McKeon-The Philosophy of Spinoza (1928)-Introduction.pdf

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THE PHILOSOPHY

OF SPINOZA

INTRODUCTIONHE two and a half centurieswhich have passesince he death of Spinozahave beenprolific incriticism of his work. Much that has beenwrit-

ten about him, to be sure, seems o have sprung from no

more profound motivation than a wish to praiseor defame

but even of seriouscommentary few philosophersbeside

Aristotle can boasta larger critical library. Other details

moreover, of Spinoza's philosophic fortune suggest the

comparisonof Aristotle: even f one were permitted to for-

ge t that he has beenrediscovered af.tera comparative ob-

livion, one would be led by the fervor with which he isacclaimed to expect a scholasticism n modern philosophy

of which he is the Philosopher. Usually when he is not

passed y or execrated n philosophic writings, he is looked

to for a model of logical precisionand acumen,and his per-

vasive awareness f the implications of concepts as apothe

osized him among metaphysicians. Under such circum-

stances here is the danger that any further work seem a

trifling or a presumptuousaddition-either the swelling of

the scholasticism ith anotherglossaryand commentaryror

the undertaking of the magical enterpriseof detailing pre-

cisely what has been in these works for several centuriesFortunately the alternative is not exhaustive, and fortu-

nately, so fa r as t holds, one may guide oneselfby erring a

little on the side of presumption. But the situation is de-

termined somewhatby circumstances ther than only these

the passingof centuries has altered the materials of the

problem; it has added questions,and at very least it has

changed he approach and so has changed he problem too.

An agewhich boasts, s he presentagedoes, f its scientific

pragmatic, and positivistic attitudes may well have lost

in forming itself, the senseof a phitosophy which saw theI

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

possibilityof thoseposturesand avoided them. The intel-

lectualist predilections which are evinced through the

whole deductive ength of Spinoza'ssystemmolds it as no

subsequent hilosophy could be molded. It would be dif-ficult to ignore the consistent unity of purpose which

emerges n any analysisof it, and that unity seems o lay

bare in turn a metaphysicalunity evolved and expounded

in a fortified deductive ogic. The suspicionsuggeststself,even at the outset, ha t the very fact of unity recurs, not as

an accident of presentation,bu t as the solution of ethical,methodologicaland metaphysicalproblems. If, therefore

Spinoza is to be read for the body of doctrine which the

history of philosophy has attached o his name, t may not

be without use o philosophy and to the history of philoso-

phy to inquire into the meaning of this persistentstriving.Excellent reasons ould be found, consequently, or add-

ing one more to the large collection of books on Spinoza

After so much criticism it can not be a questionmerely of

approaching a work critically; the work must be seethrough the confusions and clarifications of two hundred

and fifty years. If it seemprofitable to study the unity of

Spinoza's hought, it is not merely because here are signof unity in his work, but further becausehi s critics have

found such an amazing diversity there. It is difficult to

separate he two, since he history of thought is history and,

although it be a questionof the philosophy of Spinoza, thereflections f Freudenthal, of Gebhardt,and of Brunschvicg

have entered he questionas definitely as any of Spinoza'own ideas. This is a difficulty which leads n some case

to unhappy consequences.There are few doctrines thathave not beendrawn by some critic from the body of Spi-

noza'sphilosophyl and fo r a large part, the criticism of hi s

works has played a game of horror and admiration with

each of the assorted hemes t has found. Accusationsgo

the whole length from atheism to pantheism and god-

intoxicated mysticism. Naturalism and idealism in turn,

materialism and spiritualism, nominalism and realism have

beendrawn with astonishingegerdemain rom the demon

stratidnsof the Ethics.'1 It would scarcely be desirable to rarge the whole body of Spinozana according

to the epithets employed in them. Apart from the fact that this has been done,

INTRODUCTION

Consequently, f there is a carefully conceivedunity inSpinoza's hought, it has been very little apparent in theworks of his critics. They have not lacked occasions hatpermitted them to admire, but their admiration has beenaroused or the most part by acuteand subtle analyses r bysomeparticular doctrine. There has beenuniversalpraisefor Spinoza's examination of the passions;bits from thestudy of the understandingcan be used illustratively, dis-connected rom their metaphysicalsetting; the ethics maybe looked upon as a rare piece of reasoned rdering of in-timate experience; the physics can be passedover unex-amined, since it is antiquated and, so, unessential. Only

rarely have they beenstatedas he inseparableparts of onesystem. Spinoza stated hem so, but it is perhaps natural

that after him there should be more interest n parts of hisphilosophy or in its development han in the dialectical in-terdependence f his doctrines. Yet it seemsunfortunate

that so systematized philosophy shouldbe read in so rag-

mentary a fashionand that the system f this thought should

though not literally nor exhaustively (Ernest Altkirch, Maledictus und Bened'ictus,

Felix Meiner, Leipzig, r9z4), its philosophic importance would be dubious. But

lest the statement of the range of disagreement concerning Spinoza seem exag-

gerated and rhetorical, some examples of each can be adduced with no difrculty.

