andeffects of the spil led oil. Much needed new knowledge has been gained that wil l assist in preventing afuture spill or, if a spill of this magnitude occurs, to be better prepared to deal with it.Hindsight is always 20/20 or better, and I have not been directly involved in the daily crisis managementscience that is pursued in this type of situation. Much of what I have observed and learned from thedistance of my off ice, via emails and telephone conv ersations, and d iscussions at meetings seem sfamiliar to me in terms of what has happened at other oil spills. The following are a few thoughts that Iwish to bring to your attention:

Sc ientif ic research often g ets tangled with debates abou t: "W ho is to blame for the spil l? Whowill get credi t for being the lead federal agency ? The legal requirements of NRD A.

The delays and confusion with respect to allocations and release of the research funding fromBP to consortia of academic institutions resulted in missed opportunities for research on thefate and effects of the spilled oil- missed opportunities that cannot be recaptured at this latedate.

Advances in numerical modeling and the application of floats, gliders, and other modernphysical oceanographic instrumentation, coupled with various remote sensing capabil i tiesprovided excellent assessments and projections about where the oil sl ick was and would g o. Thiswas a significant application of the nations emerging C oastal Ocean O bserving S ystem and , inmy opinion, it was a significant success.

The deployment of an in situ mass spectrometry coupled with an Autonomous UnderwaterVehicle (AUV) demonstrated the adv ances in "cutting ed ge" analytical chemistry andengineering technology now av ailable for assessing oil chem icals in waters of oil spil l areas, andin deep water d epths (Cam ill i et al, 2010).

The application of the latest molecular biology/microbiological methods in genomics andproteomics provided tools for rapid and relatively thorough assessment of microbial populationsin the spil l area and control stations, allowing an asse ssmen t for the potential of microbialdeg radation of the oil (Hazen et al, 2010).

Too m uch attention was focused initially on com parisons to the Exxon Va ldez oil spill and notthe more relevant Ixtoc I oil spill or other oil spills that have occurred along the Gulf of Mexicocoast of the United S tates.

Sc ientists today are encourag ed to comm unicate effectively with the med ia. This is a good thing.How ever, there needs to be some careful post assessment by both scientists and the mediaabout why initial scientific hypotheses, based on first interpretations of field data aboard ship byadm ittedly somew hat exhausted scientists, was parlayed into seemingly contradictory findingsby various press reports.

The D W H M C252 spi ll had several unique aspects such as being a very d eepwater blowout, useof dispersants pumped into the vertical plume, with admixture at the bottom of drilling mudwhen there was an attempt to stop the flow by pumping mud into the well and the mud flowedout.

Clearly, too little attention had been given to the real potential for a deepwater blowout.Statements that this was unexpec ted contrad ict the fact that such a spil l scenario at 1,500meters water depth was diagrammed and d iscussed in the National Academy of Sciences 2003report "Oil in the S ea II1", pages 106-108.

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There are num erous other sources of oil inputs to the Gulf of Mexico in the US ExclusiveEco nomic Zone as noted in the NAS (2003) report. Adding up ten to fifteen years of estimatedinputs for some of the sources such as natural o il seeps and ru noff f rom land and normaloperations of large and s mall ships/boats in coastal areas yields amou nts of oil in the same totalrange as that released by the DW H M C252 spil l. Obviously, chronic inputs such as those othersources and acute inputs such as the D W H M C252 spi ll are not str ic tly comparable. However,given these other so urce s of input, i t will be a significant analytical chem istry challenge toaccu rately assess the contributions of DW H M C252 oil contamination of water, sediments, andliving m arine resources in several locations.

C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S /R E C O M M E N D A T IO N SI have two overarching recommendations:

1)2)

The nation should not let the lessons from the DWH MC 252 fade from memory as time goes onand the visible presence of sl icks from the sp ill disappear. This has hap pened too often in thepast.I hope the Comm ission can recom mend , as soon as practicable, the allocation of the funds thatBP set aside for research. These fund s should be allocated through some type of rapid p eerreview process in a m anner that maximizes the very best scientif ic research. I am c oncernedthat there seems to be a m ove towards "central ized" cooperation in the research on the DW HM C252 spil l . Coord ination is fine. Howev er, my exp eriences sug gest to me that centralizedcontrol often has the unwanted effect of stifling creative scientific research.

Thank you again for the invitation and opportunity to share the preceding with the CommissionREFERENCES

Am os, Anthony F . (1980). Long H orn reports: The Ixtoc O il Sp ill . Pa rt I. Field O bservations:July-Novem ber, 1979. The U niversity of Texas M arine Science Institute, Port Aransas M arineLaboratory, Port Aransas, Texas. Final report to NOAA Environmental Research Laboratories anddepartment Transportat ion, United States Coast Guard under NO AA Contract No.NA79RAC000141.

Boehm, P., and D. Fiest (1982). Subsurface distributions of petroleum from an offshore well blowout -the Ixtoc I blowout, Bay of Campeche. Environmental Science and Technology 16 : 67-70.

Boehm, P., D . Fiest, and D. M ackay et al (1982). Physical-chemical weathering of petroleumhydrocarbons from the Ixtoc I blowout - chemical measurements and a weathering model.Environmentol Science and Technology 16: 498-505.

Brooks, J. et al (1980) in NOAA (1980) below.Camilli et al (2010). Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation at D eepw ater H or i zon.Science Exp ress 19 Aug ust 2010: 10.1126/science.1195223.

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Fiest, D. and P. Boehm (1980)in NOAA(1980) below.Hazen et al (2010). Deep-S ea Oil Plume Enrichs Indigenous O il-Deg rading Bacteria.Science Exp ress 26 Aug ust 2010: 10 .1126 /science 1195979.Hooper(ed.) NOAA (1981). The Ixtoc O il Spill : The F ederal Scienti fic Response. NOA A S pecial Report.Craig. H. Hooper (ed.) NOAA Ha zardous M aterials Response ProJect. Boulder, Colorado.Jernelov, A, and O . Linden (1981. Ixtoc h A Case S tudy of the W orlds Largest Oil Spil l.

Ambio: /0:299-306.NAS (2003). Oil in the Sea III. National Academies P ress, Washington, DCNOAA (1980). Proceedings of a S ymposium on Prel iminary Resul ts f rom the S eptember 1979

Researcher/Pierce Ixtoc I Cruise. NOAA, Boulder, Colorado, December 1980 591 pages. AvailableAs a pdf at: http://www.noaa.aoml.~ov/ocd/ocdweb/petroleum.html.

Pay ne, J. et al (1980). In NOA A (1980) above.Ross, S . L. et al (1980) in NOA A (1980) above.Waldichuk, M. (1980). Retrospective of the Ixtoc I Blowout. Marine Pollution Bulletin//:184-186.

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Meeting 3, Attachments #16-19

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Transcript of Meeting 3, Attachments #16-19