LYNN TILLoTsoN & PINKER, L.L.RATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS

Christopherl. SchwegrnannDirect Dial (214) 981-3835

cschwegrnann@lynnllp.com

750 NORTH St PAUL STREETSUITE 1400

DALLAS, TEXAS 75201

Telephone: (214) 981-3800Telecopier: (214) 981-3839

Via U.S. CertifiedMail, RRRClerk ofCourtSeventhCourtof AppealsofTexas501 S. Fillmore, Suite2-AAmarillo, TX 79101-2449

April 18, 2005

Re: TracyYolandaWardv. StateofTexasandRhondaTulaneSmithv. StateofTexasConsolidatedAppealsNos. 07-04-00457-CR(Ward))and07-04-00490-CR(Smith)

DearClerk:

Hereis the original andfive copiesofa Brief ofAmicusCuriaein theabove-referenced

If you have any questions,pleaseassistancein this matter.

cc w/enclosure:

do not hesitateto contactme. Thank you for your

Verytruly yours,

JoeMorganDawson(via US.Mail)Larry Cunningham(via US. Mail)RichardMartindale(via US.Mail)JeffBlackburn(via U.S. Mail)

matter.

CJS/psEnclosures---- --~----~---~--- --~- ----- —---————- --

Clerk ofCourtApril 18, 2005Page2

bccw/enclosure:GregoryA. HorowitzPt~iaA.Seith -

IlyssaB. Sena

Of theFirmEdwardJasonDennis

136231

CONSOLIDATEDAPPEALSNOS.07-04-00457-CR(Ward)& 07-04-00490-CR(Smith)

iN THE SEVENTHCIRCUIT COURTOF APPEALS OFTEXAS

TRACY YOLANDA WARD, Appellant,

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

RHONDA TULANE SMITH, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

THEON APPEALFROM THE 320T1T DISTRICT COURTHONORABLEDON R. EMERSON,JUDGEPRESIDING

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

LEAD COUNSEL: OF COUNSEL:

EdwardJasonDennis(No. 24045776) GregoryA. HorowitzLYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P. PatriciaA. Seith750North St. PaulStreet,Suite 1400 IlyssaB. SenaDallas,TX 75210 KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS

& FRANKEL LLP1177Avenueof theAmericasNew York, NY 10036

Attorneysfor Amicus CuriaeAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion ofTexas

KL3;2409069-

CONSOLIDATEDAPPEALSNOS. 07-04-00457-CR(Ward)& 07-04-00490-CR(Smith)

LEAD COUNSEL:

EdwardJasonDennis(No. 24045776)LYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P.750North St. Paul Street,Suite 1400Dallas,TX 75210

Attorneysfor Amicus CuriaeAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionandAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion of Texas

OF COUNSEL:

GregoryA. HorowitzPatriciaA. SeithIlyssaB. SenaKRAMER LEVIN& FRANKEL LLP1177Avenueof theAmericasNew York,NY 10036

IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURTOF APPEALSOF TEXAS

TRACY YOLANDA WARD, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

RHONDA TULANE SMITH, Appellant,

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROMTHE 320TH DISTRICT COURTTHE HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON,JUDGEPRESIDING

BRIEFOF AMICUS CURIAE

NAFTALIS

KL12409069. I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . iii

STATEMENT INTERESTOF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1

ARGUMENT 3

THE DISTRICT AnORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACYUNDERTHE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION 3

A. Allowing theDistrict Attorneyto ProsecutePregnantWomenfor TakingControlledSubstancesWould OpenTheDoorToOppressiveRestrictionsOnPregnantWomen 4

B. WomenDo Not LosetheRightof PrivacyWhen TheyBecomePregnant 10

C. AppellantsHavea FundamentalLiberty Interestin TheirIndividual Autonomy 12

II. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESSUNDERTHE UNITED STATESCONSITUTION 15

A. Construing§ 481.122to ReachPrenatalConduct WouldRenderthe StatuteVoid for Vagueness 16

1. Nothingin § 481.122or thePenalCodeGivesReasonableNoticethata FetusWouldbeConsidereda “Child” forPurposesof thatCriminal Statute 17

2. Nothing in § 481.122ProvidesAdequateNoticethataPregnantWoman’sAct ofTaking aControlledSubstanceWouldConstitute“Delivery” to theFetus 21

B. TheProsecutor’sEnforcementof § 481.122AgainstAppellantsis Arbitrary 23

—1—KL3:2409069, I

III. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTIONOFAPPELLANTS VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTSTO PRIVACY ANDDUE PROCESSUNDERTHE TEXAS CONSTITUTION 24

IV. IF § 481.122APPLIED TO PRENATAL CONDUCT,APPELLANTS’ CONVICTIONSWOULD VIOLATE THE EXPOSTFACTO CLAUSESOF THE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION,AS WELL AS OF THE TEXASCONSTITUTION 25

PRAYER 27

— 11 —

KL3:2409069-I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

In reA.C.,

573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) 9Arkansas Dep’t of HumanSvs. v. Collier,

95 S.W.3d772 (S.Ct. Ark. 2003) 10

BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559 (1996) 17 n.5

Bouie v. City of Columbia,

378 U.S. 347(1964) 25

Carey v. Population Services Intern.,431 U.S. 678 (1977) 12 & n.4

City of Chicago v. Morales,527 U.S.41(1999) 16

City of Richmond v. IA. Croson Co.,498 U.S. 469(1989) 13

City of Sherman v. Henry,

928 S.W.2d464 (1996). .24

Clark v. Martinez,U.S. —, 125 S. Ct 716 (2005) 20

Clark v. State,665 S.W.2d476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) 25

Collins v. State,890 S.W.2d893 (Tex.App.— El Paso1994) 20

Collins v. Youngblood,497 U.S. 37 (1990) 25

DenverAreaEducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. F.C.C.,518 U.S. 727 (1996) 14

111 —

KL3:2409069I

Fergusonv. City ofCharleston,532U.S. 67 (2001) 1

In re FetusBrown,689 N.E.2d397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 9

Fogo v. State,830 S.W.2d592(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) 24

Grayne.d v. City of Rockford,408 U.S. 104 (1972) 16,23

In re GuardianshipofJ.D .5,864So.2d 534(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 7, 8, 9

Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,499 U.S. 187 (1991) 11

Johnson v. State,602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992)

Johnson v. State,

829 S.W.2d836(Tex.App. —Dallas,1992) 22

Kolenderv. Lawson,461 U.S. 352(1983) 15

Peoplev. Hardy,469N.W.2d 50 (Mich. App. 1991) 23

PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri v. Danforth,428U.S. 52 (1976) 10

PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,505 U.S. 833 (1992) 10, 11, 12 n.4

ExparteRobinson,792 S.W.2d109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 26

Rosev. Locke,423 U.S. 48 (1975) 27

- iV -

KU:2409069I

Shawv. Hunt,517 U.S. 899 (1996) 13

Spellingv. State,825 S.W.2d533(Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 1992) 26