Atheism and pantheism are perhaps the most wide-spread and most frequently

repeated of the titles. It will sufrce therefore to refer, for atheism, to P. Lami's

Athiisme Renqtersie (Paris, 1696), or to P. Bayle's Dictionnaire Historiqae et

Critique (article Sfinoza: "Il a iti un athie de slstime et tune mithode toute

nouqtelle. .") or his Pensiies dioerses-sur les Comites de I'Annie t68o ("C'hoit

le plus grand Athie, qui ait jamais tti . , ") (see Freudenthal, Lebensgeschichte

Slinoza's (Leipzig, 1889),'pp. z8 and,'g4, for the Bayle quotations); for pantheism

to R. Avenarits, Ueber ilie beiden ersten Phasen des spinozischen Pantheismus

(Leipzig, 1868), This list of either might be increased indefinitely,

Novalis is not only responsible for the phrase "God-intoxicated" but will servetoo as example of both idealistic and realistic tendencies in interpretation. (Frag'

mente qrermischten Inhalts ed. J. Minor; Jena, r9o7. "27, Die wah:re Philosophie

ist durchaus realistircher ld.ealismus - oder Slinozismus (p. r8z) . . , 355.Spinoza ist ein Gott trunkener Mensch. 956 Der Spinozistn ist eine Uebersiittigung

mit Gottheit." (p. zSz) For naturalism see Nourrison, Spinoza et le Naturalisme

Contemforain (Paris, 1886), p. v, "Or, critiquer les enseigmements de Sfinoza,

Cest critiquer ces thiories m?mes, qui ne sont que des oariitis dt Spinozisme, et

que I'on a?fellerait bien en leur afpliquant une dinomination commune, le natural'isme contemporain. Car to{tes elles concluent d n'admetfte Aaatre rialiti que la

nature, c'est-d-dire d)autre ilalitt que I'Uni<ters d es corps."For nominalism see Pollock (Spinoza, His Lile and Philosophy,'London, 1899),

p. r4z. "spinoza's nominalism which we have always to bear in mind, is a suf-

fcient warniug against assuming that the 'eternal things' have anything to do with

kinds, qualities or classification." Powell (spinoza and Rcligion; Chicago, 19o6),

hopes (p. r5o, n. r) "that the traditional habit of referring to Spinoza ar a con-

sistent Nominalist will soon be corrected."



6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

havesunkso ar from view that when t is raisedat all, itis only by

-walof_ rgumentswhich make t seempainfuily

forced and which state t finally in a languageof mixedphilosophic ialects.2

Yet the signs f-rlattemptedconsistencyre oo requen

in the writings of Spinoza o be ignoredwholly. Ev.nthe externals f his work would indicatea unifiedconception. Surely t would be an unprecedentedieceof care-lessnessn a philosopher o put of f metaphysical,ogical,andmoral speculations,sSpinoza id whenhe nterruptedwork on the Ethics and possibly n the Qorrectionof theUnderstanding,o expoundpolitical and theologicaldoc-trines at variancewith his philosophy. There are com-mentators ho would havehim do that. And Spin za was

zNeedlessto say, theseconfusionsof critics have by this time ail been madeconfusions f spinoza. It is remarkable o observehow ihe processesf his thoughtcan be accounted or, how antecedentsor his doctrines can be found in history,and how the supposedweaknesses xposed n his philosophy can be traced iosimple-minded precautions which he did not have the wit to take spinoza hasfound few critics to follow the ideal which he laid in criticism: he could forgethis philosophic beliefs and obliterate himself behind Descartes when he ix-poundedhim. There are few restatements f Spinoza's hilosophywhich advanceig as he advanced Descartes's, n its firmest grounds. See, or example JohnCaftd, Spinoza (Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1888), p. 3:

,,His philosophy s not acompletelyhomogeneousroduct. It may be said to be the compositeesult of con-ficting tendencies, neither of which is followed out to its utmost logical results.',This is then illustrated by the fact that in the part of his philosophywhich is con-cerned with substancehere is no place for finite things, and th" p".t concernedwith individual things has no place for the infinite or see oito willmann,Geschichte es dealismus (Braunschweig,1897), 3 Band, p. ag4:,,SfinozasLehreitt llumper synkretitmus, ohne jeden organischen charaiter, jedei Mystik baarund der Religion entlremdet und gegnerisch. Bei ihr ist alles Mache, irzwungrn,arf den schein angelegt, uuolid; allerorts aufgerafften Anilchten wird durch-d.ensc'hniirleib der geometrischenMethode ainige Fason gegeben; uncterdauteRemi-niszensen aus durchbliitterten Biichern dienen ali Aifputz, lediglich die person-

lichkeit ist der zusammenhaltende aden; et ist recht eigentlich ein "prhtatsystemj'wat.hier <tor leigt! ' Or _see_C.N. Starcke,Baruch'de Spinoza (Copenhagen,1923), p, tz, "9ein Gott irt ein Jehosa in qterbesserter nd mod,ernitiertir Gesiatt.Ivelche Elemente er auch aut anderen Quellen in sich aufnahm, er blieb dochstets seiner Rasse reu. seine Modi sind. aristotelisch,seineAuribute cafiesianisch,aber die Substans st jiidisch."

