Marine Pilotage - virtual · 2013. 3. 6. · Marine Pilotage Ninth Report of Session 2010–13...

Published on 7 March 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited

House of Commons

Transport Committee

Marine Pilotage

Ninth Report of Session 2010–13

Volume II

Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published 17 September 2012, 22 October 2012, 10 December 2012, 21 January 2013 and 25 February 2013

The Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its Associate Public Bodies.

Current membership

Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair) Steve Baker (Conservative, Wycombe) Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham) Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton) Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative, Spelthorne) Karen Lumley (Conservative, Redditch) Karl McCartney (Conservative, Lincoln) Lucy Powell (Labour/Co-operative, Manchester Central) Mr Adrian Sanders (Liberal Democrat, Torbay) Iain Stewart (Conservative, Milton Keynes South) Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton) The following were also members of the committee during the Parliament. Angie Bray (Conservative, Ealing Central and Acton), Lilian Greenwood (Labour, Nottingham South), Mr Tom Harris (Labour, Glasgow South), Julie Hilling (Labour, Bolton West), Kelvin Hopkins (Labour, Luton North), Mr John Leech (Liberal Democrat, Manchester Withington) Paul Maynard, (Conservative, Blackpool North and Cleveleys), Gavin Shuker (Labour/Co-operative, Luton South), Angela Smith (Labour, Penistone and Stocksbridge), Julian Sturdy (Conservative, York Outer)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Farrah Bhatti (Second Clerk), Richard Jeremy (Committee Specialist), Adrian Hitchins (Senior Committee Assistant), Eldon Gallagher (Committee Assistant), Nyree Barratt-Hendricks (Committee Support Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]

List of additional written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/transcom)

Page

1 Victoria Group Holdings Ltd. Ev w1

2 Barrie Youde Ev w3, Ev w8, Ev w9, Ev w11

3 Terrence Crowe Ev w11

4 UK Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities Ev w12

5 Dave Devey MNM Ev w14

6 John H. Bryant BA MNI Ev w16

7 Stephen Chapman Ev w18

8 John Clandillion-Baker FNI Ev w18

9 Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Ev w20

10 Captain Rod Lewis Ev w21

11 Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee Ev w22

List of unprinted written evidence

The following memoranda have been reported to the House, but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Parliamentary Archives, and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to The Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London SW1A 0PW (tel. 020 7219 3074). Opening hours are from 9.30 am to 5.00 pm on Mondays to Fridays.

Barrie Youde

cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [06-03-2013 09:24] Job: 027606 Unit: PG01Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027606/027606_w014_MP 19 - Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee.xml

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev w1

Written evidence

Written evidence from Victoria Group Holdings Ltd. (MP 02)

Background

1. There are more than 600 marine pilots in the UK, of whom a little less than a third are members of ThePilots’ National Pension Fund (The PNPF). Some of them are employed by “Competent Harbour Authorities”(CHAs) and others are authorised by CHAs, while being self-employed, usually as members of co-operatives.CHAs with employed pilots make employers’ contributions to The PNPF and collect employees’ contributionsfrom their pilots, which they send to The PNPF. CHAs with self-employed pilots are supposed to collect theirpilots’ contributions and send them to The PNPF. In practice, this task is often delegated by the CHA to thepilots themselves.

2. The PNPF has an estimated deficit of approximately £300 million. The Trustee of the PNPF has soughtand obtained a ruling from the High Court which will enable it to recover the deficit from a wide range ofports and harbours ie the CHAs. The Approved Judgement, dated 28 June 2010, applies to CHAs with self-employed pilots as well as employed pilots, even though the former are not employers and have never madecontributions to The PNPF on behalf of their pilots.

3. The consequence of this ruling will be the imposition of liabilities on CHAs for their share of the deficitin the Scheme. This will have a devastating effect on the smaller ports which will be forced to increase theirdues/pilotage charges to meet these liabilities. This will make them uncompetitive with the larger ports whichnot only have greater reserves at hand, but have the advantage of economies of scale. In addition, some portshave long since ceased their commercial operations, but will still have a historical liability. It is highly probablethat, if an arbitrary recovery plan is imposed by the Trustee, many smaller ports will be forced to close.

4. The purpose of this submission is to make Members of the Transport Select Committee aware of the veryreal threat posed by this grossly unfair judgement to the future viability of the UK’s smaller ports. In the worstcase, their demise will impact on the Government’s “green agenda” by reducing options for short-sea transport,concentrating cargo-handling in a small number of large ports and significantly adding to the heavy truck mileson our national road network. It will certainly lead to major job-losses in the ports themselves and in the manylocal and regional businesses which depend upon them. The knock-on effect on their surrounding economiesand the nation’s prospects for recovery from the recession will be considerable.

Summary

5. The PNPF is a defined benefit pension scheme which has been operating since 1974. Membership is opento marine pilots, both employed and self-employed, who are authorised by Competent Harbour Authorities(CHAs). Membership of the Scheme is not compulsory and, of the 600 or so authorised pilots presentlyoperating in UK ports, fewer than 170 are members of the Scheme.

6. The PNPF has enjoyed past periods of surplus, but is now suffering (in common with many other schemes)a substantial deficit. At the beginning of 2010 the Trustee of the PNPF sought the guidance of the High Courtin order to determine inter alia the extent to which the Rules of the Scheme might be varied in order to provideThe PNPF with the power to demand deficit contributions from a wider range of sources ie not just theemployed pilots, their employers and the self-employed pilots, but also CHAs which authorise self-employedpilots and CHAs with no currently active pilots, but which had authorised pilots in the past.

7. The Approved Judgement was handed down on 28 June 2010. The Court held that the liability of CHAsto contribute to the Scheme is not limited. Instead, the Trustee has the power to demand contributions from allof the CHAs in an entirely unrestricted way.

8. The imposition of a liability on CHAs for the deficit in The PNPF has been both sudden and unexpected.CHAs around the country with self-employed pilots had in many cases never heard of The PNPF until askedfor voluntary contributions in 2005. Even CHAs with employed pilots had not anticipated that they would haveto pay for deficits of this magnitude. Furthermore, the majority of the deficit in The PNPF (c.58%) relates topilots’ service pre-1988, when all of them were self-employed and when they were authorised by the PilotageAuthorities and not by the CHAs, which had not yet been created. There is a strong feeling in the industry thatthe Government should accept a degree of responsibility for this element of the problem.

9. The distribution of the notional liability to The PNPF across the various CHAs around the country iscompletely arbitrary. For instance, there are some CHAs whose pilots were never members of The PNPF, sothey have no liability whatsoever; there are small ports with greater liabilities than large ports because of therespective ages of their pilots. Thus, some ports are being made hugely more or less competitive than othersin a wholly unanticipated and unpredictable way.

10. The potential impact of the contributions to The PNPF on small ports is significantly greater than onlarge ports. As a general rule, the notional liabilities are a bigger percentage of the turnover of small ports thanof large ports, because the latter’s ships are bigger and they need fewer pilots per tonne of throughput thansmall ports do.

cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [06-03-2013 09:24] Job: 027606 Unit: PG01Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027606/027606_w014_MP 19 - Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee.xml

Ev w2 Transport Committee: Evidence

11. In addition, the larger ports tend to have additional sources of income, from which they would be ableto subsidise their contributions to The PNPF, whereas the smaller ports tend to rely on a few streams of income.Indeed, the Harbour Commissions and Conservancy Boards have no other sources of income to supplementtheir statutory revenues.

12. The fairest way of recouping the deficit in The PNPF would be through the imposition of a levy onevery tonne of cargo shipped into or out of the country. At a relatively modest level (a few pence) such anationwide levy would not be sufficient to deter customers from using the UK’s ports, but would be capableof raising the necessary money for The PNPF without jeopardising the futures of many small ports. If theimposition of a levy were to save the small ports from disaster—and the thousands of jobs and businessesaround the country which depend upon them—then it would surely be worth supporting.

Detail

13. We have been aware of this issue for the last seven years and have been working with representativesof other CHAs to minimise its impact on our respective ports, all of which are affected to a greater or lesserextent by the rulings in this case.

14. The principal impact of the Approved Judgement on our businesses is the judge’s decision that theTrustee of The PNPF can demand contributions from what are called Self-employed CHAs (SCHAs). Theseare Competent Harbour Authorities (often ports), which authorise self-employed pilots or pilots’ co-operatives,but have no direct employer-employee relationship with them.

15. The pilots in each district around the country were given the choice whether to remain self-employed orto become employees when the Pilotage Act 1987, which abolished the Pilotage Authorities, came into forceon 1st October 1988. The majority of pilots opted for continued self-employment. We must assume that inmaking this decision they considered its pros and cons and came to the conclusion that it was better to havecontrol of their own affairs, even if it meant that they had no employer to underwrite their pensions. Now,however, the judge has ruled that the SCHAs should effectively act as employers and underwrite their pensions,so they have had all of the benefits of self-employment for the last twenty years, but are not now expected tosuffer any adverse consequences from their original decision.

16. The Approved Judgement has a considerably greater impact on small ports than on larger ports. Bearingin mind that the figures quoted will vary considerably from port to port, consider the example of a small portin which pilotage is compulsory and visiting ships are an average of 1,800 tonnes. The throughput in a yearmight be approximately 800,000 tonnes, so four pilots are required to perform 900 acts of pilotage betweenthem. In a large port the ships might be an average of 20,000 tonnes, so 900 acts of pilotage would accountfor 9,000,000 tonnes of cargo. If each port had four pilots and each pilot had a deficit in The PNPF of £500,000(or £2,000,000 in total), this would be equivalent to £2.50 for every tonne of cargo in the “small port”, butonly 22p per tonne in the “large port”.

17. We believe that it is unfair to expect CHAs to make contributions to their self-employed pilots’ pensionscheme. In fact, when the PNPF first asked for voluntary contributions, a number of small ports set up aninformal group to apply pressure on the Trustee of The PNPF and to gather evidence for the legal proceedings.Since the Approved Judgement this consortium has been active in bringing the inequitable distribution of thedeficits in The PNPF to the attention of the Trustee, the Department for Transport and local and nationalpoliticians, focusing specifically on the huge impact of the ruling on small ports.

18. The British Ports Association has yet to make any representations on behalf of those of its memberswho are likely to suffer serious consequences should they be required to comply with demands from ThePNPF. However, both the Association of Participating Bodies (see below) and the British Ports Associationcontinue to promote their view that they represent the ports and that the matter will be resolved by directnegotiation with the Trustee of The PNPF.

19. Unfortunately, the Association of Participating Bodies in The PNPF (the Association), which purports torepresent the CHAs in their discussions with the Trustee, is controlled by the large ports and it is virtuallyimpossible for the small ports’ voice to be heard in this forum. There is a serious danger, therefore, that theAssociation and the Trustee will come to an arrangement which suits some or all of the large ports, but whichimposes such a burden on the small ports that many of them will simply be unable to make the requisitepayments to The PNPF and will be forced into administration or insolvency.

