Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism

Ronald Crelinsten

polity

Copyright © Ronald Crelinsten 2009

The right of Ronald Crelinsten to be identified as Author of this Work has beenasserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2009 by Polity Press

Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press350 Main StreetMalden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposeof criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the priorpermission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4293-2ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4294-9 (paperback)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.25 on 13 pt FF Scalaby Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, CheshirePrinted and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs forexternal websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time ofgoing to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websitesand can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is orwill remain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have beeninadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to include anynecessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk.

Contents

Acknowledgments Page vii

Introduction. Terrorism and counterterrorismbefore and after 9/11 1

1 The context for counterterrorism: a complexsecurity environment 17

2 Coercive counterterrorism 48

3 Proactive counterterrorism 89

4 Persuasive counterterrorism 122

5 Defensive counterterrorism 158

6 Long-term counterterrorism 194

Conclusion. A comprehensive counterterrorismstrategy 235

Notes 251Select bibliography 302Index 314

v

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Louise Knight, commissioning editor atPolity Press, who invited me to write this inaugural book forPolity’s new series, “Understanding Terrorism.” Thanks,too, to Emma Hutchison, who took over from Louise whenshe went on maternity leave; Clare Ansell, production editor;and Leigh Mueller, copy editor; as well as the entire Polityteam.

Anonymous reviewers, both at the proposal stage and at themanuscript stage, provided very useful comments and sugges-tions that helped me improve the focus, the structure, and thecontent of the present work. Of course, all errors or omissionsare my own.

Portions of the following works were revised, updated, orexpanded for use in this book:Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Counterterrorism as Global

Governance: A Research Inventory,” in Magnus Ranstorp(ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps andFuture Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 210–35.

Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analysing Terrorism and Counter- terrorism: A Communication Model,” Terrorism and PoliticalViolence 14(2) (2002): 77–122.*

Ronald D. Crelinsten and Iffet Özkut, “CounterterrorismPolicy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights,”in Fernando Reinares (ed.), European Democracies AgainstTerrorism: Governmental Policies and IntergovernmentalCooperation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 245–71.

vii

Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Discourse and Practice ofCounterterrorism in Liberal Democracies,” AustralianJournal of Politics and History 44(3) (1998): 389–413.

Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Television and Terrorism: Implicationsfor Crisis Management and Policy-Making,” Terrorism andPolitical Violence 9(4) (1997): 8–32.*

Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, “Western Responsesto Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet,” in A. P.Schmid and R. D. Crelinsten (eds.), Western Responses toTerrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 307–40.

viii Acknowledgments

* The periodical Terrorism and Political Violence can be accessed atthe publisher’s website, www.informaworld.com.

Introduction. Terrorism andcounterterrorism before andafter 9/11

Terrorism is a specific form of violence, one that is character-ized by its communicative function.1 Whether used by state ornonstate actors, in the interests of government or against theinterests of government, the victims of terrorism function assigns in a propaganda war. The bomb attacks, the hijackings,the assassinations, the torture, the disappearances, the mas-sacres, all function to convey messages to audiences beyondtheir immediate victims. The selection of victims is both sym-bolic and instrumental. In the case of selective assassination,kidnappings, or bomb attacks, the victims are often repre -sentatives of the State or some power elite. In the case of disappearances or torture, they are often members of social orpolitical movements that are dedicated to reforming the Stateor altering the power structure. In the case of international ter-rorism, they are often citizens of states that are power-brokerswithin the world order or some smaller sphere of influence, orrepresentatives of their governments. In all these cases, thevictim is chosen because of whom she or he represents andbecause their victimization will resonate with specific audi-ences, either in generating fear or exhilaration, or in affectingallegiances and behavior. Even in the case of the most indis-criminate violence, such as machine-gunning of tourists inairports, the car bomb in city streets, the suicide bomber in amass transport system, the massacre of villagers, or the attacksof September 11, the lack of discrimination between combatantand noncombatant, between involved and uninvolved, between

1

active supporter and passive sympathizer, between innocentand guilty, has a symbolic function. What one analyst hascalled the “politics of atrocity”2 is designed to attract wide-spread attention through the shock value of the attack. Thegruesome beheading of hostages in Iraq is a more recentexample of this kind of shock terrorism.

