Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy,A Historiographic Overview With Many Questions

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Market Welfare in the Early-Modern Ottoman Economy: A Historiographic Overview with ManyQuestions Author(s): Relli Shechter Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2005), pp.

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MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY?A HISTORIOGRAPHY OVERVIEW

WITH MANY QUESTIONS

BY

RELLI SHECHTER*

Abstract

In early-modern Ottoman economy the notion of market welfare proposed here meant a sys tem that partially stifled competition and efficiency for the sake of economic stability and

equity for those established within its boundaries.1 Such a system worked even in the face of

political decentralization when economic regulation from "above" (Istanbul and "the state") was seemingly on the wane. Discussing available research and raising questions for future

study, the article examines forms of regulation from the "middle" by local officials/notables,

courts, and economic institutions in cities throughout the Empire and the role of consumers

in economic regulation. The article further suggests why economic opening in a later era of

integration into the world economy gradually put an end to an inward-looking, early-modern economic life.

Dans l'economie ottomane du debut de l'ere moderne (17e-18e siecles), la notion, proposee ici, de bien-etre par le marche signifiait un systeme qui decourageait voire etouffait par tiellement competition et efficacite dans le but d'assurer une stabilite et une equite

economique a ceux compris dans son perimetre. Un tel systeme fonctionnait toujours meme

dans un contexte de decentralisation politique, alors que la regulation economique venue ? d'en haut? (d'lstanbul et de ?l'Etat?) semblait etre en train de s'affaiblir. Considerant la

recherche effectuee a ce sujet et soulevant des nouvelles questions pour une future enquete, le present article etudie des formes de regulation emanant du ? milieu ? et etablies locale

ment par des fonctionnaires/dignitaires, des tribunaux, et des institutions economiques dans

des villes a travers l'Empire, ainsi que le role joue par les consommateurs dans ce proces sus. L'article tente aussi d'expliquer pourquoi l'ouverture economique durant la periode

posterieure, celle de 1'integration dans l'economie mondiale, a mis fin, progressivement, a

une vie economique tournee vers 1'interieur qui a caracterise le debut de l'ere moderne.

Keywords: Markets, welfare, economic history, consumption, Ottoman Empire, early modern

* Relli Shechter, Department of Middle East Studies, Ben-Gurion University, Beer She va, Israel, [email protected] 1 The author would like to thank Iris Agmon, Nimrod Hurvitz, and Dror Ze'evi for com

menting on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution

of the two anonymous readers who made many useful suggestions.

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 JESHO 48,2 Also available online - www.brill.nl



254 relli shechter

Introduction

How are we to understand past economies? What economic goals guided them? Under what principles, social, political, and cultural (religious), did they operate? I approach these questions as a modernist, an economic historian who is a visitor to the study of Ottoman history, but one who has followed the lit erature emerging from this field for the past fifteen years or so. What triggers

my interest in asking such questions is the opportunity to look at a past, differ ent model from the current economic system, but also at a model that has made a lasting impact on contemporary Middle Eastern economies. I am particularly interested in the effect of a local value system on the nature of Ottoman eco

nomic life.

Recent Ottoman historiography of the early-modern era (roughly correspond ing to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) put much effort into refuting older perceptions of the Empire's economic "decline" and counterfactual analy sis, based on perceptions of Ottoman vs. European economic development. As a result, few attempts have been made to offer a broad overview of the princi ples governing the Empire's economic life.2 My intention here is to put forward such an overview of what I consider the centerpiece of early-modern Ottoman

economy, namely the notion of welfare through the market, which, consciously or not, guided the economy during this period.

By welfare through the market (or market-welfare), I mean an economic sys tem that partially stifled competition (and efficiency/growth) for the sake of eco nomic stability and a certain level of equity for those established within its boundaries. Although it had some commonalities with social-welfare and char

ity in providing a safety net for urban dwellers, my discussion of market wel

2 Three such endeavors, which also inspired this article, are Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman

State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman

Empire, 1300-1914, ed. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), see especially the section "The Ottoman Economic Mind," 44-54; ?evket Pamuk, "Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800," Journal

of Interdisciplinary History 35, 2 (Autumn, 2004): 225-247; Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien

Regime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman

Empire," Politics and Society 21, 4 (Dec. 1993): 393-423. Pamuk's A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) further provided a broad perspective on Ottoman economics. See also: Mehmet Bulut, "Reconsideration of the Economic Concepts of the Ottomans and Western Europeans during the Mercantilist Ages" (2002) in http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/meht/papers03/Bulut.doc; M.S. Meyer, "Economic Thought in the Ottoman Empire in the 14th-Early 19th Centuries," Archiv Orientali 57 (1989): 305-318; Ahmet Tabakoglu, "Outlines of the Ottoman Economic

System," in The Great Ottoman, Turkish Civilization, vol. 2, ed. Kemal ?icek (Ankara: Yeni

TUrkiye, 2000), 7-24.



MARKET WELFARE IN THE EARLY-MODERN OTTOMAN ECONOMY 255

fare only briefly touches upon such matters in the case of waqfs (term explained

below). My main purpose here is to set the framework for a better understand

ing of economic and legal institutions, rather than social ones, that provided economic relief to cities. This is not to assert in any way that social and private action did not contribute to welfare. Even more so, in many cases, such as the

guilds, it is hard to distinguish between an economic and a social institution.

The boundaries created here are therefore methodological rather than real ones, to help me better develop the notion of market-welfare.

To the discussion on the historiography of Ottoman economic institutions and

legal systems in the first part of the article, I later add an analysis of the often

neglected demand and consumers' agency in determining the nature of Ottoman

markets (and market-welfare). The unique nature of Ottoman commerce in an

age of European mercantilism is further studied, to demonstrate the interplay between supply and demand in contemporary markets. The article thus offers an

understanding of market welfare that created a "good-enough" economy, but

one that would eventually crumble under external and internal pressures embod

ied in the semi-peripheralization of the Empire as it integrated into the world

economy. It further raises questions for future research along these lines.