20. Accordingly, we have been promoting the idea of a nationwide levy on shipping to enable the deficit onThe PNPF to be recovered over a reasonable period of time and at a level of cost to the industry which neitherdistorts competition nor pushes small ports over the edge. If a levy of perhaps 5p per tonne were charged onall cargoes coming into and going out of the country for the next few years (in 2011 throughput was 520million tonnes), it would be possible to recoup sufficient funds to plug the hole in The PNPF. A levy of thissize is unlikely to deter businesses from using ports in the UK. Furthermore, a mechanism already exists tocollect such a levy, as Trinity House has systems and staff in place to collect Light Dues from ships and couldact as the collection agent for this new levy, thus negating the need to establish a separate body.

21. The alternative to a nationwide levy—each CHA having to raise its own charges to recover the amountof its pilots’ notional deficit—will have potentially disastrous consequences for many small ports. These employ

cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [06-03-2013 09:24] Job: 027606 Unit: PG01Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/027606/027606_w014_MP 19 - Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee.xml


hundreds of people themselves and also generate significant numbers of jobs in ancillary businesses, as wellas being important economic drivers for their immediate hinterlands. If they are allowed to fail, the knock-oneffect, especially when times are already hard for many regions of the country, could be extremely damaging.

Other Points

22. In many cases around the country, self-employed pilots have been allowed by the Trustee of The PNPFto accrue extra pension entitlements by making additional contributions to the Scheme out of earnings from“other sources” ie non-pilotage-related income. CHAs are often completely unaware of either the nature or thequantum of these earnings, but are about to be compelled to underwrite the pensions deriving from them,which will be added to their notional shares of the deficit.

23. There are fundamental questions to be answered by the Trustee and its professional advisers as to howa deficit in the region of £300m has been allowed to accrue over a relatively short period of time. Unlike themajority of company pension schemes, The PNPF remains open to new members and has taken no steps tomove from defined benefits (a final salary scheme) to defined contributions (a money purchase scheme).Furthermore, it has not taken opportunities in the past to buy annuities for any of its pensioners and, when facedwith increasing liabilities and poor investment returns, it has made some questionable investment decisions.

Conclusion

24. It is critical to seek the support and understanding of politicians of all parties and other decision-makersin order to protect the UK’s small ports from the arbitrary imposition of liabilities which many will be unableto meet without potentially dire consequences for their financial viability.

25. It appears unlikely that the Association, which the Trustee continues to regard as the industry’snegotiating body, will be able to develop an equitable solution, which takes proper account of the small ports’ability to pay. Accordingly, we urge you to consider the merits of a nationwide levy on shipping to resolvethis issue.

July 2012

Written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03)

Introduction

1. The case which gives cause for concern is the abandonment by two designated Competent HarbourAuthorities (CHAs) of regulated standards in compulsory pilotage areas under the Pilotage Act of 1987,contrary not only to international law but also in express breach of the common law of the Parliamentaryjurisdiction. It will be shown also that successive Secretaries of State have been complicit in the said breaches,and have in consequence failed in their inherent duty to maintain order. Remedial action is therefore called foras a matter of some urgency in order to prevent further disorder.

2. A compulsory pilotage area may be defined as an area in which a CHA considers, in accordance withSection 2 of the 1987 Pilotage Act, that pilotage should be compulsory.

3. The motive for the conduct of the two CHAs (first at the Humber and later repeated at the Clyde) is purecommercial greed. There is no other motive. It is otherwise inexplicable why anybody, least of all a CHA,would wish to grant authorisation or promotion to pilots whose qualifications do not meet minimum establishedstandards, which is precisely what has happened on a large scale. All law confirms that the highest possiblestandards are called for in compulsory pilotage areas.

The Historical Position

4. Pilotage is one of the oldest and most public of all services, having been governed by common law,Parliamentary statute law (at both primary and secondary level) and international law as developed throughoutall history. Records available on the internet today show the state control of pilotage in the 13th century by theCode of Oleron, which (duly amended with the passage of time) remains the basis for much commercialmaritime discipline and regulation.

5. Standards of qualification for pilots in compulsory pilotage areas have been required by law for a longerperiod of time than have standards of qualification for any other class of mercantile mariner; and pilots havebeen examined and authorised by licence or other similar instrument since the middle ages. By contrast,examinations for Masters and Mates in the Merchant Service were not introduced until the middle of the 19thcentury. In the late eighteenth century (1797) a licensing authority became empowered to place restrictions ona pilot’s licence, commensurate with his knowledge and experience; and the practice thus developed ofrestricting less experienced pilots to the pilotage of vessels of smaller size as a common-sense measure in theinterests of public safety. By 1833, Bye-laws were introduced by Parliamentary Act in order to govern therestrictions (which are otherwise known as “classifications” or “post-qualification experience”) and othermatters more closely.



6. Bye-laws were maintained nationally under Section 18 of the Pilotage Act of 1913, by which time thestandard practice had developed in major ports that, even after due examination as to his knowledge, post-qualification restrictions would be placed on the licence of any pilot for his first four years in practice. TheHumber and the Clyde were amongst the many ports which applied the four-year restriction as a standardmeasure.

7. Appendix 1 shows Bye-Laws 65–75 as applicable at Liverpool in substantial detail under the 1913 Act.Bye-Laws 16 and 17 as applicable at the Humber at the same time are shown at page 61 of Appendix 2.

8. The Bye-laws introduced the pilot by incremental stages to the pilotage of larger ships until it was—andas a matter of common law still is—adjudged by regulated standard that the pilot would be sufficientlyexperienced to undertake the pilotage of a ship of any size.

9. Prior to the introduction of the 1987 Pilotage Act, pilotage was administered on a port-by-port basis byTrinity House or other local Pilotage Authorities. The Act of 1987 gives administrative power for the first timeto harbour authorities (CHAs) whose prime motive is to make commercial gain rather than to conduct anyadministration of pilotage. The administration of pilotage had not previously rested with any commercial body;and this is the cause of the present mischief.

The Modern Law

10. Most pilots throughout history have served on terms of self-employment as a matter of good practice.Many still do so today by the express terms of Section 4(2) (b) of the 1987 Act. There is an obligation underSection 4 (1) of the Act that a CHA must offer terms of employment to pilots but there is no power given toany CHA to impose terms of employment on anybody where terms of employment are not wanted.

11. Upon the repeal of the Pilotage Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder, standards of post-qualification experience were—and still are—maintained by purely ad-hoc means on a port-by-port basis.(Please see Analysis of present standards maintained at major ports at Appendix 2.) It will be seen that in someports the standard period of restriction on a pilot’s licence is confirmed at more than four years.

12. The propriety of the regulated restrictions was confirmed in two cases which came before the Courts atan apparent turning point in the law, on the introduction of the Pilotage Act of 1987 which repealed the Actof 1913. In the first case (the Esso Bernicia, which was heard in the House of Lords,—report shown atAppendix 3), the facts had arisen during the currency of the 1913 Act. Following a long line of ancientauthority, the House of Lords held (at page 2 of Appendix 3) that a pilot is an independent professional who isengaged by a shipmaster to act as a principal and not as the servant or agent of any harbour authority. Thesecond case (the Cavendish—report shown at Appendix 4) was heard in the High Court in 1993, when it washeld that the introduction of the Act of 1987 had changed nothing of any significance; and that the duty of aCHA in pilotage is (as had been the duty of Trinity House or other Pilotage Authority beforehand) limited tomaintaining an adequate supply of properly qualified pilots to be engaged by ships navigating in a compulsorypilotage area. The Cavendish case of 1993 is therefore of high significance. It was emphasised in the judgmentthat a CHA performs no pilotage; and that any pilotage is necessarily performed by authorised professionalpilots. It follows that the function of a CHA in pilotage is a purely administrative one.

13. The judgment in the Cavendish case was delivered by Mr Justice Anthony Clarke, as he then was.Subsequently Mr Justice Clarke became Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Master of the Rolls and one of thefirst judges to be appointed to the recently-created Supreme Court. Where in Lord Clarke’s judgment it isstated (at page 298 of Appendix 4) that it is the function of a CHA to maintain an adequate supply of properlyqualified pilots and (at page 301 of Appendix 4) that “the position is in my judgment the same now as it wasunder the 1913 Act”, the corollary is that upon the repeal of the Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder,there was no Parliamentary intention that any of the standards of post-qualification experience written in theformer Bye-Laws should be abandoned. Manifestly there was no Parliamentary intention that the new Act of1987 should be used as an excuse for disorder. Rather, the newly-created Competent Harbour Authorities wereplaced in a position of trust to maintain the proper standards established by the former Pilotage Authoritiesover many years. In the two CHAs which are of concern today, there has been a clear breach of theParliamentary trust imposed in them.

14. Of even greater legal significance is the case of the Sea Empress (as reported at Appendix 5) whichconcluded in the Court of Criminal Appeal in April 2000, where it was shown that maladministration hadoccurred at Milford Haven shortly before the events which are of concern today. The vessel Sea Empress wasa large oil-tanker and had been under pilotage in a compulsory pilotage area in 1996 when she grounded onrocks at the entrance to the Haven. Widespread pollution, environmental damage and economic loss wascaused. It was a major disaster. The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR,through its subsidiary Environment Agency) brought a criminal prosecution in respect of the pollution againstthe authorising body (the CHA) of the compulsory pilot.

15. The case was heard at first instance in Cardiff Crown Court in 1999 before Mr Justice David Steel, thepresiding judge of the Admiralty Court. The CHA pleaded guilty to the charge. In summarising the facts priorto passing sentence, the learned judge found that the pilot (as provided to the vessel by the CHA) was neithernegligent nor incompetent but was specifically lacking in post-qualification experience.



16. The express words of the judgment include: “The significance of these matters is all the greater in thecontext of a scheme of compulsory pilotage. Shipowners and masters must needs engage a pilot. They have totake the training, experience and expertise of the pilot provided at face value. While the master remainsnominally in command, it has to be recognized that the pilot had the con[duct of the navigation] and a mastercan only interfere when a situation of danger has clearly arisen. The port authority imposes a charge forpilotage but in the same breath has the added advantage of the pilot being treated for purposes of civil liabilityas an employee of the shipowner. All this calls for the highest possible standards on the part of the portauthority.” (p.7)

17. The CHA (having pleaded guilty to the criminal charge against it) appealed to the Court of CriminalAppeal against the severity of the sentence imposed in Cardiff Crown Court. On hearing the Appeal in April2000, Lord Bingham the Lord Chief Justice allowed a reduction in the sentence on the grounds (amongstothers) that, subsequent to the incident, the CHA had exerted its best efforts to improve the regulated standardsof experience amongst the pilots provided for engagement by vessels; and thereby to comply with the obligationto maintain the highest possible standards in a compulsory pilotage area, as determined at common law. Inshort, the classification rules/post-qualification rules at Milford Haven were significantly tightened up.

The Policy of the Department for Transport

The Humber

18. On 11 June 2001 (barely twelve months later) an extraordinary thing then happened in the compulsorypilotage area of the Humber. In a contractual dispute, the CHA stated untruthfully that it had “no choice” otherthan to revoke the authorisations of all of its authorised pilots; and, to compound its impropriety, to do so onNotice (Appendix 6) in January 2002, which time-scale of seven months obviously precluded the maintenanceof any of the existing regulated standards of post-qualification experience amongst any new pilots who mightreplace them. By the terms of the Notice, which was issued to every authorised Humber pilot, the maintenanceof established standards of experience after January 2002 became an obvious chronological impossibility. Asall other ports had done until that time (and as most still do) the Humber CHA had maintained regulatedstandards on the basis of a contract with the pilots. In other words, there is and always has been commonagreement between pilots and harbour authorities that the maintenance of standards is necessary.