This victimization of noncombatants or innocents for thepurposes of gaining public recognition for particular causes orimposing specific demands on third parties has been a featureof political life at various times and in various places for cen-turies, although it has not always been called “terrorism.” Whileoriginally linked with the revolutionary terror of the FrenchRevolution, and therefore the action of states, in its modern vari-ant “terrorism” became a common word in public discourse inthe late 1960s, when Palestinians turned to hijacking airplanesand Latin American guerrillas turned to kidnapping diplomats.In the ensuing decades, terrorism has been used by nationalistsseeking new nations or wishing to secede from existing ones, byrevolutionaries seeking to overthrow governments and to estab-lish new regimes, by governments seeking to destabilize othergovernments or to control their own nationals either at home orabroad, and by fanatics and zealots pursuing a variety of socialand religious causes. In the 1990s and culminating with theSeptember 11 attacks in 2001 by Al Qaeda, terrorism hasbecome a global phenomenon that transcends national andeven hemispheric boundaries. The US-led war in Afghanistandestroyed the command and control center of Al Qaeda and ledto its decentralization and dispersion. This, in turn, led to theoutsourcing of terror attacks to sympathetic or like-minded affil-iates in countries throughout Southeast Asia, North Africa, andthe Middle East, including Indonesia (Bali), Morocco, SaudiArabia, and Turkey. With the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, alightning rod for terrorists and extremists was created in thecenter of the Middle East, and with the 2004 Madrid bombings

2 Counterterrorism

and the 2005 London bombings, Europe became a major sta -ging area for Al-Qaeda-inspired attacks by disgruntled or alien-ated citizens inflamed by internet images and propaganda.3 TheUS-led “war on terror” has also become a master narrativethat subsumes and simultaneously disguises many other conflicts, both domestic and international, whether Israeli/Palestinian, Russian/Chechen, Chinese/Uighur,4 Kashmiri(India/ Pakistan), or Spanish/Basque. One analyst argues thatCentral Asian states “have exploited the context of the global‘war on terrorism,’ as well as the fear of Islamic extremism,tojustify and intensity their suppression of dissent,without muchconcern about international condemnation.”5

Used as a stand-alone strategy, terrorism is often consideredthe weapon of the weak: the insurgents or nation-builders wholack the material resources and the mass support necessary forsustained guerrilla warfare, armed insurrection, or a full-scalewar of national liberation, or the government that lacks thenecessary legitimacy to govern within the rule of law and thedemocratic forum of public debate and open dissent. Used asone tactic in a larger strategy of armed conflict or within awider array of violent and nonviolent political action, terrorismis prized for its economy: kill one, frighten 10,000; actionsspeak louder than words; propaganda by the deed. Because itsaim reaches beyond its immediate victim and because it isplanned in secret and enacted without warning, terrorismcommands attention while demanding few resources andmanpower. Even what one analyst calls the “wholesale terror-ism” of states6 requires less infrastructure, management, andresources than do police forces and military organizationswhich follow the rule of law, whether domestic or interna-tional, and remain accountable to political authority and, in thecase of excesses or systematic abuses, to criminal justice.

The definition of terrorism is fraught with difficulties.7

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism,

Introduction 3

although the United Nations has tried for a long time toachieve consensus among its Member States. One of the mainsticking points has been the resistance by post-colonial statesand other Third World states, including many Arab ones, touniversally condemning the practice when conducted bygroups resisting oppression or occupation. The well-knowncliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,”encapsulates the problem. A common approach in interna-tional legal conventions has been to avoid defining terrorismaltogether and to focus on terrorist tactics alone (see chapter2). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed adefinition that confines terrorism to acts against civilians andnoncombatants.8 The problem here is that this merely shiftsthe debate from what constitutes terrorism to what constitutesinnocent civilians and noncombatants. One analyst has sug-gested, for example, that “in societies highly integrated withreciprocity, . . . there is no accepted notion of individual inno-cence. All in-group members are responsible to the group, andshare responsibility for the actions of others within it. . . . Ifthere is conflict, all members of the out-group are enemiesworthy of discrimination.”9