Statev. Jackson,833 S.W.2d220(Tex. App. —Hous.1992) 23

Statev. Luster,419 S.E.2d32 (Ga.Ct. App. 1992) 23

Statev. Nelson,881 S.W.2d97 (Tex.App.—Hous. 1994) 22 n.7

Taft v. Taft,446 N.E.2d395 (Mass. 1983) 9

TexasStateEmployeesUnion v. TexasDep’t ofMentalHealth & MentalRetardation,746 S.W.2d203 (Tex. 1987) 24

In re theRetentionofTanyaP.,No. 530869/93slip op. (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Feb.24, 1995) 8

Thomasv. State,832 S.W.2d47(Tex.Crim.App.1992) 21

In re Unborn Child ofStar/cs,18 P.3d342(5. Ct Okla. 2001) 9-10

UnitedStatesv. Lanier,520 U.S. 259 (1997) 20

Vaughnv. Ruoff253 F.3d 1124 (8thCir. 2004) 12

VillageofHoffmanEstatesv. FlipsideHoffmanEstates,Inc.,455 U.S. 489 (1982) 16

Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distributors,Inc.,727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987) 18,20

KL3:24O9cI69.I

Women‘s Med. Ctr. OfNorthwestHoustonv. Bell,248 F.3d411 (SthCir. 2001) 16

STATUTES

SenateComm.on StateAffairs, Bill Analysis,Tex. S.B. 319, 78thLeg passim

Tex.Alco. Bev. Code§ 106.06 7

Tex. Const.art. I, § 16 26

Tex.Fam.Code§ 261.103(a) 4

Tex. Health& SafetyCode§ 16 1.082 7

Tex. Health& SafetyCode§ 48 1.002(8) 21

Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 481.104 7

TexasHealth& Safety Code§ 481.122 passim

TexasPenalCode§ 1.07(a)(26) 15, 20n.6

Tex.PenalCode§ 19.06 18

Tex.PenalCode~22.12 18

Tex.PenalCode§ 49.12 18

U.S.Const.art. 1, § 9 cI. 3 25

U.S.Const.art. 1, § 10 cI. 1 25

MISCELLANEOUS

AmericanCollegeof ObstetriciansandGynecologists,PlanningYourPregnancyandBirth, 100-01 (3ded. 2000) 5,7 n.2

CharlesLevendorsky,“Turning Womeninto Two-LeggedPetri Dishes,” Star-Tribune,Jan.21, 1990 8

- Vi -

KL~.24O9O69,I

CharlesLevendosky,“Using theLaw to MakeJusticethe Victim,” Star-Tribune,Feb4, 1990 8

Heidi Murkoff etal., WhatTo ExpectWhenYou’reExpecting,57-61(3d ed. 2002) 5, 6, 7 n.2

MichelleD. Mills, FetalAbuseProsecutions:“The TriumphofReactionOver

Reason”, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 989, 1022 (1998) 6 n.1

Nicholson Eastman, M.D., ExpectantMotherhood,78 (3d ed. 1957) 5

“Girl Detainedto ProtectFetus”, Wis. StateJ. Aug. 16, 1985 8

Op. Tex. Att’y Gen.No. GA-0291 (2005) 18 n.6

- Vii -

KL3:2409069I

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICESOF THE COURT OFAPPEALS:

TheAmericanCivil LibertiesUnion (“ACLU”) andACLU ofTexas,by its

undersignedcounsel,andpursuantto theprovisionsoftheTexasRulesofAppellate

Procedure,file thisAmicus Curiaebrief

STATEMENT INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

TheAmericanCivil LibertiesUnionis anationwide,nonprofit, nonpartisan

organizationwith over400,000membersdedicatedto theconstitutionalprinciplesof

libertyandequality. TheACLU ofTexasis its stateaffiliate. This caseraisesimportant

questionsabouttheright ofpregnantwomento privacyanddueprocess.TheACLU has

fought for theserightsin numerouscontextsover the yearsincluding, amongothers,

appearingasamicuscuriaein Fergusonv. City ofCharleston,532U.S. 67 (2001)

(holdingthatwomencannotbesubjectto warrantless,suspicionlesssearchessimply

becausethey arepregnant),andascounselin Johnsonv. State,602 So .2d 1288, 1297

(Fla. 1992) (rejectingapplicationofdrugdeliverystatuteto pregnantwoman). The

properresolutionof this caseis thereforeamatterofsubstantialconcernto theACLU

andits members.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This caseis the resultofaprosecutor’sdecisionto put anovel, sweeping,

andimpermissibleconstructionon a statute. Lookingto SenateBill (“S.B.”) 319,which

amendedthedefinition of“individual” in thePenalCode,thePotterCountyDistrict

AttorneymaintainsthatTexasHealth& SafetyCode§ 481.122,thestatuteprohibiting

thedelivery ofacontrolledsubstanceto children,appliesto theconductofpregnant

1KL32409069 I

womentowardstheir fetuses. Butneitherthe statutenor thelegislativehistorycontains

anyhint of suchan intention. TheprosecutionoftheAppellantshereviolatestheUnited

StatesandTexasConstitutionsin at leastthreefundamentalways.

First, theprosecutionsat issueviolatetheright to privacy. If thefetus

constitutesa child for the purposeof Texasstatutes,thestatecould intrudein virtually

everyaspectofawoman’slife on thepretextof protectingthe fetus. Therewould be no

logical stoppingpoint to theintrusionson individual autonomy. But inherentlypersonal

decisionsrelatingto individual autonomyarc constitutionallyprotected,andwomendo

not losetheright to privacywhentheybecomepregnant.

Theprosecutionsat issuehereare theresultofasingleprosecutor’s

idiosyncraticnotionofwhatpublic policy shouldbe,not anylegislativedetermination

thatsomestateinterestshouldbeadvancedby subjectingpregnantwomento draconian

criminal sanctions.Protectingfetusesfrom maternaldrugusewasno partof the Texas

Legislature’sintent in enactingS .B. 319. Indeed,whentheLegislaturemodifiedthe

definition of“individual” underthePenalCodeto include fetusesit was careful to

excludeeveryform of potentialcriminal liability for pregnantwomen. TheLegislature

did so for goodreason. If womencanbecomefelonsfor usingdrugswhilepregnant,they

will be less likely to seekprenatalcare,shareinformationfreely with theirdoctors,or

carry their pregnancies to term. The State has vastly less intrusive and more effective

means at its disposal to further this interest.