I have chosen to focus largely on examples from four urban markets?

Aleppo, Cairo, Istanbul and Izmir. I used as my selection criteria their substan

tial size and the fact that these four markets represented a variety of Ottoman

experiences: Aleppo and Cairo were well-established commercial centers when

the Ottomans captured them and continued to be so throughout most of the

period under discussion.3 During the same era, Izmir developed from a small

town into a boom city with transit markets oriented to international commerce.

Its history well reflects the fortunes of other port-city markets in the Empire, as

the latter was gradually integrated into the world economy. Istanbul's markets

were unique in serving as a centrifugal/pulling economic force that siphoned economic surplus from other parts of the Empire. Even more so, it was in

Istanbul that the state implemented its "classical" policies on the market most

carefully. Ottoman markets were not limited to the cities discussed above; those in

smaller towns and villages throughout the Empire were of no less importance for the majority of the population living in these areas and for the Ottoman state

in general. The relevance of the market-welfare notion to towns and villages can only be gauged from the discussion below, and needs further research.

Large city markets, however, were significant economic engines for Ottoman

3 I cite the relevant literature on the four cities in the appropriate discussion below.



256 RELLI SHECHTER

hinterlands; transitions in such markets had a marked impact on the countryside as well. Furthermore, we only have sufficient research on those markets for

comparative analysis on which to base certain generalizations regarding the Ottoman

economy.

Current historiography and the project ahead

The debate over Ottoman economic "decline" has focused mostly on the

function and the comprehensiveness of the Ottoman command economy and

the impact of political decentralization on early-modern Ottoman economic life.

The term "command economy," sometimes implied by the notion of oriental

despotism, suggests an economy managed by the state from above, with little

interference from society.4 The sultan and the central state bureaucracy, it was

argued, tightly controlled economic surplus by efficient collection, which further

meant restricting capital accumulation beyond the state's elites. Resources were

later re-distributed according to principles denoted by the state.

The notion of "decline" started as long ago as that era itself, with some

Ottoman writers lamenting the departed "golden-era" glory of the Empire as against

grim present realities.5 The theme was taken up by generations of twentieth-cen

tury Ottomanists, further inspired by more recent Turkish atavistic (state-cen

tered) approaches to the economy, essentialist understandings of the Empire, and/or modernization theory.6 Scholars documented an erosion of state control over the economy, which they equated with state deterioration because the state

4 On oriental despotism see Huri Islamoglu-Inan, "Introduction: 'Oriental Despotism' in

World-System Perspective," in The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy, ed. Huri Islamoglu Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3-7. In earlier historiography of the

Ottoman Empire, the notion of oriental despotism mostly designated a centralized political system and raison d'etat; past research devoted only scant attention to the Empire's econ

omy, considering it secondary and redundant for exploration of its cultural/religious and

political "essence." For further discussion on the oriental despotism paradigm in Middle Eastern Studies see: Peter Gran, "Modern Middle East History beyond Oriental Despotism, World History beyond Hegel: An Agenda Article," in New Frontiers in the Social History of

the Middle East, (Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 23, 2), ed. Enid Hill (Cairo: The

American University in Cairo Press, 2001), 162-198. 5 On the writing of Ottoman historians in early seventeenth century see Gabriel Piterberg,

Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play (Berkeley: The University of Cali

fornia Press, 2003). For a briefer analysis of the genre of advice literature of the period see

Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1999), 151-156. 6 For a critical discussion of the "decline" paradigm in Ottoman economic history see:

Roger Owen, "Introduction: The Middle East Economy in the Period of So-called 'Decline'," in his, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914 (London: LB. Tauris, 1993

[1981]), 1-23.




seemingly lost its power and failed to follow its older economic raison detat

based on three principles: provisioning of cities, army, palace, and state offi

cials; increasing the fiscal revenue of the state (by encouraging economic

activity); and preservation of the traditional order.7

More recent historiography, however, shows that a hierarchical and central

ized state never existed independently of peripheral forces, and that the two

closely interacted.8 Consequently, with the exception of Istanbul, a "classical"

Ottoman command economy never fully materialized. Indeed, as suggested by Eldem, ". . . Istanbul constitutes an aberration of a rather paradoxical nature: it

corresponds largely to the dominant ideological and ideal perception of the Ottoman

state in terms of its economic configuration while in fact it represents the most

blatant exception to the general rule of the incapacity of the state to impose this

model on its own territories."9 As we shall see, contemporary scholars also

reconsider decentralization in more favorable terms, demonstrating the benefits

of a more flexible system to the economy as a whole.

Closely related to the notion of "decline" has been the standard convention

of using European mercantilism (comparison with Europe or different countries

in Europe) as an external yardstick to measure economic performance in the

Empire. Such comparisons usually expose the "rigidity" of Ottoman economic

institutions, political system, and ideology/religious belief, which resisted

7 See analysis of the Ottoman command economy in: Mehmet Gene, "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth-Century: General Framework, Characteristic, and Main Trends," in

Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 59-68; Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the

Ottoman Empire, Mosul, 1540-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3-10;

Pamuk, Monetary History, 11-13; Traian Stoianovich "Cities, Capital Accumulation, and the

Ottoman Balkan Command Economy, 1500-1800," in Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 63-65.

8 Karen Barkey suggested a mechanism by which the central state co-opted local forces,

thereby reducing the "costs" of governing a large Empire. See her Bandits and Bureaucrats:

The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). Regional elites, on their part, went through a complimentary process of Ottomanization in which they

adopted Ottoman socio-cultural and political practices as their own. See: Ehud Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites in the Middle East and North Africa, 1700-1900," in Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within, ed. Ilan Pappe and Moshe

Macoz (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 145-162. For case studies that further

demonstrate this point see: Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Khoury, State and

Provincial. 9 Edhem Eldem, "Istanbul: from Imperial to Peripheralized Capital," in The Ottoman City

Between East and West, Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul, by Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and

Bruce Masters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 141.