In this volume, and in accordance with the centrality of com-munication in terrorist threat and violence, terrorism will beconceived as a form of violent communication or coercive persuasion. In defining terrorism, therefore, a behavioralapproach will be taken rather than a motive-based or perpetrator-based approach. A “behavioral approach” means that terror-ism will be conceived as a tool of coercive persuasion in a widevariety of power relationships, not just that of the insurgentwho contests the power of the State. The definition will focuson what terrorists do, rather than who they are (perpetrator-based approach) or why they do what they do (motive-basedapproach). This is because defining terrorism in terms of whois acting or why they are doing so opens the way to selective

4 Counterterrorism

definitions that are truncated for ideological, political, or epis-temological reasons. The bulk of the terrorism literaturefocuses exclusively on insurgent terrorism and many works,though admitting that state terrorism exists and may even bethe more pervasive and the more deadly form of terrorism,then proceed to exclude state terrorism from their object ofstudy.

A narrow focus on insurgent forms of terrorism separates thenonstate actor from the larger context within which he actsand, in particular, from the behaviour of state actors. Moralcondemnation of outrageous acts of violence can blind theresearcher and the policy maker to the place of terrorismin a wider range of options available to the non-state actor.Because other options exist, the choice of terrorism is viewedas an irrational choice, a symptom of pathology. What thenpasses as scientific discourse is really polemics, where con-ceptual typologies become catalogues of pejorative labels.The muddled state of definitions in the field of terrorismstems directly from this narrowing of conceptual frameworksto just those actors whose goals we find unacceptable. Bydefining terrorism by the context in which it occurs ratherthan as a tool of political communication which can be usedin a wide variety of contexts, we preclude the possibility ofanything more than a superficial understanding of a narrowaspect of the phenomenon.10

Viewed as a particular kind of coercive/persuasive tool, itbecomes apparent that terrorism can occur in the context ofcriminal activity (crime), as much as within a political or awar context (insurgency/revolution). It can also be commit-ted by state agents as much as by insurgents or politicalcriminals. In fact, the use of torture has often been justifiedas a necessary weapon against insurgents and terroristsand has played a central part in terrorist regimes thathave evolved from counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaigns.11

Introduction 5

Using this behavioral approach, terrorism will be defined as:

the combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret andusually executed without warning, that is directed against one setof targets (the direct victims) in order to coerce compliance or tocompel allegiance from a second set of targets (targets of demands)and to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (target of terroror target of attention).

What this definition makes clear is that there are multipleaudiences to the terrorist act and that not all these audiencesexperience fear or terror. The act of victimizing captures theattention of a variety of audiences and allows the terrorist tocommunicate more specific messages tailored to each one.The message need not be articulated in words; it can be sym-bolic (conveyed by the target selected, for example) or simplyshocking (conveyed by the indiscriminate nature of the attackor the importance of the person targeted). This is classic prop-aganda by the deed. The attacks of September 11, for example,were not accompanied by any specific demands, though somewere articulated later in the videotaped statements of Osamabin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, but the symbolism ofthe World Trade Center and the Pentagon being struck – andpossibly the US Capitol – and the horrific toll of lives lost,including the passengers and crews of four planes, conveyed acomplex set of messages that were clear to everyone. If terror-ism is seen as a particular form of violent, coercive communi-cation, then one can escape the ideological trap surroundingits definition. If freedom fighters use terrorism as part of theirstrategy, then they are terrorists; if counterterrorists use terror-ism as part of theirs, then they are terrorists as well. The ques-tion then turns to why different actors, nonstate or state, useterrorism, and this leads, in turn, to a consideration of context.

To fully understand terrorism and how it emerges and develops within a society, however defined, it is important toanalyze the targets, tactics, motivations, and modus operandi

6 Counterterrorism

of terrorist groups. This is the who, what, why, and how of ter-rorism. It is also important to look at those people, groups,communities, or institutions – whether subnational, national,international, or transnational – with which the group inter-acts. This is one aspect of the wider context within which suchgroups operate. It is also imperative to look at what the mem-bers of the group were doing before they got into terrorism,what social and political climate existed then, and what kindsof control measures were used to deal with social and politicalprotest during that time. This is the temporal dimension ofthat wider context within which any group operates. In otherwords, the spatial and temporal background of terrorist activitymust be analyzed in order to fully grasp the context fromwhich any terrorist group emerges and within which it oper-ates. Part of this spatial and temporal background is the set ofinstitutional measures taken in response to ongoing or previ-ous social and political activity, including violent forms such asterrorism. An important element, therefore, in understandingterrorism is an appreciation of the forms that counterterror-ism takes. This includes understanding how particular formsof terrorism can lead to the emergence of particular forms ofresponse.