Second, construing § 481.122 to reach a pregnant woman’s prenatal

conductwould violate theDueProcessclausesofthe UnitedStatesandTexas

2KL32409069I

Constitutions,which requirethat lawsbe sufficiently clearto providecitizensfair notice

as to whatconductis criminally prohibited. Among otherthings,thisguaranteeis

intendedto ensurethatlegislators,ratherthanlaw enforcementofficials, decidewhat

conductis subjectto prosecution.No citizenofordinaryintelligencecouldpossiblyhave

foreseenthe prosecutingattorney’sinterpretation,basedasit is on acontortedand

unfoundedreadingof thecode. And the statutepunishing“delivery” ofacontrolled

substance hasneverbeeninterpretedto applyto transactionsoccurringinsideone

person’s body. What is more, the very legislation on which the prosecutor relies excepts

pregnantwomenfrom its terms. The statute,asit is interpretedby theprosecutor,does

not satisfytheconstitutionalrequirementof fair notice.

Third, if § 481.122appliedto prenatalconducttowardsthefetus,

Appellants’ convictionswould violatethe expostfacto clauseoftheUnitedStates

Constitution,aswell asoftheTexasConstitution.Even if theCourtacceptsthe

prosecutor’sargument,given, amongotherthings,thenon-obviousnatureofthe

prosecutor’spositionandthefactthat apregnantwoman’sprenatalconductwasnot

previouslysubjectto criminal sanction,criminal penaltieson thatbasisshouldbe

imposedonly on futureconductandAppellants’ convictionsshouldbereversed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE UNITEDSTATES CONSTITUTION

Prosecutingpregnant women on the grounds that their personal useof

controlled substancesconstitutes“delivery” of drugsto a child would openthe door to

31(1.3:24090691

prosecution of a pregnant womanfor any behavior that could be detrimental to her fetus,

from smoking and drinking to eating tuna fish. This is a road with no logical stopping

point. While encouraging proper prenatal careis undeniablya laudablegoal, it cannot be

usedto justify extraordinaryintrusionsinto thezoneofpersonaldecision-makingthatis

protectedby theright to privacyundertheUnitedStatesConstitution. In fact, theTexas

Legislature has not even tried to advancefetal healthby expandingHealth& SafetyCode

§ 481.122 to reach prenatal conduct by pregnant women, for good reason. Such an effort

would in fact undermine the very goal it sought to achieve. Prosecuting chemically-

dependant pregnant women under § 481.122 would only serve to make them avoid

medical treatment, be less candid with their physicians, or prompt them to terminate

pregnancies rather than face criminal prosecution. The Constitution does not

countenancesuchresults.

A. Allowing theDistrict Attorney to ProsecutePregnantWomenfor TakingControlledSubstancesWould OpenTheDoor To OppressiveRestrictionsOn PregnantWomen

If S.B. 319canbestretchedto readthata fetusis a “child” for purposesof

drug deliveryunder § 481.122,thenthereis nothingto stoptheprosecutorfrom

interpreting“child” underthe child abusestatutes,Tex. Fam.Code§ 261.103(a),to

includea fetus. Suchaconstruction— which flows from theprosecutor’sargument—

would criminalizeabroadrangeof conductandput mostpregnantwomenat riskof

prosecution.

4KL3:2409069. I

Forgenerations,pregnantwomenhavereceivedawide andfrequently

changing list of warnings about potential threats to their fetuses. In the middle of the last

century,apopularpregnancyguidetold womento limit theirsmokingto tencigarettesor

fewer per day — although if they had“beenusedto smokingconsiderablymorethan this

for several years” they should “by no means to try to give them up during pregnancy”

because that would be too upsetting. Nicholson Eastman, M.D., ExpectantMotherhood,

78 (3d ed. 1957). Baths during late pregnancy were forbidden because of the fear of

infection from bath water. Id. at 66, 71. “Under no circumstances” could pregnant

womenengage in sexual intercourse during the last month of pregnancy. Id. at 73.

Pregnant women were told to eat “no more and no less” than they had eaten before they

became pregnant, limit salt intake drastically, andgainbetween20 and24 pounds. Id. at

46, 65, 67.

Thebehavioralguidelinescurrentlyurgedon pregnantwomenareeven

more restrictive and all encompassing. They are told to stop smoking entirely and

immediately; avoid second-handsmoke;andabstainfrom alcohol consumptionalmost

altogether. Heidi Murkoff, et a!., WhatTo ExpectWhenYou’reExpecting,57-61 (3d ed.

2002); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Planning YourPregnancy

and Birth 100-01 (3d ed. 2000) (hereinafter “ACOG”). Changing cat litter, consuming

unpasteurized milk, or gardening without gloves is off limits because of the threat of

toxoplasmosis. Murkoff, supra,at 67-68. Numerous foods, such as swordfish and tuna,

are frowned upon. Id. at 148. Pregnant womenare warned not to stand in front of the

microwave oven when it is on and to check it for leaks; wear rubber gloves and avoid

5KL3:2409069I

inhaling when cleaning; limit exposure to potentially harmful chemicals; ensure that their

drinking water is free of lead; cut back on or give up caffeine; and stay away from or

limit drinking herbal tea. Id. at 63-65, 69, 7 1-72. Womenare now told that they should

gain no less than 25, and no more than 35, pounds during pregnancy, and that they should

engage in regular—but not too strenuous — exercise. ACOG,supra,at 71-8 1, 129;

Murkoff, supra, at 190-203. Even their sleep position is dictated: pregnant women

should sleep on their left side, not on their backs. ACOG,supra, at 82-83.

Thesedirectivestouchon virtually everyaspectof apregnantwoman’slife,

andevolveconstantlyasmedicalknowledgechanges.On thebasisofcurrentknowledge

(which couldeasily changein thefuture), all or most of thesemaybesensibleguidelines.

But thathardlymeansthat theyshouldbegiventheforce of law, with criminal penalties

for disobedience. If the state could punish a pregnant woman because her personal

behavior resulted in controlled substances reaching her fetus, it could just as easily police

theinnumerableotheraspectsof herlife thatcouldaffectthe fetus. Thestatecould, for

example, make it unlawful for a pregnant womanto enter a smoke-filled room, eat tuna

fish, or take a bath.’

In fact, thereasoningemployedby theprosecutionin this casecouldbe

deployed to prosecute a pregnant womanfor drinking a beer because it is unlawful to

This road could also lead the state to launch an investigation whenever a womanmiscarries, or gives birth to a child with birth defects, in order to determine whether thatdevastating event was somehow her fault. SeeMichelle D. Mills, FetalAbuseProsecutions:The TriumphofReactionOverReason,47 DePaulL. Rev.989, 1022(1998) (citing Lynn Paltrow, “FetalAbuse”: ShouldWeRecognizeitas a Crime?75 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 39).

6KL32409069.l

deliveralcohol to aminor, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code§ 106.06;or for smokinga cigarette,2

Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 161.082(criminalizingtheprovisionofcigaretteor tobacco

productto aminor); or for takingcertainprescriptiondrugsthathavebeenapprovedby

theUnited StatesFoodandDrug Administrationbut areincludedin thepenaltygroups

listed in § 481.122, see Tex.Health& SafetyCode§~481.104and48l.122

(criminalizing the delivery of certain prescriptiondmg~to achild).