258 RELLI SHECHTER

change and blocked the way to imported novelties. Such inflexibility stands in

binary opposition to dynamic (evolving) European structures, which facilitated

the development of new technologies, financial institutions, and trade, and

enjoyed export-led growth. This comparison is so widespread that its validity is

usually taken for granted. In using an external economic model, however, scholarship anachronistically

assumed that performance was indeed the Ottomans' main criterion. Furthermore, I argue that in the early-modern Empire growth was one criterion among a

wider set of values related to the function of the economy, and that stability was no less important. My argument is corroborated by recent and more

internally oriented appreciation of the Ottoman economy, emphasizing flexibil

ity and viability of existing institutions in providing the Empire with an ade

quate economic infrastructure,10 thus compensating for the lack of novel ones

like those developed in Europe. A good example here is Hanna's study, which

shows the multi-purpose role of well-established Ottoman courts in supervising contractual transactions and financial services such as credit, deposits, and loans

under one roof.11

The debates over the command economy and the comparisons with Europe suggest that Ottoman historiography is gradually moving away from contrasting

temporally or specially-removed ideal types with early-modern economic reali ties. Yet how are we to understand such realities more fully? Currently, early

modern Ottoman history "unfolds" between two distinct periods. It was preceded

by an earlier, "classical" era of Empire building that lasted roughly until the late sixteenth century, when the Ottomans expanded their territories, placed new

economic resources (mainly agricultural lands) under state control, and engaged in large-scale commercial building projects to revive local economies and

develop trade. The early-modern era was followed by another distinct period that began around the middle of the eighteenth century, but became more

significant throughout the nineteenth century and lasted until World War I

(WWI), when the Ottoman economy went through a process of semi-peripher alization as it gradually merged into the world economy.12 The study of

10 See, for example, Pamuk, "Institutional Change." 11 Nelly Hanna, Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Ismacil Abu Taqiyya,

Egyptian Merchant (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998). See especially chapter three, for the dominant place of the court in the professional life of the merchant Isma'il Abu

Taqiyya, the protagonist of her book. 12 On Ottoman integration into the world economy see Kenneth M. Cuno, The Pasha's

Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840 (Austin:




Ottoman economic history of both the "empire building" and the "integration into the world economy" period is established within these two frameworks; the

task of economic historiography of the early-modern Ottoman Empire is still to

define the modus operandi of contemporary economy and, even more so, to

explain its meaning.

Ottoman "privatization" and the "circle of justice"

Salzmann's revisionist work on changes in the political economy of the

Empire transformed the way we now consider early-modern Ottoman decentral

ization.13 Her work examined shifts in the iltizam and later malikane methods

of landholding and surplus extraction as a more or less conscious attempt by the ruling elites to reform a malfunctioning economic system and adjust it to

contemporary needs. Such reforms further encouraged stronger alliances between political elites in Istanbul and those of various provinces within the

Empire, based on the creation of the "vazirite firm," a vertical integration that

relied on patronage, whose aim was to compete successfully for state contracts.

Taxes and other sources of revenue farming supplied the growing needs of the

Ottoman state for cash and served to raise large sums in advance when the state was in critical financial straits. The overall effect of such shifts on the Empire as a whole was a more efficient economic system, more workable in the con

temporary conditions of a mature Empire.

Although providing a good political-economic framework, Salzmann's work does not cover the effects of such "privatization" on the economic welfare of

Ottoman subjects. This was a significant aspect of contemporary transitions because

the iltizam and malikane in effect broke or at least weakened existing top-down mechanisms of checks and balances, which were embodied in the older system and justified by the principles of the Ottoman "circle of justice" (sometimes called "circle of equity"). According to the latter, the state was responsible for

political-economic equilibrium, expressed as follows: "A ruler could have no

power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well

being of the subjects, and no well-being without justice."14 I would suggest that

University of Texas Press, 1979); Islamoglu-Inan, Ottoman Empire', Re?at Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth-Century (Albany, NY: SUNY

Press, 1988); Owen, Middle East, ?evket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment, and Production (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer

sity Press, 1987). 13

Salzmann, "Ancien Regime." 14 Bulut, "Reconsideration," fn. 10, n.p., cited from H. inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional



260 RELLI SHECHTER

such a modus vivendi meant settling for an economy whose guiding principles were quite different from our own economic thinking, emphasizing socio-politi cal cohesion over performance and growth through competition; the Ottomans were ready to settle for a "good-enough" economic system that met such a goal.

With a more hierarchical (centralized) government and command economy

type control, the sultan and his immediate ruling elite were (in principle at least) in a better position in the past to cater to the socio-economic welfare of their

subjects. This was by controlling intermediaries within the ruling elite, who oth erwise might squeeze the population. Indeed, the commercialization of taxation

and surplus extraction meant a system where maximization of profits was cen

tral; with it came the potential increase of exploitation, especially as the new

system did not officially provide new ways to curtail such injustices by the cen

tral government. This was true for agriculture, but also for industry, commerce, and services in the city, all impacted by decentralization.