The danger that terrorism poses to democratic values andthe way of life that they permit stems not just from terroristthreats and violence and the vulnerabilities that terroristsexploit, but from the ways in which societies think about them,talk about them, prepare for them, respond to them, andrecover from their impact. One analyst goes so far as to suggestthat the US “war on terror” poses a greater threat than the terrorism it is trying to combat.12 This striking assertion high-lights the fact that discourse and action are intimately related.How people talk about problems, frame them, and concept -ualize them often determines what they do about them.Conversely, the way people deal with problems can often limit

Introduction 7

the ways in which they perceive them, restricting their imagi-nation and narrowing their options. These conceptual and ideological filters can make it more difficult to understand aproblem in all its facets.

For example, since the attacks of September 11 and the ensu-ing “war on terror,” counterterrorism has come to be viewedprimarily in military terms. This has led to emotional andpolemical debates about the very fundamentals of democraticlife as they relate to the nature of the terrorist threat and how todeal with it.13 When critics of this militarized approach to coun-terterrorism voice concerns about the rule of law and protec-tion of human rights, they are often met with the disdainfulreproach: “you’re so September 10!” This is sometimes coupledwith the remark, “you just don’t get it.” What critics of the “waron terror” supposedly “don’t get” is that “we are at war” with an“implacable foe” who cannot be reasoned with or deterred bythreat of retaliation, who is out to kill as many of us as possible,and who must be eliminated in order for victory to be achieved.This might take a very long time, even generations, and untilwe succeed, things like due process, rights for detainees, limitsto interrogation techniques, judicial control and oversight, andcounterweights to executive power are luxuries at best, andserious impediments to the effective prosecution of the war onterror at worst. In the words of US Justice Department spokes-woman Kathleen M. Blomquist, “The United States cannotafford to retreat to a pre-September 11 mind-set that treats terrorism solely as a domestic law enforcement problem.”14

During the 2004 US presidential campaign, Democratic candidate John Kerry was excoriated for suggesting that coun-terterrorism is primarily a question of law enforcement. Afterthe 2006 London bomb plot to explode airplanes with liquidexplosives was exposed, an anonymous Bush Administrationofficial continued to argue that the Democrats “do not have theunderstanding or the commitment to take on these [jihadist]

8 Counterterrorism

forces. It’s like John Kerry. The law enforcement approachdoesn’t work.”15

The idea that “September 10 thinking” “treats terrorismsolely as a domestic law enforcement problem” can be consid-ered a discursive tactic similar to the rhetorical device of set-ting up a straw man. Counterterrorism before the 9/11 attackswas actually not confined solely to domestic law enforcement.The argument that “we are at war” reflects the “new terror-ism” thesis16 which suggests that terrorism today is funda-mentally different from what it was previously.17 Before 9/11,terrorism was primarily seen as a form of crime; after 9/11 ithas been transformed into a new form of warfare. This wardiscourse can be called “September 12 thinking” to distin-guish it from the “September 10 thinking” that it invents as afoil for its arguments. “September 12 thinking” views terror-ism and counterterrorism post-9/11 from within a particularframework, but it also confines pre-9/11 thinking about terrorism and counterterrorism within a different frameworkthat is seen to be passé, obsolete, and out of date. As such,“September 10 thinking” is an invention of “September 12thinking” – a kind of projection which creates a straw man toargue with and criticize. They are two sides of the same coin,which represents narrow, conceptual models that distort thenature of the phenomenon to be dealt with and limit policyoptions.