Unfortunately, this is not a fanciful parade of horribles. There is ample

evidence of the willingness of state authoritiesto intrudeon pregnantwomen’srights in

the name of protecting fetal development. These measures are usually rescindedor

rejected by the courts, but often too late to prevent unwarranted suffering and deprivation

of the woman’s rights.

For example, in In re Guardiansh,~ofJ.D.S,864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 2004), a womanin a group home who suffered from severe mental retardation,

cerebral palsy, autism, and seizure disorder became pregnant as a result of rape. A

guardian was appointed for J.D.S., who recommendedthatshecontinuethepregnancy.

An individualsoughtto be appointedguardianfor the fetus,arguingthatanadvocatefor

thebestinterestsofthe womanwasnot enough. Theguardianargued,andonejudge

noted, that a guardian for the fetus could potentiallyexertcontroloversuchdecisionsas

“whether to obtain a sonogram, use of anaesthesia for medical procedures, the typeof

2 The reasoning employed by the prosecutor could even be applied to others

smoking in the presence of a pregnant woman, given that doing so might impact thehealth of the fetus. Murkoff supra, at 57-61; ACOG,supra, at 100-0 1.

71CL3:2409069.I

vitamins, choice of delivery,medicationsor otherprenatal‘dilemmas’ [thatwould] have

a profound impact on the well-being of the unborn child.” Id. at 547 (Pleus, J.

dissenting). These are, of course, the very kinds of decisions every womancarrying a

pregnancy makes. If a guardian could be appointed for J.D.S.’s fetus, there would be no

reason a guardian could not be appointed for the fetus in any other case.3

On counfless other occasions,stateauthoritieshaveseizedanddetained,or

threatenedto seizeanddetain,pregnantwomenin thenameofprotectingthefetus. For

example:

• In Wisconsin, officials held a pregnant sixteen-year-old in securedetention for the sake of fetal development because the young womantended “to be on the run” and “lack[ed] motivation or ability to seekmedical care.” “Girl Detained to Protect Fetus,” Wis. State J., Aug. 16,1985, at 3.2.

• Wyoming officials arrested a pregnant womanbecause of alcohol use andcharged her with felony child abuse. She spent time in jail before a judgedismissed the charge. SeeCharlesLevendosky,“Tuning WomenintoTwo-LeggedPetriDishes,”Star-Tribune,Jan.21, 1990, at A8; CharlesLevendosky,“UsingtheLaw to MakeJusticethe Victim,” Star-Tribune,Feb.4, 1990, atA8.

• NewYork state officials detained a pregnant womanin a mental hospitalagainst her will on the sole ground that, if released, she would resumedrug use and thereby pose a danger to her fetus. In re theRetentionofTanyaP., No. 530869/93, slip op. at 2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 1995).The court ordered the womanreleased, and, in a subsequently issuedwritten decision, emphasizedthatthe “right to determineone’s medicaltreatment and to make reproductive choices is, and must be, superior toany interest which the state may have in an unborn fetus.” Id. at 6, 26.After her release, the womangave birth to a healthy and drug-free baby.Id. at 1 & 6 n. 3.

The court held that appointment of such a guardian was unauthorized.

8ICL~:24O9O69j

In othercases,stateauthoritieshavesoughtto compelpregnantwomento

submit to invasive surgery in the name of promoting fetal health:

• In Massachusetts,a lower court orderedapregnantwoman’scervix sewnup against her will to prevent a possible miscarriage. Taft v. Taft, 446N.E.2d 395, 396 (Mass. 1983). The womanwas ultimately spared fromundergoing the procedure by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, whichvacated the lower court’s order because the record did not show“circumstances so compelling as to justif~’ curtailing[her] constitutionalrights,” id. at 397.

• In the District of Columbia, one young pregnant woman, severely ill withcancer, several times mouthed the words “I don’t want it done” when toldthat a court had ordered her to undergo a caesarian. In reA.C., 573 A.2d1235, 1241 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). The baby died within a few hours ofthe surgery and the womandied two days later. Id. An en banc panel ofthe District of Columbia Court of Appeals later vacated the court orderand held that “in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is tobe decided by the patient — the pregnant woman— on behalf of herself andthe fetus.” Id. at 1237.

• In Illinois, a pregnant woman— who opposed on religious groundsundergoing a blood transfusion for the alleged benefit of her fetus —

appealed from an order appointingaguardianadlitem for herfetus. Thebloodtransfusionwent forwardagainstherwishes,but theappellatecourtlater held that this had been error. “Under the law of this State, however,we cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant woman to consent toan invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable fetus.” In reFetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

It thus takes no stretch of theimaginationto seethattheactionsof thelocal

prosecutor in this case could be the beginning of an onslaught of intervention whenever a

pregnant woman’s medical decisions might be consideredat oddswith theinterestsofthe

fetus. Allowing the state to manage and intervene in decisionsaboutapregnantwoman’s

prenatal care and her medical treatmentwould createa “universeoftroublingquestions.”

In re Guardianship of .JD.S,864 So. 2d at 540 (Orfinger, J., concurring); seealso In re

91CL324090691

Unborn Child of Star/cs, 18 P.3d342 (Okla. 2001)(holding trial courterredin providing

an avenue to take temporary emergency custody of appellant’s fetus); Arkansas Dep ‘t of

HumanSvs.v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772 (Ark. 2003) (holding lower court’s order placing

the fetus in custodyof the Departmentof HumanServicesto provideprenatalcare

exceeded statutory authority andconstitutedgrossabuseofdiscretion).TheConstitution

simply does not tolerate such state intrusion into the private realm of what a womandoes

with her body.

B. WomenDo Not Lose the Right of Privacy When They BecomePregnant

The days have long ago passed when courts would tolerate paternalistic

regulation of womenon the basis of their sex or in the name of protectingthe fetus. The

United States Supreme Court has held, for example, that the state cannot regulate a

woman’s pregnancy so as to respect her husband’s interest in the fetus, nor can it deny

her employ in the name of protectingthefetus.

In PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992), the Court

struck down a Pennsylvania law that required a married womanto notify her husband

before having an abortion. See id. at 887-98; seealso PlannedParenthoodofCentral

Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976). The Court recognizedthatahusbandhas

a “deep and proper concern and interest” in the fetus his wife is carrying, but ruled that

the husband’s interest did not “outweigh{] a wife’s liberty” and did not permit the state to

regulate her pregnancy to protect his interest. Casey. at 895 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S.

at 69), 898. As the Court reasoned:

10KL~:24O9O69.I

[I]f the husband’s interest in the fetus’ safety is asufficientpredicatefor state regulation, the State could reasonably conclude thatpregnant wives should notify their husbands before drinking alcoholor smoking. Perhaps married womenshould notify their husbandsbefore using contraceptivesorbeforeundergoingany typeof surgerythat mayhavecomplicationsaffecting thehusband’sinterestin hiswife’s reproductiveorgans.And if ahusband’sinterestjustifiesnotice in any of these cases,onemight reasonablyargnethat itjustifies exactly what the Danforth Courtheld it didnotjustify — arequirement of the husband’s consent as well.