19. The Humber CHA was under no obligation at all to behave as it chose to do. The statutory power torevoke the authorisation of any pilot is discretionary and is not obligatory in any circumstances (Section 3 ofthe 1987 Act). Moreover, the power is in any event secondary to the obligation to “keep under consideration”matters relating to compulsory pilotage, which is regulated by Section 2 of the Act. The untruthful statementthat the CHA had “no choice” was a disingenuous and obvious attempt to persuade authorised pilots to acceptthe terms of employment which are referred to in the Notice-letter of 11 June 2001; under threat ofdisqualification if unwilling. The DTLR was warned many times and by many different voices (includingMembers of Parliament) as to the impropriety and the likely consequences of the Notice which the CHA hadissued. Nevertheless, the DTLR refused to intervene.

20. In consequence and as threatened, on 26 January 2002 the CHA abandoned all regulated standards ofexperience, executed its Notice as delivered, de-authorised all of its pre-existing authorised pilots and grantedauthorisations to new pilots whose experience fell far, far short of the previously regulated standards. Standardsof experience were not maintained at all.

21. The DTLR, for its part, in April 2002 then published a Report (Appendix 7) entitled “The New HumberPilot Service” which confirmed that the new arrangement (adopted in January 2002) had abandoned not merelysome but all regulated standards of experience for authorised pilots; and therefore did not comply with theprinciple identified in the Sea Empress case. The DTLR made no effort to address the obligation that allrelevant standards need not only to be maintained in any and every compulsory pilotage area, but maintainedat the highest possible level. The abandonment of standards of experience was confirmed by a PilotageDirection issued in July 2002, which stated that the authorisation of Humber pilots would henceforward bemerely “on the recommendation of the Harbour Master”; and that any standard or regulated measure ofexperience for pilots would therefore no longer apply. (The Pilotage Direction is shown at page 80 ofAppendix 2.)

22. To make matters substantially more dangerous, in a major port it is unusual for a Harbour Master tohold any authorisation in pilotage at all. For that reason, specifically regulated standards of post-qualificationexperience are particularly important in pilotage anywhere. It is grossly improper that an authorisation in thename of the state for the purposes of safe navigation should occur on the mere “recommendation” or judgmentof any one person alone; particularly when that person is not (or might not be) himself authorised in anyrelevant way. The grant of an authorisation is a grant of power; and it is not open to anybody to grant a powerwhich he does not himself possess. (Nemo dat quod non habet.)

23. The DTLR Report confirms (at Paragraph 10.9) that the obligations of a CHA in a compulsory pilotagearea are “strict and onerous”. The entire Report, however, represents an open travesty of any compliance withthose obligations. The Report shows a carefully detailed catalogue of the disorder and impropriety which hadarisen; which is not a thing which Parliament ever intended should happen, quite regardless of any case law.The Report refers (at Paragraph 7.7) to a “crisis” which had arisen, following a lawful strike by the pilots



which began (with the approval of the Court of Appeal) on 12 December 2001 in protest at the behaviour ofthe CHA; and (in a table at Paragraph 7.15) to the 946 occasions on which the CHA was unable to provideany pilot at all (whether experienced or otherwise) to ships in want in a compulsory pilotage area. Of those946 occasions, the same table shows that no fewer than 444 of them arose after 23 January 2002, when thepilots’ strike ended, three days before the de-authorisation en masse on 26 January 2002. After 26 January2002, the sole cause of the acute shortage of pilots which existed was the mass de-authorisation which theCHA carried out that day by its own choice. Plainly, Parliament never did intend (nor even contemplate) thatsuch a thing might happen. That extraordinary event, in a major port on a hazardous estuary (at one of thelargest ports in Europe), was beyond the contemplation of any responsible person.

24. In October 2001 the pilots under Notice of de-authorisation had themselves given Notice to the CHA oftheir intention to stage a strike in protest. In November 2001 the CHA (in response to the strike-Notice)obtained a restraining injunction against the pilots in the High Court. The validity of the restraining injunctionwas over-ruled in the Court of Appeal on 11 December 2001, when the Court determined that a strike by thepilots would be wholly lawful in the circumstances. The crisis then facing the CHA was so great that it evenwent to the extent of suspending compulsory pilotage altogether, not because the Humber estuary and itsapproaches had become any less hazardous (manifestly they had not) but because the CHA knew full well thatit had placed itself in a position where it simply could not provide an adequate number of pilots. The CHAwas clearly aware that it had acted improperly. It is inconceivable that the CHA ever contemplated, when itissued the mass de-authorisation Notice in June 2001, that compulsory pilotage in the Humber should perhapsbe suspended. Nor should it have done so. It clearly ought never to have issued the Notice which it chose toissue, with or without the clear untruth contained within the Notice.

25. The DTLR, however, openly approved the crisis and disorder which the CHA had created by its ownNotice as issued. As the executive arm of Parliament, the DTLR expressed no syllable of disapproval and wasvery clearly complicit in the disorder. Where the DTLR Report asserts (at Paragraph 5.25 of its Report) thatthe arrangements newly put in place were “fit for purpose”, it is no more legally correct or proper than wouldbe an assertion that any other legally non-compliant arrangement might be fit for purpose. Fitness for purposeand compliance with legally-required minimum standards are plainly two different things. The former is amatter of mere opinion whereas the latter is a matter of fact and strict law.

26. The author of the Report is fastidious in his avoidance of any suggestion that there might have beencompliance with any relevant law. Plainly there was none, as the author makes clear that he knew perfectlywell. It is clear beyond a doubt that the DTLR intended to turn a blind eye to the impropriety of the CHA; andin fact did so. The Report properly makes the point that there are more methods than one to train a pilot; but,playing fast and loose with the common law, dismisses altogether the need to comply with the legal obligationto maintain established minimum standards of post-qualification experience, particularly so where pilotage iscompulsory. In that regard, there was no compliance whatsoever.

27. As to the 133 authorised pilots who were de-authorised en-masse on 26 January 2002, 88 of them (twothirds of their number) sued the CHA in a group action in the High Court in the matter of misfeasance inpublic office. Their action was settled on terms out of Court, in April 2008, shortly before it was listed to beheard at trial in the Admiralty Court.

International Law

28. As if in confirmation of the improper nature of the behaviour of the Humber CHA and the inadequacyof the DTLR to keep it in check, in 2003 the International Maritime Organization (the maritime arm of theUnited Nations Organization, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory state) issued its Resolution A960 inwhich it is declared (at Paragraph 2.3.2) that developed standards in pilotage should not only be maintainedbut should be “enforced”. (Appendix 8.) In compulsory pilotage areas this international obligation is clearlymuch the greater, for all of the reasons identified by Mr Justice Steel in the SEA EMPRESS case.

The Clyde

29. In December 2007, the large vessel Red Jasmine was navigating in the Clyde under pilotage in acompulsory pilotage area inward-bound in dense fog, assisted by two tug-boats. The head-tug Flying Phantom,attached by a tow-wire to the ship’s bow, suffered a capsize with the loss of three lives. Subsequently the pilotof Red Jasmine suffered mental stress and has since retired.

30. Between 2008 and 2010, having got away scot-free with its inadequacy in 2002, the Department forTransport (DfT) (as the DTLR had become) then turned a blind eye to events as they were developing on theClyde, where (notwithstanding the Red Jasmine/Flying Phantom incident) the CHA had chosen to revoke theauthorisations of so many of its senior authorised pilots that it could no longer provide any pilot (not a singlepilot) whose post-qualification experience complied with the regulated standards applicable on the Clyde.(Clyde standards as at July 2009 are shown at pages 42, 43 and 57 of Appendix 2.)

31. On 9 May 2008 in the Scottish Parliament, Mr Salmond the First Minister referred to the “obvious” riskof “extreme damage” which arises when any standards in pilotage are not maintained.



32. By a letter of 3 April 2009 (Appendix 9) the shortage of properly qualified Clyde pilots was already soacute that the Clyde Harbour Master on behalf of the CHA ordered the pilot of Red Jasmine to report for duty,notwithstanding the fact that the medical advisor to the CHA had long-previously certified that the pilot waspsychiatrically unfit. Between 13 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, the CHA on the Clyde was invited toindicate how many of its serving pilots held experience in accordance with the Clyde Regulations; and itsimply declined the invitation. Appendix 9 comprises a clip of the above correspondence with the Clyde CHAin which the refusal (and therefore the failure) to show any compliance with any standards is clearly shown.

The Role of the Shipping Ministers

33. The DfT has been challenged repeatedly to explain its lack of interest in the maintenance of pilotagestandards in the two major ports of Humber and Clyde, particularly in light of the untruth and secrecy whichhas taken place at those two ports respectively. It is alarming that the DfT has stated that it “does not accept”the common law position. Still less does it accept the international law position. Appendix 10 is a copy of aletter of 29 June 2009 signed by Paul Clark MP, the Shipping Minister at the time, setting out the Departmentalposition. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the Department for Transport has cocked snooks at the laws ofpilotage within its own jurisdiction, as clearly have the two CHAs in question. It appears quite clear that theDepartment has held in contempt the very law which it is its function to administer.

34. On 29 September 2010 I met the then-new Shipping Minister, Mike Penning MP. I was presented to himat a meeting that day on another matter at Hope Cove, South Devon. Mr Penning indicated that he shared myconcerns for the matters raised here. Accordingly he has encouraged me to ventilate them, as have many othersincluding Andrew Miller MP, Sir Malcolm Thornton (MP 1979–97) and Lord Hunt of Wirral in more openand express terms.

35. At a public meeting in Liverpool in January 2011, Mr Ian Timpson of the DfT was present. Mr PerryGlading of Forth Ports Plc was in the Chair. Also present were Sir Alan Massey, Chief Executive of theMaritime and Coastguard Agency and Captain Stephen Clinch, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of MarineAccidents. In response to a question from me, Mr Timpson had the good grace to admit that in due course theDfT might become obliged to take action to restore order in pilotage.

36. There exists no authority, as far as I know, above or higher than the common law as determined in theCourts when called upon to interpret the true meaning of the 1987 Pilotage Act as intended by Parliament.

37. The implementary power given by Section 32 (1) of the Act has not been exercised by any Secretary ofState since its enactment on 1st October 1988.

Conclusion

38. The experience of the last ten years has shown that where post-qualification standards are maintainedmerely by ad-hoc means, they are not in fact maintained at all. In those ports where standards have beenproperly maintained as required at law, the standards have been maintained as minimum standards. It couldnot be, therefore, in the public interest nor in compliance with the law in any way, to allow those standardsto be diminished by choice; which clearly is what has happened on a large scale in the cases of the twoCHAs mentioned.

39. In both cases CHA has chosen to disregard established standards for reasons better known to itself,contrary to the common law. Parliament has never intended that the public pilotage service should beadministered either by untruth or by secrecy on the part of any CHA, nor by efforts to impose terms ofemployment on pilots where pilots did not require them, nor by inadequacy on the part of the DfT, all of whichunedifying things have happened in the United Kingdom on a gross and obvious scale.

