RUSSIA, NATO AND COOPERATIVE

SECURITY

Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security explores the common ground betweenRussia and NATO and the potential to move beyond cultural differences.

Lionel Ponsard clearly demonstrates how cooperative security could serve as ameans to bridge the gap between two supposedly antagonistic entities: NATO andRussia. He skilfully shows that by building confidence between the two partiesabout each other’s intentions, cooperative security can regulate attitudes thatmight otherwise lead to misperception.

Drawing on his extensive knowledge of Russia, the author focuses on thepeculiarity of NATO–Russia relations and emphasises the Russian approach toanalyse them. Three parts articulate his work: the definition of the Russianidentity, Russia’s attitude to NATO, and the question of cooperation inRussia–NATO relations. The analysis of the Russian identity sheds some light onwhat happened to this relationship in the past several years and offers someappropriate lessons for consideration. Difficulties that arose after the demise ofthe Soviet Union up until the creation of the NATO–Russia Council in 2002 arealso stressed and interpreted. Last but not least, the importance of cooperationbetween Russia and NATO is highlighted and the author puts forward some ideasfor easing major points of friction between the two parties.

This book will be of great interest to all students of NATO, Security Studies,Russian studies and International Relations in general.

Lionel Ponsard is currently Deputy Chief of the Academic Research Branch withthe NATO Defense College in Rome. He holds a PhD in Political Science fromLeiden University.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES

NATO’S SECRET ARMIESOperation Gladio and terrorism in

Western EuropeDaniele Ganser

THE US, NATO AND MILITARYBURDEN-SHARINGPeter Kent Forster and

Stephen J. Cimbala

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Geo-strategy, geopolitics and new governance

Irina Isakova

THE FOREIGN OFFICE ANDFINLAND 1938–1940

Diplomatic sideshowCraig Gerrard

RETHINKING THE NATURE OF WAR

Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds)

PERCEPTION AND REALITY INTHE MODERN YUGOSLAV

CONFLICTMyth, falsehood, and deceit

1991–1995Brendan O’Shea

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING IN POST-DAYTON BOSNIA

Tim Donais

THE DISTRACTED EAGLEThe rift between America

and old EuropePeter H. Merkl

THE IRAQ WAREuropean perspectives on politics,

strategy, and operationsJan Hallenberg and

Håkan Karlsson (eds)

STRATEGIC CONTESTWeapons proliferation and

war in the Greater Middle East

Richard L. Russell

PROPAGANDA, THE PRESSAND CONFLICT

The Gulf War and KosovoDavid R. Willcox

MISSILE DEFENCEInternational, regional and

national implicationsBertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning (eds)

GLOBALISING JUSTICE FORMASS ATROCITIES

A revolution in accountabilityChandra Lekha Sriram

ETHNIC CONFLICT ANDTERRORISM

The origins and dynamics of civil wars

Joseph L. Soeters

GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF

TERRORISMPatterns and predictions

Brynjar Lia

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANDSTRATEGY

The evolution of American nuclear policy

Stephen J. Cimbala

NASSER AND THE MISSILE AGE IN THE

MIDDLE EASTOwen L. Sirrs

WAR AS RISK MANAGEMENTStrategy and conflict in an age of

globalised risksYee-Kuang Heng

MILITARYNANOTECHNOLOGY

Potential applications and preventivearms control

Jurgen Altmann

NATO AND WEAPONS OFMASS DESTRUCTIONRegional alliance, global

threatsEric R. Terzuolo

EUROPEANISATION OFNATIONAL

SECURITY IDENTITYThe EU and the changing security

identities of the Nordic statesPernille Rieker

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTPREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

Sustaining the peace in post conflictsocieties

T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (eds)

CONTROLLING THE WEAPONS OF WAR

Politics, persuasion, and theprohibition of inhumanity

Brian Rappert

CHANGING TRANSATLANTICSECURITY RELATIONS

Do the US, the EU and Russia form a new strategic triangle?

Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson (eds)

THEORETICAL ROOTS OF USFOREIGN POLICY

Machiavelli and Americanunilateralism

Thomas M. Kane

CORPORATE SOLDIERS ANDINTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The rise of private military companiesChristopher Kinsey

TRANSFORMING EUROPEANMILITARIES

Coalition operations and the technology gap

Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari

GLOBALISATION, CONFLICTAND THE SECURITY STATE

National security in a ‘new’strategic new era

Robert G. Patman (ed.)

