Media Framing of Terrorism, Implications for Public Opinion, Civil Liberties, And Counterterrorism...

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Media Framing of Terrorism:Implications for Public Opinion, CivilLiberties, and CounterterrorismPoliciesMary E. Brinson & Michael StohlPublished online: 06 Aug 2012.

To cite this article: Mary E. Brinson & Michael Stohl (2012) Media Framing of Terrorism:Implications for Public Opinion, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorism Policies, Journal ofInternational and Intercultural Communication, 5:4, 270-290, DOI: 10.1080/17513057.2012.713973

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Media Framing of Terrorism:Implications for Public Opinion,Civil Liberties, and CounterterrorismPoliciesMary E. Brinson & Michael Stohl

This study presents experimental findings on the impact of media framing of the 2005

London bombings. A total of 371 American participants were exposed to one of two

frames to test their effect on public attitudes towards civil liberties and Muslims, and

support for counterterrorism policies. Results show that the domestic homegrown

frame produces greater increases in fear than the international frame. This leads to

greater support for restricting civil liberties of Muslims and, under certain circumstances,

general feelings of negativity toward Muslims. The study also finds support for the

hydraulic effect of framing in that the domestic homegrown frame suppresses party

identification in attitude formation.

Keywords: Media Framing; Civil Liberties; Terrorism; Public Opinion; Political Attitude

Formation

On July 7, 2005, a series of three coordinated blasts hit Londons subways during the

morning rush hour. Less than an hour later, a fourth bomb exploded on a bus in

Tavistock Square. Fifty-two commuters and the four suicide bombers were killed in

the attacks, and more than 700 people were injured. In addition to the shock and loss

of lives, media coverage of these explosions had a significant impact on public

perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Shortly after this deadly day, the concepts of

homegrown terrorism and radicalization were (re-)invented and ascribed to

Islamic terrorism, with repercussions for civil liberties, racial, ethnic and religious

attitudes, and government policy.

Mary E. Brinson is at University of San Diego. Michael Stohl is at University of California, Santa Barbara.

Correspondence to: Mary E. Brinson, Communication Studies, Camino Hall 126, University of San Diego,

5998 Alcala Park, San Diego, CA 92110, USA. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1751-3057 (print)/ISSN 1751-3065 (online) # 2012 National Communication Association

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2012.713973

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication

Vol. 5, No. 4, November 2012, pp. 270290

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Prior to July 2005, the Islamic terrorist threat in the United States and United

Kingdom was conceived as originating from terrorist organizations based outside the

two countries (Crone & Harrow, 2010). These earlier perceptions of Islamic terrorism

as an external threat, and the perceptions subsequent to the London subway

bombings, were influenced by media presentations, or media frames,. These frames

form the narrative structure through which newsmakers produce, organize, and

explain events or issues. In their framing and interpretation of events, the media

define problems*determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs andbenefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes*identify the forces creating the problem; make more judgments*evaluate causalagents and their effects; and suggest remedies*offer and justify treatments for theproblems and predict their likely effects (Entman, 2003, p. 52).

The current study builds on Brinson and Stohls (2010) examination of the U.S.

and U.K. press coverage of the 2005 London terror attacks. We identified two

competing frames. The first, the domestic frame, defined and diagnosed the

problem as homegrown. The second, the international frame, defined and

diagnosed the problem as being connected to international terrorist organizations.

Here, we employ an experimental design to examine the effects of these two media

frames on individuals understanding and reactions to terrorist events. Given the

focus on Islamic terrorists after 9/11 and then again after 7/7, we investigate how

media coverage influences attitudes towards Muslims, perceptions of fear, and the

willingness of citizens to curtail their own civil liberties (such as restrictions on

access to information that the government deems confidential, or government

monitoring of credit cards) as well as those of others (such as racial profiling,

investigating protestors and the detention of non-citizen terrorist suspects) as part

of counterterrorism policies. The frames were tested on American respondents,

which, as argued below, should strengthen the findings, since their distance from

the immediate geographic proximity of the attacks should lessen the effects of fear,

emotion or identification with the symbols of the attacks that British participants

might experience. We find that the domestic or homegrown terror frame,

combined with increased fear of future attacks, has the more powerful impact

on support for civil liberties restrictions. We also find that higher levels of fear can

suppress an individuals reliance on ideological predispositions in making such

judgments.

To better contextualize this study, we first discuss Brinson and Stohls (2010)

identification of the media frames employed to report the 2005 London bombings.

Next, we survey scholarship regarding the impact of media framing on attitudes

related to identity-based policies. We then explore how the ability of media frames to

reinforce or challenge existing viewpoints is dependent upon how the audience

evaluates the incoming media frame. Finally, we investigate how fear, through the

hydraulic effect (Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997) acts to drive out other possible

responses.

Journal of International and Intercultural Communication 271

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Frames, Processes, and Effects

Competing Frames

In 1985 UK Prime Minister Thatcher famously asserted that media reports of

terrorist attacks served as the oxygen of terrorism (Keranen & Sanprie, 2008). A

number of previous studies have explored this charge that the medias reporting on

terrorism provides a boost to terrorists by publicizing both their message of fear and

their political demands, They have examined the question of whether governments

should restrict media coverage of terrorist incidents and organizations to limit

opportunities for terrorists to communicate with the public (see for example

Miller, 1982; Picard, 1981, 1986).