It ig a significant commentaryon the vast body of spinoza criticism that onewould be at loss o know where to turn for an adequate reatment of spinoza'sphysical doctrines; that the English translationsof his letters, both willis's andElwes's, omit almost everything concernedwith science, ven the very importantLetter vI on Bo5rle'sreatiseon salt-Petre; (seewillis Benedictde spinozi, l-on-'don, r87o, p. l35r "The sequel of this letter is on the constitution of Nitre, the na-ture of its spirit, etc., which could not interest he general reader, and would bepassedover by the chemist"; there is no consideration of the fact that it containsalso significant statementsconcerning-he relation of reason and experimentation);fnally that couchoud (Bcroit de 9|iroza, Paris, r9z4), should thinl it worth em-

INTRODUCTION 7c-ertainlyoo economical nd carefula craftsmano intro-d.ucemetaphysical onsiderationsnto an ethical work, ifthe systemof things as he conceivedt were irrelevant totheconduct f life which hewished o examine. There arecommentatorsor whomeven uch rrelevancesnotenough,since heywould haveBook of theEthics, nstead f serv-lng a pufpose o makemoral action nteltigible,

expoundasystem n which conductcould not be conceived.sTheframework n which-Spinoza,shought s set,evenmorethan this purpose, ndicites a concern-withuniiv. The at-tempt o reducean elaborate hilosophyo a m;thematicalform such hat al l it s doctrines anb; made o depend n afew postulates,ould neverhavebeenmade f t'hesvsremwerenotconceivedsautonomous.The apparatus lone fSpinozats emonstrationsrgues nmistat bty,sinceprop_ositions re eferred o axioms, efinitions, nd propositionsthrough hewhole engthof the ive booksof th€ntttics, thathe supposed is thought to follow through coherentlyand.consistently. The method would be a symptom oi thethoughteven f he wereunaware f its mplicriions,and heseventeenthenturyand spino a wete oo muchconcernedwith method o haveescapedhe truismsconcerningt.phasizing as the frst point of his method (preface,p. vii) that he will uie all thewritings of spinoza, ncluding the non-philosophic ieatisis. yet couchoud so farmisinterprets the nature of spinoza's contribuiion to scienceas to account for hisatti^tu.de_-!y supposed emperamental nfitness or the techniqueof science. (seep. 89) "Malgrd son disir, Slinoxa demeura, en sorntne, tranier d l,ilaboration dccc. que ,rous appelons a "sciencc moderne,r, Il n'aqait du iaeant ni la patience,ni la modestie intellectuelle., Il pensait saisir sur le oif, immIiliatemini, le md-canismedes choses,et, far deld ce micanisme, il eoulait'ioucher I'intime iubtanccaes abes. La science moderne lroclde autrement." santayana, on the contrary,insists( rntroduction

to the-Everyman edition of. he Ethicsl pp.'**-;ti ttot,,th"

highest part of his philosophy" i not in spinoza's eligion ot ior;tio ol.tni", uutin. his physics,yet santayana,regards hese scientific

inquiriesonry as badly ap-

plied.arguments brought up in the interest of symmetiy. ,,The details of thisscientific^speculation,hough interesting and masterly,

"r.no* somewhat anti-

quated; for the status of mathematical physics can hardly seem, o a critical phi-losopher, he same as the status of seli-consciousnesE;nd the bold assumpt-iowhich spinoza makes or the sake of systemand symmetry, hat there is conscious-nesswherever there s extension,s too sweepingarrd oo paradoxical o recommenitself to a seientific mind." clearly spinoza{ achieveinent and intention havebeen open to misinterpretation, if the attributes can come to this.

8See Caird, Slinoza, pp. 3o3-3o+ .,The last word o f Spinoza's philosophyseems o be the contradiction of the first. Not only does he often fuctuate be-tween principles radically irreconcilable, but he seems o reassert at the closeof hie speculationswhat he had denied at the beginniog. . . . at tte outset, inone word, we seem o have, a pantheiatic uuity in which-nator" and man, all'rtemanifold existences f the finite world, are swallowed up

Iat the clore, ari infinite



TFM PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

The striving after unity has left signs more properlyphilosophic than these n Spinoza'sworks, since his phi-

losophyorders tself nicely toward a single goal. No con-siderableporticn of it is wholly free from one preoccupa

tion. There are numerous statements of that problem

since almost every consideration of man or the universyields at some time t o it. The opening pages of the