40. In light of the acknowledgment by the DfT that the laws of pilotage in any compulsory pilotage area arestrict and onerous; and in light of the consistent failure of successive Secretaries of State to uphold those laws,it is submitted most respectfully in the public interest that it is now the function of the Select Committee totake steps to ensure that the failures—and the large-scale disorder which is inevitably caused thereby—continueno longer.

41. A simple, inexpensive and effective first-remedial step would be the re-introduction of the terms ofSection 22 of the 1913 Pilotage Act, whereby a CHA would be obliged to furnish to the Secretary of Statereturns on all pilotage matters at regular intervals. A copy of the Section is shown at Appendix 11. Publicpropriety calls for nothing less. It would be a very mild obligation.

42. Even better would be the re-introduction of the Bye-Laws which regulated the relevant standards withcomplete and simple success under Section 18 of the 1913 Act. It is unclear why this provision was everdiscontinued. The international obligations of the United Kingdom in safe pilotage remain undiminished in anyway. In light of the ever-increasing use of foreign-flag tonnage (which seems unlikely to be reversed in theforeseeable future) those obligations are clearly greater than ever before.

43. It is perfectly clear that any Competent Harbour Authority remains accountable to Parliament, becauseit is from Parliament alone that any CHA is granted power. It is equally clear that statutory power has been



abused to date by two CHAs acting in their own interests and with complete impunity. That is a state of affairswhich I trust that the Select Committee will find intolerable.

Appendices not published.

August 2012

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03A)

Marine Pilotage

In the letter of 12 December 2011 (copy attached) in which Andrew Miller MP proposes that an inquiryshould be conducted into pilotage on the basis of persistent failures in the Department for Transport to addressrelevant issues, I am the constituent mentioned by Mr Miller as having produced substantial evidence to himin that regard. Subsequently, Mr Miller has been most assiduous in pursuing pilotage matters and I remainmost grateful to him.

Following the hearing of oral evidence on 17 December last, publication of the transcript of the hearing (ref.HC 840-i, albeit as yet uncorrected) confirms that significant matters remain unaddressed by the Secretary ofState; and that no organisation holding a licence as a competent harbour authority under the 1987 Pilotage Actat local level has been held accountable in the last 25 years; save only in one case (the Sea Empress case of1999–2000), the judgment of which the Department refuses to recognise, as Mr Miller’s letter indicates.

Quite clearly there remains much work to be done to restore propriety into pilotage and most respectfully Ienclose also for your consideration some specific comments on the departmental evidence as given to theCommittee.

With my thanks for the proper concerns of the Select Committee.

Cc Andrew Miller MP

COMMENTS UPON THE EVIDENCE GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT TO THESELECT COMMITTEE ON 17 DECEMBER 2012

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE PREPARED 28 DECEMBER 2012 AND AUTHORISEDBY THE COMMITTEE FOR RELEASE

EVIDENCE GIVEN BY STEPHEN HAMMOND MP (SH) AND BY MR THOMAS BARRY (TB), CIVILSERVANT

Q 84 Chair: Minister, could you tell us whether there has been any risk assessment underlying the proposalsto extend the proposals to extend eligibility for pilot exemption certificates (PECs)?

SH .......................There has not been a risk assessment because there is no need for it. Nothing in this Billchanges any of the safety standards or requirements of the competent harbour authority (CHA). There is nochange in standards; there is a change in conditions.........................

Comment

It is incorrect to suggest that there is (or could be) a change in conditions without there being a change instandards. Standards and conditions amount in substance to the same thing. There is a clear proposal in theBill to relax conditions for the issue of a PEC; and the answer given by the Minister is therefore seriouslymisleading.

Q85 Chair: ........Don’t you feel any concern that, although your best concern is to maintain safety standards,the changes might in fact jeopardise those?

SH. No. If anything , the proposals in the Bill enhance safety for one very clear reason: CHAs will havetheir power extended to take away exemption certificates immediately............................

Comment

The power to suspend a pilotage qualification immediately, if appropriate in the interests of public safety,exists already at common law (Cooper v Forth Ports—Scottish Inner House/Court of Appeal—May 2011). Itis misleading to suggest otherwise. The removal of an individual qualification does nothing to enhance safetyin general and it is misleading also to suggest that it might do so.



Q99 Chair: How are the Government implementing A.960—The International Maritime Organisation’sResolution on the training and certification of pilots?

TB..................It is not for the UK Government to enforce; it is for the CHAs. Section 1.3 of therecommendation says that the UK Government should encourage CHAs in relation to the application ofstandards.

Comment

Recommendation 2 of the Resolution urges the Governments of Member States to give effect to theResolution as soon as possible. It is quite incorrect to suggest (as TB appears to do) that CHAs might havepowers which the Government does not. All powers of a CHA are given by the Government in any event andby nobody else. Moreover, the Secretary of State has specific power by Section 32(1) of the Pilotage Act tomake regulations to give effect to the pilotage legislation. Successive Secretaries of State have resiled fromany exercise of the power. It is a gross impropriety for any Government to fail to recognise its responsibilitiesin the exercise of powers which it has delegated to others. The principle delegatus non potest delegare applies,requiring the greater body to ensure that any delegated powers exercised by the lesser body are exercisedproperly and not otherwise. The principle confirms that a body which delegates powers cannot at the sametime delegate its own ultimate responsibility.

It is to be hoped that the United Kingdom is better represented in pilotage matters overseas by more accuratestatements than those in the information given by Mr Barry to the Select Committee on 17 December last.

Q100 Chair: You are still in support of [Resolution A.960]?

SH. Absolutely. To be absolutely clear, the Bill is fully compliant with that code [Resolution A 960?] as well.

Comment

It is wholly incorrect to suggest that Clause 2 of the Bill complies with Resolution A 960 in any way. Wherethe Resolution requires (at Recommendation 2.3.2 of Annex 1) that the maintenance of developed standardsshould be enforced, the Bill makes an express proposal at Clause 2 of its own text to relax standards and togrant pilotage exemption to “any deck officer”, which is not the case under the present legislation. To entrustthe pilotage of any ship in a compulsory pilotage area to “any deck officer” by way of exemption fromcompulsory pilotage is a high risk strategy which is not contemplated by the present legislation. Measures arein place to prevent it and have been in place for many years. The entire purpose of the pilotage legislationthroughout history has been to minimise public risk and not in any way to create new risk, which is whatClause 2 of the Bill very clearly proposes. It is a nonsense to suggest that the Bill might comply with ResolutionA 960 or with any other aspect of law.

Q110 Chair: Finally could you tell me whether the Department has ever revoked a licence from a competentharbour authority?

SH: I am certainly not aware of it. I am reliably informed that the answer is no.

Comment

In light of Mr Barry’s answer to Question 99, Mr Hammond confirms the reluctance of the Department tohold any local body accountable in pilotage administration. In consequence, disorder arises.

January 2013

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 3B)

On 6 December the Department for Transport wrote to the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Associationadvising of proposals to permit the grant of a Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) to any deck officer by theremoval of the present regulated standard restriction to Mister or First Mate as contained in Section 8 of thePilotage Act 1987. I attach a copy of the departmental letter. The final paragraph of the letter avers that theDepartment is focused on securing marine safety. Because it is not possible to secure any public standard ofsafety by a more permissive approach to any standard of navigation, it will readily be appreciated that ananomaly is created by the present proposal. The anomaly is made more serious by the fact that the bodies whogrant the qualifications (namely the harbor authorities at local level) are rarely if ever held accountable by theDepartment and are, moreover, in the main part commercial bodies having less public concern than the purelypublic pilotage authorities which maintained pilotage discipline in the past.

The departmental letter refers also to the collision between the vessels Stena Feronia and Union Moon atBelfast in March this year, which is more fully reported in Report 26/2012 of the Marine Accident InvestigationBranch. (A copy of the Report is also attached.) The Report makes it clear at Paragraph 2.4 that the only PECholder aboard Stena Feronia was neither the Master nor the First Mate of the vessel; and that, therefore, thevessel was being navigated intentionally in clear breach of the provisions of Section 15 of the Pilotage Act, to



which criminal sanctions attach in respect of any breach. Even though Paragraph 3.2.2 of the Report concludesthat the inadequacy of the PEC arrangement was a positive contributory factor in the collision, there was noprosecution of anybody in respect of any criminal breach of the Act.

The Report indicates (at Paragraph 1.1) that of the 108 persons aboard Stena Feronia, 47 were crew and 61were fare-paying passengers and therefore members of the general travelling public. All 61 passengers wereordered to their lifeboat stations in preparation to abandon ship (Paragraph 1.2.4). In those circumstances thepresent inadequacies in the maintenance of pilotage law and the serious risks to public safety which arise inconsequence could hardly be more obvious.

LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM MARITIMEPILOTS’ ASSOCIATION

Dear Captain Cockrill,

Marine Navigation (No. 2) Bill

Thank you for your emails addressed to the Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP dated 17 and 26 November,Stephen Hammond MP dated 16 November, and Richard Benyon MP dated 2 November regarding Sheryl!Murray MP’s Marine Navigation (No. 2) Bill. I have been asked to reply.

I would like to reassure you that the Government has publicly recognised the key role marine pilots play inthe safe and efficient operation of port facilities and their personal contribution to the economic activity andfuture prosperity of the UK. The Bill’s three Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC) clauses are intended tomaintain those safe and efficient port operations while permitting greater flexibility for shipping and strongeroversight by Competent Harbour Authorities (CHAs), which are responsible for managing pilotage in theirwaters. Importantly, the Bill does not diminish the requirement under the Pilotage Act 1987 that a PEC holdermust satisfy a CHA that they possess the “skill, experience and local knowledge... sufficient for him to becapable of piloting the ship.”

Mrs Murray and the Government tabled amendments to Clause 2 of the Bill at Report Stage on 30 November.Instead of permitting any “member of the crew” to hold a PEC, the amended clause restricts the award ofPECs to only bona fide deck officers (including Masters and First Mates). At previous debates, Mrs Murrayand the Minister had agreed it would be helpful to provide this clarity that a PEC holder must be a crewmember with navigational responsibilities on the face of the Bill. The Chamber of Shipping, British PortsAssociation and UK Major Ports Group all confirmed their support for the amendments.

The alternative wording for Clause 2 that you have suggested, “senior deck officer” or “deck officer engagedon board at Management level holding a Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping A-II/2Certificate of Competency”, would in practice maintain the existing restriction that only Masters or First Matesmay hold a PEC and therefore would not achieve the additional flexibility sought by the shipping industry.

The Port Marine Safety Code and accompanying Guide to Good Practice provide guidance on themanagement of PECs and already recommend that CHAs seek a valid certificate of competency as a deckofficer from PEC applicants. This guidance can be reviewed to consider what advice would be valuable interms of the qualifications that might illustrate whether a deck officer is ready to apply for a PEC. As a memberof the Code’s Steering Group, you will be able to participate directly in this process.

In respect of the collision between the Stena Feronia and Union Moon, a significant contributory cause wasthe alcohol consumption of the Master of the Union Moon. He was found to be three-and-a-halflimes over thelegal alcohol limit more than five hours after his last drink, and has been sentenced to one year’s imprisonmentfor his role in this accident.