MILITARY FORCES IN 21ST

CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONSNo job for a soldier?

James V. Arbuckle

THE POLITICAL ROAD TO WAR WITH IRAQ

Bush, 9/11 and the drive to overthrowSaddam

Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers

BOSNIAN SECURITY AFTERDAYTON

New perspectivesMichael A. Innes (ed.)

KENNEDY, JOHNSON AND NATO

Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962–68

Andrew Priest

SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY

New emerging international normsDenise Garcia

THE UNITED STATES ANDEUROPE

Beyond the neo-conservative divide?

John Baylis and Jon Roper (eds)

RUSSIA, NATO ANDCOOPERATIVE SECURITY

Bridging the gapLionel Ponsard

RUSSIA, NATO ANDCOOPERATIVE SECURITY

Bridging the gap

Lionel Ponsard

First published 2007by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2007 Lionel Ponsard

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,

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ISBN10: 0–415–40723–0 (hbk)ISBN10: 0–203–96924–3 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978–0–415–40723–6 (hbk)ISBN13: 978–0–203–96924–3 (ebk)

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“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’scollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

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vii

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix

1 Introduction 1

2 Russian identity 6

Introduction 6Geographic and historical components of Russian identity 7Russian national identity, the search for the Russian idea 18Russian schools of thought 23Conclusion 31

3 Russian orthodoxy 33

Introduction 33Orthodox components of Russian national identity 34The Russian Orthodox Church: a national and a State Church 36Conclusion 42

4 Russian political culture 44

Introduction 44Definition and concept 45Russian political–cultural heritage: from the Mongol

yoke to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 47A political culture for Russia 54Conclusion 58

CONTENTS

viii

5 The evolution of the Russian attitude to NATO 60

Introduction 60From the end of the Cold War to the Founding Act 61The Kosovo crisis 72Russia–NATO after 9/11 77Conclusion 85

6 Russia’s perception of NATO enlargement: a case study 87

Introduction 87Evolution of the Russian perception of NATO enlargement 88Why Russia opposed NATO’s enlargement 91Russia’s countermeasures 99Opting for cooperation 107Conclusion 108

7 Theories of cooperation 111

Introduction 111Realism and cooperation 112Theories of international regimes 120Multilateral approaches to security 123Conclusion 127

8 The Russian approach to cooperative security 130

Introduction 130Russian cooperative security initiatives 131Gorbachev and the ‘Common European Home’: case study 137Conclusion 144

9 Conclusion 147

Notes 158Bibliography 190Index 208

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of people have given considerable time and effort in support of myresearch for this book. I would like to express my sincere thanks to ProfessorDr Rob de Wijk whose criticism and suggestions played a key role in helping meto bring this work to completion. I am also deeply grateful to Professor Dr BrunoColson, Dr Dmitri V. Trenin and Mr Chris Donnelly who have given me thebenefit of their judgement and expertise.

As it was impossible to rely simply on printed sources, I have also depended toa large degree on face-to-face contacts with officials and specialists. In particu-lar, I am glad to acknowledge the help that I have received from Russianacademics. There are too many to list all by name, but special thanks are due tothose who submitted themselves to interviews: especially Dr Tatyana G.Parkhalina, Dr Nadia K. Arbatova, Dr Lena Nemirovskaya, Dr Irina Kobrinskaya,Dr Lilia F. Shevtsova, Dr Dmitri A. Danilov, Professor Viktor B. Kuvaldin. Manysenior NATO officials also provided key off-the-record interviews. I am particu-larly appreciative to Colonel Richard Williams, retired US Army Colonel, for hispersonal friendship and professional support. Our thanks go also to the NATOInformation Office and the NATO Liaison Mission in Moscow, especially Dr RolfWelberts and Major General Peter Williams. The Research and TechnologyDepartment of the Belgian Ministry of Defence and its staff also deserve ourdeepest appreciation for their financial assistance.