Id. at 898. Following Casey’s reasoning,if it is impermissiblefor thestateto give a

husband this kind of dominion over his wife, then surely it is impermissiblefor the state

to assert such control.

On other occasions, too, the Court has held that women’s conduct, and in

particulartheirjob choices,cannotbe limited so asto protectthefetus. In Int’l Union v.

Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), the SupremeCourtunanimouslyinvalidated

an employment policy that barred fertile womenfrom certain work in a battery plant

because of the risk of lead exposure. The Court noted that the bias inherent in the

challenged policy was “obvious” because “[fjertile men, but not fertile women” were

“given a choice as to whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductivehealthfor a

particular job.” Id. at 197. As theCourtheld, even“professedmoral andethical

concerns about the welfare of the next generationdo not suffice” tojustifij reducingthe

legal status of womento less than full adults. JohnsonControls,499 U.S. at 206; see

also Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-98.

11KL3 2409069I

Theprosecutionsat issueseekto trumpwomen’sright to autonomy,bodily

integrity, and privacy with the state’s interest in the health of the fetus. This flies in the

face of Supreme Court precedent and cannot be sustained.

C. No State Interest Justifies the Prosecutions at Issue Here

Inherently personal decisions as to what one does with his or her own body,

including thoserelatedto awoman’sdecisionsduringpregnancy,areprotectedby the

fundamentalright to privacyandcanonly besubjectto stateregulationon thebasisofa

compelling state interest. SeeCareyv. PopulationServs.Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89

(1977) (applying strict scrutiny and rejecting a regulation limiting access of minors to

contraceptives “because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally

protectedright ofdecisionin mattersof childbearingthat is theunderlyingfoundationof

the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, andRoev. Wade.”); Vaughnv. Ruoff 253

F.3d 1124, 1128-29(8th Cir. 2004) (reasoningthatbecause“a personaldecisionrelating

to procreationor contraceptionis aprotectedliberty interest,” involuntarysterilizationis

constitutionalonly if “it is anarrowlytailoredmeansto achieveacompellinggovernment

interest”).”

Reasoning that “[a]bortion is a unique act,” the Supreme Court has departedfromthe compelling interest standard with respect to the right to abort a pregnancy, holdingthat state regulationsin connectionwith awoman’sright to terminateherpregnancyareevaluated to determinewhetherthoseregulationspresentan “undueburden”on thatright.SeeCasey,505 U.S. at 852, 876-79. As the cases cited in the text make clear, however,the strict scrutiny holding of Careyhas been reaffirmed as to other intrusions on personalautonomy relating to childbearing.

12KL3:2409069I

Underanyanalysis,intrusionson theright to privacycannotbebasedon an

individual prosecutor’snotionofappropriatepublic policy, which is all wehavehere. It

is crucial to recognize what we understand to be an indisputed fact: Protecting the fetus

from maternaldrugusewasnopart oftheTexasLegislature’sintent in enactingS.B.

319. SeeShawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (1996) (“To be a compelling interest, the

State must show that the alleged objective wa~the legislature’s ‘actual purpose.”) (citing

MississippiUniv. for Womenv. Hogan,458 U.S. 718, 730) (1982)); City ofRichmondv.

J. A. Croson Co., 498 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (looking to actual purpose of legislative action

in EqualProtectioncontextandapplyingstrict scrutinybecausethe “purposeofstrict

scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is

pursuing a goal important enough to warrantuse of a highly suspect tool”).

TheLegislatureneverevencontemplatedthepossibility thataprosecutor

would try to use the expanded definition of“individual” underthePenalCodeto

prosecute pregnant womanunder Health & Safety Code § 481.122. Indeed, the only

pertinent evidence in the record is an affidavit from the sponsor of S .B. 3 19

demonstrating that the Legislature,in expandingthedefinition of“individual” underthe

Penal Code to include fetuses, never intended to criminalize prenatal conduct. (Ward

CR. Vol. IV, p. 1120). Where the Legislature did recognize the potential for the

expandeddefinition of“individual” to beusedto prosecuteapregnantwomanfor actions

causing harm to her fetus, it expressly excludedthatpossibility. SeeSenateComm.on

State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. 5.13. 319,78

th Leg., R.S. (2003).

131CL3:2409069I

InsofarastheLegislaturenevercontemplatedagoalofprotectingthe fetus

from prenatal drugusein enactingS.B. 319,it follows that theLegislaturenever

consideredwhetherthatunrecognizedgoalcouldbeachievedthroughnarrowermeans.

“When applying strict scrutiny, we will not assume plausible alternatives will fail to

protect compelling interests; there must be some basis in the record, in legislative

findings or otherwise, establishingthelaw enactedastheleastrestrictivemeans.” See

DenverAreaEducationalTelecommunicationsConsortium,Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727,

807 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Sable

CommunicationsofCal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989)).

Threateningpregnantwomenwith lengthyprisonsentencescouldhardlybe

called the narrowest means to protect the fetus. To the contrary, the approach taken by

theprosecutorherewouldinevitably becounterproductivebecauseit gives the

chemically-dependent pregnant womanunfortunate incentives. She might not share vital

informationwith herhealthcareprovider,or forgo medicalcarealtogether,in orderto

avoid detection. She might even abort her fetus to avoid breaking the law. If she decides

to go forward with her pregnancy, putting her in prison for up to twenty years (the

sentence initially sought by the prosecutor here) would obviouslybe devastatingto the

well-being of the child that the fetus is to become. Any State interest in the fetus would

be far better served through other means, such as education, accessiblemedicalcare,and

drugtreatmentfacilities for pregnantwomen.

14KL3:240~O69i

II. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESSUNDERTHE UNITED STATES CONSITUTION

Neither the statutory language relied upon by the prosecutor, nor the

manner in which it has previously been enforced, provided Appellantswith anything

approachingthenoticerequiredby theDueProcessClauseof theUnitedStates

Constitution. No pregnant woman could reasonably have expected that the Texas Health

& Safety Code § 48 1.122, which prohibits “Delivery of Controlled Substance or

Marihuana to [a] Child,” would be applied to her own ingestion of a controlled substance

and its consequentindirect“delivery” to her fetus. Nor couldanypregnantwoman

reasonably have expected that § 481.122 would be stretched to such an end by virtue of

the Legislature’s amendment of the Penal Code to include a fetus within the definition of

“individual” under Texas Penal Code § 1 .07(a)(26). Nothing in either of these provisions

evidences any intentionto reachprenatalconduct. To thecontrary,astheprosecutor

admits, the Legislature took pains to ensure that the expanded definition of “individual”

could not be used to prosecutepregnantwomenfor actionsthatharmtheir fetus. See

Appellee’s Brief at 8.