More recently, Brinson and Stohl (2010) analyzed articles from 2005 and 2006 in

major U.S. and U.K newspapers and found that media coverage of terrorist incidents

supported governments and their policies by framing their coverage in the language

introduced by government spokespersons and counterterrorism agendas. We

identified two significant underlying frames which differentiated the two countrys

media framing. The British press consistently focused on the domestic or

homegrown theme and suggested that the incidents were isolated, random, and

domestic in nature. This frame corresponded with Prime Minister Blairs statements

during this period and the wider British response, which included assigning primary

responsibility for counterterrorism to the Home Office. In contrast, the U.S. press

continually focused on the international connections of the incidents, relating

them to the international war on terror and al Qaeda. This framing corresponded

with President Bushs statements after the attacks and with the fact that the

Department of Defense was designated primary federal agency for the War on Terror.

Brinson and Stohl (2010) argued that these findings refute Mrs. Thatchers claims

and provide further evidence that news coverage of terrorism errs on the side of

governments, due to over-reliance upon the framework of interpretation offered by

public officials, security experts and military commentators, with news functioning

ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they

implement (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003, p. 1). Thus, as Nacos & Torres-Reyna (2007)

have argued, although terrorists resort to violence in order to manipulate the western

press, highly placed public officials and other influential political actors do not have

to unleash violence in order to gain such access, since they form one corner in the

domestic communication triangle. Whether circumstances involve domestic or

international counterterrorist politics and policies, governments are in excellent

positions to communicate their messages through news coverage (p. 143).

Civil Liberties Restrictions

The events of, and responses to, 9/11 created increased concerns for personal and

national security and sparked debate on the proper balance between security and civil

liberties and the American publics attitudes towards Muslims. These discussions

focused upon the scope of arrests and detentions, voluntary interviews, deportation,

272 M. E. Brinson & M. Stohl

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removal, and visa issues, monitoring attorney-client relations, secret proceedings, and

government non-disclosure of information, racial profiling, and the USA Patriot ACT.

The role of media messages in generating support for or against such identity-based

policies and civil liberties restrictions has been substantially examined. For example,

Tan, Fujioka, and Tan (2000) posit that evaluative portrayals of racial and ethnic groups

on television predict stereotypic responses from viewers and therefore affect voters

positions on identity-based policies, such as affirmative action. Mendelberg (1997)

examined the effects of exposure to black violence in the news and found that those

who had watched such coverage were more likely than those who had not to follow

their pre-existing racial prejudice when making judgments about identity-based

policies. They were also more resistant to government policy initiatives on behalf of

racial equality. A similar experiment by Valentino (1999) found subjects who viewed

depictions of minority crime were more likely to support the tougher Republican

stance on racial policy than that of the Democrats. Gilliam (1999) showed that those

exposed to portrayals of African Americans taking excessive advantage of welfare were

much less likely to support welfare spending and more likely to hold subsequent

negative evaluations of African Americans. Taking these findings into considerations, it

is reasonable to expect that the framing of media messages related to terrorism

would also perhaps contribute to peoples attitudes and levels of support for related

policies.

Contributors to Attitude Change

Three decades of extensive research has consistently indicated that media framing has

an important influence on the publics perception of news content. Bennett (1990)

argues that unless there is evidence of scandal, the press generally takes the political

frames and ideas authorities provide at face value, which threatens the democratic

process because it leads to groupthink and reluctance to challenge the government.

These patterns highlight journalistic gatekeeping practices in the coverage of

government policy (Zaller & Chiu, 1996) and support what Bennett (1990) calls

indexing. As a result Bennett and colleagues argue, with respect to the United States,

the press has grown too close to the sources of power in this nation, making it

largely the communication mechanism of the government, not the people . . . this isan odd situation in what may well be the freest press system in the world (Bennett,

Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007, p. 1).

This relationship between the press and the government can be seen as problematic

in a democracy because of the influence that many argue the media have on the way

we see and evaluate things. In other words, the media help provide us with the images

we hold in our heads about the world around us. In his classic study of public

opinion, Walter Lippmann (1922) had also worried about the impact of media on a

functioning democratic society. He described the images created by the media as the

pictures in our heads, which individuals employ to help make sense of the

information that they are presented. Contemporary media scholars refer to these as

schemas, which serve to organize knowledge about particular domains, assist in both


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processing new information and retrieving stored information, and help structure

expectations and attitudes about people, situations, and events (Entman, 2003; Shah,

Kwak, Schmierbach & Zubric, 2004). Individuals depend on these schemas as a frame

of reference for organizing existing knowledge and incoming information. McLeod,

Kosicki, Pan, and Allen (1987) describe them as an organizational filing system that

aids people in making sense of political news. The already existent pictures in our

heads are a central factor in determining how external media frames will alter

attitudes and opinion. Price, Tewksbury, and Powers (1997) argue that different

frames can fundamentally affect our comprehension and encourage particular trains

of thought, especially in relation to politics and voting. Further, Iyengar (1991)

questions whether these frames alter voting outcomes:

Inevitably the question arises whether voters acting in accordance with pictures intheir heads*pictures put there by news coverage*arrive at the same politicaloutcome as would voters endowed with perfect information and detailed,exacting, and creative choice processes. (p. 135)

When exposed to media frames, an individual relies on these schemata to

contextualize, understand, and evaluate the information. An individuals frames may

be reinforced, challenged, or remain unaffected, depending upon how they evaluate

the incoming media frame. This in turn, may alter attitudes, opinions, and even

behavior. In this way, framing is considered to be a two-step process, whereby media

frames prime, or activate some knowledge, thus making attitude change more likely

(Entman, 2003; Zaller, 1992). Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argue that through this

frame priming the press influences the standards by which policies are judged.