I particularly wish to thank the staff of the George Marshall Centre Library, oneof the great libraries in the world for Russian issues, to which I was allowedaccess; the Peace Palace Library in The Hague; the King’s College Library inLondon; the Lenin Library in Moscow; and the Belgian Ministry of DefenceLibrary.

Last but not least, I am especially in debt to my dearest Peggy who has beenmy bedrock of support and inspiration.

ix

The views expressed in this book are the responsibility of the author and donot necessarily reflect the opinions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

1

1

INTRODUCTION

How could yesterday’s enemies become tomorrow’s friends? This is, in a nutshell,the challenge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russiahave been facing since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, from 1949 until theearly 90s, NATO–Russia relations have been built on a conflicting basis only.There is no need to recall that one of the fundamentals of the North AtlanticAlliance was the protection of the West against the emergence of a threat posedby communism, then embodied by the Soviet Union. Almost simultaneously, thenewly created Euro-Atlantic organisation found its immediate rival in the emerg-ing bloc of the Warsaw Pact. By the same token, one of the justifications of theSoviet Union’s status as one of the two major powers in the aftermath of SecondWorld War was based on the existence of a threatening military organisation at itsborders. In these conditions, for over 50 years, the existence of NATO and of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in their respective capacity hadbecome mutually justifying.

From 1989 to late 1991, the well-structured post-Second World War order wasfundamentally disrupted. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequentdissolution of the Soviet Union put a sudden end to the bipolar world. The ideathat the Russian Federation was recognised as the official heir of the USSR wasonly true on paper. In reality, Russia had definitely lost the power status of itspredecessor. In the same period NATO also lost its initial raison d’être. After thedisappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the communist threat, many wonderedwhat could still justify the existence of a defensive alliance in the Euro-Atlanticarea. NATO’s future not only depended on its ability to adapt to the new interna-tional environment, but it was also closely related to the turn of its future relationswith the Russian Federation. What future was there for NATO and Russia in thenew international environment, and above all, was there a common future forthe former enemies? Could they wipe the slate clean of their past and emergetogether as a new security force?

When these questions first came to the fore, they gave rise to a great debate.There were those calling for full integration of Russia into NATO since theRussian threat had been eradicated. There were on the contrary, those whoobjected to that option on the grounds that it would give Russia an opportunity to

dismantle the Alliance from the inside. However, in their views, the perspectiveof a Russia remaining at the borders of the Euro-Atlantic zone was not veryattractive either. A number of obstacles seemed to be in the way of any construc-tive relations between the two parties. Among other things, the identity gapbetween Russia and NATO countries, and the belief in Russia’s inability to trulycooperate were very often mentioned.

In other words, NATO and Russia were deemed too antagonistic to forge last-ing relations. And yet, while these relations were first shrouded in paradox, todaythey are a tangible reality. Indeed, against all expectations, NATO and Russia haverecently embarked on relations that are no longer antagonistic. Of course, build-ing such rapport has not been an easy task. From the inauguration of the NorthAtlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 to the creation of theNATO–Russia Council in 2002, NATO–Russia relations have been punctuatedwith a succession of historic achievements and resounding failures. Even today,some 10 years after the debut of closer interaction between NATO and Russia, thefeeling persists that nothing has been won for good. There is still a long way togo before these relations will be fully normalised. However, this past decade ofoscillating relations is very instructive in many respects.

As mentioned earlier, the primary interest in analysing NATO–Russia relationsrests on the fact that it places two antagonistic entities in a context of cooperation.This point is all the more relevant in that these entities have to evolve in a newinternational security environment. Throughout the Cold War, the traditionalmenaces, like that of the USSR for NATO, were identifiable geographically; andthe capabilities of their originators were known and could be deterred. This pos-tulate went up in smoke in light of the developments of the last few years. As thiswork is being completed, the new threats to world security are defined as unpre-dictable, transnational, asymmetric and non-conventional. How do Russia andNATO perceive this new security environment? How could they approach ittogether? Could this new security environment serve as a basis for new relationsbetween the two parties and eventually lead to true cooperation?

Focusing now on the peculiarity of NATO–Russia relations, another interest isto adopt the Russian approach to these relations. Indeed, extensive analyses havealready been produced on NATO’s perception of Russia and its expectations withregard to its relations with this country. However, very few experts in and aroundNATO are sufficiently familiar with Russia to understand, explain and even antic-ipate any of its actions/reactions. This is even more surprising since, as the say-ing goes, knowing your enemy is already part of the victory. Without placingNATO–Russia relations in a conflicting context, the idea is that the better yourunderstanding of the other’s approach is, the more successful your commonundertaking will be.

