A reader prepared for the workshop

Measuring Press Freedom and Democracy:

Methodologies, Uses, and Impact

Monday, November 5, 2007

Organized by:

Center for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication,

University of Pennsylvania

TABLE OF CONTENTS METHODOLOGIES Freedom House Freedom of the Press 2007 Survey Methodology………………………………………..4 IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) Europe and Eurasia 2006/07……………………………………9 Reporters without Borders 2006 Press Freedom Index……………………………………………………14 Transparency International………………………………………………………………………………...18 African Media Barometer ………………………………………………………………………………...22 MONITORING AND EVALUATION Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Monitoring & Evaluation in Media Development: A Discussion Paper (1)……………………………………………………………………………………………………29 Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Monitoring & Evaluation in Media Development: A Discussion Paper (2)…………………………………………………………………………………...........................36 GAO Report: Independent Media Development Abroad, Challenges Exist in Implementing U.S. Efforts and Measuring Results (July 2005)…………………………………………………………………………….41 ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF PRESS FREEDOM INDICES An Evaluation of Press Freedom Indicators, by Lee Becker, Tudor Vlad and Nancy Nusser…………….91 Conceptual and Methodological Issues in Media Monitoring, by Lee Becker……………………………107 The role of the free press in promoting democratization, good governance, and human development, by Pippa Norris……………………………………………………………………………………………….166 Media Development and Speech in the Public Sphere, by Thomas Jacobson…………………………….192 Media, Governance, and Development: An Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention, by Daniel Kaufmann………………………………………………………………………………………………….199 Democratic Change: A Theoretical Perspective, by Beata Rozumilowicz………………………………..204

METHODOLOGIES

Freedom House Freedom of the Press 2007 Survey Methodology The 2007 survey, which provides analytical reports and numerical ratings for 195 countries and territories, expands a process conducted since 1980 by Freedom House. The findings are widely used by governments, international organizations, academics, and the news media in many countries. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology questions divided into three subcategories. Assigning numerical points allows for comparative analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. The degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having “Free” media; 31 to 60, “Partly Free” media; and 61 to 100, “Not Free” media. The criteria for such judgments and the arithmetic scheme for displaying the judgments are described in the following section. The ratings and reports included in Freedom of the Press 2007 cover events that took place between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2006.

This year, we have added a five-year timeline of ratings under each country report to help readers analyze trends in press freedom over time. More detailed tables with older data are available on our website at www.freedomhouse.org. Criteria This study is based on universal criteria. The starting point is the smallest, most universal unit of concern: the individual. We recognize cultural differences, diverse national interests, and varying levels of economic development. Yet Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

The operative word for this survey is “everyone.” All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are committed to this doctrine through the UN system. To deny that doctrine is to deny the universality of information freedom—a basic human right. We recognize that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some economically developed countries restrict content diversity. We seek to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. Research and Ratings Review Process

The findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor and balanced and unbiased judgments.

The research and ratings process involved 33 analysts and 10 senior-level ratings advisers—the largest number to date. The 10 members of the core research team headquartered in New York, along with 23 outside consultant analysts, prepare the draft ratings and country reports. Their conclusions are reached after gathering information from professional contacts in a variety of countries, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, the findings of human rights and press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media. We would particularly like to thank the other members of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) network for providing detailed and timely analyses of press freedom violations in a variety of countries worldwide on which we rely to make our judgments.

The ratings are reviewed individually and on a comparative basis in a series of six regional meetings—Asia-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe—involving the analysts, ratings advisers with expertise in each region, other invited participants, and Freedom House staff. The ratings are compared with the previous year’s findings, and any major proposed numerical shifts or category changes are subjected to more intensive scrutiny. These reviews are followed by cross-regional assessments in which efforts are made to ensure comparability and consistency in the findings. Many of the key country reports are also reviewed by the academic advisers and by other IFEX members. Methodology Through the years, we have refined and expanded our methodology. Recent changes are intended to simplify the presentation of information without altering the comparability of data for a given country over the 26-year span or the comparative ratings of all countries over that period.

Our examination of the level of press freedom in each country currently comprises 23 methodology questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points is allotted for a more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment. Each country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers indicating less freedom. A country’s final score is based on the total of the three categories: A score of 0 to 30 places the country in the Free press group; 31 to 60 in the Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group.

The diverse nature of the methodology questions seeks to encompass the varied ways in which pressure can be placed upon the flow of information and the ability of print, broadcast, and internet-based media to operate freely and without fear of repercussions: In short, we seek to provide a picture of the entire “enabling environment” in which the media in each country operate. We also seek to assess the degree of news and information diversity available to the public in any given country, from either local or transnational sources.

The legal environment category encompasses an examination of both the laws and

regulations that could influence media content and the government’s inclination to use these laws

and legal institutions to restrict the media’s ability to operate. We assess the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists’ groups to operate freely.

Under the political environment category, we evaluate the degree of political control over

the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media and the diversity of news available within each country; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats.

Our third category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the

structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development and sustainability of the media. Checklist of Methodology Questions for 2007 A. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS) 1. Do the constitution or other basic laws contain provisions designed to protect freedom of the press and of expression, and are they enforced? (0–6 points) 2. Do the penal code, security laws, or any other laws restrict reporting, and are journalists punished under these laws? (0–6 points) 3. Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state, and are they enforced? (0–3 points) 4. Is the judiciary independent, and do courts judge cases concerning the media impartially? (0–3 points) 5. Is freedom of information legislation in place, and are journalists able to make use of it? (0–2 points) 6. Can individuals or business entities legally establish and operate private media outlets without undue interference? (0–4 points)

7. Are media regulatory bodies, such as a broadcasting authority or national press or communications council, able to operate freely and independently? (0–2 points) 8. Is there freedom to become a journalist and to practice journalism? (0–4 points) B. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT (0–40 POINTS) 1. To what extent are media outlets’ news and information content determined by the government or a particular partisan interest? (0–10 points) 2. Is access to official or unofficial sources generally controlled? (0–2 points) 3. Is there official censorship? (0–4 points) 4. Do journalists practice self-censorship? (0–4 points) 5. Is media coverage robust, and does it reflect a diversity of viewpoints? (0–4 points) 6. Are both local and foreign journalists able to cover the news freely? (0–6 points) 7. Are journalists or media outlets subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor? (0–10 points) C. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT (0–30 POINTS) 1. To what extent are media owned or controlled by the government, and does this influence their diversity of views? (0–6 points) 2. Is private media ownership transparent, thus allowing consumers to judge the impartiality of the news? (0–3 points) 3. Is private media ownership highly concentrated, and does it influence diversity of content? (0–3 points) 4. Are there restrictions on the means of journalistic production and distribution? (0–4 points) 5. Does the state place prohibitively high costs on the establishment and operation of media outlets? (0–4 points) 6. Do the state or other actors try to control the media through allocation of advertising or subsidies? (0–3 points) 7. Do journalists receive payment from private or public sources whose design is to influence their journalistic content? (0–3 points)

8. Does the economic situation in a country accentuate media dependency on the state, political parties, big business, or other influential political actors for funding? (0–4 points) Legend Country Status: Free (0–30)/Partly Free (31–60)/Not Free (61–100) Legal Environment: 0–30 points Political Environment: 0–40 points Economic Environment: 0–30 points Total Score: 0–100 points

IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) Europe & Eurasia 2006/07

IREX prepared the Media Sustainability Index (MSI) in cooperation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a tool to assess the development of independent media systems over time and across countries. IREX staff, USAID, and other media development professionals contributed to the development of this assessment tool.

The MSI assesses five “objectives” in shaping a successful media system:

1. Legal and social norms protect and promote free speech and access to public information.

2. Journalism meets professional standards of quality.

3. Multiple news sources provide citizens with reliable and objective news.

4. Independent media are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence.

5. Supporting institutions function in the professional interests of independent media.

These objectives were judged to be the most important aspects of a sustainable and professional independent media system and served as the criteria against which countries were rated. A score was attained for each objective by rating seven to nine indicators, which determine how well a country meets that objective. The objectives, indicators, and scoring system are presented below.

The scoring is done in two parts. First, a panel of experts is assembled in each country, drawn from representatives of local media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), professional associations, and media-development implementers. Panel participants are provided with the objectives and indicators and an explanation of the scoring system. Each panelist individually reviewed the information and scored each objective. The panelists then assembled to discuss the objectives and indicators, and to devise combined scores and analyses. The panel moderator, in most cases a host-country media or NGO representative, prepares a written analysis of the discussion, which is subsequently edited by IREX representatives.

The panelists’ scores are reviewed by IREX, in-country staff and/or Washington, DC, media staff, which then score the countries independently of the MSI panel. Using the combination of scores, the final scores are determined. This method allows the MSI scores to reflect both local media insiders’ views and the views of international media-development professionals.

I. Objectives and Indicators

Objective #1: Legal and social norms protect and promote free speech and access to public information.

Indicators

1. Legal and social protections of free speech exist and are enforced.

2. Licensing of broadcast media is fair, competitive, and apolitical.

3. Market entry and tax structure for media are fair and comparable to other industries.

4. Crimes against journalists or media outlets are prosecuted vigorously, but occurrences of such crimes are rare.

5. State or public media do not receive preferential legal treatment, and law guarantees editorial independence.

6. Libel is a civil law issue; public officials are held to higher standards, and offended parties must prove falsity and malice.

7. Public information is easily accessible; right of access to information is equally enforced for all media and journalists.

8. Media outlets have unrestricted access to information; this is equally enforced for all media and journalists.

9. Entry into the journalism profession is free, and government imposes no licensing, restrictions, or special rights for journalists.

Objective #2: Journalism meets professional standards of quality.

Indicators

1. Reporting is fair, objective, and well sourced.

2. Journalists follow recognized and accepted ethical standards.

3. Journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship.

4. Journalists cover key events and issues.

5. Pay levels for journalists and other media professionals are sufficiently high to discourage corruption.

6. Entertainment programming does not eclipse news and information programming.

7. Technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing, and distributing news are modern and efficient.

8. Quality niche reporting and programming exists (investigative, economics/business, local, political).

Objective #3: Multiple news sources provide citizens with reliable and objective news.

Indicators

1. A plurality of affordable public and private news sources (e.g., print, broadcast, Internet) exists.

2. Citizens’ access to domestic or international media is not restricted.

3. State or public media reflect the views of the entire political spectrum, are nonpartisan, and serve the public interest.

4. Independent news agencies gather and distribute news for print and broadcast media.

5. Independent broadcast media produce their own news programs.

6. Transparency of media ownership allows consumers to judge objectivity of news; media ownership is not concentrated in a few conglomerates.

7. A broad spectrum of social interests are reflected and represented in the media, including minority-language information sources.

Objective #4: Independent media are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence.

Indicators

1. Media outlets and supporting firms operate as efficient, professional, and profit-generating businesses.

2. Media receive revenue from a multitude of sources.

3. Advertising agencies and related industries support an advertising market.

4. Advertising revenue as a percentage of total revenue is in line with accepted standards at commercial outlets.

5. Independent media do not receive government subsidies.

6. Market research is used to formulate strategic plans, enhance advertising revenue, and tailor products to the needs and interests of audiences.

7. Broadcast ratings and circulation figures are reliably and independently produced.

Objective #5: Supporting institutions function in the professional interests of independent media.

Indicators

1. Trade associations represent the interests of private media owners and provide member services.

2. Professional associations work to protect journalists’ rights.

3. NGOs support free speech and independent media.

4. Quality journalism degree programs that provide substantial practical experience exist.

5. Short-term training and in-service training programs allow journalists to upgrade skills or acquire new skills.

6. Sources of newsprint and printing facilities are in private hands, apolitical, and unrestricted.

7. Channels of media distribution (kiosks, transmitters, Internet) are private,

apolitical, and unrestricted.

II. Scoring System

A. Indicator Scoring Each indicator is scored using the following system:

0 = Country does not meet the indicator; government or social forces may actively oppose its implementation.

1 = Country minimally meets aspects of the indicator; forces may not actively oppose its implementation, but business environment may not support it and government or profession do not fully and actively support change.

2 = Country has begun to meet many aspects of the indicator, but progress may be too recent to judge or still dependent on current government or political forces.

3 = Country meets most aspects of the indicator; implementation of the indicator has occurred over several years and/or through changes in government, indicating likely sustainability.

4 = Country meets the aspects of the indicator; implementation has remained intact over multiple changes in government, economic fluctuations, changes in public opinion, and/or changing social conventions.

B. Objective and Overall Scoring The averages of all the indicators are then averaged to obtain a single, overall score for each objective. Objective scores are averaged to provide an overall score for the country. IREX interprets the overall scores as follows:

Unsustainable, Anti-Free Press (0-1): Country does not meet or only minimally meets objectives. Government and laws actively hinder free media development, professionalism is low, and media-industry activity is minimal.

Unsustainable Mixed System (1-2): Country minimally meets objectives, with segments of the legal system and government opposed to a free media system. Evident progress in free-press advocacy, increased professionalism, and new media businesses may be too recent to judge sustainability.

Near Sustainability (2-3): Country has progressed in meeting multiple objectives, with legal norms, professionalism, and the business environment supportive of independent media. Advances have survived changes in government and have been codified in law and practice. However, more time may be needed to ensure that change is enduring and that increased professionalism and the media business environment are sustainable.

Sustainable (3-4): Country has media that are considered generally professional, free, and sustainable, or to be approaching these objectives. Systems supporting independent media have survived multiple governments, economic fluctuations, and changes in public opinion or social conventions.

Reporters without Borders 2006 Press Freedom Index

How the index was compiled

The index measures the state of press freedom in the world. It reflects the degree of freedom journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the state to respect and ensure respect for this freedom.

Each one has a ranking and a score which together sum up the state of press freedom there. A country can change rank from year to year even if its score stays the same, and vice-versa.

It is based solely on events between 1 September 2005 and 1 September 2006. It does not look at human rights violations in general, just press freedom violations.

Reporters Without Borders compiled a questionnaire with 50 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country. It includes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and harassment).

It registers the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for such violations. It also takes account of the legal situation affecting the news media (such as penalties for press offences, the existence of a state monopoly in certain areas and the existence of a regulatory body) and the behaviour of the authorities towards the state-owned news media and the foreign press. It also takes account of the main obstacles to the free flow of information on the Internet.

We have taken account not only of abuses attributable to the state, but also those by armed militias, clandestine organisations or pressure groups that can pose a real threat to press freedom.

The questionnaire was sent to partner organisations of Reporters Without Borders (14 freedom of expression groups in five continents) and its 130 correspondents around the world, as well as to journalists, researchers, jurists and human rights activists. A scale devised by the organisation was then used to give a country-score to each questionnaire. The Statistics Institute of the University of Paris provided assistance and advice in processing the data reliably and thoroughly.

The 168 countries ranked are those for which we received completed questionnaires from a number of independent sources. Others were not included because of a lack of credible data. Where countries tied, they are listed in alphabetical order.

The index should in no way be taken as an indication of the quality of the press in the countries concerned.

Questionnaire for compiling a 2006 world press freedom index

The period runs from 1 September 2005 to 1 September 2006

During this time, how many journalists:

1. Were murdered?

2. Were murdered, with the state involved?

3. Were arrested or sent to prison (for however long)?

4. Are currently in jail and serving a heavy sentence (more than a year) for a media-related offence?

5. Were threatened?

6. Were physically attacked or injured?

7. Fled the country?

Were any journalists (yes/no):

8. Illegally imprisoned (no arrest warrant, in violation of maximum period of detention without trial or court appearance)?

9. Tortured or ill-treated?

10. Kidnapped or taken hostage?

11. Did any journalists disappear?

Over the period, was/were there (yes/no):

12. Armed militias or secret organisations targeting journalists?

13. Terrorist action against journalists or media firms?

14. Improper use of fines, summonses or legal action against journalists or media outlets?

15. Routine failure to prosecute those responsible for seriously violating press freedom?

16. Prison terms imposed for media-related offences defined by law?

17. Attacks or threats against family, friends or colleagues of journalists?

18. Surveillance of journalists (phone-tapping, being followed etc)?

19. Problems of access to public or official information (refusal by officials, selection of information provided according to the media’s editorial line etc)?

20. Restricted physical or reporting access to any regions of the country (official ban, strict official control etc)?

21. Media outlets censored, seized or ransacked? (how many?)

22. Searches of media premises or homes of journalists?

23. Surveillance of foreign journalists working in the country?

24. Foreign journalists deported?

25. Problems getting journalist visas (undue delay, demand to know names of people to be interviewed etc)?

26. Censorship or seizure of foreign newspapers?

27. Jamming of foreign broadcasts or regulating who can have satellite dishes?

28. Independent or opposition news media?

29. An official prior censorship body systematically checking all media content?

30. Routine self-censorship in the privately-owned media?

31. Subjects that are taboo (the armed forces, government corruption, religion, the opposition, demands of separatists, human rights etc)?

32. A state monopoly of TV?

33. A state monopoly of radio?

34. A state monopoly of printing or distribution facilities?

35. Government control of state-owned media’s editorial line?

36. Improper sackings of journalists in the state-owned media?

37. Journalists forced to stop working through harassment or threats?

38. Opposition access to state-owned media?

39. Strictly-controlled access to journalistic profession (compulsory certificate or training, membership of journalists’ institute etc.)?

40. Use of withdrawal of advertising (government stops buying space in some papers or pressures private firms to boycott media outlets)?

41. Undue restriction of foreign investment in the media?

42. Licence needed to start up a newspaper or magazine?

43. Cases of violating privacy of journalistic sources?

44. Serious threats to news diversity, including narrow ownership of media outlets?

45. A state monopoly of Internet service providers (ISPs)?

46. ISPs forced to filter access to websites?

47. Websites shut down over the period?

48. ISPs legally responsible for the content of websites they host?

49. Cyber-dissidents or bloggers imprisoned (how many?)

50. Cyber-dissidents or bloggers harassed or physically attacked (how many?)

Transparency International

TERMS OF REFERENCE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS COUNTRY STUDIES Transparency International Secretariat Last Updated 10.5.2007 These terms of reference (TORs) explain the purpose, method and structure of National Integrity Systems (NIS) country studies for NIS country study authors. They also contain key logistical information for this assignment, such as regarding payments, timetables and points of contact at Transparency International. These TORs are intended to guide those country studies that are managed by the TI Secretariat in Berlin. For NIS country studies carried out and managed by TI national chapters, the TORs need to be adapted and agreed with the Policy and Research department at the TI Secretariat. In addition to these TORs, other key documents for authors of NIS country studies are the NIS country study questionnaire guidelines, TI style guidelines and the contract for this assignment.

1. THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS [NIS] AND COUNTRY STUDIES

What is the NIS? The NIS encompasses the key institutions and sectors (the ‘pillars’) that contribute to integrity, transparency and accountability in a society. When it functions properly, the NIS combats corruption as part of the larger struggle against abuse of power, malfeasance and is appropriation in all its forms. Strengthening the NIS is about promoting better governance across all aspects of society. The concept of the NIS has been developed and promoted by Transparency International, as part of TI’s holistic approach to combating corruption.1 While there is no blueprint for an effective system to prevent corruption, there is a growing international consensus as to the salient institutional features that work best to prevent corruption and promote integrity. The country studies are based on an assessment of the quality of institutions relevant to the overall anti-corruption system. The NIS is generally considered to comprise the following pillars: • Executive • Legislature • Political Parties • Electoral Commission • Supreme Audit Institution • Judiciary • Civil Service/Public Sector Agencies

• Law Enforcement Agencies • Public Contracting System • Ombudsman • Government Anti-corruption Agencies • Media • Civil Society • Business Sector

• Regional and Local Government • International InstitutionsThese pillars may not constitute the comprehensive NIS in each country. For instance, in some countries the monarchy or the military may play a pivotal role; in others, some pillars may not exist. In such cases, TI allows scope for the NIS to be adapted appropriately to local circumstances, based on suggestions from experts in the country. This should enable the most accurate analysis of a country’s integrity system. Why conduct NIS country studies? The purpose of each country study is to assess the National Integrity System, in theory (law and regulatory provisions) and practice (how well it works). Through these studies, TI aims to provide an overview of the National Integrity Systems in countries from all regions of the world. The studies provide both benchmarks for measuring further developments in these countries, and a basis for comparison among a range of countries. In terms of benchmarking, the studies provide a starting point for signalling areas requiring priority action. They also form the basis from which stakeholders may assess existing anti-corruption initiatives. NIS country studies help explain, for example, which pillars have been more successful and why, whether they are mutually supportive and what factors support or inhibit their effectiveness. Country studies also assess where the emphasis should be placed on improving the system and what factors are required to support the overall development of the NIS. In terms of cross-country comparison, the country studies create a strong empirical basis that adds to our understanding of strong or weak performers. Within regions, where several countries may function with similar economic, political or social frameworks, the results of the study can create a sense of peer pressure for reform as well as an opportunity for learning from those countries that are in similar stages of development. Each country study also situates the NIS within the economic and/or developmental and corruption trends observed in the country, reporting on the government’s anti-corruption strategies and reform efforts, as well as those of other stakeholders, such as the private sector and civil society. When relevant, the study also evaluates donor-driven anti-corruption initiatives. For Transparency International, country studies are an important measurement tool. They complement TI’s global indices and surveys, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, Bribe Payers Index and Global Corruption Barometer, as well as national surveys, by exploring the specific practices and constraints within countries and providing qualitative empirical results about the rules and practices that govern integrity systems. More than 60 such country studies have been conducted as of 2006. TI believes that it is necessary to understand the provision for and capacity of the NIS pillars, as well as their interaction and practices, to be able to diagnose corruption risks and develop strategies to counter those risks. NIS country studies are a unique product of Transparency International. They reflect the systemic approach TI takes to curbing corruption, and the independence of analysis that can be offered by the world’s leading anti-corruption NGO.

2. METHODOLOGY OF THE NIS COUNTRY STUDIES

The NIS country studies offer a qualitative assessment of the integrity system in a country. The studies are based on both objective and subjective sources of data, which differ in quantity in each country evaluated. More specifically, data sources for NIS country studies include legislation, governmental and non-governmental reports, news media coverage, corruption diagnostics, academic analysis, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The studies therefore require both desk research and field research. NIS country studies are conducted by local, in-country organizations, generally TI national chapters or independent country experts in corruption and governance. The commissioning of authors is done via a selective process organized by TI. In some instances, the country study is authored by a team of authors, with one individual serving as the team leader, rather than by a single author. Each country study is refereed by at least one independent expert, also selected by TI. The country studies follow TI’s policy of ‘not naming names’ – this means that only cases that have entered the public domain, and can be referenced with reputable sources, are included in a country study. Authors should be careful to reflect the status of cases at the time of writing: whether there have been allegations only or whether investigation or prosecution by authorities has begun or has resulted in a judgement and whether it is final or subject to appeal. This distinction is important to assess the reliability of the information and the risk of defamation posed by using the case. Two separate assessments run through the evaluation of the NIS pillars. The first is an evaluation of the formal framework and legal position of the NIS pillars. The second is a review of what actually happens in practice, highlighting discrepancies between the formal provisions and reality on the ground.

At least one focus group is convened as part of the country study, although more are recommended/desirable. Focus group participants include anti-corruption and governance experts drawn from government (including donors, where relevant), the private sector, the professions (e.g. lawyers, accountants and engineers), media and civil society. The aim of the focus groups is for a broad base of stakeholders to evaluate the NIS, and to comment on the draft NIS country study. The results of the meeting then inform further revision of the country study. Stakeholder consultation, such as is offered by the focus group setting, is of key importance in formulating the priorities and recommendations sections of the country studies. All information used in the country study deriving from interviews and focus groups is cited as such in a note.

TI publishes NIS country studies on its website, as well as in hard copy and CD-Rom formats when possible. Main report and summary report The main report of the NIS country study is a comprehensive analysis of the anti-corruption provisions and capacities in a country, as well as a number of important elements that place this analysis in context.

It includes an executive summary, country and corruption profiles and a review of recent anti-corruption activities, in addition to an assessment of the core NIS pillars. The main report begins with an evaluation of the NIS, the establishment of priority areas of action and recommendations for change. The summary report offers a condensed version of the main report. It is comprised of the following sections from the main report: executive summary, priorities and recommendations and evaluation of the NIS.

The African Media Barometer

The African Media Barometer is the first in-depth and comprehensive description and measurement system for national media environments on the African continent. It is motivated by a number of reasons:

• On 1 February 2005, several media organisations, among them the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) and the International Press Institute (IPI), have expressed their concern over NEPAD's ongoing African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, saying: “The African Union has devised the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on good governance, underscoring that the APRM is designed to foster democracy in Africa. Yet, the APRM's good governance criteria have a serious defect in that they omit a key requirement for good governance: the fostering of free and independent news media.” Furthermore, the Review Mechanism was developed and is carried out by government agencies with no or not sufficient involvement of civil society organisations and those who are affected by government policies. The African Media Barometer is meant to overcome these defects in regard to the media.

• Media in Africa are the topic of numerous national or regional studies mainly written by scholars for national or regional consumption. There is no mechanism to achieve results that give an overview over the state of the media that would enable readers to compare developments in various countries.

• International freedom of the press surveys such as the one annually produced by the New York-based Freedom House collect data from correspondents overseas, international visitors, findings from human rights and press freedom organisations and a variety of news media. The criteria are set and the data evaluated at headquarters.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Southern African Media Project and MISA took the initiative to start the African Media Barometer in April 2005, a self assessment exercise done by concerned and informed citizens in each particular country according to a number of general, homegrown criteria. The benchmarks used have to a large extent been lifted from the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) “Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa”, adopted in 2002, and attached to this report as appendix 1. (It was largely inspired by the groundbreaking Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press [1991] and the African Charter on Broadcasting [2001].) The ACHPR is the authoritative organ of the African Union mandated to interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which is binding for all member states.

42 indicators (see appendix) have been developed divided into four sectors:

1. Freedom of expression, including freedom of the media, are effectively protected and promoted.

2. The media landscape is characterised by diversity, independence and sustainability. 3. Broadcasting regulation is transparent and independent, the state broadcaster is transformed

into a truly public broadcaster. 4. The media practice high level of professional standards.

At the core of the exercise is a panel of ten women and men in each state examined, comprising of personalities with high standing in their respective countries. Half of the panelists have a media background (e.g. journalists, activists, owners, editors), the other half come from civil society and

academia (e.g. human rights, law, religious groups, women's interests) . They take part in their personal capacity, not as formal representatives of their respective organisations. Government officials and office bearers of political parties are excluded from participation.

The panels discuss intensively each of the 42 indicators. All of them are formulated as an ideal goal, for example: “The right to freedom of expression is practiced and citizens, including journalists, are asserting their rights without fear”. The experts exchange legal opinion and practical experience in regard to this benchmark and contemplate to which level their country has achieved this aim. A rapporteur takes detailed notes and compiles the results into a comprehensive report – two days of debate usually produce information and assessments worth weeks of field work by a researcher.

One aspect of the exercise that helps to concentrate minds and keep discussions is the scoring. After extensive, qualitative debate panelists are asked to allocate (quantitative) scores to each of the indicator – in a secret ballot – that measure the degree of achievement:

• Country does not meet indicator.

• Country minimally meets aspects of the indicator.

• Country meets many aspects of indicator but progress may be too recent to judge.

• Country meets most aspects of indicator.

• Country meets all aspects of the indicator and has been doing so over time.

These scores can then be used both as a measurement of development in a given country over time (it is planned to repeat the exercise every two years), as well as to make comparisons between various countries.

This report documents the result of a test run in four countries (Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Kenya). First versions of some of the indicators turned out to be either not clear enough or too complex, and these were changed accordingly without causing damage to the comparability of the results.

The results of the scoring show that panelists generally took a realistic view – neither attempting to be patriotic and give undue praise nor being overly critical or cynical. Botswana and Zambia ended up with an equal overall score of 2.2 (countries minimally meet aspects of the indicators), mainly due to the lack of any attempt to reform the broadcasting sector (where both countries scored exactly the same low: 1.7). Namibia and Kenya both scored 2.7 overall, meaning that these countries “meet many aspects” of the indicators, with high marks for freedom of expression in general for Namibia (3.2) and professional standards for Kenya (3.2).

These results now make for powerful lobbying tools. As all panelists have clout in their sphere of influence they can draw on them in helping to shape opinions inside and outside the political arena. The dismal score for Botswana, for example, came as a surprise to the panel, who spoke of their country as a “democracy without democrats”, where there is “a lot of fear among citizens, partly due to intimidating threats made by state operatives like the police, security officers and the army”. The report is now being used to make people take an honest look and open their eyes on the real state of affairs. In Zambia, panelists resolved to work urgently towards the repeal of still existing pieces of colonial legislation, such as sedition laws, that impinge on freedom of expression. And in Namibia there was consensus that a defunct Media Council as a self regulatory mechanism for the media should be urgently revived.

In Southern Africa, now that the test phase is completed, MISA will continue the process. To date, the AMB has been applied to all 11 SADC countries where MISA is active. These include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Sector 1 Freedom of expression, including freedom of the media, are effectively protected and promoted

1.1 Freedom of expression, including freedom of the media, is guaranteed in the constitution and protected by other pieces of legislation.

1.2 The right to freedom of expression is practised and citizens, including

journalists, are asserting their rights without fear. 1.3 There are no laws restricting freedom of expression such as

excessive official secret or libel acts, or laws that unreasonably interfere with the responsibilities of media.

1.4 Entry into and practise of the journalistic profession is legally

unrestricted. 1.5 Protection of confidential sources of information is guaranteed by law. 1.6 Public information is easily accessible, guaranteed by law, to all

citizens, including journalists. 1.7 Civil society in general and media lobby groups actively advance the

cause of media freedom.

31

Sector 2 The media landscape is characterised by diversity, independence and sustainability

2.1 A wide range of sources of information (print, broadcasting, internet) is available and affordable to citizens.

2.2 Citizens’ access to domestic and international media sources is not

restricted by state authorities. 2.3 Efforts are undertaken to increase the scope of circulation of the print

media, particularly to rural communities. 2.4 Broadcasting legislation has been passed and is implemented that

provides for a conducive environment for public, commercial and community broadcasting.

2.5 Community broadcasting enjoys special promotion given its potential to broaden access by poor and rural communities.

2.6 The editorial independence of print media published by a public

authority is protected adequately against undue political interference. 2.7 Local or regional independent news agencies gather and distribute

information for all media 2.8 Media diversity is promoted through adequate competition

regulation/legislation. 2.9 Government promotes a political and economic environment which

allows a diverse media landscape. 2.10 Private media outlets operate as efficient and professional

businesses. 2.11 State print media are not subsidised with tax payers’ money 2.12 Government does not use its power over the placement of

advertisements as a means to interfere with media content. 2.13 The advertising market is large enough to maintain a diversity of

media outlets.

32

Sector 3 Broadcasting regulation is transparent and independent, the state broadcaster is transformed into a truly public broadcaster

3.1 Broadcasting is regulated by an independent body adequately protected against interference, particularly of a political and economic nature.

3.2 The appointments procedure for members of the regulatory body is open and transparent and involves civil society.

3.3 The body regulates broadcasting in the public interest and ensures

fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing society at large. 3.4 The body’s decisions on licensing in particular are informed by a

broadcasting policy developed in a transparent and inclusive manner. 3.5 The public broadcaster is accountable to the public through a board

representative of society at large and selected in an independent, open and transparent manner.

3.6 Persons who have vested interests of a political or commercial nature

are excluded from possible membership in the board, i.e. office bearers with the state and political parties as well as those with a financial interest in the broadcasting industry.

3.7 The editorial independence of the public broadcaster from commercial pressure and political influence is guaranteed by law and practised.

3.8 The public broadcaster is adequately funded in a manner that protects it from arbitrary interference with its budget.

3.9 The public broadcaster is technically accessible in the entire country. 3.10 The public broadcaster offers diverse programming for all interests. 3.11 The public broadcaster offers balanced and fair information

reflecting the full spectrum of diverse views and opinions. 3.12 The public broadcaster offers as much diverse and creative local

content as economically achievable.

33

Sector 4 The media practice high levels of professional standards

4.1 The media follow voluntary codes of professional standards which are enforced by self-regulatory bodies

4.2 The standard of reporting follows the basic principles of accuracy and

fairness. 4.3 The media cover the full spectrum of events, issues and cultures,

including business/economics, cultural, local and investigative stories 4.4. Gender mainstreaming is promoted in terms of equal participation of

both sexes in the production process. 4.5 Gender mainstreaming is reflected in the editorial content. 4.6 Journalists and editors do not practise self-censorship 4.7 Owners of private media do not interfere with editorial independence 4.8 Salary levels and general working conditions for journalists and other

media practitioners are adequate to discourage corruption 4.9 Training facilities offer formal qualification programmes for journalists

as well as opportunities to upgrade their skills. 4.10 Journalists and other media practitioners are organised in trade

unions and/or professional associations.

34

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring & Evaluation in Media Development: A Discussion Paper from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (1)

Introduction This brief paper aims to focus collective energy and thinking around the challenge of measuring the impact of media development work at both the individual and the collective level. In so doing, it looks to suggest ways whereby we can determine our influence within the media sector and beyond. Moreover, it presents basic framework structures around which to develop systematic monitoring and evaluatory approaches that might best ensure our current and future relevance in a very competitive world. Motivation The media development sector was born out of the samizdat era of a generation ago when it was heavily identified with the struggle for individual and political rights in the Communist bloc. Since then and particularly in the space of the last few years, the donor community has moved on – driven by political debate about effectiveness and accountability of public spending. Today development ideology, not political ideology, drives donor thinking and support for free expression is no longer in itself a sufficient reason to attract real funding. It is also more widely understood that free expression can be as inflammatory and divisive as it can be progressive and empowering: Consequently, most donors are now demanding at the very least that we demonstrate how a free press can actually support the cause of sociopolitical and economic development. To date, it could be argued that the need for better accountability and learning has been forced upon us by external factors. Now, with the first-ever Global Forum for Media Development being held this weekend, we have an ideal opportunity to take responsibility for driving our knowledge base forward in a manner that will help inform and support our work upon an ongoing basis. To do this we first need to define the parameters and ultimate aims of the sector: For purposes of clarity, we might imagine ourselves being collectively engaged upon one big macro project with a logical framework showing a goal of democratic development (see Figure 1). Our project purpose will therefore be to develop media that is more effective in its support of that goal. Outputs might include building the skills and capacity of the media itself; ensuring the media is fully working to exploit the skills and capacity we provide –and finally, to improve the media’s ability to impact and effect the governance and development sectors in their widest meaning.

Fig. 1: The Collective Media Development Project: Monitoring & Evaluation Log-frame

Goal Democratic Development

Indicators ofVerification

Means of Verification

Assumptions

Purpose Mainstream media better able to impact upon Democratic development

?

?

?

Outputs 1. Professional media skills and capacity built

?

?

?

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Board of Trustees: Dan Smith (chair), Fiona Hill, Sheena McDonald, John Owen, Zoran Pajić, Jane M.O. Sharp, Martin Woollacott Registered in the UK as a charity at the above address. UK Charity Registration No. 1027201. UK Company Registration No. 2744185.

2. New skills and capacity deployed 3. Media activity, reach and content impacts

Governance and development

? ?

? ?

? ?

Developing Figure 1 into a full log-frame that is representative of our sector as a whole, will require identifying appropriate indicators and monitoring processes for each stage, as it would designing three strands of activities to feed into and deliver the three separate outcomes. The activities themselves would comprise our individual projects that contribute to the whole. Unfortunately, log-frames are usually seen as external impositions and hurdles to be overcome at the project submission stage: The level of discipline and logic required results in our tendency to regard them as inconveniences rather than the critical planning mechanisms they actually are. Yet if we are serious about assessment, we need to rehabilitate the log-frame, acknowledging that it is as much an integral part of our toolkit as a spirit level is to a builder. Essential M&E Interventions Having defined the area of our interest –from the project level through up to the collective impact we seek to have at the level of governance and democratic development –we can then determine three primary areas of activity to focus on in terms of measuring effect, (see Fig 2).

Skills learned Capacity established

Information generated Regulation developed

Application within sector

Application within sector

Impact Beyond

Impact Beyond

Civil Society & Participation, Empowerment

M&E Interventions 2

M&E Interventions 1

M&E Interventions 3

Governance & Democracy

Fig 2: Media Development Monitoring & Evaluation - 3 Essential Interventions

M&E Interventions 1 M&E interventions at Level 1 in Figure 2 are among the easiest to measure since they mostly focus upon the straight-forward provision of skills, equipment, content or regulation at a project level. The transfer either happens or it does not. Skills can be measured, equipment tested, information produced and disseminated and regulation developed. Of course, even at this most basic of levels, the M&E challenge may require serious baseline research to ensure what is being proposed is wholly relevant –be it training, equipment or regulation. As proficiency in languages can be tested, so too can proficiency in media skills: In the UK, career progress within local and regional print media has long been dependent upon success in the National Council For Training of Journalists exams. Subjective assessment in areas where overall standards are lacking means we are without clear indicators relating to either the level of skills achieved or the quality of training provided. There is therefore a strong case to argue to develop standardized and inter-linked training modules and objective methods of assessment which measure the impact of the training provided from the point of view of the recipient and not the provider. The comparative nature of objective measuring is also valuable in as a diagnostic tool in helping us determine different needs and abilities. As with log-frames, though we may harbor an inherent dislike of using multiple choice-style testing, we should recognize the possibilities it opens us in M&E. If presented correctly and with tact, multiple choice testing can be used to measure the ability of print journalists –especially at lower levels. Similarly, TV journalists, cameramen and producers can be objectively evaluated in a ‘tick-box’ approach that examines the variety of skills that must combine to produce an effective broadcast. The same also applies to testing radio production as it does a journalist’s ability to report free and fairly during an election contest. Our challenge is then simply to begin developing and harmonizing courses and grading according to discipline and levels. While course and testing materials will be culturally and regionally sensitive, this should not ultimately detract from our ability to measure progress in skills training in a wholly effective and objective manner. The need for more systematic and qualifiable skills training applies equally to the managerial side of the business as it does the editorial sector. Similarly, we need acknowledging that skills provision is only one aspect of the direct support our sector provides. M&E Interventions 2 If the strategy to develop practical ways of assessing achievements within the area covered by M&E 1 is essentially clear, it is less so in M&E 2: Measuring the degree to which new-found skills or capacity is actually applied is problematic in everything save the use of equipment. And even equipment has to be used correctly in order to maximize benefits. When the issue is training, regulation or the press centre, the journalists’ union or the complaints’ commission, we need to develop indicators which measure the effect they are having in terms of delivering outcomes. In the case of training, this might see us measuring the overall quality of the output –of those individuals trained or even of the station as a whole. With regulation, our focus may be on how it is enforced along with testimonials to its suitability and worth from all sides. M&E Interventions 3 With M&E intervention 3, we leave our interest in impacting the development of the media sector behind and look to the influence we have on the outside world. This is the confluence where the interests of many donors start to appear; where we begin to lose the definition between our individual projects and collective aim, and too, where we need to better understand what precisely it is we are

seeking to impact and why. The more we are able to focus our interest here, the more impact we may be able to prove. In an earlier paper, I suggested civil society, participation and empowerment were merely steeping stones toward the ultimate goal of impacting governance. In reality however, civil society, participation and empowerment should be seen as an important aspect of governance given it directly feeds into trying to improve overall accountability and behaviour. The stronger the civil society, its advocacy, lobbying and its monitoring ability, the greater its impact upon determining governance. At the same time, given their access and voice, journalists can also have a direct role in promoting transparency and holding people in high office to account. Therefore, we should consider developing twin strategies in M&E 3 – one that measures the role media plays in supporting political and economic ‘governance’, and the other at its ability to feed into civil society.