Multiple studies have found that framing drives attitudes and ultimately behavior

ranging from political cynicism to electoral support (e.g., Scheufele, 1999; Shah et al.,

2004; Zaller, 1992).

Thus, if different frames activate different schema we should find differences in the

attitudes of participants who are exposed to opposing media frames of the same

issue. For this study, we hypothesize that an international threat activates different

schema from a domestic, homegrown threat. We expect that a frame which

characterizes the threat of terrorism as homegrown would produce different tolerance

levels for restrictions of domestic civil liberties than would frames which identify the

threat as originating far away and from foreign outsiders (e.g., al Qaeda or the

Global Network of Terror). The geographic proximity of homegrown terrorism

should activate stronger concerns as a consequence of the anxiety produced by the

sense that terrorists are within. However, if this domestic frame, which portrays the

attack as an incident with no connection to international terrorism is shown to

arouse fear in people that are not geographically proximate to the actual attack, this

would suggest that something in the frame itself*and the schema that it activates*causes the increase in fear rather than simply the threat of violence caused by

geographic proximity.

Further, as both the long line of research on Sumners (1906) in-group/out-group

hypothesis and the ferocity of civil wars and the historical reaction of populations to


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traitors and other enemies within (real and imagined) constantly remind us, citizens

may be all too easily mobilized against the other within the community with tragic

results (Stohl, 1980). Likewise, the willingness of the American public to intern

Japanese-Americans during World War II should serve as a reminder that democratic

societies are not immune to such reactions (see Stohl, 1976, pp. 118122).However, the threat must be perceived to be strong for people to set aside firmly

held, core values. Restricting civil liberties in a democratic society challenges the

schemas about freedoms that democratic societies guarantee and reinforce through-

out a citizens life. People with these existing schemas would need to believe that the

trade-off(s) between civil liberties and personal security was absolutely necessary to

eschew them. This could occur in the American context if people came to consider

that the very freedoms and openness of American society contributed to the

planning and execution of the terrorist attacks (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 29).

Therefore, the homegrown threat frame is more likely to lead to greater support for

civil liberties restrictions and thus:

H1a: Participants exposed to homegrown threat frames of terrorist events, willreport greater levels of support for restricting domestic civil liberties thanthose participants exposed to the same terrorist events framed asinternational.

In contrast, when terrorist events are framed as international they should trigger

threat schemas regarding international terrorism, and therefore:

H1b: Participants exposed to international threat frames of terrorist events willreport greater levels of support for more aggressive international security,intervention and punishment for international terrorists than thoseparticipants exposed to the same terrorist events framed as homegrownthreats.

Framing effects can fall into both minimal effects and large effects categories. Even

the slightest differential in frames can have a large effect and alter decision-making

when contextual situations are ideal, while under other conditions they may lead to

very slight adjustments to existing schema but not to overall attitude or behavioral

change (Shah et al., 2004). Zaller (1992) argues that individuals hold numerous,

inconsistent schema relating to specific issues. Further, highly engaged politically

aware individuals have more crystallized attitudes and will resist messages that are at

odds with their political dispositions and individual frames if there is sufficient

information for them to understand the difference between the received message and

the existing disposition.

Several studies have found consistent attitude differences between Republicans and

Democrats on civil liberties protections. A 2004 study conducted by Cornells Media

and Research Group indicated that Republicans are, in general, much more

supportive of restricting civil liberties than Democrats (Nacos & Torres-Reyna,

2007). Republicans are also more supportive of international security spending.

Further, a Fox News Poll on June 7, 2007 found that the question, In the war against

terrorism, do you think the United States has pursued potential terrorists here at


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home too aggressively or not aggressively enough, prompted 24 percent of

Democrats to indicate that we have acted too aggressively, whereas only 9 percent

of Republicans gave this indication. Thus, we expect that:

H2a: Levels of support for greater civil liberties restrictions will be higher forRepublicans than Democrats, regardless of frame exposure.

H2b: Levels of support for more aggressive international security, interventionand punishment for international terrorists will be higher for Republicansthan Democrats, regardless of frame exposure.

Individual attitude formation regarding counterterrorism policies is also dependent

upon existing levels of fear of terrorism. Those who are not fearful of future attacks are

less likely to be concerned with the particulars of counterterrorism policies. However,

fear levels become more important when people are confronted with trade-offs among

counterterrorism policies and restrictions on civil liberties. As indicated above, the

restriction of civil liberties in a democratic society challenges crystallized and reinforced

beliefs. Nonetheless, past research has found that higher fears of future attacks increases

support for civil liberties restrictions (Davis and Silver, 2004). Similarly, Huddy,

Feldman, Taber and Lahav (2005) found that higher fears of future attacks led to greater

support for aggressive action, negative stereotypes and civil liberties restrictions.

