Democracy & DevelopmentDemocracy & Development

Lipset and Przeworski

Class structure Class structure

I. Classic modernization theories: Lipset, Barro and NorrisBarro, and Norris

II. Revised theories: Przeworski et al. Ch 2III. Discussion exercise: policy implications

Does economic growth lead towards gdemocracy?

President Bush, Kyoto, Japan, 16 Nov 2005“Other Asian societies have taken some steps toward freedom -- but they have not yet completed the journey. When my father served as the head of our nation's diplomatic mission in Beijing thirty years ago an isolated China was nation s diplomatic mission in Beijing thirty years ago, an isolated China was recovering from the turmoil unleashed by the cultural revolution. In the late 1970s, China's leaders took a hard look at their country, and they resolved to change. They opened the door to economic development -- and today the Chinese people are better fed better housed and enjoy better opportunities Chinese people are better fed, better housed, and enjoy better opportunities than they ever have had in their history. As China reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it can not be closed. As the people of China grow in prosperity their demands for political freedom will grow as well ”grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well.”What is the evidence for this claim?

Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions

• Is economic development a necessary or sufficient condition for democratization?

• How stable are new democracies?• Will democracy persist under economic crisis?

Can democracy be built and sustained in poor nations?

• Eg in Afghanistan (GDP $800 per capita 2003), or Iraq (est. GDP $2100 per capita in 2004)

I:Theoretical debateI:Theoretical debateE t i lit t d d Extensive literature on democracy and development:

S M ti Li t 1959 1993 2004– Seymour Martin Lipset 1959, 1993, 2004– Samuel Huntington 1963

Guillermo O’Donnell 1973– Guillermo O Donnell 1973– Jackman & Bollen 1985– Robert Barro 1999Robert Barro 1999– Adam Przeworski et al. 2000

Causes? Why is there a relationship between Causes? Why is there a relationship between economic development and democracy?

Lipset’s classical theoryLipset s classical theory

Seymour Martin Lipset – “Some social requisites of democracy” APSR 1959 53: 69-105.– “A comparative analysis of the social requisites ”ISSJ 1993 45(2)A comparative analysis of the social requisites.. ISSJ 1993 45(2)– The Democratic Century (Lipset and Lakin 2004)

General process of societal modernization– Industrialization urbanization education/literacy communication etcIndustrialization, urbanization, education/literacy, communication, etc.

Led to growth of civil society – organized labor & associationsSocietal complexity led to failure of authoritarian commandDevelopment generated successful challenges to dictatorial Development generated successful challenges to dictatorial regimes– Eg Brazil, Portugal, South Korea, Greece

Robert BarroRobert Barro

R. Barro. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth (MIT)R. Barro ‘Determinants of democracy.’ 1999.Journal of Political E 107(6) 158 183Economy 107(6): 158-183.Panel study of nations 1960-1995Democracy (measured by Freedom House) is consistently Democracy (measured by Freedom House) is consistently associated with a higher standard of living, measured by:– Per capita GDP– Primary school attainment– Size of middle class

Confirms the Lipset hypothesisConfirms the Lipset hypothesis

R. Barro ‘Determinants of democracy.’ 1999.Journal of Political Economy 107(6): 158-183.

Democracy & development 1975Democracy & development, 1975Poor democracies

Rich autocracies

Democracy and Development 2004Democracy and Development, 2004

Poor democracies

Rich autocracies

Table 4.1: Wealth and democracy, all societies worldwide

Liberal democracy

Constitutional democracy

Participatory democracy

Contested democracy

Freedom House Polity IV Vanhanen Przeworski et al/ Cheibub and

Gandhi b b b b b pcse p. b pcse. p. b pcse p b pcse p

Log GDP/Capita (US$)

13.54 (.682) *** 11.64 (.758) *** 22.16 (.423) *** 1.13 (.088) ***

CONTROLS

Ex-British colony (0/1)

9.83 (.709) *** 11.46 (1.44) *** .019 (.945) N/s .778 (.094) ***

Middle East (0/1)

-15.41 (1.11) *** -21.39 (1.22) *** -22.58 (.539) *** -1.056 (.186) ***

Regional .644 (.029) *** .685 (.032) *** .007 (..004) N/s .047 (.002) ***

diffusion of democracy

Ethnic fractionalization (0-100-pt scale)

-10.24 (.597) *** -5.94 (1.34) *** -18.28 (.687) *** -.921 (.175) ***

Population size (thou)

-0.01 (.001) *** -.001 (.001) *** -.001 (.001) N/s .001 (.001) N/s

Area size (sq.miles)