Media & Governance The media can be seen to have a direct relationship with most if not all of the six dimensions of governance as defined by the World Bank: Voice and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law and control of corruption. The World Bank itself devoted a chapter on the media in its World Development Report of 2002, which focused on building institutions for markets.a Given shared beliefs that the media does somehow affect governance, the only questions are how and to what degree –and how might we find ways to strengthen that impact still further? Two separate yet related ideas suggest themselves: one is to develop a series of indicators measuring intervention into each of the six dimensions (e.g. for corruption: is it legal for the media to monitor police radio networks?) – and then to develop projects around them. The other is an overall index that measures media’s impact upon governance. This would build upon the success of established indices such as the IREX and Freedom House reports, and would determine media’s influence on each of the six dimensions in a particular country before coming up with a collective score. Data would be drawn from perception testing as well as from new and existing quantitative sources. Such an index might rank a country at zero (the media having no obvious influence on governance) as it might show a positive –or even a negative score –where media is collectively found to be destructive. The collective challenge of our sector might even perhaps be to move the index on to a fixed score over a certain number of years. Media and Civil Society, Participation & Empowerment Little analytical work has so far been done in this area –and yet this is where the communication for development sector is so vibrant. This is where serious audience research, participatory approaches and a far greater awareness of how communities make use of the information provided, becomes so vitally important. This is also the area in which we promise to effect change through our project outcomes. Given our learning here is so very limited, research into M&E streams here should be a top priority –perhaps through serious engagement with players within the communication for development sector. The Way Forward: A Quick Win This briefest of papers has sought to encourage a more rigorous and analytical approach to monitoring and evaluation. In breaking down the overall challenge into identifiable areas of interest, it has sought

a World development report 2002 - building institutions for markets, Volume 1 (OUP)

to help organizations look at their own current processes, in order to develop, learn, and benefit more. At the collective level, while acknowledging the ambitious scope and complexity in trying to develop measurement systems across the board, we might consider trying to collectively agree and establish a system of basic standards at some level as part of a joint project. The easiest possible entry point to join forces would appear to be in M&E Intervention 1, and within that, in training. Developing more systematized and standardized approaches toward training will obviously benefit: 1. The trainees - better able to see their own improvement 2. The trainers - know more about what to expect, how to prepare and are better supported 3. The donors - better able to visualize benefit & prove value 4. The organization - improved reputation, marketability and & confidence in training methods 5. The sector - systems and standards are set and are constantly reviewed and improved A short list of recommended material for further reading has been enclosed overleaf for those interested. All have direct and working links to web sites. Alan Davis IWPR, September 2005

Further Selected Reading: 10 Useful M&E links 1. About Monitoring and Evaluation http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/html/about_monitoring.htmCharities Evaluation services (UK) 2. New Voices –An Evaluation of 15 Access Radio Projects (UK) http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radio/ifi/rl/commun_radio/new_voices.pdfPublished by the Radio Authority, now part of Ofcom 3. The Communication Initiative (The Drumbeat) http://www.comminit.com/Communication intervention clearing house for sustainable development 4. Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004 http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer_report_8_12_2004.pdf 5. Transparency Iinternational Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/dnld/media_pack_en.pdf 6. Freedom House (FH): Freedom of the Press 2005 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm 7. International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX): 2004 Media Sustainability Index http://www.irex.org/msi/index.asp 8. Reporters Without Borders (RSF): 2004 Worldwide Press Freedom Index http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11715 9. Center For Democracy And Governance: Handbook Of Democracy And Governance Program Indicators http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacc390.pdf

10. US Agency for International Development (AID): Media Assistance: Best Practices and Priorities, July 2002. http://www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/topics/media/docs/hume_report.doc

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Monitoring & Evaluation in Media Development: A Discussion

Paper from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2) Introduction This paper aims to establish the basis for a sector-wide discussion and path forward toward developing shared monitoring and evaluation systems able to measure and demonstrate local media’s ability to promote democratic change. Though media development dates back a generation or more to the samizdat era, the sector is still in its infancy in terms of our learning. While we may all think we know what we are doing and why –we often face difficulty in communicating this to each other –not to mention to outsiders. Ironically, as communication experts, former journalists and trainers, we are failing to present the kind of clear structure and logic we constantly demand of our trainees. We are fortunate enough to draw funding from free expression, human rights and mainstream development donors based on the premise that free media provide objective information and are therefore good per se. Wherever this assumption is not shared or its importance downplayed against other factors, we run into problems – as we do when trying to measure the particular benefit of one project against another. Donors similarly are unable to determine the relative value of our work – as are those within the very societies we claim to be helping. The fact is that the longer we remain unwilling or simply unable to prove the value of what we do, the greater the risk we face of being sidelined by donors and our sector stagnating. We must therefore move from an intuitive way of working toward an explicit approach if we seriously wish to mature and develop as a group. Learning implies awareness and both depend upon monitoring and evaluation as the means of charting our way forward. Incorporating M&E into our work and rooting it as a core competency will help us understand more, communicate better, improve planning, increase confidence and demonstrate benefit. Ultimately it will also serve to increase our profile and strengthen our position within the wider development community. The Way Forward For those organisations that see M&E as a means of securing our development as a group, the possibility exists to move forward collectively. While this paper does not wish to be prescriptive about the ways in which this happens, initial steps may include:

1) Agreement on some basic guiding concepts to steer the process 2) Determining a very basic framework structure to define the challenge 3) Identification of useful measurement systems and tools 4) Establishing and funding a small cross-organisational panel to coordinate, undertake collective

research, publish and update a media development M&E book for practitioners 5) Identification of initial common areas of work on which to focus first collective efforts

1) Basic Guiding Concepts Collaboration in developing measurement systems should start with the establishment of guideline concepts that could include (by way of example):

• M&E being a project not a donor-driven requirement In demonstrating results, they are a means toward greater job satisfaction

• M&E needing to be owned and not imposed They must be valued as critical project planning and operational tools and not perceived as external impositions

• M&E being a learning process They demand ongoing participation and development with practicality and flexibility key requirements

• M&E being costed activities in themselves They are designed for project success and may even be partly or even wholly independent from the project could be managed by the stakeholders themselves

• M&E drawing upon both quantitative and qualitative indicators We need to be sensitive to and learn from any unintended effects of the work

• M&E focusing upon both structure and content Looking at one without the other will teach us very little

• M&E measuring both project and sector-wide interventions We need a simple yet overarching M&E framework that easily connects the two (see fig 1)

2) Framework Structure As a collective sector and as individual organisations, we need to be able to measure the impact of our activities along a sliding scale of complexity and magnitude. At one end, we need to measure the achievements and impacts at the level of small projects and individual results. At the other, we are obviously looking to impact on external processes such as civil society, governance, human rights, the rule of law and security. Consequently, we need M&E capabilities that allow us to measure these crucial outer limits of our interest.

Fig. 1 4 Essential M&E Interventions

Skills

learned

Skills

applied

Difference

made

1 2 4

Capacity

established

Difference

made

Capacity applied

Information generated

Information

applied

Difference

made

Support

to

Impact upon

Impact upon

3

Media sector Civil society Governance sector

Figure 1 identifies and locates four essential points where M&E interventions should be measuring the value of activities throughout the three main areas of media development activity –training, capacity building and information generation. This basic framework model can also be used in locating M&E interventions surrounding media law and regulation.

Capacity building

Information

Training

A small scale project might simply seek to justify itself by promising and then delivering a simple increase in skills level. This then requires the M&E intervention (1): A bigger and more complex project might be developed with the intention of developing skills and then see them applied. This would obviously require interventions (1) & (2). A project which seeks its specific justification as being in support of civil society will require (1), (2) & (3), while a bigger project still or perhaps a collective intervention ought to be looking at (1), (2) (3) & (4). Whether (3) is always an integral stage in pursuit of (4) is an important question we should be sure to address and answer. While most donors are ultimately interested in (3) and (4), it may not be possible or even desirable for all organisations to be proving the impact of every project outside of the media sector. This could encourage a tendency toward ‘super projects,’ reduce flexibility and nullify all small precision or emergency activities. Impact moreover cannot be secured without either learning (1) or application (2). All projects regardless of size or focus therefore have a critical value so long as they successfully target a specific need within

this framework. A project might then simply and logically focus upon application –as long as it is able to show learning skills are already in existence. In the same way that the emergency assistance and relief community is not intimidated by the desire to prove development beyond the simple act of feeding villages or inoculating children, we should not be deterred from the challenge of demonstrating results outside the immediate area of our activity. Whereas concepts such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are substantial issues to wrestle with –they can probably be broken down to more manageable levels. We should also be looking to learn from and work with others already engaged in this field. Thus as well as working with existing governance analysts who may have their own diagnostic tools, we need to be undertaking media assessments that first determine media’s place in society as a whole before moving to examine the media landscape itself. This means learning about the extent to which the media underwrites civil society, facilitates between competing stakeholders, acts as a public watchdog –or is simply trusted and believed by consumers. The more we can learn about its position and relationship to others, the more confident we can be about developing appropriate responses. This should also help us make progress toward the ideal whereby we find how a combination of media factors and applications culminates into a critical mass which positively affects democracy. 3) Measurement Systems and Tools Having guiding concepts and a simple framework established, we should be identify measurement systems as the next step towards developing practical interventions. Essentially, since ‘what we wish to measure’ is already clear –the actual improvement – our real interest rests with the ‘how?’ How we try measuring change will help determine what kind of systems we can use. So too will our area of focus –be it training, capacity building or information provision - and whether specifically interested in the development of skills (or information); their application; their impact on civil society –or in the difference they ultimately make. Determining change requires measurement between two points: It is therefore essential to establish baselines - regardless of whether interest lies with the smallest of projects or in the collective sectoral assault on a particular country. Baselines may be quantitative in character – in the case of testing basic skills improvement –or qualitative in terms of national attitudes and assumptions. Contradictory though it might at first seem, even qualitative indicators can be translated into quantifiable findings for sake of easy measurement and comparison. In trying to determine the impact upon civil society (3) and the ultimate difference made (4), it will be necessary to develop indicators which measure both structure and content of the media. Structure may be taken to mean ‘reach’ and can include things like size and make-up of audience or circulation. It can also include training. Content is obviously the quality and focus of the material published or broadcast. An excellent training project where skills are fully applied may only have marginal impact if we are only talking about 10 journalists writing for a magazine with a circulation of 500 which never reaches instrumental players in the area we wish to affect. However, we should; equally be aware to the fact that were each of these 10 journalists subsequently to establish their own key outlets –then the impact ultimately would be something different. Thus we need to be sensitive to time factors. Similarly, we need to be acutely aware that a critical mass of small publications may help to precipitate change just as they did in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1970s. Alongside content and structure indicators therefore, we need develop mechanisms that are time and trend

sensitive. We also need the ability to pick up and measure such things as the ‘B92 factor’ – small media outlets which are able to define and precipitate a mass movement through their activity and outlook. We must then be careful not to develop blunt tools that may be used to stifle project creativity and experimentation. 4) M&E Steering Vehicle While groups are individually beginning to realize the importance of incorporating M&E know-how into their work, moving forward practically as a collective group requires information sharing and serious teamwork among those interested. Sectoral progress may therefore best be served via the formation of a core team of committed individuals drawn from these groups which is then able to develop overall strategies, originating, testing and rolling out specific M&E interventions wherever possible. Such a team might secure funding from donor agencies as it works to develop, root and mainstream M&E activities across the sector. 5) Initial Areas for first collective efforts While acknowledging the ambitious scope and complexity of developing measurement systems across the board, with proper effort, it probably is possible to establish a system of basic standards at some level. One possible entry point would appear to be in (1) skills development and within that, in training. Given the ‘training field’ within media development is itself huge and the challenge consequently great, we might consider focusing upon measurements for basic level training within electronic and print media projects. Developing more systematised and standardised approaches toward training will benefit: The trainees - better able to see their own improvement The trainers - know more about what to expect, how to prepare and are better supported The donors - better able to visualise benefit & prove value The organisation - improved reputation, marketability and & confidence in training methods The sector - systems and standards are set and are constantly reviewed and improved Conclusion In adopting, improving or otherwise debating this paper as a group in Amman, we are already signaling a level of commitment to M&E that has hitherto been absent. However, we move forward, we should be constantly looking to draw and build upon lessons and work, existing mechanisms and tools -and expertise. This includes building links with governance analysts and incorporating surveys such as IREX’s sustainability index and Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press reports. At the end of the day, M&E are essentially defined as learning processes and are consequently always evolving and improving. While it is essential to develop comparative practices so as to map patterns and measure progress, our goal is not to impose rigidity or uniformity upon the sector. Development comes from risk, change and experimentation. As part of this, we should not be unduly concerned about rigorous debate or even collective buy-in. Those organisations unable to initially commit to M&E may well be forced to do so over time by the changing environment. In this way, as a sector we will be setting and developing our own standards and ultimately prove self-regulating Sincere thanks go out to Alison Campbell of Internews for her work in helping to structure and edit this paper. Alan Davis, IWPR London, May 9, 2005

GAOUnited States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

July 2005 INDEPENDENT MEDIA DEVELOPMENT ABROAD

Challenges Exist in Implementing U.S. Efforts and Measuring Results

a

GAO-05-803

What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

HighlightsAccountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-803. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-05-803, a report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

July 2005

INDEPENDENT MEDIA DEVELOPMENT ABROAD

Challenges Exist in Implementing U.S. Efforts and Measuring Results

The Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 for the development of independent media, including activities such as journalism and business management training and support for legal and regulatory frameworks. About 60 percent of the fiscal year 2004 USAID and State obligations we identified supported independent media development projects in Europe and Eurasia. However, precise funding levels are difficult to identify due to a lack of agencywide budget codes to track media development obligations, differing definitions of independent media development, and complex funding patterns. State and USAID face challenges in designing performance indicators and accurately measuring and reporting results directly tied to the performance of U.S. independent media efforts. The tools most frequently used by State and USAID as performance indicators—Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press survey and the IREX Media Sustainability Index—are useful for determining the status of the media in selected countries but are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of U.S.-sponsored programs and activities toward developing independent media in countries when used alone. Several country-specific and programmatic challenges can impede the implementation of media development efforts, including a changing political condition, sustainability of local media outlets, and coordination between donors and providers. Specifically, a country’s changing political condition or lack of adequate civic and legal institutions can create challenges for a mission to plan, implement, and measure the results of its efforts. The sustainability of program recipients can also impede the overall success of efforts or specific activities at the country level. In addition, when coordination of activities is unstructured or informal, redundancies and confusion of responsibilities can impact project implementation. U.S. Independent Media Development Journalism Training Program in Ukraine

Source: GAO.

Independent media development led by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports the national security goal of developing sustainable democracies around the world. Independent media institutions play a role in supporting commerce, improving public health efforts, reducing corruption, and providing civic education. According to the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press 2005 survey, despite important gains in some countries, the overall level of press freedom worldwide continued to worsen in 2004.

GAO was asked to examine (1) U.S. government funding for independent media development overseas; (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies measure performance toward achieving results; and (3) the challenges the United States faces in achieving results.

The Department of State generally concurred with our report and USAID offered technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. In addition, State indicated that it plans to develop additional performance indicators and promote best practices in the future.

Contents

Letter 1Results in Brief 2Background 3U.S.-Sponsored Media Development Funding Levels Difficult to

Determine 9Independent Media Development Performance Measurement

Efforts Complicated by a Variety of Factors 11Country-Specific and Programmatic Factors Can Impact Media

Development Efforts 19Agency Comments 29

AppendixesAppendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II: Select International Organizations or Donors That

Implement Media Development Programs 34

Appendix III: State Department and USAID Goals Related to Independent

Media 35

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State 40

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International

Development 42

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff and Acknowledgments 43

Tables Table 1: Bureaus or Offices at State and USAID and Select U.S. NGOs and Their Roles in Independent Media Development 6

Table 2: U.S. Independent Media Development Priorities for Select Countries 12

Table 3: Performance Objectives and Indicators Related to USAID Independent Media Development Efforts from Select Performance Monitoring Plans 15

Table 4: USAID Definition and Media Approach for Each Political Society 20

Table 5: Goals Related to Select Independent Media Development Programs from Current State Mission Performance Plans 35

Table 6: Objectives for Select Independent Media Development Programs from Current USAID Country Strategies 38

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Contents

Figure Figure 1: U.S.-Sponsored Independent Media Development Projects and Activities in Ukraine 27

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Contents

Abbreviations

BBG Broadcasting Board of GovernorsDCHA Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian AssistanceDG Office of Democracy and GovernanceDRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and LaborE&E Bureau for Europe and EurasiaECA Bureau of Educational and Cultural AffairsEUR/ACE Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and

EurasiaFSA Freedom Support ActICFJ International Center for JournalistsIIP Bureau of International Information ProgramsIP implementing partnerIREX International Research and Exchanges BoardMDF Media Development FundMEPI Middle East Partnership InitiativeMSI Media Sustainability IndexNED National Endowment for DemocracyNGO nongovernmental organizationOMFU Open Media Fund for UkraineOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropeOTI Office of Transition InitiativesRAK Bosnian Communications Regulatory AgencySEED Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989 State U.S. Department of StateUSAID U.S. Agency for International Development

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United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 29, 2005 Letter

The Honorable Richard G. LugarChairman Committee on Foreign RelationsUnited States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

U.S.-sponsored independent media development efforts support the national security goal of developing sustainable democracies around the world, while complementing U.S. public diplomacy efforts by encouraging the development of sustainable media outlets with responsible and professional reporting standards and editorial practices. Independent media development projects include such activities as direct financial assistance to media outlets, journalism and business management training, and support for developing the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary for a free and open press. Beyond serving as a source of information, independent media institutions can play a role in supporting commerce, improving the effectiveness of public health efforts, reducing corruption, improving citizen access to information, and providing civic education.1 However, despite important gains in some countries, like Ukraine, the overall level of press freedom worldwide continued to worsen in 2004, continuing a 3-year decline.2 The declining level of press freedom has been illustrated, for example, by cases of journalists being censored, tortured, imprisoned, and murdered in response to published news reports about their government.

The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are primarily responsible for U.S. government media development funding and activities. At your request, this report examines: (1) U.S. government funding for independent media development overseas, (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies measure performance toward achieving results, and (3) the challenges the United States faces in achieving results.

1World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

2As measured by Freedom House’s global average score from the Freedom of the Press 2005 survey.

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To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed documentation and spoke with officials from State, USAID, and their primary partners, including the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),3 National Endowment for Democracy (NED), International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Internews, Eurasia Foundation, International Center for Journalists, and The Asia Foundation.4 In addition to audit work performed in the United States, we traveled to and reviewed documentation on U.S.-sponsored independent media development projects in Croatia, Ukraine, and Indonesia. We also sent questions to posts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, and Mali. Our analysis of key challenges included a review of several recent studies covering independent media development. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. We conducted our evaluation in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards from June 2004 to July 2005.

Results in Brief State and USAID together obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 for the development of independent media, with USAID providing the largest share. The majority—about 60 percent—of the fiscal year 2004 USAID and State obligations we identified supported independent media development projects in Europe and Eurasia. Precise funding levels for independent media development activities in countries overseas are difficult to identify due to a lack of agencywide budget codes to track media development obligations, differing definitions of independent media development, and complex funding patterns.

State and USAID have a variety of independent media development efforts under way; however, in some cases, they face challenges in designating performance indicators and in accurately measuring and reporting results directly tied to the performance of U.S. efforts. State supports media efforts under the broader context of public diplomacy or democracy building and has not widely established specific independent media development performance indicators for overseas missions or for specific media projects or activities at posts we reviewed; anecdotal examples,

3Due to its limited efforts, we did not examine the BBG’s media development programs.

4Department of Defense media activities, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not included in the scope of our work, as its primary focus for independent media is psychological operations and postconflict media reconstruction.

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rather than quantifiable measures, are frequently used to demonstrate success. USAID more frequently established performance measures for its missions and individual media development projects. Examples of performance indicators used for USAID missions we visited and reviewed included the audience share of media outlets, the sustainability of those outlets, the number of journalists trained, and the quality of programming developed. We also found that the tools most widely used by State and USAID as performance indicators—Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press survey and the IREX Media Sustainability Index—are useful for measuring the state of the media in countries but they are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of U.S.-sponsored projects toward developing independent media in countries when used alone.

Several country-specific and programmatic challenges can impede the implementation of media development efforts. Foremost, a nation’s changing political condition or lack of adequate civic and legal institutions can impact a mission’s ability to plan and implement its media activities and measure the results of its efforts. The sustainability of project recipients can also impede the overall success of projects or specific activities at the country level. For example, in Croatia, a U.S.-sponsored national television network, which linked several local stations’ news programs together to compete with the state media’s nationwide newscasts, is struggling to survive in part because the network did not develop the advertising revenue and profit-sharing structures necessary to sustain it. In addition, when coordination of activities is unstructured or informal, redundancies and confusion can impact efforts. For example, due to a lack of coordination between various agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in Indonesia, two nongovernmental organizations (NGO), one funded by State and the other by USAID, each received funds to rebuild some of the same radio stations destroyed during the recent Indian Ocean tsunami. While USAID has taken actions to improve coordination, funding for regional conferences and program evaluations is limited.

Background The United States has, for many years, funded various agencies’ educational, visitor, and democracy-assistance programs that promote democratic ideals, including freedom of the press. Although considered a fundamental human right by many, freedom of the press remains unrealized in many parts of the world, particularly in countries governed by repressive regimes. Journalists continue to be censored, tortured, imprisoned, and murdered for publishing articles or broadcasting information about their government. Media assistance emerged as a significant aspect of

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development work in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Media development aid has evolved from relatively modest activities with minor donations of equipment and training tours for journalists to, in some cases, long-term, multifaceted projects with millions of dollars invested over the life of the project.

Independent media development efforts are not clearly defined, but are commonly understood to include activities such as

• training5 or educating local or indigenous reporters and editors on subjects such as media ethics, professionalism, accountability, investigative journalism, media business management and marketing, strategies for transforming state broadcasters into public service networks, and legal defense or legal regulatory issues;

• developing media or press centers;

• developing journalism schools and curriculum;

• ensuring the financial sustainability and independence of media outlets, through loan programs, advertising development, grants for commodities, and other means;

• supplying equipment or helping to build infrastructure needed to ensure media independence, including technical capacity;

• developing professional journalist, publisher, or broadcast associations;

• developing networks of independent media, such as sharing arrangements, which link production, distribution, and management of material;

• supporting the establishment of legal and regulatory frameworks and advocacy groups that protect freedom of the press;

• promoting an understanding of professional media practices and the role of free and independent media in society; and

5Includes activities such as in-country training, third-country training, long-term study, training of trainers, and in-country residencies by expatriate experts.

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• engaging diplomatically to advance the development of press freedoms or media-related institutions, laws, and regulatory frameworks.

A Number of Agencies and Organizations Implement or Fund a Range of Media Development Efforts

The Department of State and USAID are primarily responsible for funding and overseeing U.S. media development projects and activities. State and USAID do not have separate global or agency-specific independent media development strategies and goals; rather, State and USAID often consider independent media development part of broader agency goals. State’s independent media development efforts are generally used as tools within broader public diplomacy and democracy building efforts.6 USAID’s independent media development efforts are generally designed to promote the development of civil society and increase citizen access to information.

A commonly agreed upon definition of independent media development programs does not exist among State, USAID, and other donors. Rather, a variety of U.S. projects and activities support independent media in various countries overseas through individual contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements with NGO partners, or through other established U.S. programs, such as exchange programs administered by embassy public affairs sections. In addition, donors frequently use different approaches for developing independent media. For example, State offers training opportunities to a select number of individuals in the media sector or offers small grants to organizations for media development. NED provides small, short-term grants to media or advocacy organizations in many countries. In contrast, USAID has developed a more comprehensive, multiyear, multiproject approach to developing independent media in many countries that addresses the training and education of journalists, financial sustainability of local organizations, and development of the supporting legal and regulatory frameworks.

Five primary U.S. nongovernmental organizations—IREX, Internews, the International Center for Journalists, Eurasia Foundation, and The Asia Foundation—assist U.S. donors by implementing media development projects and offering funding or programmatic activities to local media

6One senior State official told us there is currently no separate interagency strategy guiding U.S. democracy assistance programs. Moreover, as identified in our recent GAO report on public diplomacy, no U.S. strategic communications strategy currently exists to guide agency public diplomacy efforts. See GAO, Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by

the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2005).

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organizations. In addition, due to political sensitivities in the region, USAID has awarded contracts to private organizations for media development projects in the Middle East. Examples of possible independent media development recipients include media outlets, media organizations, and local nongovernmental organizations; professional associations; journalism schools or universities; and policymakers. In addition, there are several international organizations that support media development. (See app. II). See table 1 for a description of the roles of each bureau or office at State and USAID and select U.S. NGOs in independent media development.

Table 1: Bureaus or Offices at State and USAID and Select U.S. NGOs and Their Roles in Independent Media Development

Donor Department of State Roles

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL)

Funds and administers projects that develop legal and regulatory frameworks in support of free and independent media in countries with a history of government-run media. Provides a number of democracy-building grants for specific media development activities or to support specific media outlets.

Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE)

Provides funding and oversight for Freedom Support Act (FSA) and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) funds allocated to embassy’s public affairs sections and USAID for journalism training and other media development activities.

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) Funds, oversees, and administers select grants for programs that foster mutual understanding between the United States and other countries, including international educational and citizen exchange media development efforts that promote personal, professional, and institutional ties between private citizens and organizations in the United States and abroad.

Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)

Funds, oversees, and provides select support to Speaker/Specialist and Professional-in-Residence programs, which develop international understanding of professional media practices in democratic societies, as well as of the importance of press freedom and of developing knowledge of media-related institutions, laws, and regulatory frameworks.

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Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) Supports efforts to promote free uncensored press in the Middle East by funding, overseeing, and administering grants for projects that improve the quality of reporting, train journalists, and support the growth of independent self-regulating sectors of media sustainability.

U.S. embassy public affairs sections Responsible for coordinating, overseeing, and administering select grants for State’s independent media efforts at U.S. missions overseas. Efforts, including academic and citizen exchange programs, speakers programs, international visitors programs, and book translations, are designed to improve the professionalism of the media, while at the same time increasing mutual understanding among citizens.

Regional bureaus Oversee U.S. embassy public affairs sections’ media efforts in each region, including the Middle East Partnership Initiative media activities.

USAID

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)

Manages programs in fragile states by strengthening democratic systems, nongovernmental organizations, and other elements of civil society. Both the Office of Democracy and Governance and the Office of Transition Initiatives oversee media development projects.

• Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) Coordinates and administers grants for long-term independent media development efforts overseas and works to strengthen commitment to an independent and politically active civil society in developing countries. The range of groups receiving USAID Democracy and Governance assistance includes coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, women's rights organizations, business and labor federations, media groups, bar associations, environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring organizations.

• Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Primarily responsible for coordinating and administering grants for USAID short-term media development efforts. Designed to provide fast, flexible assistance in response to rapidly changing conditions on the ground, such as in postconflict situations.

Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) Oversees and coordinates USAID independent media development country efforts and administers grants for regional media projects in Europe and Eurasia.

(Continued From Previous Page)

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Sources: State, USAID, and U.S. NGOs.

USAID Overseas Missions Funds and administers comprehensive or targeted independent media development efforts at the country level with program design and technical support provided by various USAID bureaus.

NED

National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Funds and oversees in-country subgrants that promote freedom of information, human rights, electronic communication, nontraditional communication, media monitoring, and media law reform through local, grassroots organizations.

Providers U.S. nongovernmental organizations Roles

Eurasia Foundation Funds and oversees subgrants and provides technical assistance to grassroots organizations that promote civil society, including media development in 12 countries of the former Soviet Union.

Internews Supports open media worldwide by implementing State and USAID grants and cooperative agreements to foster independent media in emerging democracies and training journalists and station managers in the standards and practices of professional journalism.

International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)

Implement State and USAID grants and cooperative agreements that focus on (1) professionalism in reporting or journalism training, (2) democratic media legislation, (3) support for local media associations, and (4) media business management for sustainability.

International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) Provides global training programs and resources for journalists with 30 percent USAID funding and 70 percent private donor funding. ICFJ’s workshops cover reporting, editing, production, ethics, and business management.

The Asia Foundation Supports the development of an open Asia-Pacific region by providing funding to local organizations for programs that help improve governance and law, economic reform and development, and international relations. Provides subgrants to directly assist media in areas such as management training, regulatory analysis, equipment supply, media ethics, direct technical assistance, media law and regulatory reform, and networking.

(Continued From Previous Page)

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U.S.-Sponsored Media Development Funding Levels Difficult to Determine

Our analysis of available documents revealed that together, State and USAID obligated at least $40 million in fiscal year 2004 to support a number of independent media development efforts. According to State, it obligated approximately $14 million for media development projects for fiscal year 2004.7 State also transferred more than $700,000 to the BBG8 for fiscal year 2004 independent media development obligations. USAID was not able to provide global budget obligations figures for its 2004 support of independent media. However, we calculated that USAID obligated at least $25.6 million in fiscal year 2004.9 USAID’s largest independent media contractors—Internews and IREX— received fiscal year 2004 obligations of $14.1 million and $11.3 million, respectively. In addition, the Asia Foundation identified that it received $175,000 in fiscal year 2004 obligations provided by USAID. Although we were not able to confirm these figures, USAID officials told us that they obligated an average of $33 million per year for independent media development efforts since 1991 in amounts ranging from approximately $13 million in fiscal year 1992 to $61 million in fiscal year 1999.

We found that the largest portion of the State and USAID fiscal year 2004 obligations for independent media development—about 60 percent of all the agency obligations we could identify—funded efforts in Europe and Eurasia. The Middle East, which has the lowest level of press freedom, according to Freedom House’s 2005 Press Freedom survey, received only about 2 percent of the total fiscal year 2004 obligations we could identify. Agency officials said that the larger funding levels for Europe and Eurasia are attributable to the democracy assistance funding provided through the Freedom Support Act and the Support for East European Democracy Act

7State department officials provided us these figures directly after requesting information from relevant bureaus and posts regarding their 2004 obligations for independent media.

8The BBG has an interagency agreement with USAID through which it receives an interagency transfer from State’s Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia to support a limited number of media training programs.

9We were not able to compile global fiscal year 2004 obligations using initial budget records USAID provided because we determined that they were not sufficiently reliable due to insufficient or inconsistent media activity coding and lack of updated global data for the fiscal year. We subsequently obtained documentation or records on fiscal year 2004 obligations made by USAID from the main NGO providers that receive independent media development grants from USAID headquarters, including the International Center for Journalists, IREX, The Asia Foundation, and Internews. For more information on how these figures were developed and data limitations, see appendix I.

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of 198910 and the high priority given to independent media development projects by the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. According to State officials, independent media development funding levels for the Middle East are expected to increase in the future due to an expansion of efforts through the Middle East Partnership Initiative. In addition, USAID officials said they expect that USAID will provide up to four times the amount of media development funding to individual countries in the Middle East in the near future—with the U.S. Mission in Egypt already in the process of launching a $15 million media project. Officials at one mission in Central Europe expressed concern that such a funding shift could be detrimental to the ultimate success of media development efforts in European countries that have fragile and changing media environments.

Due to a variety of factors, it is difficult to accurately determine U.S. funding obligations for independent media development efforts. USAID media development funding is difficult to track globally over time because the agency has not implemented consistent agencywide budget codes to document its obligations for cooperative agreements, grants, and contracts for independent media projects and activities.11 Rather, USAID’s financial systems are designed to collect obligation information at the higher strategic objective level, where, we were told by USAID officials, there are inconsistencies in coding independent media activities because definitions for budget codes and strategic objectives have changed over the years. However, USAID officials told us they are currently in the process of developing systems to better track agencywide obligations data for individual program components under each strategic objective, including for independent media development efforts. State Department funding is also difficult to track because State does not keep systematic records or budget codes of its obligations at the level of independent media development activities and posts consider varying activities to embody independent media development. Finally, complex donor funding arrangements, including in some cases multiple project implementers and subgrantees, can obscure funding relationships and make it difficult to

10See Public Law 102-511 and Public Law 101-179, respectively.

11USAID officials told us that individual missions currently track spending for various program components, including media development; however, because independent media projects can often be defined differently or be intermixed within broader civil society projects, all missions may not be recording media spending in the same manner.

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accurately determine the overall level of U.S. financial support, as well as the number of specific efforts provided in individual countries.

Independent Media Development Performance Measurement Efforts Complicated by a Variety of Factors

State and USAID have a variety of independent media development efforts under way. State has not widely established specific independent media development performance indicators for the overseas missions we reviewed or for specific media projects or activities sponsored by its embassy public affairs sections. USAID frequently established specific independent media development performance indicators for its missions and for specific independent media development projects we reviewed. Both agencies commonly used the IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) and Freedom House’s Press Freedom surveys to measure performance— where indicators were established; however, our analysis found these indexes to be of limited utility in measuring the contributions of specific media activities, or the efforts of entire missions toward developing independent media in particular countries, when used alone.

State and USAID Sponsor a Number of Media Efforts

State and USAID support a wide range of media projects and activities, from training journalists to supporting media law reform. In the countries we visited—Croatia, Ukraine, and Indonesia—we spoke with several individuals who said that they had benefited from U.S. government media support. For example, we met with members of a consortium of five local NGOs advocating passage of Indonesia’s Freedom of Information Act and working with the Parliament to get it placed on the agenda. In Croatia, we visited a U.S.-funded national association of journalists whose mission is to raise the professional standards of its 2,000 members. In Ukraine, we met with individuals of a U.S.-sponsored organization that has provided 220 training programs, in subjects ranging from technical production to media management, to over 2,800 media professionals. We also spoke with a number of journalists in all three countries who had visited television, radio, and newspaper operations throughout the United States as part of embassy exchange programs. See table 2 for a description of current U.S. independent media development efforts and priorities in countries we selected for in-depth analysis.

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Table 2: U.S. Independent Media Development Priorities for Select Countries

Source: State Department.

Case study country Independent media development priorities

Croatia Promote independent media through exchange and training programs to expose Croatian journalists and editors to U.S. practices.

Ukraine Employ bilateral engagements, including sustained high-level demarches, in support of a free press, access to information, and journalists’ rights to freely exercise their profession; coordinate with the EU and G-7 and other key countries, donors, and institutions on matters including assistance and policy; support grassroots media initiatives such as expansion of Internet access by regional media, substantive newspaper supplements, and TV documentaries through embassy, USAID, NGO, and foundation projects; provide technical assistance for projects that strengthen independent media and increase the availability of quality news, journalist advocacy, financial viability, and managerial capacity of independent media; finance legal assistance for journalists and media outlets; improve the legal and regulatory frameworks for media, including access to information, laws protecting free speech, and fair professional practices for media; foster the growth of NGOs that promote media freedom.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Assist viable private sector broadcast and print media to provide a broad range of objective programming; provide technical assistance and political support to Bosnian Communications Regulatory Agency (RAK), Press Council, Association of Electronic Media, journalist associations, and media training providers; support domestic production.

Kyrgyzstan Work with government officials to press for reform of media and libel laws and to reduce pressure against independent media; support independent media through programs to provide independent printing facilities, legal counsel, institutional support to journalists’ associations, and training in new media technology; support journalists’ professional associations and their capacity to monitor and document press freedom infringements and advocate on these issues with the government; monitor violations of press freedom and report on policy and trends affecting media; teach objective journalism and management skills to increase media outlets’ professional and economic viability; support programs that encourage political dialogue and debate, such as discussion clubs and TV/radio talk shows, and ensure that remote areas also have access to such programs; increase the accessibility to diverse forms of information about political, economic, and social issues for all citizens throughout the country; support spread of Internet access throughout the country.

Haiti Strengthen the independent press; strengthen media independence and community radio networks; increase citizen awareness of their rights and responsibilities to the extent that citizens apply this knowledge in everyday experiences; strengthen journalists’ ability to report on issues related to democratic development and to advocate for greater freedom of the press.

Georgia Foster the development of an increasingly vibrant civil society; assist in building a vibrant and diverse civil society, including political parties, independent and responsible media, and constituency-based NGO coalitions, to advocate for reforms in Georgia and to partner with the new government in carrying out key reforms; increase journalistic professionalism through U.S. and locally based assistance for print and broadcast media.

Egypt Initiate new projects to support journalism training on free, fair, and accurate reporting through both classroom work and internships with U.S. news media.

Indonesia Professionalize media through exchange and training programs; U.S. Fulbright lecturers, students and researchers outreach on the topic of free and responsible media; provide Small Democracy Grants to bolster free and independent media.

