This bundle: 1

Marine Pilotage: Memoranda Received

NEW items are listed below with the number and title in bold, and are available on the Members’ shared drive (Inquiry/MP/Written evidence)

No. Author

MP 01 Maritime Pilots’ AssociationMP 02 Victoria Holdings Ltd.MP 03 Barry Youde MP 03A Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde MP 03B Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde MP 04 Terrence Crowe MP 05 United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ AssociationMP 05A United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ AssociationMP 05B United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ AssociationMP 05C United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ AssociationMP 06 United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities MP 07 Dave Devey MP 08 John Bryant MP 09 David Snelsdon MP 10 Stephen Chapman MP 11 Nautilus MP 12 Department for TransportMP 12A Department for TransportMP 13 Chamber of ShippingMP 14 Unite MP 15 UKMPG and BPA MP 16 John Clandillon-Baker FNIMP 17 Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport MP 18 Captain Rod Lewis MP 19 Joint Hull Committee

Written evidence from the International Maritime Pilots' Association (IMPA) (MP 01)

Preamble 1. Whilst the Committee are quite naturally concerned with Marine Pilotage in a National setting, Shipping is a global business and the position of the UK in terms of Pilotage has to be considered in this international setting. IMPA will only concern itself with this issue in its submission. IMPA is a professional technical body, formed 40 years ago to represent the world’s pilots at the IMO (International Maritime Organization). IMPA represents 8,000 Marine Pilots in 55 Administrations, of which the UK is one. It is not a Trade Union and is based in the UK to service IMO. 2. The UK is highly dependent on ship-borne trade for not just its very existence, but for much of its prosperity. The UK coast has considerable areas of shoal water off-shore, has some of the biggest tides in the world and has a port network which struggles with capacity for larger vessels which increasingly form the backbone of international trade in bulk cargo such as ore, oil and boxes. 3. It is compulsory to take a pilot to enter a UK port unless specifically exempted. This is the norm elsewhere in the world. Marine pilots either act as an “advisor” to the Master or actually have “conduct” of the Navigation of the vessel. In either case they can be manoeuvring vessels of more than 200m in length displacing some 200,000 tons, carrying a cargo worth hundreds of millions of pounds, and yet have little more than a metre of water beneath their keel. They will work with a very small polyglot crew, and the vessel will have limited capacity to manoeuvre itself unaided. 4. Shipping being an international activity, is regulated by an international body, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) whose headquarters is on the other side of the river to Parliament. The UK is an active member and participant in IMO business. IMPA sits at IMO as an NGO with consultative status. 5. IMO recognises Pilotage as the single-most effective measure that can be used to protect the Marine environment. In 2003 IMO adopted Resolution A960 “Recommendations on Training and Certification of Maritime Pilots other than Deep Sea Pilots”. Whilst ‘only’ recommendatory it was looked at by the Industry as a good step

forward, containing as it did guidance on Pilot Training, Certification, Licensing and a syllabus, as well as Operational Procedures. 6. Following discussions with the P & I Clubs (Protection and Indemnity Clubs, a form of mutual liability insurance unique to the Shipping Industry), IMPA wrote to all governments represented at IMO seeking their advice on the implementation of Resolution A960. No reply was received from the UK despite a reminder and it seems clear the Resolution, either never got beyond the UK IMO Delegation, or there was a failure within the MCA to give the text to the Competent Harbour Authorities (CHAs). 7. The UK suffers from a lack of cohesive structure to deal with pilot training and what is in place is solely as a result of the pilots’ own efforts. The CHAs seem unwilling or unable to meet A960’s training recommendations in a unified way and the UK is as a result no longer regarded as among the best places in respect of Pilotage practice. There appears no will in the administration to meet the international obligations the UK owes to IMO and the International Shipping Community. 8. Sadly, prior to the passing of the 1987 Pilotage Act the UK’s 1913 Pilotage Act was used as a model piece of legislation in the rest of the world. The rest of the world who copied Pilotage practice in the UK looked on in amazement as a much-admired system was emasculated in 1988. The very uneven Pilotage standards found in UK ports are a direct outcome of this ill-advised piece of legislation. July 2012

Written Evidence from Victoria Group Holdings Ltd. (MP 02) Background 1. There are more than 600 marine pilots in the UK, of whom a little less than a third are members of The Pilots’ National Pension Fund (The PNPF). Some of them are employed by ‘Competent Harbour Authorities’ (CHAs) and others are authorised by CHAs, while being self-employed, usually as members of co-operatives. CHAs with employed pilots make employers’ contributions to The PNPF and collect employees’ contributions from their pilots, which they send to The PNPF. CHAs with self-employed pilots are supposed to collect their pilots’ contributions and send them to The PNPF. In practice, this task is often delegated by the CHA to the pilots themselves. 2. The PNPF has an estimated deficit of approximately £300 million. The Trustee of the PNPF has sought and obtained a ruling from the High Court which will enable it to recover the deficit from a wide range of ports and harbours i.e. the CHAs. The Approved Judgement, dated 28th June 2010, applies to CHAs with self-employed pilots as well as employed pilots, even though the former are not employers and have never made contributions to The PNPF on behalf of their pilots. 3. The consequence of this ruling will be the imposition of liabilities on CHAs for their share of the deficit in the Scheme. This will have a devastating effect on the smaller ports which will be forced to increase their dues/pilotage charges to meet these liabilities. This will make them uncompetitive with the larger ports which not only have greater reserves at hand, but have the advantage of economies of scale. In addition, some ports have long since ceased their commercial operations, but will still have a historical liability. It is highly probable that, if an arbitrary recovery plan is imposed by the Trustee, many smaller ports will be forced to close. 4. The purpose of this submission is to make Members of the Transport Select Committee aware of the very real threat posed by this grossly unfair judgement to the future viability of the UK’s smaller ports. In the worst case, their demise will impact on the Government’s “green agenda” by reducing options for short-sea transport, concentrating cargo-handling in a small number of large ports and significantly adding to the heavy truck miles on our national road network. It will certainly lead to major job-losses in the ports themselves and in the many local and regional businesses which depend upon them. The knock-on effect on their surrounding economies and the nation’s prospects for recovery from the recession will be considerable. Summary 5. The PNPF is a defined benefit pension scheme which has been operating since 1974. Membership is open to marine pilots, both employed and self-employed, who are authorised by Competent Harbour Authorities (CHAs). Membership of the Scheme is not compulsory and, of the 600 or so authorised pilots presently operating in UK ports, fewer than 170 are members of the Scheme. 6. The PNPF has enjoyed past periods of surplus, but is now suffering (in common with many other schemes) a substantial deficit. At the beginning of 2010 the Trustee of the

PNPF sought the guidance of the High Court in order to determine inter alia the extent to which the Rules of the Scheme might be varied in order to provide The PNPF with the power to demand deficit contributions from a wider range of sources i.e. not just the employed pilots, their employers and the self-employed pilots, but also CHAs which authorise self-employed pilots and CHAs with no currently active pilots, but which had authorised pilots in the past. 7. The Approved Judgement was handed down on 28th June 2010. The Court held that the liability of CHAs to contribute to the Scheme is not limited. Instead, the Trustee has the power to demand contributions from all of the CHAs in an entirely unrestricted way. 8. The imposition of a liability on CHAs for the deficit in The PNPF has been both sudden and unexpected. CHAs around the country with self-employed pilots had in many cases never heard of The PNPF until asked for voluntary contributions in 2005. Even CHAs with employed pilots had not anticipated that they would have to pay for deficits of this magnitude. Furthermore, the majority of the deficit in The PNPF (c.58%) relates to pilots’ service pre-1988, when all of them were self-employed and when they were authorised by the Pilotage Authorities and not by the CHAs, which had not yet been created. There is a strong feeling in the industry that the Government should accept a degree of responsibility for this element of the problem. 9. The distribution of the notional liability to The PNPF across the various CHAs around the country is completely arbitrary. For instance, there are some CHAs whose pilots were never members of The PNPF, so they have no liability whatsoever; there are small ports with greater liabilities than large ports because of the respective ages of their pilots. Thus, some ports are being made hugely more or less competitive than others in a wholly unanticipated and unpredictable way. 10. The potential impact of the contributions to The PNPF on small ports is significantly greater than on large ports. As a general rule, the notional liabilities are a bigger percentage of the turnover of small ports than of large ports, because the latter’s ships are bigger and they need fewer pilots per tonne of throughput than small ports do. 11. In addition, the larger ports tend to have additional sources of income, from which they would be able to subsidise their contributions to The PNPF, whereas the smaller ports tend to rely on a few streams of income. Indeed, the Harbour Commissions and Conservancy Boards have no other sources of income to supplement their statutory revenues. 12. The fairest way of recouping the deficit in The PNPF would be through the imposition of a levy on every tonne of cargo shipped into or out of the country. At a relatively modest level (a few pence) such a nationwide levy would not be sufficient to deter customers from using the UK’s ports, but would be capable of raising the necessary money for The PNPF without jeopardising the futures of many small ports. If the imposition of a levy were to save the small ports from disaster – and the thousands of jobs and businesses around the country which depend upon them – then it would surely be worth supporting.

Detail 13. We have been aware of this issue for the last seven years and have been working with representatives of other CHAs to minimise its impact on our respective ports, all of which are affected to a greater or lesser extent by the rulings in this case. 14. The principal impact of the Approved Judgement on our businesses is the judge’s decision that the Trustee of The PNPF can demand contributions from what are called Self-employed CHAs (SCHAs). These are Competent Harbour Authorities (often ports), which authorise self-employed pilots or pilots’ co-operatives, but have no direct employer-employee relationship with them. 15. The pilots in each district around the country were given the choice whether to remain self-employed or to become employees when the Pilotage Act 1987, which abolished the Pilotage Authorities, came into force on 1st October 1988. The majority of pilots opted for continued self-employment. We must assume that in making this decision they considered its pros and cons and came to the conclusion that it was better to have control of their own affairs, even if it meant that they had no employer to underwrite their pensions. Now, however, the judge has ruled that the SCHAs should effectively act as employers and underwrite their pensions, so they have had all of the benefits of self-employment for the last twenty years, but are not now expected to suffer any adverse consequences from their original decision. 16. The Approved Judgement has a considerably greater impact on small ports than on larger ports. Bearing in mind that the figures quoted will vary considerably from port to port, consider the example of a small port in which pilotage is compulsory and visiting ships are an average of 1,800 tonnes. The throughput in a year might be approximately 800,000 tonnes, so four pilots are required to perform 900 acts of pilotage between them. In a large port the ships might be an average of 20,000 tonnes, so 900 acts of pilotage would account for 9,000,000 tonnes of cargo. If each port had four pilots and each pilot had a deficit in The PNPF of £500,000 (or £2,000,000 in total), this would be equivalent to £2.50 for every tonne of cargo in the ‘small port’, but only 22p per tonne in the ‘large port’. 17. We believe that it is unfair to expect CHAs to make contributions to their self-employed pilots’ pension scheme. In fact, when the PNPF first asked for voluntary contributions, a number of small ports set up an informal group to apply pressure on the Trustee of The PNPF and to gather evidence for the legal proceedings. Since the Approved Judgement this consortium has been active in bringing the inequitable distribution of the deficits in The PNPF to the attention of the Trustee, the Department for Transport and local and national politicians, focusing specifically on the huge impact of the ruling on small ports. 18. The British Ports Association has yet to make any representations on behalf of those of its members who are likely to suffer serious consequences should they be required to comply with demands from The PNPF. However, both the Association of Participating Bodies (see below) and the British Ports Association continue to promote their view that they represent the ports and that the matter will be resolved by direct negotiation with the Trustee of The PNPF. 19. Unfortunately, the Association of Participating Bodies in The PNPF (the Association), which purports to represent the CHAs in their discussions with the Trustee, is controlled

by the large ports and it is virtually impossible for the small ports’ voice to be heard in this forum. There is a serious danger, therefore, that the Association and the Trustee will come to an arrangement which suits some or all of the large ports, but which imposes such a burden on the small ports that many of them will simply be unable to make the requisite payments to The PNPF and will be forced into administration or insolvency. 20. Accordingly, we have been promoting the idea of a nationwide levy on shipping to enable the deficit on The PNPF to be recovered over a reasonable period of time and at a level of cost to the industry which neither distorts competition nor pushes small ports over the edge. If a levy of perhaps 5p per tonne were charged on all cargoes coming into and going out of the country for the next few years (in 2011 throughput was 520 million tonnes), it would be possible to recoup sufficient funds to plug the hole in The PNPF. A levy of this size is unlikely to deter businesses from using ports in the UK. Furthermore, a mechanism already exists to collect such a levy, as Trinity House has systems and staff in place to collect Light Dues from ships and could act as the collection agent for this new levy, thus negating the need to establish a separate body. 21. The alternative to a nationwide levy – each CHA having to raise its own charges to recover the amount of its pilots’ notional deficit – will have potentially disastrous consequences for many small ports. These employ hundreds of people themselves and also generate significant numbers of jobs in ancillary businesses, as well as being important economic drivers for their immediate hinterlands. If they are allowed to fail, the knock-on effect, especially when times are already hard for many regions of the country, could be extremely damaging. Other Points 22. In many cases around the country, self-employed pilots have been allowed by the Trustee of The PNPF to accrue extra pension entitlements by making additional contributions to the Scheme out of earnings from “other sources” i.e. non-pilotage-related income. CHAs are often completely unaware of either the nature or the quantum of these earnings, but are about to be compelled to underwrite the pensions deriving from them, which will be added to their notional shares of the deficit. 23. There are fundamental questions to be answered by the Trustee and its professional advisers as to how a deficit in the region of £300m has been allowed to accrue over a relatively short period of time. Unlike the majority of company pension schemes, The PNPF remains open to new members and has taken no steps to move from defined benefits (a final salary scheme) to defined contributions (a money purchase scheme). Furthermore, it has not taken opportunities in the past to buy annuities for any of its pensioners and, when faced with increasing liabilities and poor investment returns, it has made some questionable investment decisions. Conclusion 24. It is critical to seek the support and understanding of politicians of all parties and other decision-makers in order to protect the UK’s small ports from the arbitrary imposition of liabilities which many will be unable to meet without potentially dire consequences for their financial viability.

25. It appears unlikely that the Association, which the Trustee continues to regard as the industry’s negotiating body, will be able to develop an equitable solution, which takes proper account of the small ports’ ability to pay. Accordingly, we urge you to consider the merits of a nationwide levy on shipping to resolve this issue. July 2012

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Written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03)

INTRODUCTION 1. The case which gives cause for concern is the abandonment by two designated Competent

Harbour Authorities (CHAs) of regulated standards in compulsory pilotage areas under the Pilotage Act of 1987, contrary not only to international law but also in express breach of the common law of the Parliamentary jurisdiction. It will be shown also that successive Secretaries of State have been complicit in the said breaches, and have in consequence failed in their inherent duty to maintain order. Remedial action is therefore called for as a matter of some urgency in order to prevent further disorder.

2. A compulsory pilotage area may be defined as an area in which a CHA considers, in accordance

with Section 2 of the 1987 Pilotage Act, that pilotage should be compulsory.

3. The motive for the conduct of the two CHAs (first at the Humber and later repeated at the Clyde) is pure commercial greed. There is no other motive. It is otherwise inexplicable why anybody, least of all a CHA, would wish to grant authorisation or promotion to pilots whose qualifications do not meet minimum established standards, which is precisely what has happened on a large scale. All law confirms that the highest possible standards are called for in compulsory pilotage areas.

THE HISTORICAL POSITION 4. Pilotage is one of the oldest and most public of all services, having been governed by common

law, Parliamentary statute law (at both primary and secondary level) and international law as developed throughout all history. Records available on the internet today show the state control of pilotage in the 13th century by the Code of Oleron, which (duly amended with the passage of time) remains the basis for much commercial maritime discipline and regulation.

5. Standards of qualification for pilots in compulsory pilotage areas have been required by law for a longer period of time than have standards of qualification for any other class of mercantile mariner; and pilots have been examined and authorised by licence or other similar instrument since the middle ages. By contrast, examinations for Masters and Mates in the Merchant Service were not introduced until the middle of the 19th century. In the late eighteenth century (1797) a licensing authority became empowered to place restrictions on a pilot’s licence, commensurate with his knowledge and experience; and the practice thus developed of restricting less experienced pilots to the pilotage of vessels of smaller size as a common-sense measure in the interests of public safety. By 1833, Bye-laws were introduced by Parliamentary Act in order to govern the restrictions (which are otherwise known as “classifications” or “post-qualification experience”) and other matters more closely.

6. Bye-laws were maintained nationally under Section 18 of the Pilotage Act of 1913, by which time

the standard practice had developed in major ports that, even after due examination as to his knowledge, post-qualification restrictions would be placed on the licence of any pilot for his first four years in practice. The Humber and the Clyde were amongst the many ports which applied the four-year restriction as a standard measure.

7. Appendix 1 shows Bye-Laws 65-75 as applicable at Liverpool in substantial detail under the

1913 Act. Bye-Laws 16 and 17 as applicable at the Humber at the same time are shown at page 61 of Appendix 2.

8. The Bye-laws introduced the pilot by incremental stages to the pilotage of larger ships until it was - and as a matter of common law still is - adjudged by regulated standard that the pilot would be sufficiently experienced to undertake the pilotage of a ship of any size.

9. Prior to the introduction of the 1987 Pilotage Act, pilotage was administered on a port-by-port

basis by Trinity House or other local Pilotage Authorities. The Act of 1987 gives administrative power for the first time to harbour authorities (CHAs) whose prime motive is to make commercial gain rather than to conduct any administration of pilotage. The administration of pilotage had not previously rested with any commercial body; and this is the cause of the present mischief.

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THE MODERN LAW 10. Most pilots throughout history have served on terms of self-employment as a matter of good

practice. Many still do so today by the express terms of Section 4(2) (b) of the 1987 Act. There is an obligation under Section 4 (1) of the Act that a CHA must offer terms of employment to pilots but there is no power given to any CHA to impose terms of employment on anybody where terms of employment are not wanted.

11. Upon the repeal of the Pilotage Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder, standards of

post-qualification experience were – and still are - maintained by purely ad-hoc means on a port-by-port basis. (Please see Analysis of present standards maintained at major ports at Appendix 2.) It will be seen that in some ports the standard period of restriction on a pilot’s licence is confirmed at more than four years.

12. The propriety of the regulated restrictions was confirmed in two cases which came before the Courts at an apparent turning point in the law, on the introduction of the Pilotage Act of 1987 which repealed the Act of 1913. In the first case (the Esso Bernicia, which was heard in the House of Lords, - report shown at Appendix 3), the facts had arisen during the currency of the 1913 Act. Following a long line of ancient authority, the House of Lords held (at page 2 of Appendix 3) that a pilot is an independent professional who is engaged by a shipmaster to act as a principal and not as the servant or agent of any harbour authority. The second case (the Cavendish – report shown at Appendix 4) was heard in the High Court in 1993, when it was held that the introduction of the Act of 1987 had changed nothing of any significance; and that the duty of a CHA in pilotage is (as had been the duty of Trinity House or other Pilotage Authority beforehand) limited to maintaining an adequate supply of properly qualified pilots to be engaged by ships navigating in a compulsory pilotage area. The Cavendish case of 1993 is therefore of high significance. It was emphasised in the judgment that a CHA performs no pilotage; and that any pilotage is necessarily performed by authorised professional pilots. It follows that the function of a CHA in pilotage is a purely administrative one.

13. The judgment in the Cavendish case was delivered by Mr Justice Anthony Clarke, as he then was. Subsequently Mr Justice Clarke became Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Master of the Rolls and one of the first judges to be appointed to the recently-created Supreme Court. Where in Lord Clarke’s judgment it is stated (at page 298 of Appendix 4) that it is the function of a CHA to maintain an adequate supply of properly qualified pilots and (at page 301 of Appendix 4) that “the position is in my judgment the same now as it was under the 1913 Act”, the corollary is that upon the repeal of the Act of 1913 and the Bye-Laws made thereunder, there was no Parliamentary intention that any of the standards of post-qualification experience written in the former Bye-Laws should be abandoned. Manifestly there was no Parliamentary intention that the new Act of 1987 should be used as an excuse for disorder. Rather, the newly-created Competent Harbour Authorities were placed in a position of trust to maintain the proper standards established by the former Pilotage Authorities over many years. In the two CHAs which are of concern today, there has been a clear breach of the Parliamentary trust imposed in them.

14. Of even greater legal significance is the case of the Sea Empress (as reported at Appendix 5)

which concluded in the Court of Criminal Appeal in April 2000, where it was shown that maladministration had occurred at Milford Haven shortly before the events which are of concern today. The vessel Sea Empress was a large oil-tanker and had been under pilotage in a compulsory pilotage area in 1996 when she grounded on rocks at the entrance to the Haven. Widespread pollution, environmental damage and economic loss was caused. It was a major disaster. The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR, through its subsidiary Environment Agency) brought a criminal prosecution in respect of the pollution against the authorising body (the CHA) of the compulsory pilot.

15. The case was heard at first instance in Cardiff Crown Court in 1999 before Mr Justice David

Steel, the presiding judge of the Admiralty Court. The CHA pleaded guilty to the charge. In summarising the facts prior to passing sentence, the learned judge found that the pilot (as provided to the vessel by the CHA) was neither negligent nor incompetent but was specifically lacking in post-qualification experience.

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16. The express words of the judgment include:- “The significance of these matters is all the greater in the context of a scheme of compulsory pilotage. Shipowners and masters must needs engage a pilot. They have to take the training, experience and expertise of the pilot provided at face value. While the master remains nominally in command, it has to be recognized that the pilot had the con[duct of the navigation] and a master can only interfere when a situation of danger has clearly arisen. The port authority imposes a charge for pilotage but in the same breath has the added advantage of the pilot being treated for purposes of civil liability as an employee of the shipowner. All this calls for the highest possible standards on the part of the port authority.” (p.7)

17. The CHA (having pleaded guilty to the criminal charge against it) appealed to the Court of

Criminal Appeal against the severity of the sentence imposed in Cardiff Crown Court. On hearing the Appeal in April 2000, Lord Bingham the Lord Chief Justice allowed a reduction in the sentence on the grounds (amongst others) that, subsequent to the incident, the CHA had exerted its best efforts to improve the regulated standards of experience amongst the pilots provided for engagement by vessels; and thereby to comply with the obligation to maintain the highest possible standards in a compulsory pilotage area, as determined at common law. In short, the classification rules/post-qualification rules at Milford Haven were significantly tightened up.

THE POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT THE HUMBER 18. On 11th June 2001 (barely twelve months later) an extraordinary thing then happened in the

compulsory pilotage area of the Humber. In a contractual dispute, the CHA stated untruthfully that it had “no choice” other than to revoke the authorisations of all of its authorised pilots; and, to compound its impropriety, to do so on Notice (Appendix 6) in January 2002, which time-scale of seven months obviously precluded the maintenance of any of the existing regulated standards of post-qualification experience amongst any new pilots who might replace them. By the terms of the Notice, which was issued to every authorised Humber pilot, the maintenance of established standards of experience after January 2002 became an obvious chronological impossibility. As all other ports had done until that time (and as most still do) the Humber CHA had maintained regulated standards on the basis of a contract with the pilots. In other words, there is and always has been common agreement between pilots and harbour authorities that the maintenance of standards is necessary.

19. The Humber CHA was under no obligation at all to behave as it chose to do. The statutory power

to revoke the authorisation of any pilot is discretionary and is not obligatory in any circumstances (Section 3 of the 1987 Act). Moreover, the power is in any event secondary to the obligation to “keep under consideration” matters relating to compulsory pilotage, which is regulated by Section 2 of the Act. The untruthful statement that the CHA had “no choice” was a disingenuous and obvious attempt to persuade authorised pilots to accept the terms of employment which are referred to in the Notice-letter of 11th June 2001; under threat of disqualification if unwilling. The DTLR was warned many times and by many different voices (including Members of Parliament) as to the impropriety and the likely consequences of the Notice which the CHA had issued. Nevertheless, the DTLR refused to intervene.

20. In consequence and as threatened, on 26th January 2002 the CHA abandoned all regulated

standards of experience, executed its Notice as delivered, de-authorised all of its pre-existing authorised pilots and granted authorisations to new pilots whose experience fell far, far short of the previously regulated standards. Standards of experience were not maintained at all.

21. The DTLR, for its part, in April 2002 then published a Report (Appendix 7) entitled “The New

Humber Pilot Service” which confirmed that the new arrangement (adopted in January 2002) had abandoned not merely some but all regulated standards of experience for authorised pilots; and therefore did not comply with the principle identified in the Sea Empress case. The DTLR made no effort to address the obligation that all relevant standards need not only to be maintained in any and every compulsory pilotage area, but maintained at the highest possible level. The abandonment of standards of experience was confirmed by a Pilotage Direction issued in July 2002, which stated that the authorisation of Humber pilots would henceforward be merely “on the recommendation of the Harbour Master”; and that any standard or regulated measure of

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experience for pilots would therefore no longer apply. (The Pilotage Direction is shown at page 80 of Appendix 2.)