Huddy et al. (2005) also found that higher perceived threat levels increases support

for punitive retaliatory actions, including military action against a threatening enemy,

especially an external enemy. Likewise, Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser (1999) argue

that Americans generally support international military action in direct proportion

to the threat they perceive from a foreign aggressor against U.S. interests. We thus

anticipate that schema activated by news frames focusing on external threats will

interact with fear to increase support for aggressive international behaviors. Thus:

H3: Both levels of support for restricting domestic civil liberties and support formore aggressive international counterterrorism policies will be higher forthose who exhibit higher fear levels of another terrorist attack than for thosewho exhibit lower levels of fear.

Previous findings have also found that high threat levels are related to xenophobia

and out-group rejection (Huddy et al., 2005) as well as in-group solidarity, both of

which further enhance out-group bias (Giles & Evans, 1985). Therefore we posit:

H4: Negative attitudes toward members of the threatening out-group (in thiscase*Muslims) will be higher for those who exhibit higher levels of fear ofanother terrorist attack than for those who exhibit lower levels of fear.

Fiske and Taylor (1984) argue that most individuals are cognitive misers and thus

frequently rely on simple and efficient strategies when evaluating information and

making decisions. Thus, as media frames or fear of terrorism enter the equation, the

impact of other factors can be suppressed. As Lang (2000) argues, an individuals

limited capacity to process information constrains the number of considerations

employed simultaneously in judgment making. This has led scholars such as Price et al.

(1997) and Lee, McLeod and Shah (2008) to propose that a hydraulic pattern of


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framing effects occurs. As Lee et al. (2008) explain, when one frame-induced

consideration has been accentuated, other relevant considerations will be suppressed in

the process of making subsequent judgments. Likewise, when one frame-induced

consideration is deactivated, other considerations are likely to be elevated (Lee et al.,

2008, p. 703).

Therefore, we expect participants who indicate high levels of fear, either pre-

experiment or as a result of the experimental manipulation, to suppress their normal

reliance on ideology and let fear dominate their responses. Likewise, if the hydraulic

pattern holds, we expect that the suppression of ideology in response to the domestic

frame will also result in a decrease in the importance of related considerations. Thus:

H5: In the presence of high fear of future attacks and exposure to homegrownterrorism media frames the reliance on political party affiliation in makingsubsequent judgments regarding restrictions of civil liberties will besuppressed.

Methods

This study incorporates a Solomon 4 group experimental design. The manip-

ulation,*through exposure to news frames*contains two conditions (internationalframes, domestic frames). In addition, party ID, and fear of future attacks, will also be

employed as independent variables. The dependent variables are (1) levels of support

for civil liberties restrictions in the U.S., (2) levels of support for international

counterterrorism efforts and aggressive punishment for international terrorists, and

(3) attitudes toward Muslims.

Participants

Email addresses for a random national adult population were purchased through the

Syracuse University StudyResponse Center which emailed 3000 individuals offering

raffle incentives in exchange for participation. A total of 371 individuals participated

in the online experiment. The sample demographic information is contained in the

discussion of results below. The participants were all United States citizens.

Procedures

The experiment was conducted in June 2008, long enough after the event for it to be

likely that participants would have forgotten the news coverage of the events. The

original 3,000 email address draw was randomly divided between four groups. A link

was emailed to one of four variations of the Internet based self-administered

questionnaire with embedded manipulation. Half of the participants received the

international frame video news report (experimental group 1) and the other half of

participants received the domestic homegrown frame video segment (experimental

group 2). 170 participants in experimental group 1 (international) and 201

participants in experimental group 2 (domestic) completed the survey. As per the

Solomon design, roughly half of each experimental group received the pre-tests and


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all participants received the post-test, enabling the monitoring of changes from the

pre-test to the post-test, while also determining if participants were affected by

the experimental manipulation and not simply the pre-test. The pre-test enabled the

compilation of a baseline from which to compare the groups prior to the

manipulation with past studies of similar attitudes. Following the online manipula-

tion participants completed the survey, and clicked submit, and then viewed a screen

thanking and debriefing them. Each participant was assigned a unique and

anonymous code which was entered into a raffle administered by the Syracuse

SurveyResponse Center.

Materials

Video segments from the actual newscasts of July 7, 2005 were acquired through

Vanderbilt Media Services and edited by the researchers to be equivalent in length

and format. They were approximately 10 minutes in length, and consisted of news

clippings depicting the two frames. Both manipulations began with the same short

(less than two minutes) episodic introduction presented by Brian Williams on the

NBC Nightly Newswhich provided basic factual information about the attacks and

contained neither international nor domestic threat frames.

The domestic manipulation included news segments and statements by Mr. Blair

indicating that the attacks were likely to have been initiated by London locals. Some

clips focused on the individual suspects and their local connections. The interna-

tional manipulation included news segments indicating that the attacks were

reminiscent of al Qaeda, or perhaps connected to attacks in other countries. It also

included clips of Mr. Bush connecting the incident to the larger war on terror. The

montages were transformed into YouTube videos and embedded in the Web based

survey which also included pre-tests and post-tests using several existing scales (see

below). The video segments were subjected to manipulation checks by two groups of

students at the authors university: those who watched the domestic manipulation

perceived the attacks to be homegrown, while those who watched the international

manipulation perceived the attacks to be connected to international terrorism.

Scales

To measure civil liberty restrictions, Davis and Silvers (2003) Civil Liberties Wave 2

Questionnaire was employed. To analyze results in more detail, the Davis and Silver

scale was divided into two indices. The first represented support for civil liberties

restrictions that affected everyone, including oneself, such as limitations on access to

information, or government monitoring of credit card information. The second

represented support for civil liberties restrictions that generally impacted others as

opposed to oneself and included questions related to racial profiling (see factor

analysis below).