.001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) N/s .001 (.001) ***

Constant -20.55 -12.59 -38.45 -5.89

N. observations 5115 4205 4586 .4852

N. of countries 187 157 180 185

Adjusted R2 .583 .525 .523 .602

Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy are unstandardized beta OLS regression coefficients (b) with panel corrected standard errors (pcse) and the significance of the coefficients (p) for the pooled time-series cross-national dataset obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. With pcse the disturbances are, by default, assumed to b h k d i ( h i h i i ) d l l dbe heteroskedastic (each nation has its own variance) and contemporaneously correlated across nations. Models for Contested democracy were run using logistic regression for the binary dependent variable, with the results summarized by Nagelkerke R square. For the measures of democracy, standardized to100-point scalesand lagged by one year, see Chapter 2. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level, and *** the 0.001 level. Source: Pippa Norris Driving Democracy Ch 4

Table 4.2: Wealth, literacy, education and liberal democracy, all societies worldwide

Liberal democracy Liberal democracy Liberal democracy Freedom House Freedom House Freedom House

b pcse p. b pcse p. b pcse. p b pcse p. b pcse p. b pcse. p

Log GDP/Capita 13.54 (.682) *** % Literacy .114 (.011) *** % Secondary .150 (.015) ***% Secondary education

( )

CONTROLS Ex-British colony 9.83 (.709) *** 8.73 (.064) *** 8.42 (.726) *** Middle East -15.41 (1.11) *** -1.93 (.716) *** -8.16 (.750) *** Regional diffusion of democracy

0.644 (.029) *** 0.77 (.026) *** 0.77 (.026) ***

Ethnic -10.24 (.597) *** -4.24 (1.00) *** -9.86 (.833) ***Ethnic fractionalization

0 ( 59 ) ( 00) 9 86 ( 833)

Population size -0.01 (.001) *** -0.01 (.001) *** -.001 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** Constant -20.55 .797 .625 N. observations 5115 3158 4328 N. of countries 187 120 169 Adjusted R2 .583 .415 .561 Note: Entries for liberal democracy are unstandardized beta OLS regression coefficients (withNote: Entries for liberal democracy are unstandardized beta OLS regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parenthesis) for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command with panel corrected standard errors. For the measures of democracy, standardized to 100-points and lagged by one year, see Chapter 2. For details of all the variables, see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.05 level, ** the 0.01 level, and *** the 0.001 level. Source: Pippa Norris Driving Democracy (Forthcoming) Ch 4

Yet many exceptions: y pe.g. economic growth in S. Korea and Singapore

$30 000

$25,000

$30,000

$15 000

$20,000

$10,000

$15,000

$0

$5,000Note: GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $)Source: World Bank Development Indicators

197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004

S.Korea Singapore

II: Revised theory Przeworski et alII: Revised theory - Przeworski et al

1. Are democracies more likely to emerge as countries develop economically? (Endogenous p y ( gexplanation)

2 Having emerged for other reasons are they 2. Having emerged for other reasons, are they more likely to survive as democracies in developed nations? (Exogenous explanation)developed nations? (Exogenous explanation)

ExplanationExplanation

1. Dictatorships die for multiple reasons (civil war, crisis, death, external threat, popular uprisings etc.)

2 In poorer nations when regimes shift either 2. In poorer nations when regimes shift, either democracies or dictatorships may emerge

3. In wealthy nations when regimes shift, democracies ipersist

• Per capita income has a strong impact on the survival of democracy • eg No democracy with per capita income over $6000 has ever been

b t dsubverted4. In the long run given economic development there are

more democracies in the world

ModelModel

Regime change

Affluent

Democracy

Affluent Democracy

PoorDemocracy

DictatorshipDictatorshipDictatorship

Poor Dictatorship Dictatorship

RegimeRegime change

Definitions & MeasuresDefinitions & Measures

Minimalist definition (p14-15)– Dichotomous classification democratic v. dictatorial Dichotomous classification democratic v. dictatorial

regime, not a continuous scale– Criteria

• Contestation– Regimes that allow some regularized competition among

conflicting visions and interestsconflicting visions and interests– Regimes in which some values or interests enjoy a monopoly

buttressed by threat or the actual use of force

OperationalizationOperationalization

“Democracy is a regime in which government offices are filled by contested elections.” p19b “D i t i hi h i b t l “Democracy is a system in which incumbents lose elections and leave office when the rules dictate.” p54.All other regimes are not democraticAll other regimes are not democratic.Subtypes:– Democracies can be parliamentary, mixed, presidentialDemocracies can be parliamentary, mixed, presidential– Dictatorships can be bureaucracies (rule of law) or

autocracies

RulesRules1. Chief executive must be elected directly or indirectlyy y2. The lower house of the legislature must be elected3. There must be more than one party4 (If pass above) and if incumbents subsequently held but never 4. (If pass above) and if incumbents subsequently held but never

lost elections, we consider such regimes authoritarian.Cases of Singapore, Kenya, Mexico??Examine list in Appendix 1 2Examine list in Appendix 1.2