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Performance Indicators for State’s Independent Media Development Efforts Not Widely Established

While State’s independent media activities conducted at overseas missions support U.S. objectives in these countries, performance indicators were not widely established for the activities, making it difficult for State to accurately measure and report their value. At four of the nine countries we reviewed, State had developed some media-related performance indicators to measure the overall results of the missions’ independent media development efforts. For instance, for Kyrgyzstan, State currently measures the results of the embassy’s efforts in developing independent media and improving the availability of political information in several ways, including by surveying whether editors and journalists that receive support become more skilled in reporting and editing political news. However, aside from counting the number of participants, specific performance indicators for individual embassy-sponsored independent media projects or activities were not widely established in the cases we reviewed. For example, embassy officials in Croatia said there were no measurable performance indicators tracked for their journalism exchanges and other media-related public diplomacy efforts.

Several State Department officials told us that posts rely heavily on their knowledge of the activities and anecdotal reports of accomplishments to evaluate performance. In some instances, embassy public affairs sections submit reporting cables to State Department bureaus and offices or enter descriptions of media projects or activities and anecdotal information into a database managed by the Bureau of International Information Programs. State’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) bureau has, in some cases, used quantifiable indicators, including the number of local radio stations that broadcast sponsored programs or the number of articles written as a result of journalist training seminars, to measure the performance of independent media projects related to democracy assistance, in addition to gathering descriptive or anecdotal information on accomplishments.

State officials told us that embassies are more likely to develop independent media-specific performance indicators for evaluating results when independent media is a priority at the post and specific performance goals are set in mission-planning documents.12 For example, the current

12Media development efforts are frequently designated by the mission as a tactic or strategy for accomplishing broader performance goals related to Democracy and Human Rights or Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. See table 6 in appendix III for related goals and strategies for our case study countries.

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mission plan for Kyrgyzstan includes a stated goal of helping to build independent media that reports objectively and freely. Officials also said that posts are not currently required to develop specific indicators for individual public diplomacy projects and activities; however, a requirement for the establishment of such measures is currently being considered. Additionally, officials in State’s Middle East Partnership Initiative office told us the office plans to develop measures for the effectiveness of its new media assistance project in the Middle East, but could not provide details because the initiative is still being designed. State officials we spoke with told us it is difficult to develop performance indicators with limited staff and funding, as well as the inherent difficulties in determining when and how results will occur for public diplomacy-related efforts.

USAID Performance Indicators for Independent Media Development Efforts Frequently Established

In the cases we reviewed, USAID performance indicators for independent media efforts were frequently established at the country or USAID mission level and for individual projects. For example, six of the nine USAID missions we reviewed established performance indicators in their current planning documents for their missions’ independent media performance objectives. In addition, all missions we obtained documentation from had established performance indicators for country-specific projects.13 USAID officials told us that the establishment of specific independent media performance objectives is left to the discretion of the local USAID mission and that some missions with active independent media development projects or activities may not choose to designate media-related performance objectives based on their relative priorities, or they may view media development as a crosscutting issue or as a tool for accomplishing other specific objectives.14 See table 3 for a list of the objectives and performance indicators for USAID missions in the countries we reviewed.

13Seven of the nine USAID missions provided us with documentation on performance indicators for specific independent media projects; we did not obtain relevant documentation from the USAID missions in Egypt and Mali.

14If performance objectives (referred to as strategic objectives or intermediate results by USAID) are established, USAID missions are required to establish performance indicators for those goals.

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Table 3: Performance Objectives and Indicators Related to USAID Independent Media Development Efforts from Select Performance Monitoring Plans

Country Performance objective Mission performance indicators

Ukraine Availability of quality information increased • Media sustainability index (MSI)• Quantity of information produced by partner regional outlets (print

and broadcast)• Quality of information produced by partner regional outlets (print

and broadcast)

Croatia Sustainable and balanced commercial media • An increased rating for Croatia on the overall average for media sustainability (MSI)

• Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey score • An increased rating for Croatia on the MSI, attribute 3: Multiple

news sources provide citizens with reliable and objective news

Journalists’ professional standards improved • An increased rating for Croatia on the MSI, attribute 2: Journalism meets professional standards of quality

Management and business capacity of media organizations strengthened

• An increased rating for Croatia on the MSI attribute 4: Independent media are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Viable private-sector broadcast and print media provide broad range of objective programming

• Number of people who buy independent news publications• Audience share of independent broadcast media

Kyrgyzstan Increased availability of information on civic rights and domestic public issues

• MSI

Increased news programming • Average daily minutes of nonstate electronic media local news programming

Improved financial management systems in targeted media entities

• Technical quality of local nongovernmental broadcast news• Quality of independent broadcast management.

Georgia Alternative media represents citizen concerns on key issues

• Percentage of citizens who respond that the media fairly represent the views of all citizens

• Percentage of stories/articles by USAID-assisted media outlets representing two or more viewpoints

Mali Increase pubic access to quality development information in targeted areas

• Percentage of Malians having access to at least one local radio station

• Internet access costs

Regulatory and policy environment responsive to public interest

• Appropriation of Internet management by a neutral institution• Internet access costs reduced• Mean time to obtain radio licenses reduced

Policies and procedures proposed for adoption • Internet regulatory policies proposed• Radio licensing procedures proposed

Improved quality of development information • Percentage of radio broadcasts that employ appropriate communication techniques

Enhanced institutional capacity to produce development information

• Number of information content producers trained • Percentage of radio stations in targeted areas having trained staff in

program production

Haiti Civil society organizations positively influence policies

• (No specific media indicators identified in mission performance monitoring plan)

Page 15 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Source: USAID.

aIndicates USAID intermediate results, subintermediate results, or lower-level results categories.

State and USAID Missions Use Broad Indexes of Country Press Freedom That Cannot Measure Performance of U.S. Efforts

In the cases we reviewed, State and USAID often selected media indexes, such as the Media Sustainability Index (MSI) and Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey, to measure the results of their independent media development efforts. The MSI and the Press Freedom survey assess the freedom of media in a country; however, when used alone as performance indicators, media indexes are of limited utility in measuring the specific contributions of specific activities or combined U.S. efforts toward developing independent media in particular countries.

State and USAID Rely Frequently on Media Indexes to Measure Performance

State and USAID commonly use media indexes to measure the performance of independent media efforts. In cases we reviewed where State had specifically defined performance indicators for its independent media development efforts, Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey and MSI were frequently used by the mission for measuring results. In the cases we reviewed, all four State missions that designated performance indicators relied on media indexes to measure the performance of their efforts.15 For example, the U.S. Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina designated the MSI as its primary performance indicator for its independent media efforts. USAID missions we reviewed also frequently used the MSI and the Press Freedom survey as measures of performance. Of six USAID missions that established indicators for their performance goals, three used the media indexes as performance indicators. Some missions, including the USAID Missions to Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, used the MSI along with other measures they had created to measure the accomplishment of performance

Indonesia (Strengthening independent media is a cross-cutting objective, crossing all mission performance objectives)

• (No specific media indicators identified in mission performance monitoring plan)

Egypt Establish and ensure media freedom and freedom of information

• (Under development)

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Performance objective Mission performance indicators

15Media-specific indicators were established in current planning documents for the U.S. missions to Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia. In addition to the MSI and Freedom House Press Freedom Survey, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Independent Media Survey scores were used.

Page 16 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

objectives.16 However, the USAID Mission to Croatia used the media indexes alone to measure performance objectives related to independent media development. In addition, the only performance indicators established for the USAID media project in Croatia were the four broad MSI components, including “journalists professional standards improved in Croatia” and “multiple news sources provide citizens with reliable and objective news.” USAID officials told us that the MSI index is generally promoted and used as an independent media development performance indicator in Europe and Eurasia and that it is generally used in coordination with more specific indicators of activities to determine program performance.

Broad Indicators Assess Media Freedom, Not Necessarily a Measure of U.S. Efforts

Media indexes used alone are of limited use for determining the performance of U.S. independent media development programs. Commonly used media indexes—such as the Press Freedom Survey and MSI in particular—cannot pinpoint the effects of U.S. government programs, and are general indicators rather than precise measures. These indexes use reasonably consistent methodologies to measure broad concepts such as press freedom and media sustainability. However, because the indexes focus on broad concepts that are affected by a wide variety of social, political, and economic factors, they have limited utility for purposes of identifying the effects of particular U.S. media development programs. The indexes do provide general measures of trends and allow for some cross-country comparisons. However, IREX has only been collecting data on the MSI for 3 years, which makes it impossible to evaluate longer term trends and establish baselines for efforts that began before 2001. Another concern is the time lag in the data of 1 year from scoring to publication.

Freedom House and IREX officials told us that the Press Freedom survey and MSI were not designed to measure the performance of U.S. media development programs. According to a senior Freedom House official, the Press Freedom survey was initially intended to inform debate and discussion about the state of media development in particular countries, and potentially could be used to prod particular countries to liberalize their

16The USAID mission to Ukraine has hired a special marketing consultant to develop specific indicators of performance, including measures of the quality and quantity of news and information produced by partner media outlets, consumer satisfaction with partner media outlets, financial viability of partner outlets, and awareness of legal rights and responsibilities of journalists and media owners. Funds were set aside in the cooperative agreement for the development of such data.

Page 17 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

media. Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey has been used to assess the freedom of the media in more than 100 nations since 1981. The Press Freedom survey evaluates countries’ legal, political, and economic environments, scoring between 8 and 12 subcategories. According to IREX officials, the MSI was designed, with the support of USAID, to be used for making prioritized decisions on funding. IREX’s Media Sustainability Index has assessed the sustainability of independent media in about 20 countries in Europe and Eurasia since 2001.17 The MSI measures five objectives—free speech, professional journalism, plurality of news sources, business management, and supporting institutions—each of which includes between 7 and 9 subcategories. Freedom House and IREX officials both stated that use of the indexes for anything other than what they were designed for imply an unwarranted precision to their measures.

Some State and USAID officials indicated that they do not think media indexes alone are comprehensive indicators for measuring mission or project performance and supported the development of additional measures in some cases. However, they also told us that it is difficult to develop their own independent media development performance indicators for several reasons. In addition to funding constraints, agencies noted that there are also difficulties separating media efforts from broader goals and determining when and how results will occur for democracy-related or public diplomacy programs.18 Some USAID officials in the field noted that USAID officials in Washington, D.C., supported using the MSI as a primary performance indicator and some USAID officials noted they viewed using the MSI as a cost-effective means to provide a common indicator to measure and compare the results of efforts in Europe and Eurasia.

17Countries or territories assessed in the MSI include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

18State provided a list of some suggested measures for missions, including using the following as indicators when relevant independent media development goals are established: opposition parties have access to state-run media, independent media outlets are established, and mechanisms are established to provide citizens with information to make objective decisions about political and social choices.

Page 18 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Country-Specific and Programmatic Factors Can Impact Media Development Efforts

In all the cases we reviewed, countries faced changing political conditions or deficiencies in the legal, regulatory, or professional environments, which created challenges for planning and implementing independent media development efforts. In some cases, programmatic factors, such as unsustainable local partner organizations or lack of coordination at overseas missions, affected overall U.S. efforts or specific projects or activities in a country. The following media development challenges represent a sample of those frequently mentioned during our review.

Country-Specific Factors, Such as a Changing Political Society or Inadequate Legal, Regulatory and Professional Environments, Can Impact Media Development Efforts

A country’s political conditions can impact efforts to plan and implement independent media development projects and activities. In January 2004, USAID surveyed its independent media development efforts, as well as those supported by other donors, and determined that different programmatic approaches are required for five different types of political societies, which USAID classified as: (1) closed, (2) semidemocratic/developing, (3) war-torn, (4) postconflict, and (5) transition. For semidemocratic, postconflict, or transitional countries making progress toward democracy or no longer experiencing conflict, USAID has identified a variety of activities to support the development of an independent media. However, in closed or war-torn societies, USAID determined it can do very little because the environments are unsuitable for outside intervention. See table 4 for definitions of political societies and further detail on the appropriate programmatic media strategies identified by USAID.

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Table 4: USAID Definition and Media Approach for Each Political Society

Source: USAID.

We examined independent media development projects in nine different countries—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Krygyzstan, Mali, and Ukraine—each experiencing differing domestic political conditions that limit the impact of these projects. In some of the cases we reviewed, changes in domestic conditions or the status of political societies occurred following the onset of independent media development activities, creating further challenges in implementing efforts in these countries. For example, in Haiti—a nation experiencing civil conflict—violent demonstrations and protests prior to the departure of the

Political society Definition USAID media approach

Closed Closed societies are governed by monarchs, military dictators, or ideologues with a relatively closed political system and underdeveloped economy. Free press is almost nonexistent in these societies.

USAID or other international agencies have not designed or implemented major projects for independent media development in closed societies. The situation is likely to change because of the growing interest in promoting democracy in the Middle East.

Semidemocratic/ developing

Countries that appear to have made tangible progress toward democratization, but where stagnation and even backsliding occur, are considered semidemocratic developing societies. Independent media remains extremely fragile in such countries, and journalists work under trying conditions. Subtle forms of censorship and self-censorship continue, and the legal and regulatory environment is not conducive to a free press.

USAID and other international actors can undertake a wide variety of media projects, but strong political and diplomatic pressure is necessary to push for independent media in semidemocratic societies. If multiple donors work together, they increase the chances of gaining political support for independent media development.

War-torn This category refers to countries with ongoing civil wars. Such societies tend to have highly authoritarian regimes and predatory social and political structures. Civil wars give the ruling regime a pretext to stifle whatever little freedom media enjoyed in the past.

USAID and other donors can do very little in such conditions, as the whole political environment, intellectual climate, and economic conditions are not suitable for outside interventions.

Postconflict This category refers to countries where conflict has ended, leading to the establishment of a legitimate government. One distinguishing characteristic of these societies is that tremendous opportunities exist for establishing democratic institutions and practices.

Examples of the types of projects that can be undertaken in these countries include the following: establishing a legal framework for free media, supporting the government in establishing appropriate regulatory bodies, training journalists, assisting independent media outlets, and establishing civil society organizations that articulate the interests of journalists and a free press.

Transition This category primarily refers to relatively socially and economically advanced societies in which the political order has collapsed, opening the way for liberalization and democratization.

As in postconflict societies, unprecedented opportunities for promoting independent media exist in these countries. Practically all of the programming strategies suggested for postconflict societies have been followed in transition countries.

Page 20 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

president prevented some USAID-funded media development projects from continuing because staff were physically unable to get to work. Officials told us that several radio stations suffered extensive damage from looters, and community radio stations reported several cases where police, as well as government officials loyal to the president, tried to use their power to silence independent media voices. After the president’s departure, all nonessential USAID staff were ordered to evacuate the country, and the media project was on hold for nearly a month.

In countries with deficient legal, regulatory, or professional environments, agencies can face challenges in implementing independent media development projects and activities. All nine of the countries we reviewed faced challenges due to deficiencies in at least one of these areas, which impacted efforts to train the media, build the capacity of the media outlets, and improve the freedom of the press within the country. In particular, these deficiencies have led to such challenges as limited press freedom due to direct government control over the media industry; changing legal and regulatory frameworks; limited training opportunities; and lack of skilled journalists due to widespread problems in professional and educational systems. Agency officials provided examples of how such deficiencies have impacted their programs:

• Limited press freedom. Prior to the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz government maintained a tight hold on broadcast frequencies, prevented new stations from obtaining frequencies, and canceled frequencies of certain independent outlets. Agency officials said that journalists were afraid to broadcast on certain topics for fear of harassment or prosecution. In Georgia, most television stations are owned by oligarchs, many of whom support the new government. According to embassy officials in Tbilisi, working journalists exercise self-censorship for fear that reports critical of the government would be unpopular with their owners.

• Changing legal and regulatory frameworks. Although Ukraine’s new president stated publicly his support for a free mass media, State officials said Ukraine’s legal and regulatory environments still need assistance. Though legislation has been enacted to improve freedom of the press and oversight of the media industry, these changes have not been consistently applied by Ukrainian judges and media outlets. Therefore, journalists can still be pressured by government officials and oligarchs to report information in a certain way, and media outlets’ legal status and license to operate remain in question.

Page 21 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

• Limited training opportunities. Since 1993, Mali’s constitution has made it relatively easy to obtain radio broadcast licenses for FM frequencies. However, officials noted that that there are currently no in-country professional training institutions for broadcast media. As a result, individuals have to go outside of Mali to receive training, or obtain informal training from their peers and colleagues.

• Lack of skilled journalists. In Croatia, most journalists have little academic or professional training. Agency officials stated that although independent media is evolving, journalists still report biased news and information, do not check their facts or sources, do not follow up or correct their errors, and skew the focus of articles to accomplish personal agendas.

According to USAID’s January 2004 media assistance study, USAID has funded a range of activities designed to further promote legal and regulatory reforms, though undemocratic structures, politicians, and slow-to-change traditions have made the creation of enabling laws, policies, and practices difficult or impossible in some cases. Assistance projects and training efforts have been designed to mitigate legal, regulatory, and professional deficiencies, though progress of these programs has been slow. Agency officials from missions in several countries we examined provided examples of approaches to addressing unregulated media environments, including the following:

• Limited press freedom. In order to limit editorial interference by state bodies, USAID’s media project in Kyrgyzstan currently supports local efforts to draft a new broadcasting law, which would include stipulations for the transformation of state television and radio to a public broadcasting system. To dilute the editorial influence of oligarchs who own the vast majority of TV stations in Georgia, USAID’s implementing partner in Tbilisi introduced a television rating system, which produced verifiable ratings that made the commercial market far more attractive to advertisers. The increased interest of advertisers in the media market has made nonbusiness-based policies more costly for oligarch owners.

• Changing legal and regulatory frameworks. USAID’s media development project in Ukraine has established a Media Law Institute that will provide journalists with an outlet for legal defense and consultations when faced with political pressure. The center also plans

Page 22 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

to train local lawyers and judges on media law reform, and to publish bulletins about changes in legislation.

• Limited training opportunities. The USAID Mission to Mali has tried to address the lack of professional media training institutions by supporting a technical training facility, bringing professionals to Mali to conduct training sessions, and sending broadcast and print journalists as well as key members of the government and civil society to an anticorruption ethics training seminar.

• Lack of skilled journalists. Croatia’s USAID media development project focused on developing the capacity of the national journalist association, including conferences to improve journalists’ professionalism, their capacity for reporting, and their relationships with other sectors of society, such as the police and judiciary. Additionally, University of Zagreb’s journalism school partnered with the U.S. Embassy to participate in academic exchange programs, international visits, and speaker programs.

Programmatic Factors Can Affect Media Development Efforts

The sustainability of local organizations can impact the overall results of media development efforts or the success of specific projects and activities in a country. Additionally, limited coordination and lack of communication with local recipients at some posts have impacted some projects and activities by causing confusion of responsibilities or duplication of efforts.

Sustainability of Local Organizations Can Affect Long-Term Media Development Results

The success of media development projects and activities can be impacted by the sustainability of local partners. We found that seven of the nine countries we reviewed had cases where local media outlets had difficulty ensuring their financial sustainability as their U.S. funding decreased. Sustainability challenges were primarily due to a poor economic environment or lack of sufficient business management training. Specific examples include the following:

• Poor economic environment. An official from the USAID Mission in Haiti stated that because many independent radio stations are community owned, the stations cannot increase their operating budgets or replace expensive pieces of equipment without first increasing the financial resources available to the entire community. Additionally, the self-sustainability of private media outlets in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a major problem due to widespread crime and corruption and a national unemployment rate of about 40 percent.

Page 23 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

• Lack of business management training. According to one local television station owner in Croatia, a U.S.-sponsored national television network, designed to link several local station’s news programs, is struggling to survive because the network did not develop the advertising revenue and profit-sharing structures necessary to keep it financially sustainable. USAID acknowledged that this may be the case, but they viewed the network project as a success because it had served to provide an alternative, independent news program to the state-controlled TV network during an earlier period of political transition.

To respond to these programmatic challenges, some USAID officials offered the following suggestions:

• Poor economic environment. The USAID Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina has focused on encouraging local business development strategies, and currently financially supports the survival of only a select number of media outlets. The USAID Mission in Mali told us that because of the country’s high poverty rate, they conduct workshops for radio stations in order to provide them with small-business concepts that can be used to generate additional outside revenues, like the sale of solar power to provide lighting or the creation of centers to provide the community with computer services and Internet access.

• Lack of business management training. Since 2002, Georgia’s USAID media project has worked to promote the sustainability of print and broadcast media outlets by improving their business management skills and establishing an independent and credible national system of television audience measurement. As a result of better information on the profile of viewers, TV advertising in Georgia increased from $3 million to $7 million in 2004 and is expected to increase to $13 million by 2006.

Various studies have also offered suggestions for addressing the sustainability of media outlets. A working paper by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations on “International Media Assistance” suggested allowing more time during the life of a project to focus on sustainability. Another report published by USAID, Media Assistance:

Policy and Programmatic Lessons, suggested that in postconflict societies, only media outlets willing to take concrete and concerted steps toward economic independence should be given technical or financial assistance. According to this study, USAID has implemented several

Page 24 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

activities that promote the financial independence or sustainability of media outlets, but these activities have achieved only limited success.

Limited Coordination at Some Locations Can Result in Confusion of Responsibilities and Duplication of Efforts

While not as widespread as other programmatic challenges, we found that four of the nine countries we examined were challenged by coordination issues, such as an unclear chain of command and limited communication, which resulted in confusion over the responsibilities of donors and providers of media development, duplication of efforts, or periods of program inactivity. For example, the director of a Croatian media development project worked with three different U.S. donors, with no clear chain of command established. Thus, the director was unsure to whom he should report under certain circumstances, resulting in difficulty in reacting to urgent needs. In another case we reviewed, State and USAID had unknowingly funded different NGOs that were working independently to rebuild the same radio stations that had been destroyed during the recent tsunami in Indonesia, leading to on-the-ground project conflicts. Officials at the USAID Mission to Indonesia told us this duplication of effort resulted from their lack of awareness of a grant awarded by State’s DRL bureau in Washington, D.C., that was similar to the grant USAID awarded.19 Poorly maintained roads, combined with poor phone and Internet access, contributed to communication and coordination challenges faced by the USAID Mission in Haiti and the community radios it supports; this, in turn slowed USAID’s training activities, the delivery of equipment, and other activities. USAID officials said they are planning to install Internet and phone lines in rural areas to improve the situation.

One example of effective coordination can be found in Ukraine. Ukraine is challenged by a complicated network of donors, providers, and recipients (see fig. 1), multiple ongoing projects, various funding sources, and agencies funding the same organizations and similar activities. For example, four separate organizations, including the U.S. Embassy (via the Media Development Ffund), Internews Network (via a cooperative agreement via the USAID mission), the International Renaissance Foundation, and NED (via its annual grant from State), currently provide U.S.-sponsored funding or programmatic activities to the advocacy and media monitoring organization Telekritika. However, in Kiev, USAID and State officials have worked well together to minimize coordination

19In May 2005, USAID Indonesia completed its media strategy that sets out broad strategic parameters with respect to media programming, including some attention on the tsunami-affected region of Aceh.

Page 25 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

problems by keeping track of donor awards on a Web site and attending donor coordination meetings on a monthly basis. According to USAID officials, the Web site “Marketplace for Donors” is funded jointly by State (the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, public affairs section) and the International Renaissance Foundation.

Page 26 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Figure 1: U.S.-Sponsored Independent Media Development Projects and Activities in Ukraine

Due to the complex network of donors and providers in Ukraine, State and USAID have coordinated their media efforts.

Independent Association of Broadcasters

Local end recipients(i.e., Crimean Information and Press Center, Kafa and MV

newspapers,TVRK Chernomorska and many others)

International Renaissance Foundation

International Research and

Exchanges Board (IREX)

Ukrainian Association of

Press Publishers

Open Media Fund for Ukraine

(OMFU)

International visitor

program

Academicand

citizens exchanges

Speaker programs

IREX Ukrainian Media Partnership

Program

Office of the Coordinator of

the U.S. Assistance to Europe and

Eurasia

Embassy public affairs

section

EurasiaFoundation

National Endowment for

Democracy (NED)

Internews Network, U-Media

Telekritika

Ukrainian Newspaper Publishers Association

Media Development Fund (MDF)

Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).

Department ofState

USAID

U.S. government agencies

Subrecipients of USAID IPs

U.S. government prime recipientsand/or implementing partners (IP)

Funds

Public affairs section/embassy-funded programs

Local end recipients

Page 27 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Media evaluations have made specific suggestions to improve the coordination of donors, providers, and recipients of independent media development programming in order to minimize the confusion of responsibilities and duplication of efforts. An evaluation by the University of Oxford, “Mapping Media Assistance,” suggested donors and providers coordinate the distribution of their limited resources in a systematic and logical manner, based on their areas of specialization. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations working paper on “International Media Assistance,” suggested establishing a strategic coordination mechanism, like the European Media Agency for the European Union, that could serve as a clearinghouse and evaluator of all media-related assistance proposals for the targeted countries.

To address challenges in coordination, USAID funds regional media conferences and has conducted a limited number of independent media program evaluations, so that participants can share lessons learned; however, these efforts face funding constraints. USAID has funded six independent media development regional conferences in Europe and Eurasia and one multiregional conference over the past 8 years. These conferences have brought together journalists, media development donors, providers, and civil society organizations to discuss issues in journalism that transcend borders. USAID has also designated the Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination to conduct several assessments of independent media programs in various countries and identify lessons learned and best practices. In addition, USAID bureaus and missions have conducted several different types of studies on independent media efforts, including midterm assessments, final reports, and program evaluations. According to the Policy and Program Coordination bureau director, USAID’s independent media evaluations have created a body of knowledge and lessons learned on subjects ranging from conflict areas to transitional countries. However, USAID media officials noted that the discontinuation of funding for conferences and limited funding levels for evaluations could reduce the amount of collaboration and sharing of lessons learned officials said is necessary to enhance media development programming efforts. Additionally, several media officials indicated that in some instances insufficient funding for USAID program evaluations has forced media development providers to fund their own evaluations through their project budgets, thus reducing funds available for development activities. Although USAID requires its evaluations to be posted on the Development Experience Clearinghouse to make them accessible to other posts, one senior official said it was unclear to what degree the lessons learned from evaluations are shared or used by missions. For example, one official in

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Croatia said that program evaluations are shared only within the region due to concerns that other countries’ approaches may not be relevant.

Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator for their review and comment. State generally concurred with our report, and USAID offered technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. In addition, State indicated that it plans to develop additional performance indicators and promote best practices in the future. The comments provided by State are reprinted in appendix IV, and comments by USAID are reprinted in appendix V.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. We will also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. FordDirector, International Affairs and Trade

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Appendix I

AppendixesScope and Methodology Appendix I

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed documentation and spoke with officials from the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and key U.S. nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners, including the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Internews, The Asia Foundation, the Eurasia Foundation, and the International Center for Journalists. In addition, we reviewed USAID’s guidance for performance measurement. Department of Defense media activities were not included in the scope of our work as its primary focus in the media field is on conducting psychological operations.

In addition to audit work performed in the United States, we traveled to and reviewed documentation on U.S.-sponsored independent media development programs in Croatia, Ukraine, and Indonesia. These countries were primarily selected based on geographic representation; preliminary estimates on funding and years of assistance provided;1 and the range of programs offered. During travel to Croatia, Ukraine, and Indonesia, we met with State Department and USAID officials; multiple nonprofit, private donor, and multilateral officials; and program recipients to discuss issues of coordination, funding, measuring of program effectiveness, and challenges faced when implementing foreign independent media development programs. We also sent questions to and reviewed select documentation from posts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, and Mali.

Agency Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Obligations

In order to determine estimates for agency fiscal year 2004 obligations, we obtained data from State, USAID, the BBG, and select NGOs. Assessments of the reliability of the data yielded mixed results, but provided an overall indication of the minimum level of funding for the agency.

USAID and Select NGOs USAID’s historic budget obligations from USAID’s Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance bureau proved to be unreliable because (1) USAID historic budget records on media development programs are incomplete after 1996 because agencywide budget codes related to media activities were discontinued at this time; (2) USAID budget records were

1With the exception of two countries that we were not able to obtain initial estimates for, case studies and follow-up countries were selected that had estimated U.S. investments of over $1 million for independent media development.

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

not finalized for fiscal year 2004; and (3) historic funding codes could not be recoded or configured to accurately reflect the specific activities of missions falling under our definition of independent media development. In addition, although USAID officials indicated that individual missions currently track spending for various program components—including media development—independent media projects can often be defined differently or be intermixed within broader civil society projects; thus, missions may record media funding levels inconsistently. Given this determination, we instead obtained USAID fiscal year 2004 obligations from NGOs that USAID identified as the main implementers of independent media development projects. In particular, we gathered documentation separately from the International Center for Journalists, Internews, The Eurasia Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and IREX. USAID officials told us that the true figure for USAID fiscal year 2004 obligations is likely significantly higher than our estimate because (1) we were not able to obtain documentation from all NGOs that received independent media development grants from USAID headquarters;2 (2) we were not able to obtain data on fiscal year 2004 obligations awarded directly by USAID missions to local NGOS; and (3) we may not have captured all budget accounts that funded obligations for fiscal year 2004.3

State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy

We gathered State Department fiscal year obligation data by obtaining documentation from the following bureaus or offices: Democracy Human Rights and Labor (DRL), the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE), Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), International Information Programs (IIP), Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and State’s regional bureaus.4 We requested the bureaus and offices include 2004 budget obligations that met our definition of media assistance programs and exclude programs funded by the State

2We obtained documentation or records on fiscal year 2004 obligations made by USAID from the main NGO providers that receive independent media development grants from USAID headquarters, including the International Center for Journalists, IREX, the Asia Foundation, and Internews. In addition, we obtained information from the Eurasia Foundation on the amount in subgrants it awarded during fiscal year 2004.

3Some agency budget accounts fund obligations for only 1 fiscal year, over 2 fiscal years, or until funds are expended (also called “no-year” money). In some instances, we were not able to associate an obligated amount to a particular fiscal year.

4State’s East Asia and Pacific bureau reported actual expenditures. Agency officials indicated that these expenditures were approximations because of the time of year that the data were collected.

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Department via interagency transfers to USAID or BBG. To assess the reliability of the obligation data, we (1) posed a standard set of questions to State officials, and (2) reviewed the list provided for consistency with our definition of media assistance programs. According to State officials, some variation existed in the techniques used to compile the programs and budget obligations. For example, some bureaus or agencies relied on electronic databases to gather information, while others did not have these systems. We found the list of programs to be consistent with the media assistance program definition in our request. We determined that the data provided by State were sufficiently reliable to provide an estimate of 2004 budget obligations for media assistance programs. We were not able to specifically determine NED’s fiscal year 2004 obligations from State for independent media development projects because NED receives several broad grants each year for its work to support democratic initiatives. However, we were able to obtain information from NED on the amount in subgrants for media development activities it awarded during fiscal year 2004.5

Broadcasting Board of Governors

We determined fiscal year 2004 obligations data provided by the BBG to be sufficiently reliable following an interview with BBG officials to assess data reliability. The key factors in making the determination were that BBG (1) used one budget account for the program area, and (2) routinely performed checks on the reliability of the database used.

Review of Media Development Indexes

To address our objective of examining agency performance measurement for independent media development efforts, we also (1) reviewed available agency, country, and program-level performance documentation for the case study countries; and (2) assessed the principle media development indexes—Freedom House’s Press Freedom survey and the IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI). Our analysis of the Press Freedom survey and the IREX MSI included interviews with officials at the organizations responsible for the indexes and interviews with State and USAID officials to determine the strengths and limitations of the data.

5The data showed that during fiscal year 2004, NED awarded approximately $6.5 million in subgrants for independent media development projects.

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Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Challenges to Media Development

To address the challenges that the United States faces in implementing media development activities and achieving results, we interviewed or requested information from State and USAID officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, and Ukraine. State and officials at all nine missions were asked to list the challenges their mission has dealt with while implementing media development programs and provide specific examples of how each challenge impeded the effectiveness of their program. The officials were also asked to explain the steps their mission took to mitigate these challenges. Although the challenges provided could not be generalized worldwide, we believe that the steps taken to mitigate the challenges, or lessons learned, should be shared globally. Lastly, we reviewed several media development studies published between 2000 and 2005 by State, USAID, the Knight Foundation, University of Oxford, Freedom House, IREX, Foreign Affairs, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, UNESCO, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, World Bank Institute Development Studies, and Routledge Group. We did not review these studies for sufficiency of methodology.

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Appendix II

Select International Organizations or Donors That Implement Media Development Programs Appendix II

Source: Select non-U.S. donors.

Note: Media development funding from these various donors was not readily available, not presented in similar formats, and not easily verifiable.

Select non-U.S. donors Program description

European Commission Provides major source of funding for media development at the European level as part of its larger program of human rights and democratization. Includes both macroprojects, implemented in partnership with international organizations (like the Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) that work with local entities, and microprojects that directly fund local organizations.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Supports freedom of the press and freedom of information by providing training for journalists and technicians, setting up radio stations, and monitoring freedom of information in the media. OSCE also assists and advises governmental authorities as well as print and electronic media in their endeavour to reform the media sector.

Open Society Institute and Soros Foundations Network

Concentrates on projects addressing issues of democratic media legislation, monitoring violations of media freedom, protecting journalists, establishing self-regulation systems and strong independent professional organizations, and raising the professionalism of journalists and media managers.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Provides training to journalists and technical media staff to strengthen independent media, establishes independent printing plants and print distribution networks, and develops public service broadcasting— including the establishment of a regulatory framework and support for TV productions and co-productions.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Promotes global access to information by strengthening the legal and regulatory environment for freedom and pluralism information, supporting capacity strengthening, networking, and elevation of standards of media at national and local levels; raising awareness on rights to official access to information; and developing communication mechanisms for vulnerable groups.

World Bank Supports civil society with direct funding support—often provided in partnership with other international aid donors—to back programs such as information technology access and human rights.

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Appendix III

State Department and USAID Goals Related to Independent Media Appendix III

Table 5: Goals Related to Select Independent Media Development Programs from Current State Mission Performance Plans

Country Strategic goals Performance goals, strategies, and media-related tactics

Croatia Democratic systems and practices/democracy and human rights

Goal: Croatia completes democratic transition away from its socialist and authoritarian past and puts in place democratic institutions needed for integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Strategy: Support transparent and accountable democratic systems, full integration of minorities into national and local political structures, combat trafficking in persons, and improve the climate for independent media.Media-related tactic: Promote independent media through exchange and training programs to expose Croatian journalists and editors to U.S. practices.

Ukraine Democratic systems and practices/democracy and human rights

Goal: Ukraine meets Euro-Atlantic standards of democratic practice and human rights. Strategy 1: Support the capacity of the citizenry to engage effectively in promoting its rights and interests for a more democratic Ukraine.Media-related tactic: Foster the growth of NGOs that promote and defend human rights, religious freedom, and media freedom.Strategy 2: Encourage Ukrainian government institutions to become more effective, transparent, and accountable to the citizens within an overall rule of law framework.Media-related tactic: Develop and maintain a wide range of contacts in government, academia, media, think tanks, and the international community to advocate effectively and monitor progress, both in the government and in society as a whole.

International public opinion/public diplomacy and public affairs

Goal: Public Opinion in Ukraine moves towards U.S./Western values.Strategy: Strengthen the capacity of Ukrainian media and civic organizations to present a balanced view of domestic and international events.Media-related tactics: Employ bilateral engagements, including sustained high-level demarches, in support of a free press, access to information, and journalists’ rights to freely exercise their profession; coordinate with the European Union and G-7 and other key countries, donors, and institutions on matters including assistance, policy, and demarches; support grassroots media initiatives such as expansion of Internet access by regional media, substantive newspaper supplements, and TV documentaries through embassy, AID, NGO, and foundation projects; provide technical assistance for projects that strengthen independent media, journalist advocacy, and managerial capacity of independent media; finance legal assistance for journalists and media outlets to improve the legal and regulatory framework for media, including access to information.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Democratic systems and practices/democracy and human rights

Goal: Bosnia-Herzegovina is an accountable, transparent democracy with a robust civil society and respect for human rights.Strategy: Increase citizen participation in political/social decision making, particularly in public sector reform. Media outlets provide useful information to citizens as basis for making informed judgments and identify areas where public pressure can be usefully applied. Media-related tactics: Assist viable private sector broadcast and print media to provide a broad range of objective programming; provide technical assistance and political support to the Bosnian Communications Regulatory Agency (RAK), Press Council, Association of Electronic Media, journalist associations, and media training providers; support domestic production.

International public opinion/public diplomacy and public affairs

Strategy: Influence public opinion and explain U.S. positions on global issues including the war on terrorism, Iraq, and the Middle East; stress democratic and economic themes related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration, rule of law, trafficking in persons, development of an independent and professional media, and private sector growth.

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Appendix III

State Department and USAID Goals Related

to Independent Media

Kyrgyzstand Democratic systems and practices/democracy and human rights

Goal: Encourage the growth of an active and informed civil society in the Kyrgyz Republic; help build independent media that report objectively and freely; encourage strong democratic institutions including an independent parliament and independent judiciary; support active independent political parties, rule of law, respect for human rights, and free and fair and transparent elections.Strategy: Increase the quality, quantity, and accessibility of information available to Kyrgyz citizens.Media-related tactics: Work with government officials to press for reform of media and libel laws and for decrease in pressure against independent media; support independent media through programs to provide independent printing facilities, legal counsel, institutional support to journalists’ associations, and training in new media technology; support journalists’ professional associations and their capacity to monitor and document press freedom infringements and advocate on these issues with the government; monitor violations of press freedom and report on policy and trends affecting media; teach objective journalism and management skills to increase media outlets’ professional and economic viability; support programs that encourage political dialogue and debate, such as discussion clubs and TV/radio talk shows, and ensure that remote areas also have access to such programs; increase the accessibility to diverse forms of information about political, economic, and social issues for all citizens; support spread of Internet access throughout the country.

Haiti Stable conditions in fragile or failing states/counterterrorism

Goal: Support the transition of Haiti in the context of a long-term effort to strengthen democratic practices, invest in people through education and training, and economic development.Strategy: Use of all mission resources effectively to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, promote the rule of law and good governance, and strengthen civil liberties.Media-related tactics: Strengthen the independent press; strengthen media independence and community radio networks.