Can we suggest the continuation of an economic modus vivendi emphasizing welfare through the market even though the centralized system that supported it

in the past was on the wane? I argue that implementing such a system did not

require a fully centralized, state-led command economy. Indeed, in a period of

decentralization, with the exception of Istanbul, it was local economic institu

tions, such as religious endowments (waqf) and guilds (tariqa, ta'ifa, hirfa, in

Arabic or esnaf in Turkish) that operated midway between government and pri vate interests to uphold economic welfare through tight market regulation. The

qadi and the court system also played a significant role in upholding justice in markets. Furthermore, consumers (sometimes in the form of public opinion) resisted economic injustices, and their agency in deciding what to buy was more

significant than any written law. In Polanyi's terms, while centricity gradually receded, redistribution and reciprocity took other, local forms that kept market

welfare a lively principle of the economy.15 The system outlined above provided (mostly urban) populations with minimal

standards of living through fixing quantity and prices of commodities, especially in times of shortage. In addition, it guaranteed industries a more or less regular

supply of affordable raw material. Welfare through the market also meant pro tection of employment, and perhaps also stabilizing commercial rents through

Society," in Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. R. Ward and D. Rustow

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), also N. Itzkowitz, The Ottoman Empire and

Islamic Tradition (New York: n.p., 1972). No page mentioned for both citations; Meyer, "Economic

Thought," 307; based on N. Berkes, Turkiye iktisat tarihi, vol. 2 (Istanbul: n.p., 1972), 325. 15 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). See especially

chapter four.




the operations of local waqfs. The crux of my argument here is that the Empire's economy continued to be highly regulated even after decentralization. However, such regulation was carried by a broad consensus from the middle (in both geo

graphical and social terms) rather than being a top-down affair (regulated by a

command economy "from above"). Such economic regulation did not provide equality in the market for all. As

Raymond has emphasized, Ottoman city dwellers were far from being equal in

their earnings or their housing facilities.16 Moreover, it did not mean that city inhabitants were immune from being squeezed by local officials, for example,

by special taxation (avariz). However, this economic system did support exist

ing interests of large social segments such as organized labor. It further allowed

preferential treatment to city dwellers in face of newcomers from the country side, and protected them from extreme hardship (starvation). Its existence indi

cated a wide interest in economic stability, which was expressed from the mid

dle as well as from above and manifested a desire for a moral economy in

which markets were embedded in socio-cultural and political relations that

secured such interest.

Another gap in market regulation and the welfare through the market that it

implied was the treatment of the peasantry. The majority of Ottomans living in

the countryside were less protected from economic distress and natural or man

made disasters. Peasants surely resisted being squeezed of surplus in a variety of ways, ranging from hiding part of the crops to abandoning the land or even

resorting to armed struggle. They also petitioned local officials or even the sul

tan, and aired injustices in court. While such manifestations of peasant agency should not go unnoticed, the main beneficiaries of the existing economic system

were cities' middle-strata whose voice (and actions) counted more in contem

porary Ottoman political and economic settings.

Waqfs, guilds, and market welfare

In light of the above, I now further elaborate on the notion of regulation from the middle and market welfare by discussing the role of religious endowments and guilds in early-modern times. During an initial period of Empire building, the waqf, an old Islamic economic and welfare (redistributive) institution, served as a key tool for state economic development projects. The growth of

markets in Istanbul, Aleppo, and Cairo after the Ottoman conquest illustrated

16 Andre Raymond, "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 21, 1 (1994): 3-18.



262 RELLI SHECHTER

well its efficiency in enhancing urban economies and the potential inherent

in the new Empire, which would reap the benefits of new economies-of-scale

for local agriculture, industry, and commerce.17 Even after this "classical" era

of concentrated state-sponsored development, the waqf institution remained

dynamic and its presence was far from diminishing economic transformation, as past literature sometimes implied.18 During early-modern times, some waqf revenues were surely siphoned off to support administrators, especially in cases

where they were descendants of the waqf's founder, and such "carrying

charges" did not benefit the community at large. Nevertheless, waqf institutions were important in the day-to-day running of the city economy.19 The waqf was

a significant player in commercial real-estate markets and as such it had a

major role in determining rents. While requiring future research, it may be

argued that the waqf provided economic stability by keeping low rents. Taken

from another era, Geertz's discussion of the role of the habus (the local waqf) in Sefrou, a medium-sized Moroccan city in the 1960s, may provide some illus

tration to this point.20 In its other capacity as a redistributive mechanism, the waqf channeled funds

directly from markets (rather than through the state) to religious establishments

and facilitated religious practice, for example, in paying for the provisions of

mosques, and religious seminars (madrase).21 It also provided immediate eco

17 After the occupation of Istanbul, Mehmet the Conqueror reconstructed and built new

markets in the city in order to revive the economy of his new capital and the Empire at large (Inalcik, "Ottoman State," 18-19). The presence of Empire significantly reduced security costs and facilitated a more or less unified legal and taxation system, enhancing local, inter

regional, and international commerce. This was demonstrated well in the case of Aleppo and

Cairo, which benefited from the incorporation of the Mamluk state into the Ottoman Empire. Masters showed that construction of commercial establishments in Aleppo was a proxy for economic growth: their number more than doubled the commercial core of the city (al

madina) in the first half century of Ottoman rule (Bruce Masters, "Aleppo: the Ottoman

Empire's Caravan City," in Ottoman City, 26). Raymond discussed for Cairo a similar but

slightly smaller growth of about a third in the same period. According to Raymond, during Ottoman times we find 57 new markets out of a total of 144 in the city, and 228 new cara

vanserais out of a total of 348. See his contribution to "Suq" in Encyclopaedia of Islam (EI), vol. 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1997 [new edition]), 792.

18 Miriam Hoexter," Waqf Studies in the Twentieth Century: The State of the Art," Journal

of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41, 4 (1998): 479-481. 19 Ibid. 480-483. 20

Clifford Geertz, "Suq: The Bazaar Economy in Sefrou," in Meaning and Order in

Moroccan Society, Three Essays in Cultural Analysis, by Clifford Geertz, Hildrad Geertz, and

Lawrence Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 123-244. 21 The role of waqfs as social and economic welfare providers was recently discussed in

Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer, eds., Poverty and Charity in Middle East Con texts (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003); Mine Ener, Managing Egypt's Poor and the Politics

of Benevolence, 1800-1952 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), chapter one.




nomic relief for the poor through imaret (kitchen soup) complexes attached to

large city mosques. Waqfs further routed foodstuffs and raw material from the

countryside to cities. Through such a direct, and possibly indirect (rent) welfare

mechanisms, religious endowments demonstrated a socio-cultural preference for

redistribution of private wealth through social projects, as opposed to accumu

lation and re-investment of economic resources. Even more so, waqfs stabilized urban economic life and provided a safety net for mostly city dwellers, with lit

tle involvement by the central government.