22. To make matters substantially more dangerous, in a major port it is unusual for a Harbour Master

to hold any authorisation in pilotage at all. For that reason, specifically regulated standards of post-qualification experience are particularly important in pilotage anywhere. It is grossly improper that an authorisation in the name of the state for the purposes of safe navigation should occur on the mere “recommendation” or judgment of any one person alone; particularly when that person is not (or might not be) himself authorised in any relevant way. The grant of an authorisation is a grant of power; and it is not open to anybody to grant a power which he does not himself possess. (Nemo dat quod non habet.)

23. The DTLR Report confirms (at Paragraph 10.9) that the obligations of a CHA in a compulsory

pilotage area are “strict and onerous”. The entire Report, however, represents an open travesty of any compliance with those obligations. The Report shows a carefully detailed catalogue of the disorder and impropriety which had arisen; which is not a thing which Parliament ever intended should happen, quite regardless of any case law. The Report refers (at Paragraph 7.7) to a “crisis” which had arisen, following a lawful strike by the pilots which began (with the approval of the Court of Appeal) on 12th December 2001 in protest at the behaviour of the CHA; and (in a table at Paragraph 7.15) to the 946 occasions on which the CHA was unable to provide any pilot at all (whether experienced or otherwise) to ships in want in a compulsory pilotage area. Of those 946 occasions, the same table shows that no fewer than 444 of them arose after 23rd January 2002, when the pilots’ strike ended, three days before the de-authorisation en masse on 26th January 2002. After 26th January 2002, the sole cause of the acute shortage of pilots which existed was the mass de-authorisation which the CHA carried out that day by its own choice. Plainly, Parliament never did intend (nor even contemplate) that such a thing might happen. That extraordinary event, in a major port on a hazardous estuary (at one of the largest ports in Europe), was beyond the contemplation of any responsible person.

24. In October 2001 the pilots under Notice of de-authorisation had themselves given Notice to the

CHA of their intention to stage a strike in protest. In November 2001 the CHA (in response to the strike-Notice) obtained a restraining injunction against the pilots in the High Court. The validity of the restraining injunction was over-ruled in the Court of Appeal on 11th December 2001, when the Court determined that a strike by the pilots would be wholly lawful in the circumstances. The crisis then facing the CHA was so great that it even went to the extent of suspending compulsory pilotage altogether, not because the Humber estuary and its approaches had become any less hazardous (manifestly they had not) but because the CHA knew full well that it had placed itself in a position where it simply could not provide an adequate number of pilots. The CHA was clearly aware that it had acted improperly. It is inconceivable that the CHA ever contemplated, when it issued the mass de-authorisation Notice in June 2001, that compulsory pilotage in the Humber should perhaps be suspended. Nor should it have done so. It clearly ought never to have issued the Notice which it chose to issue, with or without the clear untruth contained within the Notice.

25. The DTLR, however, openly approved the crisis and disorder which the CHA had created by its

own Notice as issued. As the executive arm of Parliament, the DTLR expressed no syllable of disapproval and was very clearly complicit in the disorder. Where the DTLR Report asserts (at Paragraph 5.25 of its Report) that the arrangements newly put in place were “fit for purpose”, it is no more legally correct or proper than would be an assertion that any other legally non-compliant arrangement might be fit for purpose. Fitness for purpose and compliance with legally-required minimum standards are plainly two different things. The former is a matter of mere opinion whereas the latter is a matter of fact and strict law.

26. The author of the Report is fastidious in his avoidance of any suggestion that there might have

been compliance with any relevant law. Plainly there was none, as the author makes clear that he knew perfectly well. It is clear beyond a doubt that the DTLR intended to turn a blind eye to the impropriety of the CHA; and in fact did so. The Report properly makes the point that there are more methods than one to train a pilot; but, playing fast and loose with the common law, dismisses altogether the need to comply with the legal obligation to maintain established

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minimum standards of post-qualification experience, particularly so where pilotage is compulsory. In that regard, there was no compliance whatsoever.

27. As to the 133 authorised pilots who were de-authorised en-masse on 26th January 2002, 88 of them (two thirds of their number) sued the CHA in a group action in the High Court in the matter of misfeasance in public office. Their action was settled on terms out of Court, in April 2008, shortly before it was listed to be heard at trial in the Admiralty Court.

INTERNATIONAL LAW 28. As if in confirmation of the improper nature of the behaviour of the Humber CHA and the

inadequacy of the DTLR to keep it in check, in 2003 the International Maritime Organization (the maritime arm of the United Nations Organization, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory state) issued its Resolution A960 in which it is declared (at Paragraph 2.3.2) that developed standards in pilotage should not only be maintained but should be “enforced”. (Appendix 8.) In compulsory pilotage areas this international obligation is clearly much the greater, for all of the reasons identified by Mr Justice Steel in the SEA EMPRESS case.

THE CLYDE 29. In December 2007, the large vessel Red Jasmine was navigating in the Clyde under pilotage in a

compulsory pilotage area inward-bound in dense fog, assisted by two tug-boats. The head-tug Flying Phantom, attached by a tow-wire to the ship’s bow, suffered a capsize with the loss of three lives. Subsequently the pilot of Red Jasmine suffered mental stress and has since retired.

30. Between 2008 and 2010, having got away scot-free with its inadequacy in 2002, the Department

for Transport (DfT) (as the DTLR had become) then turned a blind eye to events as they were developing on the Clyde, where (notwithstanding the Red Jasmine/Flying Phantom incident) the CHA had chosen to revoke the authorisations of so many of its senior authorised pilots that it could no longer provide any pilot (not a single pilot) whose post-qualification experience complied with the regulated standards applicable on the Clyde. (Clyde standards as at July 2009 are shown at pages 42, 43 and 57 of Appendix 2.)

31. On 9th May 2008 in the Scottish Parliament, Mr Salmond the First Minister referred to the “obvious “ risk of “extreme damage” which arises when any standards in pilotage are not maintained.

32. By a letter of 3rd April 2009 (Appendix 9) the shortage of properly qualified Clyde pilots was

already so acute that the Clyde Harbour Master on behalf of the CHA ordered the pilot of Red Jasmine to report for duty, notwithstanding the fact that the medical advisor to the CHA had long-previously certified that the pilot was psychiatrically unfit. Between 13th September 2011 and 28th October 2011, the CHA on the Clyde was invited to indicate how many of its serving pilots held experience in accordance with the Clyde Regulations; and it simply declined the invitation. Appendix 9 comprises a clip of the above correspondence with the Clyde CHA in which the refusal (and therefore the failure) to show any compliance with any standards is clearly shown.

THE ROLE OF THE SHIPPING MINISTERS 33. The DfT has been challenged repeatedly to explain its lack of interest in the maintenance of

pilotage standards in the two major ports of Humber and Clyde, particularly in light of the untruth and secrecy which has taken place at those two ports respectively. It is alarming that the DfT has stated that it “does not accept” the common law position. Still less does it accept the international law position. Appendix 10 is a copy of a letter of 29th June 2009 signed by Paul Clark MP, the Shipping Minister at the time, setting out the Departmental position. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the Department for Transport has cocked snooks at the laws of pilotage within its own jurisdiction, as clearly have the two CHAs in question. It appears quite clear that the Department has held in contempt the very law which it is its function to administer.

34. On 29th September 2010 I met the then-new Shipping Minister, Mike Penning MP. I was

presented to him at a meeting that day on another matter at Hope Cove, South Devon. Mr Penning indicated that he shared my concerns for the matters raised here. Accordingly he has

6

encouraged me to ventilate them, as have many others including Andrew Miller MP, Sir Malcolm Thornton (MP 1979-1997) and Lord Hunt of Wirral in more open and express terms.

35. At a public meeting in Liverpool in January 2011, Mr Ian Timpson of the DfT was present. Mr Perry Glading of Forth Ports Plc was in the Chair. Also present were Sir Alan Massey, Chief Executive of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and Captain Stephen Clinch, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents. In response to a question from me, Mr Timpson had the good grace to admit that in due course the DfT might become obliged to take action to restore order in pilotage.

36. There exists no authority, as far as I know, above or higher than the common law as determined

in the Courts when called upon to interpret the true meaning of the 1987 Pilotage Act as intended by Parliament.

37. The implementary power given by Section 32 (1) of the Act has not been exercised by any

Secretary of State since its enactment on 1st October 1988.

CONCLUSION 38. The experience of the last ten years has shown that where post-qualification standards are

maintained merely by ad-hoc means, they are not in fact maintained at all. In those ports where standards have been properly maintained as required at law, the standards have been maintained as minimum standards. It could not be, therefore, in the public interest nor in compliance with the law in any way, to allow those standards to be diminished by choice; which clearly is what has happened on a large scale in the cases of the two CHAs mentioned.

39. In both cases CHA has chosen to disregard established standards for reasons better known to itself, contrary to the common law. Parliament has never intended that the public pilotage service should be administered either by untruth or by secrecy on the part of any CHA, nor by efforts to impose terms of employment on pilots where pilots did not require them, nor by inadequacy on the part of the DfT, all of which unedifying things have happened in the United Kingdom on a gross and obvious scale.

40. In light of the acknowledgment by the DfT that the laws of pilotage in any compulsory pilotage

area are strict and onerous; and in light of the consistent failure of successive Secretaries of State to uphold those laws, it is submitted most respectfully in the public interest that it is now the function of the Select Committee to take steps to ensure that the failures – and the large-scale disorder which is inevitably caused thereby - continue no longer.

41. A simple, inexpensive and effective first-remedial step would be the re-introduction of the terms

of Section 22 of the 1913 Pilotage Act, whereby a CHA would be obliged to furnish to the Secretary of State returns on all pilotage matters at regular intervals. A copy of the Section is shown at Appendix 11. Public propriety calls for nothing less. It would be a very mild obligation.

42. Even better would be the re-introduction of the Bye-Laws which regulated the relevant standards

with complete and simple success under Section 18 of the 1913 Act. It is unclear why this provision was ever discontinued. The international obligations of the United Kingdom in safe pilotage remain undiminished in any way. In light of the ever-increasing use of foreign-flag tonnage (which seems unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future) those obligations are clearly greater than ever before.

43. It is perfectly clear that any Competent Harbour Authority remains accountable to Parliament,

because it is from Parliament alone that any CHA is granted power. It is equally clear that statutory power has been abused to date by two CHAs acting in their own interests and with complete impunity. That is a state of affairs which I trust that the Select Committee will find intolerable.

Appendices not published August 2012

Supplementary written evidence from Barrie Youde (MP 03A)

Dear Mrs Ellman MP Re: Marine Pilotage

In the letter of 12'h December 2011 (copy attached) in which Andrew Miller MP proposes that an inquiry should be conducted into pilotage on the basis of persistent failures in the Department for Transport to address relevant issues, I am the constituent mentioned by Mr Miller as having produced substantial evidence to him in that regard. Subsequently, Mr Miller has been most assiduous in pursuing pilotage matters and I remain most grateful to him.

Following the hearing of oral evidence on 17th December last, publication of the transcript of the hearing (ref. HC 840-i, albeit as yet uncorrected) confirms that significant matters remain unaddressed by the Secretary of State; and that no organisation holding a licence as a competent harbour authority under the 1987 Pilotage Act at local level has been held accountable in the last twenty-five years; save only in one case (the Sea Empress case of 1999/2000), the judgment of which the Department refuses to recognise, as Mr Miller's letter indicates.

Quite clearly there remains much work to be done to restore propriety into pilotage and most respectfully I enclose also for your consideration some specific comments on the departmental evidence as given to the Committee.

With my thanks for the proper concerns of the Select Committee.

Cc Andrew Miller MP Yours sincerely, Barrie Youde

COMMENTS UPON THE EVIDENCE GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 17th DECEMBER 2012

UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE PREPARED 28th DECEMBER 2012 AND AUTHORISED BY THE COMMITTEE FOR RELEASE

EVIDENCE GIVEN BY STEPHEN HAMMOND MP (SH) AND BY MR THOMAS BARRY (TB), CIVIL SERVANT

Q 84 Chair: Minister, could you tell us whether there has been any risk assessment underlying the proposals to extend the proposals to extend eligibility for pilot exemption certificates (PECs)? SH .......................There has not been a risk assessment because there is no need for it. Nothing in this Bill changes any of the safety standards or requirements of the competent harbour authority (CHA). There is no change in standards; there is a change in conditions......................... COMMENT It is incorrect to suggest that there is (or could be) a change in conditions without there being a change in standards. Standards and conditions amount in substance to the same thing. There is a clear proposal in the Bill to relax conditions for the issue of a PEC; and the answer given by the Minister is therefore seriously misleading. Q85Chair ........ Don’t you feel any concern that, although your best concern is to maintain safety standards, the changes might in fact jeopardise those? SH. No. If anything , the proposals in the Bill enhance safety for one very clear reason: CHAs will have their power extended to take away exemption certificates immediately............................ COMMENT The power to suspend a pilotage qualification immediately, if appropriate in the interests of public safety, exists already at common law (Cooper v Forth Ports – Scottish Inner House/Court of Appeal –May 2011). It is misleading to suggest otherwise. The removal of an individual qualification does nothing to enhance safety in general and it is misleading also to suggest that it might do so. Q99Chair : How are the Government implementing A.960.- The International Maritime Organisation’s Resolution on the training and certification of pilots? TB.................. It is not for the UK Government to enforce; it is for the CHAs. Section 1.3 of the recommendation says that the UK Government should encourage CHAs in relation to the application of standards COMMENT Recommendation 2 of the Resolution urges the Governments of Member States to give effect to the Resolution as soon as possible. It is quite incorrect to suggest (as TB appears to do) that CHAs might have powers which the Government does not. All powers of a CHA are given by the Government in any event and by nobody else. Moreover, the Secretary of State has specific power by Section 32(1) of the Pilotage Act to make regulations to give effect to the pilotage legislation. Successive Secretaries of State have resiled from any exercise of the

power. It is a gross impropriety for any Government to fail to recognise its responsibilities in the exercise of powers which it has delegated to others. The principle delegatus non potest delegare applies, requiring the greater body to ensure that any delegated powers exercised by the lesser body are exercised properly and not otherwise. The principle confirms that a body which delegates powers cannot at the same time delegate its own ultimate responsibility. It is to be hoped that the United Kingdom is better represented in pilotage matters overseas by more accurate statements than those in the information given by Mr Barry to the Select Committee on 17th December last. Q100Chair: You are still in support of [Resolution A.960]? SH. Absolutely. To be absolutely clear, the Bill is fully compliant with that code [Resolution A 960?] as well. COMMENT It is wholly incorrect to suggest that Clause 2 of the Bill complies with Resolution A 960 in any way. Where the Resolution requires (at Recommendation 2.3.2 of Annex 1) that the maintenance of developed standards should be enforced, the Bill makes an express proposal at Clause 2 of its own text to relax standards and to grant pilotage exemption to “any deck officer”, which is not the case under the present legislation. To entrust the pilotage of any ship in a compulsory pilotage area to “any deck officer” by way of exemption from compulsory pilotage is a high risk strategy which is not contemplated by the present legislation. Measures are in place to prevent it and have been in place for many years. The entire purpose of the pilotage legislation throughout history has been to minimise public risk and not in any way to create new risk, which is what Clause 2 of the Bill very clearly proposes. It is a nonsense to suggest that the Bill might comply with Resolution A 960 or with any other aspect of law. Q110Chair: Finally could you tell me whether the Department has ever revoked a licence from a competent harbour authority? SH: I am certainly not aware of it. I am reliably informed that the answer is no. COMMENT In light of Mr Barry’s answer to Question 99, Mr Hammond confirms the reluctance of the Department to hold any local body accountable in pilotage administration. In consequence, disorder arises. January 2013

Written Evidence from Terence Crowe (MP 04)

Contact Name TERENCE CROWE 6 Paddock Drive, Parkgate, South Wirral, Cheshire, CH64 6TQ. Tel. 0151 336 5521 Who am I (1) Terence Crowe, Liverpool Pilot Service (retired). Joined in 1956, retired 2004. Served an apprenticeship from 1956 to 1964. Piloting from1964 to 2004, including nine years on the Rio Nunez in Guinea West Africa. 1979 - 1988. Elected to Pilot representative in Liverpool 1992 to 2004. This position involved the general administration of the Pilot Service, and sitting on various panels for recruitment, discipline, and pilotage authorization. Co- Founder of the new Liverpool Pilot Service Limited, established the 1stJune 1997. MAIN ISSUE (2) The Humber C.H.A.s interpretation of the 1987 Pilotage Act. Particularly clause 4 (2)A (a) (b) i.e. employment status of Pilots, leading to the sacking of 90% of the serving pilots and the loss forever of their expertise, the life blood of pilotage, handed down over many years, and now denied to the next generations of pilots. INTERPRETATION (3) A view is taken that clause 4 does not make it clear as to what should happen if the Pilots and the C.H.A. cannot agree on any new contract. This is seen as a default option which enforces employment status on the pilots and denies them the right to choose their own future. PROFIT (4) Profit from pilotage has resulted from the 1987 act , for the first time in history. This profit is achieved at the direct cost to the Pilots and pilotage infrastructure. EVIDENCE(5) The present day Humber pilot service is living evidence of the folly of the conduct of the C.H.A. in 2002. It is believed that over 200 prospective pilots have past through the port since the enforcement of employed status.(Liverpool saw 2 pilots depart during the same period.) OBSERVATION(6) The authors of the 1987 pilot age act could not have envisaged such an outcome, to their carefully worded act. The actual dismissal of 90% of the largest pilot service in the UK (Re Lord Chauncey :- Cavendish Report.) QUESTION? (7) How could any C.H.A. consider such an act of vandalism? THE NEXT STEP (8) An inquiry into the conduct of this C.H.A. regarding the pilots in 2002, and the quality and length of training of the new pilots. THE FUTURE (9) The Liverpool Pilot Service (Liverpool Pilots Limited) Established 1st June 1997 is the most modern service in the U.K. A contract for services is in place which meets all the

requirements of the 1987 pilotage act, and relieves the C.H.A. of their obligation to offer employment status to pilots. (A Humber type situation is there by prevented.) COMMENT (10) How could so many senior personell i.e MP’s, Civil Servants, Ship owners feel able to stand by and watch this catastrophy develop without stepping in? A pilots position onboard ship is in general not understood. “In compulsory pilotage water the Master SHALL hand over the conduct of the vessel to the Pilot. He is not some form of guide or bystander. Is it appropiate for a vessel carrying hazardous cargo to be under control of a pilot short on experience and time in training? CONCLUSION (11) The U.K. pilot services are a national asset and shoud not be left at the mercy of C.H.A.’s many of whom have little maritime knowledge or experience, especially at the most senior level i.e. CEO’s, MD’s etc. T.E. CROWE LIVERPOOL PILOT(rtd) PS (12) The next pilot age act must establish unambiguously the right of all U.K. pilots to self employed status. September 2012

 Written evidence from the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Association 

Captain Don Cockrill FNI, Chairman (MP 05) 

 

a. The UKMPA is the association in the United Kingdom representing the professional interests of Marine Pilots.  Its membership of about 460 pilots covers most UK major and minor ports throughout the nation. Active and proactive in the preservation and enhancement of professional standards and qualifications, it is progressive in utilising new technologies and working methods along with working towards the improvement of safety equipment, procedures and training courses in the many disciplines which marine pilotage encompasses.  The UKMPA has membership of and works closely with both the European and International (EMPA & IMPA) Maritime Pilots’ Associations and assists the UK delegation to the IMO wherever appropriate. It has seats on a number of MCA committees including the PMSC SG, UKSON and the VTS SG and endeavours to work closely with all other stakeholders within the UK ports sector including the UKHMA, the UKMPG and the BPA.  

b. The Association welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Transport Select Committee and wishes to bring to the committee’s attention our concerns on a number of important issues pertaining to pilotage within the UK that directly affect the safety and efficiency of our ports. 

 

2. Port Marine Safety Code  

a. The code and its associated Guide to Good Practise are the foundation of safe and efficient port operations within the UK. However, both continue to have only voluntary and not mandatory  compliance status with (in our view) no truly effective process for determining compliance and certainly no effective system for enforcement or sanctions where non‐compliance is suspected or determined.  There is no effective procedure in place by the Dft/MCA  to react to any reports or complaints of suspected non‐compliance.  Recently, the system of MCA Verification Visits has been downgraded to “health checks” and only about a third of UK ports actually comply with the voluntary request for the submission of a triennial “Compliance Statement”.  Of those ports that do state compliance, there is no requirement for comprehensive compliance and there is evidence that suggests in some ports areas of compliance are selective for commercial or other reasons. Thus there are significant implications to the proper regulation and administration of UK Pilotage under the 1987 Pilotage Act as a result of the non‐compulsory status of the PMSC.  

b. Obligatory compliance with the code by all UK ports would create a fair operational and competitive market between ports and would ensure that full and proper safety and operational standards were applied to a port’s pilotage services thus ensuring the highest proper operational and safety standards throughout UK ports. It is worth considering the credibility state of certain sectors of the banking and financial 

 sectors which many attribute to failed voluntary self regulation processes analogous to the PMSC in the ports sector.  

 

 

3. Pilot Training, Qualifications and Operational standards  

a. The UK, despite supporting its passage through the IMO (completed in 2003) has not yet formally adopted the recommendations contained within resolution A960 in any way.  Similarly, the Dft/MCA will not formally acknowledge the provisions of the Education, Training and Certifications Standards (ETCS) developed by the EMPA with significant input by the UKMPA.  The recently updated and ratified UK National Occupational Standards (NOS) for pilots and the ongoing work towards a Marine Pilotage Certificate (MPC), both projects involving significant UKMPA involvement with Port Skills and Safety (and its predecessor organisations BPIT etc), are not going to require compulsory compliance or adoption by Competent Harbour Authorities.  Thus the goal of developing and maintaining a national standard of first class pilotage services will likely be unattainable as commercial pressures inevitably compromise training and operational standards if unregulated.  

b. The simple formal adoption of resolution A960 by the MCA and its direct inclusion into the Port Marine Safety Code will go a long way towards achieving this essential goal and ensuring  the continuing safe and efficient shipping movements within UK ports. The obligatory compliance with the Marine Pilotage Certificate and its associated NOS when it is completed will go a long way towards ensuring effective and industry wide Continual Professional Development processes and the maintenance and enhancement of pilotage standards in all UK ports. 

 

4. 1987 Pilotage Act – The lack of a fair and proper appeals process  

a. In contrast with the previous legislation it replaced, the 1987 Act contains no right of appeal process in the event that a CHA exercises provisions of the Act in taking action against an authorised pilot.  Currently the only course of action available to a pilot who feels he has been inappropriately treated under the Act is to seek permission for Judicial Review.  A time consuming and costly process for all involved including the courts system itself.  

b. It is widely acknowledged in various maritime and legal circles that the 1987 Pilotage Act is quite possibly one of the worst pieces of maritime legislation to have been enacted for many decades.  There are a number of factors which determine this opinion, one of which (specifically acknowledged by the Dft itself some years ago) is that under close scrutiny the Act does not comply with the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention (particularly Article 6) which as you know is now incorporated into UK statutory law. 

c. It should be noted that an appeal under the 1987 Act against a perceived improper revocation of a pilot's Authorisation is not the same as an industrial disciplinary 

 process. In any post incident or event investigation which results in disciplinary action then the process is two‐fold:   

d. The first ‐ particularly in the case of an employed pilot ‐ deals with disciplining the pilot as an employee under the appropriate industrial relations legislation. This includes strict formal disciplinary procedures which must be strictly adhered to and which also include formally structured appeal processes, ultimately through an industrial tribunal.   

e. The second part of the process for employed pilots (and probably the only part for self employed pilots) is the consideration of potential de‐authorisation under the Act.  There is also the aspect of potential abuse of Authorisation revocation by an unscrupulous CHA to be considered, as unlikely as that may seem today.   

f. What then in summary, is the case for reinstatement of statutory right of appeal to the County Court and Magistrates’ Court? 

g. In short, a pilot's Authorisation is a statutory professional qualification which can not be summarily revoked by a CHA. As it is a statutory qualification granted through the Act it follows that its revocation can only be if it is proven that the pilot's legal obligations under the Act have not been complied with. 

h. A pilot is a public servant holding a public office. The only reason that Judicial Review is available to him in the High Court is because his professional qualification is issued by a public body. This position remains fundamental to the role of a pilot. It has always been so. 

i. The Courts have confirmed the above position throughout history and continue to do so to the present day by the express terms of the Pilotage Act 1987. 

j. A normal disciplinary management process does not provide (and cannot provide) the independent tribunal to which any pilot is entitled when his statutory professional qualification is placed at issue. The such procedures of a commercial company are not independent. It would be surprising if they were. They are biased (as is to be expected) in the interests of the company. In most cases, the only discipline to which a pilot is subject is conducted by a commercial company which holds public office (as a Competent Harbour Authority) by appointment of the state. The normal disciplinary process of any commercial company remains biased, however, even when hearing the case of a pilot who remains a public servant in any event. It would be unrealistic (and untruthful) to suggest otherwise.  It is why industrial tribunals form part of the commercial industry disciplinary process. 

k. The discipline of any public servant (in this case, marine pilots) should not be subject to commercial bias in any way. That is one of the reasons why the process of Judicial Review exists. A CHA which conducts its affairs improperly (in this case through the improper revocation of an Authorisation) is vulnerable at Judicial Review. 

l. The omission of the statutory appeal right from the Pilotage Act of 1987 appears to have been by way of error and oversight rather than improbable misguided intent which should not be perpetuated in any circumstances.  This is thus an ideal opportunity to correct that omission. 