Going then into the substance of NATO–Russia relations, it seems worth look-ing at what type of relations best suits NATO and Russia. Are these relations onlyforeseeable in the framework of an integrated Russia? Or is there a solution,halfway between full integration and mere coexistence, that can best apply to

INTRODUCTION

2

NATO–Russia relations? Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has beendeveloping a policy of cooperative security with the former Warsaw Pactmembers. This policy was first introduced as a ‘hand of friendship’ betweenthe Allies and their Central and Eastern European neighbours. Opting forthis approach of NATO, is it possible to say, from a Russian point of view, thatcooperative security is indeed the most suitable answer to NATO–Russiarelations?

At this stage, the question is thus whether cooperative security could serve asa means to bridge the gap between two supposedly antagonistic entities: NATOand Russia. This study explores mutual common ground and the potential tomove beyond cultural differences, particularly in political culture. By buildingconfidence between the two parties about each other’s intentions, cooperativesecurity regulates attitudes that might otherwise lead to misperception. In addi-tion, the closer the interaction between NATO and Russia, the more they will findways to further their security cooperatively. True interaction implies indeed aconstant knowledge, respect and understanding of one another.

We also have the methodology that will be used to bring this research to itsachievement. As mentioned earlier, the approach that will be taken throughout thestudy will be the Russian one. Again this is mainly motivated by the fact that theRussian approach to its relations with NATO is often ignored or misunderstood.This is usually due to either the difficulty of acceding to Russian expertise on theissue or to the lack of Western work from that angle.

Our work will be articulated in three parts: the definition of the Russian iden-tity, Russia’s attitude to NATO and the question of cooperation in NATO–Russiarelations. The first part will aim at answering the following questions: how do theRussians define themselves? What is it to be a Russian? Are Russian traditions,culture and history closer to Europe or Asia? In this way, we will try to arrive ata definition of the Russian identity that is as precisely as possible as to what theRussians themselves would say to define their identity.

This first implies looking at the Russian identity based on some of the funda-mental elements of any national identity namely: history, geography, religion andculture. Indeed, outside observers have long encountered difficulties in definingthe Russian identity as anything but what Churchill once described as ‘a riddle,wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’. In order to reach the most accuratedefinition possible, we will have to underpin our work on an analysis of theRussian approach to the notion of national identity.

In so doing, we will have to focus on the role of religion in the determinationof the Russian identity. Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church indeed pro-vide both a background and a framework for understanding many of the issuespertaining to the Russian identity. With regard to NATO–Russia relations, it isimportant to assess, from an identity point of view whether or not Orthodoxy canhamper relations with countries of mainly Western Christian faith. We will alsotry to see to what extent Orthodoxy, as a dominant element of Russian culture,has an influence on the shaping of Russian domestic and foreign policies. All this

INTRODUCTION

3

information will notably be instrumental in assessing the identity gap betweenRussia and the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

We will conclude this part of our research with a study of the Russian politicalculture as one of the factors framing today’s Russian policies. In this context, wewill use the 1993 Russian Constitution as a case study and a possible illustrationof our conclusions on the Russian political culture.

The work on the Russian identity will help us view NATO–Russia relations ina new light. In order to develop a positive, lasting relationship between NATO andRussia, it is first necessary to make a clean sweep of mutual mistrust remainingfrom the Cold War. It is also important to understand what has happened to thisrelationship in the past several years, and to draw the appropriate lessons. Thisanalysis will review and explain the difficulties that have arisen in that quest. Itwill also assess the relative importance of cooperation between NATO and Russiaand set forth some ideas for easing major points of friction between the two.

To this purpose, we divided up the 10 years of NATO–Russia relations intothree main phases: from the end of the Cold War to the Founding Act; the Kosovocrisis; and Russia–NATO after September 11. Not only will this aim at reviewingthe evolution of Russia–NATO relations up to this day, focusing on the structureused to formalise these relations and looking at how NATO and Russia dealt withdifficulties, but this work will also permit us to assess whether the peculiarRussian identity is indeed a stumbling block to Russia–NATO relations. At a laterstage, we will look into the question of NATO’s first wave of enlargement as thepolicy that was long presented as the major conflicting issue of NATO–Russiarelations.