The Union Moon had not been navigated by a PEC holder. The ship’s Master had taken on board a pilot toconduct the vessel through the pilotage area in Belfast Harbour. In line with the pilotage directions thenin force, the pilot disembarked at a point before the accident occurred. Belfast Harbour has since changedthose directions.

The accident investigation did identify flaws in the crewing arrangements made by the company managingthe Stena Feronia when the PEC holder was transferred from a sister ship. It was not a causal factor in theaccident but, nevertheless, the report’s sole recommendation is that the company amends its SafetyManagement System.

The Government does not believe that the circumstances of this accident have any bearing on the Bill’sproposals regarding the eligibility criteria for PECs. Further, the various actions taken in response to thisaccident appear proportionate and focused on securing marine safety.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Read-Leah



Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03C)

RE: MARINE NAVIGATION (NO.2) BILL

This Bill stands referred to the Select Committee, The Bill contains a proposal that a present standardobligation which needs to be shown by a candidate before the grant of a Pilotage Exemption Certificate bySection 8 of the Pilotage Act 1987 should no longer be maintained, The standard obligation which it is proposedto remove is that the candidate must show that, as a matter of responsibility and fact, he is at least the bonafide First Mate of a nominated vessel. The proposal is that the standard level of responsibility be reduced by asubstantial degree, or even removed altogether: and I am therefore obliged to draw your attention to thefollowing facts and matters:

1. The common law provides in principle that the highest possible standards are called for incompulsory pilotage areas. Pilotage exemption applies only in such areas. The principle wasapproved by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, in the Court of Appeal in April 2000 (Copyattached),1 following the judgment of Mr Justice David Steel. Presiding Judge of theAdmiralty Court (Copy attached)2 following the Sea Empress disaster of 1996. The rationaleof both judgments is that the highest possible standards are required not only to justify the costsincurred by the imposition of compulsion in pilotage but also to protect the general public ingeographical areas where navigation is deemed to be so hazardous as to warrant the impositionof compulsory pilotage in the interest of public safety, The reduction of any existing standardin a compulsory pilotage area. as now proposed in the Bill, accordingly contravenes thecommon law,

2. Paragraph 2.3.2 of Annex 1 of Resolution A960 of the International Maritime Organization onbehalf of the United Nations Organization (copy attached)3 calls strongly for the maintenanceof all “developed” (ie presently existing) standards in pilotage, by enforcement. The proposalbefore the Select Committee is quite plainly that a developed standard be removed and thereforeno longer maintained; and therefore rebuts Resolution A 960 altogether.

The obviously increased risk of mischief which arises whenever any high standard of responsibility isdelegated downwards will need no further explanation to the Members of the Select Committee: and I ambound to confirm that the proposal contained in the Bill contravenes both domestic and international law forthe reasons stated, in any event. The proposal is therefore unlawful.

November 2012

Written evidence from Terence Crowe (MP 04)

Contact Name Terence Crowe

6 Paddock Drive, Parkgate, South Wirral, Cheshire, CH64 6TQ. Tel. 0151 336 5521

1. Who am I

Terence Crowe, Liverpool Pilot Service (retired). Joined in 1956, retired 2004.

Served an apprenticeship from 1956 to 1964. Piloting from1964 to 2004, including nine years on the RioNunez in Guinea West Africa. 1979–88.

Elected to Pilot representative in Liverpool 1992 to 2004. This position involved the general administrationof the Pilot Service, and sitting on various panels for recruitment, discipline, and pilotage authorization.

Co- Founder of the new Liverpool Pilot Service Limited, established the 1st June 1997.

2. Main Issue

The Humber C.H.A.s interpretation of the 1987 Pilotage Act. Particularly clause 4 (2)A (a) (b) ie employmentstatus of Pilots, leading to the sacking of 90% of the serving pilots and the loss forever of their expertise, thelife blood of pilotage, handed down over many years, and now denied to the next generations of pilots.

3. Interpretation

A view is taken that clause 4 does not make it clear as to what should happen if the Pilots and the C.H.A.cannot agree on any new contract. This is seen as a default option which enforces employment status on thepilots and denies them the right to choose their own future.1 Not published2 Not published3 Not published



4. Profit

Profit from pilotage has resulted from the 1987 act , for the first time in history.

This profit is achieved at the direct cost to the Pilots and pilotage infrastructure.

5. Evidence

The present day Humber pilot service is living evidence of the folly of the conduct of the C.H.A. in 2002.It is believed that over 200 prospective pilots have past through the port since the enforcement of employedstatus. (Liverpool saw two pilots depart during the same period.)

6. Observation

The authors of the 1987 pilot age act could not have envisaged such an outcome, to their carefully wordedact. The actual dismissal of 90% of the largest pilot service in the UK (Re Lord Chauncey: Cavendish Report.)

7. Question?

How could any C.H.A. consider such an act of vandalism?

8. The Next Step

An inquiry into the conduct of this C.H.A. regarding the pilots in 2002, and the quality and length of trainingof the new pilots.

9. The Future

The Liverpool Pilot Service (Liverpool Pilots Limited) Established 1 June 1997 is the most modern servicein the U.K. A contract for services is in place which meets all the requirements of the 1987 pilotage act, andrelieves the C.H.A. of their obligation to offer employment status to pilots. (A Humber type situation is thereby prevented.)

10. Comment

How could so many senior personell ie MP’s, Civil Servants, Ship owners feel able to stand by and watchthis catastrophy develop without stepping in?

A pilots position onboard ship is in general not understood. “In compulsory pilotage water the MasterSHALL hand over the conduct of the vessel to the Pilot.” He is not some form of guide or bystander. Is itappropiate for a vessel carrying hazardous cargo to be under control of a pilot short on experience and timein training?

11. Conclusion

The U.K. pilot services are a national asset and shoud not be left at the mercy of C.H.A.’s many of whomhave little maritime knowledge or experience, especially at the most senior level ie CEO’s, MD’s etc.

T.E. CroweLiverpool Pilot (rtd)

12. PS

The next pilot age act must establish unambiguously the right of all U.K. pilots to self employed status.

September 2012

Written evidence from the United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA)(MP 06)

MEMORANDUM submitted to the Transport Committee by the United Kingdom Association of Deep SeaPilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA) comprised of the Corporations of Trinity House in Hull, London andNewcastle, who, under Section 23 of the Pilotage Act 1987 are authorised to grant deep sea pilotage certificates.

Transport Committee invites evidence on issues affecting marine pilotage, and this Memorandum containsthe response of the three Corporations of Trinity House, who welcome the opportunity to assist the Committee.

Deep Sea Pilotage can be described in this context as: the provision of experienced Master Mariners withspecialist local knowledge, to client shipmasters, owners and ship-operators, on a voluntary basis for a fee,whilst their vessels are transiting Northwest European waters, these being amongst the most congested andhigh risk sea areas in the world.



Pilotage generally has been one of the functions granted to the Corporations of Trinity House by a numberof Royal Charters over the years, the first being to Trinity House London in 1514 when Henry VIII gavepowers inter alia to regulate pilotage. Our authority as deep sea pilotage authorities, under the Pilotage Act1987 is the main remaining responsibility since this Act passed district pilotage to the Competent HarbourAuthorities in the United Kingdom.

Deep Sea Pilots are certificated by the Examining Boards of the three Trinity Houses following examinationusing a common syllabus based on the 1976 Antwerp Rules agreed by the former North Sea PilotageCommission. A valid Certificate of Competency as Master Mariner is required, as are all relevant trainingcertificates and medical certification ENG1. Every candidate must have relevant nautical charts and publicationsin his possession, corrected to date for the area for which he being examined, which currently extends fromMurmansk to Gibraltar, limited to Skagen in the east and to Longitude 14° 00’ in the west.

Every deep sea pilot licensed by the Authorities in the UK has substantial command experience, which,together with extensive knowledge of our waters, conditions and risks, makes them a considerable asset to thoseusing their services. The pilots themselves are self-employed and gain assignments through their affiliation toone of the two Deep Sea Pilotage Agencies operating in the UK. Other such agencies exist in France, Belgium,The Netherlands and Germany.

The UK Authorities issue licences valid for one year only, and every licensed deep sea pilot must attend arevalidation interview each January where it is assessed if he is fit for renewal of his certificate for the year.

In 2011 it was estimated that the number of licensed deep sea pilots operating in Northwest European waterswere: France 14, Germany 12, Netherlands 19 and the UK 45, giving a total of about 90. However, thesefigures vary with demand by shipowners, often changing due to deep sea pilotage being voluntary and subjectto the commercial pressures in a volatile trading environment.

The typical cost to use a deep sea pilot for a container ship’s European port rotation—average seven days—is about £3,000. This is a very small proportion of the costs of the vessel and its cargo freight, when consideredas a means of reducing risk to safe navigation by having an experienced pilot onboard. The added advantageof a deep sea pilot’s local knowledge can save fuel costs, using experience of routes, passages and tides andadvising the shipmaster how best to conduct the voyage.

In many areas of the maritime world there are activities aimed at increasing the use of deep sea pilots toreduce risk. The Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission is lobbying for pilotage to be compulsory in the BalticSea. In Australia it is compulsory to take a pilot when transiting the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Straightand in Turkey, whilst strongly recommended for transiting vessels, pilotage is compulsory for the BosphorusStraits for certain classes of ships. Singapore are also keen to have compulsory pilotage for certain high riskvessels (gas carriers, tankers etc) in their confined and congested waters.

However, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defends the right of innocent passage and apart fromthe above there are no areas outside port authority jurisdiction where vessels must use the services of a pilot.We believe that this will continue for many years to come and therefore encourage shipmasters, owners andoperators to voluntarily make use of deep sea pilots, as an appropriate risk control measure, in our waters.

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has, for many years, recognised the advantage of deep seapilotage in congested and restricted waterways. At the Twelfth IMO General Assembly in 1981 the followingResolution A.486 (XII) was adopted: USE OF ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED DEEP SEA PILOTS IN THENORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL & SKAGERRAK.

This Resolution: “Recommends Member Governments to encourage ships flying their flag to make use onlyof the services of deep sea pilots in possession of a deep sea pilot’s card in accordance with the Antwerp rules,and invites the Governments of the coastal states of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Skagerrak toprovide information to IMO on how to secure the services of adequately qualified deep sea pilots. TheResolution contain two Annexes: giving Example of deep sea pilot’s card and a List of competent authoritiesin the littoral states of Northwest Europe.

In recent years, the UK ADSPA, together with representatives of deep sea pilots and the UK Safety ofNavigation Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, have worked todevelop a revision of the IMO Resolution A.486(XII) described above. This work came to fruition in May2012, when a revised draft Resolution A.486 “RECOMMENDATION ON THE USE OF ADEQUATELYQUALIFIED DEEP-SEA PILOTS IN THE NORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL AND SKAGERRAK” wassubmitted to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee for consideration, as a joint submission by all 27 EUMember States.

The Baltic States have a similar IMO Resolution, (A.480) recommending using adequately qualified DeepSea Pilots in the Baltic Sea, and agreed to revise their version at the same time and in the same way as theNorth Sea resolution.

These revised Resolutions made stronger the recommendation for shipmasters, owners and ship-operators touse qualified deep sea pilots, and added a new Annex 1 which listed: “Factors to be taken into account whenconsidering the use of a Deep-Sea Pilot to enhance the effectiveness of the Bridge Team for the safety ofnavigation and the protection of the marine environment”.