Other scales included were: Stereotypical Attitudes toward Arabs, taken from

Brighams (1993) College Students Racial Attitudes and Stephan et al. (2002)s


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Negative Racial Attitudes; Threat Scales, taken from Davis and Silvers threat scales

(2004); Political Identification Scale, a four-item scale taken from Price et al. (1997);

Media Usage Scale, taken from the Pew 2003 dataset; and Demographic Background,

adapted from the 2007 dataset (The Pew Research Center for the People and the

Press, 2003, 2007). A few additional scales and subscales are discussed below in the

reliability and factor analysis section.

Pre-Test Effects on Scales

A pre-test was necessary in this experiment in order to compare attitudes prior to

manipulation exposure with past support for civil liberties restrictions (Davis & Silver,

2003). One-way ANOVAs confirmed that there were no significant differences among

groups prior to manipulation. The only difference of note was an age difference

(M3.962; pB.05). This was disregarded, as a 4-year difference in the span of our agegroups (2082) was not large enough to be generational (Mage 42.32; SD13.731).

One-way ANOVAs comparing post-tests of groups viewing identical manipula-

tions found some significant differences between groups, suggesting that some of our

subjects experienced pre-test effects. These results indicate that those exposed to the

pre-test were likely to have higher regard for Muslims in response to some items, as

well as being less supportive of civil liberty restrictions for both self and others. In

order to correct for these differences this study used the following techniques: (1)

Affected individual variables were eliminated from the attitudes towards Muslims

scale. (2) In analyzing affected variables of fear and willingness to give up civil

liberties, post-test only groups were used. (3) Civil liberties scales were created using

only variables that were not significantly affected by the pre-test.

Reliability & Factor Analysis

Principal-components factor analysis was utilized to confirm that the scale

components were measuring unique and distinct attitudes and exploratory factor

analysis was used to assist in creating sub-scales. Factor analysis uncovered two

distinct components into which the individual Davis & Silver (2003) civil liberties

questions loaded. Factors consistent with component 1 were ID cards (.820),

government monitoring (.681) overall decreased liberties for everyone (.739). Factors

consistent with component 2 were profiling (.636), investigating protestors (.671),

and arrest and detain non-citizen terrorist suspects (.784). The components that were

uncovered represent two distinct variables. Component 1 represents liberties that

would be imposed on oneself as well as others, whereas component 2 reflects

restrictions that most Americans would not experience, but that would be imposed

on others, such as Muslims. Thus, two separate variables were created (which we refer

to as restrictions on self and restrictions on others). We found high reliability for

both the restrictions on self scale (Cronbachs Alpha.841) and the restrictions onothers (Cronbachs alpha.783). The overall Davis and Silver (2003) civil libertiesscale also produced high reliability (Cronbachs Alpha.787). Since some of the


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individual components were affected by the pre-test, the scales were adjusted by

eliminating affected questions. Reliability coefficients were calculated after the

omission of these individual components.

The attitudes toward Muslims scale contained 16 final items and was adjusted by

eliminating variables affected by the pre-test and had high reliability (Cronbachs

Alpha.943). Finally, the scale containing questions related to support forinternational intervention and more aggressive behavior against accused terrorists,

also had high reliability (Cronbachs Alpha.870).

Results

Table 1 presents a summary of the important demographic and attitudinal

descriptors of the participants prior to their exposure to the manipulations.

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1A predicted that participants exposed to homegrown threat frames of

terrorist events will report higher levels of support for restricting domestic civil

Table 1 Participant Summary

Total Republicans Democrats

Age 42

GenderMale 51%Female 49%

Political PartyDemocrat 48%Republican 33%

EducationStarted College 74%Graduated College 37%Graduate School 13%

Fear of Future Attack 1.44 (M) 2.21 (M) 2.54 (M)(1very fearful; 4no fear)Willing to give up Civil 2.56 (M) 2.32 (M) 2.74 (M)Liberties for safety(1willing; 4unwilling)Support for Civil Liberties 1.59 (M) 1.47 (M) 1.68 (M)Restrictions on Self Scale(1support; 2 no support) 1.68 (M) 1.57 (M) 1.76 (M)Support for Civil LibertiesRestrictions on Others(1support; 2 no support)Attitudes Toward Muslims 4.47 (M) 3.97 (M) 4.82 (M)(1negative; 7positive)


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liberties than those participants exposed to the same terrorist events framed as

international. To test this hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA was run using SPSS.

Significant effects were found on both the Davis & Silver scale (pB .05; df1;F4.178) and the scale created to measure support for the restrictions on self scale(pB .01; df1; F6.893). These differences show that those exposed to thedomestic manipulation were significantly more likely to restrict civil liberties in

general, including on themselves, than those exposed to the international manipula-

tion. A one-way ANOVA showed no significant effects of the manipulation on the

scale specifically highlighting restrictions imposed on others.