Treatiseon the Correction of the Understandingarc char-acteristically eloquent: whether there is someGood whichis truly good and able to communicate ts goodness nd bywhich alone he mind could be affectedafter t had rejecteal l other things. That question s reiterated with increasing emphasis. Clear knowledge in any human disciplinewould contribute to solving it. It is significant, oo, thatthe work which contains the rnost complete statement ofSpinoza'sphilosophy, the one which treatsof God and ofthe relations of man to man, to Nature, and to God, should

have been called rn Ethics. The unity of his thought is

indicated there; the Ethics is a work of morals and, in thatobvious sense, ractical. But to be practical it must statit s problem fully. The discussion f physics,metaphysics

and psychologycontributesalways somebit of information

which is essential o a knowledge of the nature of man and

of the manner n which he should ive and act. The Ethics

is, though critical interpretations have almost neglecte

that central aspect o emphasizeothers,an examination of

moral ideals and of human potentialities and circum-

stances; t is no t the occasiononly for metaphysicalspecu

lations and psychological and physical analyses. But if

any knowledge s to be derived from the sciences hich maybear on man's powers and his opportunities, that knowl-

edge will help organize ethical philosophy. "Ethicsshould,tt Spinoza says, tas everyone knows, be based on

metaphysicsand physics."a

The force binding Spinoza's philosophy in a unified

whole, then, is precisely the one which directs the science

to a moral ideal. Obviously knowledge s indispensableor

the examination of ethical problems. It is impossible to

self-conscious mind, in which all finite thought and being f,nd their reality and

explanation."aElistola XXVII (olin g8) to Blyenbergh; IV' r6er6r.

INTRODUCTION

engagen moral inquiry while the natureof good and evilis wholly unknown and unexamined. Even an elementarexperience f things suffices o show that the sameobjecmay begood n onesetof circumstancesnd evil in anotherthat in itself alone t can not begoodor evil, perfector im-perfect,and that therefore here is no good or evil in thenature of things, But theseare metaphysical onsider

tions. Human abilitiesare unequal o a continued isionof thingsas hey are in the eternal order and fixed laws ofNature. Life and experienceead man to conceive hu-man nature more perfect than his own and to seek hemeans ha t will lead him to such a perfection. This isthe origin of notions f goodandperfection;whateverad-vancesman toward that ,moreperfect nature is a truegood; tbe supremegood is that which enables im, to-getherwith other men, o attain to that nature; all sciencand philosophy houldbe useful o that end.

('Whatthat

naturemay be," Spinozasays, I shall show n its proper

place,namely, hat it is the knowledgeof the union whichthe mind haswith the whole of Nature. Therefore this isthe end o which I tend, obviously, o acquiresucha natureand o endeavorhat manyacquire t with me that s, t ispart of my happinesso take care hat manyothersunder-standas do, and hat heir understanding nd desireagrethoroughlywith my understanding nd desire,and in or-der o achievehis t is necessaryo understand smuch con-cerningNature as s needed o acquiresucha nature,andmoreover t is necessaryo form such a societyas wouldbring about hat as many as possible ttain hat nature as

easilyand securely spossible. Again caremustbe takenconcerningMoral Philosophyas well as concerning heTheory of the Educationof Children; and sincehealth snot an unimportantmeanso this end, he whole science fMedicine must be arrangedappropriately, nd finally in-asmuch as many things which are difficult are renderedeasyby art and sincewe cangain a greatdeal of time andbenefit by it, Mechanicsmust by no meansbe despisedBut beforeall elsea methodmustbe thought out of healingthe understanding nd of purifying it asmuch as s possible at the beginning hat t may understandhings ruitfully



ro TIitE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

and without error and as well as possible. From all thisanyonewill now be able o see hat I wish to direct al l sci-ence o one end and goal,namely, hat the highesthumanperfection, swe said,be attained, nd so,al l that doesnotadvance s n the scienceso the end andgoal,mustbe re-jectedasuseless,hat is , to say t in a word, ai l ou r operationsand alsoour thoughtsmustbe directed o this end.ttE

This is reiteratedn a foot note: "There is but oneend nthe scienceso which all mustbe directed."

Consequently,f ethics s to pursuean inquiry into thenature of goodness nd into the meansof attaining thatwhich s good, t i s unavoidablehat t draw on metaphysicand he sciences.But it mustbe seen t the verv outset fthe inquiry-in fact, it should have appeared n what hasbeensaid-that thereare wo ideals nvolved n ethics, otonly the right conductof living, but also he selection fconduct hat will fit to the higher ideal of living and thatwill lead o perfection. There s the good ife which may

be led thoughonehave no unusualpowersof understanding, and here s the perfectionwhich is the status nd thereward of the well-guided ntellect. One must ive in awell-ordered tateand according o the rules ha t lead togoodhealth and riendship o live well. Such hings,how-ever,are externaland not n the controlof man. To knowits highest perfection,mants nature must be considereapart from his circumstancesn relation o the intelligiblenatureof things; t would be tautology o say hat knowl-edgeand metaphysical peculation re neededo attain othis perfection.

At no point, then,can ethicsproceed ertainlywithoutthe aid of science. A knowledgeof the natureof the body,of the mind, of human societymust complement t eachstep he progress f the science f ethics. No question, nthe otherhand,cancomeup which does ot nvolveethicalproflems. When John Bouwmeester rites to ask Spi-noza"if. somemethod s givenor canbe givenby which wecanarrive unhindered ndwithout weariness t the under-standingof the bestof things,or are our minds, ike ourbodies, subject to the vicissitudesof chance and our

6Tract. de Int. Emend.,' II, 8-9.