Georgia Democratic systems and practices/democracy and human rights

Goal: Georgia’s democratic reforms are consolidated, resulting in adherence to the rule of law, improved government transparency and accountability, reduced corruption and broad public participation in political life.Strategy: Foster the development of an increasingly vibrant civil society. Assist in building a vibrant and diverse civil society, including political parties, independent and responsible media, and constituency-based NGO coalitions to advocate for reforms in Georgia, and to partner with the new government in carrying out key reforms.Media-related tactics: Increase journalistic professionalism through U.S. and locally based assistance for print and broadcast media.

Egypt American values respected abroad/public diplomacy and public affairs

Goal: U.S. core values advanced in Egypt through the Middle East Partnership Initiative and public diplomacy programs.Strategy: Foster pluralism and democracy in Egypt.Media-related tactic: Initiate new program to support journalism training on free, fair, and accurate reporting through both classroom work and internships with U.S. news media.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Strategic goals Performance goals, strategies, and media-related tactics

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Appendix III

State Department and USAID Goals Related

to Independent Media

Source: State Department.

Indonesia Democratic systems and practices

Goal: Indonesia consolidates political reforms, addresses the causes of separatist and ethnic crises, and enhances protections for vulnerable populations.Strategy: Help transform Indonesia’s civilian governmental institutions—including the parliament, ministries, and judicial sector—into efficient, democratically functioning entities.Media-related tactic: Professionalize media through exchange and training programs.

Mutual understanding Goal: Increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives to create a receptive environment in Indonesia. Strategy 1: Conduct a variety of exchanges to increase mutual understanding and build trust between American and Indonesia people and institutions.Media-related tactic: U.S. Fulbright lecturers, students, and researchers outreach on the topic of free and responsible media. Strategy 2: Ensure the basic human values embraced by Americans are respected and understood by the Indonesia public and institutions.Media-related tactic: Provide Small Democracy Grants to bolster free and independent media.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Country Strategic goals Performance goals, strategies, and media-related tactics

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Appendix III

State Department and USAID Goals Related

to Independent Media

Table 6: Objectives for Select Independent Media Development Programs from Current USAID Country Strategiesa

Case study country Strategic objectives Performance objectives and objectives for activities

Ukraine Citizens increasingly engaged in promoting their interests and rights for a more democratic market-oriented state

Performance objective: Availability of quality information increased.

Croatia More effective citizen participation and improved governance

Performance objectives: Sustainable and balanced commercial media; journalists’ professional standards improved; management and business capacity of media organizations strengthened.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

A more participatory, inclusive democratic society

Performance objectives: Increased citizen participation in political and social decision making; viable private-sector broadcast and print media provide a broad range of objective programming.

Georgia More effective, responsible, and accountable local governance

Performance objectives: Independent media highlights citizens’ concerns and informs communities on key issues.Objectives for activities: Increased media professionalism to provide objective information at both the national and local level; better business management of local media outlets and increased financial management; improved legal and regulatory framework that supports free speech and access to information.

Kyrgyzstan Strengthened democratic culture among citizens and target institutions

Performance objectives: Increased availability of information on civic rights and domestic public issues; increased news programming and improved financial and management systems in targeted media entities.

Haiti Genuinely inclusive democratic governance attained

Performance objective: Civil society organizations positively influence policies.

Indonesia Effective democratic and decentralized governance

(Independent media development is considered a cross-cutting issue)

Performance objectives: Expanding participatory, effective and accountable local governance.Objectives for activities: Civil society organizations and other stakeholders such as universities, religious-based organizations, business associations, labor associations, and the media develop the capacity to effectively participate in local decision-making and advocacy processes.

Performance objectives: Consolidating the reform agenda.Objectives for activities: Unions and press councils provide policy advice and advocate on behalf of media legislation, undertaking litigation to seek compliance with media laws and regulations, and the provision of legal aid and services in the defense of journalists and the media industry; work with civil society organizations to support the laws that give media freedom; support media initiatives that promote transparency and freedom of information.

Performance objectives: Addressing conflict and encouraging pluralism.Objectives for activities: Media Coverage in conflict areas becomes objective and noninflammatory; support program that gives information to the tsunami affected area.

Mali Increase pubic access to quality development information in targeted areas

Performance objectives: Regulatory and policy environment responsive to public interest.

Performance objectives: Policies and procedures proposed for adoption.

Performance objectives: Improved quality of development information; enhanced institutional capacity to produce development information.

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Appendix III

State Department and USAID Goals Related

to Independent Media

Source: USAID.

aStrategic objectives and performance objectives (also called intermediate results) are included that we judged to be related to mission independent media development efforts.

Egypt Initiatives in governance and participation strengthened

Performance objectives: Establish and ensure media freedom and freedom of information.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Case study country Strategic objectives Performance objectives and objectives for activities

Page 39 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of State Appendix IV

Page 40 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Appendix IV

Comments from the Department of State

Page 41 GAO-05-803 Independent Media Development Abroad

Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development Appendix V

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Appendix VI

GAO Contact and Staff and AcknowledgmentsAppendix VI

GAO Contact Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268

Staff Acknowledgments

Diana Glod, Melissa Pickworth, Julia A. Roberts, and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report. Martin de Alteriis, Ernie Jackson, Amanda K. Miller, and Valerie J. Caracelli provided technical assistance.

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ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF PRESS FREEDOM INDICES

An Evaluation of Press Freedom Indicators

By Lee B. Becker, Tudor Vlad and Nancy Nusser Submitted to Gazette, September 22, 2005. Abstract Despite uncertainties about the popular measures of media freedom, no systematic analyses have been undertaken of their development, of the assumptions that lie behind their different methodologies, of the reliability of the resultant measures, or of the consistency of conclusions across the different measures. This article examines four measures, by Freedom House, Reporters sans frontieres, IREX and Committee to Protect Journalists and finds considerable consistency in the measurement. In addition, the Freedom House measure, which has been in existence for more than 20 years, varies in meaningful ways across time. The article examines the conceptual implications of these findings and offers suggestions for their use by researches in the future. Key Words: Media freedom, press freedom, media independence, media reform, press freedom indicators.

In the last decade and a half, media reform and media freedom have come under close scrutiny by governmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as by academic scholars. Media reform and freedom often are viewed as intrinsically important and are seen by many as related to development of democratic institutions and a civil society. In the view of some, media reform is needed for media freedom, and media freedom is a necessary condition for democratization. Because of the perceived importance of media freedom, western governments have invested heavily in training of media workers and in media reform in order to bring it about. In addition, a number of prominent governmental and nongovernmental organizations have developed indices of press freedom, at least implicitly so as to judge the consequences of and need for media reform. The methodologies employed in creating these indices of media freedom are not always transparent, however, and charges are often made about biases in the underlying assumptions behind them. Nor are the conceptual bases for the indices always obvious. It is possible that the competing indices measure different concepts, measure the same concept unreliably, or measure the same concepts in a reliable but invalid way. Despite these uncertainties about the existing measures of media freedom and independence, no systematic analyses have been undertaken of their development, of the assumptions that lie behind their different methodologies, of the reliability of the resultant measures, or of the consistency of conclusions across the different measures. This article provides that analysis. Concept of Press Freedom The concept of press freedom is a contentious one in the literature of mass communication. Early definitions of the concept reflected post World War II geopolitical construction and focused primarily on freedom from government control (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). Lowenstein (1970) argued that “A completely free press is one in which newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, books, radio and television have absolute independence and critical ability, except for minimal libel and obscenity laws. The press has no concentrated ownership, marginal economic units or organized self-regulation.” Weaver (1977) identified three components of press freedom: the relative absence of government restraints on the media, the relative absence of nongovernmental restraints, and the existence of conditions to insure the dissemination of diverse ideas and opinions to large audiences. Piccard (1985), among others, distinguished between negative press freedom (the absence of legal controls, such as censorship) and positive press freedom (the ability of individuals to use the media). Subsequent work (for example, Hachten, 1987) argued that definitions of media freedom should include other concepts, such as the role of media in nation building, economic development, overcoming illiteracy and poverty, and building political consciousness. Hagen (1992) focused on what she described as media democratization. She proposed altering the top-down, “one-way flow” of messages from contemporary mass media to the public by increasing citizen participation. Breunig (1994) viewed press freedom as one type of communication. Others were freedom of speech, freedom of opinion and information freedom. Curran (1996) differentiated between a classical liberal perspective on media freedom and the radical democratic perspective. The former focuses on the freedom of the media to

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publish or broadcast. The latter focuses on how mass communications can “mediate in an equitable way conflict and competition between social groups in society.” Within the classical liberal perspective, according to Curran, is a “strand” arguing that the media should serve to protect the individual from the abuses of the state. Within the radical democratic perspective, he continued, is a “strand” that argues that the media should seek to redress the imbalances in society. McQuail (2000) said that the concept of media freedom covers both the degree of freedom enjoyed by the media and the degree of freedom and access of citizens to media content. “The essential norm is that media should have certain independence, sufficient to protect free and open public expression of ideas and information. The second part of the issue raises the question of diversity, a norm that opposes concentration of ownership and monopoly of control, whether on the part of the state or private media industries.” For Price (2002), the “foundation requirement” for media freedom is that government does not have a monopoly on information. Rozumilowicz (2002) similarly contended that the question of who controls the media is critical to consideration of whether it is free and independent. There must be a diffusion of control and access supported by a nation’s legal, institutional, economic and social-cultural systems, she argues. Thus, free and independent media “exist within a structure which is effectively demonopolized of the control of any concentrated social groups or forces and in which access is both equally and effectively guaranteed.” Empirical Analysis of Press Freedom Empirical research on press freedom goes back to at least the early 1960s. Nixon (1960), found that per capital national income, proportion of adults that are literate, and level of daily newspaper circulation were positively related to level of press freedom, as measured by two International Press Institute classifications of media systems around the world. Gillmor (1962), found little evidence that the religious tradition of a country was associated with press freedom, again using the IPI measures of the latter. Nixon (1965), using a panel to rank press freedom in countries around the world rather than the IPI ratings, replicated his earlier findings of the importance of economic development, literacy, and growth of the mass media. Farace and Donohew (1965), using the Nixon (1965) press freedom measures, found that additional variables such as life expectancy, population, and education also were related to press freedom. Lowenstein (1970), working at the University of Missouri’s Freedom of Information Center, developed a measure of Press Independence and Critical Ability, based on 23 separate indicators, including restraints on media through legal and extra-legal controls, ownership of news agencies or their resources, self-censorship, and economic hardship that could extinguish some voices. The rating was by judges throughout the world who received a survey from the Freedom of Information Center. The resultant classification of the media was found to match closely those of Nixon’s earlier surveys. Kent (1972), analyzed the PICA measures and found them to measure a single dimension of press freedom. Nam and Oh (1973), using Nixon’s Press Freedom Index (1965), found that freedom of the press is a function of subsystem autonomy in the overall political system. In other words, in political systems in which the various players have freedom of activity, the press operates accordingly. Weaver (1977) used the Lowenstein (1970) and Kent (1972)

48

classification of press freedom and found that increases in economic productivity leads to less stress in the political system, and this decreased political stress leads to increased press freedom. Weaver, Buddenbaum and Fair (1985) attempted to replicate the findings of Weaver (1977) but concluded instead that increases in economic productivity in developing countries may have negative effects on press freedom rather than positive ones. For these analyses, Weaver and his colleagues used the then relatively new measures developed by Freedom House, a nongovernmental organization based in Washington, D.C. Breunig (1994) examined the relationship between legal protection of communication freedom as written into the constitutions and related documents of nations of the world and another measure of press freedom, namely offenses against communication freedom. Breunig gathered data on offenses against communication freedom through a content analysis of the Bulletins of the International Journalism Institute in Prague between January 1, 1988, and October 9, 1991. He found a disconnect between the two sources of information. States that guarantee communication freedom in their legal documents did not necessary provide for more freedom. The early empirical work on press freedom treated press independence as the dependent or outcome variable, predicted by political and social factors. Stevens (1971), in fact, states these relationships as a series of propositions about the determinations of press freedom. Besley and Prat (2001) found that press freedom, as measured by the Freedom House index, is negatively related to corruption and to political longevity of office holders. Brunetti and Weder (2003), again using the Freedom House measures of press freedom, replicated the finding of a negative relationship between press freedom and corruption in a cross sectional study and established that the direction of the relationship was from press freedom to decreases in corruption using panel data. Jacobsson and Jacobsson (2004), also using the Freedom House index of press freedom, found that press freedom is the outcome of economic wealth and of low market concentration in the consumer goods industries. Organizations Reporting on Media Freedom More than 100 organizations throughout the world are currently engaged in some form of media system assessment and evaluation or media freedom promotion. Many of these are newly-formed in response to recent democratization in Europe and redemocratization in Latin America. The groups describe their missions variously as promoting free and independent media through activism, monitoring media freedom violations, evaluating media systems through indices and written reports, and defending and protecting journalists working in conflict zones and under repressive governments. The organizations have applied rather than conceptual goals for their work. They are interested in media reform often because they believe it plays a role in the development of democratic states. (See USAID, 1999, for an articulation of this position. See Snyder, 2000, and McConnell and Becker, 2002, and de Mesquita and Downs, 2005, among others, for a more skeptical view.) Their work is often described and cited in the popular media, giving weight to their operationalizations--and consequent conceptualizations--of media freedom.

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Freedom House Probably the best known of the press freedom indicators is that of Freedom House. A non-governmental organization based in Washington, D.C., Freedom House was founded more than 60 years ago to promote democracy globally. Since 1978, Freedom House has published a global survey of freedom, known as Freedom in the World, now covering 192 countries and 18 related or disputed territories. This indicator is widely used by policy makers, academics, and journalists. In 1980, as a separate undertaking, Freedom House began conducting its media freedom survey–Freedom of the Press: A Global Survey of Media Independence–which in 2003 covered the same 192 countries (Freedom House, 2004). For Freedom House, the concept of interest is freedom of the media, which is defined as being linked to “the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to information” (Freedom House, 2004). To measure press freedom, Freedom House attempts to assess the political, legal, and economic environments of each country and evaluate whether the countries promote and do not restrict the free flow of information. According to the Freedom of the Press managing editor Karin Karlekar (personal communication, July 6, 2004), Freedom House U.S.-based staff keeps year-round files on media activities for each country. The files contain news articles by and on media in each country and other reports from governmental and international organizations. These files are consulted prior to the production of the annual reports. To augment that information, Freedom House staff members consult local and international media organizations, multilateral and governmental organizations, and other NGO’s. Staff members also rely on the Toronto-based International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), a global clearing house for media freedom organizations around the world, and on Freedom House’s own Freedom in the World surveys. In evaluating the collected material, Freedom House (2004) examines the legal environment, political influences, and economic pressures on the media. To assess the legal environment, Freedom House analyzes laws and regulations that could influence media, as well as governments’ propensity for using those laws to manipulate media. It assesses the potentially negative or positive impact of various legal factors. Political influence is measured by evaluating the degree of political control over news media content. Economic pressures are measured by evaluating characteristics of the media system such as the structure of media, the costs of establishing media outlets, and the impact of corruption and bribery on content. Freedom House staff members then score each country, using a 20-item questionnaire that includes questions in the three areas of legal, political and economic influences. Higher numbers indicate less media freedom, as shown in Appendix 1. The legal environment is scored on a 30-point scale, political environment on a 40-point scale, and economic environment on a 30-point scale. The three subindices are summed to come up with a final score for each country. The 2003 data were scored by 18 to 20 people and the 2002 data by five people; in preceding years, one senior staff member scored all countries, according to Karlekar (personal communication, July 6, 2004). International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) IREX was founded in 1968 by U.S. universities to promote exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C., IREX focuses on higher education, independent media, Internet development, and civil society in the United States and internationally.

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In 2001, IREX, in cooperation with USAID, prepared its first Media Sustainability Index (MSI) to evaluate the global development of independent media (IREX, 2001). The report rated independent media sustainability in 20 states in four regions: Southeast Europe, Russia and Western Eurasia, Caucasus, and Central Asia. The final reports (IREX, 2002; IREX 2003a) include ratings and an extensive Executive Summary of regional findings as well as individual country reports. The concept behind IREX’s empirical work is independent media sustainability, defined as the existence of sustainable, “independent media systems” (IREX, 2002, p. xxi). This is operationalized as the extent to which political, legal, social, and economic circumstances and institutions, as well as professional standards within independent media, promote and/or permit independent media to survive over time. IREX assesses independent media sustainability using five criteria or objectives: 1) legal and social norms that protect and promote free speech and access to public information; 2) journalism that meets professional standards; 3) multiple news sources that provide citizens with reliable and objective news; 4) independent media that are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence; and 5) supporting institutions that function in the professional interests of independent media. To determine how well a country meets those five objectives, from seven to nine indicators for each of the objectives are assessed, as shown in Appendix 2. The range of scores is from 0 to 4 for each of these indicators. The scores for each of the indicators within the five objectives are averaged to obtain a single score for the objective. The scores on the five objectives are averaged to arrive at a final score for each country. To conduct scoring, IREX assembles in each country a panel of experts—local media representatives, members of NGOs and professional associations, international donors, and media development workers. Each panel is provided with the objectives, indicators and an explanation of the scoring system. Panelists review the information individually, then assemble to come to a consensus on scores. The panel moderator, in most cases a representative from one of the country’s media or an NGO, prepares a written analysis of the discussion, which is edited by IREX representatives. IREX staff (in-country and in Washington, D.C.) also review indicators and objectives, scoring countries independently. The final score for a country is an average of the panel score and the IREX staff score. Reporters sans frontieres (RSF) The non-profit RSF works to defend journalists and media outlets by condemning attacks on press freedom worldwide, by publishing a variety of annual and special reports on media freedom, and by appealing to governments and international organizations on behalf of journalists and media organizations. The group, based in Paris and including a network of 100 correspondents, works to reduce censorship, opposes laws devised to restrict press freedom, supports journalists and media outlets with financial aid, and has recently developed a judicial branch to promote effective prosecution of crimes against journalists. On an annual basis, RSF publishes comprehensive regional and country reports that assess political, economic, and legal environments for media freedom. In 2002, RSF released its first Worldwide Press Freedom (RSF, 2002a) report and ranking of individual nations. The RSF concept is respect for media freedom, defined as “The amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by government to see that press freedom is respected” (RSF, 2002b). The concept is operationalized as the extent to

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which legal and political environments, circumstances, and institutions permit and promote media freedom and the ability of journalists to collect and disseminate information unimpeded by physical, psychological, or legal attacks and harassment. To create the index, RSF sends out a 53-item questionnaire to in-country sources, usually members of domestic and foreign media as well as legal experts and members of NGOs involved with media freedom. RSF receives an average of three to four completed questionnaires for each country, and if it does not receive at least three, the country is not included. The questions fall into the five categories of physical and psychological attacks on the journalists, legal harassment of and discrimination against journalists, obstacles to collecting and disseminating information, and government manipulation of the media. The complete questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3. After questionnaires are returned, RSF staff members in Paris score the surveys. Each of the questions is weighted. Lower scores indicate more media freedom. Points are summed and averaged to arrive at a final score. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Formed in 1981 by a group of foreign correspondents, the New York City-based CPJ reports and investigates attacks on journalists and lobbies domestic and foreign governments on their behalf. With a full-time New York staff of 22 and one Washington, D.C., staff member, CPJ (2004) monitors media in countries in five different regions: the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Developments are tracked through independent research, fact-finding missions, and contacts in the field. CPJ has published annual reports on attacks on the press since 1987 and country reports on more than 100 nations since 1993. The concept of concern to CPJ is freedom of the press, defined as “The rights of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004). The concept is operationalized as the number of attacks or restrictions on journalists. Annual reports are prepared by a New-York CPJ regional director and sources in the country. CPJ checks each case from the field identified as a violation of press freedom by more than one source for factual accuracy, confirmation that the victims were journalists or news organizations, and verification that intimidation was the probable motive. Journalists are defined as people who cover news or write commentary on a regular basis. CPJ classifies abuses of journalists and the media using 10 definitions, shown in Appendix 4. In addition, CPJ publishes yearly evaluations of media freedom in various nations, which are known as country reports. Generally, the reports focus on the political, legal, and economic environments for media freedom. According to CPJ deputy director Joel Simon (personal communication, May 15, 2004), the report includes countries in which CPJ has intervened, as well as any other countries CPJ considers to have violated press freedom in a substantial way. Staff coordinators and researchers also rely for information on their own independent research, fact-finding missions to the countries, and contacts in the field, including government officials, human rights or press organizations, and individual journalists. Methodology The Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres indices are based on similar concepts, namely the existence of press autonomy and independence. The IREX Media

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Sustainability Index includes freedom of expression as one of its five components. The remaining four elements of the index are potentially quite distinct, incorporating the idea of durability of press operations in a competitive market. The Committee to Protect Journalists index focuses solely on attacks on press operation, rather than on support for the media. In general, the Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres evaluations should produce quite similar responses. They are undertaken by representatives of media interests in two distinct, though decidedly western, countries. A comparison of these two measures should give some sense of their commonality and the generalizability of the classifications of the media systems. A comparison of the evaluations by Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres with the Media Sustainability Index should give a sense of how successful IREX has been in expanding its measure to include more than simple press freedom. Similarly, a comparison of the Committee to Protect Journalists measures with the others should give an indication of how much the other indices have incorporated positive, rather than simply negative, indicators of freedom into their measures. Finally, an examination of the Freedom House Press Freedom Index across time gives a sense of the extent to which this measure reflects variability across time, particularly in the period of the late 1980s and early 1990s when systemic change was taking place in governmental systems, most notably in eastern and central Europe. To undertake these analyses, a data base was created in which country was the unit of analysis and the index score for each of the four measures was recorded. Where possible, subparts of the indices were included into the data base as well. Specifically, data from the Freedom House Press Freedom Index from 1981 to 2004 were included. The Freedom House Press Freedom Index in a given year is for evaluation of the media system a year earlier, so the 1981 index covers the 1980 period. During this time period, only an ordinal level measure was available, with countries being classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. From 1994 to 1999, the Freedom House Press Freedom total index was recorded, with a theoretical range of from 1 to 100. In fact, the lowest score (indicating freedom) was 5 during this period; the highest score was 100. From 2000 to 2004, data were available not only on the total index score, but also on the three subparts, legal environment, political influences, and economic pressures. The Reporters sans frontieres indices have been reported only for 2002 and 2003. In each year, the period covered was from September 1 of the previous year through August 31 of the listed year. Only the total index, ranging in theoretical value from 0 to 100, was available. The IREX Media Sustainability index has been released for three years, 2001, 2002 and 2003. The reports, released in the following year, cover the listed year. The index covers 20 political entities: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. In creating the file, the data for Montenegro and Serbia were averaged to create a single score for that country. In each of the three years, the MSI score and each of its five subparts were entered into the data base. Those subparts are: free speech, professional journalism, plurality of news sources, business management, and supporting institutions. The theoretical range of scores for the total index and each of its parts is 0 to 4.

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Data from the Committee to Protect Journalists were available only for 2003, covering that year. Both the total number of attacks on the press and the individual components making up that total were entered into the data file. Included were the number of: physical attacks on journalists or facilities, cases of censorship, expulsions, harassments, imprisonments, murders of journalists, murders of journalists not documented as related to their work, legal actions against journalists, missing journalists, threats to journalists, and cases of kidnapping of journalists. Actual scores for the total index ranged from 0 to 46. Findings The Reporters sans frontieres ratings and the Freedom House ratings are empirically quite similar, as Table 1 makes clear. In 2002, the Pearson Product Moment Correlation coefficient between the two ratings was .81. In 2003, the coefficient was .84. In other words, about 70% of the variance in ratings is shared. Despite the differences in measurement techniques and between the countries of the organizers, the two groups mostly agree on the classification of the media systems of the world. More surprising is the strong relationship between the IREX Media Sustainability Index and both the Reporters sans frontieres and the Freedom House ratings. For the 18 countries rated by IREX and by the other two NGOs (Kosovo was not rated by either Reporters sans frontieres or Freedom House), the correlation coefficient was .82 and .91 respectively in 2003. (The sign of the relationship in the accompanying table reflects the reverse scoring of the Reporters sans frontieres and Freedom House indices.) In 2002, as Table 1 shows, the figures were .72 for RSF and .89 for Freedom House. In 2001, the correlation between the Freedom House index and MSI was .84. Only the tally of attacks on the press by the Committee to Protect Journalists produces evaluations different from those of the other three groups. In 2003, the only year for which these comparisons are possible, the CPJ tally is correlated .30 with the RSF rating, .31 with the Freedom House rating, and .08 with the IREX Media Sustainabililty Index. The suggestion is that the CPJ data provide new information not fully incorporated in the other indices. The IREX Sustainabililty index seems to include more of the positive features of press operation than do the RSF and Freedom House measures. The Committee to Protect Journalists is a wholly negative measure. The lower–really almost trivial--correlation of the CPJ and the Sustainability Index is, in this sense, not surprising. Table 2 shows that the RSF index correlates equally well with the three subparts of the Freedom House Index (.81 for Legal Environment, .82 for Political Influences, and .80 for Economic Pressures). The RSF index, however, correlates less well with the business management part the IREX Sustainability Index (.62) than with the other parts. The CPJ tally of attacks correlates best with the Political Influences part of the Freedom House index. The lowest correlation is with the Economic Pressures. These findings are consistent with the argument that the three components of the Freedom House index have some distinctiveness. The CPJ tally is more strongly related to the IREX Free Speech, Professional Journalism and Plurality of Sources subcomponents than to the Business Management and Supporting Institutions components, where the relationship is really nonexistent. The interrelationships of the Freedom House and IREX subparts do not show clear patterns. The Freedom House Legal Environment is more highly correlated with the IREX

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Business Managment item than with other IREX components. The Freedom House Political Influences component is least correlated with the IREX Free Speech component. The Freedom House Economic Pressures component is highly correlated with the IREX Plurality of News and Supporting Institutions measures. The easiest interpretation is that the Freedom House and IREX measures have much in common internally as well as in the sum. The part-whole correlations for both the Freedom House and the IREX indices, also presented in Table 2, show that each total index is roughly evenly influenced by the subparts. The three subparts of the Freedom House index also are very highly correlated, meaning that little new variance is obtained by any one of the three components. For the IREX index, on the other hand, more variance among components exists. IREX’s sweep is a bit wider, it seems, in gathering components for its index. In sum, the Reporter sans frontieres, Freedom House and IREX measures all seem to be measuring much the same thing. The Freedom House gain for including the three components is not great, at least as far as the 2003 measures are concerned. The IREX MSI index does seem to include components not represented as fully in the other indices, but, in terms of the total index, little is gained from the exercise. The IREX index is more strongly related to the Freedom House than the Reporters sans frontieres indices, perhaps reflecting an American bias in the evaluation. The Committee to Protect Journalists tally of Attacks on the Press is not the same as the other three indices. The relationship is particularly weak between it and the IREX index. The suggestion is that the Committee to Protect Journalists adds information not redundant with that of the other indices. These findings speak to the distinctiveness of the measures, or, in the reverse, to the consistency and the reliability of the information they provide. What evidence is there that they vary in significant ways across time, that is, reflect real changes that take place in the media environment? Only the Freedom House measure has been used for a long enough period to allow for an assessment of this question. In general, data not tabled here show that the Freedom House measures are related from year to year, suggesting more stability than change, as one would expect. Across time, however, the size of the relationships declines, again as one would expect if real change is taking place in the system. This also suggests that the evaluators are not simply using the rating from the year before to evaluate the current year. The relationship between the 1981 evaluation and the 1982 evaluation is .92, but by 1993 (when the scale changed), that relationship had dropped to .62. This pattern is repeated across the years and across measurement type. The 1994 measure of Press Freedom by Freedom House is correlated .91 with the measure a year later, but that relationship dropped to .85 by 2004. It is clear from analyses of these measures that there has been more consistency than change reflected in the Freedom House measure across the more than 20 years that it has been reported. The mean scores for the index changed not at all from 1981 to 1989, nor did the standard deviation of the measures. Treating the data as appropriate for computation of means and standard deviations is a stretch, of course, as the measure used during that time period was truly ordinal. (Correlation computation also assumes better measurement than exists.) Given the small range of the measures, however, median change can hardly be expected. In the 1989 to 1993 period–a crucial one in world history and in the history of media democratization–the Freedom House index of Press Freedom did change in the expected direction. The overall scores for the nations ranked move in the direction of press freedom.

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The standard deviation, as would be expected, did not change. Change from 1994 to 2004, based on the full 100-point scale, was not as dramatic, but it was in the direction of increased press freedom. The standard deviation has increased slightly as well. Table 3 shows these data for the Warsaw Pact countries, where change was certainly dramatic. In 1981, the mean for all six countries (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) was 3. There was no variance, as all countries had that score. In 1990, there was evidence of change, which continued through 1993. (East Germany dropped out of the analyses after 1989.) Based on the new scale used from 1994 to 2004, change continued to be in evidence. (The division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia created six states again.) In other words, the Freedom House measure across time seemed to pick up what most would argue was real change in the media environments of these countries across the 20-plus years it has been used. These same analyses were repeated for the 15 states evolving from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The data for 1981 to 1992 reflect the evaluation only of the Soviet Union. From 1994 on, the 100-point measure reflects the situation in the 15 new states. The measure shows a deterioration of the media landscapes in terms of press freedom. The change has not been overly large, but it is noticeable nonetheless. Absent other evidence, one would conclude that the media environment in these states as a whole did not improve, and that the Freedom House evaluators did not get swept up in the euphoria of the moment in reaching their assessment. (The ratings for the three Baltic states did improve during this time period, but it was offset by deteriorating media situations in other states, according to the Freedom House data.) Summary and Conclusions This article has focused on the work of four organizations, though more than 100 organizations are involved in the evaluation of press freedom. The selection was based on prominence and longevity of the work of the organization. Freedom House, for example, has been producing evaluations of press freedom since 1981, and its assessments of the media are widely referenced in the English-language writings on the topic. The empirical analysis of the numerical ratings of four of these organizations–Reporters sans frontieres, Freedom House, IREX and Committee to Protect Journalists–shows that at least the first three of these organizations largely come to the same conclusions about the media. The RSF and Freedom House ratings for 2002 were correlated .81, while the figure in 2003 was .84. The IREX index correlated .72 with the RSF index and .89 with the Freedom House ratings in 2002. In 2003, the figures were .82 and .91. The correlation of the IREX measures with those of Reporters sans frontieres and Freedom House is surprising, given that IREX tried to create a distinct concept, namely media sustainability. The goal was a measure that incorporated press freedom, but focused more heavily on the economic and social environment of the country thought necessary for the development of a durable, independent media. The comparisons are only for the 18 countries rated by all three organizations, but they suggest that IREX has not been successful in getting beyond the media freedom measurement–or that the RSF and Freedom House measures were already broad enough to capture the meaning sought by IREX. The higher correlation of the IREX measure with Freedom House’s measure both years also suggests a nationality bias, as both IREX and Freedom House measures are the

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product of U.S. organizations, while RSF is a French NGO. This at a minimum raises a question about the independence of the evaluations of country perspectives on press freedom reflecting domestic, political concerns. The Freedom House and IREX measures are designed to be multi-dimensional. In the case of Freedom House, the subindices are very highly correlated internally. This argues for internal reliability. But it also suggests that the measures do not sample elements of the concept widely--at least not as widely as is the case for the IREX MSI index, which has lower internal consistency. In other words, the internal consistency is at the cost of the face validity of the measure. Clearly the Committee to Protect Journalists, through its measures of attacks on the press, has gathered information that is not redundant with the RSF, Freedom House and MSI indices. The CPJ counts of attacks correlates weakly with the first two measures and very poorly with the IREX measure. One option would be to incorporate the CPJ data into a global index, perhaps one that also combined the RSF and Freedom House measures. Combining RSF and Freedom House into a single, averaged, index would improve the reliability of the measures–if each has random error associated with it. Adding the CPJ measure, on the other hand, would increase the breadth of the measure, that is, potentially improve its validity. One of the notable deficiencies of the existing indices is that they are heavily oriented toward application. Little effort has been made to define the theoretical concepts being used. Mostly, one must guess about what it is that the organization is actually trying to measure. The evidence is, in the case of Freedom House, which has reported data across more than 10 years, that the measurement is consistent. The evidence also is that it has varied in meaningful ways across time, picking up the dramatic change in the media environment of the former Warsaw Pact countries following the fall of communism in 1989. The usefulness of the Freedom House measure, or any amalgamation of the Freedom House measure with that of RSF, CPJ or other organizations, is its match to the theoretical concepts of interest and to other systemic variables, such as the evolution of a civil society and key democratic institutions. It is possible to make some assessment of the first of these issues by reflecting back to the definitions of press freedom identified in the scientific literature on the media. McQuail (2000) has said that a free press should have sufficient independence to protect free and open public expression of ideas and information. It also should be diverse. Others, such as Curran (1996) and Rozumilowicz (2002) have added additional requirements about mediation of societal interests and balance between commercial and public components. None of the existent measures seem adequate to address the diversity argument of McQuail let alone to respond to the broader concepts of press freedom called for by Curran and Rozumilowicz. The relationship of the existing measures–or a broader measure incorporating already existing information on new information gathered to reflect the broader concepts of McQuail, Curran, Rozumilowicz and others–to other measures is virgin territory. The findings of this analysis suggest it is territory worthy of exploration.

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International Press Institute (2004a) ‘World Press Freedom Review’: at: www.freemedia. at/wpfr/world.html (accessed 7 June 2004). International Press Institute (2004b) ‘IPI Watch List’; at: www.freemedia.at/index1.html (accessed 7 July 2004). International Research & Exchanges Board (2001) ‘Media Sustainability Index’; at: www.irex.org/ msi/2001.asp (accessed 24 May 2004). International Research & Exchanges Board (2002) ‘Media Sustainability Index’; at: www.irex. org/ msi/2002.asp (accessed 24 May 2004). International Research & Exchanges Board (2003a) ‘Media Sustainability Index’; at: www.irex.org/ msi/2003.asp (accessed 7 July 2004). International Research & Exchanges Board (2003b) ‘Media Sustainability Index. Methodology’; at:http//www.irex.org/msi/ms103-intro.pdf.(accessed 7 July 2004). Jacobsson, A. and Jacobsson E. (2004) ‘Freedom of the Press, Economic Development and Market Concentration’, Paper presented at the international conference organized by the Center for Global Media Studies, Seattle, July 16-17. Kent, K.. (1972) ‘Freedom of the Press: An Empirical Analysis of One Aspect of the Concept’, Gazette (18): 65-75. Lowenstein, R. (1970) ‘Press Freedom as a Political Indicator’, in H.D. Fischer and J.C. Merrill (eds) International Communication, Media, Channels, Functions’, pp. 129-142. New York: Hastings House, Publishers. McConnell, P. and Becker, L.B. ( 2002, July) ‘The Role of Media in Democratization’, Paper presented to the Political Communication Section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research at the Conference in Barcelona, Spain. McQuail, D. (2000) McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. 4th ed. London: Sage Publications. Media Institute of Southern Africa (2004) ‘So this is Democracy 2003'; at: www.misa.org/ sothisisdemocracy.html (accessed 6 July 2004). Nam, S. and Oh, I. (1973) ‘Press Freedom: Function of Subsystem Autonomy, Antithesis of Development’, Journalism Quarterly (50)4: 744-750. Nixon, R. (1960) ‘Factors Related to Freedom in National Press Systems’, Journalism Quarterly (37)1: 13-28. Nixon, R. (1965) ‘Freedom in the World’s Press: A Fresh Appraisal with New Data’, Journalism Quarterly (42)1: 9-14. Office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2004) ‘The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression - Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received’; at: www.ods-ods-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/GO4/124/00/PDF/G0412400.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 24 May 2004). Organization of American States Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (2003a) ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression’; at: www.cidh.oas.org/Relatoria/ English/AnnualReports/AR03/ChapterII2003-1.htm (accessed 12 May 2004). Organization of American States Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (2003b) ‘Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003'; at: www. cidhorg/ Relatoria/Engligh/AnnualReports/AR03/Chap (accessed 20 June 2004).

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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Representative on Freedom of the Media (2003) ‘Freedom and Responsibility Yearbook 2002-2003'; at: www.osce.org/fom/documents/rfm/2003/ 12/1713_en.pdf (accessed 6 May 2004). Picard, R. (1985) The Press and the Decline of Democracy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Price, M. (2002) Media and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Reporters sans frontieres (2002a) ‘First World Press Freedom Ranking’; at: www.rsf.org/article. php3 ?id_article=4116 (accessed 10 January 2004). Reporters sans frontieres (2002b) ‘First World Press Freedom Ranking’; at: www.rsf.org/article. php3?id_article=4118 (accessed 10 January 2004). Reporters sans frontieres (2003) ‘Second World Press Freedom Ranking’; at: http://www.rsf.org/ article.php3?id_article=8248 (accessed 10 January 2004). Rozumilowicz , B. (2002) ‘Democratic Change: A Theoretical Approach’, pp. 9-26 in M.E. Price, B. Rozumilowicz and S.G. Verhulst (eds) Media reform. London: Routledge. Russian Journalists Union (2004) ‘Committee for Journalists in Extreme Situations’; at: www.cjes. ru/about (accessed 7 July 2004). Siebert, F.S., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W. (1956) Four Theories of the Press. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. Snyder, J. (2000) From Voting to Violence. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Stevens, J. (1971) ‘Freedom of Expression: New Dimmensions’, pp. 14-37 in R. Farrar and J. Stevens (eds) Mass Media and National Experience. New York: Harper & Row. USAID (1999) The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach. Washington: Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research, Technical Publication Series. United Nations (2003) ‘The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Commission on human rights resolution 2003/43'; at: www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/1b040773 be33221dc1256d1f00369600?Opendocument (accessed 20 June 2004). Weaver, D. (1977) ‘The Press and Government Restriction: A Cross-National Study Over Time’, Gazette (23):152-170. Weaver, D., Buddenbaum, J. and Fair, J. (1985) ‘Press Freedom, Media, and Development, 1950-1979: A Study of 134 Nations’, Journal of Communication (35): 104-117.