This joint submission from the EU Member States (Res.A.486) and the Baltic (BPAC) members had beencommented upon by: various interested parties, in a joint submission to the MSC (MSC/90/25/21), whereinthose bodies and member states objected to the inclusion of Annex 1 in the revised resolution and requestedthat it be removed. They claimed that the “Factors to be taken into account when considering the use of adeep sea pilot” are subjective and cause them concern.

The UK Licensing Authorities provided the MCA delegation to IMO MSC with a written response to theobjections raised, and circulated this response to Northwest European Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (NEDSPA)and the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission, requesting their support in progressing the Revised ResolutionA.486 without amendment or removal of Annex 1.

This Annex of the Revised A.486 and A.480 is seen as an important addition to the document; as itrecommends a risk based approach to assessing whether to use a Deep Sea Pilot when transiting the EnglishChannel, North Sea, Skagerrak, and Baltic Sea, and lists some of the factors to be considered when makingthis decision. We strongly recommended that it be retained in the revised Resolution.

The ADSPA considers it unfortunate that several IMO Members objected to its inclusion resulting in removalof the Annex.

These IMO Members and bodies were content to update the existing resolutions but they had strongarguments against the Annex. The major objection was their opinion that the Annex will increase costs forship-owners and that this is a first step for implementing mandatory deep sea pilotage in the English Channel,North Sea and Baltic Sea. The IMO NAV Sub-Committee can update the existing resolutions (A.480 andA.486) but is not allowed to include the Annex.

The consideration of updating the Resolutions will not take place until IMO NAV 58 (2013). The Annexcan not now be included or discussed.

It is essential that the risk to the safety of navigation is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).It is the view of the UK Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities that the use of licensed pilots by vessels transiting theEnglish Channel, Dover Strait and the North Sea is one of the key control measures available in this regardwithout which the risk is not ALARP.

This important control measure can make a significant contribution to navigation safety and protection ofthe marine environment. We strongly recommend that shipmaster, owners and operators consider the use of adeep sea pilot as an additional risk mitigation measure.

Estimating that there are some 90 licensed deep sea pilots providing their services to many different vesselsin the North Sea, English Channel and Skagerrak area, the number of vessels served by deep sea pilots are nomore than 2,000 per annum, which is based on each pilot undertaking approximately 20 vessel acts per year.

Therefore the actual use of the deep sea pilotage service is very small compared with the estimated 80,000vessels that transit the Dover Strait on an annual basis, meaning a high percentage of the remaining vesselsare navigating in this area without a deep sea pilot and the identified risk control measure he provides.

It is, therefore, the strong recommendation of the UK Authorities for the licensing of Deep Sea Pilots thatthe UK Government take all necessary actions to promote and encourage the use of adequately qualified deepsea pilots by vessels in the congested and constrained waters around the UK, in order that safety of navigationand protection of the marine environment are better assured and that risk to life and property is better protected.

Signed on behalf of the Corporation’s of Trinity House in Hull, London and Newcastle and the Association ofDeep Sea PIlotage Authorities of the United Kingdom (ADSPA)

September 2012

Written evidence from Dave Devey MNM (MP 07)

My Background

My name is Dave Devey and I am a retired pilot for the Port Of Liverpool, aged 70. I have spent a lifetimein pilotage beginning in 1958 at the age of 16 as a cadet with The Blue Funnel Line and progressing throughthe various stages of apprenticeship on to gaining my first Pilot’s Licence at the age of 24 in 1966. I then spentover 40 years as a licenced/authorised pilot, retiring at the age of 65 in 2007 with an unblemished record. Thelast 10 years of my career was spent as the elected Senior Representative of Liverpool Pilots and I representedPilots both nationally and in Europe as a committee member of the United Kingdom Maritime PilotsAssociation. I was awarded the Merchant Navy Medal in 2007 for services to UK and European Pilotage.

Pilotage in the UK

The fact that the Transport Select Committee have chosen to invite evidence on the current position ofpilotage in the UK is a welcome step as it is a subject which indeed requires much airing following the manyyears of neglect at the hands of a number of the Competent Harbour Authorities set up following the 1987Pilotage Act.



We need to examine the reasons behind the 1987 Pilotage Act which offered employment to pilots andtransferred the means by which they were remunerated into the hands of the Competent Harbour Authorities.The Act gave CHAs greater control over pilots and diminished their ability to act in an independent mannerin issues involving safety. This change was brought about under the guise of “the need for a more unified andtherefore better management of all port operatives under the single banner of The Competent HarbourAuthority”. What it actually achieved, in the cases of those who became employed, was to seriously devaluethe status and therefore the remuneration of the pilots and to gag them from speaking out about anyimproprieties which arise from day to day within the port operation. “Loyalty to the company that now paidtheir wages” was the new watchword. It should be noted that the revenue earned from pilotage comes fromthe shipowner and is a separate and distinct payment from the port charges that are made. Prior to 1987 thisrevenue went to the pilots themselves and the port authority took a commensurate share which paid for thecosts of running the pilotage operation which included the building and maintenance of launches and the wagesof pilot boat crews. Once harbour authorities took control of this money the pilots’ share diminished inproportion and the savings were absorbed into the general harbour accounts.

UK Pilots prior to 1987 were self employed and therefore able to retain their status as independentprofessional persons who, by reason of their independence, were able to uphold the safe practices of navigation,which are essential to every port operation, without the constraints of financial pressures which are frequentlybrought to bear on port authorities by their customers under the threat of “taking their custom elsewhere ifnon-compliancy with their wishes”. The loss of this independence is a serious threat to the good governanceof our port operations and needs to be addressed before the situation deteriorates any further. To underline thispoint I can best relate my personal experiences of what happened in my own port of Liverpool in the yearsfollowing the introduction of the 1987 Act. In 1988 Liverpool Pilots elected to forego their self employedstatus and to join the CHA as employees of the Mersey Docks & Harbour Company. What followed was nineyears of confrontation which was only relieved in 1997 when, by mutual agreement, the pilots reverted to theirprevious position of one of self employment. Since that day the relationship between the pilots and the harbourauthority has steadily improved and all issues relating to pilotage and port safety are discussed and resolvedfollowing regular meetings. Liverpool Pilots are now recognised as one of the UK’s foremost bodies in thepursuit of safe practices in pilotage. This should be the way forward for all CHAs who currently employtheir pilots.

What does a Pilot do?

The public’s perception of a pilot can vary from one of a level of no knowledge of his very existence to oneof “He’s a man who helps the captain to bring his ship in and out of port” This is usually followed by “I thinkhe drives the tug boat that pulls the ship” or “He goes out in a little boat and leads the ship in to/out of port”.Only those people who have experienced a trip on a cruise liner will be aware that he comes on board andgoes up to the bridge and even the majority of those people think that he is there just to help the captain todock his ship. The reality is a sea mile away from this perception and is at the heart of why the pilotageprofession is currently being dumbed down by a number of the CHAs.

This public perception of what a pilot does has been supported and encouraged by civil servants who havebeen persuaded of the belief that a pilot is merely an adviser and that the master of the vessel is in control ofall aspects of his vessel’s operation which includes navigation in compulsory pilotage waters. The perceptioncurrently being promulgated is that the pilot stands to one side of the master and that he advises him shouldhe believe that he may be doing something wrong. What happens in reality is that the master of the vessel,because he is obliged to by law, hands over the charge of the navigation to the pilot, barring certain stipulatedexceptions (Royal Naval vessels etc). He duly does this following a briefing based on the pilot’s passage planwhich has already been formulated by the pilot prior to boarding, drawing on his unique knowledge of thetidal situation and the quirks of wind and current that may subsequently affect the passage of the vessel in hischarge up until it reaches the safety of its final berthing place.

The erroneous perception that the pilot is merely an adviser has been fostered by those who seek to diminishthe true responsibilities of the pilot’s position and therefore his status. This misconception has led to the currentdowngrading of the UK pilot’s status in employment and a reduction in his resulting entitlement to a properremuneration under the 1987 Act.

What the general public does not know, and that includes the government, is that the pilot has a very difficultand complex job. He must be both mentally and physically fit in order to deal with the many problems he willencounter in his daily task of safely navigating the vessels in his charge. He alone has to make on the spotdecisions involving millions of pounds of equipment and most of all the lives of those people both on boardhis ship and those on other vessels which he will pass at close quarters. One mistake on his part can lead to acatastrophic situation whereby multi-million pounds of pollution and loss of life is the end result. One of thereasons why he needs to be physically fit is that he is frequently required to journey out to the boarding pointvia a small launch in all weather conditions both day and night before he has to negotiate a climb up a ropeladder which can be as much as 10 metres in height. When this is done in bad weather (of which the UK getsits fair share) and at night it can be extremely dangerous as the vessel can be rolling or pitching with the effectof the sea. Making the right judgement as to when to make the jump from launch to ladder can be the difference



between a safe ascent or ending up in the water. Even more difficult to judge is the descent from a vessel onto the safety of the deck of the launch.

The pilot, on safely boarding the vessel then has to ascend numerous decks in order to arrive at his place ofwork ie the ship’s bridge. My own experience has been that few of the larger vessels are equipped with liftsand the ascent has to be made by staircase. I encountered 99 steps on one particular vessel. Now the pilot hasarrived on the bridge he is met by the master who is usually extremely pleased to see the man who issubsequently going to relieve him of his apprehensions about how his vessel is going to safely negotiate thispassage. An exchange of passage plans thus takes place—if indeed the master is fully aware of what is aboutto happen to his vessel. The pilot will then direct the passage of the vessel both in its speed and directionemploying, if felt needed, tugs for the final part of the berthing, directing the tugs as to how they tow thevessel with the use of a hand held radio. This operation requires a high degree of concentration in controllingthe engine movements to govern the speed of the vessel, the giving of orders to the helmsman as to the directionof the vessel and instructions to the tugs as how they assist the berthing. The pilot is also communicating withthe shore by radio indicating which lines are required for the final mooring position.

All this is a sea mile away from the pilot being an adviser.

Comments

Relaxing the rules on the granting of Pilotage Exemption Certificates should be viewed with extreme cautionand issues of safety should be paramount in any final decisions.

Pilots should have a greater say in the affairs governing their profession and should not be relegated to justanother department of the CHA where frequently they have been left to wither on the vine.

The UK Government should publicly recognise the importance of pilots and support them in their daily roleof protecting the UK shores from pollution and the loss of life.

(Please see the dvd “A Day In The Life Of A Liverpool Pilot”.)

Post Script

I apologise for exceeding the number of pages recommended but I would have liked to have written a lotmore and have condensed my evidence as best I can.

September 2012

Written evidence from John H Bryant BA MNI ( Retired Trinity House and Port of London Authoritypilot) (MP 08)

The following issues are the most significant for marine pilotage in 2012 and beyond.