Contestation rules:– Ex-ante uncertainty (probability that at least one member of

incumbent coalition will lose))– Ex-post irreversibility (whoever wins election will be allowed to

assume office)– Repeatability (temporary outcomes)

Minimalist exclusionsMinimalist exclusions

Social or economic aspectsAccountability, responsibility, responsiveness or y, p y, prepresentationFreedom, liberties or human rights, gParticipationCivil-military relationsCivil military relations• Advantages and disadvantages of this minimalist

definition?

DataData

Annual observation in 141 countries from 1950-19904730 annual observation of regimes classified as gdemocracies or dictatorshipAppendix 1.2 Classification of regimes(Updated to 2000 by Cheibub and Gandhi)

Results: Rise in democraciesResults: Rise in democracies

Old

World

New

Measures & controls:Measures & controls:1. LEVEL of economic development: 1. LEVEL of economic development:

– Per capita GNP 2. Political legacy

– NewC – year independent after 1945NewC year independent after 1945– BritCol - British colony in 1919 (0/1)

3. Political history– STRA - N. of past transitions to authoritarianismp

4. Religious structure– % Catholic, Protestant, and Muslims

5. Cleavages g– ELF60 ethno-linguistic – RELDIF religious fractionalization

6. International political climate – Proportion of other democracies in world

Table 2 1 p 82Table 2.1 p.82

ConclusionsConclusions

Predict probability of being democratic or dictatorship– 77.5% of regimes types predicted by per capita income

No other variable adds much to prediction81.4% of regimes predicted by everythingSome incorrect predictions (outliers) can be explained by specific factors

Conclusions Ch2Conclusions Ch2.

“To summarize, the level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, is by far the best predictor of political regimes.

Yet there are countries in which dictatorships persist when ll th b bl diti i di t th t th h ld all other observable conditions indicate that they should

not; there are others in which democracies flourish despite the odds ” p 88despite the odds. p.88.

Criticisms of study?Criticisms of study?What is excluded from the definition?What is excluded from the definition?

• Participation and competitionWhat is excluded from analysis?a s e c uded o a a ys s

• Six oil rich states• Other institutional factors?• Other social structural controls?

Focus on economic or human development?Causes of regime change unansweredLimited time period – patterns since 1990?

III Ford Foundation Discussion ExerciseIII. Ford Foundation Discussion ExercisePolicy Analysis Role Playing Exercise: Ford Foundation Program ManagementDivide into pairs to discuss the following. You have 15 minutes to develop your joint recommendations and the reasons for your conclusions.

You are employed as Senior Program Managers for the Ford Foundation. The Foundation has decided to invest $50m over a ten year period in the Rights and Social Justice Program aimed to encourage Governance and civic society in thea ten year period in the Rights and Social Justice Program aimed to encourage Governance and civic society in the developing world. “In governance we foster effective, transparent, accountable and responsible governmental institutions guided by the rule of law and dedicated to reducing inequality.”

The Foundation has asked you to advise them about suitable criteria for this Program when evaluating how to prioritize y g g papplications for different projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Foundation wants to know which of the following two options they should follow.

(i) To prioritize investments in projects which will directly encourage economic growth and social equality in developing countries, (including improving education , encouraging literacy, and reducing extreme poverty), on the

d th t h d l t ill d ll t th i l d lt l f d ti f d tigrounds that human development will gradually create the necessary social and cultural foundation for democratic consolidation.OR(ii) To prioritize investments in projects in developing countries which will directly encourage the reform of political institutions, including funding independent advisors to promote free and fair elections, effective party competition, the organization of voluntary and professional associations in civil society and a free pressorganization of voluntary and professional associations in civil society, and a free press.Focus your discussion on any two poorer developing countries (defined as those with a per capita GDP (PPP) of less than $4,000). What are your recommendations, and why? Use information from your experience, from Przeworski, and from the data to support your conclusions.

Democracy and Development 2004Democracy and Development, 2004

Poor democracies

Rich autocracies

Next class: REGIONAL CASE STUDIES