Early modern guilds regulated professional life in cities and ensured much

stability in industry and commerce. They also shielded established economic actors against the encroachment of newcomers of various sorts (local and for

eign) by raising high legal barriers to entry into markets. In this they served as

another pillar of social welfare through the market. The analysis above further

finds support in recent scholarship arising from the debate on the place of the

guilds between state and society. For Lewis, and later Baer, the guild was an institution through which the

state and local authorities regulated the economic and personal behavior of indi

viduals.22 The guilds also served as conduits for surplus extraction from urban

subjects. Mantran and others took an opposite approach, which emphasized the autonomy of guilds as craft unions (and a nascent "civil society"). From this

perspective, the guilds mediated internal conflicts and served as a collective

bargaining tool in their negotiations with other players in the market. This

approach further emphasized the sovereignty of guilds as social mechanisms aimed at ensuring a stable labor market by providing security at work, protec tion from unrestrained competition, and a grip on price of labor, number of

employees, and production quotas.

Contemporary research on Ottoman guilds suggests an intermediary position between the role of guilds from above and from the middle. Eldem has sug

gested that for Istanbul ". . . the guild structure was a two-edged sword which both granted a form of autonomy and self-control to the esnaf, and potentially contributed to their relative neutralization and easier control by the state."23 Ghazaleh reached the same conclusion for Cairo: ". . . we should postulate nei

ther state control nor autonomy to understand the structure and role of the

22 For the contour of the historiographie debate on guilds see Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and

Change, 1590-1699," in Economic and Social History, 586-589. Pascale Ghazaleh, "The Guilds between Tradition and Modernity," in The State and Its Servants, Administration in

Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present, ed. Nelly Hanna (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995), 60-69.

23 Eldem, "Istanbul," 161.



264 RELLI SHECHTER

guilds in Cairo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An examination of

the guilds' internal organization further demonstrates the guilds' complex rela

tionship with the state and society, on the one hand, and the scope of their inde

pendence concerning decision-making on the other."24 Marcus developed a sim

ilar argument for Aleppo "[T]he guild system operated outside government, but

not independently of it. The latitude of the guilds was restricted by the interests

of other groups, by the existing laws, and by the economic policies and inter

ests of the state. Although not entirely instruments of government, they did sub

mit to various forms official oversight which affirmed the limits of their inde

pendent authority."25 The quotes above reinforce the impression that the guilds were part of a "decentralized urban regime" of notables, suggested by Chal

craft,26 which sits well with my argument of market welfare regulated from the

middle.

Economic justice and governance through the legal system

Although economic welfare through both guilds and religious endowments was not solely dependent on its implementation from above, it did require legit

imacy and the occasional use of force to impose the law; the institutions that

regulated the local economy were dependent on mechanisms outside the market to maintain their efficacy and control over economic affairs.

The legal system played a major role in the daily running of guilds as their

members brought their internal affairs to court. The court also resolved griev ances between guilds and other players, including state officials who operated in the same sphere. It further empowered the guilds in restricting competition from outside, by creating legal barriers for entry into already established mar

kets. McGowan suggested that during the eighteenth century, due to migration into towns, the most common complaint of guilds to the courts was against pressure of entry by newcomers into trades.27 The courts facilitated cross

Ottoman and cross-Islamic economic activity (e.g., the case of Muslim Indian

traders in the Empire),28 and even substituted modern financial institutions by

24 Ghazaleh, "Guilds," 65.

25 Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity, Aleppo in the Eighteenth

Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 173. 26 John Chalcraft, "The Striking Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in

Egypt, 1863-1914," unpublished dissertation (New York University, 2001), 9-15. 27

Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812," in Economic and Social History, 697. For Jerusalem see: Dror Ze'evi, An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem in the

1600s (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 158. 28

Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 524-525.




allowing complicated transactions.29 Ottoman courts supported the administra

tion of waqfs as well, providing the legal framework for establishing endow

ments and overseeing future matters related to their management. The legal system contributed to welfare through the market more immedi

ately, through direct interference in markets. Significant to our discussion here, but still awaiting adequate treatment in the literature, are the transitions over

time in the tasks of the muhtasib (the market regulator assigned by the qadi) and his many lieutenants.30 A major difficulty in evaluating their role is that any

investigation of locally-based officials would reflect geographical differences in

their functions, and even their mere existence. Thus, before the eighteenth cen

tury in Aleppo, the hisba disappeared altogether.31 In Egypt, the position of the

muhtasib was abolished only under Mehmet Ali.32 In Istanbul, the seat of gov ernment, the hisba also lasted until the tanzimat (reforms) of 1826.33 However, the co-existence of muhtasibs in Cairo and Istanbul did not necessarily mean

that they carried the same weight and responsibilities. The qadi, who was in charge of the muhtasib, was also responsible for other

market officials such as the kayyal (the person responsible for weights and mea

sures) and for the regulation of prices by determining narh (ceiling) prices, the

latter especially in times of economic hardship.34 Research has to pay more

attention to the role of officials in markets, and the degree to which narh actu

ally determined prices, before we can better evaluate the immediate impact of

legal-religious players in early-modern markets.

The impact of the qadi and the court went beyond regulating and adminis

trating practical solutions in the day-to-day running of markets. Their deep involvement in market life meant that the courts were crucial in upholding the

principles guiding such economy. It may even be argued that they served as a

29 In her Making Big Money, Hanna demonstrates the regularity at which merchants went

to the courts, convincingly pointing out their significant role as facilitators of commercial life.