Hypothesis 1B predicted that participants exposed to international threat frames

would report higher levels of support for more aggressive international security,

intervention and punishment than those participants exposed to the same terrorist

events framed as homegrown. A one-way ANOVA was run to test this hypothesis and

no significant effects between groups were uncovered in relation to their support for

more aggressive punishment of international terrorists and support for stronger

international counterterrorism policies (p.862; df1; F.030).In summary, although we did not find support for hypothesis 1B regarding the

international manipulation, we did find strong support for hypothesis 1A, so that

when terrorist events are framed as domestic, levels of support for restricting

domestic civil liberties will increase more than when the same terrorist events are

framed as international. This is especially significant since our sample consisted of

Americans who were not impacted by geographic proximity to the events and we can

thus be more confident that the increase is the result of the manipulated frames

rather than proximity to the attack, thus providing high levels of internal validity.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2A predicted that individuals identifying as Republicans will be more in

favor of civil liberties restrictions than those identifying as Democrats, regardless of

frame exposure. Hypothesis 2B predicted that the levels of support for international

security, intervention and punishment for international terrorists would be higher for

Republicans than Democrats, regardless of frame exposure. One-way ANOVAs found

significant differences between Republicans and Democrats in their support for

stronger international counterterrorism policies (pB.029; df1; F4.855); restric-tions on others civil liberties (pB.01; df1; F14.573); restrictions on self civilliberties (pB.01; df1; F12.872); and the overall Davis & Silver restrictions oncivil liberties scale (pB.01; df1; F11.792). These results support hypothesis 2.When directly asked how willing are you to give up civil liberties for curbing

terrorism Republicans were more willing than Democrats to give up liberties in

exchange for security. Party identification also had significant effects on attitudes

toward Muslims (pB .01; df4; F18.192. Democrats rated Muslims morefavorably than Republicans. As indicated in Table 1, on a scale of 17 (1negativenegative attitudes toward Muslims; 7positive attitudes toward Muslims), Demo-crats had a mean score of 4.82 and Republicans a mean score of 3.97.


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Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 predicted that both levels of support for restricting domestic civil

liberties and support for more aggressive international counterterrorism policies will

be higher for those with greater levels of fear of another terrorist attack, than for

those with lower levels of fear. A one-way ANOVA uncovered significant differences

in support for more aggressive international policies and punishment (pB.001;df1; F44.618); restriction of others civil liberties (pB.01; df1; F41.877);restriction of self civil liberties (pB.001; df1; F20.807); and the general Davis &Silver civil liberties scale (pB.001; df1; F43.178). The direction displayed ineach of these individual results suggests that, as hypothesized, those more fearful of a

future terrorist attack are more willing to restrict liberties, and show greater support

for more aggressive international policies.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 predicted that negative attitudes toward members of the perceived

threatening out-group will be higher for those who exhibit higher levels of fear of

another terrorist attack than for those who exhibit lower levels of fear.

The results indicate that fear had significant effects on attitudes toward Muslims

(pB.01; df4; F16.556). Those with higher levels of fear of another attack were alsomore likely to have more negative views of Muslims than those with lower fear levels. In

addition, those subjects with higher levels of fear about a future attack were more likely to

believe that Muslims are often involved in violent crimes (pB.001; df1; F36.528).

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 predicted that for participants with a high fear of future attacks who

were exposed to the domestic frame, the reliance on political party affiliation

(substituting for political ideology) would be suppressed. As noted above, Democrats

were found to be less supportive of civil liberties restrictions than Republicans. After

being exposed to the international manipulation, Democrats continued to be less

supportive than Republicans of civil liberties restrictions as measured via the Davis &

Silver civil liberties scale (pB.01; F9.316; M (1.48, 1.70)), the restrictions on selfscale (pB.05; F5.334; M (1.45, 1.67)), and restriction of others scale (pB.05;F8.618; M (1.5, 1.74)). However, following exposure to the domestic manipula-tion, no significant differences were found between Democrats and Republicans

related to any of the above scales. We posit that hydraulic patterns of effects between

party identification and exposure to varying types of media are at play here.

To investigate the hydraulic pattern, we employed a hierarchical regression analysis.

To do so, we considered the regression weights of both party identification and fear of

future attacks on the dependent variables, as analyzed independently for each media

frame condition. This enabled us to examine the extent to which respondents relied

on (a) party identification to form judgments regarding civil liberties, (b) the role of

fear of future attacks and (c) the interaction of these two variables with the media

frames presented.


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Tables 24 summarize the results from the regression analyses that predict supportfor varying levels of civil liberties. For each outcome variable, the same regression

models were estimated separately for the experimental conditions. The patterns

highlighted in the regression tables indicate suppression of party identification in the

presence of the domestic media frame condition. This pattern of results provides

support for Hypothesis 5 predicting that partisanship will be suppressed in the

Table 2 Results of Regression Models Predicting Support for Civil Liberties

Restrictions (Davis & Silver)

Experimental condition

Domestic frame International frame

Model 1Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.02 .23*Fear of Future Attack .14*** .38***R2 0.19 0.24Model 2Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.13 .02**R2 0.01 0.09


Restrictions on Others



Model 1Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.16 .20*Fear of Future Attack .45*** .44***R2 0.22 0.26Model 2Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.16 .31**R2 0.02 0.08


Restrictions of Self



Model 1Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.10 .17Fear of Future Attack .33** .30**R2 0.11 0.12Model 2Partisanship (Rep.Dem.) 0.12 .21**R2 0.01 0.03


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domestic frame condition. In all regression tables, entries are standardized ordinary

least squares (OLS) regression coefficients. Cell entries with different subscripts differ

in the hypothesized direction at the .05 level, one-tailed. Tests of difference in

coefficients across the frame conditions were not performed for the blocking variables

*p5.05, **p5.01, ***p5.001.