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TABLE 3 Freedom House Scores Across Times: Warsaw Pact Countries

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1981

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1982

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1983

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1984

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1985

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1986

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1987

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1988

6 3 3 3 0 FH 1989

6 2 3 2.33 0.516 FH 1990

5 1 3 1.6 0.894 FH 1991

5 1 2 1.4 0.548 FH 1992

5 1 2 1.2 0.447 FH 1993

6 20 55 37.5 13.004 FH Total 1994

6 21 55 38.67 12.66 FH Total 1995

6 19 49 35 12.696 FH Total 1996

6 19 49 36.17 12.238 FH Total 1997

6 19 47 32.33 10.231 FH Total 1998

6 20 44 31 8.944 FH Total 1999

6 19 44 28.83 9.042 FH Total 2000

6 19 44 27.83 8.495 FH Total 2001

6 18 35 25.33 5.955 FH Total 2002

6 18 38 25.5 7.287 FH Total 2003

6 19 47 27.5 11.203 FH Total 2004

From 1981 to 1993, Freedom House reported data using a three-point ordinal measure. From 1994 on, scores could range from 0 to 100.

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Conceptual and Methodological Issues in Media Monitoring

Lee B. Becker

James M. Cox Jr. Center for International Mass Communication Training and ResearchGrady College of Journalism and Mass Communication

University of GeorgiaAthens, GA 30602

U.S.A.

Keynote Address delivered to the Conference, On Media Monitoring–The Media andTheir Contribution to Democracy, organized by SwissGIS, Swiss Center for Studies onthe Global Information Society at the University of Zurich, June 29-30, 2007.

Much of the research discussed in this paper was supported by contracts with the John S. and James L.

Knight Foundation of Miami, FL, and a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The author

acknowledges the support of those institutions.

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Nongovernmental and governmental organizations around the world invest an estimated $1 billion

in media assistance projects each year, with the basic assumption that this assistance ultimately will bring

about improvements in democracy in the recipient countries.

These media assistance initiatives are pervasive. At least 70 organizations in 25 donor countries

outside the United States are involved in funding media assistance projects (Becker & Vlad, 2005). In the

U.S., the number of donors is more than 50 (Hume, 2004). Donors are units of governments,

nongovernmental organizations, including foundations, and multinational organizations. Spending is

distributed around the world, with eastern and central Europe and African countries having been major

recipients since the end of the 1980s.

A concern with the media in countries other than one’s own is not new. Governments probably

have been concerned with the type and quality of media that operate outside their borders since the

development of media themselves. In the period after W orld W ar II, the United States and its allies

invested heavily in the training of journalists and offered other forms of media assistance in order to

control the media in the countries they occupied. Funding for media assistance has been a key part of the

U.S. policy in occupied Iraq (Future Media W orking Group, 2002; Internews, 2003)

Although the western assistance programs have been predicated on the assumption that

development of free, independent media staffed by trained journalists leads to–or at least contributes

to–the development of democracy, the evidence to support that assumption is not robust. Relatively little

work has been done to empirically evaluate the media assistance programs. Most of the work that has

been done has focused on the impact of the assistance programs on journalists, rather than on the impact

of the assistance programs on the large media system. And almost no work has been done linking the

media assistance programs to democratization.

This paper begins with a discussion of some common assumptions about the role of media in

fostering democracy. Next it examines those assumptions in the context of more general theoretical

discussions of the link between the media and democracy. The paper then looks at what is known about

the amount of investment in media assistance. Then it reviews what is known about evaluation of that

investment. In this context, it looks at concepts that might be appropriate outcomes and examines

-2-

measurement of those concepts. Finally, it offers some suggestions about future research and about the

measures that should be used to monitor the media.

Assumptions about Role of Media in Fostering Democracy

Kumar (2006), a senior social scientist at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),

has explained the dominant western perspective lying behind media assistance projects. Media

assistance, he writes, is based on the underlying assumption that independent media contribute to the

building of democracy and to economic development. The assistance is directed at journalistic practice

and the media itself, he continues,

“to lay the foundation for the emergence and consolidation of a media sector free of state editorial

or financial control, relying on advertising and sales for its survival and growth. Media

development efforts strive to achieve the ideal of a ‘Fourth Estate,’ in which the press serves as a

complement and balance to the three branches of power–legislative, executive and judicial. The

Fourth Estate, by virtue of its financial and editorial independence, is supposed to hold state

authorities accountable by documenting the government’s actions and nurture democracy by

encouraging an open but respectful exchange of ideas and opinions (p. 1).”

The language, of course, is that of western, liberal, normative theory, as articulated by Siebert,

Peterson and Schramm (1956) in their classic work on normative press theory. Media assistance is

expected to produce better journalists, better media organizations, and a better media system. That media

system is supposed to produce, or at least contribute to, the development of democracy.

Kumar (2006) has stated this position clearly:

“(I)t is difficult to overstate the significance of media freedom and an unfettered flow of

information. W ithout it, democracy is starved, markets are stifled, and public health suffers.

Cultivating and nurturing a free media has to form an integral element of any effort to build

-3-

democracy. Once independent-minded news organizations find a foothold, a whole range of

positive effects ripple through society and ultimately spread beyond the country’s borders. (p.

166).”

Figure 1 is a representation of this perspective.

Much emphasis in the media assistance programs, in fact, has been placed on training of the

journalists. The training is designed to produce more skilled and motivated workers whose work will help

create media organizations that facilitate and distribute their work. Media assistance programs also are

directed at these media organizations. Some such training programs even have created media

organizations, such as radio and television stations and newspapers. Others have provided subsidies for

existing organizations. These organizations are supposed to operate in a way that creates a free–or

independent–competitive media environment. Finally, media assistance is directed at the media system as

well. For example, assistance programs have employed legal advisers who have drafted laws to help

create the legal environment in which free media can operate.

The free press–free media–are expected to create information that can be used by the institutions

of civil society to create a functioning democracy and economy. The expectation is that the free

media–free press–creates information that is functional from the point of view of governmental institutions,

such as the judiciary, the legislative bodies, the executive institutions, and the various nongovernmental

organizations that make up civic life. These institutions can make use of this functional information to

create the democratic society.

The institutions of a civil society are thought to be the product of–or at least influenced

by–assistance programs aimed at creation of a civil society. Often these programs have included the

media as one type of civil society institution, and media assistance is viewed, in this perspective, as a

subtype of civil society assistance. Certainly it is possible to question the ability of media institutions to

create other civil society institutions, and the question mark in the model is meant to so indicate.

In fact, no standard definition of civil society exists, as Carothers and Ottaway (2000) have noted.

W hile Carothers sees the media as separate from other institutions of civil society (Carothers & Ortaway,

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2000; Carothers, 2004), others, such as Dalpino (2000), do not. For Dalpino, civil society is made up all

groups and activities not legally bound to the state. She includes the media explicitly in her list of civil

society institutions, which also includes religious organizations, advocacy groups, and social service

organizations. Lederach (2001) says a civil society is a “web of human relationships made up of individual

people, their networks, organizations and institutions around which social and community life is built (p.

842).” Certainly the media can be part of such a web.

In much of the current literature, democratic and economic institutions are viewed as linked. As

Kumar (2006) wrote, the expectation is that media assistance would lead not only to democracy, but also

to a “liberal” economy.

Putzel and van der Zwan (2006) have explicitly challenged the idea of any causal relationship

between media freedom and independence and economic development, represented by the dotted line in

the model. They label this a product of neo-liberal ideologies and say evidence of the relationship is

tenuous at best. In what they term fragile states--that is a state susceptible to crisis, vulnerable to internal

and extern shocks, and experiencing domestic and international conflicts--the relationship is unlikely to

hold at all, they contend. Even more problematic are crises states, that is, a state under acute stress, or

failed states, that is, a state that can no longer function.

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Figure 1: Theoretical Model of Impact of Media Assistance

Use of the media to promote conflict, war and even genocide in states that have experienced

liberalization of, or unexpected lack of control over, their media has done much to challenge the simplistic

view that media freedom should be the primary goal of developmental assistance. Much of the writing has

focused on Rwanda, where the liberalization of media regulation resulted in media that contributed to and

encouraged genocide (Berkeley, 2001; Kurspahic, 2003; Putzel & van der Zwan, 2006; Snyder &

Ballentine, 1996; Thompson, 2007), and the Balkans, where the disintegration of the Yugoslav state and

its media system resulted in the creation of media properties that incited conflict (Goff, 1999; Putzel & van

der Zwan, 2006; Snyder & Ballentine, 1996; Thompson, 1994). Gross (2002) has argued that the media in

all of Eastern Europe have failed to contribute to democratization in the period of change after 1989.

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The counter argument is that the introduction of press freedom is a matter of timing. Before the

system can be liberalized, that is, before a system of press freedom can be introduced, training of

journalists and the creation of appropriately structured media organizations must be in place (Snyder and

Ballentine, 1996). Such a position, of course, tolerates constraints on media freedom in the interim. This is

a position argued explicitly by Allen and Stemlau (2005), who acknowledge the conflict between their

position and traditional liberal press theory. (They also note the conflicted nature of U.S. media policy in

Iraq.) It also is possible that other elements of civil society must be in place–such as established parties

and governmental institutions, rule of law–for the society to be able to manage press freedom successfully

(W aisbord, 2007). Snyder and Ballentine (1996), for example, argue that regulations on hate speech and

for protection of minority groups may be prerequisites for a functional press system.

The use of media in war and conflict has created a new emphasis on training of journalists in

coverage that is either conflict sensitive (Ross, 2003) or actually promotes peace (Lynch & McGoldrick,

2005). Hanitzsch (2004) has challenged the logic of the latter, arguing that peace journalism may make

unrealistic assumptions about media effects. Payne (2005) also has argued that in modern war media are

always an instrument of war, regardless of the level of training of the journalists or the independence of

the media organization.

Scientific Literature

Linz (1975) lists freedoms of association, information, and communication as essential

components of democracy. Gunther and Mughan (2000) call mass media the “connective tissue of

democracy.” O’Neil (1998) writes that without the freedom of communication mass media provide, the

foundation of democratic rule is undermined.

Jakubowicz (2002), however, says that whether mass media lead or follow change, whether they

mirror or mold society, and whether they should be conceptualized as agents of change or of the status

quo have yet to be resolved. In their study of Spain, Gunther, Montero, and W ert (2000) found evidence

that media aided in the transition to a consolidated democracy by helping to legitimate the new regime and

by contributing to the socialization of the public in ways of democratic behavior. Not all media practices,

though, may be beneficial to democratic development. In the case of Nigeria, Ette (2000) argues that

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media can undermine democracy and states and that it is not even clear the press has a common

understanding of how it should serve the cause of democracy.

Downing (1996) sees media as pivotal in the struggle for power in all regimes, including

nondemocratic regimes. Media of all types facilitate the struggle that emerges between political

movements and the authoritarian state in the process of regime change, and continues through the

transition stage into the consolidation stage, with whatever regime emerges. Gunther and Mughan (2000)

argue that most political elites, regardless of regime type, believe the media to be important in shaping the

views of the public and have attempted to develop policies to suit their economic, social, and political

purposes.

Rozumilowicz (2002) provides an elaborate argument for the relationship between the media and

democracy. Five key points are offered. First, a media structure that is free of interference from

government, business or dominant social groups is better able to maintain and support the competitive

and participative elements that define democracy and the related process of democratization. Second,

free and independent media buttress the societal objectives of democracy, a particular economic

structure, greater cultural understanding and general human development. Third, free and independent

media allow individuals to find a public forum in which to express opinions, beliefs and viewpoints to their

fellow citizens. Free and independent media inform, entertain and enrich the life through the profusion of

others’ ideas, opinions and visions. Fourth, free and independent media provide for an expression of

options so meaningful decisions can be made. And fifth, free and independent media guarantee access to

the less privileged in society, giving them voice.

In sum, according to this argument, free and independent media are necessary for the functioning

of democracy.

Appropriate Outcome: Press Freedom

W hile media assistance projects are most commonly oriented toward the individual media worker,

generally a journalist, the ultimate goal, as reflected in Figure 1, is the improvement of the operation of the

press system in the country. Historically, the ideal outcome has been termed press freedom.

The concept of press freedom is a contentious one in the literature of mass communication. Early

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definitions of the concept reflected post W orld W ar II geopolitical construction and focused primarily on

freedom from government control (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). Lowenstein (1970) argued that

“A completely free press is one in which newspapers, periodicals, news agencies, books, radio and

television have absolute independence and critical ability, except for minimal libel and obscenity laws. The

press has no concentrated ownership, marginal economic units or organized self-regulation.”

W eaver (1977) identified three components of press freedom: the relative absence of government

restraints on the media, the relative absence of nongovernmental restraints, and the existence of

conditions to insure the dissemination of diverse ideas and opinions to large audiences. Piccard (1985),

among others, distinguished between negative press freedom (the absence of legal controls, such as

censorship) and positive press freedom (the ability of individuals to use the media).

Subsequent work (for example, Hachten, 1987) argued that definitions of media freedom should

include other concepts, such as the role of media in nation building, economic development, overcoming

illiteracy and poverty, and building political consciousness. Hagen (1992) focused on what she described

as media democratization. She proposed altering the top-down, “one-way flow” of messages from

contemporary mass media to the public by increasing citizen participation. Breunig (1994) viewed press

freedom as one type of communication. Others were freedom of speech, freedom of opinion and

information freedom.

Curran (1996) differentiated between a classical liberal perspective on media freedom and the

radical democratic perspective. The former focuses on the freedom of the media to publish or broadcast.

The latter focuses on how mass communications can “mediate in an equitable way conflict and

competition between social groups in society.” W ithin the classical liberal perspective, according to

Curran, is a “strand” arguing that the media should serve to protect the individual from the abuses of the

state. W ithin the radical democratic perspective, he continued, is a “strand” that argues that the media

should seek to redress the imbalances in society.

McQuail (2000) said that the concept of media freedom covers both the degree of freedom

enjoyed by the media and the degree of freedom and access of citizens to media content. “The essential

norm is that media should have certain independence, sufficient to protect free and open public

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expression of ideas and information. The second part of the issue raises the question of diversity, a norm

that opposes concentration of ownership and monopoly of control, whether on the part of the state or

private media industries.”

For Price (2002), the “foundation requirement” for media freedom is that government does not

have a monopoly on information. Rozumilowicz (2002) similarly contended that the question of who

controls the media is critical to consideration of whether it is free and independent. There must be a

diffusion of control and access supported by a nation’s legal, institutional, economic and social-cultural

systems, she argues. Thus, free and independent media “exist within a structure which is effectively

demonopolized of the control of any concentrated social groups or forces and in which access is both

equally and effectively guaranteed.”

Rozumilowicz sees media independence as the outcome of a process of media reform. The

general assumption is that the media “should progress ever nearer to an ideal of freedom and

independence and away from dependence and control” (p. 12). In her view, a media structure that is free

of “interference from government, business, or dominant social groups is better able to maintain and

support the competitive and participative elements that define the concept of democracy and the related

process of democratization.”

Rozumilowicz sees the ideal media environment as one in which there are two media sectors, a

market-led media sector and a nonmarket-sector. W ithin the market sector, advertisers are free to present

their goods to target audiences, programmers can use fees provided by these advertisers to draw in

audiences, and audiences are informed and entertained to the extent the market allows. The nonmarket-

sector provides balance by ensuring that the needs of non-dominant groups are met. It also creates a

forum in which a common discourse emerges and which allows people to function within the society.

For these two sectors to exist, there must be both legal and institutional support for them as well

as social-cultural support. For example, the market sector can exist only if laws are in place protecting

media from government interference. Audiences also must be protected via defamation laws from media

abuse. Also needed are anti-trust legislation, ownership laws limiting concentration, licensing laws, and

rules on advertising.

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For the nonmarket-sector to exist, there must be legal and institutional support for the right to

publish and the right of access. Citizens are guaranteed the right to information, and the various voices in

society are guaranteed the right to communicate.

For Rozumilowicz, socio-cultural support for free media comes from training for and

professionalism among journalists, a general educational system that instills values of tolerance within

society, and training for politicians on the workings of a free press in an open society.

Following from this conceptualization, Rozumilowicz outlines four stages of media reform. The

first stage, labeled a Pre-transition Stage, lays the groundwork for subsequent change. During this

change, there is an opening of freeing of a previously constrained media system. The regime signals a

greater willingness to tolerate criticism and expressions of alternative points of view.

The second stage is termed a Primary Transition Stage. During this stage, there is a systematic

change within the formerly authoritarian regime. Statutes on access to information, defamation,

ownership, and the like are passed. The culture of censorship is disrupted.

The next stage is called the Secondary Stage. During this period both politicians and journalists

participate in training seminars to explain and clarify the new institutional and legal order. Networks of

media professionals develop. Journalists receive training in new skills of investigative and responsible

journalism.

The final stage is called the Late or Mature Stage. At this point, legal and institutional questions

have been resolved. Educational opportunities for journalists are well established. Instruction to provide

support for open communication is incorporated in primary and secondary schooling.

The political science literature also indicates that there are four distinct stages that a country or

territory goes through on the path to becoming a stable democracy (McConnell & Becker, 2002). These

four stages of societal development can be labeled pretransition, transition, consolidation and stable (or

mature). The pretransition stage focuses on societal conditions under the old regime, while the transition

stage is that historical moment when the previous regime no longer holds political power. A state becomes

consolidated when the ideals of democracy are accepted and adhered to, and then is considered stable

when democracy functions over a period of time.

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Empirical Analysis of Press Freedom

Empirical research on press freedom goes back to at least the early 1960s. Nixon (1960), found

that per capital national income, proportion of adults that are literate, and level of daily newspaper

circulation were positively related to level of press freedom, as measured by two International Press

Institute classifications of media systems around the world. Gillmor (1962), found little evidence that the

religious tradition of a country was associated with press freedom, again using the IPI measures of the

latter. Nixon (1965), using a panel to rank press freedom in countries around the world rather than the IPI

ratings, replicated his earlier findings of the importance of economic development, literacy, and growth of

the mass media. Farace and Donohew (1965), using the Nixon (1965) press freedom measures, found

that additional variables such as life expectancy, population, and education also were related to press

freedom.

Lowenstein (1970), working at the University of Missouri’s Freedom of Information Center,

developed a measure of Press Independence and Critical Ability, based on 23 separate indicators,

including restraints on media through legal and extra-legal controls, ownership of news agencies or their

resources, self-censorship, and economic hardship that could extinguish some voices. The rating was by

judges throughout the world who received a survey from the Freedom of Information Center. The resultant

classification of the media was found to match closely those of Nixon’s earlier surveys. Kent (1972),

analyzed the PICA measures and found them to measure a single dimension of press freedom.

Nam and Oh (1973), using Nixon’s Press Freedom Index (1965), found that freedom of the press

is a function of subsystem autonomy in the overall political system. In other words, in political systems in

which the various players have freedom of activity, the press operates accordingly. W eaver (1977) used

the Lowenstein (1970) and Kent (1972) classification of press freedom and found that increases in

economic productivity lead to less stress in the political system, and this decreased political stress leads to

increased press freedom. W eaver, Buddenbaum and Fair (1985) attempted to replicate the findings of

W eaver (1977) but concluded instead that increases in economic productivity in developing countries may

have negative effects on press freedom rather than positive ones. For these analyses, W eaver and his

colleagues used the then relatively new measures developed by Freedom House, a nongovernmental

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organization based in W ashington, D.C.

Breunig (1994) examined the relationship between legal protection of communication freedom as

written into the constitutions and related documents of nations of the world and another measure of press

freedom, namely offenses against communication freedom. Breunig gathered data on offenses against

communication freedom through a content analysis of the Bulletins of the International Journalism Institute

in Prague between January 1, 1988, and October 9, 1991. He found a disconnect between the two

sources of information. States that guarantee communication freedom in their legal documents did not

necessary provide for more freedom.

The early empirical work on press freedom treated press independence as the dependent or

outcome variable, predicted by political and social factors. Stevens (1971), in fact, states these

relationships as a series of propositions about the determinations of press freedom.

Besley and Prat (2001) found that press freedom, as measured by the Freedom House index, is

negatively related to corruption and to political longevity of office holders. Brunetti and W eder (2003),

again using the Freedom House measures of press freedom, replicated the finding of a negative

relationship between press freedom and corruption in a cross sectional study and established that the

direction of the relationship was from press freedom to decreases in corruption using panel data.

Jacobsson and Jacobsson (2004), also using the Freedom House index of press freedom, found that

press freedom is the outcome of economic wealth and of low market concentration in the consumer goods

industries. Islam (2002) reports a scatterplot for the relationship between Freedom House measures of

Press Freedom and its measures of democracy score. The plot suggests a weak relationship exits.

Similarly, Carrington and Nelson (2002) show evidence linking media “strength” and “strength” of the local

economy. The analysis is based on the W ealth of Nations Triangle Index for developing countries.

Our Project

W e have engaged in a number of projects in the last several years to better understand the role of

the media in democratization. W e have undertaken this work for two reasons. First, the Cox Center

conducts small training programs to link the faculty of the Grady College of Journalism and Mass

Communication at the University of Georgia and other communication professionals to journalism and

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communication practice around the world. Knowing the impact of our work is important to us. Second, the

Cox Center also has recognized the need for evaluation of formal journalism education and in post-

employment settings, so an assessment of the impact of media assistance is a natural component of our

larger evaluation enterprise.

Developing the model represented in Figure 1 has been an important part of our effort to

understand the role of the media in democratization. Identifying the key concepts and how they have been

used by others also has been a part of that. The perspective presented to this point in this paper, in sum,

is an outgrowth of our work.

In reviewing the writing on the role of media in democratization, we have recognized that there are

two distinct operating frameworks. For one group, the question of whether the media always play a

positive role in democratization is still open. For the other group, that question has been answered

affirmatively, and the issue is documenting that impact. The first framework is largely that of academic

researchers; the second framework is largely that of practitioners, specifically of funders and organizations

engaged in media assistance activities.

Though, as noted, we do engage in media assistance projects, we remain open to the possibility

that such assistance may not lead to democracy. Our goal is to examine whether media assistance leads

to democracy (and, if it does, under what circumstances), not to document that such projects in fact

produce the desired democratic outcome.

Much of our research has been funded by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, based in

Miami, Florida. The Knight Foundation funds media assistance projects, but it supported our efforts to

explore whether such programs worked and under what circumstances.

Examination of Measures of Press Freedom

W e recognized early the importance of developing indices at the national level of key media

system characteristics. As Figure 1 shows, such systematic outcomes are the ultimate goal of most efforts

at media assistance. If it were possible to know how much money had been invested in each country of

the world and the nature of that investment, and if we had good indicators of changes in the

characteristics of media systems across the time period of those investments, it would be possible to

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provide an important test of any relationship between investment and type of investment and outcome.

Organizations Reporting on Media Freedom

More than 100 organizations throughout the world are currently engaged in some form of media

system assessment and evaluation or media freedom promotion. Many of these are newly-formed in

response to recent democratization in Europe and redemocratization in Latin America. The groups

describe their missions variously as promoting free and independent media through activism, monitoring

media freedom violations, evaluating media systems through indices and written reports, and defending

and protecting journalists working in conflict zones and under repressive governments.

The organizations have applied rather than conceptual goals for their work. They are interested in

media reform often because they believe it plays a role in the development of democratic states. Their

work is often described and cited in the popular media, giving weight to their operationalizations--and

consequent conceptualizations--of media freedom.

W e have reviewed the activities of these organizations in our article in The International

Communication Gazette (Becker, L.B. Vlad, T., & Nusser, N. , 2007). I will summarize some of the

findings reported in that article for completeness.

Freedom House

Probably the best known of the press freedom indicators is that of Freedom House. A non-

governmental organization based in W ashington, D.C., Freedom House was founded more than 60 years

ago to promote democracy globally. Since 1978, Freedom House has published a global survey of

freedom, known as Freedom in the World, now covering 192 countries and 18 related or disputed

territories. This indicator is widely used by policy makers, academics, and journalists. In 1980, as a

separate undertaking, Freedom House began conducting its media freedom survey–Freedom of the

Press: A Global Survey of Media Independence–which in 2003 covered the same 192 countries (Freedom

House, 2004).

For Freedom House, the concept of interest is freedom of the media, which is defined as being

linked to “the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic

factors that affect access to information” (Freedom House, 2004).

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To measure press freedom, Freedom House attempts to assess the political, legal, and economic

environments of each country and evaluate whether the countries promote and do not restrict the free flow

of information. Freedom House U.S.-based staff keeps year-round files on media activities for each

country (Becker, Vlad & Nusser, 2007). The files contain news articles by and on media in each country

and other reports from governmental and international organizations. These files are consulted prior to the

production of the annual reports. To augment that information, Freedom House staff members consult

local and international media organizations, multilateral and governmental organizations, and other

NGO’s. Staff members also rely on the Toronto-based International Freedom of Expression Exchange

(IFEX), a global clearing house for media freedom organizations around the world, and on Freedom

House’s own Freedom in the World surveys.

In evaluating the collected material, Freedom House (2004) examines the legal environment,

political influences, and economic pressures on the media. To assess the legal environment, Freedom

House analyzes laws and regulations that could influence media, as well as governments’ propensity for

using those laws to manipulate media. It assesses the potentially negative or positive impact of various

legal factors. Political influence is measured by evaluating the degree of political control over news media

content. Economic pressures are measured by evaluating characteristics of the media system such as the

structure of media, the costs of establishing media outlets, and the impact of corruption and bribery on

content.

Freedom House staff members then score each country, using a 20-item questionnaire that

includes questions in the three areas of legal, political and economic influences. Higher numbers indicate

less media freedom. The legal environment is scored on a 30-point scale, political environment on a 40-

point scale, and economic environment on a 30-point scale. The three subindices are summed to come

up with a final score for each country.

International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX)

IREX was founded in 1968 by U.S. universities to promote exchanges with the Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe. A non-profit organization based in W ashington, D.C., IREX focuses on higher education,

independent media, Internet development, and civil society in the United States and internationally.

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In 2001, IREX, in cooperation with USAID, prepared its first Media Sustainability Index (MSI) to

evaluate the global development of independent media (IREX, 2001). The report rated independent media

sustainability in 20 states in four regions: Southeast Europe, Russia and W estern Eurasia, Caucasus, and

Central Asia. IREX has continued these annual evaluations, and, in 2005, added 18 countries in North

Africa and the Middle East (IREX, 2006).

The concept behind IREX’s empirical work is independent media sustainability, defined as the

existence of sustainable, “independent media systems” (IREX, 2003, p. xxi). This is operationalized as the

extent to which political, legal, social, and economic circumstances and institutions, as well as

professional standards within independent media, promote and/or permit independent media to survive

over time.

IREX assesses independent media sustainability using five criteria or objectives: 1) legal and

social norms that protect and promote free speech and access to public information; 2) journalism that

meets professional standards; 3) multiple news sources that provide citizens with reliable and objective

news; 4) independent media that are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence; and 5)

supporting institutions that function in the professional interests of independent media.

To determine how well a country meets those five objectives, from seven to nine indicators for

each of the objectives are assessed. The range of scores is from 0 to 4 for each of these indicators. The

scores for each of the indicators within the five objectives are averaged to obtain a single score for the

objective. The scores on the five objectives are averaged to arrive at a final score for each country.

To conduct scoring, IREX assembles in each country a panel of experts—local media

representatives, members of NGOs and professional associations, international donors, and media

development workers. Each panel is provided with the objectives, indicators and an explanation of the

scoring system. Panelists review the information individually, then assemble to come to a consensus on

scores. The panel moderator, in most cases a representative from one of the country’s media or an NGO,

prepares a written analysis of the discussion, which is edited by IREX representatives. IREX staff (in-

country and in W ashington, D.C.) also review indicators and objectives, scoring countries independently.

The final score for a country is an average of the panel score and the IREX staff score.

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Reporters sans frontieres (RSF)

The non-profit RSF works to defend journalists and media outlets by condemning attacks on

press freedom worldwide, by publishing a variety of annual and special reports on media freedom, and by

appealing to governments and international organizations on behalf of journalists and media

organizations. The group, based in Paris and including a network of 100 correspondents, works to reduce

censorship, opposes laws devised to restrict press freedom, supports journalists and media outlets with

financial aid, and has recently developed a judicial branch to promote effective prosecution of crimes

against journalists. On an annual basis, RSF publishes comprehensive regional and country reports that

assess political, economic, and legal environments for media freedom. In 2002, RSF released its first

W orldwide Press Freedom (RSF, 2002a) report and ranking of individual nations.

The RSF concept is respect for media freedom, defined as “The amount of freedom journalists

and the media have in each country and the efforts made by government to see that press freedom is

respected” (RSF, 2002b). The concept is operationalized as the extent to which legal and political

environments, circumstances, and institutions permit and promote media freedom and the ability of

journalists to collect and disseminate information unimpeded by physical, psychological, or legal attacks

and harassment.

To create the index, RSF sends out a 53-item questionnaire to in-country sources, usually

members of domestic and foreign media as well as legal experts and members of NGOs involved with

media freedom. RSF receives an average of three to four completed questionnaires for each country, and

if it does not receive at least three, the country is not included. The questions fall into the five categories of

physical and psychological attacks on the journalists, legal harassment of and discrimination against

journalists, obstacles to collecting and disseminating information, and government manipulation of the

media.

After questionnaires are returned, RSF staff members in Paris score the surveys. Each of the

questions is weighted. Lower scores indicate more media freedom. Points are summed and averaged to

arrive at a final score.

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Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)

Formed in 1981 by a group of foreign correspondents, the New York City-based CPJ reports and

investigates attacks on journalists and lobbies domestic and foreign governments on their behalf. W ith a

full-time New York staff of 22 and one W ashington, D.C., staff member, CPJ (2004) monitors media in

countries in five different regions: the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Developments

are tracked through independent research, fact-finding missions, and contacts in the field. CPJ has

published annual reports on attacks on the press since 1987 and country reports on more than 100

nations since 1993.

The concept of concern to CPJ is freedom of the press, defined as “The rights of journalists to

report the news without fear of reprisal” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004). The concept is

operationalized as the number of attacks or restrictions on journalists.

Annual reports are prepared by a New-York CPJ regional director and sources in the country. CPJ

checks each case from the field identified as a violation of press freedom by more than one source for

factual accuracy, confirmation that the victims were journalists or news organizations, and verification that

intimidation was the probable motive. Journalists are defined as people who cover news or write

commentary on a regular basis.

Methodology

The Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres indices are based on similar concepts,

namely the existence of press autonomy and independence. The IREX Media Sustainability Index

includes freedom of expression as one of its five components. The remaining four elements of the index

are potentially quite distinct, incorporating the idea of durability of press operations in a competitive

market. The Committee to Protect Journalists index focuses solely on attacks on press operation, rather

than on support for the media.

In general, the Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres evaluations should produce quite

similar responses. They are undertaken by representatives of media interests in two distinct, though

decidedly western, countries. A comparison of these two measures should give some sense of their

commonality and the generalizability of the classifications of the media systems.

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A comparison of the evaluations by Freedom House and Reporters sans frontieres with the Media

Sustainability Index should give a sense of how successful IREX has been in expanding its measure to

include more than simple press freedom. Similarly, a comparison of the Committee to Protect Journalists

measures with the others should give an indication of how much the other indices have incorporated

positive, rather than simply negative, indicators of freedom into their measures.

Finally, an examination of the Freedom House Press Freedom Index across time gives a sense of

the extent to which this measure reflects variability across time, particularly in the period of the late 1980s

and early 1990s when systemic change was taking place in governmental systems, most notably in

eastern and central Europe.

To undertake these analyses, a data base was created in which country was the unit of analysis

and the index score for each of the four measures was recorded. W here possible, subparts of the indices

were included into the data base as well.

Specifically, data from the Freedom House Press Freedom Index from 1981 to 2004 were

included. The Freedom House Press Freedom Index in a given year is for evaluation of the media system

a year earlier, so the 1981 index covers the 1980 period. During this time period, only an ordinal level

measure was available, with countries being classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. From 1994 to

1999, the Freedom House Press Freedom total index was recorded, with a theoretical range of from 1 to

100. In fact, the lowest score (indicating freedom) was 5 during this period; the highest score was 100.

From 2000 to 2004, data were available not only on the total index score, but also on the three subparts,

legal environment, political influences, and economic pressures.

The Reporters sans frontieres indices have been reported only for 2002 and 2003. In each year,

the period covered was from September 1 of the previous year through August 31 of the listed year. Only

the total index, ranging in theoretical value from 0 to 100, was available.

The IREX Media Sustainability index for three years, 2001, 2002 and 2003, was used. The

reports, released in the following year, cover the listed year. The index covers 20 political entities: Albania,

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo,

Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and

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Uzbekistan. In creating the file, the data for Montenegro and Serbia were averaged to create a single

score for that country. In each of the three years, the MSI score and each of its five subparts were entered

into the data base. Those subparts are: free speech, professional journalism, plurality of news sources,

business management, and supporting institutions. The theoretical range of scores for the total index and

each of its parts is 0 to 4.

Data from the Committee to Protect Journalists were available only for 2003, covering that year.

Both the total number of attacks on the press and the individual components making up that total were

entered into the data file. Included were the number of: physical attacks on journalists or facilities, cases

of censorship, expulsions, harassments, imprisonments, murders of journalists, murders of journalists not

documented as related to their work, legal actions against journalists, missing journalists, threats to

journalists, and cases of kidnapping of journalists. Actual scores for the total index ranged from 0 to 46.

Findings

The Reporters sans frontieres ratings and the Freedom House ratings are empirically quite

similar. In 2002, the Pearson Product Moment Correlation coefficient between the two ratings was .81. In

2003, the coefficient was .84. In other words, about 70% of the variance in ratings is shared. Despite the

differences in measurement techniques and between the countries of the organizations, the two groups

mostly agree on the classification of the media systems of the world.

More surprising is the strong relationship between the IREX Media Sustainability Index and both

the Reporters sans frontieres and the Freedom House ratings. For the 18 countries rated by IREX and by

the other two NGOs (Kosovo was not rated by either Reporters sans frontieres or Freedom House), the

correlation coefficient was .82 and .91 respectively in 2003. In 2002, the figures were .72 for RSF and .89

for Freedom House. In 2001, the correlation between the Freedom House index and MSI was .84.

Only the tally of attacks on the press by the Committee to Protect Journalists produces

evaluations different from those of the other three groups. In 2003, the only year for which these

comparisons are possible, the CPJ tally is correlated .30 with the RSF rating, .31 with the Freedom House

rating, and .08 with the IREX Media Sustainabililty Index. The suggestion is that the CPJ data provide new

information not fully incorporated in the other indices. The IREX Sustainabililty index seems to include

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more of the positive features of press operation than do the RSF and Freedom House measures. The

Committee to Protect Journalists is a wholly negative measure. The lower–really almost trivial--correlation

of the CPJ and the Sustainability Index is, in this sense, not surprising.

The analysis shows that the RSF index correlates equally well with the three subparts of the

Freedom House Index (.81 for Legal Environment, .82 for Political Influences, and .80 for Economic

Pressures). The RSF index, however, correlates less well with the business management part the IREX

Sustainability Index (.62) than with the other parts.

The CPJ tally of attacks correlates best with the Political Influences part of the Freedom House

index. The lowest correlation is with the Economic Pressures. These findings are consistent with the

argument that the three components of the Freedom House index have some distinctiveness. The CPJ

tally is more strongly related to the IREX Free Speech, Professional Journalism and Plurality of Sources

subcomponents than to the Business Management and Supporting Institutions components, where the

relationship is really nonexistent.

The interrelationships of the Freedom House and IREX subparts do not show clear patterns. The

Freedom House Legal Environment is more highly correlated with the IREX Business Managment item

than with other IREX components. The Freedom House Political Influences component is least correlated

with the IREX Free Speech component. The Freedom House Economic Pressures component is highly

correlated with the IREX Plurality of News and Supporting Institutions measures. The easiest

interpretation is that the Freedom House and IREX measures have much in common internally as well as

in the sum.

The part-whole correlations for both the Freedom House and the IREX indices show that each

total index is roughly evenly influenced by the subparts. The three subparts of the Freedom House index

also are very highly correlated, meaning that little new variance is obtained by any one of the three

components. For the IREX index, on the other hand, more variance among components exists. IREX’s

sweep is a bit wider, it seems, in gathering components for its index.

In sum, the Reporters sans frontieres, Freedom House and IREX measures all seem to be

measuring much the same thing. The Freedom House gain for including the three components is not

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great, at least as far as the 2003 measures are concerned. The IREX MSI does seem to include

components not represented as fully in the other indices, but, in terms of the total index, little is gained

from the exercise. The IREX index is more strongly related to the Freedom House than the Reporters

sans frontieres indices, perhaps reflecting an American bias in the evaluation. The Committee to Protect

Journalists tally of Attacks on the Press is not the same as the other three indices. The relationship is

particularly weak between it and the IREX index. The suggestion is that the Committee to Protect

Journalists adds information not redundant with that of the other indices.

These findings speak to the distinctiveness of the measures, or, in the reverse, to the consistency

and the reliability of the information they provide. W hat evidence is there that they vary in significant ways

across time, that is, reflect real changes that take place in the media environment of a country?

Only the Freedom House measure has been used for a long enough period to allow for an

assessment of this question.

In general, the data show that the Freedom House measures are related from year to year,

suggesting more stability than change, as one would expect. Across time, however, the size of the

relationships declines, again as one would expect if real change is taking place in the system. This also

suggests that the evaluators are not simply using the rating from the year before to evaluate the current

year. The relationship between the 1981 evaluation and the 1982 evaluation is .92, but by 1993 (when the

scale changed), that relationship had dropped to .62. This pattern is repeated across the years and across

measurement type. The 1994 measure of Press Freedom by Freedom House is correlated .91 with the

measure a year later, but that relationship dropped to .85 by 2004.

It is clear from analyses of these measures that there has been more consistency than change

reflected in the Freedom House measure across the more than 20 years that it has been reported. The

mean scores for the index changed not at all from 1981 to 1989, nor did the standard deviation of the

measures. Treating the data as appropriate for computation of means and standard deviations is a

stretch, of course, as the measure used during that time period was truly ordinal. (Correlation computation

also assumes better measurement than exists.) Given the small range of the measures, however, median

change can hardly be expected.

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In the 1989 to 1993 period–a crucial one in world history and in the history of media

democratization–the Freedom House index of Press Freedom did change in the expected direction. The

overall scores for the nations ranked move in the direction of press freedom. The standard deviation, as

would be expected, did not change. Change from 1994 to 2004, based on the full 100-point scale, was not

as dramatic, but it was in the direction of increased press freedom. The standard deviation has increased

slightly as well.