INTRODUCTION rr

thoughts uled by fortune rather than by skill?',, Spinozarepliesby detailing he "methodby which our clear anddistinct perceptionsmay be directed and concatenated.,tThen he concludesis answer,ti t remains nly to warn youthat assiduousmeditation and a resoluteand mostconstantmind are neededor all thesematters, nd to insure hemit is beforeall necessaryo setup a fixed modeand plan of

living and to prescribe ome efiniteend.,'0 The problemof ethicsslips mperceptibly nto the problem of logic andthe materials elevant o it are drawn from the metaphysicsof thought, since deaswhich are formed from the neces-sity of our nature alone,dependon fixed laws and must betrue.? This is the metaphysical roblemof the relationoffixed and eternal hings o contingentand changing hings;it is the logical problemof the sufficient roundsof cer-tainty; it is the central problem of ethicssince he contem-plationof the best hings s exactly hat knowledge f theunion of our minds with Nature, and such knowledge

makes umanperfection. Bu t meanwhile, ven n a prob-Iem of logic, one mustbe reminded (by admonitions o as-siduousmeditation, o a constantmind and fixed modeofliving) that to arrive at truth is part of a way of l ife andinvolvesmoral considerations.

fn the metaphysicaleaches f thought he end of all activity will be single. There is no difficulry in the fact thatthe intellectual ove of God is at oncebeatitudeand thecontemplation f truth. In fact, this identity in the changing world is the source f the solutionof ethicalproblernNot that action needbe rational. nor need t evenbe subject

to rationalcontrol,bu t logic on the onehand s a function of a living thing, and morality on the other is the de-ductionof rulesor meansor thepracticaluseof the acultyof knowing. Virtue is neither he reward of wisdomnor itsnecessaryrerequisite;t growswith each tem of knowl-edge,whetherof the natureof the universe n which man isplacedor of his relation o its parts. It may be asunifiedas he sourceof being and as diversifiedas he sum of thesciencesfor man s a part of a world andhe s caught n its

eElittola X)O(VII to Bouwmeester; IV, r87-r89.? SeeEfittola XXXVU cited above.



12 THE, PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

logical mplications, ut he s affected irectly ooby thingin it other han himself,movedby his desires ith respeto them,and helpedand hinderedvariouslyby them n at-taining the endshe has set up. Consequentlyf onestarwith a concern or man and his perfection,a completphitosophicnquiry hasbeen nitiated n all its logicalandscientificamifications.

('Forthe bounds f natureare not

the awsof human eason hich are directedonly to the n-terestand preservation f man,but other and nfinite awswhich regard he eternalorderof al l nature, f which manis a particle;al l individuals redeterminedrom the solnecessity f this order to exist and to operate n a fixedmanner. t t

8

The laws of human naturear e o be considered; ut there

are also a ws which determinemantsbody and other bodies

and there are the laws which determinehis relation to the

things of his environment. Finally, the nature of good is

such that goodswill be developedproper to any field in

which man engages: he improvement of his mind, the de-velopment of his body, the continuanceof amicable rela-

tions with other men in ordinary association,n political

society,or in religion. But the summurn bonum must be

sought in none of thesebu t in the law of them all, in the

being of God which sets he order of the universe. The

Ethics falls easily nto a division of subjectswhich takesal l

these nto account,and it is not surprising to find that Spi-

noza'scontemporariesseem o have spoken of it in terms

very much like these. In 1676 Leibniz had not yet seen

the text of the Ethics, but he had spokenof itwith severa

ofSpinoza's riends, and from their conversationhe knew

that it would be "about God, the mind, beatitudeor the idea

of a perfectman, about he medicineof the mind, about the

medicine of the body, etc." e

8 Polit. II, par. vIlI; llI, 279.s"Mons. Tschirnhaus m'a conti beaucou| de choses du liqtre d'e Spinoza. Il.

y a an marchand i Amsterdam, nommi Gillet Genit puto, qui cntletient SPinosa.

Le liqtre de Spinosa sera de Deo, mente, beatitudine seu petfecti hominis id.ea, d.e

Medicina mentis, de Medicina corporis, ctc," Atts Leibniz' Papieren, Die Lebens'

geschichte Spinozds, J. Freudenthal (Leipzig, 1899), p. zor. Somewhat before

this (November l'4, t675) Schuller had requested that Leibniz be permitted to see

the manuscript (Epiilola LXX; IV, 3o3) and Spinoza had refused (Epistola

LXXII; IV, goS).