 

 m. A simple and cost effective solution to this issue would be to reinstate the appeals 

procedure that was contained within the 1913 Act whereby the first stage for appeal was via Magistrate or County courts. This was the situation that prevailed until 1988 (upon the repeal of the Pilotage Act of 1913 and the introduction of the Act of 1987). The cost of conducting litigation in the County Court or the Magistrates’ Court is a fraction of the cost of any judicial review, which is available only in the High Court.  

 

5. Pilotage Exemption Certificates a. Members of the Transport Select Committee will no doubt be aware of the 

continuing efforts by certain sectors of the UK shipping and ports’ industries to deregulate the eligibility requirements for Pilotage Exemption Certificates from the current well established and proven “Bona‐Fide Master or Mate” requirement to effectively any ship’s navigating officer.    

b. The dangers of such action to the safety of navigation, the protection of ports infrastructures and their environments and the overall operational efficiency of UK ports are real and significant.  Details of some of the factors substantiating this reality are contained within the appendix to this submission which has also been posted to the TSC as hard copy. 

c. It is long overdue that the importance of a strict and properly regulated PEC regime is recognised as an important part of the efficient operation of a port and its waterways and that it must be subject to the same high quality level of operation as the properly operated compulsory pilotage system of which it forms a part. 

 

6. Security monitoring, defect reporting, pollution control and offshore emergency roles.  

a. A marine pilot has many additional roles as well as conducting the navigation of a vessel into and out of port. They include: Being the vanguard individual in assisting with monitoring UK border security and having legal obligations for defect reporting (including ship condition, machinery failures, substandard operations and questionable onboard health implications). Additionally, a pilot is in a  unique position to report observed pollution and other environmental anomalies and has the potential to offer expert advice to assist in offshore shipping salvage and emergency operations where required.  

b. These are all areas where we believe that the full potential of UK pilots is not properly understood or utilised and which should be comprehensively investigated with a view to improving the provision of maritime services in a cost effective manner. 

 

 

 

  

7. Industry attitudes to the value of UK Port and Deep Sea pilotage  

Although the Dft and MCA as well various ports industry bodies always express support for the value of UK pilotage, there is persistence to undermine the value and quality of UK pilotage for short term commercial expediency. There is reluctance to improve standards and invest in training and technology, instead we see CHAs and government departments looking for ways to circumvent established and well proven standards of recruitment, training and operations.  There is evidence of this in the number of ports that do not have comprehensive Continual Professional Development programmes for pilots; the apparent reluctance of the Chamber of Shipping to promote the greater use of Deep Sea Pilots and within government, by the latest attempt via a Private Members Bill to significantly deregulate the current eligibility criteria for Pilotage Exemption Certificate holders. 

 

 

Submitted for and on behalf of the UKMPA 31st August, 2012 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix to the UKMPA Submission.

The Marine Navigation Bill 2012 (2) – a PMB Sponsored by Sheryll Murray MP

Comments on the Proposal to Deregulate Pilotage Exemption Certificates

By The United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Association

Executive Summary UK Pilotage is governed under the 1987 Pilotage Act as amended. A pilot’s legal status was defined under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 and still stands today under current legislation as “ any person not belonging to a ship who has the conduct thereof.” Compulsory Pilotage in port areas is the principal risk mitigation measure available to ensure the safety of navigation of visiting ships; the safety of passengers and crews; the protection of the various environments: port, marine, riparian and littoral; the safety of other vessels navigating in the same waters and the overall efficiency and commercial success of the port. Additionally in the UK, a pilot is bound by statute to perform other roles relating to reporting of ship defects including vessel condition and operational practises, reporting health concerns and to participate as a “vanguard” element in the system of UK border protection. Thus the pilot is not simply a navigation adviser. In law the pilot has conduct of the navigation of the ship which involves a multitude of tasks and responsibilities. His / hers is a senior managerial role whilst on board the ship as both servant of the owner for navigational purposes and as a servant of the crown and society for the other wider responsibilities. There is provision in the 1987 Act for Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PECs), based on centuries of experience which limits the holders of PEC’s to the bona-fide Master or Mate (aka First Mate / Chief Officer). The PEC system has evolved significantly since 1987, not least in reaction to the many recorded instances of abuse of the system (and many more unrecorded). The concept of PECs is to provide an alternative to the employment of a compulsory pilot for vessels in frequent, regular trade to a port without compromising in any way the level of safety provided by the pilot replaced. Thus the standard of training and examination of the PEC holder shall be no more (nor less) onerous than that of the pilot that is replaced. The practical application of this provision is covered in the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) and detailed in its associated Guide to Good Practise (GTGP) which clearly stipulates the minimum standards that ports should aspire to in granting PECs, the standards being based on the holders being Master or Chief Officer. It follows therefore that the holder of a PEC is entrusted with high level on-board managerial responsibilities as well as having overall conduct of the vessel’s navigation. The proposal to de-regulate the existing system by permitting “any person”, understood (from though not confirmed in writing by the Dft) to actually mean junior deck officers has no safety or port efficiency case attached to it, neither is there any perceived and substantiated argument to support the proposal. The proposal is based on purely commercial profiteering grounds by a small sector of the UK fleet. The proposal to deregulate PECs is potentially in contravention of the requirements of the Standards of Training and Certification of Watch-keepers (STCW) regulations and will directly act against the agreed and developed practises of bridge team manning and operational practises which lie at the core of safe onboard navigational safety procedures whether in confined or open waters.

  Motivation for the proposal to deregulate PECs The Chamber of Shipping has admitted that the desire to see de-regulatory change is limited to one part of the marine aggregate dredging sector. This was first lobbied for prior to publication of the Draft Marine Navigation Bill in 2008. It was purely commercially driven and was and remains as a result of the operational practises on board the vessels concerned. There is history attached to their desire to see change: Prior to the 1987 Pilotage Act, the British aggregate fleet in common with other coastal vessels were issued with exemptions for the vessel not individual ship’s officers. In the period up to STCW 1978 implementation, vessels of 99 metres were even allowed to be navigated in and out of major ports, including London and Southampton by officers with no formal nautical education or training. Dredgers were working at various locations within the limited European trading area. When operating on the Continent the service of local Pilots was always employed. Attempts were made by dredging companies to exploit local rules allowing exemptions for dredgers operating in continental estuarial clearance work, but this was generally not allowed due to language issues. Within the UK the situation varied from port to port. Generally for the major ports including Southampton, London, the Medway and the Humber the previously mentioned system prevailed whereby the vessels and not officers were exempt and could in theory be operated and navigated by personnel with no local knowledge or experience. It is worthy of note that some of these vessels were loading and discharging 2 cargoes per day with crews of 6 men in total, this included manned engine rooms. The 1987 Pilotage Act changed the situation completely and ship exemptions were replaced by the current system whereby individuals obtain PECs. The requirements for obtaining PEC’s varied (and in some respects continue to) from port to port at the discretion of the CHA’s – a provision of the Pilotage Act and the PMSC. One common factor is that for all PEC’s the holder is still required to be “the bona-fide Master or Mate”. Since the ship-owners first lobbied for change over 5 years ago, there have been significant changes in shipping operations affecting all sectors. Notwithstanding the lack of the safety case for change, it is questionable whether the original commercial argument is still relevant. Why the PEC is currently limited to the Bona-Fide Master or Mate Traditionally, pilotage has been and still is regarded as the pinnacle of practical maritime expertise. Maritime pilots are globally acknowledged as being expert closed waters and close quarters navigators and ship handlers based on decades of maritime experience and significant daily on-going practical experience, training and continuous professional development processes. The underlying foundation of the basic elements of the pre-pilotage training requirements is extensive experience in navigation and managerial processes in order to be able to make highly complex decisions in a confident manner with minimal negative results whilst under extreme stress and often working for extended periods. It has thus long been recognised that in order to ensure that an applicant for a pilotage position has a proper portfolio of relevant expertise and experience, the ideal basic requirements for the candidate are a senior ship management qualification (Masters certificate – Now STCW II/2) and a determined period of service in preferably command position or at the very least as Chief Officer. One reason for the relevant experience requirement is that this ensures that the candidate has a proven ability to make high level decisions independently with confidence and without having to refer to a “higher authority” to determine if the decision is acceptable.

 Thus the purpose of the present restriction on the issue of a PEC is to ensure that exemption is granted only to those who hold bona fide authority in the conduct of a particular vessel or specific vessels; particularly in the light of the specific proviso in Section 8 (2) of the 1987 Pilotage Act. In circumstances where the bona fide master or first mate of a vessel holds a PEC in respect of that vessel but is nevertheless unable through any cause to undertake the pilotage, the maintenance of the highest possible standards requires that a duly authorised pilot should be engaged. It is contrary to the public interest and the entire purpose of the Pilotage Act that pilotage in a compulsory pilotage area should be entrusted to anybody of any lesser qualification. STCW 95 (Amended 2010) The Merchant Shipping (Training and Certification) Regulations 1997 implement in the United Kingdom some of the requirements of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping 1978 as amended in 1995 and 2010 (aka the Manila Amendments) and its associated Code (STCW Code). The STCW Code details the levels of knowledge, understanding and proficiency and the methods which may be used to determine candidates’ competence to undertake different functions associated with different levels of responsibility. The Regulations provide for the certification of masters and deck department personnel involved in bridge watch keeping and navigational duties at levels  of responsibility: Management ‐ (master, chief mate) and Operational ‐ (watch‐keeping officers). 

 

The STCW code states that: 

1.2 Management level means the level of responsibility associated with: 

.2.1 serving as master, chief mate, ... on board a seagoing ship, and 

.2.2 ensuring that all functions within the designated area of responsibility are properly performed; 

 

1.3 Operational level means the level of responsibility associated with: 

.3.1 serving as officer in charge of a navigational or engineering watch ... on board a seagoing ship, and 

.3.2 maintaining direct control over the performance of all functions within the designated area of responsibility in accordance with proper procedures and under the direction of an individual serving in the management level for that area of responsibility... 

 

Thus it can be seen that if a PEC is granted to a junior officer, regardless of the level of STCW qualification that he holds, the compliance with the STCW regulatory manning requirements would be in question. 

Bridge Teams and Bridge Resource Management The importance of a ship’s bridge team and the effective implementation of Bridge Resource Management principles is acknowledged and required by the IMO, all its member states and all NGO observers as being fundamental to the safe and efficient operation of shipping. The team itself will have a different composition depending on a variety of influences including but not limited to the

 vessel’s size, trade, location, traffic density etc. Passages through port approaches and within harbour waters are recognised as being the most hazardous and critical stages of a voyage for any vessel. The bridge team therefore needs to be at its highest level of composition and operation during this period. The pilot is the additional element of specialist expertise provided to work with the bridge team to ensure the team’s essential effectiveness. In the event that a PEC is granted to the master or chief officer then the composition of the bridge team will still require the same additional personnel in the form of junior officers (if available on board) as if the pilot was on board. If the PEC were to be granted to a junior officer on the same ship, then it has to be questioned where the additional personnel to make up the team would come from. It has to be remembered that underpinning all operations on board a ship are the ILC and STCW hours of work regulations whose provisions can not be exceeded or contravened. Conclusion The comments submitted herein give but a brief outline of the serious implications of the proposal to deregulate the current long established and proven system of PEC management within the UK. There are many more implications of the proposal which need to be fully considered including the current poor standards of training, qualifications and experience of junior (and senior) officers; the lack of a formal English language standard for PEC holders etc. This in addition to the implications within the on-board command structure whereby granting a PEC to a junior officer would mean that the junior officer would be expected to give orders to the master, clearly a ludicrous situation. The UK system is highly respected around the world as being a fair, equitable and robust process which does not undermine or compromise the safe and efficient operation of UK ports yet acknowledges the sensible needs of efficient and cost effective frequent, regular trades to specific ports. The UK system is in full compliance of the policies of the European Maritime Pilots’ Association and the International Maritime Pilots’ Association. The current system is also fully supported by the United Kingdom Harbour Masters’ Association. Commercial shipping and port operations are dynamic, progressive industries, facing operational and competitive challenges daily. In meeting these challenges, the maintenance of public safety, the protection from harm of ships crews, passengers and the environment along with ensuring the integrity of ports’ infrastructures from accidental physical damage by ships to facilitate the economic efficiency and growth of ports and thus the nation’s trade can not be over emphasised. The proposed deregulation of PECs is thus unacceptable. It should be removed from the Bill and furthermore dropped as current government policy as being not in the public interest. For and on behalf of the UKMPA. August 2012  

Supplementary written evidence from United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Association (UKMPA) (MP 05A)

Pilot station breakdown Region Pilot Station Number of Pilots 1 Cowes 1 1 Dover 6 1 London 79 1 Medway 31 1 Portsmouth 4 1 Southampton 39 2 Crouch 2 2 Great Yarmouth 4 2 Harwich Haven 26 3 Boston 4 3 Kings Lynn 1 3 Tees Bay 31 3 Seaham 1 3 Wisbech 3 4 Aberdeen 10 4 Clyde 5 4 Dundee 3 4 Forth 28 4 Cromarty Forth 1 4 Inverness 2 4 Lerwick 1 4 Orkney 2 4 Perth 3 4 Peterhead 4 4 Sullom Voe 1 5 Barrow 1 5 Belfast 4 5 Heysham 2 5 Liverpool 51 5 Londonderry 5 5 Manchester 19 6 Bristol 14 6 Dartmouth 1 6 Europilots 10 6 Falmouth 7 6 Fowey 3 6 Gloucester 3 6 Milford Haven 19 6 Poole 6 6 Scilly Isles 2 6 SE Wales 5 6 Swansea 5 6 Teignmouth 2 6 Weymouth 1 6 Bridgewater 1 Total 452

Non UKMPA member ports These figures are derived from estimated information based on own knowledge and information gained from websites Port Status of pilots Number Ayr and Troon HM + DHM/Pilots 2 Glensanda HM/Pilot 1 Silloith Pilot 1 Workington Pilot 1 [+1 standby from yacht

harbour] Mostyn HM + DHM/ Pilots 3 Briton Ferry HM/Pilot 1 Plymouth Pilots 4 Portland DHM/Pilots 2 Littlehampton HM/Pilot 1 Shoreham Pilots 3 Lowestoft HM/Pilot 1 Whitby HM + DHM/ Pilots 2 Sunderland DHM/Pilots 3 Tyne AHM/Pilots 5 Blyth HM Pilot 1 Berwick upon Tweed HM/Pilot 1 Montrose HM/Pilot + Pilots 2 Total 34

Supplementary written evidence from United Kingdom Maritime Pilots’ Association (UKMPA) (MP 05B)

UKMPA Comments on the Dft Evidence Submission to the TSC

Marine Pilotage

Evidence from the Department for Transport (MP 12) Summary The Government: • seeks to promote a successful and sustainable maritime sector, with a ports sector empowered to

meet its customers’ needs ; • recognises the key role marine pilots play in the safe and efficient operation of port facilities, and

their personal contribution to the economic activity and future prosperity of the UK ; Pilotage is a public service to ensure the safe and efficient navigation of ships, security and pollution prevention. Shipping accounts for the transportation of 95% of goods and passengers and is the most economical form of global transport. It serves heavy industry with transportation of raw, hazardous and polluting materials, which requires strict regulation.

• believes that the local knowledge and experience of port operators makes them uniquely well-placed to decide the pilotage provision and other operational requirements appropriate to their facilities; CHA v Port operator – they can often be different entities within the UK. Following the privatisation of ports in the 1980's there are now an estimated 27 combinations of port ownership and the administration of their key functions. One of an Authority’s functions (as a CHA under the 1987 Pilotage Act) is the responsibility for pilotage. A Port operator may not be a CHA.

• compliments the ports industry on its endeavours to improve port safety and pilotage standards over recent years, especially through its Ports Skills and Safety organisation; and

• anticipates continuing to work with the industry on further joint projects, such as the recent production of port accident statistics and the updating and reissue of the Port Marine Safety Code. The PMSC is voluntary and HMG refuses to make it mandatory yet has admitted that only 37% of CHAs report demonstrating compliance with the code.

Introduction 1. The Government welcomes the opportunity to outline its approach to UK marine pilotage and, more widely, the safe operation of ports. 2. Statutory Harbour Authorities have legal duties relating to the safety of people who use their harbours and their property, and to the wellbeing of the port environment and community. Safe port operations are governed not only by maritime legislation (such as the Harbours Act 1964 and Merchant Shipping Act 1995), but also by general legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. There are 18 key UK primary port and shipping legislation statutes. Some of the others are the Habitats Directive, Coast Protection Act and Dangerous Vessels Act. 3. It is over twenty years since the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme. The Scheme imposed restrictive practices that meant the UK ports industry was competitively disadvantaged compared to the ports of our neighbouring countries. The implication of this statement is that the restrictive practices that disadvantaged free competition have been dispensed with and that we now operate in an environment of unrestricted practice whereby best practice and value are now normal. 4. After a period of consolidation, the UK ports industry underwent a renaissance and today it effectively and efficiently facilitates our import and export trade; it is critical to the economic wellbeing of this country and its citizens. This has been achieved through the deregulation of the marketplace, and the achievement of equilibrium between Government legislation and free market activity. This approach underlies the National Policy Statement for Ports, published by the Department for Transport earlier this year. [1] However, Pilotage is a public service primarily to ensure the safe conduct of vessels in, out and around

coastal and port waters whilst not compromising commercial efficiency. The deregulation of the market place has nothing to do with pilotage service provision and the levying of fees for such a service. Free Market activity in the form of competition within pilotage in a number of countries has proven to be unsafe and expensive. It has proven that each port should have only one pilotage service provider. 5. Therefore, the Department believes that the ports industry should remain responsible for the safe operations of its facilities and for negotiating the pay and conditions of marine pilots at local level without central Government intervention. The Department further recognises that the insurance market helps to ensure that operational risks are minimised at ports. The TSC is presumably concerned about the provision of pilotage services, not pay. In any line of employment an appropriate remuneration package commensurate with responsibilities, skills and qualifications can be expected. In the maritime industry, it is widely acknowledged that retention of skilled professionals is essential to the safe operation of vessels [assets] and an essential contribution to the efficiency of the port’s business. The Dft suggests that Insurance companies will maintain standards by increasing premiums to identified ports where de-regulation has increased accidents. Is it also envisaged (as implied) that Shipowners complaining about increased port dues as a result of increased insurance premiums will therefore pressurise the respective CHA to improve pilotage standards? 6. It is appropriate, however, that the Department should seek to assist the ports industry in raising awareness and promoting the adoption of best operational practices through collaborative working. Unfortunately, the department is very selective in choosing whom to collaborate with. The Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) initiative is a prime example of this approach; it promotes safe working practices and provides clear guidance on harbour authorities’ duties and powers in a practical way that is responsive to change, recognises local variation, and enjoys the industry’s confidence. Yet only 37% of CHAs have admitted adhering to it. Pilotage 7. Marine pilots are employed to guide ships through dangerous or congested waters, using their local knowledge and skills to ensure safe passage. This statement is incorrect. The 1987 Pilotage Act requires pilots to ‘conduct the navigation', not to simply advise or “guide”. Depending on the size, geography, tides and many other variables affecting a port, the responsible Competent Harbour Authority (CHA) may require certain vessels to employ pilots. Significant here are the key words ‘dangerous’, ‘congested’, ‘local knowledge’ and ‘skills’. By recognising all of these elements and adapting to each situation, through a wealth of empirical knowledge, the pilot conducts a ‘safe passage’. 8. The Pilotage Act 1987 ("the 1987 Act") regulates UK pilotage, and in common with most port safety legislation puts the onus of responsibility for pilotage on the individual harbour authorities. This deregulatory Act, which updated the Pilotage Act 1913, sought to address the over-supply of qualified and expensive pilots employed at UK ports. It is a feature of de-regulated pilotage that the CHA’s are free to contract with whomever they wish. The 2002 ABP Humber reorganisation proved the point.

9. The 1987 Act governs the pilotage activities of CHAs. It empowers CHAs to determine whether marine pilotage services need to be provided, to what degree, what charges may be levied for the service and whether, in the interests of safety, pilotage should be compulsory. Harbour Revision Orders, made by the Secretary of State for Transport using powers in the Harbours Act 1964, describe and empower operations. 10. Under section 3 of the 1987 Act, the management of pilotage arrangements is a matter for the CHA, which has discretion for determining the qualifications required by those persons applying to be pilots. The authority may establish qualifications in respect of, inter alia, age, physical fitness, time of service, local knowledge, skill and character. 11. Many harbour authorities will only authorise pilots to handle larger vessels after they have completed a

specified number of trips and spent several years piloting smaller vessels, or acting as an assistant pilot. These pilotage authorisations may be limited to ships of a particular description and to particular parts of the harbour. It can be thus determined that if there are significant commercial pressures, then a CHA will accede to those pressures and promote pilots without appropriate training. 12. CHAs may suspend or revoke an authorisation if it appears to the authority that the pilot is guilty of any incompetence or misconduct or has ceased to have the required qualifications. An authorisation may also be suspended or revoked after the termination of any contract or other arrangement upon which the pilot provides his services, critical to ensure the commercial viability of some port operations. The statement omits to mention that many CHA’s deem it commercially prudent to maintain a professionally and practically accountable pilot service and that in order to do so, they require that their pilots be employed (rather than self employed). This is the nature of the contractual arrangements that they deem most suitable to their particular needs.

13. CHAs provide the pilotage services they consider necessary. Their duty is not discharged simply by authorising one or more pilots; it includes the management of the service, ensuring that the person assigned as the pilot for each vessel is fit and appropriately qualified for that task. Note that there is currently no national pilot qualification, only local Authorisations. Under the 1987 Act, pilotage services are free to determine their own form and function. Indeed, it is the nature of the pilotage service relationship with many CHA’s that management of the pilotage function is left up to the Pilot Association.

It is also the nature of professional associations (as with pilots) that internal regulation, borne out of professional pride in quality and the provision of the highest service standards, is generally much stricter than those that are driven and determined by statute. Good examples are the self-regulation of Surgeons, Medical practitioners, Lawyers and Nurses.

Pilots as senior maritime experts are no different in this respect.

14. Sections 8 and 15 of the 1987 Act provide powers for CHAs to issue Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PECs). These may be used to exempt the bona fide Master or First Mate of a vessel from the requirement to take an authorised pilot if the CHA is satisfied that they have the knowledge and ability to guide a ship through the harbour waters safely. 15. In practice, a large proportion of commercial shipping movements, especially ferries, are conducted by PEC holding senior officers. These senior officers are highly trained and experienced The relevance of the confirmation of Senior, Highly trained and experienced Officers holding a PEC should not be overlooked. PECs are valid for one year from the date of issue, and their renewals depend upon CHAs being satisfied with the conduct of the holder. CHAs may suspend or revoke a PEC if the holder has been guilty of incompetence or misconduct. They are also required to be revalidated at 5 yearly intervals. 16. The Department does not have a statutory responsibility under the 1987 Act to police CHAs in relation to pilotage. It would not be appropriate for the Department to intervene in pay, conditions or working practices issues that were the focus of dispute between a harbour authority and its pilots. However, the Dft (through the MCA) is as the national pilotage authority, custodian of the 1987 Pilotage Act and its enforcement. Being a Government body (with pilotage being a public service), charged with ensuring that CHAs provide a proper pilotage service, then maybe there should be some form of ombudsman office to police the Dft. Working practices are an issue of relevance to the Dft., in that it does have an undeniable responsibility to ensure that a CHA maintains the highest possible standards in pilotage.

PMSC 17. The PMSC and its accompanying Guide to Good Practice is a joint initiative between the Department and the ports and shipping industry to promulgate safe practices at maritime facilities. [2] The Department drafted both documents in conjunction with industry and is currently updating the PMSC for re-issue at the end of the year. The Code and Guide also detail the statutory obligations that exist under existing legislation relating to the safe operations of ports. Chapter 5 of the PMSC refers to the main powers and duties that CHAs have under the 1987 Act; these are further detailed in section 8 of the Guide. 18. The PMSC steering group, comprising members from ports, unions, other industry bodies and government, considers trends in safety and the need for information updates to the Code and Guide. 19. Those who are directly accountable for safe marine operations in their facilities are the PMSC’s target audience. In most harbour authorities, their board members are individually and collectively responsible for adhering to the Code. 20. The Code provides guidance on policies, procedures and the performance of harbour authorities, and describes the role of board members, officers and key personnel in relation to safety of navigation; summarising the main statutory duties and powers of harbour authorities. The Department expects harbour authorities to adhere to the standards applicable to the facility type and to develop an effective marine safety management system based on formal risk assessment. 21. The varied nature of maritime facilities (including location, tides, approaches, cargo types and vessel calling patterns) introduces a myriad of operational environments that make a single detailed legislative framework for safety within the industry difficult. The more flexible and responsive non-mandated PMSC is an effective and desirable alternative.