In 1981, the mean for all six countries W arsaw Pact Coutries (Poland, East Germany,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) was 3. There was no variance, as all countries had that

score. In 1990, there was evidence of change, which continued through 1993. (East Germany dropped out

of the analyses after 1989.) Based on the new scale used from 1994 to 2004, change continued to be in

evidence. (The division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia created six states again.)

In other words, the Freedom House measure across time seemed to pick up what most would argue was

real change in the media environments of these countries across the 20-plus years it has been used.

These same analyses were repeated for the 15 states evolving from the former Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics. The data for 1981 to 1992 reflect the evaluation only of the Soviet Union. From 1994

on, the 100-point measure reflects the situation in the 15 new states. The measure shows a deterioration

of the media landscapes in terms of press freedom. The change has not been overly large, but it is

noticeable nonetheless. Absent other evidence, one would conclude that the media environment in these

states as a whole did not improve, and that the Freedom House evaluators did not get swept up in the

euphoria of the moment in reaching their assessment. (The ratings for the three Baltic states did improve

during this time period, but it was offset by deteriorating media situations in other states, according to the

Freedom House data.)

Summary and Conclusions

Since the details of the findings are in Becker, Vlad and Nusser (2007), I’ll only summarize here.

The empirical analysis of the numerical ratings of four of these organizations–Reporters sans

frontieres, Freedom House, IREX and Committee to Protect Journalists–shows that at least the first three

of these organizations largely come to the same conclusions about the media. The RSF and Freedom

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House ratings for 2002 were correlated .81(Pearson Product Moment), while the figure in 2003 was .84.

The IREX index correlated .72 with the RSF index and .89 with the Freedom House ratings in 2002. In

2003, the figures were .82 and .91.

The correlation of the IREX measures with those of Reporters sans frontieres and Freedom

House is surprising, given that IREX tried to create a distinct concept, namely media sustainability. The

goal was a measure that incorporated press freedom, but focused more heavily on the economic and

social environment of the country thought necessary for the development of a durable, independent

media. The comparisons are only for the 18 countries rated by all three organizations, but they suggest

that IREX has had limited success in getting beyond the media freedom measurement–or that the RSF

and Freedom House measures were already broad enough to capture the meaning sought by IREX.

The higher correlation of the IREX measure with Freedom House’s measure both years also

suggests a nationality bias, as both IREX and Freedom House measures are the product of U.S.

organizations, while RSF is a French-based NGO. This at a minimum raises a question about the

independence of the evaluations of country perspectives on press freedom reflecting domestic, political

concerns.

The Freedom House and IREX measures are designed to be multi-dimensional. In the case of

Freedom House, the subindices are very highly correlated internally. This argues for internal reliability. But

it also suggests that the measures do not sample elements of the concept widely--at least not as widely as

is the case for the IREX MSI, which has lower internal consistency. In other words, the internal

consistency of the Freedom House measure is at the cost of the face validity.

Clearly the Committee to Protect Journalists, through its measures of attacks on the press, has

gathered information that is not redundant with the RSF, Freedom House and MSI indices. The CPJ

counts of attacks correlates weakly with the first two measures and very poorly with the IREX measure.

One option would be to incorporate the CPJ data into a global index, perhaps one that also

combined the RSF and Freedom House measures. Combining RSF and Freedom House into a single,

averaged, index would improve the reliability of the measures–if each has random error associated with it.

Adding the CPJ measure, on the other hand, would increase the breadth of the measure, that is,

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potentially improve its validity.

The evidence is, in the case of Freedom House, which has reported data across more than 10

years, that the measurement is consistent. The evidence also is that it has varied in meaningful ways

across time, picking up the dramatic change in the media environment of the former W arsaw Pact

countries following the fall of communism in 1989.

The usefulness of the Freedom House measure, or any amalgamation of the Freedom House

measure with that of RSF, CPJ or other organizations, is its match to the theoretical concepts of interest

and to other systemic variables, such as the evolution of a civil society and key democratic institutions.

It is possible to make some assessment of the first of these issues by reflecting back to the

definitions of press freedom identified in the scientific literature on the media. McQuail (2000) has said that

a free press should have sufficient independence to protect free and open public expression of ideas and

information. It also should be diverse. Others, such as Curran (1996) and Rozumilowicz (2002) have

added additional requirements about mediation of societal interests and balance between commercial and

public components. None of the existent measures seem adequate to address the diversity argument of

McQuail let alone to respond to the broader concepts of press freedom called for by Curran and

Rozumilowicz.

The relationship of the existing measures–or a broader measure incorporating already existing

information on new information gathered to reflect the broader concepts of McQuail, Curran,

Rozumilowicz and others–to other measures is virgin territory. The findings of this analysis suggest it is

territory worthy of exploration.

Using IREX Index to Study Impact of Competition

In a series of workshops that we conducted in Romania approximately a decade after the fall of

communism in that country, we heard repeatedly from journalists about sensationalism in the media,

about corruption and bribes involving journalists, and about the influence of powerful political figures and

business elites on the media. W e also were told about western media assistance projects that supported

the establishment of new media organizations in these markets. W e also were told, and could observe,

the very high level of competition in the media markets in that country.

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These comments and observations, as well as similar comments and observations from other

settings, led us to conduct two related studies that looked at the impact of excessive market competition

on media performance. In the second study, we used the IREX Media Sustainability Index, and, in doing

so, were able to gain indirect evidence of the validity of that measure.

The first of these studies has been reported in two reports (Hollifield, Becker & Vlad, 2004:

Hollfield, Becker and Vlad, 2006). The first report (Hollifield, Becker & Vlad, 2004) was based on detailed

interviews with the managers of two newspapers from an African nation, one daily and one weekly, and

four newspapers from a former Soviet bloc nation, one daily and three weeklies. Both nations are low in

income and have limited economies. The second report (Hollfield, Becker and Vlad, 2006) was based on

interviews with the managers of 13 radio and television networks in six countries with developing, but

limited, economies. Six of the 13 networks were public broadcasters, seven were commercial

broadcasters, and four were in organizations converting from a public broadcasting to a commercial

model. The study was designed to learn about management strategies these media organizations were

employing to survive in their markets. The managers spoke often of extremely high levels of competition

for viewers and advertisers, aging and shrinking audiences and of concentrated and unstable advertising

markets. In the view of the managers, the competition hindered the development of strong independent

journalism.

This exploratory work led us to examine more carefully the theoretical and empirical research on

the effects of competition on news media performance. W hat we found is that, contrary to classical

economic theory, there is evidence that more competition may not always improve consumer welfare in

media markets if consumer welfare includes the socioeconomic effects of news products (Jacobsson,

Jacobsson, Hollifield, Vlad & Becker, 2006). The review suggests that a combination of supply-side

competition for resources and demand-side vertical and horizontal product differentiation strategies may

result in excessive sameness of low-cost, low-quality content that either focuses on celebrity and

sensationalism or slants news to appeal to the audiences’ ethnic, political, or religious biases. In short, it

may well be that under conditions of hypercompetition, media that survive in the market may do so at the

expense of their journalistic product and their larger contributions to society.

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In fact, there is some reason to believe that the relationship between media competition and

media performance might be curvilinear (Hollifield, 2006). Under this model, monopoly markets would be

expected to produce the highest level of market performance in the form of profit for media organizations,

but not the highest quality of news for consumers. The underlying assumption is that with virtually no direct

competition, media will have the resources to produce quality information products but will have little

incentive to do so.

Low-to-moderate levels of competition are expected to stimulate media organizations to invest in

improving the quality of their news products in an attempt at vertical product differentiation. The increased

investment produces an optimal combination of outcomes in the form of more balanced, enterprising,

diverse coverage of important issues, and solid market performance in terms of audience size, advertising

revenues, and organizational profits.

Finally, as competition among news providers becomes extreme, the organization’s financial

commitment to quality news is expected to decline as will the market performance of the organization. The

quality and diversity of news content should fall, as will journalists’ wages, the size and quality of the

editorial staff, and the numbers of bureaus and subscriptions to wire services and other external sources

of content. Journalists and the media organizations that employ them are expected to become more

subject to capture by outside actors, and the organization is expected to pursue low-cost product

differentiation strategies.

Methodology

I will not go into the theoretical rationale for this argument, but turn instead to the methodology,

which is most relevant to this paper. To test our expectation about the relationship between competition

and media performance, we used the IREX Media Sustainability Index as our measure of media

performance.

IREX, as explained above, assesses media sustainability using five criteria or objectives: 1) legal

and social norms that protect and promote free speech and access to public information; 2) journalism

that meets professional standards; 3) multiple news sources that provide citizens with reliable and

objective news; 4) independent media that are well-managed businesses, allowing editorial independence;

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and 5) supporting institutions that function in the professional interests of independent media. W e used

the second criterion, journalism that meets professional standards, as our measure of professional

performance.

The measure of professional performance contains the following seven criteria: 1) Reporting is

fair, objective, and well sourced; 2) Journalists follow recognized and accepted ethical standards; 3)

Journalists and editors do not practice self-censorship; 4) Pay levels for journalists and other media

professionals are sufficiently high to discourage corruption; 5) Entertainment programming does not

eclipse news and information programming; 6) Technical facilities and equipment for gathering, producing,

and distributing news are modern and efficient, and 7) Quality niche reporting and programming exists

(investigative, economics/business, local, political).

IREX’s 2004 (IREX 2005) report contained additional data on the media in the countries studied,

including the number of media outlets. IREX attempted to gather information on the advertising market in

the countries as well but, in most cases, was unsuccessful.

An alternative source of data on advertising markets is W orld Press Trends, produced by the

W orld Association of Newspapers (W AN, 2004). Advertising data on the countries rated by IREX,

however, also were incomplete in the W AN report. An analysis of the W AN data for 47 countries where

the data were available, however, showed that there was a Pearson Produce Moment correlation

coefficient of .87 between total advertising revenue and the country’s Gross Domestic Product, taken from

the CIA W orld Factbook (2003). Gross Domestic Product, then, can be treated as a rough surrogate for

advertising resources.

For this study, Gross Domestic Product (purchasing power parity) was obtained from the CIA

W orld Factbook (2004) and used as a surrogate for the size of the advertising market. The GDP was

divided by the total number of media outlets to provide a measure of market competition. In a highly

competitive market, this ratio should be small compared to a market with a low level of competition.

The nine states included in the 2004 IREX assessment from Southeast Europe were Albania,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.

Kosovo is an international protectorate that was technically part of the federation of Serbia and

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Montenegro. IREX in 2004 treated these as three separate countries. Three countries from the Caucasus

were included: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine were included

from W estern Eurasia. From Central Asia were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Findings

IREX reported inconsistently on the number of media outlets for the various countries, sometimes

giving precise numbers for daily newspapers, nondaily newspapers, radio stations and television stations,

but often giving only total print and total broadcast. For that reason, total print and broadcast outlets were

used in this analysis. For one of the countries, Georgia, no data were reported by IREX on the number of

media outlets. Data for Georgia were taken from the BBC web site (BBC, 2005). The range of scores was

dramatic, with Russia reporting 42,167 media outlets, and Tajikistan reporting 42.

Gross Domestic Product also varied widely, from Kosovo’s $5.7 billion to Russia’s $1.3 trillion.

The GDP figures for Serbia were taken from the IREX report, rather than from the CIA W orld Factbook,

since the latter did not differentiate GDP among the three parts of the Serbia and Montenegro federation.

For Kosovo, GDP was taken from United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK 2007).

Purchasing power parity was computed by using the conversion factor for neighboring Albania, taken from

the W orld Bank (2006a). Neither the CIA Factbook nor IREX had a GDP estimate for Montenegro, so it

was dropped from the analysis.

To create the measure of competition, the GDP was divided by the number of media outlets.

Ukraine had the lowest score (meaning the highest level of competition), with just under $13 million in

GDP per media title, while Azerbaijan had the highest score (lowest competition), with $168 million in GDP

per media title.

The IREX professional journalism scores ranged from Uzbekistan’s 0.54 to Bulgaria’s 2.56. The

mean and median were both 1.78, while the standard deviation was 0.50.

The simple correlation (Pearson Product Moment) between the measure of competition and the

IREX professional journalism index for the 19 countries included in the analysis was -.092 (R square =

.008; adjusted R square = .05). In other words, the relationship predicted by the dominant thread of the

literature was not correct. Competition clearly was not associated with improved journalism, as measured

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by the IREX index.

Evidence that the relationship is, in fact, curvilinear, as predicted, does exist, though the pattern

clearly is not perfect. Low levels of competition were associated with low levels of journalistic

performance, consistent with the dominant arguments about the negative effects of monopolistic markets.

Moderate levels of competition produced higher levels of journalistic performance than did lower levels.

There also seemed to be evidence that higher levels of competition produced a drop-off in journalistic

performance, as expected. A comparison of a linear model, a quadratic model (inverted U), and a cubic

model indicates that the cubic model is the best fit. The R squared figures, respectively, are .008, .021 and

.054 (unadjusted).

Five different regression analyses were employed to explore this relationship more fully. Here, a

measure of urbanization was used in the regression analysis to correct for a potential problem in the

measure of competition used in the initial analysis. Two countries with identical GDPs and numbers of

media outlets might have very different levels of competition if those populations were differently

dispersed. In one country, the media outlets and population could be spread around the country, and real

competition could be low, while in the other, both the population and media outlets could be highly

concentrated, indicating real competition. The measure of urbanization was taken from the W orld Bank

(2006b) and reflects, for 2004, the percent of the population that resides in an urban area. (The estimates

are based on national definitions of what constitutes a city or metropolitan area, making cross country

comparisons more difficult than is ideal.) No urbanization measures were available for Kosovo and Serbia.

To capture the inverted u-shape with respect to competition in these analyses, the GDP per media

outlet measure of competition plus the square of the same were used. The two measures of competition,

the simple score and the square of that score, are highly correlated (.96). W hen the two measures are

used in the regression equation, with the IREX Professional Journalism score as the dependent variable,

the two measures show the expected relationships, meaning that more competition is actually bad for

professional journalism. The squared variable indicates a decreasing positive slope--probably ending up

with a negative slope. Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro have been eliminated from these analyses.

Introduction of the urbanization measure does not have any impact on the findings. Urbanization

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is not a predictor of the dependent variable, and it does not alter the relationship between the two GDP

measures and journalistic performance.

Models three to five introduce three other components of the Media Sustainability Index as

controls: Supporting Institutions that function in the professional interests of independent media, legal and

social norms that protect and promote Free Speech and access to public information, and independent

media that are well-Managed Businesses, allowing editorial independence. These three measures hold

constant the effect of the media environment generally, thereby allowing for a more sensitive examination

of the impact of competition on media performance.

It appears that the IREX control measure of Supporting Institutions is relatively well suited to

capture the country specific institutional situation. It is also clear that this measure dwarfs the other

variables in explanatory power. The adjusted multiple R for the third equation was .813. The multiple R

figures (adjusted) actually decline with introduction of the two other components of the Sustainability

Index.

At the same time, it is clear that these three controls do not appreciably alter the relationship

between competition and media performance. There are indications that more competition after a point is

bad for Professional Journalism even when urbanization, as well as the basic level of press freedom is

controlled.

Conclusion

The data presented here challenge the dominant argument in the literature that increased

competition in the media market is always a good thing. At best, the study finds evidence that high levels

of competition have little effect on the quality of journalism produced in the emerging media markets

studied. At worst, the data suggest that competition, after a point, may have negative consequences.

The findings are tentative for a number of reasons. First, it was not possible to get a precise

measure of the advertising market from existing sources, and GDP was used as a surrogate. The

measures of number of media outlets also were less precise than would be ideal. In the dynamic media

environments studied, measurement of this sort is necessarily problematic. Titles come and go literally

daily.

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The measure of journalistic performance also does not capture the full meaning of that concept.

As our earlier analysis had found (Becker, Vlad and Nusser, 2007), the performance measure also was

highly correlated with other components of the IREX index, which raises the possibility that the evaluators

did not strongly differentiate among the components of Media Sustainability.

At the same time, the fact that a relationship, consistent with the expectation, was found lends

support to the validity of the media performance component of the Media Sustainability Index.

Mapping Media Assistance Projects

These two studies provided evidence that it is possible and profitable to measure characteristics

of the media system and that the existing measures, focusing on media freedom and media sustainability,

are useful indicators of the possible outcome of media assistance projects. W hile working on these

analyses, we also focused our attention on media assistance itself.

Despite the high level of interest in media assistance on the part of many western governments in

the years after the end of the Cold W ar, these investments were made without a comprehensive plan or

even much coordination among the donors (Hume, 2004). The consequence was that some countries

received much aid and others, also with considerable need, received little.

Only in 2002 did anyone make a serious effort to document the nature of that investment. Price,

Noll and DeLuce (2002) examined the assistance activities of governmental agencies, nongovernmental

organizations, foundations and associations from Europe and the United States in 14 program areas.

These are listed below:

Price, Noll and DeLuce Categorization of Media Assistance Projects:

1. Journalism training and education for reporters and editors in print and broadcast news.

2. Training in marketing, business management, and efforts to ensure financial

independence.

3. Training that focused on transforming state broadcasters into genuine public service

networks, including journalism training for editorial staff and technical advice for the

broadcaster’s managers and producers.

4. Training in professional media ethics, accountability, and professionalism.

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5. Material assistance aimed at helping build the infrastructure needed to ensure continued

media independence.

6. Assistance in developing networks of independent media including providing assistance in

program sharing arrangements, linking production, distribution, and management of

broadcast material.

7. Assistance and advice in building democratic legal and regulatory frameworks for media.

8. Trade association development, including assistance in the creation of professional

associations of journalists and trade associations of broadcasters or publishers and

support for the organization of lobbying campaigns aimed at reforming restrictions on

media freedom.

9. Legal Defense. Support or training for the legal defense of journalists and news

organizations facing harassment by a particular regime.

10. Conflict prevention initiatives that attempt to educate journalists about reporting on

alienated communities and overcoming religious, ethnic, or national prejudice.

11. Security training for journalists, mainly in areas of conflict and where there are significant

security risks for journalists.

12. Support for legal advocacy, including the establishment, training, and support for media

monitoring and watchdog groups that monitor press freedom and provide protection for

journalists.

13. Social and cultural development. This includes programs that seek to develop community

radio and journalism.

14. New communications assistance in developing information technology, building new

Internet sites, establishing Cyber cafes, and helping ensure unrestrictive regulation, and

promoting Internet access.

W hile the team was able to provide a broad overview of the nature of the work and was able to

identify many of the key donor organizations, assistance providers, and recipients, it was not able to

identify the overall level of funding. Among the challenges for the field identified by Price, Noll and DeLuce

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was a need for planning and coordination of efforts, conflicting philosophies about assistance, lack of

expertise on the part of assistance providers, uneven geographic spread of projects, and inadequate

evaluation of the programs funded.

In a subsequent study, Hume (2004) provided an overview, largely from the perspective of U.S.

organizations, of media training assistance efforts. The title of the report, Media Missionaries, seemed to

reflect the perspective of at least some of those involved in the international initiatives. Hume estimated

that U.S. donors had spent “at least $600 million and probably much more” in media assistant projects

over the previous decade. Despite Hume’s acknowledgment that the figure was a very rough estimate, it

has been used by others in discussing media assistance projects (e.g., Kumar, 2006).

Methodology of Project to Identify Amount of Founding Outside U.S.

To provide an estimate of funding by donor organizations outside the U.S., we undertook another

study in 2005, with the support of the Knight Foundation in Miami.

International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is a member of the W orld Bank Group, identifies

26 countries as Donor Countries. These are Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,

Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the

United States. Included are all 22 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The European Commission, which is

a member of the DAC, was included on the list of 26 Donor Countries.

During the early stages of this project, efforts were made to identify all organizations in these 26

countries involved in some phase of media assistance, either as a funder of these projects or as provider

of some form of assistance, such as training, support for media organizations, or assistance in the

development of law in support of operation of independent media. Researchers in the Cox Center used a

“snowballing” tactic of checking linkages among these organizations in their web and printed documents.

Organizations providing training often partner in projects. These partnerships resulted in the identification

of additional organizations. The training organizations can get funding from multiple sources. The

identification of funding sources provided new information on organizations involved in media assistance.

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The most difficult challenge initially was organization of the information. The government agencies

and trainers were uneven in the amount of information they reported on their web sites, in their printed

reports, and in interviews, so it was difficult to know what the final data base would look like. Researchers

in the Center explored a number of options for the creation of a data base and ultimately decided on a

relatively open structure for the records. This allowed for modification as the project developed.

As the project evolved, work focused most heavily on the funding organizations in the 25 donor

countries other than the United States, consistent with the project goal. Two documents that surfaced as

part of the “snowballing” procedures provided considerable assistance. The first was the draft report by

Price, Noll and De Luce (2002). The second was an OECD report on international development (IDS,

2005).

The definition of media assistance used by Price, Noll and De Luce (2002) was simplified slilght

and used for this project. Media assistance included the following:

1. Journalism training and education.

2. Training in marketing and business management and efforts to ensure financial

independence for the media.

3. Training to transform state broadcasters into public service organizations.

4. Training in professional ethics, accountability and professionalism.

5. Material assistance to help build the infrastructure needed for media independence, such

as printing presses and transmission facilities, as well as the development of Internet

sites and capability.

6. Assistance in the development of networks of independent media and in development of

trade associations.

7. Assistance and advice in building the legal and regulatory framework for media operation

and in legal defense.

8. Assistance in development of models for coverage of conflict and conflict resolution and

of security measures for coverage of conflict.

9. Support for media monitoring and watchdog groups.

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10. Development of community support for media independence and of community use of

media technologies.

To identify organizations in countries on the OECD list but not found through other techniques, we

made telephone calls, sent e-mail messages, and traveled to meet with key sources of information on

media assistance.

Outcome of the Research

W e identified 70 organizations and foundations in the 25 countries outside the United States

involved in the funding of media assistance. Of these, 27 were units of governments in a single country,

22 were nongovernmental organizations, including foundations, and 21 were multinational organizations.

At least one organization providing funding for media assistance was identified in 24 of the 25

countries. Bahrain is the single donor country without an organization involved in media funding. Germany

had the most organizations, with 10, the United Kingdom had six, followed by Japan with four and Norway

with three.

An effort was made to obtain detailed financial information from each of these funding sources.

Some of the governmental organizations directed Cox Center researchers to the OECD web site for their

records. Others provided them directly. W here possible, estimates provided directly were compared with

those on the OECD web site. W here conflicts existed, the estimates obtained directly were taken as more

accurate.

In the end, 38 of the 70 funders provided a figure for the amount of media assistance they had

funded in at least one year from 1999 through 2004. Most of the estimates were for 2003 or 2004. Based

on the most recent year, it is possible to say that $0.75 billion was being spent each year for media

assistance projects by these 38 organizations. The actual tally for the 38 organizations was $776,609,000.

An additional nine organizations provided total disbursement funds for a year but did not provide

data solely for media assistance, indicating that spending is not broken down in that fashion. Of the 38

organizations that provided a figure on the amount of media assistance, 23 also provided a figure

representing their total assistance disbursement that same year. For these organizations, the media

assistance component represented 2.5% of total assistance spending. If the nine organizations not

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providing media budgets are spending at a similar ratio to those that provided data on media assistance

and total assistance, these nine organizations have been spending $42.5 million in media assistance in

recent years .

Of the 23 organizations that did not provide any type of data, six were government organizations

and 17 were private organizations. One of the organizations, a foundation, explicitly refused to provide the

data. The others, despite repeated telephone and e-mail contacts, simply did not provide the information.

Five of those six government agencies were units within the European Union, and much of their funding

actually was accounted for by other EU units to which they transfer funds and for which data were

provided. Foundations generally provide lesser amounts than government agencies. For this reason, it

probably is a reasonable estimate that about $1 billion was being spent by organizations outside the U.S.

each year on media assistance programs.

If Hume’s (2004) estimate of $600 million per year by the U.S. is added, our estimate of at least

$1 billion per year in spending for media assistance in the early part of this decade seems quite

reasonable. The Hume estimate is almost certainly too low, suggesting that the figure is probably

considerably more than $1 billion.

U.S. spending since 2003 has been shaped by the country’s invasion and occupation of Iraq.

Serafino, Tarnoff and Nanto (2006), in a Congressional Research Service report for Congress, said $28.9

billion was spent for Iraqi assistance from 2003 to 2006. About 17.6 billion went for economic and political

reconstruction assistance, with the remainder going to Iraqi security. No figures are available for media

assistance spending. Barlett and Steele (2007) report that one media assistance contract alone, to the

contractor Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was worth $82 million.

Evaluation of Investments in Media Assistance

W e also undertook a systematic examination of what already is known about the impact of media

assistance projects by examining available evaluation reports on those projects. W e looked at the impact

of these programs on the individual journalists, the organizations for which they work, and the media

system itself. W e also wanted to know if the evaluation offered any evidence of the impact of media

assistance on development of a civil society or on democratization.

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Evaluation has not been prominent in the media assistance landscape (Price, Noll and DeLuce,

2002). Relatively few efforts have been made (or at least publicly reported) that do more than simply tally

the number of persons trained. The exceptions are noteworthy.

Carothers (1996), in his assessment of democracy assistance to Romania, included an evaluation

of two major media assistance projects in that country. In 1990, the U.S. government underwrote the

purchase of a printing press and provided newsprint and other supplies for the newspaper România

Liber|. Between 1990 and 1993, the International Media Fund helped the newspaper get the press in

working order. The International Media Fund also from 1990 to 1993 helped launch the first private

television station in Romania, SOTI. Carothers concluded that the support for România Liber| “failed to

contribute to the development of independent media” and “has not contributed to the development of

professionalized media” in the country. SOTI failed in 1993. Carothers believes the lessons are two: it is

very difficult to develop an organization in a setting where the foreign interest in its survival outweighs the

local interest; and the management expertise needed for such an organization is not likely to exist locally.

In 1999 and 2000, the Cox Center conducted an evaluation of the Knight International Press

Fellowship Program, operated by the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) in W ashington, D.C.

(Becker & Lowrey, 2000). The Knight International Press Fellowship Program, which began in 1994, every

year sends a group of about 15 journalists from the United States to assignments around the world for

periods of up to nine months. The trainers, known as Knight International Press Fellows, work in

conjunction with local hosts to provide a wide variety of training.

To obtain reports of impact from those with whom the Knight Fellow worked, three evaluators

from the Cox Center attempted to find as many of those who worked with the Knight Fellows in the 11

countries as possible and to conduct interviews with them. The evaluation focused on self-reports of

impact and reports of observations of impact on others, on media organizations, and on the media system

in the country. Evidence from the 11 countries in which the Knight Program had a significant presence in

the 1994 to 1998 period was of impact.

Thompson (2000) reviewed efforts by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) to reform the broadcast media of the former Yugoslavian states. Thompson concluded that efforts

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at media assistance were not well coordinated, did not recognize that the media in Yugoslavia were some

of the most sophisticated in a communist state, as were the audience members, and the United Nations

Protection Forces had little understanding of how to implement a coherent communication policy. In his

view, there was little evidence of the effectiveness of the media assistance programs.

Berger (2001), in a study of trainees who had participated in a variety of journalism programs in

southern Africa over a two and a half year period, found that trainees reported that they had gained from

the programs, that female trainees had more impact on their newsrooms, that some were frustrated they

could not implement their skills because of the work environment, and that training took time to have

impact.

The International Center for Journalists (2002) contracted Philliber Research Associates to

conduct an evaluation of Free Press Seminars it conducted in Latin America between 2000 and 2002.

Before and after the workshops, participants were asked to rate how familiar they were with the

Declaration of Chapultepec, a free press manifesto for the Americas, and other key free press documents

or restrictions. After the ICFJ workshops, familiarity with Chapultepec, Article 19, the First Amendment,

and legal restrictions on freedom of expression in the United States and in the home country of the

workshops increased significantly. After the workshops, the participating journalists in most countries were

less likely to feel the press should be legally restricted, though the differences were not great. Participants

also rated the workshops highly overall and rated individual components highly.

Nelson and Stinson (2004) provided USAID in 2004 an assessment of the impact of media

training programs in Kosovo funded by USAID and other sources. Much of that investment has been in

training, according to the report, and the training has produced mixed responses. Some trainers were

judged to be unqualified and course content did not always respond to local needs. ARD faulted USAID for

not investing enough of its resources in evaluation of the work that was done.

Press Now, a non-governmental organization (NGO) located in Amsterdam, in 2004 analyzed the

media development work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the

Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Manro, Palmer & Thompson, 2004). Press Now relied on “media

experts” in the countries studied to serve as critics of the programs of OSCE. Most of the comments were

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focused on the assessment of program process, though these experts did offer comments about impact

as well. For the most part, Press Now concluded that the programs were effective, though no systematic

evidence was provided of this.

USAID has conducted a number of assessments of media programs it has funded around the

world. Kumar (2006) reported the findings of those assessments of media assistance projects in

Afghanistan, Bosnia, Central America, Indonesia, Russia, Serbia, and Sierra Leone. USAID also issued

individual reports on a number of these projects (De Luce D. , 2003, September; Kumar, K., & Cooper, L.

R., 2003, August; McLear, R., McLear, S., & Graves, P., 2003, November; Rockwell, R., & Kumar, K.,

2003, June). The media assistant projects reviewed by Kumar (2006) took place between 2002 and 2004.

The evaluations examined both the process (implementation) and outcomes (impact) of the media

assistance projects (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004).

Kumar (2006) reported that a large number of persons completed training programs that were

part of the project and that surveys conducted by USAID and interviews with others involved in the media

in Central America indicated that the training made a major contribution toward improving the technical

and professional skills of journalists. He also concluded that the project contributed to democratization

directly and indirectly.

The USAID project in Russia was designed to encourage the growth of independent, regional

television stations. Kumar (2006) reported that large numbers of persons attended the training courses

offered and that the project contributed to improved management at participating television stations.

In Serbia, USAID and other donors worked to increase the technical and logistical capabilities of

media organizations so they could provide alternative information in the 2000 election, when Slobodan

Milosevic was turned out of office. In 2002, USAID commissioned a national survey that showed that

about half of the respondents said they watched at least one of the programs of the independent television

stations, about three-quarters reported reading one or more of the independent newspapers, and nearly

six in 10 said the independent media were an important source of information in the election (Kumar,

2006). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, donor countries established a commercial, multi-ethnic television network

to provide balanced and comprehensive coverage of the entire country. The network failed as a

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commercial network, but Kumar concluded it had, during its operation, provided access to the airwaves for

people who would otherwise have been excluded. A number of lessons were learned from the project,

Kumar (2006) reports, including that a “top-down” approach to building media entities managed by

international organizations is unlikely to succeed.

In Indonesia, USAID focused on improving independent radio news coverage by enhancing the

skills of those in existing radio stations selected for the project. Kumar (2006) again reports that large

numbers of persons participated in the project and that interviews with media owners, journalists and local

experts said that the training programs improved professional expertise in the radio stations. He

acknowledged, however, that there is no hard evidence that the skills and techniques taught actually were

utilized. The program also attempted to expand the amount of news coverage by participating radio

stations. Prior to the program, only five of the 50 selected stations broadcast news bulletins on regular

intervals in their programming. After the program, all 50 stations had established news departments and

broadcast news at regular intervals. Kumar (2006) noted, however, that only stations interested in

expanding or developing their news capability were selected for the program, so they may have increased

news broadcasts even without the assistance of the project. In addition, the demand for greater news

coverage by the audience put pressure on all stations to increase their news broadcasts. No control group

of stations not part of the project was used in the evaluation.

The Afghanistan project also focused on radio. USAID established a network of community radio

stations to air local and national current affairs programs. Fourteen local radio stations were created for

the network. Kumar (2006) reported that the quality of programming and local reporting remained poor at

the time of evaluation of the project. Also unclear is whether the stations could survive once international

assistance was removed. Establishment of the stations and the network, however, was considered to be a

significant accomplishment.

In Sierra Leone, donors created a broadcast studio to produce radio news and entertain program

for distribution in the country. Kumar (2006) reported that interviews with informants indicated the

programs were reaching a national audience, that they covered a broad range of topics, and that the

programming was giving a voice to poor and other people with no other access to radio. Persons

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interviewed, who represented various groups in the war-torn country, indicated that they felt the programs

had contributed to democratization in the society. The studio is entirely supported by donors, Kumar wrote,

and its sustainability is in question.

Another study conducted in the Cox Center examined the impact of media assistance programs in

Ukraine. Mussuri (2005) compared how four online publications supported by international donors differed

in their coverage of the country’s Orange Revolution of late 2004 from four other online publications that

had not received support from international donors. Included in the support by international donors was a

variety of training programs. The researcher sampled stories in these eight publications in October and

November of 2004. W hat she found was that the media with outside support and training were more likely

to cover the political events taking place in Ukraine at that time. Though each of these media covered the

opposition in those stories, the stories in the media supported by outside donors were more likely to

provide balanced coverage of the opposition. The stories about the opposition in the media not getting

outside training and support were often sarcastic in tone, the writers often mixed their personal opinions

into the news stories, and language choice presented the opposition in a negative way. The web sites that

had been given outside training and support did not use biased language, presented more than one point

of view, and did not mix editorial comment with reporting. She concluded that the style of reporting in

these media was “very close to the western style of reporting, or to what is usually taught in training

sessions.”

Takeuchi (2005) completed an evaluation of a program that the Sasakawa Peace Foundation

funded from 1991 to 2004. The program brought 81 journalists from the Pacific Islands to Japan for visits

of differing duration. The purpose of the program was to expose the journalists to Japanese culture,

politics and media. Takeuchi surveyed participants and reviewed stories written upon their return to

assess impact of the program. The evaluator concluded that the program undoubtedly was successful in

exposing a group without prior experience to Japanese life, but there was little evidence the program had

an impact on the professional development of the journalists. It also had limited impact on what the

journalists wrote or did after they returned.

The Cox Center (Becker & Vlad, 2006) also studied the impact of a two-year project media

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assistance project it conducted in Philippines on conflict-sensitive journalism. The analysis examined

media coverage of the ongoing conflict in the south of the country and the impact of two workshops

conducted with journalists covering the conflict. The research showed a gap between the ways the

journalists described media coverage of Mindanao and what the content analyses showed. The journalists

from Mindanao described their coverage as rich in detail and background. The content analyses showed

just the opposite. The journalists there, as well as those working in the capital, Manila, complained about

the lack of coverage by the Manila media of anything but conflict in Mindanao. The content analyses

showed the Manila media coverage to be more complete than that criticism suggests. Evidence of strong

impact of the workshops on the actual stories written by the participating journalists was minimal. Despite

this lack of strong evidence of the impact of the workshops on the story product, however, other evidence

from the post-session questionnaires suggests the workshops did have impact. The journalists in both

workshops said they found the workshops helpful and positively assessed the value of the workshops to

them and their media organizations. In addition, the questionnaires returned by the journalists four months

after the second workshop provided specific examples of how the journalists actually used the workshop

in their work. The research found that the journalists recognized that they can gain from being in contact

with each other. After the second workshop, the journalists, on their own, created an online discussion

group. The group seems to have been active for only a short period of time, yet the potential was

considered to be immense.

The Next Steps

Obviously, our project is far from complete. In the ideal, we would apply the same methodology

we used to identify the level of funding from U.S. sources as we have employed for non-U.S. sources. W e

next would begin a detailed mapping of investments of all of those funding sources across time. W e have

learned that such an undertaking is possible. It also will be expensive, and we have not identified any

funding source interested in providing the necessary resources. Dr. Kwame Boafo, former chief executive

officer for the Communication and Information Sector at UNESCO, told us that it would need one person

working full time for a year to put together detailed information about its media projects.

W e also have a lot of work to do on measurement. The research we conducted using the

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Freedom House, Reporters sans frontieres, IREX and Committee to Protect Journalists measures largely

provided evidence of the reliability and comparability of the measures. W e found the measures to be

consistent across time. The Freedom House, RSF and, to a lesser extent, IREX measures were judged to

be highly comparable. W e did find some evidence of an effect for country, but it was not overly large. Only

the CPJ measure seemed to be introducing a component of press freedom not highly linked to the other

measures.

W e also gained some evidence of the validity of the Freedom House measure. It picked up the

dramatic changes in the media landscape following the fall of communism in 1989. This is a type of

criterion validity. Our analysis of the subscale of IREX’s Media Sustainability Index in our study of media

competition also provides evidence of the validity of that measure. In this case, the evidence is indirect,

through hypothesis testing, and is, of course, referred to as construct validation. Clearly, however, much

more work on the validity–as well as the reliability–of the measures needs to be undertaken.

Construct validation–tied as it is to hypothesis testing–necessarily directs our attention back to our

theoretical model of the role of the media in democratization. As Figure 1 indicates, the key relationship is

between press freedom and democracy. This means we have to know what democracy is in its ideal or

end stage.

Rozumilowicz (2002) has reviewed the many different definitions of democracy and identified two

components that she feels are common to them, the notions of competition and of participation. For a

democracy to exist, there must be competition among political actors so that the electorate has a choice

and so that there is accountability for those elected. Those making the decision–those participating in the

selection of leaders–must be representative of those to be governed.

Only media that are free and independent support the competition and participation that are the

cornerstones of democracy, Rozumilowicz (2002) argues. I have already discussed this formulation, but it

is worth repeating here. By free and independent, she means media that are part of a system in which a

small number of social groups or other forces do not have control of the media and in which access to the

media is equal and guaranteed.

Rozumilowicz (2002) believes that such a media system can only exist if there is a rule of law and

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if social institutions ensure the freedom. Drawing on Curran (1996), she argues that the rule of law is

necessary to guarantee that the media have at least two sectors, one controlled by the market and the

other state-funded and guaranteeing public access. The key social institutions for free media provide

education for journalists and for the citizens at large. In other words, civil society is necessary for the

creation of media freedom.

As noted, Rozumilowicz (2002) identified four stages of media reform, that is, media change

leading to the type of media she considers to be free and independent and essential for creating a

democracy. She has identified the characteristics of each stage. Rozumilowicz does not provide an

explicit checklist for classification of media according to their stage of reform, but it should be possible to

develop one. In fact, this framework for classification guided the case studies reported in Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst (2002).