INTRODUCTION t t

So intimate s the interdependencef all thesestrandsthat Spinozawould havehad o beco,mesystem-builderoexpress vena fragmentarypart of his convictions. TheEthics was to have expounded hat moral centerof hisphilosophy, he knowledgeof the union which the mindhaswith the whole of Nature th:eQomection f the Under-standingwas to supplement hat with the medicine by

which the mind may be brought o a condition n which itmight enter nto that union. But the two had to encroachon each other unavoidably, inceeachas it proceeds e-comesmoreclearly ncompletewithout the otherand eachcould be understood nly if the otherhad alreadybeenex-pressed. In both theEthicsand he Correction f the Un-derstanding,he nquiry is in the interests f the life andcareer f an ndividualbeing,but t is mpossibleo explainwhata thing s or how t will act, f it beconsideredn termsonlyof itself. Thereareproblems onnected ith it whichare problemsof naturalhistoryl to resolve hem the con-

sequencesf the action of other thingsmustbe taken ntoaccount.Other problemsare involved which belong atherto metaphysics,nc ln themare mplicated he endless rin-ciplesby which all thingsare. Whateverwe do andwhat-everwe know is relevant o a universe f thingsactinguponeachother and boundby necessarynd intelligible aws:ultimatelyeach hing is not merely part of a cosmicorderbut an elementn a logicalunity.

The constantecurrence f God as an important principle of explanation n the philosophyof Spinozahas usthis significance. t is a manifestohat there could be no

insignificant vent n theworld which thisphilosophys todescribe; t is scarcely o be wonderedat that there willbe no inconsequentialetail in the philosophy hat is expounded. The fact is particularly mportantsince his isthe philosophy f a man who would direct all the sciencto an ethicalend: the Ethics and the Short Treatisebegiwith an examination f the natureof God; the Treatiseonthe Correctionof the Understandingeadsback to Godand examineshe relationof the humanmind to the metaphysicalstructuresdiscoveredn the Etftics; even he dis-cussionsof the Political Treatise and the Theoloqico



r4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

Political Treatiseare carried very frequently o metaphysical principlesand to God. There is finally an apparatuto bind the whole together; he politics, he theology, helogic, and the ethics,are referred,all, by footnotesand

scholia o the metaphysics. Moral and intellectual udg'

ments renot o be comprehendedully without their metaphysicat mplications:so the Ethicr openswith frankly

metaphysical uestions nd the Treatiseon the Correctioof the (Jnderstanding an proceedonly by referring bacto

((myPhilosophy" or further explanation.toA mathe

matical physicsor a transcendentalpsychologymay bedeveloped, ut without their relation to eachother they are

incomplete, nd that relationcan be explained nly by th

doctrineof God. Religionand politicswill be misunde

stoodand thereforemisdirectedf they are not considerin their proper subordination o God and the laws determinedby his attributes. In a word, although nformatioanddetailsmay be amassedrom experience nd may eve

be constitutednto a body o be calleda science,hat sciencwill not be true knowledgeunless here s a sense f inne

and ogicalnecessityhat binds t to othercertainties:haperception an come rom no experience,ut only from re

flection. This convictionmust be mplicit in the statemeof any part of Spinoza's hilosophy. To bring it out he

had o resort o constanteiteration: hysics, sychology,nethics operateupon identical mechanisms. Any statemeis a partial statement, nly partly, ntelligible in itself ye

each ontributeso the lluminationof otherstatements. t

is not difficult,consequently,o accountor some f themis

interpretationso which Spinozahasbeensubjected: uotations an be found n his works o supportmostof them

Spinoza'sphilosophywould be a difficult and subtleon

to siateeven f it were completely ormulated ashe left it

the articulationand dependencef it s partsarenot perfec

Distinctionsare frequently reiterated o become harponly

gradually;sometimest seems s f definitions re modifie

in repetition. Extension and Thought are defined only

after repeatedexplanations ave made clear how theseat

tributes are to be distinguished rom the traditional one

roTract. de Int. Emend. Notes to pages ro, t2, ar'd 14; alro page 36.

INTRODUCTION I5

and what correlation and what contrast here is to be be-tween them. Sometimeshe difficulty seemso be one ofexpression,or though the language s terselyexactandbeautifullyaccurate,t bears he marksof painiul revision.Since here s somuchmisunderstandingi seems robablethat the work of revisionmay not havebeenperfected rcompleted.

Pot

possiblyhe fault is not alwaysSpinoza's,and if what he meansby, say, dea seemso be labored oits final conception hrough the whole length of Book IIof the Ethics, the confusionsmay not havecome from anyvaguenessn his mind, but from the variety of sensesnwhich we havebeen eading the word since his time.

In expression s well as ideasSpinozastandsbetweentwo ages. \Mithin his lifetime even he languagehe usedhad come to have different meanings. He is 1 contem-porary of the first of the philosopherswe have come tocall modern,but in a significant ense is intellectual el -lowship is with the medievals. This place which he oc.

cupiesn the historyof thought s another ourceor muchof the strange nterpretation that has been ound for hisdoctrineand his terminology. He was concernedargelywith problemswhich occupied he attentionof his prede-cessors; nd except n rare instances,he statementse citedwith approval rom the worksof his contemporaries leasedhim for other reasons, nd because f other impliiations,than hosewhich their authors ad tried most o bring out.The misfortune s that his generationand those hat strc-ceededt have acedaboutand that he expressedis con-victionspartly in termswhich they continuedo use.