As explained at para 13 (above), it is the nature of professional associations, who are also the repository of empirical knowledge, that self-regulation borne out of developed professional standards is generally far stricter than statutory regulation.

22. The ports industry is dynamic and constantly changing, ready to adopt operational innovations and new technologies when proven to be safe. The non-mandated nature of the Code facilitates a flexible, collaborative nature to its development, far removed from the rigid and potentially over-cautious legislative approach. Consequently, the PMSC can reflect rapidly new best practice in terms of port operations, allowing speedy promulgation to interested parties. Conversely, if the Code were to be mandated, it could take much longer to recognise the benefits of revised practices formally. Pilots operate at the very forefront of technological innovation and development and, because of the particular risks of their occupation, are best positioned to identify inherent weaknesses and defects in operational systems that are often simply not apparent in the wider maritime environment.

ECDIS is an excellent example of the recognition of defects outwith normal practice parameters.

Generally, experienced pilots, recognising the technical issues through usage, will not trust ECDIS within their own district whereas ships’ crews often rely upon it fastidiously – even to the point of mistrusting, or relegating into disuse, their own common sense.

23. Separately, if a harbour authority is found liable for a serious accident or incident on its premises, there already exists extensive legislation such as the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 that can be invoked. 24. Should specific legislation be required at port operational level, harbour authorities often have the powers to make byelaws. These byelaws empower authorities to regulate activities, including the speed of all vessels, reflecting local circumstances and enabling the conduct of business efficiently and safely. 25. Moreover, the insurance market helps to ensure that operational risks are minimised at ports through the types and requirements of the premiums and risk coverage they provide. Where risk is least, premiums are lowest, providing a virtuous circle that favours improved safety .

Insurers require experienced pilots to be on board during port (and thus hazardous) passages and under those circumstances, P&I clubs also deem pilots to be essential components of the safety mechanism. It is recognised at law that a ship’s master who disregards a pilot’s direction when under his conduct also deprives his ship of the insurance protection that comes with employing a pilot. 26. Both private industry and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) undertake PMSC 'health checks', designed specifically to help ports adhere to the Code. The MCA aims to undertake four such health checks each year. Each health check costs £8,500 to carry out, but the MCA does not charge for this service. With 180 CHAs in the UK, 180/4 = 45 years to “Health Check” all ports to confirm their compliance. 27. The MCA recently undertook a PMSC health check at Grimsby, part of which looked into pilotage on the Humber. It concluded that the pilotage authority, Humber Estuary Services, adhered to the PMSC and the report highlighted the industry best practices found in the Humber Pilot Handbook (October 2011). It is notable that a Humber port is used as an example and not one of the other ports “checked” recently. This is presumably as a result of the widespread criticism that has been and continues to be leveled at the quality of pilotage operations at the port since 2002 (often by masters of ships). Within the “Health Check”, it should be determined whether any Humber pilots were consulted to gather a comprehensive picture. The port suffers a much higher than (the national) average turnover of pilots and the CHA struggles to recruit the necessary replacements. The workforce apparently remains demoralised. There is current court action against the CHA via the pilots’ trade unions (currently under Appeal) to get adequate rest periods as prescribed under the “European working time directive”. The Humber Pilot Handbook contains elements that are far from “best practice”. It is in many cases too prescriptive in daring to venture away from objective factual information.

There is a long established school of thought that adherence to intended “best practices” can often fail to achieve their goal as the result of strictly imposed adherence can be a deterioration of the operation’s underlying core principles. “Good operations” are rarely attributable to “best practices”. Reflected in the PMSC’s associated Guide to Good Practice, which was intentionally named “Good” for this very reason.

28. While the PMSC health check is undoubtedly a useful exercise, if the PMSC were to be mandated the MCA has estimated that it would have to undertake up to 200 such visits in the first year at a cost to the taxpayer of £1,700,000. Subsequently, the Code would require inspection of all commercial ports on a three yearly cycle at a cost of £570,000 per annum. This cost may be viewed as excessive, especially at some smaller ports with low financial turnovers, particularly as there is no direct evidence to suggest ports are not adhering to the PMSC. The MCA could in theory charge for their services, but this would impose a financial burden on industry, and the commercial sector can already provide the health checks where required. The sums mentioned herein are intentionally dramatic. The ports operate commercially and so as with many other industries the costs of inspections and surveys should be borne by the industry. If one uses the figure of 180 (CHA) commercial ports, equally shared between them the initial cost to the ports of mandatory inspection will be £9,500 – about the same cost as the tugs required for a large container ship in one port call. Annual visits about £3,500. The cost to the taxpayer would be zero. The PMSC is a risk mitigation measure. Non-compliance can very easily result in a significant marine incident. Pollution clean-up or civil claims will quickly exceed £9,500 - running into many millions in even relatively minor pollution incidents affecting sensitive areas. Proposed new pilotage legislation 29. In May 2008, the Department published a Draft Marine Navigation Bill ("the 2008 draft Bill") for pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation among interested parties. [3] It included three clauses relating to PECs, the first of which is consistent with the Government’s wider deregulatory agenda, while the others improve aspects of the PEC process. The three clauses were: • Granting a PEC – to enable a CHA to grant a PEC to any bona fide crew-member who meets their

requirements as to skill, experience and local knowledge (instead of only the master or first mate, to which they are restricted currently).

See the original (2008/9) UKMPA submission to the TSC for an explanation of the dangers of this clause, further validated by the 2012 submission to this TSC inquiry.

• Pilotage Notification – to ensure that the master of a ship notifies the harbour authority of which PEC

holder is acting as pilot before the ship is navigated in an area for which a pilotage direction is in force. • PEC suspension and revocation – to enable a PEC to be suspended or revoked immediately where an

incident has taken place that raises doubts about the PEC holder’s capacity to act as a pilot of a vessel, or where there have been incidents of misbehaviour by the holder.

30. The Department wishes to promote a package of measures on PECs that balance the desire to increase flexibility about who may be issued with a PEC, reflecting modern shipping practices with appropriate safeguards that ensure cases of incompetence or misconduct can be responded to quickly, protecting the safety of shipping in CHA areas. It is for this reason that PECs should only be granted to management function senior officers. A Master will not hand the conduct of his ship to a junior officer who holds a PEC.

31. The changes would assist shipping companies in ensuring that properly qualified personnel are available to pilot ships. This infers deregulation to increase economic benefit. In many CHAs pilots are not involved in the PEC examination process. It is in those cases left to the Harbour master or his/her Deputy even though he/she may not hold an authorisation or possess recent pilotage experience and the requisite pilotage knowledge. 32. At the same time, CHAs would receive the necessary powers to suspend or revoke a PEC immediately in cases of incompetence or misconduct relating to the capability of the holder to pilot the ship. The current situation leaves the PEC holder free to pilot ships during the PEC suspension or removal procedure, to give him a reasonable opportunity to appeal. To ameliorate the effect of this change, CHAs would have discretion to make compensation payments where it was found that the statutory notice was issued in circumstances where the CHA subsequently accepted that it was not appropriate to do so. Some may already have this power in their constitutions but the measure will ensure consistent coverage. 33. Consequent on the changes proposed, the existing offence of misusing a PEC would be amended such that when the master of a ship reported to a CHA that a PEC was being used, the identity of the PEC holder undertaking the pilotage would need to be reported. This is not considered a new burden, as vessels are already required to report to the CHA that a PEC is being used. 34. The 2008 draft Bill also included a power for the Secretary of State to make orders revoking CHA status at the request of an authority. This change would not directly affect the practical operation of marine pilotage. It would, however, relieve such authorities of the onerous duties related to the provision of pilotage services where the harbour was inactive, or where pilotage was no longer required. Thus, it is also consistent with the Government’s deregulatory agenda. 35. However, recognising the industry’s achievements through Ports Skills and Safety (PSS) in creating its own system of accreditation, it is no longer considered appropriate to pursue a further clause from the 2008 draft Bill relating to a national qualifications system for pilots. The industry has yet to achieve the system of accreditation referred to. The national qualification is being stalled, presumably through lack of financial input by the BPA and UKMPG into PSS and a lack of input from the Dft to drive the process forward. 36. Following the Private Member’s Bill ballot in May 2012, Sheryll Murray MP expressed an interest in taking forward clauses from the 2008 draft Bill as part of a Private Member’s Bill. This Bill received its First Reading on 20 June as the Marine Navigation (No.2) Bill; its Second Reading is scheduled for 19 October. The Department is in discussion with Mrs. Murray about the inclusion of the three clauses on PECs and the order-making power for revoking CHA status ahead of publication of the Bill for its Second Reading. Please see the UKMPA comments concerning the PMB contained within the submission to the TSC.

EU pilotage study 37. The European Commission’s "Communication and action plan with a view to establishing a European maritime transport space without barriers", issued in January 2009, invited Member States to create a regulatory framework which would permit easier pilotage exemptions. [4] This communication specified that the conditions required for obtaining a PEC should be reasonable and should not contain elements of protectionism. The intention was to introduce lower costs for short sea shipping operators and faster turn-around times of vessels in ports. This places economic competition before safety. It is an individual CHA’s responsibility in the UK to decide on pilotage. There are no “protectionism” elements in the current UK PEC regime. 38. In spring 2012, consultants appointed by the Commission commenced a study of pilotage and, in particular, PEC arrangements across all EU maritime Member States. This is in response to concerns that, in some Member States, pilotage exemption arrangements are inconsistent and unreasonable, so may represent a barrier to trade, resulting in inefficiency and unnecessary costs. Thus far, the consultants have been gathering information from governments and interested industry organisations in each member state through a series of questionnaires. The Final Report is now published - the results are poor and inaccurate. The UK (Dft) submission contained a number of factual inaccuracies which the UKMPA brought to the attention of the MCA. 39. The Department continues to monitor the outcome of this review, seeking to promote the existing deregulatory approach adopted in the United Kingdom as a positive model for other member states. The existing UK PEC process is widely respected internationally, it is a fair balance of regulation and self administration. The proposed deregulation contained within Clause 2 of the PMB (see above) will destroy this respected position. Port safety statistics 40. During 2010, the Department initiated a safety statistics project with PSS supported by the UK Major Ports Group and the British Ports Association. Formed in 2002, PSS is the ports industry’s organisation for health, safety, skills and standards. 41. The purpose of this exercise was the production of robust statistics for port safety for the advancement of best practice, and where necessary the basis for consideration of legislation. The project backdated data collection to 2005, to provide a data set where trends could be analysed. 42. The statistics project enlisted the support of a number of major UK ports including the Port of London Authority , Dover , Belfast and Aberdeen to provide a cost effective, yet representative cross section of activities and facilities. Note: these are all Trust Ports and not private ports with CHA status. For private operators the cost would be much higher. 43. In 2011, the Department presented PSS with the data collected for the period 2005-2010 and a process for the continuation of the statistics project. PSS has collected much of the relevant information for 2011 and will shortly present the latest data set to the PMSC steering group. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigations involving pilotage 44. The MAIB examines and investigates all types of marine accidents to, or on board, UK ships worldwide, and for all ships in UK territorial waters. This is no longer true. Owing to the significant budget reductions imposed upon the MAIB, CHAs are often required to investigate incidents in their ports, sometimes quite significant events. The same impact has been felt by the MCA and their ability to investigate incidents and reports of substandard operations as Port State Control.

45. At Annex A is a table of the key MAIB accident investigations involving pilotage stretching back nearly ten years. The key conclusion of each investigation highlights the need for local cooperation and knowledge to ensure the appropriate provision of pilotage for safe port operations. See the covering letter to this critique paper. The conclusions stated are not“key”. The table is incorrect and subjectively biased. 46. The conclusion relating to the vessel Stolt Tern , where the pilot lost control at Holyhead recommended the introduction of national occupational standards for pilots. As mentioned in paragraph 35, PSS has taken forward a system of accreditation without the need for central government involvement. Read also the comments to para 35. Only the NOS themselves have been accredited, there is no national system of accreditation for pilot training and qualification. The Dft analysis is corrupt as it misses out other accidents in CHA waters involving mismanagement of navigation by either pilot or PEC holder. The extracts are very selective. Selective statistics can be ‘manipulated’ to vouch for anything an author wishes to promote, hence all statistical assertions must be contextualised and tested against comparators for efficacy and viability.

In this instance, if this data is to be considered useful and / or trustworthy, it must be contextualised by comparing with the number of shipping accidents as a percentage of the number of pilotage acts for several jurisdictions including other EU and Global maritime states.

Annex A

Additional MAIB Reports relevant to pilotage

1. Fairplay 22/ Stena Brittanica 11/11/10 Link on MAIB website to “investigations led by foreign administrations”. http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.php/onderzoeken/sleepboot-omgeslagen-hoek-van-holland-11-november-2010/ Collision and capsizing of tug Fairplay 22 with the UK-registered RoRo passenger vessel Stena Britannica on the Nieuwe Waterweg near Hook of Holland with the loss of two lives. Recommendations to Port of Rotterdam Harbour Master: Specify requirements relating to the Captains knowledge, training and experience with respect to tug assistance when issuing a PEC to a captain using tug assistance, and ensure compliance.

2. 1/2008 Logos II (contact) Jersey so not officially part of UK http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/logos_ii.cfm Although the port had introduced a number of initiatives to improve marine safety, 1. its safety management system had remained in draft form since its introduction in 2001, and no audits to verify compliance with the PMSC had been undertaken. [2.5.3] Compliance with the PMSC has not been given a sufficiently high priority, and it 2. is highly likely that the ability of the DHM to allocate sufficient time and personal resource to marine safety management has been adversely influenced by his other work commitments. [2.5.3] Risk assessments within St Helier were not periodically reviewed and had not been 6. accessible since March 2007. [2.5.3] There was no programme of continuing professional development training for the 7. port’s pilots. [2.5.3]

3. 2/2008 Audacity/Leonis (Collision) - Humber http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/audacity_leonis.cfmAt 1351 on 14 April 2007, the UK registered product tanker Audacity was involved in a collision with the Panama registered general cargo ship Leonis, in very poor visibility, in the precautionary area at the entrance to the River Humber. Both vessels sustained damage to their bows. Fortunately there were no injuries and no pollution was caused. Audacity had been outward bound from Immingham Oil Terminal and was approaching the precautionary area in order to disembark her pilot. Leonis had entered the precautionary area from seaward and had just completed embarking her pilot. The MAIB investigation found that the operation of the bridge team on Audacity was inadequate, and the extent of the VTS area and VTS powers was not clearly understood by the VTS operators. The investigation identified contributing factors to the accident; these included: • The pilots and bridge teams, on both vessels, did not make a full assessment of the risk of collision. • VTS procedures for managing traffic in the precautionary area were insufficient. • VTS operators were unaware of the poor visibility in parts of the VTS area. • Humber VTS did not have a formal operating procedure for periods of reduced visibility. • Communications were poor. • The Port Authority misunderstood how risk assessment could be used to improve the effectiveness of the VTS operations. As a result of this accident, Associated British Ports Humber Estuary Services (ABP HES) has taken several actions to improve the performance of the VTS, pilots and pilot boarding operations.

Recommendations have been made to: the UK Major Ports Group/British Ports Association regarding the situational awareness of pilots immediately prior to boarding vessels; and to the ABP Group to develop policies covering headline issues, which can be implemented and monitored in all ports within the Group.

4. 17/2008 Flying Phantom (tug girting loss of life) - Clyde http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2008/flying_phantom.cfmThe port risk assessment was poor, and the few control measures that had been put in place after a previous similar serious accident in thick fog proved ineffective. UK ports appear to have been failing to learn lessons from accidents at other ports.

5. Completed PE Summary MONTIS (collision with railway bridge) 24/06 2008 - Humber http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/completed_preliminary_examinations/completed_preliminary_examinations_2008.cfm Action taken: The Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents has written to British Waterways (the competent harbour authority for the River Ouse at the Goole railway swing bridge and Howdendyke) strongly advising them: • to include in the Ouse pilot passage plan the required speed for transiting through the Goole Railway Bridge; and • to require a more detailed discussion during the master/pilot exchange so that masters are able to challenge decisions or actions taken by pilots at an early stage in order that, when required, effective corrective action can be taken to prevent accidents; and suggesting that they should consider the best practice of a pilot not acting as helmsman. The Chief Inspector has also written to the owner of Montis, highlighting the need for effective dialogue between the master and the pilot in order that the master can be assured of the intentions of the pilot at an early stage.

6. Completed PE Summary Monsoon (contact with Mooring dolphin) - Humber 23/08/2008 http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/completed_preliminary_examinations/completed_preliminary_examinations_2008.cfm Synopsis: After loading a cargo of butane, Monsoon was due to sail for sea with a pilot and the assistance of a tug. The ship was port side alongside and was heading upriver. Just before boarding, the pilot met the berthing master, who drew his attention to the port side stowed anchor, the crown of which sat proud of the ship’s hull. The berthing master was conscious that the ship did not have a bow thruster, and was concerned that the anchor could cause damage to the jetty fenders if the ship was manoeuvred off the berth as normal using the forward back-spring and the ship became bowsed in excessively. The wind was light but a strong flood tide was flowing and the berthing master had recommended the use of a tug. The tug was made fast to the starboard main deck bitts at the break of the aft accommodation superstructure. Once singled up, VTS gave permission for the ship to sail. The pilot ordered all lines to be let go, the engine to be placed astern and the tug to push, with the intention of swinging the bow off the jetty in preparation for proceeding into the river and then turning to starboard. When the ship’s head had altered about 1º to starboard, the pilot instructed the tug to pull at 20%, which caused the bow to fall back towards the jetty. He then decided to use the rounded downriver end of the jetty to swing the ship’s head into the river. This was achieved, but as he then attempted to manoeuvre the ship clear of the jetty, he was surprised to see an outbound vessel that appeared to be approaching the area in

which he intended to make the starboard turn. VTS had broadcast information about the outbound vessel, but the pilot had not heard this and had not been made aware of the broadcast by the bridge team. To prevent a close-quarter situation developing with the outbound vessel, the pilot manoeuvred the ship ahead to pass closely off the berth. The engine was then placed full astern, but this failed to prevent the ship from making contact with a mooring dolphin, located about a ship’s length upstream of the jetty. Action taken: The Deputy Chief Inspector has written to the pilot, strongly advising him to: • Carefully plan any intended manoeuvre, taking full account of the potential effect of the tidal stream • Keep VTS fully informed of any intended course of action; and • Maintain full situational awareness by gaining information on all scheduled ship movements before boarding, and utilising the bridge team to relay relevant communications and traffic information as necessary. The Deputy Chief Inspector has also written to the ship’s management company, strongly advising it to instruct its masters to: • Discuss all intended manoeuvres in detail during the master/pilot exchange so that they are able to challenge decisions or actions taken by pilots at an early stage, and enable effective corrective action to be taken when required. Published: OCTOBER 2008

7. 6/2007 Skagern/ Samskip Courier (collision) - Humber http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007/skagern_samskip_courier.cfm The ensuing investigation identified contributing factors to the accident; these included: • Failure to apply long established collision avoidance methods by the masters and pilots of both vessels. • Pilot /master relationships: the masters' over reliance on the pilots. • Poor interaction and communications among the bridge teams. • Loss of situational awareness by Samskip Courier’s pilot. • The positioning of Sand End light float. • Use of mobile telephones on the bridge. Recommendations: Recommendations have been made to the Port Marine Safety Code Steering Group, Associated British Ports Humber Estuary Services and the International Chamber of Shipping with reference to: improving pilot/master interaction; the appropriate use of mobile telephones and the importance of safe speeds.

8. 24/2007 Prospero (Contact) - Milford Haven http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2007/prospero.cfm At 0035 on 10 December 2006 Prospero was approaching No. 2 Jetty, of the Sem Logistics terminal, Milford Haven, when the master suddenly and without warning lost control of the vessel’s podded propulsion system. This caused the vessel to make contact with the jetty’s infrastructure, resulting in material damage to both the jetty and the vessel before control was regained.

9. 13/04/05 Thorngarth/Stolt Aspiration (collision) – Liverpool http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2005/thorngarth.cfmThe accident was caused by the tug master’s lack of familiarity with the tug, and the

lack of training in the particular manoeuvre he was required to perform. This was one of a number of similar incidents involving tugs in a period of 4 months. All were attributable to the lack of training and familiarisation of the tug master with the tug, and the particular task required of him. This prompted the MAIB to issue Safety Bulletin 02/2005 (Annex A), highlighting the need for an assessment of the “tug to task” allocation before each towing operation, and ensuring that tug masters are fully trained. A recommendation has been made to major tug operators, the British Tugowners Association (BTA), and the PMSC (Port Marine Safety Code) steering group. The recommendation is aimed at encouraging discussion between all parties when deciding the optimum allocation of tugs for all manoeuvres within a port, and the level of crew experience required for each task. A further recommendation has been made to the BTA to encourage its members to ensure that the movement of personnel between tugs is closely monitored, and that training and expertise of tugs’ crews is matched and is consistent with the type of tug and its expected task requirement.

10. 01/03/04 Orade (Collision with light tower) – Humber http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2005/orade.cfm The investigation found that there had been poor communications between the master and the pilot, and it is probable that the master had engaged autopilot and not riverpilot when requested to change the steering mode by the pilot. The master had never used riverpilot mode on the vessel, and he was also probably suffering from fatigue as he had been working a 6 hours on/6 hours off watchkeeping routine for the previous 5½ months. The pilot had not checked that the changeover had been successful, and did not notice that his initial steering requests were having no effect. The rudder angle indicator was poorly sited, the pilot was unfamiliar with this vessel and there was poor control lighting. Recommendations have been made to the UK’s Port Marine Safety Code Steering Group and the vessel operator, on safety issues identified during the investigation which relate to fatigue, bridge team management and ergonomics.

November 2012

Supplementary evidence from United Kingdom Maritime Pilots Association (UK 05C)

Marine Pilotage - observations on oral evidence answers Thank you for providing the opportunity to answer your questions on 17th December. Having now heard and read the submissions from other witnesses, a number of statements were made which I feel it is important to draw to your attention. Q 43. Trying to look at pilotage as an individual function is rather out of date. ...The idea that pilotage is seen perhaps as an individual, stand-alone activity... This is not a view or position that the UKMPA (or indeed IMPA or EMPA) hold. As Mr. Bracewell identifies pilotage is part of a complex port safety management system. It is the core element in a port’s navigational safety management system, supported by the many other services that may be available such as VTS, Tugs etc. Q75. ... and it is the only place in the world where there is a documented port marine safety code. This is incorrect. New Zealand has adopted the UK PMSC. Many other nations have robust, effective statutory legislation covering the various elements of port operational safety. Q78. ... Their normal company standard, without exception, is 22: master and first mate. However, a lot of our management systems also have the role of chief officer, who should be able to have a PEC because he would be more senior to a first mate. The terms “Chief Officer / Mate” and “First Officer / Mate” are interchangeable. The correct STCW terminology is “Chief Mate”. It is only where a “Chief” and “First” mates are in roles on board (usually larger) ships that the former is senior. In this case the current Pilotage Act PEC legislation terminology clearly intends reference to the “Chief Mate”. Q88 & 89. Chair: That will be a requirement. Stephen Hammond: Yes, it will. A copy of the letter sent to Port Operators is enclosed. Its content clearly indicates only that a Port Authority “should” submit the triennial compliance statement, not that it “must” do so which was what the Minister stated both at the TSC and also in previous parliamentary statements. Once every three years all authorities and facilities/berths/terminals and marinas that fall under the Code should undertake a compliance exercise. This should come in the form of a letter from the duty holder to the MCA stating that they are compliant with the Code. Q.99 ... recommends to competent harbour authorities standards on training and certification. It is not for the UK Government to enforce; it is for competent harbour authorities. A960 (dated 5th December 2003) states: Page 2 - 2. URGES Governments to give effect to these Recommendations as soon as possible.

Page 3 – 2.1 ... Governments should inform competent pilotage authorities of the provisions of this document and encourage their implementation. Q.103 & 104. Pilotage is currently very high on the EU agenda. There is an ongoing EU study into pilotage. Pilotage is also a significant element under consideration in the current EU ports policy consultation process. In general terms, there were a number of other statements made by witnesses which indicate that the perception expressed by practitioners of a lack of current practical knowledge and expertisewithin the Dft and industry management bodies is not unfounded. Also, although most of the major UK ports are in private hands, ports’ industry representation was made by high quality, well run Trust Port representatives. Many of the safety issues that concern us within our evidence submissions are within the private sector.