The question of what kind of cooperation would best suit both NATO andRussia is paramount. Exploring cooperation first entails defining a theoreticalmodel that encompasses various strands of International Relations theory:Realism, Neorealism and International Regimes; but also traditional internationalsecurity arrangements such as Cooperative Security, Collective Security andCollective Defence. A number of specific arguments will be developed to permitthe application of the different strands of International Relations theories to thesecurity realm and to integrate them into a cooperation theory.

The purpose of this discussion will be to explore, both theoretically and prag-matically, the proposition that cooperative engagement may be the appropriateprinciple for security relations under the new international circumstances thathave emerged. In evaluating the prospects for cooperative security to become anaccepted framework for security relations between Russia and NATO, we willconsider some explicit examples of Russian cooperative security initiativesthroughout history: the Holy Alliance, Brezhnev’s détente, the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE). Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking andCommon European Home will serve as a case study for this part. Based on thisanalysis, we will try to draw the main conclusions necessary for cooperativesecurity to be applied successfully to NATO–Russia relations.

INTRODUCTION

4

It should also be noted that this whole endeavour implies a certain degree ofhumility on the part of the researcher, as well as a certain degree of indulgenceon the part of the Russians who might consult the study. Indeed, describing theview of a society without being a native member of that society must be based onthe assumption of a highly self-conscious ignorance. Such a mindset is all themore important when the work mainly relies on theoretical sources.

There are no shortcuts to understanding the Russians. It takes time, andWestern officials often seek quick fixes for complex issues. Obviously, frequentvisits to Russia and discussions with eminent scholars and experts of Russiansociety are instrumental in developing a better knowledge of this fascinatingcountry.1 Mastery of the Russian language is also a critical asset to fine-tunethe understanding of the Russian mind. Russian speakers, be they diplomats,business people or scholars, all have a significant advantage. The ability to carryon a conversation in Russian raises the relationship to a more meaningful level.Together with it comes mutual trust and understanding.

INTRODUCTION

5

6

2

RUSSIAN IDENTITY

The notion of ‘Russia’ is already tattered and torn; everyone usesthis notion, whether appropriately or not. When the monstrousUSSR went to grab slices of Asia or Africa, the entire worldrepeated: ‘Russia, the Russians . . . ’ What exactly is Russia? Today,and tomorrow (even more importantly). Who sees himself as partof the future Russia? Where do the Russians themselves envisagethe borders of Russia?1

Introduction

If the notion of Russia appears as a real challenge to the most renowned ofits national intellectuals, it is easy to imagine what challenge it could representto those non-natives having to deal with it. Many came up against this‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’, as Sir Winston Churchill oncesaid. To many, this very challenge of understanding the workings of the Russianidentity2 acted and still acts as a deterring factor. When NATO embarked oncloser relations with Russia, many experts had produced the Russian identityargument as the main impediment to the success of this endeavour. Therefore,whoever wishes to analyse NATO–Russia relations, especially with the aim ofconfirming the feasibility and utility of these relations, has no choice but tostart grappling with this tortuous issue and to try lifting all the fears that arelinked to it.

How can we define what Russia is and what the Russian identity means ifRussians themselves come up with more questions than answers when addressingthis matter? As mentioned earlier, the question of Russian identity is indeed along-standing one.3 Despite the incessant efforts of numerous Russian experts,writers, historians and political leaders throughout history, the notion ofRussian identity still lacks any commonly agreed definition. Famous figures likeBerdyaev, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Blok and Herzen have nevertheless tried toformulate what the Russian self-image embodied. Even President Yeltsin initiateda public debate aimed at developing a definition of the Russian identity thatwould be in line with the then new democratic government.4

All these unfruitful attempts have led many Russians to believe that it isactually impossible to come to a definition of their identity. And yet, these sameRussians would agree that they are different, unique, that they can on no accountbe assimilated to any other existing identity, be it Western, European, or Asian.This very observation confirms that a Russian identity does exist, and that it ispossible to define Russians based on the basis of unique characteristics that makethem distinct from the other people.