But even these eadjustments o not leavethe writingsof Spinoza ormed n a perfectand coherent ody n whichthereare no conflictingdoctrinesand no unfilled lacuneSometimeshedifficultyand he confusion regenuine hil-osophicproblemswhich evolved n the courseof his workand which yield no solution. He was faced, o take oneexample,with the problem of the relation of finite bodieto God. In his first work, it seemed simple problemand he disposed f it : "now to prove that thire is a bodyin Nature, can be no difficult task for us."11 The proof

rt$hort Treatise, Pt. II, ch. xur, p. rr9.



t6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

requires only a knowledge of God and of his attributes

Fifteen years later a correspondent,Tschirnhaus,12 raise

that problem in almost he same erms: ttln the first place

I can conceiveonly with difficulty how the existenceof

boclieswhich have motion and figure can be demonstrate

a priori; sincenothing of the sort-occurs n extension, on-

sidering the thing absolutely.n' Spinoza's reply takes up

other problems raised in the letter, bu t in regard to thishe says nly that if Extensionbe conceivedasDescartes on-

ceived t, that is , as a quiescentmass, t is not only difficult

bu t impossible to demonstrate the existence of things.

Tschirnhaus recognizes and expandson the difficulties in

the caseof Descartes, ut asksSpinoza o indicate('how

the

variety of things can be shown a priori from the concep

of Extension according to your meditations."13 Spinoza

answers ha t the variety of things can not be demonstrate

from the concept of Extension alone, that consequentl

Descarteshad defined matter badly as extension,but that

it must necessarily e explainedthrough an attribute whichexpresses ternal and infinite essence. This position and

statementwere those which in the Short Treatise seeme

to him the solution of the problem. ttBut," he adds now,

"I shall treat of these hings with you more clearly som

da f if life be sufficient. For up to the present have been

able to put nothing concerning thesematters in order." ln

Since that reply, written on the fifteenth of July 1676, s

the next to last of the letters we have of him, life was not

to sufif;ce or removing this difiiculty. But it had been

long enough to indicate that the confident statementof the

Short Treatisewas the statementand not the solution of the

problem: bodies are related to the attribute of Extension;

bu t the mechanism o mediatebetweenbodiesand Extension

was never se t n order. There are other such definite out-

lines in the Ethics which were never to be filled in.

There are consequentlyenough elements of confusio

gatheredabout the works of Spinoza. But it doesnot see

too much to hope that the coherent logical form, which

Spinozastroveso definitely and consistently o confer upon

12E?istolaLXXX (olim 69), May z, 16761 V, s:t.rs Epistola LXXXII, (olim 7t); lY, 333.LaElistola LXXXIII (olim 7z) IY, fil,

INTRODUCTION r7

his philosophy, anbe recoveredn at east he detail that hegave t. Restatement f that unity is neededparticularlysince t can be madewith an emphasis eterminedby criti-cism o which, houghhe couldno thaveanticipatedt, Sp inozahasgiven the implicit answer. From the methodheemployedand from the confidence e had in the efficacy fdeductive r synthetic easoning, ne s ed to expect hat the

answerwill be a consistent nd autonomous octrine. Itmaybe ncompleten some etails,or the unity is a formaone,andconcerned,herefore, otwith the specificnclusioof everything hat is known,but rather with the conceivable manner n which anything hat may be known is tobe ncluded. To say his s only to insiston Spinoza'sirmconviction ha t the search or truths and goodscould beconducted ith profit only afteronehad nvestigated hatis implied in the fact that we can conceive truth or cadesire hat which we conceiveo be good. Then onemayspeakof the power of the intellect and the strengthof th-

emotions. Such an insistencewill bring out forcefullwhat is involved n his philosophy nd will recognize,ooas a properconsequencef this philosophy hat in the agwhich was o go into a madness f observation nd experimentation, e could appraiseBacon's 'little stories" 5andinsist hat Boyle'sexperimentsevealedand could reveanothingwhich was not alreadyknown about he natureofthings.

In view,moreover, f this conviction hat things n theiressencesre articulated n a closesystem,here must in-evitablybe rapid transitions nd reduplicationsrom part

topart

of Spinoza'sphilosophy.

His dominant ethicaconcerneads hrougha metaphysics,nd he unity of pur-pose akeson a philosophic ignificancen that it is baseon a unity found among he factsof physics nd ethicsandmetaphysics.Ethics must be preceded y an analysis fexperiencen termsof essencend existence. For a thingor for an idea to be, t is necessaryot only that a set ofcircumstancesnd antecedentonditions repare or it, bu talso hat it be and exemplify one of a system f essencwhich hascome, n it, into existence.This is the metaphy

a6"Mentis ive perceptionat4 hhtoriolam," Elistola XXXy1I (olin 42)[V , r8 9



I8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

sical unity which is one of the important propertiesofGod's nature; Spinozadevoteshe first part of Book I ofthe Bthics to it. That the existence f God and his sim-plicity are necessarys a statementhat there s an orderin nature; he order s all the mplications nd sequencesfthings,not in time but in essence,o hat, n brief, the na-ture and the sum of things indicatea set of conditions

theseproperly analyzed ollow directly from the natureand attributes f God.