It is true that counterterrorism before September 11 did privilege the rule of law, but it also emphasized internationalcooperation, policy harmonization across domestic and inter-national jurisdictions, and, indeed, the rule of law, respect forhuman rights, and the primacy of law enforcement over themilitary option.18 The latter was always included in the coun-terterrorism toolbox, but usually as a last resort and, in thecase of aid to civil power, under the control of civilian author-ity. The use of force was often a tool of last resort in prolonged

Introduction 9

hostage sieges, for example.19 International humanitarian law,including the Geneva Conventions, was not usually a part ofthe discourse since a war model of counterterrorism was notthe norm. When international humanitarian law was dis-cussed, it was usually in the context of explicitly excluding it asirrelevant to counterterrorism.20 Since 9/11, internationalhumanitarian law has come under increasing scrutiny as crit-ics of the “war on terror” attempt to develop a legal frameworkfor a primarily military approach to counterterrorism.21 It istrue that during the 1980s and, in particular, the Reagan years,a precursor of “September 12 thinking” did exist22 and some-times prevailed. An example was the 1986 US bombing ofLibya. However, its military character was limited in scopeand usually was a part of an overall “hard-line” approach. Acommon characteristic of this early discourse, for example,was an insistence on no negotiations with terrorists under anycircumstances.23

Despite the militarized discourse and practice associatedwith the post-9/11 “war on terror,” counterterrorism can actu-ally take many forms. The polarization between “September 12thinking” and “September 10 thinking” is a shortcut repre -sentation of the ideological divide that characterizes muchcontemporary discussion of counterterrorism. This ongoingideological debate forms a kind of backdrop to any attempt tounderstand the complexities and challenges that counteringterrorism faces in today’s world. Each side highlights thestrengths of their favored approach, while emphasizing theweaknesses of the other side. This introduces a background ofdistortion – a kind of white noise – for anyone attempting tounderstand counterterrorism and to formulate policy in thisimportant domain. Figure I.1 depicts this by presenting anadaptation of the classic illusion of the vase and two faces thatalternate as each other’s backgrounds. The vase represents ourunderstanding of counterterrorism in all its facets, while the

10 Counterterrorism

two faces represent the polarized discourse on the nature ofterrorism and how to combat it, as represented by thedichotomy between “September 10 thinking” and “September12 thinking.” As we focus on the counterterrorism vase, ourmind’s eye suddenly becomes aware of the polarized discoursein the background (the faces). This then becomes the focus ofattention for a while, only to be supplanted once again by thevase as one continues to try and comprehend the complete pic-ture. Many assumptions about the subjects that people studyare not really conscious, even though they inform the way theytalk about them and the way they define and conceptualizethem. Although the goal of social science is to be objective,even scientists and researchers cannot always prevent theirfeelings and emotions from affecting how they think about dif-ficult issues and challenging problems. This is certainly true ofthe study of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Not all counterterrorism experts or terrorism analysts fall onone side of the divide depicted in figure I.1, and both kinds ofthinking existed before the attacks of 9/11 and persisted there-after. The dichotomy between “September 10 thinking” and

Introduction 11

COUNTER

TERRORISM

You’re soSeptember 12!

You’re soSeptember 10!

Figure I.1 Seeing counterterrorism through ideological filters: thepolarized discourse revolving around 9/11

“September 12 thinking” can be characterized as another ver-sion of the more traditional dichotomy between hard-line andsoft-line counterterrorism policies. Policy disagreementsbefore 9/11 were certainly intense at times. Yet the post-9/11period and the ensuing “war on terror” have been character-ized by profound disagreements over the kind of threats we arefaced with, the kinds of responses required, the institutionswhich should be responsible for this response, and the time-frame within which an effective response can be accom-plished. Table I.1 summarizes the main differences across themost important variables.