Discussion

Our results suggest that media framing of terrorism and other international crises

influences not only how the public perceives and reacts to an event, but also how the

public processes attitudes in the formation of judgments. In turn, this can affect

public opinion regarding government policy and the construction and maintenance

of minority stereotypes. Our data analyses yield interesting results regarding the

different ways that government influence on media can indirectly affect national

attitudes and attitude formation, and provide clear support for the impact of framing

on public perceptions and attitudes.

The results also reveal how domestic and international frames produce different

impacts. When terrorist events are framed as domestic or homegrown, individuals are

more likely to support civil-liberties restrictions. While this may not be surprising,

since we would expect increased security concerns following exposure to messages

that threaten perceptions of domestic security, we did not find support for hypothesis

1B, for which, given the post 9/11 concern with the international terrorist threat, we

expected similar results. If similar schema were activated by the international

manipulation, participants should have responded by increasing support for

international security measures. This raises the question of why the manipulation

worked for the domestic frame but not for the international frame, even though the

terrorism in question took place across the Atlantic. Perhaps there is more at work

here than simply the activation of domestic versus international security responses.

Since the domestic manipulation had a stronger impact, we would posit that the

international threat was perceived as less palpable. The domestic terror threat appears

to raise different anxieties and greater fear levels associated with the possibility of

terrorists within. Despite the fact that the event occurred in London and thus

involved an attack within another country, the domestic homegrown frame produced

a higher level of fear than did the international frame. It is possible that the domestic

homegrown frame reignited fears of such an event occurring in the United States,

which might explain the strong reaction.

As discussed, historically Democrats have been less supportive of restrictions on

civil liberties than Republicans. This study was conducted during the Presidency of

Republican George W. Bush and this should have reinforced the differences between

Democrats and Republicans. We did find support for hypothesis 3 that Democrats,

prior to manipulation exposure, would be less supportive of restrictions on civil

liberties than Republicans and this was the case for all the civil liberties scales. In

general, Democrats also consistently expressed more positive attitudes towards

Muslims. Further, prior to the experimental manipulation, we also found Democrats


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to be less supportive of torture or increasing punishment levels for international

terrorists (partially supporting hypothesis 4), and less willing to give up some

liberties in exchange for security. Although these results might seem obvious and

uninteresting, they provide a baseline from which to compare the effects of the

manipulations on the experimental subjects who identified as Republicans or

Democrats.

As indicated above, in regard to hypotheses one and two, the domestic

manipulation created greater fear levels. This becomes clearer when we look at the

results of the manipulation effects on the two different party IDs. When the effects of

party identification are measured on those exposed to the international manipula-

tion, we see the expected differences between Republicans and Democrats with regard

to all dependent variables. However, when we examine the effects of party ID on

those exposed to the domestic manipulation, all ideological differences disappear.

After viewing the domestic frame, significant differences between Democrats and

Republicans evaporate with regard to civil liberties. This result is consistent with the

regression analysis reported above. In attempting to predict the variables that were

more likely to indicate support for restrictions on others, party ID is eliminated from

the best-fit equation following the domestic manipulation but not after the

international manipulation. The same results occur for the models predicting

support for civil liberties in general. This aligns with our argument that the domestic

manipulation creates greater fear than the international manipulation. The domestic

frame creates effects that tend to suppress party identification. These findings parallel

results found in survey data following the London bombings, which led the authors

to conclude, Americans feared similar strikes in the United States. Because the

perpetrators of the deadly terrorism in London were identified as homegrown

Muslim extremists, there was a mass-mediated debate on the likelihood of terrorist

cells in the United States prepared to strike . . . (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2007,p. 57).

These findings suggest that when frames induce or increase one relevant

mechanism used in creating judgment, another existing mechanism will be

suppressed (Price et al., 1997). Thus in this study, high levels of fear and high threat

acted to suppress partisanship in the formation of judgments about counterterrorism

policies. While it has been argued that in some situations suppression of party

identification may lead to deeper, and perhaps more thoughtful processing because

individuals are not forming judgments based on group membership alone (see

Elaboration Likelihood Model; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), we believe that the

suppression of party identification may simply make more room for emotional

fear-driven judgments. This is consistent with Cho et al.s (2003) study, which found

that emotional reactions are often caused by televised news exposure with dramatic

images as opposed to in-depth newsprint coverage.

In contrast, after viewing the domestic manipulation, the ANOVAs indicate that

party ID still appears related to attitudes towards Muslims. However, the regression

models predicting attitudes toward Muslims indicate that party ID is suppressed

when fear is added to the model. Huddy et al. (2005) argue that high anxiety will lead


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to increased support for domestic actions and restrictions on liberties due to a need

to reduce anxiety. However, they also found that anxiety has no substantial impact

on policies directed at Arabs or the endorsement of Arab stereotypes (p. 602). While

we recognize the differences between Arab and Muslim, it is important to note

stereotype conflation in the minds of Americans, and we employ the comparison for

illustrative purposes (see Gualtieri, 2009).