Annex: Letter from Stephen Hammond MP, Department for Transport to the Ports and Harbours Authorities

To Ports and Harbours Authorities The Government has published an updated edition of the Port Marine Safety Code, which applies to all marine and port facilities in the UK that have statutory powers and duties. Its aim is to enhance safety for those who work or use ports, their ships, passengers and the environment. This document is available on the government website at www.gov.uk and can be located by typing Port Marine Safety Code into the search box and selecting the 'Inside Government' tab. Marine operations are hazardous, but can be conducted safety if the hazards and risks are properly assessed and appropriate systems are in place. Our ports and harbours generally have a good record and serious incidents are rare. Historically, the Department has maintained a policy of self-regulation for marine activities in ports. As a consequence the Department and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) have limited powers to intervene directly. The Code mirrors the Government's policy of reducing the number and the burden of regulations on industry and ensuring that any intervention is proportionate. I believe that adding further legislative requirements by mandating the Code and establishing a formal ports inspectorate would detract from this approach. The Government's policy for marine safety in ports places the onus of responsibility on harbour authorities (the duty holder) to manage safety in their harbour waters and the approaches. Using their statuary powers, harbour authorities have the necessary tools to fulfil their duties and maintain a safe port. Where necessary the MCA may undertake a health check visit. These visits are usually arranged following an MAIB investigation into an incident, but could also be triggered by other indicators. The aim of these visits is to encourage adherence to the code rather than to take formal action.Once every three years all authorities and facilities/berths/terminals and marinas that fall under the Code should undertake a compliance exercise. This should come in the form of a letter from the duty holder to the MCA stating that they are compliant with the Code.

The next round of compliance letters is due in March 2015. Letters should be sent to Navigation Safety, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Spring Place, Southampton, S015 1EG.

Please take this opportunity to examine the revised version of the code to ensure you are familiar with the contents. Stephen Hammond

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Written evidence from the United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA) (MP 06)

1. MEMORANDUM submitted to the Transport Committee by the United Kingdom Association of Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (UK ADSPA) comprised of the Corporations of Trinity House in Hull, London and Newcastle, who, under Section 23 of the Pilotage Act 1987 are authorised to grant deep sea pilotage certificates.

2. Transport Committee invites evidence on issues affecting marine pilotage, and this Memorandum contains the response of the three Corporations of Trinity House, who welcome the opportunity to assist the Committee.

3. Deep Sea Pilotage can be described in this context as: the provision of experienced Master Mariners with specialist local knowledge, to client shipmasters, owners and ship-operators, on a voluntary basis for a fee, whilst their vessels are transiting Northwest European waters, these being amongst the most congested and high risk sea areas in the world.

4. Pilotage generally has been one of the functions granted to the Corporations of Trinity House by a number of Royal Charters over the years, the first being to Trinity House London in 1514 when Henry VIII gave powers inter alia to regulate pilotage. Our authority as deep sea pilotage authorities, under the Pilotage Act 1987 is the main remaining responsibility since this Act passed district pilotage to the Competent Harbour Authorities in the United Kingdom.

5. Deep Sea Pilots are certificated by the Examining Boards of the three Trinity Houses following examination using a common syllabus based on the 1976 Antwerp Rules agreed by the former North Sea Pilotage Commission. A valid Certificate of Competency as Master Mariner is required, as are all relevant training certificates and medical certification ENG1. Every candidate must have relevant nautical charts and publications in his possession, corrected to date for the area for which he being examined, which currently extends from Murmansk to Gibraltar, limited to Skagen in the east and to Longitude 14° 00’ in the west.

6. Every deep sea pilot licensed by the Authorities in the UK has substantial command experience, which, together with extensive knowledge of our waters, conditions and risks, makes them a considerable asset to those using their services. The pilots themselves are self-employed and gain assignments through their affiliation to one of the two Deep Sea Pilotage Agencies operating in the UK. Other such agencies exist in France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany.

7. The UK Authorities issue licences valid for one year only, and every licensed deep sea pilot must attend a revalidation interview each January where it is assessed if he is fit for renewal of his certificate for the year.

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8. In 2011 it was estimated that the number of licensed deep sea pilots operating in Northwest European waters were: France 14, Germany 12, Netherlands19 and the UK 45, giving a total of about 90. However, these figures vary with demand by shipowners, often changing due to deep sea pilotage being voluntary and subject to the commercial pressures in a volatile trading environment.

9. The typical cost to use a deep sea pilot for a container ship’s European port rotation – average 7 days – is about £3,000. This is a very small proportion of the costs of the vessel and its cargo freight, when considered as a means of reducing risk to safe navigation by having an experienced pilot onboard. The added advantage of a deep sea pilot’s local knowledge can save fuel costs, using experience of routes, passages and tides and advising the shipmaster how best to conduct the voyage.

10. In many areas of the maritime world there are activities aimed at increasing the use of deep sea pilots to reduce risk. The Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission is lobbying for pilotage to be compulsory in the Baltic Sea. In Australia it is compulsory to take a pilot when transiting the Great Barrier Reef and Torres Straight and in Turkey, whilst strongly recommended for transiting vessels, pilotage is compulsory for the Bosphorus Straits for certain classes of ships. Singapore are also keen to have compulsory pilotage for certain high risk vessels (gas carriers, tankers etc.,) in their confined and congested waters.

11. However, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defends the right of innocent passage and apart from the above there are no areas outside port authority jurisdiction where vessels must use the services of a pilot. We believe that this will continue for many years to come and therefore encourage shipmasters, owners and operators to voluntarily make use of deep sea pilots, as an appropriate risk control measure, in our waters.

12. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has, for many years, recognised the advantage of deep sea pilotage in congested and restricted waterways. At the Twelfth IMO General Assembly in 1981 the following Resolution A.486 (XII) was adopted: USE OF ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED DEEP SEA PILOTS IN THE NORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL & SKAGERRAK.

13. This Resolution: “Recommends Member Governments to encourage ships flying their flag to make use only of the services of deep sea pilots in possession of a deep sea pilot’s card in accordance with the Antwerp rules, and invites the Governments of the coastal states of the North Sea, the English Channel and the Skagerrak to provide information to IMO on how to secure the services of adequately qualified deep sea pilots. The Resolution contain two Annexes: giving Example of deep sea pilot’s card and a List of competent authorities in the littoral states of Northwest Europe.

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14. In recent years, the UK ADSPA, together with representatives of deep sea pilots and the UK Safety of Navigation Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, have worked to develop a revision of the IMO Resolution A.486(XII) described above. This work came to fruition in May 2012, when a revised draft Resolution A.486 “RECOMMENDATION ON THE USE OF ADEQUATELY QUALIFIED DEEP-SEA PILOTS IN THE NORTH SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL AND SKAGERRAK” was submitted to the IMO Maritime Safety Committee for consideration, as a joint submission by all 27 EU Member States.

15. The Baltic States have a similar IMO Resolution, (A.480) recommending using adequately qualified Deep Sea Pilots in the Baltic Sea, and agreed to revise their version at the same time and in the same way as the North Sea resolution.

16. These revised Resolutions made stronger the recommendation for shipmasters, owners and ship-operators to use qualified deep sea pilots, and added a new Annex 1 which listed: “Factors to be taken into account when considering the use of a Deep-Sea Pilot to enhance the effectiveness of the Bridge Team for the safety of navigation and the protection of the marine environment”.

17. This joint submission from the EU Member States (Res.A.486) and the Baltic (BPAC) members had been commented upon by: various interested parties, in a joint submission to the MSC (MSC/90/25/21), wherein those bodies and member states objected to the inclusion of Annex 1 in the revised resolution and requested that it be removed. They claimed that the “Factors to be taken into account when considering the use of a deep sea pilot” are subjective and cause them concern.

18. The UK Licensing Authorities provided the MCA delegation to IMO MSC with a written response to the objections raised, and circulated this response to Northwest European Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities (NEDSPA) and the Baltic Pilotage Authorities Commission, requesting their support in progressing the Revised Resolution A.486 without amendment or removal of Annex 1.

19. This Annex of the Revised A.486 and A.480 is seen as an important addition to the document; as it recommends a risk based approach to assessing whether to use a Deep Sea Pilot when transiting the English Channel, North Sea, Skagerrak, and Baltic Sea, and lists some of the factors to be considered when making this decision. We strongly recommended that it be retained in the revised Resolution.

20. The ADSPA considers it unfortunate that several IMO Members objected to its inclusion resulting in removal of the Annex.

21. These IMO Members and bodies were content to update the existing resolutions but they had strong arguments against the Annex. The major objection was their opinion that the Annex will increase costs for ship-owners and that this is a first step for implementing mandatory deep sea pilotage in the English Channel, North Sea and

4  

Baltic Sea. The IMO NAV Sub-Committee can update the existing resolutions (A.480 and A.486) but is not allowed to include the Annex.

22. The consideration of updating the Resolutions will not take place until IMO NAV 58 (2013). The Annex can not now be included or discussed.

23. It is essential that the risk to the safety of navigation is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). It is the view of the UK Deep Sea Pilotage Authorities that the use of licensed pilots by vessels transiting the English Channel, Dover Strait and the North Sea is one of the key control measures available in this regard without which the risk is not ALARP.

24. This important control measure can make a significant contribution to navigation safety and protection of the marine environment. We strongly recommend that shipmaster, owners and operators consider the use of a deep sea pilot as an additional risk mitigation measure.

25. Estimating that there are some 90 licensed deep sea pilots providing their services to many different vessels in the North Sea, English Channel and Skagerrak area, the number of vessels served by deep sea pilots are no more than 2,000 per annum, which is based on each pilot undertaking approximately 20 vessel acts per year.

26. Therefore the actual use of the deep sea pilotage service is very small compared with the estimated 80,000 vessels that transit the Dover Strait on an annual basis, meaning a high percentage of the remaining vessels are navigating in this area without a deep sea pilot and the identified risk control measure he provides.

27. It is, therefore, the strong recommendation of the UK Authorities for the licensing of Deep Sea Pilots that the UK Government take all necessary actions to promote and encourage the use of adequately qualified deep sea pilots by vessels in the congested and constrained waters around the UK, in order that safety of navigation and protection of the marine environment are better assured and that risk to life and property is better protected.

Signed on behalf of the Corporation’s of Trinity House in Hull, London and Newcastle and the Association of Deep Sea PIlotage Authorities of the United Kingdom (ADSPA)

September 2012

Written evidence from Dave Devey MNM (MP 07) 

 

My Background:‐ 

My name is Dave Devey  and I am a retired pilot for the Port Of Liverpool, aged 70. I have spent a lifetime in pilotage beginning in 1958 at the age of 16 as a cadet with The Blue Funnel Line and progressing through the various stages of apprenticeship on to gaining my first Pilot’s Licence at the age of 24 in 1966. I then spent over 40 years as a licenced/authorised pilot, retiring at the age of 65 in 2007 with an unblemished record. The last 10 years of my career was spent as the elected Senior Representative of Liverpool Pilots and I represented Pilots both nationally and in Europe as a committee member of the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots Association. I was awarded the Merchant Navy Medal in 2007 for services to UK and European Pilotage.  

Pilotage in the UK 

The fact that the Transport Select Committee have chosen to invite evidence on the current position of pilotage in the UK is a welcome step as it is a subject which indeed requires much airing following the many years of neglect at the hands of a number of the Competent Harbour Authorities set up following the 1987 Pilotage Act.  

We need to examine the reasons behind the 1987 Pilotage Act which offered employment to pilots and transferred the means by which they were remunerated into the hands of the Competent Harbour Authorities. The Act gave CHAs greater control over pilots and diminished their ability to act in an independent manner in issues involving safety. This change was brought about under the guise of “the need for a more unified and therefore better management of all port operatives under the single banner of The Competent Harbour Authority”. What it actually achieved,  in the cases of those who became employed, was to seriously devalue the  status  and therefore the remuneration of the pilots and to gag them from speaking out about any improprieties which  arise from day to day within the port operation. “Loyalty to the company that now paid their wages” was the new watchword. It should be noted that the revenue earned from pilotage comes from the shipowner and is a separate and distinct payment from the port charges that are made. Prior to 1987 this revenue went to the pilots themselves and the port authority took a commensurate share which paid for the costs of running the pilotage operation which included the building and maintenance of launches and the wages of pilot boat crews. Once harbour authorities took control of this money the pilots’ share diminished in proportion and the savings were absorbed into the general harbour accounts. 

 UK Pilots prior to 1987 were self employed and therefore able to retain their status as independent professional persons who, by reason of their independence, were able to uphold the safe practices of navigation, which are essential to every port operation, without the constraints of financial pressures which are frequently brought to bear on port authorities by their customers under the threat of “taking their custom elsewhere if non‐compliancy with their wishes”. The loss of this independence is a serious threat to the good governance of our port operations and needs to be addressed before the situation deteriorates any further. To underline this point I can best relate my personal experiences of what happened in my own port of Liverpool in the years following the introduction of the 1987 Act. In 1988 Liverpool Pilots elected to forego their self employed status and to join the CHA as employees of the Mersey Docks & Harbour Company.  What followed was 9 years of confrontation which was only relieved in 1997 when, by mutual agreement, the pilots reverted to their previous position of one of self employment. Since that day the relationship between the pilots and the harbour authority has steadily improved  and all issues relating to pilotage and port safety are discussed and resolved following regular meetings. Liverpool Pilots are  now  recognised as one of the UK’s foremost bodies in the pursuit of safe practices in pilotage. This should be the way forward for all CHAs who currently employ their pilots. 

What Does A Pilot  Do? 

The public’s perception of a pilot can vary from one of a level of no knowledge of his very existence to one of “He’s a man who helps the captain to bring his ship in and out of port” This is usually followed by “I think he drives the tug boat that pulls the ship” or “He goes out in a little boat and leads the ship in to/out of port”. Only those people who have experienced a trip on a cruise liner will be aware that he comes on board and goes up to the bridge and even the majority of those people think that he is there just to help the captain to dock his ship. The reality is a sea mile away from this perception and is at the heart of why the pilotage profession is currently being dumbed down by a number of the CHAs. 

This public perception of what a pilot does has been supported and encouraged by civil servants who have been persuaded of the belief that a pilot is merely an adviser and that the master of the vessel is in control of all aspects of his vessel’s operation which includes navigation  in compulsory  pilotage waters. The perception currently being promulgated is that the pilot stands to one side of the master and that he advises him should he believe that he may be doing something wrong. What  happens in reality is that the master of the vessel, because he is obliged  to by law, hands over the charge of the navigation to the pilot, barring certain stipulated exceptions (Royal Naval vessels 

etc). He duly does this following a briefing based on the pilot’s passage plan which has already been formulated by the pilot prior to boarding, drawing on his unique knowledge of the tidal situation and the quirks of wind and current that may subsequently affect the passage of the vessel in his charge up until it reaches the safety of its final berthing place. 

The erroneous perception that the pilot is merely an adviser has been fostered by those who seek to diminish the true responsibilities of the pilot’s position and therefore his status. This misconception has led to the current downgrading of the UK pilot’s status in employment and a reduction in his  resulting entitlement  to a proper remuneration under the 1987 Act. 

What the general public does not know, and that includes the government, is that the pilot has a very difficult and complex job. He must be both mentally and physically fit in order to deal with the many problems he will encounter in his daily task of safely navigating the vessels in his charge. He alone has to make on the spot decisions involving millions of pounds of equipment and most of all the lives of those people both on board his ship and those on other vessels which he will pass at close quarters. One mistake on his part can lead to a catastrophic situation whereby multi‐million pounds of pollution and loss of life is the end result. One of the reasons why he needs to be physically fit is that he is frequently required to journey out to the boarding point via a small launch in all weather conditions both day and night before he has to negotiate a climb up a rope ladder which can be as much as 10 metres in height. When this is done in bad weather (of which the UK gets its fair share) and at night it can be extremely dangerous as the vessel can be rolling or pitching with the effect of the sea. Making the right judgement as to when to make the jump from launch to ladder can be the difference between a safe ascent or ending up in the water. Even more difficult to judge is the descent from a vessel on to the safety of the deck of the launch.   

The pilot, on safely boarding the vessel then has to ascend numerous decks in order to arrive at his place of work i.e. the ship’s bridge. My own experience has been that few of the larger vessels are equipped with lifts and the ascent has to be made by staircase. I encountered 99 steps on one particular vessel. Now the pilot has arrived on the bridge he is met by the master who is usually extremely pleased to see the man who is subsequently going to relieve him of his apprehensions about how his vessel is going to safely negotiate this passage. An exchange of passage plans thus takes place – if indeed the master is fully aware of what is about to happen to his vessel. The pilot will then direct the passage of the vessel both in its speed and direction employing, if felt needed, tugs for the final part of the berthing, directing the tugs as to how they tow the vessel 

with the use of a hand held radio. This operation requires a high degree of concentration in controlling the engine movements to govern the speed of the vessel, the giving of orders to the helmsman as to the direction of the vessel and instructions to the tugs as how they assist the berthing. The pilot is also communicating with the shore by radio indicating which lines are required for the final mooring position. 

 All this is a sea mile away from the pilot being an adviser.  

Comments 

Relaxing the rules on the granting of Pilotage Exemption Certificates should be viewed with extreme caution and issues of safety should be paramount in any final decisions. 

Pilots should have a greater say in the affairs governing their profession and should not be relegated to just another department of the CHA where frequently they have been left to wither on the vine. 

The UK Government should publicly recognise the importance of pilots and support them in their daily role of protecting the UK shores from pollution and the loss of life. 

(Please see the dvd  “A Day In The Life Of A Liverpool Pilot” ) 

Post Script 

I apologise for exceeding the number of pages recommended but I would have liked to have written a lot more and have condensed my evidence as best I can.    

September 2012 

Written evidence from John H Bryant BA MNI ( Retired Trinity House and Port of London Authority pilot) (MP 08)

The following issues are the most significant for marine pilotage in 2012 and beyond.

1) Recruitment ( Recruitment of marine pilots, difficulties and suggestions for the future.)

2) Maintaining standards ( The effect of technology on training and safety)

3) Vessel Traffic Services ( Misunderstandings about the role of a VTS)

4) The legal position. (The legal position of pilotage and VTS ) 1) Recruitment Traditionally in UK and Europe pilots are recruited from the pool of experienced seafarers available in each region. In the main, pilots in major UK and European ports are qualified to command all classes and sizes of ships and many have command experience. This qualification (Master Mariner) takes some 10 years to obtain and requires a degree level education. In many cases a master Mariner will also hold a degree in Nautical Science. Before becoming a marine pilot it is likely that he or she will have about another 5 years experience of watchkeeping and will the take 4 years to qualify as a First Class Pilot in a major port. A total of 19 years. Thirty or more years ago this level of experience and education was common among seafarers in UK; this is no longer the case. The training and experience is difficult and onerous to obtain and more lucrative opportunities are available. Pilots are for the most part reasonably well paid as you would expect after 20 years of training and experience, however remuneration now is proportionately considerably less than 30 years ago. Pilotage is no longer considered an enviable occupation by seafarers. As an example a cruise ship master can expect to earn over £100,000 pa tax free working 6 months of the year whereas a pilot will likely earn £70,000 pa taxable and have about 30 days annual leave. A pilot with a masters certificate is certainly capable of becoming a cruise ship master and not surprisingly many do. The solution is to offer marine pilots a career in port management. Many will prefer to stay working as pilots but others will take the opportunity to progress and the port industry will benefit enormously. When pilots are recruited they should be offered a career path from pilot to Chief Executive if that is what they want and they are suitable. This may mean that harbour masters may need to be pilots before they progress to harbour master but this is a progressive step and the port industry will benefit from more experienced and more confident harbour masters. Of course this progression happens now but it is not encouraged. 2) Maintaining Standards. Pilotage skills have changed in the last 50 years, mainly because of the continual advances in technology: radar, gps, ais, vts, towage and communications. It is easy to assume that these advances have brought more safety to the industry, resulting in fewer collisions and groundings. This is not the case. Unfortunately Pilotage skills have not improved despite the increase in technology. Pilotage is essentially the ability of a pilot to use his local knowledge together with his experience in shiphandling to bring a ship safely to her berth even when working within very fine tolerances. The tolerances have undoubtedly been reduced over the last several decades but shiphandling skills have not improved. It is likely that increased use of technology while bringing some benefits will not outweigh the decline in shiphandling skills. The use of technology in shiphandling seems to have the effect of making people believe that the natural elements (wind and tide) can be “over powered” by the brute force of ever more powerful tugs and machinery.

This is a dangerous misunderstanding and is now being taught in shiphandling and towage simulators everywhere. Pilots are best trained by learning with other pilots. This has always been the case and any attempt to reduce this practical training should be restrained. We can think of many other industries which have more recently learned the benefits of this way of training. In the future it may be necessary to review the recruitment of pilots because traditional sources of manpower may disappear. However it would be foolish to think you can take graduates and make them into pilots with just a few years training. The consequences of this lack of experience might be very expensive. I suggest the solution is for the port industry and self employed pilots to work together to devise a training scheme with sponsored training at sea, in port and in towage together with graduate entry standards. I suggest that a pilotage appointment should not be made until the trainee is 30 years of age. Such schemes have existed in the past and have succeeded in South Africa and the UK. 3) Vessel Traffic Services Vessel Traffic Services have come to play an important part in UK and European ports over the last 30 or more years. VTS cannot replace pilotage. Many uninformed and inexperienced people in the port and shipping industries fail to understand this point. VTS provides services to ships transiting a port area, it provides up to date navigational information, though with today’s technology there is no reason why this information should not be transmitted directly to the ship in data form rather than using telecommunications. For many years there has been a rather cynical campaign to make people believe pilotage can be done from the shore in a VTS. Of course this is an attractive proposition given the expense of providing a pilot and the opportunities available for a VTS to charge for this service. The two services are separate and distinct, both operationally and legally. A pilot provides services to the master of the ship and is employed by the master when engaged in piloting. His duty is to the ship. A VTS is not employed by the ship or the master and a VTS has a duty to the port. A VTS may have a duty to the ship in the sense that it is not to give false information but that is all.