“September 10 thinking” emphasizes legal approaches tocounterterrorism, privileging the rule of law, internationalcooperation, and understanding the root causes of terrorism.While the military option is considered an indispensable partof the overall counterterrorism arsenal, it is seen as a tool oflast resort, whose use must be legitimized and carefully con-trolled. The range of terrorist threats is seen as wide anddiverse and the importance of understanding root causes andlocal contexts is recognized. Diplomacy and negotiations areconsidered important counterterrorism tools, particularly inthe international arena. As far as state sponsors of terrorismare concerned, the preferred strategy is deterrence and con-tainment. “September 12 thinking” emphasizes the militaryapproach to counterterrorism, privileging the use of forceand legitimizing it by changing the legal rules of the game ifnecessary, unilateral action by those capable of acting ifothers refuse or are incapable of cooperating, a heightenedfocus on state sponsorship of terrorism and weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) / chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, particularly in the context of iden-tifying rogue (axis of evil) and failed states, the supplanting ofdeterrence and containment by a doctrine of preemptivedefence, and a singular emphasis on one form of globalized

12 Counterterrorism

Introduction 13

Table I.1 “September 10 thinking” and “September 12 thinking”compared.

September 10 thought September 12 thoughtterrorist threat - terrorist threat is - terrorist threat is perception diverse (domestic; uniform and primarily

transnational; global (Salafist–Jihadi)international)- terrorist threat is - terrorist threat is newevolving - terrorism is primarily a - terrorism is a newcrime form of warfare

terrorist use of WMD/ - unlikely - likelyCBRNimportance of state - not a primary focus - a primary focus (axissponsorship of evil)importance of root - a primary focus - not a primary focuscausespreferred - criminal justice model - war modelcounterterrorism approachattitude towards rule - of central importance; - luxury at best;of law, human rights must be respected hindrance at worst;law, and international can be circumventedhumanitarian law or compromised in the

interests of effectivecounterterrorism

attitude towards the - unacceptable; - acceptable underuse of torture in evidence based certain controlled interrogation on torture not circumstances;

admissible in court evidence based ontorture admissible incourt

place of military - last resort and only in - central and primaryoption in overall aid of civil power role; civil power iscounterterrorism secondarystrategykind of power - soft power; diplomacy - hard power; threatspreferred in dealing and negotiation and sanctions; militarywith state sponsors strikespreferred international - deterrence and - preemption,strategy containment including missile

defenceattitude towards - international - international alliances and cooperation essential cooperation desired,international - multilateralism but not essentialcooperation preferred - unilateralism if

necessary

terrorism: Salafist–Jihadist terrorism of the Al Qaeda brand.Both approaches, taken alone, make sense in certain contextsand situations. Both exhibit serious limitations in other con-texts or can trigger unintended consequences in particularsituations.

The main aim of this book is to provide the reader with aclear understanding of the full variety of counterterrorismapproaches that exist and the kinds of variables that underlietheir differences. This will involve moving beyond the polar-ized discourse represented in table I.1, highlighting both thestrengths and weaknesses of each side’s favored approach, aswell as considering other options that neither side empha-sizes. The result will be a comprehensive survey that helps thereader to see through the ideological filters that often colorpeople’s understanding of counterterrorism and to grasp thecomplete picture that neither side permits. In keeping with theoverall series of which this book is a part, the idea is to helpthe reader to understand the complexities and challengesrelated to countering terrorism in the contemporary world andto appreciate the full range of options available. The contrastbetween “September 10 thinking” and “September 12 think-ing” can aid in understanding how conceptions of terrorismand its place in today’s security environment can determinethe particular approach taken to counterterrorism and theinstitutions that are marshaled to combat it.

Chapter 1 looks at the wider security environment withinwhich terrorism exists today. This will provide the broader con-text for examining counterterrorism. It is an important firststep, since it helps to understand the full range of securitythreats in today’s world and how terrorism fits into the largersecurity framework. The following five chapters examine dif-ferent types of counterterrorism.

Chapter 2 analyzes the two most commonly used models ofcounterterrorism: the criminal justice model and the war

14 Counterterrorism

model.24 Each model allows the state to exercise its monopolyon the use of violence, but each places strict limits on howthis violence is to be used. The debate about whether theSeptember 11 attacks by Al Qaeda constituted criminal acts oracts of war will be used to illustrate the tendency for these twomodels of counterterrorism to blur into each other.

Chapter 3 considers proactive approaches to counterterror-ism that are concerned primarily with stopping the terroristbefore s/he takes action. This is sometimes called preventivecounterterrorism or simply anti-terrorism. It can include awide variety of activities, ranging from risk and threat assess-ment and target hardening to preemption. However, the pri-mary focus of the chapter will be on the intelligence function,blocking terrorist financing, and the particular challenges thatcountering secret activity poses for the police, the security serv-ices, and the military. More “defensive” preventive aspects willbe examined in chapter 5 (see below).