Moreover, Appellants were prosecuted as a result of an arbitrary decision

by a single prosecutor,baseduponwhat couldcharitablybecalleda “unique” theoryof

statutory interpretation not shared by law enforcementofficials in anyotherdistrict of

this state. This is a separate and independently fatal due process violation. See Kolender

v. Lawson,461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).

15KL3:2409069 I

A. Construing§ 481.122to ReachPrenatalConduct

Would RendertheStatuteVoid for Vagueness

For thereasonsably setforth in Appellants’Brief, thestatutorylanguageat

issuehereunambiguouslyprecludesprosecutionofpregnantwomenfor delivering

controlledsubstancesto their fetuses.But evenif the prosecutor’sconstructionofthe

statutesweretenable,theseprosecutionswouldrun afoul ofthedueprocessrequirements

oftheUnited StatesConstitution.As the SupremeCourthasnoted,“[n]o onemaybe

requiredat peril of life, libertyorpropertyto speculateasto themeaningofpenal

statutes.” City ofChicagov. Morales,527U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (quotingLanzettav. New

Jersey,306 U.S.451,453 (1939)). Moreover,vaguestatutesareconstitutionally

problematicbecausetheycourttherisk ofarbitraryenforcementby delegating“basic

policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective

basis.” Graynedv. City ofRockford,408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A statute will be

declaredunconstitutionallyvagneasappliedwhereit either(1) fails to providethose

targeted by the statute a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, or

(2) is so indefinite that it allows arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Women‘s

Med. Cit. ofNorthwestHoustonv. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 421(5th Cir. 2001) (collecting

cases); seealso VillageofHoffmanEstatesv. Flipside, HoffmanEstates,Inc., 455 U.S.

489, 498 (1982) (noting that statute is vagne if it fails to “give the person of ordinary

intelligencea reasonableopportunityto know what is prohibited”).5

It is no answerto assert,as theprosecutordoes,that thedefendantcouldhaveknownher conduct was illegal in somerespect. To the contrary, the relevant inquiry iswhetherthedefendantsreceivedadequatenoticethattheirconductviolatedthespecjflc

161(12:2409069.1

1. Nothingin § 481.122orthePenalCodeGivesReasonableNoticethata FetusWould beConsidereda “Child” for Purposesofthat Criminal Statute

TheprosecutorcontendsthattheLegislaturecriminalizedapregnant

woman’s prenatal conduct impliedly, and silently, when it enactedS.B. 319 expanding

the Penal Code definition of “legal entity” to include fetuses. Whenthe state seeks to

plow new legal ground by criminalizing conduct not ordinarily within the scope of the

penal laws, fairness requires that it do so with clarity; impliedly and silently will not pass

muster.

The language of § 481 .122 cannot fairly be read to reach delivery of

controlled substances to a fetus. As an initial matter, theprosecutordoesnot eventry to

contend that § 481.122 reached such conduct before the Legislature enactedS.B. 319 in

2003. Rather,theprosecutorrelies entirelyon thenotionthatS.B. 319somehow

expanded§ 481.122to createanewcriminal offense. But S.B.319 did nottouch §

481.122;it merelymodifiedthemeaningofthe term“individual” for purposesofthe

PenalCode.

Section481.122of theHealth& SafetyCodedoesnot usetheword

“individual.” To thecontrary,it prohibitsthedeliveryof a controlled substance to a

“person. . . who is a child.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.122(a)(l) (2004). “Child”

is in turndefinedas it isgenerallyandcommonly used: as “a person younger than 18

penalstatutein question. See,e.g.,BMWofNorth America,Inc. v. Gore, 517U.S. 559,574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudencedictatethatapersonreceivefair noticenot only oftheconductthatwill subjecthim topunishment,but alsoof theseverityofthepenaltythata Statemay impose”).

17KL3:2409069.I

years of age.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 48 1.122(d). The Texas Supreme Court has

held that the term “child” should not be construed to include fetuses unless the

Legislature has specificallyso decreed.SeeWitty v. Am. Gen.CapitalDistributors,Inc.,

727 S.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Tex. 1987).6

Whenit enacted S.B. 319, the Legislaturewascareful to exclude harmto a

fetus resulting from an action by a pregnant woman. SeeSenateComm.on State Affairs,

Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 319, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (“S .B. 319 amends the Penal Code to

allow theprosecutionofapersonwho harmsor kills anunbornchild, unlessthedeathis.

the result of an action by the mother.”); seealso Tex. PenalCode§ 19.06 (“This

chapter [relating to homicide] does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the

conduct charged is. . . conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child); Tex. Penal

Code § 22.12 (“This chapter [relating to assaults] does not apply to conduct charged as

having been committed against an individual who is an unborn child if the conduct is

committed by the mother of the unborn child.”); Tex. Penal Code § 49.12 (“Sections

49.07 and 49.08 [intoxicated assault and intoxicated manslaughter] do not apply to injury

to or the death of an unborn child if the conduct charged is conduct committed by the

mother of the unborn child). Overriding the presumption established in Witty, as the

prosecutor attempts here, would thwart the declared intention of the Legislature that

pregnant womennot be prosecuted for their prenatal conduct. In fact, the bill’s House

6 The Attorney General has handed down an opinion employing similar reasoning

for theproposition that physicians are not required by the change to the definition of“individual” in § 1.07 to reportpregnantwomenwho takedrugs for engagingin theabuse of a “child.” See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen.No. GA-0291 (2005).

18KL2:2409069I

sponsor,Rep.RobertRaymondAllen, hasstatedin a swornaffidavit that it was “not the

intentoftheLegislatureto allow prosecutionofwomenfor conduct.. . that theycommit

against their unborn child.” (Ward CR. Vol. IV, p. 1120). It defies logic to think that

theLegislature,havingspecificallysoughtto precludeprosecutionofpregnantwomen

underS.B. 319, would,at the sametime, haveintendedto enablesuchprosecutionsunder

theHealth& SafetyCode.

Indeed,theprosecutor’sown argumentsevidencethe overreachinghereat

issue.Theprosecutorsaysthat§ 481.122 “provides that a person (any person) commits

an offense if she knowingly delivers a controlled substance to a person under the age of

18 years,” and notes that “person” is defined elsewhere as any “individual, corporation,

government, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association,or any legal entity.”

Appellee’s Brief at 6 (underlining provided by the prosecutor).From thesepremises,the

prosecutorreasonsthat“a very strangeinterpretationoftheterm ‘legal entity’ would be

neededif it werenow construedsoasto excludeabeingthatmaysue,beprosecutedfor,

andis otherwiseaffordedall otherprotectionsof thelaws [sic: of] this State.” Id. at 7.

But considerwherethe prosecutor’sreasoningleads.If § 481.122criminalizesthe

delivery of a controlled substance to any “legal entity.. . underthe ageof 18 years”(as

the prosecutorexpresslyparsesthe statute,id.), then somebody could properly be arrested

for delivery of controlled substance to a child for finding a vial of crack cocaine and

turning it in to a local police department that has only been in existence for ten years.