4) The Legal position The legal position of a pilot is clearly stated in law. Briefly, a pilot is someone who has the conduct of the ship but is not a member of the crew. His duty therefore is to the ship. A pilot can be criminally indicted for failure to enact this duty to a good standard. There is no shortage of Case Law with regard to pilotage. The legal position of a VTS is unclear and to my knowledge has never been tested in Court. There have been many cases of a VTS being involved in groundings and collisions, either by giving false information or by becoming involved in the decision making on board. To my knowledge these cases have never involved the Courts and in many cases the involvement of the VTS has been obscured. Worldwide, these incidents have not necessarily occurred in port limits, the Singapore Straits are a particularly contentious area at the moment. VTS has grown from the signal stations of the 19th and 20th Century and now has ambitions to control shipping , this is a dangerous development and either the law must catch up or VTS must be told to be less ambitious. September 2012

Written evidence from David Snelson CB FNI (MP 09) This input to the Transport Select Committee enquiry on marine pilotage is written as a short introduction to the subject from a personal perspective. It is deliberately neutral regarding some of the issues raised by the draft Marine Navigation Bill in order to give an unbiased straightforward overview of some of the issues surrounding the subject. My credentials in term of pilotage are as follows: - Commanded 3 ships in the Royal Navy using pilotage services in UK and overseas ports and a holder of Pilotage Exemption Certificates in UK dockyard ports - 5 years as Chief Harbour Master of the Port of London from 2006 to 2011 responsible for marine safety at Board level including the management of a pilotage service comprising 85 to 90 Pilots - Currently Non Executive Director of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and of the Port of Milford Haven. The remarks are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent the views of my current employers. The need for Pilotage The need for Pilotage in the era of precise satellite navigation is often questioned by those outside the marine industry. Why, it is sometimes asked, should a ship need piloting into port when airliners manage to land safely at airports all round the world without an extra pilot somehow being placed in the cockpit? There are a number of factors that create this state of affairs. There are differences between airliners and ships. Ships move slowly relative to the wind and water currents in which they navigate, making them much more subjected to external forces than an airliner which moves quickly relative to the single external force, the wind, to which it is subject. Ports and Harbours by their very nature are complex, often with winding channels, shallow water, and complex traffic patterns which cannot be subject to standardisation like an airport runway. Airline crews enjoy high levels of automation and precise navigation support within the cockpit and from air traffic control (ATC) services while the equipment in ships varies enormously and vessel traffic services (the marine equivalent of ATC) are less well established and patchy in coverage. However there is another very significant factor and this is one of international shipping regulation and standards. The airline industry is highly regulated and with a few notable exceptions in developing countries, implements high standards of training, qualification and certification. This gives rise to almost universally high standards in the cockpit making planes capable, with ATC support, of navigating to and landing at almost all airports. In contrast, the international marine industry, regulated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is much less closely regulated than the airline industry. While the IMO sets the overall standards for such issues as the fitting of bridge equipment and the standards and training for the certification of watch keepers, the detailed implementation of these issues is delegated to individual countries known as 'Flag States'. This produces widely variable standards as evidenced by the existence of so called 'Flags of Convenience' whereby ship owners, in what is a highly competitive market, make savings by flagging their ships in an administration which is perhaps less rigorous and thus makes for cheaper compliance. There is one other factor in this comparison between marine and airline industries and that is passenger safety. Airlines by their very nature carry predominately one type of cargo - passengers. To let standards lapse and accidents occur would destroy customer

confidence. In contrast ships carry every conceivable cargo where price rather than safety is often the dominating factor. By way of illustration of these points it is instructive that the marine world pays very close attention to something called the 'Paris MOU list' which is a de facto league table of standards in world shipping operating in the European area. Ships are allocated to one of 3 lists, white, grey or black, depending on the number of port state control detentions and other factors in a ship and it's owner's recent history. The very fact that there is such a list, which is constantly updated, serves to illustrate the very real variability in standards. Port responsibilities for marine safety UK ports responsibilities for safety, while to some extent governed by statute, are predominately governed by a voluntary code called the 'Port Marine Safety Code'. This requires ports to assess the risks associated with safe navigation in its jurisdiction and apply mitigation measures. Given the background of widely varying standards in the international marine industry and the particular nature of their port, which may be complex, most ports will elect to put their own navigational expert on the bridge of a ship - a pilot - to ensure that the Master of the ship has the best possible expertise to hand to bring the ship safely into (or out of) that port. Ports apply all sorts of other risk mitigation measures including detailed and comprehensive charts, routing advice, a vessel traffic service, the installation of channel marking buoys and other measures. Pilotage is but part, though a very important part, of this support mechanism and it's primacy in a port's risk mitigation measures will depend very much on the circumstances of the port. In statutory terms pilotage in UK ports is governed by the 1987 Pilotage Act which was enacted when pilotage was devolved from a central regulatory body, Trinity House, to individual ports. Ports entitled to require ships to take pilots are known as 'Competent Harbour Authorities' and have a duty to train and licence their pilots for the local area of the port. The pilots, under the Act have the unusual freedom to decide for themselves, by ballot, as to whether they should be self employed or employees of the port. Unsurprisingly, most ports will require their pilots to be qualified masters and to have held command at sea. While this is an obvious starting point for the qualification of pilot it also reduces the costs of recruitment and training for the port as they do not have to expend resource in getting a prospective pilot to the stage at which he or she can be trained to be a pilot. Given the reducing number of UK and EU seafarers, this situation may well change in years to come and ports will need to train pilots from other backgrounds. It is to this end that quite a lot of work has been on done on National Occupational Skills for pilots though there is as yet no national system to 'grow' pilots from other occupations or sectors of the marine world. Nature of a Pilots job Pilots are often criticised for apparently working within relatively easy shift systems and, given their limit of liability enshrined in the 1987 pilotage act, having significant responsibility and little accountability. However it is also important to recognise the challenges a pilot faces. In most ports it is not possible to work a simple daylight hours roster system. Shipping is generally a 24/7 activity. The timings of entry and exit from ports are often governed by tides which are themselves driven by the moon and not the sun - i.e. not contiguous with normal working hours. Add to this a fairly long pilotage 'act', which in some ports can be as long as 8 to 9 hours, when the time taken to get to the offshore pilot boarding station is taken into account and fatigue management becomes a real issue with which roster systems need to cope.

A pilot is also faced with many challenging situations; poor weather, ships of widely varying standards and manoeuvring characteristics and bridge teams, which by my own observation, are often too ready to delegate almost all the navigation responsibility onto the pilot and not support him or her in bringing the ship safely into port. However, some Pilots are criticised for exploiting their pivotal position in ports to resist changes to working practices and acceptance of more realistic pay and pensions. Pilots, as highly qualified seafarers, operate in an international market and are able to demand remuneration accordingly. Many guard their position jealously, particularly amongst the generation of Pilots in their 50s and 60s who were trained under the UK flag and then suffered an erosion to their working conditions as the UK shipping industry suffered contraction in the 1970s to 1990s. The very nature of a pilot's job, as a de facto lone worker, makes them less accessible to ports management and thus perhaps requiring closer engagement and leadership. There is also a cultural issue among pilots of being the 'servant of the shipowner' when conducting pilotage and not the servant of the port which pays their wages. This status is enshrined in case law, most recently in the 'Cavendish ruling' by the then Mr Justice Clarke. National regulation - or not? There are, from time to time, calls for a more rigorous system of national regulation to be introduced for pilots in oder to address a perception of variable standards between ports and thus a risk of financial loss for shipowners and cargo owners. Whether or not to regulate more closely is essentially a matter of judgement. At present ports are almost entirely responsible for professional standards under the 1987 pilotage act and the Port Marine Safety Code. However it is very much in the interests of ports to ensure the standards of their pilots is high because, although their liability is limited, they will be keen to avoid a poor reputation and thus a loss of income. Current government policy is to avoid over regulation and allow industry to get on with the job. Unless there is evidence of poor pilotage standards leading to a significant number of incidents, there is no overwhelming case for government to expend extra resource on pilotage regulation. An examination of the statistics arising from investigations by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch involving pilots would be useful in this regard. For the most part the conclusions of recent incidents involving pilots have focussed on the lack of bridge team support for the pilot making him or her a single point of failure. As a result a number of ports have introduced 'Bridge Resource Management' courses for their pilots to help improve bridge team performance Pilotage Exemption Certificates A contentious issue for ports, pilots and shipowners is that of pilotage exemption certificates (PEC). Most ports have a PEC regime whereby the Masters and Mates of ships frequently trading in and out of a port can be granted an exemption certificate based on their knowledge of the port. The requirement that only a Master or Mate can be granted a PEC is contained in the 1987 Pilotage act and is designed to underpin standards for safety in navigating in and out of ports. PECs are usually only granted by ports following a set number of entries and exits into the port and after an examination to a similar standard to that the port requires for its Pilots. For the ports it is in their interest to grant PECs as it reduces the cost of Pilotage and is thus less of a financial burden on trade in and out of the port. However, for many ships trading over relatively short distances the concept of a single Master and single Mate is outdated. Cross channel ferries, dredgers and other ships

operating in similar circumstances will often have more than one Master and Mate in order to sustain virtual round the clock operations. In these circumstances limiting the award of a PEC to a 'bona fide' Master or Mate is no hardship on the shipping company as both Masters and Mates onboard the ship will qualify. However for ships trading slightly further afield but making frequent port entries in, say northern european ports relatively close together, the single Master (and Mate) are often subject to high levels of fatigue. Thus to be able to use a more junior watch keeper to take the ship into port would be an advantage for the shipowner and the senior bridge team. However, given that junior officers are not trained to the same standard as Masters and Mates and are likely to have less experience, there is a risk that even if they passed the PEC tests they would be less well equipped to deal with unforeseen circumstances and emergencies. Both ports and their pilots are likely to be resistant to a change which would allow more junior members of ships crew to be examined for PECs; ports because of the possible risk to standards and thus safety and pilots for similar reasons and a perceived undermining of their profession. Whether to relax the standards for PECs is a finely judged issue. In theory, if ports set and maintain absolute standards and monitor performance closely, safety should not be compromised. But in a ports industry that is so widely disparate, in the absence of national regulation, arguably a de facto reduction in safety standards would creep in. It is also likely that if the 1987 pilotage act requirement for only 'bona fide' Masters or Mates to be granted PECs was relaxed then shipping companies would embark their own PEC holders prior to entry into port, effectively setting up a separate pilotage service, which would in all likelihood over time be less rigorous than that run by the port concerned. Conclusions Marine pilotage is likely to be required for many years to come despite the improvements in navigation technology. Pilotage is a highly skilled occupation. Pilotage is an important part of port's safety management systems. Pilots guard carefully their professional and remuneration status. National regulation of pilotage standards would only be justified if evidence from accident statistics demonstrated such a need. Broadening the eligibility for Pilot Exemption Certificates would be useful in some circumstances but runs the risk of undermining standards. Some of the provisions of the 1987 Pilotage Act are outdated September 2012

Written evidence from Stephen Chapman (MP 10)   I would first of all like to state that there are many issues affecting marine pilotage and the remit given is too vague. I could say that the UK having a mixture of private ports and trust port affects pilotage; the draft of the ship could affect pilotage. But I believe you are looking to the future of pilotage in the UK. I can see two major issues that affect pilotage and will continue to do so   

1. The standard of ships crews   The implementation of STCW was meant to raise the levels of training and the standards of ships crews. As a serving pilot I see many crews, who have all the right certificates and bits of paper but are still well below standard. I cannot see this altering in the foreseeable future as ship owners push for the cheapest crewing options available on the world market. This fact means that the UK government should continue to support all UK ports to provide a well trained pilot service. 

  This leads to my next point.  

2. Where are the new pilots coming from?  Traditionally pilots have been recruited from the Merchant Navy since the demise of some pilot services to have an apprentice scheme. That option has been reducing for many years; the British Merchant Navy is practically nonexistent. If the Government and Port Authorities method of dealing with this problem is to look at foreign nationals as the new UK pilots, then enough said as far as I am concerned. I will not be party to training such replacements when there are enough young talented persons in the UK. In my view what is required is a national ports qualification which could lead to pilotage/VTS/Harbourmaster as dictated by the candidate’s skills and preference. The Port of London and I understand ABP Humber has started this in a style of training, but more needs to be done. I am not sure of the average age of UK pilots but it would not surprise me to be over 50 years , with a large group of pilots all due to retire at the same time . So something needs to be done in the near future to fill the void left . 

 September 2012  

   

Written evidence from Nautilus International (MP 11)

1. Nautilus International is the trade union and professional organisation representing some 23,000 ship masters, officers, officer trainees and other professional staff working in the maritime sector, at sea and ashore, including marine pilots, harbour maters and vessel traffic services staff.

2. As previous Transport Committee inquiries have highlighted, Britain remains a nation

extremely dependent upon the sea, with around 95% of its international freight movements by tonnage moving through the country’s ports each year. Around 70 million passengers also pass through UK ports annually on domestic and international voyages. Recent decades have seen significant increases in both the volume of shipping movements and in the size of ships using UK ports. A safe and effective pilotage service for all ports in the UK is therefore essential for the prosperity and wellbeing of the nation.

3. Nautilus International’s concerns focus upon the need for a continued high standard of

pilotage throughout the UK — in both major ports and small ports and harbours, including isolated wharves and terminals.

4. Nautilus views with concern the potential for the downgrading of the UK’s pilotage

services through unnecessary and unwarranted competition. Competition can be either constructive or destructive, but with the ever-increasing pressure to reduce pilotage costs (which, incidentally, are a minor part of ship operation) there is the potential for unfair competition to prevail, so reducing the standards of marine pilotage of which this country to date has been justly proud.

5. The risks that are created by reducing standards of pilotage not only threaten the

safety of seafarers and ships, but also the travelling public and to marine environment — with the potential for substantial environmental and economic damage on a local or even a regional scale.

6. It is therefore essential that pilotage services are independent and free from

unnecessary interference by destructive port management regimes. In order to ensure this, it is essential for the regulatory authorities — the Maritime & Coastguard Agency or, in its absence, an alternative such as Trinity House to oversee the integrity and the standards of services in the UK.

7. However, in recent years we have witnessed the fragmentation of standards of control of

pilotage in the UK, despite the robust defence by Nautilus and the UK Marine Pilots Association. Nautilus has previously identified, for example, the way in which the Sea Empress disaster of 1996 demonstrated many profound problems affecting safety in port areas — many of which could be linked to the deregulatory pressures of the 1980s.

8. The pilot plays an important role in providing advice to the master of a vessel with

respect to the safe conduct of navigation, assisting with the safe passage of ships that may be carrying high-risk cargoes in environmentally sensitive areas. This role should not be under-estimated and is of particular importance given the increased number of ship masters who are not EU nationals and are therefore unfamiliar with our waters or may have limited English language capabilities.

9. It is also important to note that in addition to the vital role exercised by harbour and

river pilots, deepsea pilots in the English Channel and the North Sea help to ensure the safe navigation of shipping in some of the world’s busiest and most congested shipping lanes. The benefits of having a deepsea pilot onboard include reduced crew stress and fatigue, local knowledge and familiarity with reporting requirements. However, because deepsea pilotage is not compulsory in the Channel many owners choose not to use it.

10. It should also be noted that vessel traffic services (VTS) are of critical importance in supporting the work undertaken by harbour and river pilots. Nautilus considers it

incredulous that it is left to ports to decide on the type of VTS that they deploy — which can vary between an ‘advice-only’ information service, a navigational assistance service and a full traffic organisation service. The freedom given to statutory harbour authorities in determining which category VTS to implement affords the opportunity of unfair competition through the provision of lower standards of service. The UK is almost unique in western Europe in having major ports that utilise the lowest grade of VTS — something which has been alluded to, albeit indirectly, in Marine Accident Investigation Branch casualty reports.

11. Of particular concern to Nautilus is the issuance of pilotage exemption certificates (PECs). Nautilus recognises the need for PECs, particularly within the ferry trades, and accepts their issuance to bona fide masters and first mates of ferries operating on scheduled services. However, there is evidence of the misuse of PECs and concerns centre upon the issuance to small vessels with limited crew complements operating intensively in coastal trades, in some cases with hazardous cargoes. The current provisions of the international STCW Convention/Code permit for a working week of 98 hours (for a maximum of two consecutive weeks before a reversion to a maximum of 91 hours) and the ILO Convention 180 (due to be replaced next year by the Maritime Labour Convention 2006) permits a working week of up to 91 hours. In such circumstances, ship masters, officers and crew suffer from unacceptable levels of tiredness — as recently demonstrated by the EU-funded Project Horizon research. It is therefore essential, where the necessary support structures for the safe navigation of the ship are inadequate, that a marine pilot is engaged to support the master at the most critical stage of the vessel’s voyage. Nautilus believes there is considerable evidence to show that the issue of PECs should be restricted to vessels that operate on regular trades and where it can be demonstrated that there is adequate manning to conduct safe pilotage. There is an associated need for a more effective regime to govern the issue of PECs and improved controls against their misuse.

12. Nautilus has consistently raised concerns over the current non-mandatory nature of the Port Marine Safety Code. The existing arrangements rely upon the goodwill of the ports — neglecting or failing to appreciate the competitive nature of the industry and the resulting tendency to reduce costs, with subsequent and substantial reductions in levels of safety and no apparent means of intervention. The lack of statutory sanction has permitted some ports to operate unsafely, competitively disadvantaging those that maintain high standards. There is continuing evidence that a significant proportion of the foreign ships visiting UK ports are unsafe (around 3% have to be detained as unseaworthy) and it is wrong that the UK is effectively abrogating its responsibilities for ensuring a uniform standard of safety in its ports. We have seen in other sectors of the industry the eventual consequence of what is initially considered beneficial — the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation — with substantial long-term costs and economic loss.

13. Nautilus remains extremely concerned about the future supply of skilled and

experienced UK seafarers to fill safety-critical posts such as marine pilots, harbour masters and VTS. Despite increased training following the introduction of the tonnage tax regime in 2000, the annual officer trainee intake remains well below the level acknowledged as necessary to meet future seagoing and shore-based demand and the government’s own figures show that the pool of UK seafarers will, on current trends, decline by around 35% over the next two decades. For this reason, it is essential that the government not only continues to retain its Support for Maritime Training scheme, but also expands it in order to ensure an adequate flow of personnel with the necessary maritime skills. This would avoid the need for the importation of labour to the detriment of the UK employment market.

September 2012

Evidence from the Department for Transport (MP 12)

Summary

The Government:

seeks to promote a successful and sustainable maritime sector, with a ports sector empowered to meet its customers’ needs;

recognises the key role marine pilots play in the safe and efficient operation of port facilities, and their personal contribution to the economic activity and future prosperity of the UK;

believes that the local knowledge and experience of port operators makes them uniquely well-placed to decide the pilotage provision and other operational requirements appropriate to their facilities;

compliments the ports industry on its endeavours to improve port safety and pilotage standards over recent years, especially through its Ports Skills and Safety organisation; and

anticipates continuing to work with the industry on further joint projects, such as the recent production of port accident statistics and the updating and reissue of the Port Marine Safety Code.

Introduction

1. The Government welcomes the opportunity to outline its approach to UK marine pilotage and, more widely, the safe operation of ports.

2. Statutory Harbour Authorities have legal duties relating to the safety of people who use their harbours and their property, and to the wellbeing of the port environment and community. Safe port operations are governed not only by maritime legislation (such as the Harbours Act 1964 and Merchant Shipping Act 1995), but also by general legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

3. It is over twenty years since the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme. The Scheme imposed restrictive practices that meant the UK ports industry was competitively disadvantaged compared to the ports of our neighbouring countries.

4. After a period of consolidation, the UK ports industry underwent a renaissance and today it effectively and efficiently facilitates our import and export trade; it is critical to the economic wellbeing of this country and its citizens. This has been achieved through the deregulation of the marketplace, and the achievement of equilibrium between Government legislation and free market activity. This approach underlies the National Policy Statement for Ports, published by the Department for Transport earlier this year.1

1 assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/national-policy-statement-for-ports/national-policy-statement-ports.pdf

5. Therefore, the Department believes that the ports industry should remain responsible for the safe operations of its facilities and for negotiating the pay and conditions of marine pilots at local level without central Government intervention. The Department further recognises that the insurance market helps to ensure that operational risks are minimised at ports.

6. It is appropriate, however, that the Department should seek to assist the ports industry in raising awareness and promoting the adoption of best operational practices through collaborative working. The Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) initiative is a prime example of this approach; it promotes safe working practices and provides clear guidance on harbour authorities’ duties and powers in a practical way that is responsive to change, recognises local variation, and enjoys the industry’s confidence.

Pilotage

7. Marine pilots are employed to guide ships through dangerous or congested waters, using their local knowledge and skills to ensure safe passage. Depending on the size, geography, tides and many other variables affecting a port, the responsible Competent Harbour Authority (CHA) may require certain vessels to employ pilots.

8. The Pilotage Act 1987 (“the 1987 Act”) regulates UK pilotage, and in common with most port safety legislation puts the onus of responsibility for pilotage on the individual harbour authorities. This deregulatory Act, which updated the Pilotage Act 1913, sought to address the over-supply of qualified and expensive pilots employed at UK ports.

9. The 1987 Act governs the pilotage activities of CHAs. It empowers CHAs to determine whether marine pilotage services need to be provided, to what degree, what charges may be levied for the service and whether, in the interests of safety, pilotage should be compulsory. Harbour Revision Orders, made by the Secretary of State for Transport using powers in the Harbours Act 1964, describe and empower operations.

10. Under section 3 of the 1987 Act, the management of pilotage arrangements is a matter for the CHA, which has discretion for determining the qualifications required by those persons applying to be pilots. The authority may establish qualifications in respect of, inter alia, age, physical fitness, time of service, local knowledge, skill and character.

11. Many harbour authorities will only authorise pilots to handle larger vessels after they have completed a specified number of trips and spent several years piloting smaller vessels, or acting as an assistant pilot. These pilotage authorisations may be limited to ships of a particular description and to particular parts of the harbour.

12. CHAs may suspend or revoke an authorisation if it appears to the authority that the pilot is guilty of any incompetence or misconduct or has ceased to have the required qualifications. An authorisation may also be suspended or revoked after the termination of any contract or other arrangement upon which

the pilot provides his services, critical to ensure the commercial viability of some port operations.

13. CHAs provide the pilotage services they consider necessary. Their duty is not discharged simply by authorising one or more pilots; it includes the management of the service, ensuring that the person assigned as the pilot for each vessel is fit and appropriately qualified for that task.

14. Sections 8 and 15 of the 1987 Act provide powers for CHAs to issue Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PECs). These may be used to exempt the bona fide Master or First Mate of a vessel from the requirement to take an authorised pilot if the CHA is satisfied that they have the knowledge and ability to guide a ship through the harbour waters safely.

15. In practice, a large proportion of commercial shipping movements, especially ferries, are conducted by PEC holding senior officers. These senior officers are highly trained and experienced. PECs are valid for one year from the date of issue, and their renewals depend upon CHAs being satisfied with the conduct of the holder. CHAs may suspend or revoke a PEC if the holder has been guilty of incompetence or misconduct.

16. The Department does not have a statutory responsibility under the 1987 Act to police CHAs in relation to pilotage. It would not be appropriate for the Department to intervene in pay, conditions or working practices issues that were the focus of dispute between a harbour authority and its pilots.

PMSC

17. The PMSC and its accompanying Guide to Good Practice is a joint initiative between the Department and the ports and shipping industry to promulgate safe practices at maritime facilities.2 The Department drafted both documents in conjunction with industry and is currently updating the PMSC for re-issue at the end of the year. The Code and Guide also detail the statutory obligations that exist under existing legislation relating to the safe operations of ports. Chapter 5 of the PMSC refers to the main powers and duties that CHAs have under the 1987 Act; these are further detailed in section 8 of the Guide.

18. The PMSC steering group, comprising members from ports, unions, other industry bodies and government, considers trends in safety and the need for information updates to the Code and Guide.

19. Those who are directly accountable for safe marine operations in their facilities are the PMSC’s target audience. In most harbour authorities, their board members are individually and collectively responsible for adhering to the Code.

20. The Code provides guidance on policies, procedures and the performance of harbour authorities, and describes the role of board members, officers and key personnel in relation to safety of navigation; summarising the main statutory duties and powers of harbour authorities. The Department expects harbour

2 www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mcga07-home/shipsandcargoes/mcga-shipsregsandguidance/navigation/dms-nav-pmsc-gtgp.htm

authorities to adhere to the standards applicable to the facility type and to develop an effective marine safety management system based on formal risk assessment.

21. The varied nature of maritime facilities (including location, tides, approaches, cargo types and vessel calling patterns) introduces a myriad of operational environments that make a single detailed legislative framework for safety within the industry difficult. The more flexible and responsive non-mandated PMSC is an effective and desirable alternative.

22. The ports industry is dynamic and constantly changing, ready to adopt operational innovations and new technologies when proven to be safe. The non-mandated nature of the Code facilitates a flexible, collaborative nature to its development, far removed from the rigid and potentially over-cautious legislative approach. Consequently, the PMSC can reflect rapidly new best practice in terms of port operations, allowing speedy promulgation to interested parties. Conversely, if the Code were to be mandated, it could take much longer to recognise the benefits of revised practices formally.

23. Separately, if a harbour authority is found liable for a serious accident or incident on its premises, there already exists extensive legislation such as the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 that can be invoked.

24. Should specific legislation be required at port operational level, harbour authorities often have the powers to make byelaws. These byelaws empower authorities to regulate activities, including the speed of all vessels, reflecting local circumstances and enabling the conduct of business efficiently and safely.

25. Moreover, the insurance market helps to ensure that operational risks are minimised at ports through the types and requirements of the premiums and risk coverage they provide. Where risk is least, premiums are lowest, providing a virtuous circle that favours improved safety.

26. Both private industry and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) undertake PMSC 'health checks', designed specifically to help ports adhere to the Code. The MCA aims to undertake four such health checks each year. Each health check costs £8,500 to carry out, but the MCA does not charge for this service.

27. The MCA recently undertook a PMSC health check at Grimsby, part of which looked into pilotage on the Humber. It concluded that the pilotage authority, Humber Estuary Services, adhered to the PMSC and the report highlighted the industry best practices found in the Humber Pilot Handbook (October 2011).

28. While the PMSC health check is undoubtedly a useful exercise, if the PMSC were to be mandated the MCA has estimated that it would have to undertake up to 200 such visits in the first year at a cost to the taxpayer of £1,700,000. Subsequently, the Code would require inspection of all commercial ports on a three yearly cycle at a cost of £570,000 per annum. This cost may be viewed

as excessive, especially at some smaller ports with low financial turnovers, particularly as there is no direct evidence to suggest ports are not adhering to the PMSC. The MCA could in theory charge for their services, but this would impose a financial burden on industry, and the commercial sector can already provide the health checks where required.

Proposed new pilotage legislation

29. In May 2008, the Department published a Draft Marine Navigation Bill (“the 2008 draft Bill”) for pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation among interested parties.3 It included three clauses relating to PECs, the first of which is consistent with the Government’s wider deregulatory agenda, while the others improve aspects of the PEC process. The three clauses were:

Granting a PEC – to enable a CHA to grant a PEC to any bona fide crew-member who meets their requirements as to skill, experience and local knowledge (instead of only the master or first mate, to which they are restricted currently).

Pilotage Notification – to ensure that the master of a ship notifies the harbour authority of which PEC holder is acting as pilot before the ship is navigated in an area for which a pilotage direction is in force.

PEC suspension and revocation – to enable a PEC to be suspended or revoked immediately where an incident has taken place that raises doubts about the PEC holder’s capacity to act as a pilot of a vessel, or where there have been incidents of misbehaviour by the holder.