Chapter 4 looks at the communicative dimension of coun-terterrorism. Propaganda, psychological warfare, hearts andminds campaigns, and the idea of providing incentives for ter-rorists to abandon violence and seek nonviolent paths insteadall refer to this notion of counterterrorism as a form of com-munication. The chapter begins by examining two forms of“coercive persuasion” – deterrence and preemption – and thenturns to the use of “soft power” or the propaganda dimensionof counterterrorism. As such, it looks at political, social, cul-tural, and religious aspects of terrorism and counterterrorismand the importance of psychological operations (psyops).

Chapter 5 focuses on the kinds of preventive or protectivemeasures that can be taken to minimize the risk of terroristattack or to mitigate the impact of attacks that are carried out.Issues include target hardening, critical infrastructure protec-tion, crisis management, emergency preparedness, conse-quence management, contingency planning and gaming, civil

Introduction 15

defense, and the promotion of citizen resilience in the face ofterrorist threat and attack. Defensive models of counterterror-ism treat terrorism, even of the mass-casualty variety, as one ofmany threats to public health or like any major disaster orcatastrophe, whether man-made or not. Emphasis is placednot only on making it harder for terrorists to strike in the firstplace, but also on the social and psychological consequences ofterrorist attack and how to minimize them.

Chapter 6 focuses on the kinds of counterterrorism initia-tives that do not promise quick fixes, but play out in the longterm. This includes the realm of “root causes” and the morestructural factors that can create a suitable climate for the pro-motion and use of terrorism by ideologues and zealots. Somuch counterterrorism is focused on the short term, simplybecause the electoral horizon of most governments is so short,usually not exceeding five years. Structural factors usually playout over much longer periods than that – what the French historian Fernand Braudel calls “la longue durée” or the longterm.25 The chapter will focus on the kinds of long-term strate-gies that hold out promise for changing the environment inwhich terrorism thrives, as well as the difficulties and chal-lenges that these strategies face.

The Conclusion brings everything together and evaluatesthe extent to which a comprehensive counterterrorism strategycan be achieved that would provide a framework for security inthe twenty-first century while preserving the values that under-lie democratic and global governance.

16 Counterterrorism

chapter one

The context forcounterterrorism: a complexsecurity environment

During the Cold War, the world of terrorism and political vio-lence was viewed through the bipolar lenses of East vs. West,Communism vs. Capitalism, Evil vs. Good. Definitional andtypological complexities were papered over by Cold Warriorsintent on forcing all conflicts into a Procrustean bed of aSoviet-sponsored, international terror network intent on desta-bilizing and subverting the West.1 This resulted in several dis-tinct trends in the terrorism literature, particularly during the1970s and early 1980s:

• a tendency to focus exclusively on international andtransnational terrorism and to ignore domestic terrorism orto cast it in a transnational light. This often involved strip-ping national conflicts of their social, political, and culturalcontexts so as to more easily characterize the conflict as theresult of Soviet influence;

• a tendency to ignore right-wing terrorism and to focusexclusively on left-wing terrorism. This was facilitated bythe first trend, since many left-wing terrorist groups eithercooperated internationally/transnationally or else used aninternationalist rhetoric, claiming common goals with com-rades and brethren throughout the world in their commonfight against Western (US) imperialism and colonialism;2

• a tendency to focus primarily on insurgent terrorism and toignore state terrorism, particularly of the variety used byWestern- and particularly US-sponsored “authoritarian”

17

regimes. This may be why the state terrorism of the Shah ofIran, for example, was tolerated (and, it may be argued,facilitated, through technology transfer and police train-ing) – until the Khomeini Revolution put an end to it in1979 and replaced it with another form;3

• a willful blindness to any evidence of a US-sponsored terrornetwork intent on destabilizing and subverting the Easternbloc and creating market opportunities in the Third World.4