Our attempt to define the Russian identity will be based on what are tradition-ally considered to be the fundamental components of the identity concept, namelyhistory, geography, ethnicity, culture and religion.5 Consequently, when lookingat Russian history, geography, religion and culture, we will try to determine towhat extent these contribute to defining the Russian identity, in the same way asthe French revolution and the peculiar geographic situation of France help com-pose the French identity. In so doing, we will notably focus on the notion of diver-sity and multiplicity of the Russian history and geography in the hope that thiswill prove useful in understanding why no one has ever come to terms with aunique definition of the Russian identity.

Understanding the nuances and the importance of the dual signification of‘Russian’ in the Russian language meaning – rossiskii (of the Land of Rus’) orrusskii (ethnic Russian) – will be the first step of our approach. We will thendwell on the notion of international messianism, a self-perceived vocation tocarry out a universalist Christian mission. These two considerations will beinstrumental in addressing the issue of whether or not the Russian identity hasa national dimension.6 We will then confront the results of our research tothree paramount – and yet radically opposed – political phases: the tentativeEuropeanisation of Russia by Peter the Great; the negation of the Russian iden-tity and its internationalisation under the Soviet rule; and the consequent identitycrisis that emerged in post-communist Russia.

At the theoretical level, several schools of thought have tried to develop adefinition of the Russian identity. We will first distinguish the Westernisers andthe Slavophiles who, while both denying the significance of the Mongol yoke inshaping the Russian identity, argue that either the Slav origins or the Westerninfluence is the primary determinant of the Russian identity. We will then tacklethe theories of the Asianists, Scythians and Eurasianists, whose main commonground is to place the Mongol yoke to the fore in their defining of the Russianidentity.

Geographic and historical components of Russian identity

Like other people, Russians soon agreed on the fact that there must be asignificant link between their geographical position in the world and theirnational identity. Writers from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Alexander Solzhenitsynhave elevated the Russian land to the status of a symbol of the essence of Russia

RUSSIAN IDENTITY

7

and Russian identity. According to them, the Russian steppe, the Siberian taigaand the peasant villages are all inherent features of this identity. Russia’s landstretches across both Europe and Asia. Its immensity provides the country withnatural strategic interests throughout Europe, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East. However, this immensity is also the cause of scores ofinvasions of the Russian territory, from the Mongols to Napoleon to the Nazis. Atthe same time, it is a country the brutal weather of which has often repelled thesesame foes with equal power. According to George Vernadsky, ‘the Russian landwas, because of its flat topography, the meeting place for European and Asianpeoples’.7 The nomads who periodically swept westward from the depths of innerAsia, such as the Scythians, the Huns, and the Mongols, had intermarried with themore sedentary eastern Slavs. He further explained that ‘each of these invasionsbrought new cultural patterns and each, when it retreated years or centuries after,left its imprint indelibly on the land that was to become Russia’.8

A continuous sense of occupying some kind of critical middle ground betweenhighly differentiated zones of global civilisation has been pervasive in Russia,since the reforms of Peter the Great (the so-called Petrine reforms) at least. Thisfeeling must be understood in terms of ‘a sort of existential indeterminacybetween East and West a veritable geo-schizophrenia which for nearly three cen-turies has penetrated irresistibly and tormentingly to the very core of the society’sself consciousness’.9 In this context, Russia’s geographical position is a funda-mental factor in the Russians’ sense that they are different – not part of theEuropean family or the West, but surely not part of Asia either.

In this respect, Russian history is also very explicit indeed.10 Russian identitytoday is in many ways the product of historical determinants as much as it is thevictim of those determinants. Distinctions were already being drawn in the earli-est origins of Russian civilisation, that is to say in Kievan Rus’.11 AncientRussians were different from their eastern neighbours in most aspects of theirsocial, political, religious and economic life. These firstly included their Christianfaith – from the second half of the tenth century –, but also political institutionsof monarchy and the economic foundations of Kievan Rus’ in commerce. By con-trast, Russia’s neighbours were at that time nomads practicing a variety ofshamanistic–pagan religions. Despite few social contacts and commercial inter-course, relations between these two communities were most often antagonistic.