See especially chapter three. 30 On the hisba (ihtisab in Ottoman sources), the institution of market regulation see:

"Hisba," in EI, vol. 3, 485-490. The muhtasib operated according to a religious mandate of

"commanding right and forbidding wrong" when assuming (theoretically at least) three tasks:

enforcing just business conduct among those who made a living in the market in both indus

try and trade, intervening in markets in times of crisis to secure minimal standards of living, and taxing the working population. 31

Marcus, Middle East, 173. 32 Gabriel Baer, Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society,

1964), 44. 33 R. Mantran in "Hisba;' in EI, vol. 3, 489. 34 M. S. Kutukoglu in "Narh" in EI, vol. 7, 964-965. Inalcik ("Ottoman State," 46) con

sidered the narh a central tool in an Ottoman "economy of plenty."



266 RELLI SHECHTER

buffer between transitions in state politics and local economic transformation.

This argument resonates well with Masters' discussion of the centrality of

Islamic law in prohibiting structural economic change in Aleppo's economy: "The law's interpretation could change. We have evidence of this in the allow al

of interest under the legal guise of terming it profit rather than usury and in the

seemingly antiguild rulings of eighteenth-century Aleppo. But even in these

cases, the underlying ideology of justice in the marketplace, including the idea

of fair pricing, the sanctity of contract, and the right for labor to receive a just wage, makes us wonder whether conditions for a capitalist protoindustry such as arose in Europe could ever have appeared in Aleppo without a total collapse of the Ottoman system of government, with its courts and bureaucrats."35

Although we are less interested in "preconditions" that would make the

Empire's economy more like Europe's, Masters is right in emphasizing the cen

tral place of the courts and law in safeguarding the principles of the Empire's economy. Such principles would only collapse when a new Ottoman political economy was shaped under the (external and internal) impact of the integration of the Empire into the world economy, especially during the nineteenth century. The re-centralized (post-tanzimat) state stipulated new commercial laws and

reformed the court system. Furthermore, an important sector of foreign and

minority businessmen now running lucrative chunks of the local economy

totally circumvented local courts and developed European-like financial institu

tions that would take on many of the courts' earlier tasks.

Provisioning, consumption, and stratification

So far I have centered the discussion on economic institutions, the legal sys tem, and their impact on the supply side of the economy. However, demand was

also regulated; its study is significant in outlining the influence of market wel

fare on consumption in the Empire. In Ottoman economic orthodox thinking,

provisioning replaced a value-free market equilibrium by socio-cultural and

political principles of redistribution, which determined differential levels of con

sumption outside the marketplace. Provisioning aimed at two main goals: first, it stood for financially rewarding the bureaucracy and the military for running the state. Second, it was to ensure an adequate supply of foodstuffs and com

modities to markets in large cities where most state elites lived, and where

35 Bruce Masters, The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East:

Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750 (New York: New York

University Press, 1988), 221.




political unrest, the result of insufficient resources, could seriously threaten Ottoman

authority. As research demonstrates, neither of these tasks was ever simple because the

state constantly competed with other players over availability and price. In fact,

provisioning was used on a regular basis only in Istanbul, the principal seat of

government and the largest city in the Empire, and even there not always suc

cessfully. For example, during the early seventeenth century there was much

timber smuggling from northwestern Anatolia, an area designated to send wood to the Arsenal in Istanbul because prices for wood in Cairo were much higher.36

Although other cities did not exert enough economic (and political) domi nance to allow such an efficient siphoning off of surplus, and provisioning poli cies were less strictly imposed, local authorities did pay much attention to sec

uring minimal standards of living for city dwellers. Indeed, supplying Damascus

with reasonably-priced grain was important enough to serve as an index for

good governance.37 Grain was crucial for the survival of the city's inhabitants.

Its availability in city markets in times of scarcity meant that local authorities were savvy or powerful enough to organize its supply in face of competition from other players who interfered with the local grain market to enhance their

profits. Provisioning of cities in times of crisis would be a cause of much pull from the countryside, where the authorities cared less about such matters.

The introduction of coffee in the mid-sixteenth century and of tobacco at the turn of the seventeenth well demonstrate the political economy of consumption

regulation in the Empire in this period.38 The introduction of these two com

modities was highly contested by the authorities on religious and moral grounds, as well as for hygienic, health, and financial reasons. Tobacco smoking was

also deemed unsafe as a fire hazard. Taking either substance was initially out

lawed, at times under the strictest penalties. But they were both enthusiastically adopted by users of various social backgrounds, and their consumption became a leading socio-cultural practice. The cases of coffee and tobacco well exem

plify how changing consumer preferences played an active part in shaping local demand even when banned by the state and condemned by religious authorities.

36 Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," 493.

37 James Paul Grehan, "Culture and Consumption in Eighteenth-Century Damascus,"

unpublished dissertation (Austin: University of Texas, 1999), 110. 38

On coffee see: Ralph S. Hattox, Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social

Beverage in the Medieval Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985); Cengiz Kirli, "The Struggle Over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845," unpublished dissertation (Binghamton, NY: Binghamton University, State University of New York, 2000),

chapter one. On tobacco see Relli Shechter, Smoking, Culture, and Economy in the Middle East: The Egyptian Tobacco Market c!850-2000 (London: LB. Tauris, forthcoming), chapter one.



268 RELLI SHECHTER

The interplay between Ottoman sumptuary laws and local dress codes is

another illustration of the relations between market regulation and the agency of consumers seeking to break away from it. Ottoman sumptuary laws, first

codified during the time of Suleiman Qanuni, aimed at creating social distinc

tions for different ethnic and religious communities and professional affiliations.