While the United States focused primarily on international ter-rorism, mainly because United States nationals were primetargets, the Soviet Union focused primarily on the danger ofdomestic terrorism. Much of the Cold-War-era terrorist litera-ture took on a Manichaean flavor with titles such as How theWest Can Win.5 The enemy was clear and academic analysisoften tended to cast itself in a cheering mode for increas- ingly militaristic policy solutions to the terrorist problem.6

Academic studies of terrorism came chiefly from the disci-plines of political science and psychology, though history andlaw, as well as other disciplines such as communications, alsomade contributions.7

With the end of the Cold War, the old enemy was gone, thewar was won. When the bipolar lenses were removed, theworld looked quite different. Domestic conflicts were moreeasily seen in their social, political, and cultural contexts; right-wing terrorism became more apparent; state terrorism wasmore easily seen to cross ideological divides and to have itsown set of unique variables; and the idea of terror networkssponsored by superpowers was more easily seen to be a sim-plifying myth that conveniently obscured the complexity of theterrorism phenomenon.8 In the post-Cold War era, terrorismat home became a prime focus of the Americans in the wake ofthe 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing and espe-cially the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, while the Soviet fears

18 Counterterrorism

were proven to be justified by the Chechen use of terrorism intheir ongoing insurgency against Russian rule.9

In short, the world suddenly became more complicated. Asa result, the enemy became more diffuse. Phenomena such asdrug trafficking, organized crime, and illegal immigrationwere included along with the more traditional objects of con-cern for those responsible for dealing with terrorism. In addi-tion, new kinds of threats were formulated, ranging frominfectious diseases10 to information warfare.11 The recognitionof new/old threats was, in turn, translated into a broader operational mandate for agencies responsible for counterter-rorism. The mandates of different control agencies that previ-ously were quite distinct, such as customs agencies, bordercontrol, security intelligence, defense, and policing, began toblur into one another.12 This tendency to place disparate phe-nomena into the same security basket was also reflected in various analyses of terrorism of that time. For example, oneanalyst13 lumped drug trafficking, international crime, ethniccleansing, religious fanaticism, rural guerrilla and urban terrorism all together as legitimate concerns for counterterror-ism policymaking in the post-Cold-War world. In the mid- tolate 1990s, the “new terrorism” thesis (see introduction) beganto take hold as analysts recognized the threat of Islamistextremists and, in particular, demobilized Afghan fightersreturning home after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan.Islamist terrorism became the new post-Soviet enemy andbegan to attract increasing attention away from the wide rangeof other threats that emerged in the wake of the Cold War. Thistrend only became more acute after the September 11 attacks of2001.

This chapter will examine this wider geopolitical context inwhich terrorism and counterterrorism interact. This willinvolve a description of the different kinds of actors who takepart in international politics, the kinds of security threats

The context for counterterrorism 19

which coexist with the terrorist threat, and the overall securityarchitecture that has emerged under the influence of global-ization, both technological and cultural.14 In describing thiswider context, the chapter will raise a series of questions con-cerning the nature of terrorism and the kinds of approachesneeded to deal with it. This, in turn, will lead to a considerationof a detailed inventory of counterterrorism approaches that issuitable for countering terrorism in such a complex securityenvironment.

A proliferation of new actors on the world stage

Today’s world is one where people, goods, and services crossborders with increasing ease, and entities other than statesinteract and play an increasingly important role in interna-tional politics. With the rapidly expanding reach and speedof global communications technologies and jet travel, areassuch as trade, finance, and migration have been transformed.Immigration, welfare, development, human rights, education,and tolerance of diversity and difference within societies andbetween states have all been greatly affected. All this has cre-ated severe challenges for state sovereignty and authority andincreasing limits to state control over a wide variety of policyproblems, including terrorism. Some have argued that the stateis disappearing, weakening, or eroding as a result of these chal-lenges and limits. While they probably go too far, it is fair to saythat the state is transforming under the pressures of globaliza-tion.15 State actors must now interact with a wide variety of nonstate actors and deal with a diverse array of transnationalthreats and vulnerabilities – not alone, but within a frameworkof international and regional cooperation and global gover-nance. This is the wider geopolitical context in which terrorismand counterterrorism coevolve. And it is in this complex envi-ronment that security, in particular, needs to be addressed.

20 Counterterrorism