30. The Department wishes to promote a package of measures on PECs that balance the desire to increase flexibility about who may be issued with a PEC, reflecting modern shipping practices, with appropriate safeguards that ensure cases of incompetence or misconduct can be responded to quickly, protecting the safety of shipping in CHA areas.

31. The changes would assist shipping companies in ensuring that properly qualified personnel are available to pilot ships.

32. At the same time, CHAs would receive the necessary powers to suspend or revoke a PEC immediately in cases of incompetence or misconduct relating to the capability of the holder to pilot the ship. The current situation leaves the PEC holder free to pilot ships during the PEC suspension or removal procedure, to give him a reasonable opportunity to appeal. To ameliorate the effect of this change, CHAs would have discretion to make compensation payments where it was found that the statutory notice was issued in circumstances where the CHA subsequently accepted that it was not appropriate to do so. Some may already have this power in their constitutions but the measure will ensure consistent coverage.

33. Consequent on the changes proposed, the existing offence of misusing a PEC would be amended such that when the master of a ship reported to a CHA that a PEC was being used, the identity of the PEC holder undertaking the

3 www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7370/7370.pdf

pilotage would need to be reported. This is not considered a new burden, as vessels are already required to report to the CHA that a PEC is being used.

34. The 2008 draft Bill also included a power for the Secretary of State to make orders revoking CHA status at the request of an authority. This change would not directly affect the practical operation of marine pilotage. It would, however, relieve such authorities of the onerous duties related to the provision of pilotage services where the harbour was inactive, or where pilotage was no longer required. Thus, it is also consistent with the Government’s deregulatory agenda.

35. However, recognising the industry’s achievements through Ports Skills and Safety (PSS) in creating its own system of accreditation, it is no longer considered appropriate to pursue a further clause from the 2008 draft Bill relating to a national qualifications system for pilots.

36. Following the Private Member’s Bill ballot in May 2012, Sheryll Murray MP expressed an interest in taking forward clauses from the 2008 draft Bill as part of a Private Member’s Bill. This Bill received its First Reading on 20 June as the Marine Navigation (No.2) Bill; its Second Reading is scheduled for 19 October. The Department is in discussion with Mrs Murray about the inclusion of the three clauses on PECs and the order-making power for revoking CHA status ahead of publication of the Bill for its Second Reading.

EU pilotage study

37. The European Commission’s “Communication and action plan with a view to establishing a European maritime transport space without barriers”, issued in January 2009, invited Member States to create a regulatory framework which would permit easier pilotage exemptions.4 This communication specified that the conditions required for obtaining a PEC should be reasonable and should not contain elements of protectionism. The intention was to introduce lower costs for short sea shipping operators and faster turn-around times of vessels in ports.

38. In spring 2012, consultants appointed by the Commission commenced a study of pilotage and, in particular, PEC arrangements across all EU maritime Member States. This is in response to concerns that, in some Member States, pilotage exemption arrangements are inconsistent and unreasonable, so may represent a barrier to trade, resulting in inefficiency and unnecessary costs. Thus far, the consultants have been gathering information from governments and interested industry organisations in each member state through a series of questionnaires.

39. The Department continues to monitor the outcome of this review, seeking to promote the existing deregulatory approach adopted in the United Kingdom as a positive model for other member states.

4 eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0010:EN:NOT

Port safety statistics

40. During 2010, the Department initiated a safety statistics project with PSS supported by the UK Major Ports Group and the British Ports Association. Formed in 2002, PSS is the ports industry’s organisation for health, safety, skills and standards.

41. The purpose of this exercise was the production of robust statistics for port safety for the advancement of best practice, and where necessary the basis for consideration of legislation. The project backdated data collection to 2005, to provide a data set where trends could be analysed.

42. The statistics project enlisted the support of a number of major UK ports including the Port of London Authority, Dover, Belfast and Aberdeen to provide a cost effective, yet representative cross section of activities and facilities.

43. In 2011, the Department presented PSS with the data collected for the period 2005-2010 and a process for the continuation of the statistics project. PSS has collected much of the relevant information for 2011 and will shortly present the latest data set to the PMSC steering group.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) investigations involving pilotage

44. The MAIB examines and investigates all types of marine accidents to, or on board, UK ships worldwide, and for all ships in UK territorial waters.

45. At Annex A is a table of the key MAIB accident investigations involving pilotage stretching back nearly ten years. The key conclusion of each investigation highlights the need for local cooperation and knowledge to ensure the appropriate provision of pilotage for safe port operations.

46. The conclusion relating to the vessel Stolt Tern, where the pilot lost control at Holyhead recommended the introduction of national occupational standards for pilots. As mentioned in paragraph 35, PSS has taken forward a system of accreditation without the need for central government involvement.

Annex A Incident Key points Conclusions Link to Report Stena Feronia/ Union Moon 7 March 2012

Collision between ro-pax and cargo vessel off Belfast. An issue identified thus far is that the pilot got off the vessel before the official disembarkation point; arguably he might have been able to prevent the collision had he stayed on board the vessel.

Investigation in progress Investigation in progress

Chiefton 12 August 2011

PLA pilots criticised for planning and supervision of tow down Thames.

PLA has enhanced simulator training for all grades of pilot with respect to the combined push/ pull towage configuration, including, when possible, attendance of a tug master for professional advice and realism.

www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2012/chiefton.cfm

Clipper Point 24 May 2011

Ro-ro cargo ferry hit Heysham’s South Quay. MAIB mildly critical of the way pilots checked the competency of PEC holders.

Port should consider the familiarisation & training required to ensure that local pilots maintain sufficient knowledge and experience in manoeuvring large ferries in the port.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/ClipperPoint.pdf

CMA-CGM Platon 15 May 2011

Pilot misjudged things leaving a berth in the Thames and hit quay.

PLA had no means for ensuring that the lessons identified in its accident investigations had been effectively promulgated to its pilots.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Platon_Report.pdf

Antonis 11 December 2010

Pilot misjudged situation in Liverpool docks and collided with a swing bridge that punctured a fuel tank, causing significant pollution.

The port agreed to discuss with the pilotage company how the use of the third tug could be optimised to enhance pilots’ control of the manoeuvre through the passageway concerned.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Antonis_Report.pdf

Incident Key points Conclusions Link to Report Norman Arrow 31 March 2010

Pilot misjudged strength/ effect of wind when shifting berths in Portsmouth.

There was little information exchanged between the masters and the harbour pilots, and no guidance on when to use a tug(s).

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Norman_Arrow_Report.pdf

Ijsselstroom 14 June 2009

Capsize of tug entering Peterhead as part of a tow. Pilot did not plan and went too fast for the tug.

Neither a generic, nor the required specific, risk assessment was carried out by the pilot, nor was a briefing held between the pilot and the skipper, when the latter would have alerted the pilot to his tug’s limitations while running astern at speeds in excess of 2 knots.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Ijsselstroom_Report.pdf

Vallermosa 25 February 2009

Collision between tanker and several others on Fawley terminal. Caused primarily when pilot became overloaded. The bridge team were no use to him.

Major recommendation to ports and pilot organisations to work together to identify the minimum support pilots can expect from ships’ staff when they board vessels and encourage feedback mechanisms for pilots to report substandard bridge team performance.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Vallermosa_Report-Annexes.pdf

Sichem Melbourne 25 February 2008

Vessel collided with dolphins while trying to leave the berth at Coryton; the pilot and master were not talking to each other.

Importance of taking the time required for full exchange of information, using diagrammatic explanation where appropriate, between the pilot and the full ship’s team, including mooring parties.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Sichem_Melbourne.pdf

Sea Mithril 18 February 2008

Cargo vessel grounded three times on the River Trent, poor communication between master and the pilot.

Importance of ports and pilots working together to identify minimum support required from bridge teams, and those vessels unable to provide that support.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Sea_Mithril_Report.pdf

Incident Key points Conclusions Link to Report Ursine/ Pride of Bruges 13 November 2007

PEC holder, who was placed on the vessel the evening before by the operator when the ship was put onto the route, misjudged situation and collided with another vessel within Hull docks.

BPA/ UKMPG to promulgate to CHAs the importance of ensuring, as far as practicable, that candidates for PECs are bona fide masters or first mates of the vessels concerned; and, assessing carefully a candidate’s ship handling ability before a PEC is issued, or vessels of particular types and sizes are added to existing PECs.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Ursine_Pride%20of%20Bruges.pdf

Sea Express 1/ Alaska Rainbow 3 February 2007

Collision in Liverpool; MAIB criticised the pilot on board the Alaska Rainbow for not communicating with the bridge team.

Highlight the need for pilots to communicate proactively with approaching vessels and VTS at an early stage to avoid needless development of a close-quarters situation.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Sea%20Express%201_Alaska%20Rainbow.pdf

Stolt Tern 1 December 2004

Pilot lost control-manoeuvring vessel through breakwaters at Holyhead.

MCA recommended to expedite and resource the requirement for national occupational standards for pilots to be a prerequisite for their recruitment and statutory authorisation.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/StoltTern.pdf

September 2012

Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Transport (DfT) (MP 12A)

MARINE PILOTAGE – MONDAY 17 DECEMBER 2012 Q94, Q105, Q110: A note of clarification on the evidence given in relation to the revocation of Competent Harbour Authority status: To be clear, the Department does not currently have this power, but it would be provided by Clause 1 of the Marine Navigation (No.2) Bill, currently before Parliament. This is why, in relation to Q110, no port has had its CHA status revoked. The provisions of the 1987 Pilotage Act only provide for the Department to confer CHA status. I note that you will write separately about requests made at committee for further information, but in case it is helpful, I can provide you now with the response to the request at Q107, when the Minister undertook to confirm the proportion of ports that are privately owned. There are around a thousand ports, harbours, jetties and piers around the UK, but around 90% of the UK’s total maritime traffic by tonnage passes through the largest 20 ports, so it makes sense to focus on them when considering this statistic. Of these ports, the private sector operates 15, through which pass around two-thirds of the traffic. This substantiates the conclusion reached at the hearing that, predominantly, UK maritime traffic is focused on privately-owned ports and shipping. January 2013

Written evidence from the UK Chamber of Shipping (MP 13)

1. The Chamber of Shipping is the industry body representing the British shipping industry. It has 140 member companies, from all sectors of the shipping industry, who, between them, call at all classes and types of ports in the UK. 2. The Chamber is pleased to have this opportunity to present evidence to the Committee; it is timely to review the Pilotage Act 1987 which after 25 years has provided a comprehensive framework for the delivery of the pilotage services essential to the safe and efficient running of ports and the ships which serve them. 3. The submission takes account of the Marine Navigation No 2 Bill currently being drawn up as a Private Members Bill by Sheryl Murray MP, but not with full knowledge of the clauses it will contain. 4. Shipowners’ overall interest in pilotage is now much less than previously and while we welcome the career paths that pilotage contributes to employment in the wider maritime sector it is important that policy development continues to be directed at increasing operational and commercial flexibility and efficiencies in the provision of pilotage services, and at the same time towards maintaining and where possible improving the currently good safety record. COMPETENT HARBOUR AUTHORITIES 5. There has been shown to be clear merit in all harbour authorities having powers to regulate navigation in their harbour areas, in order to address common safety risks and to present visiting ships with a regulatory framework that is familiar and comprehensible. General Directions are a normal part of such a framework, and it is desirable that all harbour authorities should continue to have a power to issue them. PILOTAGE EXEMPTIONS 6. The provisions of the Pilotage Act 1987 governing eligibility for Pilotage Exemption Certifications requires a change that the Chamber of Shipping has been advocating for several years and which would make a significant contribution to safety management. We advocate that ships be permitted to carry more than two PEC-holders, so as to enable the critical duties of navigation and pilotage to be better shared with other qualified officers. The Pilotage Act currently requires those duties to be performed by just two individuals, the Master and the First Mate, creating a problem of fatigue on board vessels whose trading pattern involves frequent repeated passage through extensive pilotage areas. 7. The problem is most acute on board dredgers supplying marine aggregate to wharves on the Thames and in the Solent. In both instances, the dredging grounds are close to the limits of the pilotage area, and the pilotage area itself is extensive. There is therefore no opportunity for key personnel, who need to be on duty for the dredging operations, to rest properly before needing to be back on the bridge to pilot the vessel into port. The lengthy pilotage into port and out again, with only a brief

stay alongside to discharge, then creates a near-continuous demand that is excessive when shared between only two individuals. It is difficult to draw up rosters that both ensure that one of the two PEC-holders is on the bridge at all times and provide them with proper rest periods. 8. Similar difficulties can arise in relation to any vessel, including ferries whose trading pattern involves frequent repeated passage through extensive pilotage areas. 9. Removing the references to masters and first mates would allow all navigating officers on a vessel to apply for a PEC, and enable a PEC to be obtained by any officer who can demonstrate his competence by passing the examination prescribed by the CHA. Over time, as additional experienced officers qualify, the load on existing PEC-holders can be lightened, enabling them to keep more regular hours of work and rest and enhancing standards of safety management on the vessel. 10. CHAs already have powers to suspend or revoke a PEC where the holder shows himself to be incompetent or otherwise incapable of piloting the vessel, once they have served notice on him of their intention to do so and have given him a reasonable opportunity to answer the charges. It is not obvious why, or on what evidence as has been suggested CHAs need further powers to suspend or revoke a PEC with immediate effect. 11. Immediate revocation of a PEC has the effect of depriving a ship’s officer of part of his livelihood, without giving him an opportunity to answer any allegations. Such a suspension offends against a basic principle of justice. If powers for immediate suspension are sought then they must be balanced by a means whereby officers subsequently cleared of all charges receive adequate compensation. 12. Extinguishing of pilotage powers. The creation of a statutory mechanism for removing a harbour authority’s CHA status has merit, as it would enable a harbour authority to respond to changes in trade at its port that led to pilotage no longer being required. The Chamber of Shipping considers, however, that the test that leads to CHA status being removed should be that a safety assessment shows that there is no need for a pilotage service rather than that the harbour authority finds it burdensome or irksome to provide one. The Chamber is available to provide further information on any of the issues raised in this short submission. September 2012

Written evidence from Unite the union (MP 14)

1 Introduction

1.1 This response is submitted by Unite the Union, the UK’s largest trade union with 1.5 million members across the private and public sectors. The union’s members work in a range of industries including manufacturing, financial services, print, media, construction, energy generation, chemicals, transport and local government, education, health and not for profit sectors. In the arena of transport Unite represents over a quarter of a million members in all transport modes, making it the largest transport union in the UK.

1.2 Of importance to this submission, Unites membership includes members of the

UK Marine Pilots Association, tug operators and dockworkers engaged in brining shipping safely into harbour. Unite works closely with the UK Ports Skills and Safety committee, European and International Transport Federation as well as a number of other national and international organisations.

2 Port Marine Safety Code

2.1 Despite this guidance and its associated Guide to Good Practise, being critical to

the safe operation of vessels in UK ports, these provisions are only a voluntary code without any legal status or penalties for non compliance. Consequently there is no effective procedure in place by the Dft, MCA or any other body to react to reports concerns or complaints of suspected non compliance.

2.2 Only about a third of UK ports actually comply with requests for the submission of

a triennial “Compliance Statement”. Whilst it is acknowledged that this is voluntary, of those ports that state they comply, there is no requirement for a comprehensive compliance and evidence suggests that in some ports, only selective areas comply with the guide due to commercial or other reasons. As a consequence Unite has significant concerns over the regulation and administration of UK Pilotage under the 1987 Pilotage Act due to the non-compulsory nature of the PMSC.

2.3 Unite has dealings with port operators who have become in effect “judge”, “jury”

and proverbial “executioner” in their presiding role as CHA(Competent Harbour Authority) over a number of different issues. Frequently Port Authority investigations are accepted by the MAIB and MCA as gospel as they do not have the resources to investigate matters themselves. These investigations may often be biased in favour of the port operator, or CHA and there is rarely a proper independent investigation into incidents. Where there are accident investigations or Near-Miss occurrences, under the PMSC, these are often compromised leading to ‘root-cause’ and contributory factors rarely, if ever, considered. It is always much easier to lay the blame upon a pilot in charge of a vessel or on the vessel itself.

2.4 Even when local and international regulations have been contravened within the

port authority’s jurisdiction, harbour masters have, on occasion, displayed a reluctance to use this authority, despite requests, probably as they would not wish

to upset ‘important’ customers. Unite believes there is a link between profit-driven motivation, Key Performance Indicators (KPI) of port management staff, and a reduced level of overall safety. Unite believes there is a clear link between management KPI’s in an area and a decline of safety standards, often as a result of corner-cutting. Being financially-dependant and profit-driven operations, port services under the direction of the harbour master are generally allowed to default towards a ‘lowest-common denominator safety-factor’

2.5 Unite has seen instances where vessels have been allowed to move in a river or

estuary without the requisite number of tugs (or stipulated bollard pull) in specific ports. The initial logic which provided for these specific safety requirements is being ignored. Unite has reason to believe that PMSC compliance and Verification Checks by the MCA are, apparently in some ports, little more than ‘tick-box’ exercises carried-out by apparently junior MCA staff.

2.6 As the level of compliance is variable, there is nothing to ensure that full and

proper safety and operational standards are applied to a port’s pilotage services. This lack of a compulsory standard unbalances the market giving advantages to some ports while others face the additional financial cost of ensuring safe operations. Unite believes that legislation is necessary to ensure the highest proper operational and safety standards throughout UK ports. A port operator is effectively in complete and total overall charge of tariff-setting, and can (and indeed, has in some cases) introduced competition into ancillary services. Unite is consequently increasingly concerned over the lack of mandatory compliance with set standards.

2.7 Pilot fatigue, as an essential element under the PMSC but Unite believes it has

been given scant and casual disregard in some ports. Unite members have suggested that CHA’s in some pilotage districts appear to be of the opinion that the EU Working Time Directive (WTD)does not apply to them, in any form at all. Unite feels that this integral element of safety should not (as has previously been stated by the MCA) be a contractual matter between employer and employee, but should form part of the integral compliance and verification by the DfT/MCA.

2.8 Unite has had to resort supporting a legal challenge in one instance, to force a

Port Authority to comply with the basic requirements of the WTD, as pilots were receiving insufficient rest between piloting ships. This Port Authority had taken the decision to reduce rest, below what was lawful, on purely commercial grounds, highlighting the conflicts that arise when one party is responsible for both the safety and commercial roles.

2.9 Unite calls on the committee to do whatever they can to influence Government

into make the PMSC compulsory within every port. We should not leave it to the operators to decide if the safety of the worker in these areas is worth the financial investment.

3 Pilot Training, Qualifications and Operational Standards

3.1 Despite supporting its passage through the IMO in 2003, the UK has not yet

formally adopted the recommendations contained within resolution A960 in any way. Similarly, the Dft/MCA will not formally acknowledge the provisions of the Education, Training and Certifications Standards (ETCS). The recently updated

3.2 Adoption of resolution A960 by the MCA and its direct inclusion into the Port

Marine Safety Code would go a long way towards achieving the goal of ensuring the continuing safe and efficient shipping movements within UK ports. Unite feels an industry wide Continual Professional Development processes to maintain and enhance safety should be develop as the result of compliance with the Marine Pilotage Certificate and its associated NOS (when it is completed) becoming mandatory.

4 1987 Pilotage Act – The lack of a fair and proper appeals process

4.1 In contrast with the previous legislation, the 1987 Act contains no right of appeal

process in the event that a CHA exercises provisions of the Act in taking action against an authorised pilot. Currently the only course of action available to a pilot who feels he has been inappropriately treated under the Act is to seek permission for Judicial Review as their Authorisation is bestowed upon him by a public body and very often, that “public body” and the commercial organisation employing them are one and the same entity. Reviews are by their very nature a time consuming and costly process for all involved, including the courts system itself.

4.2 Unite believes the 1987 Pilotage Act is one of the worst pieces of maritime

legislation to have been enacted for many decades. Unite understands that the Act does not comply with the requirements of the European Human Rights Convention (particularly Article 6) the right to a fair trial. An appeal under the 1987 Act against a perceived improper revocation of a pilot's Authorisation is not the same as an industrial disciplinary process. In any post incident or event investigation which results in disciplinary action then the process is two-fold: • The first (particularly in the case of an employed pilot) deals with disciplining

the pilot as an employee under the appropriate industrial relations legislation. This includes strict formal disciplinary procedures which must be strictly adhered to and which also include formally structured appeal processes, ultimately through an industrial tribunal.

• The second part of the process for employed pilots (and probably the only part for self employed pilots) is the consideration of potential de-authorisation under the Act. There is also the aspect of potential abuse of Authorisation revocation by an unscrupulous CHA to be considered.

4.3 A pilot's Authorisation is a statutory professional qualification which can not be

summarily revoked by a CHA. As it is a statutory qualification granted through the Act it follows that its revocation can only be if it is proven that the pilot's legal obligations under the Act have not been complied with. A pilot is a public servant holding a public office. The only reason that Judicial Review is available to him in the High Court is because his professional qualification is issued by a public body. This position remains fundamental to the role of a pilot. It has always been so.

4.4 The Courts have confirmed the above position throughout history and continue to

do so to the present day by the express terms of the Pilotage Act 1987. A normal

disciplinary management process does not provide (and cannot provide) the independent tribunal to which any pilot is entitled when his statutory professional qualification is placed at issue, however. The procedures of a commercial company are not independent; they are biased in the interests of the company. In most cases, the only discipline to which a pilot is subject is conducted by a commercial company which holds public office (as a Competent Harbour Authority) by appointment of the state.

4.5 The normal disciplinary process of any commercial company remains biased,

however, even when hearing the case of a pilot who remains a public servant in any event. It would be unrealistic (and untruthful) to suggest otherwise. It is why industrial tribunals form part of the commercial industry disciplinary process.

4.6 The discipline of any public servant should not be subject to commercial bias in

any way. That is one of the reasons why the process of Judicial Review exists. A CHA which conducts its affairs improperly is therefore vulnerable at Judicial Review. The omission of the statutory appeal right from the Pilotage Act of 1987 appears to have been by way of error and oversight rather than improbable misguided intent.

4.7 A simple and cost effective solution to this issue would be to reinstate the appeals

procedure that was contained within the 1913 Act whereby the first stage for appeal was via Magistrate or County courts. This was the situation that prevailed until 1988 (upon the repeal of the Pilotage Act of 1913 and the introduction of the Act of 1987). The cost of conducting litigation in the County Court or the Magistrates’ Court is a fraction of the cost of any judicial review, which is available only in the High Court.

5 Pilotage Exemption Certificates

5.1 Unite is concerned to receive reports from members of a worrying trend on rivers

and estuaries where near-misses are occurring due to inexperienced staff having no grasp or understanding of vessel operations, vessels manoeuvring capabilities, or an inherent sense of spatial awareness. Several tug accidents have happened, often with tragic consequences for one or more crew members. A too high ship's speed is mostly the direct cause for such accidents, while tug type is also an important factor. One possible cause of these instances is the increased use of Pilot Exemption Certificates (PEC) and the masters of these vessels not having been trained in tug operations as has not been considered a requirement.

5.2 The dangers of such action to the safety of navigation, the protection of ports

infrastructures and their environments and the overall operational efficiency of UK ports are real and significant. UK shipping and ports’ industries are attempting to deregulate the eligibility requirements for Pilotage Exemption Certificates from the current well established and proven “Bona-Fide Master or Mate” requirement to effectively any ship’s navigating officer which will make the situation even worse.

5.3 In the Ursine & Pride of Brugges accident, which culminated in an incident

investigation by the MAIB in 2007, highlights the quantative dangers of using personnel who do not belong to the ship’s crew, nor bona fide master or first mate. The Ursine incident is probably the first proper investigation conducted by

an independent examining authority since the enactment of the 1987 Pilotage Act. The Ursine investigation shows how badly things can go wrong, three-fold;

• the lackadaisical approach to port authorities/CHA issuing & controlling the

usage of PEC’s; • CHA’s lack of rigidity in applying the regulations; and, • how an individual, who was not a member of the crew, was in a position to

allow such a significant incident to develop and unfold.

5.4 Earlier incidents may well have been examined by CHA’s and port authorities but will unlikely have been as through or deeply-probing as the Ursine situation.

5.5 Additionally, many of ships in this “frequent-user sector” have seen, over the past

few years, substantial changes to the nationalities crewing the said vessels. The standard of spoken English is, at times, very poor; and their comprehension of instructions issued by port services (i.e. Pilot stations, pilot launches, or VTS) is border-line dangerous.

5.6 Anecdotal evidence suggests a significant proportion of vessels do not carry

appropriate chart folios, and of those vessels that do, it is apparent many ships crew’s cannot interpret the fundamental chart basics. To allow a junior officer, let alone “any person” (who may or may not be a crew member) to be granted a PEC under the proposals would suggest the proposer has no grasp of the role and stature of the shipmaster, or first mate.

5.7 There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that PEC’s have also been granted

in a number of ports without any familiarisation with tug operations putting the lives of tug operators at risk.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Unite is concerned that training for pilots has become in some cases haphazard

and lackadaisical by some port authorities in maintaining training standards. There needs to be a clear separation between the commercial aspect of a port and the public body that issues the pilots licence. Unite believes, at the very least, the PMSC needs to be compulsory in all ports and not left to the commercial interests of the CHA. Failure to do this is putting lives at risk.