(Recall that “person” is defined to include governments, as well as corporations,

19KL3:2409069.I

partnerships,andso on.) Theprosecutionofpregnantwomenbasedon thestatuteshere

is no less absurd.

Especiallyin light ofthe Wittypresumption,aswell astheLegislature’s

expressed intent not to impact pregnant women, the term “child” as used in § 481.122 can

only rationallybeconstruedto meanhumanbeingswho are born— not governments,not

corpbrations, not fetuses — undertheageof eighteen.SeeClark v. Martinez, -- U.S. --,

125 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2005) (noting that “when deciding which of two plausible statutory

constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequencesof its choice”

and that if “one of them would raise a multitude of other constitutional problems, the

other should prevail”); cf UnitedStatesv. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[A]s a sort

of ‘junior version of the vagueness doctrine,’ the canon of strict construction of criminal

statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal

statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.” (citation omitted)).

In 1994, the Court of Appeals, El Paso Division, considered an example of

prosecutorial overreaching strikingly similar to the present case: a womanwastriedand

convicted of “reckless endangermentof achild” for takingdrugswhile pregnant.Collins

v. State,890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.— El Paso 1994). The Court of Appeals reversed,

holding that the law wasunconstitutionallyvagueasappliedbecausethe defendanthad

not been afforded adequate notice that she could face criminalprosecutionfor such

conduct. Id. at 898. The court explicitly rejected the state’s contention that there was

“precedent in Texas for punishing prenatal conduct.” Id. at 897. In that regard, nothing

has changed since Collins was decided. There is no new authority for thepropositionthat

201(12:24090691

a pregnant womancan be punished for her prenatal conduct. Now, as then, the Penal

Codedoesnot confer criminal liability upon womenwho take drugs while pregnant for

harmto their fetus. Indeed,if anything,theexpresslanguageof S.B.319 makesthis fact

evenclearer.

2. Nothingin § 481.122ProvidesAdequateNotice thataPregnantWoman’sAct of Takinga ControlledSubstanceWouldConstitute“Delivery” to theFetus

Theprosecutor’stheory of statutoryconstructionwould furtherrequirethis

Courtto interprettheword “delivery” to includetheinvoluntaryandnonvolitional

transferof acontrolledsubstancefrom apregnantwoman’sbloodstreamto herfetus.

Such aninterpretationis at oddswith ordinarylanguageandjudicial precedent.

In craftingtheTexasHealth& SafetyCode,the Legislaturedefined

“delivery” as“to transfer.actually or constructively,to anotheracontrolledsubstance.”

Tex.Health& SafetyCode§ 481.002(8)(emphasisadded).To deliver, therefore,is to

transfer,a termthat is not definedin thestatutebut whosemeaninghasbeenconsidered

at somelengthby theTexasCourtof Criminal Appeals:

Becausebothactualandconstructivetransfersrequire,by definition, the“transfer” ofacontrolledsubstancefrom thedefendantto anotherperson,we mustexaminethemeaningoftheword “transfer.” “Transfer” is definedin Webster’sNinth New CollegiateDictionary (1988)as“a conveyanceofright, title, or interestin real orpersonalpropertyfrom onepersontoanother.”Black’s Law Dictionary(6thed. 1990)definestransferas“[a]nactof theparties. . . by whichthetitle to property is conveyedfrom onepersonto another.”It is clearto us thattheterm“transfer” plainly requiresavoluntary relinquishment ofpossession in favor of another.

Thomasv. State,832 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (emphasis added).

21KL3:2409069I

This controllingprecedentconfirmswhatordinaryspeakersofthelanguage

already know, namely, that “delivery” or “transfer” is a volitional act: onemustwant to

give up possession of the property to somebody else. Seeid. A pregnantwomancould

only besaidto “deliver” acontrolledsubstanceto herfetus if relinquishingherown

possessionof thatsubstanceandsubsequentlygiving it to herfetus washer goal.

Manifestlyit was not. Whenanaddicttakesdrugs,hergoal is to getherself not

somebodyelse,high.

Moreover,a “delivery” or “transfer” couldonly takeplaceif thefetuscould

actuallytakepossessionofthe controlledsubstance.Of course,fetusesareincapableof

possessingproperty. SeeJohnsonv. State,829 S.W. 2d 836,837 (Tex.App. — Dallas,

1992) (notingthat,to “prove unlawful possessionof a controlledsubstance,the State

must show. . . that the accusedexercisedcare,control,andmanagementoverthe

substance”).At most,thefetuscouldhaveremnantsof controlledsubstancein its

bloodstream.As amatterof law, this doesnot constitute“possession.”“[Nb Texas

court has held that a person could be held in possession of narcotics because residual of

[sic] drugs found in his or herbody.” Statev. Jackson,833 S.W.2d220,223 (Tex. App.

—Hous. l992).~

TheprosecutorarguesthatAppellant’s relianceon Jacksonis misplaced, citingState v. Nelson, 881 S.W.2d97 (Tex.App.—Houston.1994). Appellee’sBrief at 9. Inattempting to distingnish Jackson from thecaseatbar, theprosecutor contends that therewas additionalevidencethat thedefendants“possessed”drugs,aboveandbeyondthemere fact that residue of such substances was present in their bloodstreams. Id. at 9-10.However, as to the question of whether a fetus could possess drugs, its response toAppellants is beside the point. Neither Nelson nor anyotherTexascaseestablishesthat

221(1.2:2409069

The Georgia Court of Appeals embraced this logic in an analogous case,

where it reversed the conviction of a womanwho had given birth to an infant whose

blood contained trace elements of cocaine under a statute making it “unlawful for any

person to deliver or distribute anycontrolled substance.” Statev. Luster,419 S.E.2d32,

33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (internalalterationsomitted). Thecourtheldthat the defendant

hadnot receivedtherequisite“fair warning” that shecould incur criminal liability under

the statute because the “ordinary, logical and commonmeanings of [deliver and

distribute] encompass only transfers that take place between one person and another

person, outside the bodies of the persons involved.” Id. at 34. This interpretation,the

courtnoted,was“in accordwith prior judicial construction,asreportedcasesof criminal

prosecution[underthestatute]haveall involvedthe transferofcontrolledsubstancesto

anotherperson.” Id.; cf Johnsonv. State,602 So.2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting

applicationofdeliverystatuteto pregnantwoman);Peoplev. Hardy, 469N.W.2d 50, 53

(Mich. App. 1991) (same).

B. TheProsecutor’sEnforcementof~481.122AgainstAppellantsisArbitrary

Vague statutes are particularly problematic because they risk arbitrary

enforcementby delegating“basicpolicy matters to police[], judges, and juries for

resolutionon anad hocandsubjectivebasis.” Graynedv. City ofRockford,408 U.S.