The only variable found to have the power to suppress ideological differences with

respect to attitudes toward Muslims is high fear of a future attack. Those expressing

higher fear were more likely than those with lower fear levels to support civil liberties

restrictions and international intervention, and indicated less favorable attitudes

towards Muslims. In addition, the results indicated that higher levels of fear also

suppressed the reliance on party identification in judgment formation of attitudes

toward Muslims. When fear levels were high, no significant differences were found

distinguishing Democrats from Republicans on any of the scales (i.e., support for

civil liberties restriction, international support, and attitudes toward Muslims). This

was further supported in the regression analysis, which again shows party

identification dropping out of the best-fit equation only for those viewing the

domestic manipulation, leaving fear as the main predictor of decreasing positive

attitudes toward Muslims.

The suppression of differences between Democrats and Republications when high

fear is present not only supports the occurrence of the hydraulic effect of framing, but

also raises an interesting issue regarding which attitudes are most easily manipulated.

The data suggest that it is more difficult to increase negative, prejudicial attitudes

toward Muslims than it is to increase support for restrictions on Muslims civil

liberties. This would indicate that although authorities may be able to garner support

in times of fear towards more restrictive policies on out-groups, greater sensitivity

may hold people back from directly expressing negative attitudes toward the same

out-group.

These results may demonstrate what Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) label the

aversive racism effect, wherein individuals exhibit prejudices against minorities

only if they threaten majority values; or what McConahay labels modern racism

(McConahay, 1986) wherein individuals tend to express their prejudicial attitudes

more subtly or politely. The argument is that as a result of changing social norms and

the importance of political correctness, individuals tend to communicate expressions

of prejudice indirectly, sometimes in the form of support for or against race-based

policies with liberals likely to engage in aversive racism, while conservatives were

more likely to engage in modern racism (Nail, Harton & Decker, 2003). This study

confirms such predilections, with Republicans found to be more likely than

Democrats to support policies that infringe on minority civil liberties, which is

representative of modern racism. Democrats, however, became more likely to support

restrictions on minority liberties when faced with the fear of the domestic

homegrown threat, which is representative of aversive racism. The media impact

on aversive and modern racism needs to be investigated more thoroughly as such

effects can be severe, yet because they often go unrecognized, they are more difficult


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to address than the more traditional or direct forms of racism (Pearson, Dovidio, &

Gaertner, 2009).

Conclusion

This study created experimental conditions to examine the differences between

domestic and international media framing of a terrorist attack. We find that the

domestic frame, portraying the terrorist attack as arising from within the country

impacted more significantly on subjects than the international frame in terms of

attitudes towards Muslims and willingness to restrict civil liberties. Thus, we find that

the differing frames the UK and US governments adopted, as identified by Brinson

and Stohl (2010), led to different levels of support for counterterrorism policies as

well as different processes of judgment formation. These findings highlight some of

the consequences of long-standing journalistic conventions, which yield consistent

structural reporting biases that include privileging authority in the framing of news

reporting (see Bennett, 2002, p. 58).

When the message of the government elite is reinforced throughout all levels of the

framing process, it may affect the publics support of government policies and

reinforce minority stereotypes and justifications for aversive racism. As this study

demonstrates, frame manipulation produces significant impacts on individual

attitudes. An interesting question in light of the results is the role of government

intention. By framing events as international and connected to al Qaeda, President

Bush remained consistent with his previous messages about supporting the war on

terror. He did not invoke the Patriot Act and the need for domestic restrictions on

civil liberties. Importantly, the results suggest that Mr. Bushs frame would not

generate increased support for his administrations counterterrorism policy, which, in

addition to the international war on terror, included the curtailment of civil liberties.

We had anticipated that the international frame, in as much that the events had

occurred in the UK, would have far more impact on our subjects than it did.

In contrast, Prime Minister Blairs framing of the events as homegrown deflected

discussion of the possible link to British participation in the War in Iraq and

suggested that higher levels of concern with Muslim minorities as well as greater

support for restricting British Muslim civil liberties were warranted. This framing led

to a substantial program of monitoring and surveillance of the UKs Muslim

Community and a fairly aggressive counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST). The

strategy includes the PREVENT policy which aggressively targeted the Muslim

Community and has been the subject of much scholarly criticism (see, for example,

Heath-Kelly 2012) as well as a critical government review (completed in January

2011) (Carlile, 2011).

Expanding the current study to examine United Kingdom citizens reactions would

be useful to gauge the strength of frame impact in conjunction with existing schema.

The dominant media messages in the UK consistently frame terrorism as a domestic

concern and given this studys results, we would expect more significant impacts from

the priming effects of the domestic manipulation. This would also provide a further


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test of the hydraulic effect to see if the domestic threat suppresses political ideology in

British participants, as was the case for American subjects. It would also be important

to determine whether a British sample would exhibit the same pattern respect to the

international frame as US participants.

The processes involved in the publics formation of judgments and general

opinions are important for understanding the cognitive effects of media framing and

for understanding the development of subtle attitude shifts following traumatic acts

of terrorism. The impact of events causing high levels of fear in combination with

consistent exposure to certain message frames can lead to changes in racial, ethnic,

and religious attitudes and shape counterterrorism policies. These cognitive effects of

media framing and subtle attitudes shifts are especially significant in a globalised

world of increasingly multicultural societies. Media frames can influence the extent to

which inhabitants of a country accept or reject, or become fearful of others,*religious, ethnic or racial*living among them. Given the unfortunate likelihood thatdemocratic societies will continue to be the victims of future terrorist events, it is

crucial that we gain greater understanding of the implications of the interaction

between government positioning, media framing of events and the subsequent policy

choices democratic polities make.

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