Rozumilowicz (2002) has chosen a stage approach to media reform precisely because it mirrors

the dominant notion that democratization also follows stages (McConnell & Becker, 2002). Carothers

(2002), it is worth noting, has argued that transition theory has been discredited. Central to all measures of

both press freedom and democracy, however, is the notion of some type of continuum on which a given

state can be classified. If we allow, for the sake of simplification, the possibility of stages, we could easily

imagine cross-classifying states according to their level of media reform and level of democratic reform.

The simple model is shown in Figure 2.

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Media Reform

Pretransition Primary

Transition

Secondary

Stage

Mature Stage

Democratization

Pretransition X

Transition X

Consolidation X

Mature Democracy X

Figure 2. Classification of states in terms of media reform and democratization.

I have placed the cases in the diagonal, for that is what is predicted by Figure 1. This assumes

civil society is not an essential contributor to democratization. Remember, of course, that Rozumilowicz

(2002), consistent with the model, argues that civil society is a co-contributor with the media to

democratization.

This is a very simple representation, of course, but it is surprising how little empirical work has

been done looking at such a prominently discussed relationship. I mentioned earlier the work of Islam

(2002), but I am not yet aware of others who have even attempted this type of test. It also is worth noting

that the model represented by Figure 1 is not the only one possible. In fact, it is easy to imagine at least

six different hypotheses regarding the role of the media in democratization.

1. The media-supremacist position, which holds that media freedom and independence produce

democracy.

2. The democracy-supremacist position, which holds that democratic reform determines and

produces media freedom and independence.

3. The media-freedoms-are-an-element-of-democracy position, which argues that media

freedoms are simply an element of democracy and, as such, have no causal force leading to democracy.

4. The null-effect position, which holds that there is no relationship between media freedom and

democracy.

5. A media-freedom-hinders-democracy argument.

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6. A democratization-hinders-media-freedoms stance.

The question is how one might distinguish among these positions empirically. If media freedoms

and democratization are, in fact, linked, one should be able to determine covariation between them at a

given point in time. That is to say, the cases should fall on the diagonal in Figure 2. The fourth position, in

sum, can be eliminated easily enough if, in fact, one can show that there is covariation between media

reform and democratization. But a covariation cannot distinguish among positions 1 through 3. A positive

correlation, however, would eliminate positions 5 and 6, which suggest a negative relationship.

If we treat the existing measures of press freedom and of democracy as suitable approximations

of more perfect measures, it makes sense to simply look for the correlations between press freedom and

democratization. W hat I am about to present is a very simple examination of that relationship. It is worth

noting that very sophisticated empirical work looking at the predictors of democratization has been done

by Vanhanen (1990, 1997, 2002). It also is worth noting that his analysis finds that democratization is

predicted by economic factors, specifically the distribution of social and economic goods, rather than

anything like press freedom.

Table 1 provides a string of bivariate correlations between the Freedom House measures of press

freedom, which are available across the longest period of time, and Freedom House’s measures of two

political variables, Political Rights and Political Liberty (Freedom House, 2007). The former looks at the

electoral process in a country, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. In other

words, it contains the key elements of plurality and participation identified as common to measures of

democracy. The Political Liberty measure looks at freedom of expression and belief, association and

organizational rights, the rule of law, personal authority and individual rights. This, it seems, is a

reasonable measure of civil society.

In Table 1, the correlations have been lagged by one year, that is, Press Freedom for a given

year, such as 1981, has been correlated with the two political measures a year later. The lag is a guess, of

course, but it is certain that some lag of effects is necessary. Across the period from 1981 to 2003, Press

Freedom has been consistently related to the two political variables. That relationship was .79 in 1981,

and it increased to .94 for 2002. Some of the change may be artificial. W hile the political variables were

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measured on a seven-point scale through 2004, the Press Freedom measure used only a three-point

scale from 1981 to 1993, when it was converted to a 100-point scale. As Table 1 shows, the correlations

improved from 1993 to 1994 by a greater amount than for any other year-to-year comparison. Basically,

across time, there is no consistent difference between the correlations for Press Freedom and the two

political measures.

Also in Table 1 are the correlations between the two democracy variables and Press Freedom,

one year later. If democracy comes before press freedom, a lag of at least one year makes sense. Again,

the relationship is relatively consistent across time. There is no evidence of an effect for the change in

measures of Press Freedom in 1994. And there is no evidence of a difference between the two political

measure and Press Freedom.

The comparison of the two lags gives a very slight nod to the relationship between democracy and

lagged Press Freedom over the relationship between Press Freedom and lagged democracy, but overall

the differences are tiny and probably not important. It remains equally plausible that Press Freedom

causes the two political variables as that the two democracy measures, including one of civil society,

causes Press Freedom. But the lack of a relationship is ruled out, as well as the possibility of a negative

relationship between these two variables.

The use of Freedom House measures for both the Press Freedom and measures of democracy is

problematic, as the possibility of a “firm” effect exists. In other words, the two measures may co-vary

because they are created by the same institution, using basically overlapping methodologies and sources

of information. Many other measures of key political variables exist, of course, and they should be

explored.

The Fund for Peace (Fund for Peace, 2007) , in collaboration with Foreign Policy magazine (FP

Index, 2007), has recently released data on what the researchers term failed states, or states with an

extreme breakdown of civil society. The index includes measures of uneven development, human flight,

human rights violations, deterioration of public services, and other factors that make a state unstable. The

index is correlated with an indicator of freedom of religion (negatively) and with a measure of

environmental sustainability (negatively), according to analysis presented in the Foreign Policy article (FP

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Index, 2007). Just for illustration, I have also looked at the relationship between the Freedom House Press

Freedom score in 2004 and the Failed States Index for 2005. It seems reasonable to expect that a free

press would contribute to state stability and sustainability. The Pearson Product Moment Correlation

Coefficient is .08, meaning virtually no relationship exists. The sign actually is the opposite of what one

would expect.

These are only illustrative of the kinds of analyses that can and should be done. It should be

possible to try several different lags in the correlations as well as examine contingencies, such as those

that might be caused by conditions in the civil society, as measured by a number of civil society indicators.

These analyses, however, are limited in one very important way. They focus on the structure of

the media system and assume its consequences. To be more precise, the analysis assumes that a media

system judged to be reformed, in the Rozumilowicz (2002) sense, or judged by Freedom House or

Reporters sans frontieres to be free, or by IREX to be Sustainable, will produce news that is needed by a

democracy to grow and prosper. Among the existing indices, the IREX MSI, through its professional

journalism component, probably comes closest to actually measuring media content. It seems appropriate

that more attention be given to this issue.

This approach is consistent with Hage’s (1972) notion of a definitional premise. Such a premise

stipulates a property of a concept. In this case, the concept is democracy. For example, one could argue

that a democracy, by definition, is a state in which all citizens have access to information about how the

state operates. A democratic state is one in which citizens have the ability to communicate to each other.

A democratic state is one in which conflicts are managed without resort to violence. A democratic state is

one in which representations of members of the state are presented in a way that fosters appreciation and

understanding.

Hage (1972) would next suggest a mechanistic premise, in which we posit that one way of

providing these needs of society is through the media system. W e would measure the media in terms of

whether they were, in fact, providing what a democratic state requires. For example, we could classify the

media in terms of whether they provided content that fostered harmony, rather than conflict. The conflict

sensitive journalism approach (Ross, 2003) is a step in that direction. This approach is very much focused

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on media performance, rather than on media characteristics. It need not be a substitute for measures that

focus on system characteristics. It can be a complement to those measures.

Of course, we don’t know precisely what a democracy needs to function. W e can theorize, or, as

Hage says, offer premises. Measurement is, of course, is, at heart, a theoretical exercise.

Final Comments

Media monitoring, as noted at several points in this paper, is not a neutral activity. Those who

engage in it have different perspectives, and, consequently, make different demands of the monitoring

process.

The theoretical model represented by Figure 1 is one way of focusing attention on what we know

about media assistance and what still needs to be known. Each of the lines in the model can be put as a

question.

Does media assistance lead to trained, skilled, motivated journalists? The answer is yes,

probably, but evaluation is spotty, more often focusing on process than on impact. Much of the evidence

comes from self-reports of impact. Control groups are used infrequently. The evaluation often has been

carried out by the funder or the media assistance provider, raising questions about the independence of

the fundings.

Does media assistance lead to the creation of media organizations that facilitate and distribute the

work of journalists? The answer is, maybe. Most of the evidence that exists is indirect, based on

observations of participants. Designs are often limited. Many examples of failed investments exist, and

few general rules have been learned. The problem of sustainability is paramount.

Does media assistance lead to creation of independent media systems? There is almost no

systematic evidence at present that it does at present. No comparative studies of investment at the

country level have yet been done. Such an analysis is badly needed. Considerable controversy also exists

about what is meant by independent media.

Do independent media produced information needed for the functioning of democracy (or an open

economy)? Almost no evidence exists that independent media are more likely to produce the information

needed for democracy than media that are not independent. In fact, in China today, where all the media

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are still in one way or another state controlled, considerable critical reporting is being done and citizens

are being given information they need to challenge their leaders. The U.S. media–often considered

independent of government–did a very poor job of challenging the assumptions behind the 2003 U.S.

invasion of Iraq, as even the media themselves have acknowledged (Massing, 2004).

Do independent media lead to the creation of the institutions of a civil society? No one knows the

answer to this question. In fact, no one has seriously examined the question empirically. The evidence that

civil society assistance has been effective in creating a civil society also is mixed (Carothers & Ottaway,

2000).

Do the institutions of civil society make use of the information provided by independent media to

produce a functioning democracy (and an open economy)? Surprisingly little effort has been made to

answer this question, though it is at the heart of the assumptions we made about media and civil society

assistance. W e certainly know relatively little about the conditions that may be required to make this

relationship work.

It also is worth asking: What do we know about media freedom and other measures of the

characteristics of the media system? W e have strong evidence of the reliability of the measures across

time. W e also have convincing evidence of the reliability across different measurements by different

“firms.” W e also have some evidence of criterion validity, that is the ability of the measures to reflect

known changes in the media environment. W e have gained some evidence from our analysis of the IREX

MSI of its construct validity, that is its ability to produce a predicted relationship in a test of a hypothesis.

The simple analysis shown in Table 1 here also produces evidence of construct validity.

The measures, for the most part, focus on media freedom and independence from government

control, but they do not take into consideration the pressures of commercial dependence. They also

largely ignore the needs of the audience. Additional measures, focusing on the “needs” of democracy still

are to be developed.

The model, in sum, tells us how much still needs to be done.

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Table 1. Correlations between Press Freedom and Political Measures

Year of Press Freedom Political Rights +1 Political Liberty +1 Political Rights -1 Political Liberty -1

1981 0.79 0.82 0.79 0.81

1982 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.85

1983 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.85

1984 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.87

1985 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.87

1986 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.87

1987 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.86

1988 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.86

1989 0.82 0.77 0.93 0.89

1990 0.83 0.77 0.94 0.88

1991 0.81 0.77 0.93 0.91

1992 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.88

1993 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.85

1994 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.90

1995 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.91

1996 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.91

1997 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.92

1998 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.92

1999 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.93

2000 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.93

2001 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.93

2002 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94

2003 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95

2004 0.93 0.94

The role of the free press in promoting democratization, good governance, and human development

Pippa Norris

(from May 2006) McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics Director, Democratic Governance Group John F. Kennedy School of Government United Nations Development Program

Harvard University Bureau for Development Policy

304 East 45th Street, 10th Floor 79 JFK Street

Cambridge, MA 02138 New York, NY 10017 Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu pippa.norris@undp.org www.pippanorris.com http://www.undp.org/governance/

Synopsis: What is the role of the free press in strengthening good governance, democracy and human development? To explore these issues, Part I presents the analytical framework, develops the core testable propositions, and summarizes the previous research literature on the topic. Part II outlines the comparative framework, evidence, and research design. This study utilizes a large-N cross-sectional comparison to analyze the impact of press freedom on multiple indicators of democracy and good governance. Freedom House provides the principle measure of Press Freedom with annual data available from 1992 to 2005. Part III describes the distribution of press freedom and regional trends. Part IV analyzes the impact of these patterns. The regression models control for many factors commonly associated with processes of democratization and good governance, such as wealth, ethnic fractionalization, and colonial histories. The results confirm that the free press does matter for a range of indicators of good governance, and it is integral to the process of democratization. The Conclusion summarizes the key findings and considers their consequences for strengthening political and human development and thereby alleviating poverty. Paper for UNESCO meeting on World Press Freedom Day: Media, Development, and Poverty Eradication, Colombo, Sri Lanka 1-2 May 2006.

63

What is the role of the free press in strengthening good governance, democracy and human

development?2 A long tradition of liberal theorists from Milton through Locke and Madison to John

Stuart Mill have argued that the existence of a unfettered and independent press within each nation is

essential in the process of democratization by contributing towards the right of freedom of expression,

thought and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness and accountability of governments to all

citizens, and providing a pluralist platform and channel of political expression for a multiplicity of

groups and interests.3 The guarantee of freedom of expression and information is recognized as a

basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, the

European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African

Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The positive relationship between the growth of the free press

and the process of democratization is thought to be reciprocal (see Figure 1). The core claim is that, in

the first stage, the initial transition from autocracy opens up the state control of the media to private

ownership, diffuses access, and reduces official censorship and government control of information.

The public thereby receives greater exposure to a wider variety of cultural products and ideas through

access to multiple radio and TV channels, as well as the diffusion of new technologies such as the

Internet and mobile telephones. Once media liberalization has commenced, in the second stage

democratic consolidation and human development are strengthened where journalists in independent

newspapers, radio and television stations facilitate greater transparency and accountability in

governance, by serving in their watch-dog roles, as well as providing a civic forum for multiple voices

in public debate, and highlighting social problems to inform the policy agenda.4

Through this process, many observers emphasize that a free press is not just valuable for

democracy, a matter widely acknowledged, but the final claim is that this process is also vital for

human development. This perspective is exemplified by Amartya Sen’s argument that political

freedoms are linked to improved economic development outcomes and good governance in low-

income countries by encouraging responsiveness to public concerns. The free press, Sen suggests,

enhances the voice of poor people and generates more informed choices about economic needs.5

2 For a bibliographic guide to the literature on the media and development see Clement E. Asante. Press Freedom and Development: A Research Guide and Selected Bibliography. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. For a discussion of how alternative theories have evolved in the normative debate see H. Shah. 1996. ‘Modernization, marginalization and emancipation: Toward a normative model of journalism and national development.’ Communication Theory. 6(2); Denis McQuail. 2001. Political Communication Theory. London: Sage. 3 Amartya Sen. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. 4 Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu F. Ogundimu. Eds. 2002. Media and Democracy in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 5 Amartya Sen. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books; T. Besley and R. Burgess. 2001. ‘Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media.’ European Economic Review. 45(4-6): 629-640.

64

James D. Wolfensen echoed these sentiments when he was the president of the World Bank: “A free

press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable development, because if you

cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on

corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about

change.”6

[Figure 1 about here]

More liberal media landscapes are therefore widely regarded as strengthening

democratization and good governance directly, as well as human development indirectly. These

claims are commonly heard among popular commentators, donor agencies, and the international

community. But what systematic evidence supports these contentions? Despite historical case-

studies focusing on the role of the press in specific countries and regions, it is somewhat surprising

that relatively little comparative research has explored the systematic linkages in this process. Much

existing research has also focused on assessing the impact of media access, such as the diffusion of

newspaper readership or television viewership, rather than press freedom. Beyond paying lip service

to the importance of political rights and civil liberties, work on democratic institutions has tended to

emphasize constitutional arrangements, including the impact of electoral and party systems, federal or

unitary states, and parliamentary or presidential executives, while neglecting to analyze comparable

evidence for the role of the news media as part of the democratization process.7 To explore these

issues, Part I presents the analytical framework, develops the core testable propositions, and

summarizes the previous research literature on the topic. Part II outlines the comparative framework,

evidence, and research design. This study utilizes a large-N cross-sectional comparison to analyze the

impact of press freedom on multiple indicators of democracy and good governance. Freedom House

provides the principle measure of Press Freedom, with annual data available from 1992 to 2005. This

indicator is strongly correlated with the independently developed Press Freedom Index created by

Reporter’s Without Borders, increasing confidence in the reliability of the Freedom House measure.

Part III describes the distribution of press freedom and regional trends. Part IV analyzes the impact of

this pattern. The regression models control for many factors commonly associated with processes of

democratization and good governance, including levels of economic development, colonial origins,

population size, and regional effects. The results presented confirm that the free press does matter for

good governance, and it is integral to the process of democratization. The Conclusion summarizes the

key findings and considers their consequences for strengthening development.

I: The roles of the news media as watch-dog, civic forum, and agenda-setter In the late 1950s and early 1960s, early modernization theories assumed a fairly simple and

unproblematic relationship between the spread of access to modern forms of mass communications,

economic development, and the process of democratization. Accounts offered by Lerner, Lipset, Pye,

6 James D. Wolfenson. 1999. ‘Voices of the Poor.’ Washington Post, 10 November 1999, A39. 7 See, for example, Arendt Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

65

Cutright and others, suggested that the diffusion of mass communications represented one sequential

step in the development process. In this view, urbanization and the spread of literacy lead to growing

access to modern technologies such as telephones, newspapers, radios and television, all of which

laid the basis for an informed citizenry able to participate effectively in political affairs.8 Hence, based

on a strong connection between the spread of communications and political development, Daniel

Lerner theorized: “The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to

perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third stage, when the

elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce

newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the

spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which

we find in all advanced modern societies.”9

By the late-1960s and early-1970s, however, the assumption that the modernization process

involved a series of sequential steps gradually fell out of fashion. Skepticism grew, faced with the

complexities of human development evident in different parts of the world, and the major setbacks for

democracy with the ‘second reverse wave’ experienced in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and

Asia.10 There was growing recognition that widening public access to newspapers, radio and television

was insufficient by itself to promote democracy and development, as these media could be used to

maintain autocracies, to reinforce crony capitalism, and to consolidate the power of media oligopolies,

as much as to provide a democratic channel for the disadvantaged.11 Access remains important, but

this study theorizes that the news media is most effective in strengthening the process of

democratization, good governance, and human development where they function as watch-dog over

the abuse of power (promoting accountability and transparency), as a civic forum for political debate

8 For the classics in this account see Daniel Lerner. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Il: The Free Press; Lucian W. Pye. 1963. Communications and Political Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. ‘Some social prerequisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.’ American Political Science Review 53: 69-105; Donald J.McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde. 1967. ‘Toward a communication theory of democratic political development: A Causal model.’ American Political Science Review 61(1): 72-79. 9 Daniel Lerner. 1958. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Il: The Free Press p.60. 10 Samuel Huntington. 1993. The Third Wave. Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press. 11 For a discussion of the criticisms of the older literature and heated debates about the role of the media in development that arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s see Hamid Mowlana. 1985. International Flow of Information: A Global Report and Analysis Paris, UNESCO; Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1984. Foreign News in the Media: International Reporting in Twenty-Nine Countries. Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 93. Paris, UNESCO; Robert L.Stevenson and Donald Lewis Shaw (eds). 1984. Foreign News and the New World Information Order Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press; K. Kyloon Hur. 1984. 'A Critical Analysis of International News Flow Research.' Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1: 365-378; William Preston, Edwards S. Herman and Herbert I.Schiller. 1989. Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945-1985 Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

66

(facilitating informed electoral choices), and as an agenda-setter for policymakers (strengthening

government responsiveness to social problems).12

The role of journalists as watchdogs of the powerful

In their ‘watchdog’ role, the channels of the news media can function to promote government

transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny of decision-makers in power, by highlighting policy

failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary, and scandals in the corporate

sector.13 Ever since Edmund Burke, the ‘fourth estate’ has traditionally been regarded as one of the

classic checks and balances in the division of powers.14 Investigative journalism can open the

government’s record to external scrutiny and critical evaluation, and hold authorities accountable for

their actions, whether public sector institutions, non-profit organizations, or private companies.

Comparative econometric studies, and historical case studies of developments within particular

countries such as Taiwan, have explored evidence for the impact of the news media upon corruption.

Brunetti and Weder, amongst others, found that there was less corruption in nations with a free press.

The reason, they argue, is that journalist’s roles as watchdogs promote the transparency of

government decision-making process, and thereby expose and hinder misuse of public office,

malfeasance, and financial scandals.15 In competitive multiparty democracies, voters can use

information provided by the media to hold parties and leaders to account by ‘kicking the rascals out’.

By contrast, control of the news media is used to reinforce the power of autocratic regimes

and to deter criticism of the government by independent journalists, though official government

censorship, state ownership of the main radio and television channels, legal restrictions on freedom of

expression and publication (such as stringent libel laws and restrictive official secrets acts), limited

competition through oligopolies in commercial ownership, and the use of outright violence and

intimidation against journalists and broadcasters.16 In Malaysia, for example, human rights observers

report that the state has manipulated the media to stifle internal dissent and forced journalists

employed by the international press to modify or suppress news stories unflattering to the regime. 17

Elsewhere governments in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia, among others, commonly place

serious restrictions on press freedom to criticize government rulers through official regulations, legal

12 See Pippa Norris. 2000. A Virtuous Circle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13 George A. Donohue, Philip Tichenor et al. 1995. ‘A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of the Media.’ Journal of Communication. 45(2): 115-128. 14 Renate Kocher. 1986. ‘Bloodhounds or Missionaries: Role Definitions of German and British Journalists.’ European Journal of Communication. 1: 43-64. 15 A. Brunetti and B. Weder B. 2003. ‘A free press is bad news for corruption.’ Journal of Public Economics 87 (7-8): 1801-1824; S.K. Chowdhury. 2004. ‘The effect of democracy and press freedom on corruption: an empirical test.’ Economics Letters 85 (1): 93-101; D. Fell. 2005. ‘Political and media liberalization and political corruption in Taiwan.’ China Quarterly (184): 875-893. 16 Leonard R. Sussman.2001. Press Freedom in Our Genes. Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee. 17 See for example the International Federation of Journalists. http://www.ifj.org/ and the Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/

67

restrictions and state censorship.18 It remains more difficult for governments to censor online

communications, but nevertheless in nations such as China and Cuba, state-controlled monopolies

provide the only Internet service and thereby filter both access and content.19 Media freedom

organizations demonstrate that each year dozens of media professionals are killed or injured in the

course of their work. In Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Egypt, for example, many

journalists, broadcasters and editors have experienced intimidation or harassment, while journalists in

many parts of the world face the daily threat of personal danger from wars or imprisonment by the

security services. 20

The role of the news media as civic forum

Equally vital, in their civic forum role, the free press can strengthen the public sphere, by

mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating debate about the major issues of the day, and

informing the public about their leaders.21 If the channels of communication reflect the social and

cultural pluralism within each society, in a fair and impartial balance, then multiple interests and voices

are heard in public deliberation. This role is particularly important during election campaigns, as fair

access to the airwaves by opposition parties, candidates and groups is critical for competitive, free and

fair multiparty elections. During campaigns, a free media provides citizens with information to compare

and evaluate the retrospective record, prospective policies and leadership characteristics of parties

and candidates, providing the essential conditions for informed choice.22 The role of the news media

as a civic forum remain deeply flawed where major newspapers and television stations heavily favor

the governing party, in the amount or tone of coverage, rather than being open to a plurality of political

viewpoints and parties during campaigns. This principle has been recognized in jurisprudence from

countries as varied as Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia.23 There are

many cases where electoral observers have reported that pro-government bias on television and radio

has failed to provide a level playing field for all parties, exemplified by campaigns in Russia, Belarus,

18 See, for example, cases documented by the Index on Censorship http://www.indexoncensorship.org/, The World Press Freedom Council www.wpfc.org, and the International Press Institute http://www.freemedia.at. See also Louis Edward Inglehart. 1998. Press and Speech Freedoms in the World, from Antiquity until 1998: A Chronology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 19 See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas. 2001. The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba and the Counterrevolution. Global Policy Program No 21 Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Leonard R. Sussman. 2000.’Censor Dot Gov: The Internet and Press Freedom.’ Press Freedom Survey 2000. Washington DC: Freedom House. www.freedomhouse.com. 20 See for example the International Federation of Journalists. http://www.ifj.org/ and the Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/ 21 See Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. 1995. Communication and Citizenship. London: Routledge; Peter Dahlgren. 1995. Television and the Public Sphere. London: Sage. 22 Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23 ACE Project. http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/me/mea01b.htm

68

and Mozambique.24 In Madagascar, for example, Andriantsoa et al argue that the process of

liberalization and privatization has undermined the older state-controlled media which once

consolidated the grip of autocrats across much of Africa, facilitating multiparty electoral democracies.25

By contrast, where the media fails to act as an effective civic forum, this can hinder democratic

consolidation. State ownership and control is one important issue, but threats to media pluralism are

also raised by over-concentration of private ownership of the media, whether in the hands of

broadcasting oligopolies within each nation, or of major multinational corporations with multimedia

empires.26 It is feared that the process of media mergers may have concentrated excessive control in

the hands of a few multinational corporations, which remain unaccountable to the public, reducing the

diversity of news media outlets.27 Contemporary observers caution that the quality of democracy still

remains limited where state ownership of television has been replaced by private oligopolies and crony

capitalism, for example in nations such as Russia, Brazil and Peru which have failed to create fully-

independent and pluralistic media systems. Broadcasting cartels, coupled with the failure of regulatory

reform, legal policies which restrict critical reporting, and uneven journalistic standards, can all limit the

role of the media in its civic forum or watch-dog roles.28

Speaking truth to power

Lastly, the news media also functions as an agenda-setter, providing information about urgent social

problems and thereby channeling citizens’ concerns to decision-makers in government. Particularly in cases of

natural disaster, public officials often suffer from a breakdown in the usual channels of communication. As

illustrated by the dramatic failure of government over the Katrina debacle in the United States, and the poor

internal communications among official agencies which hindered the delivery of effective emergency relief,

timely and accurate information about the scope and nature of any disaster is vital if officials are to respond

effectively. In these situations, independent reporters can act as a vital channel of information for decision-

makers, helping to make democratic governments more responsive to the needs of the people. For example,

24 See, for example, the Report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the October 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election_reports/by/bel200fin.pdf. 25 P. Andriantsoa, N. Andriasendrarivony, S. Haggblade, B. Minten, M. Rakotojaona, F. Rakotovoavy, and H.S. Razafinimanana. 2005. ‘Media proliferation and democratic transition in Africa: The case of Madagascar.’ World Development 33 (11): 1939-1957. 26 See Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmer. 1991. Media Moguls. London: Routledge; Anthony Smith. 1991. The Age of Behemoths: The Globalization of Mass Media Firms. New York: Priority Press; Alfonso Sanchez-Tabernero. 1993. Media Concentration in Europe: Commercial Enterprises and the Public Interest. London: John Libbey. 27 Ben Bagdikian. 1997. The Media Monopoly. Boston, MA: Beacon Press; Leo Bogart. 1995. Commercial Culture; Robert McChesney. 1999. Rich media, poor democracy: communication politics in dubious times. Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press; Robert G. Picard. 1988. Press Concentration and Monopoly: New Perspectives on Newspaper Ownership and Operation. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp. 28 S. Hughes and C. Lawson. 2005. ‘The barriers to media opening in Latin America.’ Political Communication 22 (1): 9-25.

69

Besley and Burgess examined the Indian case, and established that regional states with higher levels of

newspaper circulation proved more active during an emergency in responding to food-shortages.29 The reason,

they suggest, is that political leaders learn about local problems more accurately and in a timely fashion when

journalists function as an intermediary by reporting local conditions at the grassroots, and the role of the media

as an agenda-setter can also pressure the government to respond to local problems.

II: Data, indicators, and research design For all of these reasons, where the press is effective in these roles, we would expect that

greater press freedom should help to promote democracy, good governance and thus human

development.

Measuring press freedom

To explore some of the evidence, the annual Freedom House index of Press Freedom can be

used as the standard cross-national indicator. As discussed in the Technical Appendix, press freedom

is measured in this index according to how much the diversity of news content is influenced by the

structure of the news industry, by legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence

or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual

incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to

journalists. The assessment of press freedom distinguishes between the broadcast and print media,

and the resulting ratings are expressed as a 100-point scale for each country under comparison.

Evaluations of press freedom in 191 contemporary nations were available in the Freedom House

annual index from 1992 to 2004.

[Figure 2 about here]

To check whether the results of this measure proved reliable, the Freedom House index was

compared with the Worldwide Press Freedom Index, which is independently produced by Reporters

without Borders. The results of the comparison of these sources, illustrated in Figure 2, show a strong

correlation across both these measures, with just a few outliers where the organizations disagree in

their rankings. Both indices differ in their construction, data sources, and conceptualization. Despite

this, these organizations largely confirm similar findings, which increases confidence in the reliability of

the measures. Many of the countries scoring most highly on press freedom by both these indicators

are highly developed nations, such as New Zealand, the Netherlands and Sweden, as expected given

the strong linkage between affluence and democracy. But other countries with high press freedom are

classified by the UNDP as having only moderate or even low development, including Mali and Benin,

Nicaragua and El Salvador, as well as Burkina Fasa. The countries which rank as having the least free

media by both organizations include Cuba, Eritrea, China and Turkmenistan.

Measuring democracy

29 T. Besley and R. Burgess. 2001. ‘Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media.’ European Economic Review. 45(4-6): 629-640.

70

The dependent variables are indicators of levels of democracy and good governance. Recent

years have seen growing attempts to gauge and measure systematic, valid and reliable indicators of

the quality of democracy in a wide range of countries worldwide. Three measures are compared in this

study: the Polity IV project’s measure of constitutional democracy, Vanhanen’s indicator of

participatory democracy, and Przeworski et al’s classification based on contested democracy. These

represent the most widely-cited indicators of democracy commonly used by scholars and policy

analysts in comparative research. They each have broad cross-national scope and a lengthy time-

series, with data based on annual observations classifying regimes worldwide.30 Freedom House’s

index of liberal democracy is also widely used, but this is not employed in this study as the measure

contains freedom of the press as one of its core components. The reason to adopt more than one

measure is that no single indicator is best for all purposes, instead as Collier and Adcock suggest,

specific choices are best justified pragmatically in terms of the theoretical framework and analytical

goals in any study31. The most prudent strategy, adopted by this study, is to compare the results of

analytical models using alternative indicators, to see if the findings remain robust and consistent

irrespective of the specific measures of democracy which are employed for analysis. If so, then this

generates greater confidence in the reliability of the results and we can conclude that the main

generalizations hold irrespective of the particular measures which are used.

Measuring good governance

The study also draws on the measures of good governance developed by Kaufmann et al for

the World Bank.32 This dataset is based upon subjective perceptions of five indicators of good

governance, drawing on multiple surveys of experts, that assessed the degree of political stability, the

rule of law, government efficiency, regulatory quality, and levels of corruption in each nation. Political

stability is important as this reflects the regular rotation of government office, consolidation of the ‘rules

of the game’, continuity in constitutional practices, and lack of political violence due to acts of

terrorism. The rule of law concerns the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary and courts,

perceptions of violent or non-violent crime, and the enforceability of contracts. Government efficiency

is gauged by perceptions of the quality of the public service and the independence of the civic service

from political pressures. Regulatory quality refers to public services and the difficulty of conducting

routine business transactions. Lastly, perceptions of corruption reflect the success of a society in

30 A useful review of these is available from Geraldo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. ‘Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices.’ Comparative Political Studies. 35 (1): 5-34. 31 David Collier and Robert Adcock. 1999. ‘Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts.’ Annual Review of Political Science 1: 537-565. 32 Daniel Kaufmann, Aaart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. ‘Governance Matters.’ World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196. Washington DC: World Bank. www.worldbank.org; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. May 2003. ‘Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002.’ http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

.

71

developing fair, transparent and predictable rules for social and economic interactions. Subjective

judgments may prove unreliable for several reasons, including reliance upon a small number of

national ‘experts’, the use of business leaders and academic scholars as the basis of the judgments,

variations in country coverage by different indices, and possible bias towards more favorable

evaluations of countries with good economic outcomes. Nevertheless in the absence of other reliable

indicators covering a wide range of nations, such as representative surveys of public opinion, these

measures provide one of the best available gauges of good governance. It should be noted that none

of the indicators of good governance that were selected included measures of freedom of the press as

part of their construction. If the free press plays an important role in promoting government

accountability and responsiveness, then this should be evident in these indicators. The regression

analysis models are presented for the five Kaufmann indicators of good governance and the three

standard indicators of democracy provided by Polity IV, Vanhanen, and by Cheibub and Gandhi, to

double check whether the key findings are confirmed and the results are robust irrespective of the

particular measure which is selected for analysis.

III: The Distribution of the Free Press The contemporary pattern of press freedom shows considerable variations around the world.

As illustrated in figure 3, as expected, the most liberal media were found in the industrialized nations,

including the most affluent economies and longest-standing democracies. Latin America and South-

East Asia proved the regions which also scored relatively highly in freedom of the press, with the Arab

states proving the least free. Despite the growing audience for the more independent and aggressive

style of journalism found in Al Jazeera, and moves to liberalize the press in other nations in the region,

this region lagged behind others to a marked extent. The map illustrated in Figure 4 breaks the

comparison down by countries around the world, showing important contrasts within Africa, Latin

America, and Asia. Although the countries scoring most highly in press freedom tend to be found in

North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia, and developed nations in Asia-Pacific, nevertheless

some poorer developing nations, such as Mali, Benin and South Africa, also scored well on journalistic

freedom.

[Figure 3 and 4 about here]

The relationship between economic development and press freedom is explored more fully in

figure 5, which contrasts both factors. The results show a moderately strong correlation but there are

also important outliers in this relationship. Hence there are a range of nations located in the bottom

right-hand corner of the scatter-gram which are relatively affluent and yet with restrictions on an

independent press, notably Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Malaysia. In Singapore, for example, the

People’s Action Party (PAP), founded and originally led by Lee Kuan Yew, has maintained its

unbroken rule in government since 1959, despite a regular series of multiparty contests challenging

their hegemonic status. One reason contributing to the ruling party’s predominance is their strong

control of the press and news media, for example the leading newspaper of Singapore, the Straits

72

Times, is often perceived as a propaganda newspaper because it rarely criticizes government policy,

and it covers little about the opposition. The owners of the paper, Singapore Press Holdings, have

close links to the ruling party and the corporation has a virtual monopoly of the newspaper industry.

Government censorship of journalism is common, using the threat or imposition of heavy fines or

distribution bans imposed by the Media Development Authority, with these techniques also used

against articles seen to be critical of the government published in the international press, including The

Economist and International Times Herald Tribune. Internet access is regulated in Singapore, and

private ownership of satellite dishes is not allowed. Due to this record, the Reporters Without Borders

assessment of Press Freedom Worldwide in 2005 ranked Singapore 140th out of 167 nations.

[Figure 5 about here]

By contrast, there are other nations which have low per capita GDP and yet which are

relatively free in media communications, notably those nations located in the top-left quadrant of

Figure 5. One example is Benin, which is widely regarded as a successful African democracy with

constitutional checks and balances, multiple parties, a high degree of judicial independence, and a

lively partisan press which is often critical of the government. Benin ranks 161st lowest out of 177

states in the 2003 UNDP Human Development Index, with a per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power

Parity) of $1,115. One third of the population lives with incomes below the poverty level and two-thirds

of the adult population is illiterate. Despite this, the country is categorized as ‘free’ by the 2006

Freedom House index, comparable to Argentina, Mexico, and Romania in its record of civil liberties

and political rights.

IV: The impact of the free press on good governance and democracy

The key question is whether press freedom is related to democracy and good governance,

even using multivariate regression models controlling for many others factors which are commonly

associated with political development. The relationship between wealth and democracy has been a

long-standing observation which has withstood repeated tests in the social sciences and accordingly

the models entered levels of economic development (measured by logged per capita GDP in

Purchasing Power Parity). The models also control for the effects of the historical pattern of colonial

legacies. An association between the past type of colonial rule and contemporary patterns of

democracy has been noted by several observers; for example Clague, Gleason and Knack report that

lasting democracies (characterized by contestation for government office) are most likely to emerge

and persist among poor nations in ex-British colonies, even controlling for levels of economic

development, ethnic diversity, and the size of the population.33 The Middle East is also entered into

the analysis, since many observers have pointed out that this region has been least affected by the

trends in democratization since the start of the third wave, and indeed to be the least democratic

33 Christopher Clague, Suzanne Gleason and Stephen Knack. 2001. ‘Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries: Culture, development and institutions.’ Annals of the American Academy of Social Sciences 573: 16-41.

73

region worldwide. The degree of ethnic heterogeneity is also entered into the models, on the grounds

that deeply-divided societies are widely assumed to experience greater problems of democratic

consolidation. Nations were classified according to the degree of ethnic fractionalization, based on a

global dataset created by Alesina and his colleagues.34 The models also control for the impact of the

size of the population in each country. Ever since Dahl and Tufte, the idea that size matters for

democracy has been widely assumed, and Alesina and Spolaore have provided the most detailed

recent examination of this proposition.35 Smaller nations are expected to be easier to govern

democratically, for example the smaller the population, the greater the potential for citizen participation

in key decisions.

[Table 1 and Figure 6 about here]

The results of the analysis in Table 1 confirms that the free press is significantly associated

with levels of democracy, even after employing the battery of economic and social controls. The

results appear to be robust irrespective of the particular indicator of democracy which is selected,

despite major differences in the conceptualization and measurement processes used by Polity IV,

Vanhanen, and Przeworski et al/Cheibub. Indeed the impact of media liberalization was the most

consistent predictor of democracy out of any of the factors under comparison, even stronger than

wealth. The pattern was inspected visually in figure 6, using the Polity IV measure of democracy, to

examine the goodness of fit and to identify any obvious outliers. As the scatter-plot shows, there are a

few countries which fall quite far below the line, such as Russia, Guatamala and Bangladesh,

suggesting that limits on independent journalism in these nations may be more severe than might be

expected from other indicators of democracy, such as holding free and fair elections for the major

government offices. And there are other countries well above the line where the free press is

particularly strong, given their overall level of democratization.

The models were replicated for the five selected indicators of good governance and again the

results, presented in Table 2, proved significant and consistent. The models show that countries where

much of the public has access to the free press usually have greater political stability, rule of law,

government efficiency in the policy process, regulatory quality, and the least corruption.