This metaphysical ackground s so very importantbe-cause he waysof knowing and the natureof al l things,including the passions,an be explainedonly in view ofit : they are n final analysis nly the symptoms f the dis-tinction between hings and the metaphysicalbasis ofthings. The natureof no thing saveonly God determinethat it mustexist; that a thing is, is separaterom what itis ,save nly hat o be, t mustbe us t hat. Spinoza ound,for this reason, o direct means f deductionof the exist-

enceof things rom God. It is the reverse f the modernproblemof logic for whereasMill found that any gen-eralization built on experiencewas only tentative andhypothetical, pinozaworking from generalnotions o ex-perience,ound that experiences unreliableand that gen-eralizations eveal rather what a thing must be than whatit is. The wholeproblemwhich appearsn various ormsin differentdepartments f philosophy s here: Spinoza'medievalpredecessorsould have said hat a principle ofindividuationwas neededI in essence thing which existsis no different rom a thing which does ot exist it is bodyor some

equivalentrinciple

which is the cause f all par-ticularity; it s existence epends n physicalantecedentbut to be, t mustbe something. For Spinoza he essencwhich in the realm of ideasand eternal hingsconstitutethe hing thatwhich it i s,becomesn the realm of existenca tendency nd nclination o persist n existence. n manthis is a conatus ecome elf-conscious;t constitutestriv-ing and desire. The contributionof metaphysicso theethicalproblem s preciselyn this restatement:ow can heimpulsewhich comes rom experience nd from thingsbemadecommensurateith the inclinationwhich is the es-senceof the thing. To ask this is to inquire what the

INTRODUCTION

strengthof the passionsnd the powerof the intellectareOr again, t is said hat infinite modesproceedn infi.nitways rom the divine efficacy: he tendency f a body tomove n a straight ine, the tendency f ideas o follow ina sequencef associations,nd the tendency f emotionsofollow in the fulfillments and frustrationsof desires, llthesehave explanationswhich are remarkably similar

But the similarity s to be anticipatedn the metaphysictruth that extension nd thoughtare attributes f God anthat the order and sequencef ideas s identicalwith thorder and sequencef things. An insistence n the unityof Spinoza'shought s an insistence nly on the grounand ntimacyof such nterdependences.

Spinoza s, n the sense adeclearby thispersistentnityand mplied in his constant ross-references,he best ntroduction o himself he s,himself,hisownbest ommentatoHis early works often contain fuller statements f histhoughtsand not infrequently here are given he detaile

reflectionsn which he distinguishes hat he says romwhat would have beenheld traditionally. It is possiblto trace someconceptionshrough perceptible tepsuntilthey arrive finally at an adequate tatement;he repeaterestatementsf a doctrine,by rounding out different approacheso it, may indicate t clearly, hough t be a doctrine which defies accurate exposition; sometimesanearly opinion is definitelyabandoned. n the works expoundedaccording o tlie geometricmethod, statementhat seemquestionable r even unintelligiblemay be il -luminated by the necessary eferenceso doctrinesonwhich they depend. Or analogiesmay be carried fromone realm to another n which the inner continuity s thesame;so the Lemmasof the SecondBook of the Ethicsnot onlystate he physical rinciplesof all bodies, ut llus-trate aswell the fundamental rinciplesof thought.

The plan which this study will follow is determined ythese acts. An attemptwill be made irst to indicate hepossiblenfluences hich entered nto the intellectual or -mation of Spinoza. There are various materialswhichmaybe used o this end: first,what s known of his ife andof his associatesnd his relations o them.and for this wehave testimony n the writings of someof his contempo

r9



THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA

rariesand n his own etters;second, hat is knownof thintellectual influenceshat helped mold his thought, andthese anbe udgedsomewhatrom the ist of bookseft inhis ibrary and rom the citationsof authors n his works andfrom the familiarity which he showswith some raditionaproblemsand discussions.Such'an investigation houlrevealat least he questionshat recurred n his readin

and his reflection;both the possibilityand the utility ofdetermining definitely what philosophy inspired him toany particular ideal or what doctrine nfluencedhim toany conviction,are rather dubious. But the broad ines ofmaterials o be usedand problems o be consideredmaybe marked. Then, on this background,he purposewhichmanifeststself early n theworksof Spinozamaybe racethrough the modifications f his statements.Finally inthe secondpart of. his study the thought of Spinozamaybe examined n a unity and entirety made more definitby this approach. This last can perhapsbe done bestby

tracing he relations f the deas n his matureworks,so aras hat is justifiedby his explicit statement, nd rednforcewhereverpossibleby referenceo the earlier works. Aunity in his thought emerges ut of the dominantpurposwhich animateshis investigations, ut the coherencenwhich the final doctrine is set is not the outgrowth onlyof this conscious irecting; n it the philosophicproblemuncovered long he way find a metaphysicalolution.

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