Even more, they were to differentiate between the ruling bureaucratic, military, and religious elites and their subjects. This avenue of social stratification, how

ever, proved as dependent on consumer choice as on top-down enforcement of

the law. In the late eighteenth century local officials in Aleppo enforced sump

tuary laws to demonstrate authority, or simply to extort money or humiliate the

Christian minority of the city.39 Nevertheless, it was Ottoman consumers who

ultimately decided what to wear, based more on personal and group preferences than on official dictates. In fact, we may probably time the emergence of new

fashions in attire by the dates on which sumptuary laws re-emerged.40 For the

eighteenth century, Zilfi suggested that the many laws that attempted to re

impose past dress codes in fact clearly indicated an anxiety over erosion in the

power of the Ottoman government and over breakdown of communal identities

associated with past clothing regimes.41 Jirousek argued that between 1550 and 1800 men's wear changed slightly.42

Women's clothes began to change earlier, around the turn of the eighteenth cen

tury, because while encouraging inter-elite competition this was kept indoors?

literally, within the Ottoman harems, and symbolically, within the boundaries of

the state elite. In this context, women's clothing and other forms of conspicu

ous consumption replaced older modes of internal elite competition, and stratifica

tion through consumption became politically important. The introduction of new fashions also led to the gradual destabilization of textile production and

the growing impact of foreign commerce on the local economy.43 Noteworthy here is the fact that the Ottoman ruling elite, supposedly the guardians of the

Empire's economic traditions, played a subversive economic role in developing new demands.

39 Marcus, Middle East, 98-99; Masters, "Aleppo," 58-59.

40 Donald Quataert, "Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720

1829," International Journal of Middle East Studies 29, 3 (1997): 404. 41 Madeline C. Zilfi, "Goods in the Mahalle: Distributional Encounters in Eighteenth

Century Istanbul," in Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550

1922: An Introduction, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2000), 297. 42 Charlotte Jirousek, "The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman

Empire," in Consumption Studies, 211, based on Hiilya Tezcan and Selma Deliba?, The Top

kapi Saray Museum: Costumes, Embroideries, and Other Textiles (London: n.p., 1986), 26. 43

Eldem, "Istanbul," 179-196; Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the

Industrial Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3-4.




In the early eighteenth century (the tulip era) notions of intra-elite compe tition and stratification-through-consumption materialized in the unprecedented

building of palaces along the banks of the Bosphoros. This activity raised the

demand for imported household and other luxury items, and changed elite food

consumption habits.44 The era itself received its name from the renewed craze

for outdoor gardens planted with expensive tulips and the decoration of a vari

ety of commodities in the shape of the tulip. In 1730, however, such conspicu ous consumption was fiercely resisted, and brought to a halt by a revolt that

erupted from the most densely populated quarters of Istanbul.45

The revolt reflected dissatisfaction with contemporary politics (mainly the fall

of Tabriz to the Iranians, which triggered a sense of insecurity among the inhab

itants of the capital) and was not directed against upper class consumption itself; such consumption provided work for many in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the

revolt did set itself against the use of much needed public space for planting

tulips, and against lavish private spending at a time when the majority of the

city's population experienced economic hardships and insecurity. It implied that

conspicuous consumption could be tolerated only in periods of relative peace and prosperity, and when serving the interest of the community as a whole

through stimulating local production and commerce. The overthrow of Ahmet

III as well as the destruction of Saadabad palace and its tulip gardens sounded a call for a return to a moral economy in this new time of need, one that would

improve the welfare of Istanbul's residents at large. The ending of the tulip era marked a temporary setback in elite consumption

preferences, but this process proved unstoppable in the changing economic and

political sphere of the Empire. During the eighteenth century a new commercial

bourgeoisie consisting of ethnic and religious minorities and a relatively small

group of Muslims took over this trend, and even outpaced state and military elites in its adoption and adaptation of Western consumption patterns.46 It was

44 TuTay Artan, "Aspects of the Ottoman Elite's Food Consumption: Looking for 'Staples,'

'Luxuries,' and 'Delicacies' in a Changing Century;" Ariel Salzmann, "The Age of Tulips: Confluence and Conflict in Early Modern Consumer Culture (1550-1730)," both in

Consumption Studies, 107-200 and 83-106 respectively. 45 On the revolt and its consequences see Salzmann, "Age of Tulips," 94-98. The revolt was not the first instance in Islamic history of acts against the elite's conspicuous consump tion. See, for example, Hanbali criticism of court consumption habits in Baghdad in Nimrod

Hurvitz, "From Scholarly Circles to Mass Movement: The Formation of Legal Communities in Islamic Societies," The American Historical Review 108, 4 (October, 2003), 994-998. I

thank the author for bringing this information to my attention. 46 Fatma Miige Gocek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Western

ization and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chapter 3.



270 RELLI SHECHTER

only during the nineteenth century that mass consumption patterns began to

change. However, the development of new consumption habits among the rul

ing elites and later the commercial bourgeoisie paved the way for future

changes in local demand. Such changes are little discussed in much of the

literature on the integration of the Empire into the world economy, where the

European impact on local markets is most often studied. Still, it has great poten tial for explaining why some Ottoman players gradually replaced the notion of

market welfare with that of free market, which better suited their interests.

Capitulations, breaking away from the "old" economy, and market welfare

Regulation and the market welfare it supported could only be maintained as

long as the Empire's economy was inward-looking and relatively secluded from

other economies. Faroqhi and Quataert rightly emphasize that we should not

over-estimate the significance of European (and international) commerce in Ottoman

markets during the period under discussion or even later during the nineteenth

century.47 This is true for the volume of imported as opposed to local trade and

for the financial contribution of imports and exports to the Ottoman economy. Still, the impact of cross-border commerce was more significant than its imme

diate (concrete) contribution in "freeing" Ottoman markets from regulation and

leading the way to integration with the world economy. The Ottomans themselves were aware early on of the potentially subversive

role of foreign trade, and while acknowledging its importance attempted to con

trol it via the capitulation system.48 The Ottomans were also ready to allow such commerce locally by ethnic and religious minorities, which would be dependent on elite patronage and find it difficult to translate money into power outside the

existing system.49 However, forestalling major change in their political-econ

47 Suraiya Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire

(London: LB. Tauris, 2000), 50; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 126. 48 The Ottomans regulated international trade by giving favorable trading rights to amica

ble states. In the capitulations the Ottoman government seceded some of its sovereignty by

allowing European traders to conduct commerce in the Empire under favorable conditions. In

allocating restricted political and economic rights to chosen states, the Ottomans improved their political ties with these countries. The capitulation also assured the inflow of needed raw materials, foodstuffs, and luxury items, the latter much sought after by the local elite.