(1) Recruitment (Recruitment of marine pilots, difficulties and suggestions for the future)

(2) Maintaining standards (The effect of technology on training and safety)

(3) Vessel Traffic Services (Misunderstandings about the role of a VTS)

(4) The legal position. (The legal position of pilotage and VTS)

1. Recruitment

Traditionally in UK and Europe pilots are recruited from the pool of experienced seafarers available in eachregion. In the main, pilots in major UK and European ports are qualified to command all classes and sizes ofships and many have command experience. This qualification (Master Mariner) takes some 10 years to obtainand requires a degree level education. In many cases a master Mariner will also hold a degree in NauticalScience. Before becoming a marine pilot it is likely that he or she will have about another five years experienceof watchkeeping and will the take four years to qualify as a First Class Pilot in a major port. A total of 19 years.

Thirty or more years ago this level of experience and education was common among seafarers in UK; thisis no longer the case. The training and experience is difficult and onerous to obtain and more lucrativeopportunities are available. Pilots are for the most part reasonably well paid as you would expect after 20 yearsof training and experience, however remuneration now is proportionately considerably less than 30 years ago.Pilotage is no longer considered an enviable occupation by seafarers. As an example a cruise ship master canexpect to earn over £100,000 pa tax free working six months of the year whereas a pilot will likely earn£70,000 pa taxable and have about 30 days annual leave. A pilot with a masters certificate is certainly capableof becoming a cruise ship master and not surprisingly many do.

The solution is to offer marine pilots a career in port management. Many will prefer to stay working aspilots but others will take the opportunity to progress and the port industry will benefit enormously. Whenpilots are recruited they should be offered a career path from pilot to Chief Executive if that is what they wantand they are suitable. This may mean that harbour masters may need to be pilots before they progress to



harbour master but this is a progressive step and the port industry will benefit from more experienced andmore confident harbour masters. Of course this progression happens now but it is not encouraged.

2. Maintaining Standards

Pilotage skills have changed in the last 50 years, mainly because of the continual advances in technology:radar, gps, ais, vts, towage and communications. It is easy to assume that these advances have brought moresafety to the industry, resulting in fewer collisions and groundings.

This is not the case. Unfortunately Pilotage skills have not improved despite the increase in technology.Pilotage is essentially the ability of a pilot to use his local knowledge together with his experience inshiphandling to bring a ship safely to her berth even when working within very fine tolerances. The toleranceshave undoubtedly been reduced over the last several decades but shiphandling skills have not improved. It islikely that increased use of technology while bringing some benefits will not outweigh the decline inshiphandling skills. The use of technology in shiphandling seems to have the effect of making people believethat the natural elements (wind and tide) can be “over powered” by the brute force of ever more powerful tugsand machinery. This is a dangerous misunderstanding and is now being taught in shiphandling and towagesimulators everywhere.

Pilots are best trained by learning with other pilots. This has always been the case and any attempt to reducethis practical training should be restrained. We can think of many other industries which have more recentlylearned the benefits of this way of training.

In the future it may be necessary to review the recruitment of pilots because traditional sources of manpowermay disappear. However it would be foolish to think you can take graduates and make them into pilots withjust a few years training. The consequences of this lack of experience might be very expensive. I suggest thesolution is for the port industry and self employed pilots to work together to devise a training scheme withsponsored training at sea, in port and in towage together with graduate entry standards. I suggest that a pilotageappointment should not be made until the trainee is 30 years of age. Such schemes have existed in the pastand have succeeded in South Africa and the UK.

3. Vessel Traffic Services

Vessel Traffic Services have come to play an important part in UK and European ports over the last 30 ormore years. VTS cannot replace pilotage. Many uninformed and inexperienced people in the port and shippingindustries fail to understand this point. VTS provides services to ships transiting a port area, it provides up todate navigational information, though with today’s technology there is no reason why this information shouldnot be transmitted directly to the ship in data form rather than using telecommunications. For many years therehas been a rather cynical campaign to make people believe pilotage can be done from the shore in a VTS. Ofcourse this is an attractive proposition given the expense of providing a pilot and the opportunities availablefor a VTS to charge for this service. The two services are separate and distinct, both operationally and legally.

A pilot provides services to the master of the ship and is employed by the master when engaged in piloting.His duty is to the ship. A VTS is not employed by the ship or the master and a VTS has a duty to the port. AVTS may have a duty to the ship in the sense that it is not to give false information but that is all.

4. The Legal Position

The legal position of a pilot is clearly stated in law. Briefly, a pilot is someone who has the conduct of theship but is not a member of the crew. His duty therefore is to the ship. A pilot can be criminally indicted forfailure to enact this duty to a good standard. There is no shortage of Case Law with regard to pilotage.

The legal position of a VTS is unclear and to my knowledge has never been tested in Court. There havebeen many cases of a VTS being involved in groundings and collisions, either by giving false information orby becoming involved in the decision making on board. To my knowledge these cases have never involved theCourts and in many cases the involvement of the VTS has been obscured. Worldwide, these incidents have notnecessarily occurred in port limits, the Singapore Straits are a particularly contentious area at the moment.VTS has grown from the signal stations of the 19th and 20th Century and now has ambitions to controlshipping , this is a dangerous development and either the law must catch up or VTS must be told to beless ambitious.

September 2012



Written evidence from Stephen Chapman (MP 10)

I would first of all like to state that there are many issues affecting marine pilotage and the remit given istoo vague. I could say that the UK having a mixture of private ports and trust port affects pilotage; the draftof the ship could affect pilotage. But I believe you are looking to the future of pilotage in the UK. I can seetwo major issues that affect pilotage and will continue to do so:

1. The standard of ships crews

The implementation of STCW was meant to raise the levels of training and the standards ofships crews. As a serving pilot I see many crews, who have all the right certificates and bits ofpaper but are still well below standard. I cannot see this altering in the foreseeable future asship owners push for the cheapest crewing options available on the world market. This factmeans that the UK government should continue to support all UK ports to provide a welltrained pilot service.

This leads to my next point.

2. Where are the new pilots coming from?

Traditionally pilots have been recruited from the Merchant Navy since the demise of some pilotservices to have an apprentice scheme. That option has been reducing for many years; theBritish Merchant Navy is practically nonexistent. If the Government and Port Authoritiesmethod of dealing with this problem is to look at foreign nationals as the new UK pilots, thenenough said as far as I am concerned. I will not be party to training such replacements whenthere are enough young talented persons in the UK. In my view what is required is a nationalports qualification which could lead to pilotage/VTS/Harbourmaster as dictated by thecandidate’s skills and preference. The Port of London and I understand ABP Humber has startedthis in a style of training, but more needs to be done. I am not sure of the average age of UKpilots but it would not surprise me to be over 50 years , with a large group of pilots all due toretire at the same time . So something needs to be done in the near future to fill the void left.

September 2012

Written evidence from John Clandillon-Baker FNI (MP 16)

1. What is a pilot?

The following definition was established by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which states that: “Pilot meansany person not belonging to a ship who has the conduct thereof.”

2. What does a pilot do?

Basically the pilot is a seafarer who has detailed knowledge of a port approach or dangerous navigationalarea and who uses that knowledge to ensure the safe passage of a vessel through the pilotage district.

3. What is the difference between a Captain and a pilot?

The Captain (Master) always has command of the ship and thus has ultimate responsibility for the safety ofthe ship, its cargo and crew. The pilot has the conduct of the ship in the pilotage district and upon boarding avessel agrees a passage plan for the transit with the master but is then responsible for directing the course andspeed of the vessel to execute the passage plan.

4. Two Court cases have defined the term “conduct”

The Tactician (1971): In this case the judge considered the meaning of the word “conduct”. And stated: “itis a cardinal principle that the Pilot is in sole charge of the ship, and that all directions as to speed, course,stopping, and reversing, and everything of that land, are for the Pilot”.

The Mickleham (1918): This case also considered the meaning of the word “conduct” and again concludedthat if a ship is to be conducted by a pilot it “does not mean that she is to be navigated under his advice: itmeans that she must be conducted by him”.

5. Why is a pilot required

Ships are designed to proceed fast and efficiently on passages between ports so when operating in a portthey are operating in an environment for which they weren’t designed.

Likewise, ships’ Captains and officers are trained and qualified to navigate ships between ports but cannotbe trained for every port so in a port and its approaches they are working in an environment for which theyhaven’t been trained.



6. The 1987 Pilotage Act

In the UK all pilots operate under the 1987 Pilotage Act which established each UK port as a CompetentHarbour Authority (CHA) and granted these CHA’s full control of pilotage. This effectively granted powerswithout accountability to the CHA’s, a factor that was highlighted by the Marine Accident InvestigationInvestigation Branch (MAIB) enquiry into the Sea Empress grounding in 1996 (http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/1990_to_1998/sea_empress.cfm ) which states:

“The Pilotage Act 1987 gave CHAs the absolute right to determine the standards of training andauthorisation of their pilots, whether or not those responsibilities were delegated, with no mechanismto challenge their judgement of what those standards should be. This is quite unlike the training andcertification of ship’s officers where minimum national and international standards do exist. This isnot a satisfactory situation, when inadequacies in the training and experience of the pilots mightonly be detected after an accident has happened”.

Despite this finding, nothing has changed.

7. Lack of an Appeal procedure

Section 3 of the Pilotage Act grants CHA’s total powers regarding the selection and authorisation of pilotsand also the power to remove that authorisation. Several cases have occurred of pilots being de-authorised andsubsequent employment tribunals have failed because the Act doesn’t contain any clause granting a right ofappeal by a pilot against a CHA’s action. This needs to be rectified.

8. Pilot Training

The training of UK pilots is the responsibility of the CHA. Again quoting from the Sea Empress report:

“There are no national or international standards for the training and authorisation of marinepilots. At the 1993 United Kingdom Pilots Association (Marine) (UKPA(M)) Delegate Conference, aresolution to lay down appropriate general standards was agreed. This resolution was followed bya survey of all UKPA(M) pilotage districts which revealed significant differences in both methodsand standards of training. A brief policy document on the recruitment and training of marine pilots,based on the survey results, was then prepared and distributed in 1995 to many organisations. AResolution inviting IMO to consider developing such standards was adopted at the 1995 Standardsof Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Conference (STCW). It was considered by the Sub-committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping in September 1996 and placed on thatSubcommittee’s list of forthcoming work, so the development of international standards can beexpected in the future.”

Despite this finding 16 years ago there still isn’t a pilotage qualification. Work was undertaken by the nownamed United Kingdom Maritime Pilots Association (UKMPA) with the sub group of the DfT, British PortsIndustry Training (BPIT) back in 2000 and a set of standards were agreed and a standards document produced(www.portskillsandsafety.co.uk/skills/standards_and_qualifications/nos_units?category=36 ). This document(now owned by BPIT’s successor Port Skills and Safety) has been ready for incorporation into the Port MarineSafety Code for over a decade but this has never taken place because incorporation has been resisted by someparties. Likewise work, supported by the MCA, has been undertaken by the UKMPA to produce a pilotagequalification but again resistance from some stakeholders has prevented agreement on this issue being reached.In Europe a similar set of standards for pilots have been produced but again these have not been adopted bythe UK.

9. Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC)

This code provides “best practice” guidelines for port operations but without any underpinning legislationseems to be an ineffective document.

10. Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PEC)

There is currently a clause proposed for inclusion in the draft Marine Navigation Bill that seeks to removethe requirement contained in the Pilotage Act for a PEC only to be issued to the Master or “bona fide” firstMate of a ship in favour of “any person”. Pilotage is a highly skilled occupation and such skills can only beobtained through considerable experience. The only reason for downgrading eligibility requirements iscommercial expediency and therefore must be resisted at all costs.When in port limits, ships and pilots arefrequently operating at the limits of the vessels’ parameters and this element of a ship’s voyage is recognisedby insurers as the time of highest risk. Also, many pilotage districts transit the highest rated environmentallysensitive areas designated as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Marine Environmental High RiskAreas (MEHRA). With a zero tolerance from the media and general public to any maritime incident, thepotential risks of any deregulation of the existing PEC regime are unacceptable.



11. Conclusion

Statistics reveal that 93% of the world’s trade involves shipping at some stage and every day pilots aroundthe world handle thousands of ships in the challenging environments unique to their particular port. Theconsiderable skills required to safely achieve this are generally ignored and therefore unapreciated. Pilotage isessential to the safety of shipping and the coastal environment and must therefore be regarded as an asset tobe valued rather than a cost to be cut. It should be of deep concern to this select committee’s members that,over 16 years after the Sea Empress disaster, the shortcomings of the 1987 Pilotage Act with respect to trainingand accountability have not been rectified.

September 2012

Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (MP 17)

The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (“the Institute”) is a professional institutionembracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for bothpassengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government andadministration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principalconcerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far aspossible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widelydisseminated and adopted.

The Institute has a specialist Ports and Maritime Forum which contributed to this submission.

Pilotage acts around the United Kingdom vary considerably and consist of anything from entering a harbourdirect from sea and berthing within a very short distance and time frame to many hours passage up a riverand entering a dock or mooring at a tidal jetty. Other vessel movements and navigational hazards may alsodiffer widely.

In addition deep sea pilotage is carried out to/from sea to/from British and Continental ports and directlybetween ports.

Successful pilotage depends upon many elements for safe and efficient prosecution and include, but are notlimited to, expert local knowledge of geographical features, buoyage, hydrographical conditions, anomalies,customs and practise, emergency procedures, vessel traffic services, by-laws, harbour regulations, prevailingweather conditions, tidal information, other vessel movements and communications.

Under normal circumstances this expert knowledge lies within the responsibility of a fully qualified localpilot who has carried out training and completed examination by the duly appointed Competent HarbourAuthority. The Pilot carries out his/her duties and updating regularly within that district. They board shipswhich are bound by compulsory pilotage regulations.

Masters and Mates on certain classes of ships trading on a regular basis to the same port may be given theopportunity by the Competent Harbour Authority to be examined for a Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC). Acertain number of trips in and out per year by the holder of the PEC is required along with an annual reviewor examination. The PEC is only valid for the ship or ships detailed on the certificate whilst the holder issigned on that vessel in the capacity of Master or Mate.

Regardless of whether a local pilot is employed or a PEC holder other than the Master is conducting thepilotage the Master would still be expected to be on the navigation bridge as the ultimate responsibility for thesafety of the passengers, crew and ship rests with the Master.

The Mate qualifies to apply for a PEC as the second in command of the ship should anything untowardhappen to the Master. A Junior Mate who regularly relieves as the Mate may, in certain circumstances, alsoapply for a PEC. However with more than two PEC holders onboard, depending on the number of tripsrequired, keeping all PECs valid on a particular vessel may, along with the hands on experience of conning ofa vessel through a district, be difficult . Any consideration to allow junior Mates, other than those relieving theChief Mate, is fraught with problems.

Further reduction in standards directly within some Pilotage Authorities is in allowing candidates with lessthan 1st or 2nd class Certificates of Competency to apply and become fully qualified pilots.

At a time when the safety of life, and the protection of property and the environment is, quite rightly, beingrecognised as of paramount importance any consideration to water down the standards of experience, trainingor qualifications of those conducting pilotage is contrary to the principles of best practise to ensure thecommitment to safety of life, and the protection of property and the environment.

September 2012



Written evidence from Captain Rod Lewis (MP 18)

Background

I am a serving Authorised UK Marine Pilot employed by a major UK ports group (ABP) a large part of myjob is now managerial, having taken on the role of Pilot Manager and Deputy Harbour Master for the ABPSouth Wales region.

I am a member of both the UKMPA and the UKHMA but am writing this totally independently of myemployer and the associations that I am a member of.

I started my career at sea around the time of the inception of the 1987 Pilotage act, a time where few UKshipping companies where investing in the marine professionals of the future.

I attained my first command in 1995 and signed off my last ship in 2005 to start a new career as a Pilot. Iattained unrestricted Authorisation as a South East Wales Pilot in 2008. In 2010 I took up my present role.

While most certainly not unique, I consider myself to have reasonable experience of UK Pilotage from thestandpoints of a serving Master, an authorised Pilot and a Pilot Manager. Perhaps of note is the fact that allmy experience is in the 1987 act era and all my experience in senior positions coming in the era of MarineSafety Management.

The CHA and the Port Marine Safety Code

The most recent significant changes to Pilotage regulation in the UK where brought about by the 1987Pilotage act, its purpose in essence, to remove some of the rigid regulation of the Pilotage service whilstconsolidating the Pilotage acts of 1913 and 1936 along with the Pilotage provisions of the 1979 MerchantShipping Act. Pivotal to this primary aim was the designation of Competent Harbour Authorities (CHA’s) thedesignation of the CHA also served to remove a divided authority, in most cases transferring the responsibilityfor Pilotage to the Statutory Authority within which the Pilotage district fell. No doubt, this transition has hadits challenges.

In 1998 the Department for Transport, in light of the “Sea Empress” disaster, undertook a review of the1987 Pilotage act. The review concluded that “Pilotage should rightly remain the responsibility of the CHA’sand become integrated with other port marine activity under the management and responsibility of oneStatutory Authority”.

Several recommendations also came from this review, the principle one being the Port Marine Safety Code(PMSC) that was first published in 2000.

The DfT owned “Code” and the Stakeholder owned “Guide”, while not mandatory, are underpinned bylegislation. It may not be an actual offence to not be compliant with the code but a serious breach of the codewould almost certainly be in breach of relevant legislation. Perhaps more importantly, the Code is the nationalstandard, and in being so is the standard by which Port Authorities would be judged.

First published in 2000 with a major revision in 2009 the PMSC and associated Guide to good practice servevery well people such as I who have responsibility for formulating and putting into practice marine procedures,plans and policies.

The Pilot’s Role in Marine Safety Management

Marine Pilots are recognised as perhaps the most significant risk mitigation measure available to the StatutoryAuthority. As such it is important that the knowledge and experience of the Authorities Pilots is put to bestuse, in a coordinated manner that is consistent with the Authorities broader safety management responsibilities.

From my experience of managing Pilots and from formulating and implementing marine Safety Managementsystems I consider it is of vital importance that pilots are considered ( by themselves as importantly as by theStatutory Authority) inclusive in the Authorities marine safety management systems .

Pilot’s knowledge and experience should be considered an asset by their authorising Authority, especiallywhen considered along with their frequent situation of being first point of contact between the Ship and thePort Authority.

From experience, I have seen safety and operational benefits in Pilots greater involvement in the general andsafety management of ports, a situation that should be encouraged.

Port Management and Pilotage have traditionally been separate career paths. National OccupationalStandards and qualification frameworks for both Pilots and Harbour Masters would appear to offer aconvergence route between the previously distinct disciplines.

Pilotage Recruitment

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing Pilotage in the UK is recruitment. A whole generation of pilots thatcame into the service in the late 80’s and 90s are now retiring; the generation that should be replacing them



appears to be missing from the ranks of UK seafarers and marine professionals that one would expect toreplace them.

Notwithstanding this apparent black-hole where potential pilots should be, it seems that seafaring as aprofession is not as attractive a profession as it once was, with many UK seafarers leaving the sea at a veryearly stage in order to take up shore positions.

The development of the National occupational standards for marine Pilots (NOS) and the development of aPilotage qualification framework, when considered with the CHA’s duty to determine the qualification of thepilots it authorises, would appear to offer the industry the potential to secure its future pilots .

The PMSC guide to good practice acknowledges the NOS as the standard for initial and continuedauthorisation of UK Marine Pilots. The NOS, along with the PMSC Guide to Good Practice, reference IMOresolution A960 on Pilotage standards.

The NOS and qualification framework appear to offer the potential for individual CHA’s to recruit and traintheir potential Pilots based on the needs and requirements of their specific areas of jurisdiction while ensuringthat the CHA determined standard is an appropriate one.

September 2012

Written evidence from Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee (MP 19)

I write in my capacity of Chair of the London Insurance Market’s Joint Hull Committee.

You may be familiar with the work of the Committee: it is an influential body that represents the interestsof marine insurers operating in the London international market, in particular those underwriters that insurevessels and their associated risks on a global basis, including ships that call at UK ports.

The market we represent comprises both Lloyd’s and Insurance Company underwriters with a global marketshare for hull and machinery risks of approximately 18%, the most significant market by premium volume,with the next largest individual market being Norway at 14%.

The role of the Joint Hull Committee is principally one of research on behalf of the London market, providingtechnical guidance and advice where appropriate. The Committee also liaises with outside bodies in order tocontribute to relevant maritime debate and represent the interest of hull insurers in a number of areas.

My purpose in writing is to express London hull insurers’ concern over the proposed amendment to the1987 Pilotage Act through application of the Marine Navigation Bill 2012.

In recent months we have witnessed the withdrawal of the UK’s Emergency Response Vessel service and areduction in coverage by Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres. Marine insurers consider that both of thesedevelopments create more risk to shipping, passengers and seagoing personnel, cargo interests and to the UKCoastline. The proposed amendment to the Pilotage Act would, in our opinion, amount to a dumbing down ofpilotage capability within the UK’s compulsory pilotage areas and once again further heighten risk in UKcoastal and restricted waters.

HMG’s policy objective is to increase efficiency through more flexibility in managing Pilotage ExemptionCertificates. However by definition, compulsory pilotage areas require the highest standards of skill and thecurrent regime, which allows a qualified Master or First Mate to hold a pilotage exemption certificate, is welltested, understood and clear in its obligations.

Aside from legal considerations and whether such an amendment would contravene UK common law orinternational law, from a practical point of view underwriters often experience cases where groundings orcollisions occur in restricted waters due to poor bridge procedure and a lack of clarity and communication.This amendment proposes to de-regulate the existing system to such an extent where we believe bridgeprocedure may on occasion be compromised, thereby creating more risk.

Clearly, today’s economic climate demands a degree of pragmatism and paradigms may need to bechallenged to secure long term benefits. However, there are operational elements which as part of that drivefor efficiency, should not be compromised. We believe that maintaining the highest level of expertise to navigateand maneuver sophisticated vessels that are carrying high value and sometimes hazardous cargo in difficultand often stressful conditions should be a paramount consideration for operators and policymakers alike.

I realise that our representations to the Select Committee are rather late in the PMB process but we wouldbe most grateful if the select committee can take account of marine insurers’ real concerns during your debateand ultimately your policy decision.

November 2012

The Stationery Office Limited03/2013 027606 19585

Marine Pilotage - virtual · 2013. 3. 6. · Marine Pilotage Ninth Report of Session 2010–13...

Documents

Transcript of Marine Pilotage - virtual · 2013. 3. 6. · Marine Pilotage Ninth Report of Session 2010–13...