[Table 2 about here]

34 Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. ‘Fractionalization’ Journal of Economic Growth 8:155-194. For details see: www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html 35 Robert A. Dahl and E.R.Tufte. 1973. Size and democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press; RobertA.Dahl. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press; Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. The Size of Nations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

74

Conclusions

Overall the analysis lends considerable support to the claims of liberal theorists about the

critical role of the free press, as one of the major components of both democracy and good

governance. Nevertheless there are many questions remaining for future research. The analysis

presented here has not been able to explore which of the three roles of the free press – as watch-dog,

as civic forum or as agenda-setter – is most important in these relationships. Plausibly, for example,

the effectiveness of the press as watch-dogs should have the greatest impact upon stamping out

corruption, while their function in calling attention to social problems should influence government

effectiveness. It probably requires detailed case-studies focusing upon how the news media work in

particular countries to flesh out these linkages. Moreover the limited cross-sectional analysis

presented here cannot seek to disentangle some of the reciprocal relationships between the

government and the media which may be at work, and time-series analysis of developments over time

would provide a more satisfactory handle on these matters. Lastly the analysis has not sought to

demonstrate the indirect effects of the free press on levels of human development, as proposed in the

last stage of the analytical model. Nevertheless it remains plausible, as many other studies suggest,

that improving democracy and good governance will ultimately contribute towards the eradication of

poverty, particularly by making governments more accountable and responsive to human needs.36

The study therefore confirms many of the assumptions about the role of independent journalism, which

are pervasive in liberal theory, including the core argument that the free press matters, both

intrinsically and instrumentally. Policies which eradicate limits on the free exchange of information and

communication, whether due to state censorship, intimidation and harassment of journalists, or private

media oligopolies, therefore have important consequences for those seeking to strengthen both

political and human development.

36 See, for example, Joseph T. Siegle, Michael Weinstein and Morton Halperin. 2004. ‘Why democracies excel’ Foreign Affairs 83(5):57-72; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. NY: Cambridge University Press.

75

Figure 1: Analytical framework

Stage III:

Improvements in human development

Stage II:

Democratic consolidation and good

governance strengthened through the media’s role

as watch-dog, civic forum, and agenda-setter

Stage I:

Breakdown of autocratic control of the mass media and liberalization of the

press

76

Figure 2: Press freedom in 161 nations worldwide, 2004

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See technical appendix for the construction of each index. Levels of development for each society classified by

the Human Development Index, UNDP 2003.

Sources: Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org; Reporters without Borders

77

Figure 3: Press freedom by global region, 2005

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78

Figure 4: Global map of press freedom, 2005

Press freedom 2004 (FH)72 to 92 (65)38 to 72 (57)2 to 38 (66)

Note: Freedom House press freedom index, 100pts.

Source: Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org

79

Figure 5: Press freedom by level of economic development

Notes: Freedom House press freedom index 2004, 100-pt scale. Logged per capita GDP in PPP 2002, World

Bank.

Source: Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org

80

Figure 6: Press freedom by level of democratization

Notes: Freedom House press freedom index 2004, 100-pt scale. Polity IV autocracy-democracy scale,

standardized to 0-100 points.

Source: Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org; Polity IV

81

Table 1: The free press and democracy

Constitutional democracy

Participatory democracy

Contested democracy

Polity IV Vanhanen Przeworski et al/ Cheibub and Gandhi

b se p b se p b (se) p

Press Freedom 1.23 .102 *** .436 .066 *** .073 .013 ***

CONTROLS

Log GDP/Capita .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 *** .000 .000 N/s Ex-British colony -6.13 4.62 N/s -6.69 2.59 ** -.362 .497 N/s Middle East -10.68 6.88 N/s -1.48 4.91 N/s -1.68 .969 * Ethnic fractionalization

-22.2 8.41 *** -21.1 5.08 *** -1.08 .893 N/s

Population size .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 N/s Constant 3.10 2.1 -2.57 N. of countries 142 150 181 Adjusted R2 .673 .558 .568

Note: Entries for Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-pointscales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parenthesis) for the cross-national analysis in 2002. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

83

Table 2: The free press and good governance

Political stability Government effectiveness

Regulatory quality

b se p b se p b (se) p

Press Freedom .013 .003 *** .013 .002 *** .017 .002 ***

CONTROLS

Log GDP/Capita .000 .000 *** .000 .000 *** .000 .000 *** Ex-British colony .010 .128 N/s .115 .083 N/s .059 .088 N/s Middle East .164 .211 N/s .360 .144 ** .276 .153 N/s Ethnic fractionalization -.948 .243 *** -.428 .157 *** -.347 .167 * Population size .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 N/s Constant -.475 -.982 N. of countries 163 172 Adjusted R2 .45 .74 .689

Rule of Law Corruption b se p b se p

Press Freedom .014 .002 *** .012 .002 ***

CONTROLS

Log GDP/Capita .000 .000 *** .000 .000 *** Ex-British colony .169 .078 * .073 .089 N/s Middle East .536 .135 *** .296 .153 * Ethnic fractionalization -.551 .147 *** -.466 .168 *** Population size .000 .000 N/s .000 .000 N/s Constant -1.01 N. of countries 172 170 Adjusted R2 .77 .73 Note: The indicators of good governance are from Daniel Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. May 2003. ‘Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002.’ http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parenthesis) for the cross-national analysis. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.

84

Technical Appendix

1. Freedom House Index of Press Freedom 1994-2005

The Freedom House survey of Press Freedom has been conducted every year since 1980. Countries are

given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology questions divided

into three subcategories. Assigning numerical points allows for comparative analysis among the countries

surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. The degree to which each country permits the

free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as "Free," "Partly Free," or

"Not Free." Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having "Free" media; 31 to 60, "Partly Free" media;

and 61 to 100, "Not Free" media.

Sources

The FH data is derived from overseas correspondents, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, the

findings of human rights and press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas,

the reports of governments and multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media.

Methodology

Through the years, FH has refined and expanded their methodology without altering the comparability of

data for a given country over the 25-year span, or the comparative ratings of all countries over that period.

The examination of the level of press freedom in each country currently comprises 23 methodology

questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the

economic environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points are allotted for a more

free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment. The diverse nature of

the questions seeks to encompass the varied ways in which pressure can be placed upon the flow of

information and the ability of print, broadcast, and Internet-based media to operate freely; in short, FH seek

to provide a picture of the entire "enabling environment" in which the media in each country operate. Each

country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers indicating less freedom. A country's final

score is based on the total of the three categories: a score of 0 to 30 places the country in the Free press

group; 31 to 60 in the Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group.

The legal environment category encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could

influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict

the media's ability to operate. We assess the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for

freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other

criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of

information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies;

registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to

operate freely.

85

Under the political environment category, FH evaluates the degree of political control over the content of

news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned

media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the

media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and

the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment,

violent assaults, and other threats.

The third category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media

ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of

production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other

actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a

country impacts the development of the media.

2. Reporters without Borders: Worldwide Annual Press Freedom Index, 2005

The Reporters without Borders index measures the state of press freedom in the world. It reflects the degree

of freedom journalists and news organizations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the state to

respect and ensure respect for this freedom.

The organization compiled a questionnaire with 52 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each

country. It includes every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment,

physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and harassment).

It registers the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for such violations. It also takes account of

the legal situation affecting the news media (such as penalties for press offences, the existence of a state

monopoly in certain areas and the existence of a regulatory body), the behavior of the authorities towards

the state-owned news media and the foreign press, and the main obstacles to the free flow of information on

the Internet. The index reflects not only of abuses attributable to the state, but also those by armed militias,

clandestine organizations or pressure groups that can pose a real threat to press freedom.

The questionnaire was sent to partner organizations of Reporters Without Borders (14 freedom of

expression groups in five continents) and its 130 correspondents around the world, as well as to journalists,

researchers, jurists and human rights activists. A scale devised by the organization was then used to give a

country-score to each questionnaire. The 2004 index is based solely on events between 1 September 2003

and 1 September 2004. It does not look at human rights violations in general, just press freedom violations.

The 100-pt index is reversed for analysis, so that a higher score represents greater press freedom.

Appendix A: Description of the variables and data sources Description and source Obs. Name

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization

The share of languages spoken as ‘mother tongues’ in each country, generally derived from national census data, as reported in the Encyclopedia Britannica 2001. The

181

86

fractionalization index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnolinguistic group share, reflecting the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups. Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg 2003. The Polity IV project classifies democracy and autocracy in each nation-year as a composite score of different characteristics relating to authority structures. The dataset constructs a ten-point democracy scale by coding the competitiveness of political participation (1-3), the competitiveness of executive recruitment (1-2), the openness of executive recruitment (1), and the constraints on the chief executive (1-4). Autocracy is measured by negative versions of the same indices. The two scales are combined into a single democracy-autocracy score varying from -10 to +10. The democracy-autocracy index for 2000 was recoded to a 20-point positive scale from low (autocracy) to high (democracy). Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2003. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/

Polity IV Constitutional democracy index

Vanhanen developed a scaled measure of democracy in each country according to two criteria: the degree of electoral competition (measured by the share of the vote won by the largest party in the national legislature), and also the degree of electoral participation (the proportion of the total population who voted in national legislative elections), which is combined to yield a 100-pt index of Participatory Democracy. Tatu Vanhanen. 2000. ‘A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998.’ Journal of Peace Research 37(2): 251-265.

Vanhanen Participatory Democracy Index

This classification of regimes from 1950-1990 was originally developed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, and the time series was subsequently extended to 2000 by Cheibub and Gandhi. This approach defines regimes as autocratic if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is only one party, or there has been no alternation in power. All other regimes are classified as democratic. In democratic states, therefore, those who govern are selected through contested elections. Jose Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi. 2005. ’A six-fold measure of democracies and dictatorships.’ Unpublished paper.

Cheibub and Gandhi Contested Democracy classification

Indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobaton 2002.

177 Political stability

Indicators measuring the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection of governments. This includes the political process, civil liberties, political rights and media independence. Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobaton 2002.

190 Voice and accountability

Government effectiveness

Indicators of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. This includes perceptions of the quality of public services, the competence and independence of civil servants, and the ability of the government to implement and deliver public goods.

186

87

Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobaton 2002. The Human Development Index (HDI) 2001 is based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP $US). UNDP Human Development Report 2003.

170 Human Development Index (HDI)

The estimates total population per state (thousands). World Bank World Development Indicators 2002.

187 Population size

The past colonial history of countries was classified into those which shared a British colonial background (1), and all others (0). CIA The World Factbook 2004. www.cia.gov

191 BritCol

Middle East This classified the regional location of nations into those Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa (1) and all others (0).

191

88

I

Media Development andSpeech in the Public Sphere

"ls a westent style press

really a uniuersal goal of

national deuelopment? "

Thomas Jacobson, Professor School of Communrcationsand Theater, Temple University

The def ini t ive Engl ish language analysis of press-state relat ions in the Post WWllera was Four Theories of the Press (siebert , Peterson et al . 1963). publ ished inthe context of the cold war i t c lassi f ied press-state models, including mass meorageneral ly, in relat ion to the kinds of governments in which these models couldexist . For example, the " l ibertar ian" model of the press rn which free speech wasguaranteed by private ownership of media could only exist within a democratic state.Whereas a "Sovtet" model was suitable for a communist state in which pr ivateownership of media would be forbidden. For many years the l ibertar ian modelwas promoted as the system young democracies needed for successful democracy.

Today this analysis of press-state relat ions is considered dated, both naive aboutthe effects of bottom l ine pr ior i t ies in the media and also ethnocentr ic (Bates1995; Nerone 1995). But considerable disagreement remains over exact ly whatis needed. ls a commercial press enough? what about publ ic ly funded systems?Most important ly, whether commercial , publ ic, or mixed, exact ly what must thepress accomplish to serve democratic ends? " Man bites dog" news? civic journalism?Both? Neither? Does free speech mean precisely the same thing everywhere? And,is a western styled press really a universal end goal of national development, or not?

Today the most widely acclaimed analysis of these quest ions is that of Germansociologist Jurgen Habermas (1984,1987). Answers to these quest ions are hard tocome by in a postmodern world, and hence his work is formidably complex. But akind of impressionistic account of his key ideas may serve for present purposes.

Habermas argues that in al l human interact ion there is a universal assumotionunderly ing speech. The assumption is that the underly ing structure of speech is"oriented toward reaching understanding. " Habermas's claim may seem coun-ter intui t ive in the face of common forms of deceit , manipulat ion, and simplebias. But for Habermas, ly ing i tsel f preys upon understanding because in ryingone causes someone else to presume this or ientat ion, though as a falsehood. Heargues that understanding is the " le/os" of human communicat ion. Individuals donot always agree, but speech of any kind assumes an or ientat ion towards agree-ment even if rt is an agreement to disagree. This telos is a ".. .gentle but obstinate,a never silent although seldom redeemed claim to reason" that is embodied inand operates through communicat ion. wrthout i t , speech would be impossible(Habermas 1979, p .97) .

In the context of media development. Habermas's work can be seen as addressingat least two important sets of problems. one of these concerns the cul turalprerequisi tes of democracy and cultural change general ly. These prerequisi tes

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represent the cul tural inst i tut ions of moderni ty that young democracies mustacquire. and protect, if they are to build sustainable democracies. The other concernsthe specif icat ion of key stakeholders in media and democrat ic governance arongwith interactions among these stakeholders. These key stakeholders and their rnter-act ions represent what must be accomplished through communicat ion for thesake of democracy, presuming that the prerequisi tes are in place. Both sets ofproblems can be viewed in relation Io Ihe "public sphere," the figurative spacefor public discussion that exists half-way between the private sphere of civil socie-ty and the state. l t is a space where ideas must be expressed, as Art ic le 19 of theUN Human Rights Charter suggests, without interference. But i t is a space wneremuch more must be accomplrshed as wel l .

MODERNIZATION, AN ORIENTATION TOWARD UNDERSTANDING, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Studies of modernizatton have often focused on the spread of scient i f ic andtechnological reason throughout society. From this perspective science is oftenviewed as the main prereqursi te of moderni ty. For Habermas the emphasis ona scientlstic view of reason is too narrow. Modernity results from the spread ofother uses of reason as wel l . Reason, in his view, includes science but extends tothe use of "good reasons" in legal discussions, in discussions regarding preferredsocial norms, in family discusstons of chi ld rear ing pract ices, in art , and more. lnother words discussions, or discourses. of many kinds are prerequisi tes ofmoderni ty. Democracy, just ice, and hence democrat ic media use rely on them al l ,and hence the cul tural values of moderni ty are much broader than science arone.Yet al l these discourses, including science, share the abi l i ty and wi l l ingness toconsider the views of others and compromise, i .e. the hal lmarks of an or ienratrontoward understanding, and ai l contr ibute to the pubric sphere.

CULTURAL CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Due in part to the common emphasis on scient i f ic and technical knowledge,studies of media, governance, and the publ ic sphere tend to focus on press-staterelat ionships in an overly narrowfashion. They, too, overlook the ful l range ofsocial and histor ical learning embodied in cul tural inst i tut ions. perhaps becausesuch learning took place in the West over a period of centuries, democratrcculture has come to seem "natural." But it is not. when press-state relationsare observed in young democracies undergoing more raprd processes of socialchange it becomes clear that democratic culture must be actively ,,learned.,,

ftalso becomes clear that dur ing such periods of rapid change, democrat ic cul turalvalues must therefore be handled in the publ ic sphere, expl ic i t ly.

The publ ic sphere extends beyond news media. Modern media circulate ideasthrough radio, television, f i lm, and increasingly over the Internet. some of theseideas are expressed art ist ical ly and some are expressed in escapist enlertainment.Yet al l media and forms of expression play a rore in informing, motivat ing, andcontextual iz ing publ ic opinion. These media condit ion publ ic opinion on whattradit ional pract ices should be preserved, what tradi t ional pract ices should beabandoned, and what tradi t ional pract ices should be combined in hvbrid formwith other perhaps "newer" practices, including speech practices.

The point is that the publ ic sphere is a broad and sprawl ing affair in which thetradit ions of the past are f i l tered as they become combined with the pract ices ofthe present and future, through a process that involves both learninq ano cnoos_

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ing among ci t izens. And only i f th is learning and choosing is done consciously andcol lect ively in art , entertarnment, educat ion, scholarshrp, and the publ ic sphere,can sustainable chanqe be achieved.

CULTURE AND "UNIVERSAL RIGHTS"

Anthropology teaches us that no substant ive values, even free speech and thevalue of human l i fe, have ever been ful ly universal. Habermas is therefore mindfulof the fact that each society will travel a different path toward development andeach wi l l cont inue to cherish some, probably many, of i ts t radi t ional cul tural values.But he is stil l concerned to find a universalistic basis upon which to defend intuitionsof lust ice and r ights.

Habermas's approach to lust ice and r ights is to admit that specif ic r ights. such asr ights to free speech, to l i fe, and others, may not be universal ly possessed uponbir th. But at the same t ime he argues that the unconscrous or ientat ion towardsunderstanding embodied in speech nevertheless establ ishes a universal "moral

viewpoint." This moral v iewpoint is experienced as the desire to be heard andtreated fair ly, to be understood in one's own cultural context. This universal desireunderl ies struggles for r ights which have appeared more and more commonly overthe past 200 years in highly var ied cul tural contexts. He therefore argues that theuniversalistic basis of justice and rights is not a set of specific "universal rights,'but is instead a set of evolving "universalizable rights," rights that are increasinglywidespread apparent ly because they embody the moral v iewpoint.

There is a del icate balance between the moral v iewpoint which is a universal andspecif ic r ight which can only be adopted from within a cul tural f ramework oftradi t ion. Nevertheless, specif ic and just law can only ar ise as a hybrid combrningthe moral v iewpoint with each society 's own cultural preferences. The necessaryreason for this hybridizat ion is that voluntary observance of the law requires thatnew laws must be in accord with the motivat ions of individual c i t izens. Becausemotivat ions come from culture as wel l as individual experience, they cannot beforced unwil l ingly from the outside. The adopt ion of specif ic r ights can only beaccomplished through voluntary ref lect ion and col lect ive discussion leading todemocrat ic Ieoislat ion.

COLONIZATION OF THE CULTURAL L IFEWORLD

Culture comprises Ihe "lifewoild" in which individual lives and collective activitiestake place. However, the l i feworld can be damaged when powerful inst i tut ionsput too narrow an emphasis on market rat ional i ty and government by admin-istrat ion. In the industr ial ized West, economic just i f icat ions and bureaucrat icimperat ives have in too many respects taken over as the basis for pol icy making,displacing discussion among publ ics smal l and large as the basis for pol icy making.Economic justifications often take over for pedagogical discussions among educatorsand within communit ies. Economic reasoning sometimes even takes over fordiscussion within famil ies and in the art world. Habermas addresses this problem

with his thesis on "colonization of the lifeworld." Lifeworld colonization occurswhen economic and administrat ive reasoning, orrented toward eff ic iency, replacesthe proper role of publ ic discourse which is or iented toward understanding.

Li feworld colonizat ion is one important cause of the much lamented dumbingdown o f pub l i c communica t ion . Th is i s no t s imp ly a mat te r o f g reed amongmedia owners and shareholders. l t a lso involves manioulat ion of the levers of

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power by those with the capability to do so, sometimes intentionally and sometimeswithout planned lntentron as a result of bureaucrat ic processes that take on a l i feof their own. And the damaging consequences are not l imited to poor journal ism.When money and power are exerted behind the scenes and media's ubi l i ty toful ly ref lect social interests drminishes, many social subsystems can be adverselyaffected. Educat ion is hobbled in i ts abi l i ty to transmrt social norms, individualident i ty is str ipped of cul tural context, and long term social v iabi l i ty suffers.Governance becomes a strategic process devoid of the orientation towards under-standing that democracy and vibrant curturar r i fe require.

STAKEHOLDERS IN MEDIA AND GOVERNANCE

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. Adapted from "The role of the public Sphere and media independence in DeliberativePolitics, " Presented as keynote lecture at the Annual conference of the InternationalCommunication Association, Dresden, June 2i. 2006.

Even i f the cul tural prerequisi tes of democracy are in place and are r)ot underminedby lifeworld colonization, modern democracy requires an elaborate set of informationf lows i f governance is to remain responsive to ci t izens. This is a requirement thatis related to, but separate from the news media,s important role in faci l i tat inggovernmental t ransparency and accountabi l i ty. l t is the addit ional requirementthat media represent publ ic opinion in a way that meaningful ly expresses thevoice of c i t izens across the ful l range of their interests.

Most general ly, there must be a mechanism to col lect ideas, ref ine them, f i l terthem, and feed them into formal pol i t ical bodies. Habermas refers in this regardto the "eprstemic" value of the public sphere, which is his way of seconding JohnMil ton in his Areopagit ica, publ ished in 1 644, " . . .who ever knew Truth put to theworse in a free and open encounter? (Mitton, (lg0g-14).', when Mrtton pennedthese lines free and open debate took place on street corners. However, in moderncondit ions speaking openly on street corners is of l i t t le value. Al l the publ ic

discourse rn the world is of no democrat icvalue unless i t informs the del iberat ionsof formal decision-making bodies. HereHabermas refers to bolh "weak" or peripheralpubl ic spheres and core publ ic spheres. Andhe borrows the metaphor of a ',sluice gate"to indicate the need for wild and overlappingcitizen discourses from the periphery to be fed,or sluiced, into parliaments in the core of thepol i t ical system (Habermas 1996, p.356-g).

Figure 1 indicates the structur.e of thepubl ic sphere. The r ight hand column ofthe f igure shows that the publ ic sphereoccupies roughly a middle, or intermediary,position between civil society and thestate. The center column represents relatedarenas of pol i t ical communicat ion. Socialmovements and associational networks

such as crt izen interest groups express a quasi organized form of acrvrry amongcit izens in civ i l society. The mode of communicat ion there is every-day-talk inepisodic publ ics. The mediated publ ic sphere is a more organized sphere ofpol i t ical communicat ion pract iced by media systems but which also rnvolvespolr t ic ians, lobbyists, inf luent ial c iv i l society leaders and, important ly, the publ icopinion industry and media audiences. The information and opinions generatedamong al l these stakeholders in democrat ic communrcat ion must feed rntornst i tut ional ized discourses among legislat ive bodies and courts in t i re core.

Figure 1: The Public Sphere as an lntermediary System

Modes ofCommunicat ion Areas oI Pol i t ical Communi(at ion

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Figure 2 shows information f lows rn and out of the mediated publ ic sphere inmore detai l . Input into the media comes from special interest groups and lob-bies as wel l as general interest groups, experts and intel lectuals. Input also comesfrom pol i t ical part ies and pol i t ic ians who have more access to the media than doother stakeholders. output from the media is publ ic opinion generated by vir tueof the way that media select issues to publ ic ize, choose individuals to analyze

The mass media have a signi f icant impact on publ ic opinion. and vice versa, tothe extent that the media and publ ic opinion industr ies are both part of a sin-gle system. Publ ic opinion affects al l the same groups that provide input to the

media, thus forming a feedback cycle inwhich al l stakeholders attempt to affectdialog in the mediated publ ic sphere,expressing innately held interests whi le alsorespondrng to the mediated expressions ofthe interests of others.

Of cor.irse the fidelity and accuracy of mediarepresentations, and the quality of discus-sions they facilitate, are of fundamentalimportance. Habermas recognizes that thehealthy funct ioning of information f lowsnecessary to democracy comprises a strin-gent set of standards societ ies must ful f i l l .And as his colonizat ion thesis indicates,he bel ieves that there is often a signi f icantshort fal l in f idel i ty, accuracy, and qual i tyin even developed societ ies. The coloniza-t ion thesis suggests that the intrusion of

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f inancial and administrat ive pr ior i t ies into areas that should be governed by publ icdiscourse threatens to undermine processes through which media col lect ideas,ref ine them, f i l ter them, and feed them into the pol i t ical system. And this, in turn,threatens to undermine the legi t imacy of democrat ic inst i tut ions.

But colonization and the non-representative information flows it produces comprise abroader threat as well. Due to the fact that all media participate in democratic culturethrough entertatnment programming as well as news, colonization also threatenssocial integration, transmission of social norms, healthy formation of individualidentities. Indeed, discourses of action oriented toward understanding generally areendangered. In other words, the cultural prerequisites of democracy themselves areundermined whenever the orientation toward understanding in media is pushedaside by the inappropriate intrusion of corporate and administrative priorities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

With even this br ief and highly select ive review of key ideas i t is possible to seethat Habermas's theory addresses two main quest ions lef t over by the passingof standard libertarian theory, and asked by way of introduction. "what exactly,must the press accomplish to serve democratic ends?" And, 'Does free speechmean precisely the same thing everywhere?"

On the matter of what needs to be accomplished, his analysis of the publ icsphere suggests that the media must accomplish a complex process of informationand opinion processing by relying on a large and diverse collection of stakeholders.

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And to do this, especial ly in young democracres, the press and the media gener-al ly must also play a leading role rn the evolut ion of cul tural norms and ski l ls, ena-bl ing ci t izens and inst i tut ions to part ic ipate in discursive procedures.

On the matter of speech values, he says "no" lhey are not the same thing every-where. Whi le Habermas hopes for not ions of just ice and r ights that are based onthe moral v iewpoint, he also argues that the embodiment of this viewpoint wi l la lways depend to some degree on culture. The meaning of f ree speech mustand does vary as can easi ly be seen when comparing speech protect ions amongeven European nat ions. Final ly, the publ ic opinion process along with processesengendering democrat ic norms and discursive ski l ls al l can only be acquiredthrough speech or iented toward understanding, which must be protected fromexcessive market and administrat ive or ior i t ies.

l f th is account of human communicat ion and the inst i tutrons of governance is agood one, then a few specif ic implrcat ions of this theory for media developmentcan oe orawn.

1) The central feature of democrat ic pol j t ical l i fe consists in discursive procedure,and the media play a const i tut ive role in this discursive procedure. But this roleis not automatical ly ful f i l led simply by vir tue of the media being pr ivately owned.The quality of news coverage, of news analysis, of responses to political institutionsand citizen interests must be very high, and building the necessary media institu-t ions to del iver this qual i ty is a chal lenge. Debate over sui table approaches tomeeting this chal lenge, including the possible use of publ ic ly f inanced media, isoften heated. However, global forums for media development should host suchdebates with ful l awareness of the complex procedural funct ions media mustful f i l l , and pol icy makers should support detai led research into these funct ions.

2) fhe norms enabl ing discursive procedures may ref lect unconscious universalstructures of human communicat ion. However, as real social pract ices, individualsand societies must learn them. These procedural norms are as important as votingbooths, privately owned newspapers, and election laws. Democratic proceourescannot be "transplanted" as brick and mortar rnstitutions from one culture toanother. Rather. such procedures can only be planted as ideas to be taken up bycitizen participants themselves and tested against their own preferences. traditions,and hopes. Media development ini t iat ives should therefore involve educat ionalinst i tut ions, c iv ic organizat ions, local non-prof i ts, and others in generat ingcommunity learning processes dedrcated to the acquisi t ion of discussion, analysis,and debate ski l ls or iented toward understanding (not always agreement!) .

3) rhe concerns discussed in the publ ic sphere are not l imited to pol i t ics butrange across the ent ire gamut of c i t izen concerns including cul ture. For this reasonthe publ ic sphere is a vi tal tool of cul tural change. cul ture change takes placein any case, but at least some cultural issues can be taken up dei iberately andreflected on collectively. These cultural issues include matters like speech freedoms.Media development efforts should therefore engage artists and arts basedorganizat ions in addressing col lect ive issues in cul tural ly resonant ways, andshould encourage nat ional development pol ic ies that harness the vi tal i ty ofcul tural inst i tut ions. And these efforts, whi le including celebrat ions of t radi t ionalcul ture, should also engage contemporary issues of social change.

4) Li feworld colonizat ion threatens to undermine democrat ic legi t imacy anosocial reproduct ion, and i t must be resrsted. Market rat ional i ty is of fundamentalimportance for improving l i fe opportunit ies through economic growth. But marketpr ior i t ies do not serve al l social processes equal ly wel l . Producing representat ive

and responsive publ ic opinion is not l ike producing shoe laces. Enslavement ofmedia pr ior i t ies to prof i t maximizat ion can r igidi fy and f lat ten media, makingthem less able to ref lect the ful l range of c i t izen interests. The danger is cul turalimpoverishment that not only attenuates pol i t ical discussion but underminesvital cul tural l i fe. Media development work at the broadest level should encour-age democracy fr iendly pol ic ies. These wi l l vary by cul ture and region but shouldinclude pol ic ies restr ict ing consol idatron of ownership as wel l as regulat ionsresist ing the pressure to equate money and paid commercial advert isements withpol i t ical ly protected speech. careful analysis is needed across the var iety of youngdemocracy contexts to differentiate when the forces of money and power areemployed in ways that faci l i tate publ ic discourse and when these forces inhibi t i t .

CONCLUSION

Most of these problems have been explored in var ious ways by others. cul turemust be respected. Inst i tut ions cannot be transplanted. Markets can run amok.Habermas's singular contribution is to relate each problem to the other systemati-cal ly within a theoret ical f ramework defensible in the contemporary phi losophicalenvironment. The impl icat ions of his theory for media development are numerous,as has been indicated here at least br ief ly. In certain ways, media developmentchal lenges are simi lar in young and in more mature democracies. Both must worryabout the arbitrary exercise of political power over media and about corporatization.However, in other ways, young democracies face the greater chal lenge. For herethe cul tural prerequisi tes of democracy embodied in social norms and moderncultural inst i tut ions, i .e. the or ientat ion toward understanding, have sometimesyet to be bui l t .

Bafes, 5. (1995). RealigningJournalism with Democracy: TheHutchins Commission, lts Times,and Ours. Washington D.C., TheAn ne n berg Wash i ngton Prog ra min Communications Policy Studiesof N o rthweste r n l.J n ive rsi tV.

Habermas, J. (1979).Communication and the evolutionof society. Boston, Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1984). The theoryof communicative action : Reasonand the rationalization of societv.Boston, Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1987). The theoryof communicative action: A cri-tique of functionalist reason.Boston, Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1992). Autonomyand solidarity. London, Verso.

Habermas, J. (1996). Betvveenfacts and norms: Contributionsto a discourse theory of law anddemocracy. Cambridge, MA, TheMIT Press.

Milton, J. (1 909-1 91 4).Areopagitica. Vol. lll, Part 3. TheHarvard C/assics. New York: P.F.Collier & Son.

Nerone, J. C., Ed. (1995). Lastrights: Revisiting four theories ofthe press. Urbana, IJniversity ofll l inois Press.

Siebert, F., T. Peterson, et al. (1963).Four theories of the press: Theauthorita ri an, I i berta ria n, socia Iresponsibility, and Sovietcommunist concepts of what thepress should be and do. Urbana,lL, University of lllinois Press

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Synthesis Draft, May 3rd, 2006

Media, Governance, and Development An Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention

In a Keynote Presentation on May 1st–3rd, 2006 at the International Press Freedom Day Conference, sponsored by UNESCO and the Ministry of Mass Media and Information of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Sri Lanka, the World Bank’s Daniel Kaufmann highlighted some key points in the Bank's evolving position on governance and press freedom1. This draft is a synthesis of Mr. Kaufmann’s presentation. To view the full PDF file of Mr. Kaufmann’s Powerpoint presentation, please visit: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/press_freedom_day_colombo_5_06.pdf Until the mid-1990s, the World Bank believed that its mandate was limited to purely economic issues such as trade reform, privatization, or financial sector management—reforms that according to the Washington Consensus were essential for economic development. The Bank underestimated the importance of governance and strong institutions; and the word “corruption” was not part of our vocabulary. By the late 1990s the Bank became aware that poor governance and corruption were not only severe impediments to the effective use of development assistance, but that the poor were most affected by these abuses. Gradually the Bank began raising awareness about the issue, conducting research, developing instruments to diagnose corruption, delivering training programs for government officials and civil society, and working directly on governance issues with selected countries upon request. Most recently, the Bank has focused on the importance of access to information and developing a freer media as major components of good governance and ultimately effective development. Pronouncements are not enough: The power of data and analytical rigor To make a convincing case and develop properly designed initiatives, we need to understand the status of press freedom in the world today, including the factors that militate for and against an open media. We believe that the same rigorous analysis and evidence-based policy-making that we have applied to traditional economic and financial decisions should apply to governance issues as well. There has also been some recent research on media development issues. The bibliography included at the end of this synthesis draft, while not exhaustive, provides an indication of some of the work that has taken place from which these remarks also draw. We are supporting initiatives to collect and assess the current state of the media which can then be shared with clients around the world. This includes, for example, the development of country-level and internationally comparable indicators of media

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1 The research support from Juliet Pumpuni is gratefully acknowledged, as well as the inputs drawn from

the existing work at the World Bank (inter alia as contained in WBI’s ‘Right To Tell’ publication, as well as other bibliography, which is included at the end of the text. freedom and governance. Much of this data is available, but has not been widely publicized. Data on the media industry and at the firm level also need to be collected and disclosed including accurate information on real ownership structures. Similarly, assessments need to be carried out on the political environment (for example, freedom of expression), the legal and regulatory environment and their effect on the media, the competitive environment, and a number of other factors that help determine the effectiveness and viability of a free and open media. More specifically, our evidence-based approach begins by challenging a set of ten myths (or popular notions) on press freedoms, namely:

1. Freedom of the press ought to be viewed from a strictly political perspective. We reject this view, and instead we suggest the importance of viewing media development and freedoms from a governance and development perspective.

2. Press freedom should be seen as an outgrowth (or result) of a country’s

industrialization process and higher incomes, rather than as a contributor in itself to economic development and growth. In fact, a free press is not a luxury that only rich countries can afford.

3. Data on media and governance is scant, and the limited existing data is unreliable

and not useful. We challenge this notion as well, indicating the progress made on governance and media-related indicators, and that the solid empirical analysis based on this data is important. It yields evidence-based lessons, and helps inform future strategies.

4. The Impact of press restrictions on corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment is

vastly exaggerated. This is not the case. The evidence indicates that it matters enormously.

5. The written laws ‘on the books’ are crucial determinant of the existence or absence

of press freedom. Written laws do matter as the ‘de jure’ codification of rules and regulations, but they are far from sufficient. The application of such legal and regulatory frameworks, the effective implementation of Freedom of Information Acts, and the de-monopolization of the telecommunication sector, for instance, matter fully as much.

6. Broad press restrictions, including Official Secrecy Acts, and limitations to private

media ownership, are often justified on the grounds of national security considerations. Although there are legitimate concerns about confidentiality and national security, they require rather narrow and specific areas of caution (rather

90

than broad restrictions), and ought not justify restrictions on the type of ownership per se.

7. Significant state ownership of the media, and subsidies to the media, are often

rather beneficial. The evidence suggests the contrary: large-scale state ownership is usually associated with a more restricted and ineffective media. More generally, high levels of ownership concentration are associated with less media effectiveness. This also applies within the private sector where more competition should be encouraged, a process that can be aided through new technologies (web, cell, community radio, and so forth).

8. The media is not to be treated as a business undertaking. It is so distinctive in its mandate and objectives, that it ought not be viewed as an ‘industry.’ Although it is important to recognize some particular characteristics and (among others, social) objectives of the media, it is also important to view it as a business where financial viability is essential to ensure that media development objectives are attained.

9. Does holding elections in a country guarantee press freedoms? The evidence

suggests that elections, while associated with a higher degree of press freedom in general terms, do not in themselves guarantee media development and press freedoms which require other initiatives and support.

10. The international community and the World Bank can do very little in the field of

media. We suggest that this is not the case. In fact, a number of ongoing initiatives exist; and many others could be contemplated in the future.

In particular, the following can be highlighted: Today the World Bank and other development and donor agencies are “practicing what they preach” by increasing public access to information, documents, and decisionmaking processes. We are treating the media as an important partner in our governance, anticorruption, and poverty alleviation efforts by including them at the early stages of project work in countries and in poverty reduction strategies. To help develop media capacities we deliver learning programs on topics not covered by other institutions, such as business and economic journalism and media management. We are also providing support to nascent media in fragile states, and in countries implementing freedom and access to information acts such as Mexico, and we are sharing good policy practices for building competitive media and telecommunication sectors, with more limited state interference. In collaboration with other organizations, we are deepening our research and analysis on media development ratings and worldwide indicators.

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And finally, the Bank has been commenting publicly on media developments in our partner countries, highlighting achievements and actively discouraging abuses. Daniel Kaufmann The World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance The full PDF of the powerpoint presentation is online at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/events/index.html

BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahrend, R., 2001, “Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption”. DELTA Working Paper No. 2002-11 Besley, T.; Burgess, R., 2001, “Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media” European Economic Review 45 (2001) 629-640 Brunetti, A.; Weder, B., 2003, “A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption” Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003)1801-1824 Coyne, Christopher J.; Leeson, Peter T., 2004, “Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development”. KYKLOS, vol 57 - 2004 Djankov, S.; McLiesh, C.; Nenova, T.; Shleifer, A.., 2001, “Who Owns the Media?” June 2001 Gregoire, Luc-Joel, “Why development needs good journalism” Statement in “Media and Good Governance” UNESCO. 2005. Hudock, A.., 2003, “Hearing the Voices of the Poor: Encouraging Good Governance and Poverty Reduction through Media Sector Support”, World Learning. May 2003. Hume, E., 2005, “Freedom of the Press”. eJournal USA: Issues of Democracy. December 2005 Kaufmann, D., et al. “Media, Governance and Development. An Empirical Perspective.” World Bank Institute. Presentation at the 1

st Global Forum on Media Development, Amman, Jordan,

October 1st, 2005 Kaufmann, D., “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption” The World Economic Forum • Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 • Chapter 2.1 Roll, R.; Talbott, J., 2001, “Why Many Developing Countries Just Aren’t”. November 2001 Sen, A., 1999, “Development as Freedom”. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Sen, A., “Press Freedom and Development” Excerpts of the speech delivered at the 50th world congress of the International Press Institute in New Delhi (January 26- 29, 2001) World Bank, 2002, “The Media” Chapter in World Development Report 2002 World Bank, 2002, “The Right to Tell. The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development”, WBI DEVELOPMENT STUDIES. Washington, D.C. November 2002