They further enabled the Ottomans to fill their coffers from customs duties on imported

goods. Thus, the Ottomans' favorable trading rights bestowed on friendly countries were also

beneficial to their state. Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman State," 188-190. 49 Curtin suggested that apart from direct military intervention, cross-cultural trade was a

powerful external stimulus of change and disruption in any existing socio-economic system.




omy, they would not allow significant stray from their orthodoxy of keeping

significant economic-turned-political actors at bay. Thus, Pamuk rightly sug

gested that: "Despite the general trend toward decentralizations of the empire

during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, merchants and domestic pro ducers?the leading proponents and developers of mercantilist policies in

Europe?never became powerful enough in the empire to sway the Ottoman

government to deviate from its traditional ways."50 To prove the Ottomans right in their suspicion of cross-boarder commerce,

the discussion below highlights the role of international trade in transforming the local economy and gradually ending early modern regulation and market

welfare.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the Ottomans remained a

significant power in respect of Europe, they kept tight control over foreign trad

ing communities, and capitulation agreements were honored only selectively.51

Supervision of the implementation of the capitulations was also intentionally

delegated to relatively low-level officials, to emphasize the unequal relations between

the Empire and subjects of European states. European merchants had to play the

local power game to be allowed access to markets. This was well demonstrated

in the organization of foreign merchant communities (called "nations"). Consuls, whose appointment was approved by the Ottoman state, headed these commu

nities, and their sovereignty over their communities and in relations to other

players in the market depended on their ability to negotiate with central and

local officials. As Eldem puts it for Istanbul: ". . . similarly to the Ottomans

themselves, French traders consciously relied on non-economic interventions

provided by their own political agents or imposed on the bureaucratic structures

of the Ottoman state itself."52 Foreign merchant communities were thus inte

grated into the Ottoman political economy that governed local markets.

One significant outcome of the above was that the implementation of capit ulations in various urban markets depended on center-periphery relations within

the Empire. The presence of strong local officials or potent local notables meant

that the state found it hard to enforce agreements it signed, even after a foreign consul would send his complaint to Istanbul. During the first part of the seven

Delegating such necessary evil to relatively weak social groups largely mitigated the poten tial threat of international trade. Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1. 50

Pamuk, "Institutional Change," 246. 51

Daniel Goffman, "The Capitulations and the Question of Authority in Levantine Trade,

1600-1650," Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986): 155-161. 52

Eldem, "Istanbul," 192-193.



272 RELLI SHECHTER

teenth century, foreign consuls in Izmir cooperated with strong local powers at

the expense of the central government.53 The capitulations were most strongly adhered to in Istanbul, under the close supervision of the Ottoman government.

Regulation of international trade through the capitulations system was so

significant that the breakdown of its initial rules of the game, and their gradual substitution by ones presenting European dominance, had a profound effect on

the Ottoman economy. In 1740 a renewed Franco-Ottoman capitulations agree ment became a turning point, at which a strong European state dictated and

backed new terms of trade, which clearly favored French merchants.54 As a

result, foreign merchants and their consuls gradually became significant pro moters of export-led revenues and local power brokers in their own right, at

times even at the expense of central and local Ottoman ruling elites. This was

one of the most significant factors leading to the semi-peripheralization of the

Ottoman economy in the newly established European world economy. Economic

integration, however, took place not only at the behest of European powers but

also as a result of local interest groups (producers, merchants, and consumers) who had a stake in the process. Such opening up of the economy meant the

beginning of the end for an inward-looking and highly regulated early modern

economy, which benefited the state, local elites, and urban middle-strata.

Conclusion

The article argued for a broader view of the early-modern Ottoman economy,

expressed from the perspective of market welfare, which was embedded in the

local value system and the institutions that regulated economic life. This con

tinued to be the case even when a top-down command economy (of sorts) grad ually disappeared and was replaced by local regulation from the middle. The Ottomans opted for a "good enough," stable economy that protected the inter ests of those established in the system.

During the early-modern era of decentralization, the classical "circle of jus tice" maxim was re-translated into local action rather than taken up by the sul tan and his entourage. City provisioning was adhered to as a proxy of good governance, especially at times of economic trouble (food shortages). Further

more, the qadi and local courts administered the law in ways that facilitated

protectionism, catering to the interests of local production and commerce in the

53 Daniel Goffman, "Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City," in Ottoman City, 91-92.

54 Eldem, "Istanbul," 191-192.




name of social justice. The same can be argued for Ottoman guilds and reli

gious endowments, both shielding city inhabitants against a variety of economic

upheavals. City took over state-led economic governance (to the extent that such

governance had existed in the past) in guiding the local economy. Although

treating such an arrangement as "civil society" in practice would be an anachro

nism, regulation from the middle (socially) or the city-level (geographically) is

a far cry from past research that suggested a vacuum in city regimes.55 The early-modern Ottoman economy is hard to envision today, as we are

caught in a modern, neo-liberal paradigm that idealizes the economy as a free

and potentially ever-growing entity. We need to step out of such contemporary conventions if we are to avoid misconceptions created by looking through them at bygone economies. The inward-looking economy gradually crumbled as the

Ottoman government and powerful local players lost interest in protecting it (or benefited from its dissolution), and external forces grew (politically and eco

nomically) strong enough to meddle in its affairs. Nevertheless, change did not come without a struggle; the Ottoman middle had much interest in the existing

system, and a free market mostly spelled economic hardships for those earlier

benefiting from the old economy. If this analysis sounds familiar, it is not

because it has often been applied in the context of the Ottoman Empire, but

because it echoes the economic dilemmas of Middle Eastern societies today.

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