6.2 Unite recommends the following :-

• that there needs to be mandatory compliance with a safety code in the ports to which only qualified pilots should be allowed to operate.

• anybody who has a commercial interest in the outcome of an investigation should not be involved in the investigation and hence funding should be provided to the MCA or some other body to investigate incidents.

• If there is a judgement against a pilot for misconduct for causing an accident or a near miss then, there needs to be an appeal process available.

• Pilots should be fully trained to a reasonable acceptable standard specific to each port or estuary and the size of the vessel and propulsion type.

• Pilot exemption certificates should not be issued to commercial vessel masters unless they have completed the requisite training in the port or estuary for that size of vessel.

6.3 Unite believes that without such measures there will be a serious accident in one of the UK ports which will not only place lives at risk but potentially close the port to commercial operations for a considerable period. Such an incident will upset the delivery and export of goods through the port and have far wider economic implications.

September 2012

 

Written evidence from the UK Major Ports Group (UKMPG) and the British Ports Association (BPA) (MP 15)

Summary 1 The UK Major Ports Group (UKMPG) and the British Ports Association (BPA) welcome this timely inquiry by the Commons Transport Committee. With 2 private members bills on marine navigation now before Parliament, it is a good time to review how pilotage in the UK has fared over the last 25 years under the structure established by the Pilotage Act 1987. It is the associations’ firm view that self regulation has proved to be the right approach and that major improvements have taken place in the management of pilotage and its integration into the comprehensive safety management systems now run by ports. As a result shipping companies now get a more efficient service without any loss of safety. Good progress is also being made on standard setting and professional development for pilots who now have opportunities for career progression into senior management posts. UKMPG and BPA hope that the forthcoming marine navigation legislation will be an opportunity to provide all ports with a power of general direction to improve marine safety and reduce regulation. Background 2 BPA and UKMPG represent all the leading commercial ports in the UK. Our members operate some 120 ports in all parts of the country and handle around 95% of the UK’s international trade by volume. Our ports do not seek financial help from the taxpayer. Annual investment (much of it inward) in upgrading and developing port facilities has been running at between £200 – 300m a year and despite the current economic climate this investment is increasing as several large container and renewable energy port projects are taken forward. Moreover ports are hugely important to the national and local economy. A recent independent study carried out by Oxford Economics on behalf of our umbrella organisation Maritime UK has shown that UK ports directly and indirectly employ some 340,000 people and contribute around £17bn annually to UK GDP. Legal Framework for pilotage 3 Until the Pilotage Act 1987 pilotage was run as a separate service largely independent of harbour authorities with a supervisory role exercised by the Pilotage Commission. The 1987 Act swept these arrangements away and brought pilotage within the responsibility of harbour authorities with 127 competent harbour authorities set up under the Act. This creation of a single organisational structure for pilotage has had many beneficial effects. In particular it has enabled pilotage to be considered as part of the overall safety management system at ports with safety priorities determined locally using a risk assessment approach taking account of national guidance laid down in the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC). It has also brought together responsibility for the pilotage service with the provision of all pilotage service infrastructure as well as radar and other vessel traffic management tools. Further, there is now an opportunity for pilots to be employed by harbour authorities if they so desire, with clearly specified contracts of employment and a wider choice of sea and shore based career opportunities. The UK system contrasts with that applying in most other EU countries where the national administration has overall responsibility for pilotage and setting pilotage dues. 4 The 1987 Act also regularised the provision of Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PECs) for vessels which regularly use particular ports. Harbour Authorities have a duty to issue PECs to

appropriately qualified masters and first mates. There are provisions for initial training of PEC holders and follow up continuous professional development. This has provided a good framework for PECs to develop in appropriate circumstances in a way which has helped to improve efficiency and reduce shipping costs without putting safety at risk. We also note that the European Commission have been carrying out a review of the PEC system in the EU and are watching this closely. Pilotage employment trends 5 There were 1400 pilots before the 1987 Act; 10 years later when the Pilotage Act was first reviewed numbers had reduced to 800 in 1998 (10% of whom worked part time). The review noted that the main reason for the decline in numbers was the elimination of the surplus of pilots which had existed before the 1987 Act. Slightly under half of this total were employees of harbour authorities; the remaining self employed pilots were engaged individually or as part of co-operatives or companies. In 1998 UK still had more pilots than any other EU country. Using pension fund records we estimate that the number of UK pilots now stands at around 550. This further reduction reflects wider changes such as the move to larger ships making fewer calls and the increased use of PECs. At the time of the 1998 review there were around 3000 PEC holders relating to just under 2500 vessels. At that stage the PEC system was more developed in the UK than elsewhere in the EU. Our understanding is that this remains the position, though this is subject to confirmation through the current EU study of PECs. Port Marine Safety Code 6 The Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) which was originally drawn up by DfT in 2000 set up an overall safety management system framework for ports including pilotage. The Code also encouraged harbour authorities to develop and publish policies and procedures which were appropriate to their local circumstances in the context of an overall safety management system developed after formal risk assessment. Harbour authority boards were made accountable for discharging duties and powers relating to marine safety. The Code also made it clear that powers of direction should be used to require use of port passage plans in appropriate cases whether vessels were piloted or not with harbour authorities taking the lead in promoting the use of passage planning. 7 The ports industry was closely involved in the updating of the PMSC in 2009 (and will be again in the latest review in the fourth quarter this year). This exercise split out much of the detail in the original Code document putting it into a Guide to Good Practice. The industry now leads on updates to the Guide to take account of changing circumstances and relevant recommendations in reports from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). Updates need to be approved by the PMSC steering group (which is chaired by MCA/DfT and has extensive cross sector representation) before being posted on DfT’s website. These arrangements are working well and ensure that necessary changes can be made much more rapidly than under the previous 3 year review system. 8 In an extensive section on pilotage, the Guide to Good Practice maps out the main harbour authority accountabilities in relation to pilotage including the intention that pilotage should be fully integrated with other port services. The Guide also covers employment aspects and advises that harbour authorities should have contracts with authorised pilots regulating the conditions of work including procedures for resolving disputes and disciplinary processes. The Guide also makes clear that pilotage services need to be based on a continuing process of risk assessment. Before issuing pilotage directions, harbour authorities must consult with those affected, including pilots. Harbour authorities are also to ensure that pilots are trained and qualified to conduct vessels with training standards to be in line with national occupational standards (see below). Training needs are to be kept under review with additional training provided as necessary, with those with PECs encouraged to participate.

European Union aspects 9 The EU Commission are currently looking at PECs as part of their overall review of EU ports policy. This is being done as part of the Common Maritime Transport Space framework so the main policy objective is likely to be facilitation of trade. The study is being carried out by the consultants PWC/NEA who have sent a questionnaire round in order to get information on the frameworks for granting PECs and to identify the competent authorities in EU member states. We are expecting this to lead to a proposal from the Commission in the late autumn which may be legislative. It is our strong view that ports should be able to continue to set requirements for granting PECs taking account of local circumstances. Standards and training for pilots 10 The ports industry has been working closely with UK Maritime Pilots’ Association (UKMPA) and the Government to create a new framework for setting standards for pilots and assessing performance. National Occupational Standards for pilots have been updated, consulted on across all parts of the UK and approved by the UK Commission of Employment and Skills in January 2012. Work will start shortly on establishing voluntary assessment standards for marine pilot certificates. This work will again be developed in conjunction with UKMPA. To achieve a certificate, marine pilots will be required to demonstrate general nautical knowledge and skills as well as local knowledge and skills specific to their district. The system will be managed by the industry but approved by the MCA. Port Marine Accident reporting 11 The ports industry has been looking at ways of improving information on accidents and near miss incidents occurring on the water in harbour authorities to match the data already made available on landside accidents published by the industry’s Port Skills and Safety team. In developing proposals, the industry has also had in mind the Transport Committee’s recommendation in its 2008 report on the draft Marine Navigation Bill that there should be robust figures on accidents occurring in harbour authority areas. In a pilot project initially led by DfT, 13 ports handling around 40% of UK port tonnage have provided data on marine accidents and other incidents occurring in port marine areas. 12 An initial report has been produced by DfT showing total incidents occurring in the 2005-9 period. The industry is now taking the lead on collecting equivalent 2010 and 2011 numbers and in analysing the whole 2005-11 data-set in more detail to see what lessons can drawn. The industry is also looking at how the reporting scheme can be extended and some current reporting issues resolved. Marine Navigation Bills 13 It has been evident for many years that there needs to be a new Marine Navigation Bill to update provisions in the PIlotage Act 1987 and other merchant shipping legislation relating to safety. The ports associations therefore welcomed the draft Marine Navigation Bill published by DfT in 2008 and most of the provisions which it contained. We were particularly pleased to see a provision enabling all harbour authorities to issue general directions in their areas which would help to promote safe and efficient management of harbours. We also gave our support to the removal of unwanted pilotage powers, and powers for harbour authorities to suspend PECs and deal with abuses of PECs.

14 Disappointingly the Bill has since failed to obtain a firm place in the Government’s legislative programme. We are therefore pleased to note that Sheryll Murray MP has introduced a private members bill on marine navigation which is down for Commons second reading on 19 October. The scope of the bill is not yet clear but we hope that it will include provisions from the earlier DfT Bill, particularly powers of general direction which as well as producing safety benefits would also contribute usefully to removing unnecessary regulation. We are also pleased to see that Lord Berkeley has introduced a marine navigation bill in the Lords though this has a more limited scope. We strongly hope that this current interest in marine navigation in both Houses of Parliament will provide a good opportunity to pass some much needed legislation which will help to improve marine safety without adding to regulation and industry costs.  September 2012  

Written evidence from John Clandillon-Baker FNI (MP 16)

1. What is a pilot? The following definition was established by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which states that: “Pilot means any person not belonging to a ship who has the conduct thereof.”

2. What does a pilot do? Basically the pilot is a seafarer who has detailed knowledge of a port approach or dangerous navigational area and who uses that knowledge to ensure the safe passage of a vessel through the pilotage district.

3. What is the difference between a Captain and a pilot? The Captain (Master) always has command of the ship and thus has ultimate responsibility for the safety of the ship, its cargo and crew. The pilot has the conduct of the ship in the pilotage district and upon boarding a vessel agrees a passage plan for the transit with the master but is then responsible for directing the course and speed of the vessel to execute the passage plan.

4. Two Court cases have defined the term "conduct" :

The Tactician (1971): In this case the judge considered the meaning of the word “conduct”. And stated: “it is a cardinal principle that the Pilot is in sole charge of the ship, and that all directions as to speed, course, stopping, and reversing, and everything of that land, are for the Pilot”.

The Mickleham (1918): This case also considered the meaning of the word “conduct” and again concluded that if a ship is to be conducted by a pilot it “does not mean that she is to be navigated under his advice: it means that she must be conducted by him”.

5. Why is a pilot required

Ships are designed to proceed fast and efficiently on passages between ports so when operating in a port they are operating in an environment for which they weren't designed.

Likewise, ships' Captains and officers are trained and qualified to navigate ships between ports but cannot be trained for every port so in a port and its approaches they are working in an environment for which they haven't been trained.

6. The 1987 Pilotage Act

In the UK all pilots operate under the 1987 Pilotage Act which established each UK port as a Competent Harbour Authority (CHA) and granted these CHA's full control of pilotage. This effectively granted powers without accountability to the CHA's, a factor that was highlighted by the Marine Accident Investigation Investigation Branch (MAIB) enquiry into the Sea Empress grounding in 1996 ( http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/1990_to_1998/sea_empress.cfm ) which states:

"The Pilotage Act 1987 gave CHAs the absolute right to determine the standards of training and authorisation of their pilots, whether or not those responsibilities were delegated, with no mechanism to challenge their judgement of what those standards should be. This is quite unlike the training and certification of ship’s officers where minimum national and international standards do exist. This is not a satisfactory situation, when inadequacies in the training and experience of the pilots might only be detected after an accident has happened".

Despite this finding, nothing has changed.

7. Lack of an Appeal procedure.

Section 3 of the Pilotage Act grants CHA's total powers regarding the selection and authorisation of pilots and also the power to remove that authorisation. Several cases have occurred of pilots being de-authorised and subsequent employment tribunals have failed because the Act doesn't contain any clause granting a right of appeal by a pilot against a CHA's action. This needs to be rectified.

8. Pilot Training:

The training of UK pilots is the responsibility of the CHA. Again quoting from the Sea Empress report:

"There are no national or international standards for the training and authorisation of marine pilots. At the 1993 United Kingdom Pilots Association (Marine) (UKPA(M)) Delegate Conference, a resolution to lay down appropriate general standards was agreed. This resolution was followed by a survey of all UKPA(M) pilotage districts which revealed significant differences in both methods and standards of training. A brief policy document on the recruitment and training of marine pilots, based on the survey results, was then prepared and distributed in 1995 to many organisations. A Resolution inviting IMO to consider developing such standards was adopted at the 1995 Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Conference (STCW). It was considered by the Sub-committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping in September 1996 and placed on that Subcommittee’s list of forthcoming work, so the development of international standards can be expected in the future." Despite this finding 16 years ago there still isn't a pilotage qualification. Work was undertaken by the now named United Kingdom Maritime Pilots Association (UKMPA) with the sub group of the DfT, British Ports Industry Training (BPIT) back in 2000 and a set of standards were agreed and a standards document produced (www.portskillsandsafety.co.uk/skills/standards_and_qualifications/nos_units?category=36 ). This document (now owned by BPIT's successor Port Skills and Safety) has been ready for incorporation into the Port Marine Safety Code for over a decade but this has never taken place because incorporation has been resisted by some parties. Likewise work, supported by the MCA, has been undertaken by the UKMPA to produce a pilotage qualification but again resistance from some stakeholders has prevented agreement on this issue being reached. In Europe a similar set of standards for pilots have been produced but again these have not been adopted by the UK.

9. Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC)

This code provides "best practice" guidelines for port operations but without any underpinning legislation seems to be an ineffective document.

10. Pilotage Exemption Certificates (PEC)

There is currently a clause proposed for inclusion in the draft Marine Navigation Bill that seeks to remove the requirement contained in the Pilotage Act for a PEC only to be issued to the Master or "bona fide" first Mate of a ship in favour of "any person". Pilotage is a highly skilled occupation and such skills can only be obtained through considerable experience. The only reason for downgrading eligibility requirements is commercial expediency and therefore must be resisted at all costs.When in port limits, ships and pilots are frequently operating at the limits of the vessels' parameters and this element of a ship's voyage is recognised by insurers as the time of highest risk. Also, many pilotage districts transit the highest rated environmentally sensitive areas designated as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Marine Environmental High Risk Areas (MEHRA). With a zero tolerance from the media and general public to any maritime incident, the potential risks of any deregulation the existing PEC regime are unacceptab

of le.

11 Conclusion

Statistics reveal that 93% of the world's trade involves shipping at some stage and every day pilots around the world handle thousands of ships in the challenging environments unique to their particular port. The considerable skills required to safely achieve this are generally ignored and therefore unapreciated. Pilotage is essential to the safety of shipping and the coastal environment and must therefore be regarded as an asset to be valued rather than a cost to be cut. It should be of deep concern to this select committee's members that, over 16 years after the Sea Empress disaster, the shortcomings of the 1987 Pilotage Act with respect to training and accountability have not been rectified.

September 2012

Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (MP 17)

 1. The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (“the Institute”) is

a professional institution embracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for both passengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government and administration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principal concerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far as possible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widely disseminated and adopted.

2. The Institute has a specialist Ports and Maritime Forum which contributed to this submission.

3. Pilotage acts around the United Kingdom vary considerably and consist of

anything from entering a harbour direct from sea and berthing within a very short distance and time frame to many hours passage up a river and entering a dock or mooring at a tidal jetty. Other vessel movements and navigational hazards may also differ widely.

4. In addition deep sea pilotage is carried out to/from sea to/from British and

Continental ports and directly between ports.

5. Successful pilotage depends upon many elements for safe and efficient prosecution and include, but are not limited to, expert local knowledge of geographical features, buoyage, hydrographical conditions, anomalies, customs and practise, emergency procedures, vessel traffic services, by-laws, harbour regulations, prevailing weather conditions, tidal information, other vessel movements and communications.

6. Under normal circumstances this expert knowledge lies within the

responsibility of a fully qualified local pilot who has carried out training and completed examination by the duly appointed Competent Harbour Authority. The Pilot carries out his/her duties and updating regularly within that district. They board ships which are bound by compulsory pilotage regulations.

7. Masters and Mates on certain classes of ships trading on a regular basis to

the same port may be given the opportunity by the Competent Harbour Authority to be examined for a Pilot Exemption Certificate (PEC). A certain number of trips in and out per year by the holder of the PEC is required along with an annual review or examination. The PEC is only valid for the ship or ships detailed on the certificate whilst the holder is signed on that vessel in the capacity of Master or Mate.

8. Regardless of whether a local pilot is employed or a PEC holder other than

the Master is conducting the pilotage the Master would still be expected to be

on the navigation bridge as the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the passengers, crew and ship rests with the Master.

9. The Mate qualifies to apply for a PEC as the second in command of the ship

should anything untoward happen to the Master. A Junior Mate who regularly relieves as the Mate may, in certain circumstances, also apply for a PEC. However with more than two PEC holders onboard, depending on the number of trips required, keeping all PECs valid on a particular vessel may, along with the hands on experience of conning of a vessel through a district, be difficult . Any consideration to allow junior Mates, other than those relieving the Chief Mate, is fraught with problems.

10. Further reduction in standards directly within some Pilotage Authorities is in

allowing candidates with less than 1st or 2nd class Certificates of Competency to apply and become fully qualified pilots.

11. At a time when the safety of life, and the protection of property and the

environment is, quite rightly, being recognised as of paramount importance any consideration to water down the standards of experience, training or qualifications of those conducting pilotage is contrary to the principles of best practise to ensure the commitment to safety of life, and the protection of property and the environment.

September 2012

Written evidence from Captain Rod Lewis (MP 18)

Background

I am a serving Authorised UK Marine Pilot employed by a major UK ports group (ABP) a large part of my job is now managerial, having taken on the role of Pilot Manager and Deputy Harbour Master for the ABP South Wales region.

I am a member of both the UKMPA and the UKHMA but am writing this totally independently of my employer and the associations that I am a member of.

I started my career at sea around the time of the inception of the 1987 Pilotage act, a time where few UK shipping companies where investing in the marine professionals of the future.

I attained my first command in 1995 and signed off my last ship in 2005 to start a new career as a Pilot. I attained unrestricted Authorisation as a South East Wales Pilot in 2008. In 2010 I took up my present role.

While most certainly not unique, I consider myself to have reasonable experience of UK Pilotage from the standpoints of a serving Master, an authorised Pilot and a Pilot Manager. Perhaps of note is the fact that all my experience is in the 1987 act era and all my experience in senior positions coming in the era of Marine Safety Management.

The CHA and the Port Marine Safety Code.

The most recent significant changes to Pilotage regulation in the UK where brought about by the 1987 Pilotage act, its purpose in essence, to remove some of the rigid regulation of the Pilotage service whilst consolidating the Pilotage acts of 1913 and 1936 along with the Pilotage provisions of the 1979 Merchant Shipping Act. Pivotal to this primary aim was the designation of Competent Harbour Authorities (CHA’s) the designation of the CHA also served to remove a divided authority, in most cases transferring the responsibility for Pilotage to the Statutory Authority within which the Pilotage district fell. No doubt, this transition has had its challenges.

In 1998 the Department for Transport, in light of the” Sea Empress” disaster, undertook a review of the 1987 Pilotage act. The review concluded that “Pilotage should rightly remain the responsibility of the CHA’s and become integrated with other port marine activity under the management and responsibility of one Statutory Authority”.

Several recommendations also came from this review, the principle one being the Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) that was first published in 2000.

The DfT owned “Code” and the Stakeholder owned “Guide”, while not mandatory, are underpinned by legislation. It may not be an actual offence to not be compliant with the code but a serious breach of the code would almost certainly be in breach of relevant legislation. Perhaps more importantly, the Code is the national standard, and in being so is the standard by which Port Authorities would be judged.

First published in 2000 with a major revision in 2009 the PMSC and associated Guide to good practice serve very well people such as I who have responsibility for formulating and putting into practice marine procedures, plans and policies.

The pilot’s role in Marine Safety Management

Marine Pilots are recognised as perhaps the most significant risk mitigation measure available to the Statutory Authority. As such it is important that the knowledge and experience of the Authorities Pilots is put to best use, in a coordinated manner that is consistent with the Authorities broader safety management responsibilities.

From my experience of managing Pilots and from formulating and implementing marine Safety Management systems I consider it is of vital importance that pilots are considered ( by themselves as importantly as by the Statutory Authority) inclusive in the Authorities marine safety management systems .

Pilot’s knowledge and experience should be considered an asset by their authorising Authority, especially when considered along with their frequent situation of being first point of contact between the Ship and the Port Authority.

From experience, I have seen safety and operational benefits in Pilots greater involvement in the general and safety management of ports, a situation that should be encouraged.

Port Management and Pilotage have traditionally been separate career paths. National Occupational Standards and qualification frameworks for both Pilots and Harbour Masters would appear to offer a convergence route between the previously distinct disciplines.

Pilotage Recruitment

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing Pilotage in the UK is recruitment. A whole generation of pilots that came into the service in the late 80's and 90s are now retiring; the generation that should be replacing them appears to be

missing from the ranks of UK seafarers and marine professionals that one would expect to replace them.

Notwithstanding this apparent black-hole where potential pilots should be, it seems that seafaring as a profession is not as attractive a profession as it once was, with many UK seafarers leaving the sea at a very early stage in order to take up shore positions.

The development of the National occupational standards for marine Pilots (NOS) and the development of a Pilotage qualification framework, when considered with the CHA 's duty to determine the qualification of the pilots it authorises, would appear to offer the industry the potential to secure its future pilots .

The PMSC guide to good practice acknowledges the NOS as the standard for initial and continued authorisation of UK Marine Pilots. The NOS, along with the PMSC Guide to Good Practice, reference IMO resolution A960 on Pilotage standards.

The NOS and qualification framework appear to offer the potential for individual CHA's to recruit and train their potential Pilots based on the needs and requirements of their specific areas of jurisdiction while ensuring that the CHA determined standard is an appropriate one.

September 2012

Written evidence from Mark Edmondson, Chair of the Joint Hull Committee (MP 19)

I write in my capacity of Chair of the London Insurance Market's Joint Hull Committee.

You may be familiar with the work of the Committee: it is an influential body that represents the interests of marine insurers operating in the London international market, in particular those underwriters that insure vessels and their associated risks on a global basis, including ships that call at UK ports.

The market we represent comprises both Lloyd's and Insurance Company underwriters with a global market share for hull and machinery risks of approximately 18%, the most significant market by premium volume, with the next largest individual market being Norway at 14%

The role of the Joint Hull Committee is principally one of research on behalf of the London market, providing technical guidance and advice where appropriate. The Committee also liaises with outside bodies in order to contribute to relevant maritime debate and represent the interest of hull insurers in a number of areas.

My purpose in writing is to express London hull insurers' concern over the proposed amendment to the 1987 Pilotage Act through application of the Marine Navigation Bill 2012.

In recent months we have witnessed the withdrawal of the UK's Emergency Response Vessel service and a reduction in coverage by Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres. Marine insurers consider that both of these developments create more risk to shipping, passengers and seagoing personnel, cargo interests and to the UK Coastline. The proposed amendment to the Pilotage Act would, in our opinion, amount to a dumbing down of pilotage capability within the UK's compulsory pilotage areas and once again further heighten risk in UK coastal and restricted waters.

HMG's policy objective is to increase efficiency through more flexibility in managing Pilotage Exemption Certificates. However by definition, compulsory pilotage areas require the highest standards of skill and the current regime, which allows a qualified Master or First Mate to hold a pilotage exemption certificate, is well tested, understood and clear in its obligations.

Aside from legal considerations and whether such an amendment would contravene UK common law or international law, from a practical point of view underwriters often experience cases where groundings or collisions occur in restricted waters due to poor bridge procedure and a lack of clarity and communication. This amendment proposes to de-regulate the existing system to such an extent where we believe bridge procedure may on occasion be compromised, thereby creating more risk.

Clearly, today's economic climate demands a degree of pragmatism and paradigms may need to be challenged to secure long term benefits. However, there are operational elements which as part of that drive for efficiency, should not be compromised. We believe that maintaining the highest level of expertise to navigate and maneuver sophisticated vessels that are carrying high value and sometimes hazardous cargo in difficult and often stressful conditions should be a paramount consideration for operators and policymakers alike.

I realise that our representations to the Select Committee are rather late in the PMB process but we would be most grateful if the select committee can take account of marine insurers' real concerns during your debate and ultimately your policy decision.

November 2012