104, 108-09(1972). The casesbeforethisCourtdramaticallyillustratethis danger;to the

thepresenceof asubstancein thebloodstreamcan itself constitutepossessionofthatsubstance.

231CL3:2409069.I

bestofourknowledge,only asingleprosecutorin the entireStateofTexashasattempted

to prosecutepregnantwomenunder§ 481.122. The constructionput upon “delivery” by

theprosecutorherewould expandthetermbeyondanyrationalboundaryandwould

engendertherisk of furthersucharbitraryprosecutions.

III. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S PROSECUTION OF APPELLANTSVIOLATES ThEIR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND DUEPROCESSUNDER THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

Texascourtshaveheldthat thereis a right to privacyundertheTexas

Constitution.SeeTexasStateEmployeesUnion v. TexasDep‘t of Mental Health &

MentalRetardation,746 S.W.2d203,205 (Tex. 1987);seealso City ofShermanv.

Henry,928 S.W.2d464,468 (1996). “[T]he TexasConstitutionprotectspersonalprivacy

from unreasonableintrusion. This right to privacyshouldyield only whenthe

governmentcan demonstratethatan intrusion is reasonablywarrantedfor the

achievementofacompellinggovernmentalobjectivethatcanbeachievedby no less

intrusive,morereasonablemeans.” TexasStateEmployeesUnion, 746 S.W.2dat 205.

Similarly, theDueProcessClauseoftheTexasConstitution,like its federal

analogue, “forbid[s] penal laws thatdo not give reasonablyclearnotice,to thepublic and

to law enforcementofficials, of whatbehavioris beingcriminalized.” Fogo v. State,830

S.W.2d592, 595 (Tex.Crim. App. 1992) (enbanc)(citing, inter alia, Kolenderv.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983);Bynumv. State,767S.W.2d769(Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).

A criminal statutewill beheldunconstitutionallyvagueunderTexaslaw if either(1) “it

fails to give apersonof ordinaryintelligencefair noticeof theconductprohibited;” or (2)

24K13:2409069I

it is “so indefinitethat it encouragesarbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.”Clark v.

State, 665 S.W.2d476,482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).

Therefore,for thereasonssetforth in SectionsI andII above,theState’s

prosecutionofAppellantsviolatestheirrights ofprivacyanddueprocessundertheTexas

Constitutionaswell.

IV. IF § 481.122APPLIED TO PRENATAL CONDUCT,APPELLANTS’CONVICTIONS WOULD VIOLATE THE EX POSTFACTOCLAUSESOFTHE UNITED STATESCONSTITUTION,AS WELL AS OFTHETEXAS CONSTITUTION

TheUnited StatesConstitutionforbids ex postfactolaws. SeeU.S. Const.

art. 1, § § 9 cI. 3, 10 el. 1. “[T]he original understandingofthe [ex postfactoclauseis

that] legislaturesmaynot retroactivelyalter the definition of crimesor increasethe

punishmentfor criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood,497U.S.37,43 (1990). If a

judicial constructionof acriminal statuteis “unexpectedandindefensibleby referenceto

thelaw whichhadbeenexpressedprior to the conductin issue,”it mustnot begiven

retroactiveeffect. Bouiev. City ofColumbia,378U.S. 347,354(1964); Collins,497

U.S. at 42.

Theholdingproposedby theprosecutorcreatesanunforeseeablejudicial

enlargementof acriminal statute. Bouie,378 U.S. at 353;Rosev. Locke,423U.S. 48

(1975). It restson thecontentionthat theLegislaturecriminalizedapregnantmother’s

prenatal conduct by virtue ofthe interactionof statutesspanningseparatesectionsof the

Texaslegal code. Moreover,on informationandbelief no othercountyis prosecuting

pregnantwomenon thisbasis,andthe fact thatall but oneofthe statesto consider

251(0:2409069.I

whether pregnant womencan beprosecutedfor prenatalconducthaveresolvedthe issue

in the negative,seeAppellants’ Br. at 30-31. Accordingly, even if theCourt accepts the

prosecutor’sargumentthat S.B. 3 19 haspermissiblyexpanded§ 481.122to reachuseof

controlledsubstancesby pregnantwomen,criminal penaltieson thatbasisshouldbe

imposed only on future conduct, andAppellants’convictionsshouldbereversed.

Likewise,the TexasConstitutionalsoforbidsex postfactolaws. SeeTex.

Const. art. I, § 16. TheTexasCourt ofCriminal Appeals has adopted the Collins

standard in interpreting the term ex post facto in the Texas Constitution. Spellingv.

State, 825 S.W.2d533,536 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth 1992);ExparteRobinson,792

S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore,Appellants’ convictionsviolatethe

ex postfactoclauseoftheTexasConstitutionaswell.

261(1.3:2409069.1

PRAYER

As amicuscuriae,werespectfullyrequestthat thisCourtgive consideration

to the issues discussed above and reverse the convictions of Tracy Yolanda Ward and

RhondaTulaneSmith, renderjudgmentsofacquittal,andprohibit the Statefrom further

prosecutionsofthis kind.

Dated:Amarillo, TexasApril 18, 2005

Respectfullysubmitted,

LYNN TILLOTSON & PINKER, L.L.P.

By:________E war asonDennis(No. 24045776)

750 North St. Paul Street,Suite 1400Dallas,TX 75210Phone: (214) 981-3800Fax: (214) 981-3839

KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS& FRANKEL,LLP

/By: ~ ~\

GregoryA. iSio<vitzPatriciaA. SeithIlyssaB. Sena

1177 Avenue of the AmericasNew York, NY 10036Phone: (212) 715-9100Fax: (212) 715-8000

Attorneysfor AmicusCuriaeAmericanCivil Liberties

Union andAmericanCivil Liberty Union ofTexas

* Pursuantto Rule 11 oftheTexasRulesofAppellateProcedure,theACLU, Lynn

Tillotson & Pinker,L.L.P. andKramerLevin Naftalis & Frankelcertify thatno feeswere

paidor will bepaid in connectionwith thepreparationof thisbriefof amicuscuriae.

—27—1(0:2406101.14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersignedherebycertifiesthat atrue and correctcopy ofthe aboveand foregoingdocument has been served asshownbelowon this the 18th dayofApril, 2005:

Via First ClassMailJoeMorganDawson801 S. Fillmore, Suite210Amarillo, Texas 79101Attorneysfor Appellants.

Via First ClassMailLarry CunninghamAssistantProfessorof Law &Director,TexasTechCriminal JusticeClinicTexasTechUniversitySchoolof Law1802HartfordAvenueLubbock,Texas79409-0004Attorneysfor Appellants

Via First ClassMailRichardMartindaleAssistantDistrict AttorneyDistrict Attorneyfor the

47th District

501 SouthFillmore,Suite5-AAmarillo, Texas79101Attorneysfor TheStateofTexas

Via First ClassMailJeffBlackburn1304TexasAvenueLubbock,Texas79401Attorneys for Amicus Curiae