The Mongol yoke

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Mongolian armies of GhengisKhan launched a devastating campaign against Kievan Rus’. In front of the weakresistance of disunited and militarily unprepared Russian princes, the Mongolvictory was rapid and almost absolute. By 1241, all of Kievan Rus’ had been con-quered and as Nicolas Riasanovsky noted, it was ‘the only instance of total sub-jugation to a foreign invader throughout Russia’s long history’.12 The Mongolsmaintained effective control over the remnants of Kievan Rus’ for about a century

RUSSIAN IDENTITY

8

and a half. This rule, however, was not imposed by direct physical occupation, butensured by regular payment of tributes to Russian princes on the condition thatthese acknowledge Mongol rule. Towards the end of the fourteenth century,Russians began to rebel against Mongol domination. In 1380, one of the mostfamous battles in Russian military history was fought at the fields of Kulikovo,south of Moscow, where the Muscovite prince Dmitry defeated Mongol armies.Mongol authority had been radically undermined, and it continued to decreaseover the following century. Russian allegiance to the Mongols was officiallyrevoked by Ivan III in 1480.

The whole legacy of the steppe nomads, and most important of the Mongoldomination, has, since the eighteenth century, been the subject of controversialinterpretations and continuous debate. To certain experts, the relevance of the‘experience of nomadic Asiatic domination’ is considered to be either negligibleor inexistent. The famous leading Russian historian Solovyev considered the longMongol subjugation as merely an episode, albeit an important one, in Russianhistory. This attitude is not very different from that of the British people vis-à-visthe Norman Conquest, or the Spanish people vis-à-vis the Moorish domination.It stems from a systematic tendency of nations to reduce the impact of foreigninterference in their history, especially when it is assimilated with conquest.

Other experts, however, consider the Mongol rule as highly influential anddecisive for Russian history. Several scholars, amongst whom was the famousAnatole Leroy-Beaulieu, perceived it as entirely deleterious. According to thishistorian, the ‘Tatar Yoke’ could be defined as follows:

The Mongol invasion was not merely to put back the hand of Russia’s timepiece300 years, it was to turn her from the European road on which she was travelling,bend her to alien manners, and, in a measure, twist her out of shape. It was in theearly years of the thirteenth century, at the very dawn of Western civilisation,when mediaeval Europe was on the point of blossoming out on all sides – inpoetry, in architecture, in scholasticism, that the hordes of Djinghiz-Khan cutaway from Europe Russia’s cooperation.13

Nikolai Berdyaev, one of the main exponents of the Russian Idea14 shared quitethe same view: ‘It is the generally accepted opinion that the Tatar domination hada fatal influence upon Russian history and threw the Russian people back’.15 Bythe same token, Nikolai Karamzin stressed the very negative impact of Mongolrule of Russia in his famous ‘History of the Russian State’.16 Russia’s historicalexperience since the Mongol conquest and domination perpetuated those preju-dices among Russian writers. During the imperial period, Russia was constantlyat war with Asiatics like the Ottoman Turks, the central Asian Muslims, and theJapanese, whom Russians tended to regard with hatred and mistrust.

The alternative perception, while admitting Russia’s basic differentiation fromEurope that was the result of Mongol rule, nevertheless underscores the positiveaspects of this experience. It notably considers that the Mongols helped to politi-cally unify the vast steppes of Eastern Europe and Northern Asia. Renownedmembers of the Eurasian school like Nicholas Trubetskoi, George Vernadsky and

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RUSSIAN IDENTITY

10

Charles Halperin advocated this interpretation by considering Russia as thenatural heir of the Mongol empire.17 According to them, the Muscovite Russia isthe successor of the Tatar-Mongolian Empire and not of Kievan Rus’.18 Morerecent research on the Mongol rule tends to confirm this last approach, along withthe lines of the famous French epigram attributed to Napoleon: ‘Grattez le Russeet vous trouverez le Tatare!’ (Scratch a Russian, find a Tatar!).

Tsarist Russia between change and stability

Russia’s first rapprochement with Western Europe dates back to the sixteenthcentury, when Tsar Ivan IV called for England’s, Germany’s and Denmark’sexpertise in the commercial and military fields, anticipating Peter the Great bymore than a century. However, Ivan IV’s only objective was to gain the practicaladvantages from such cooperation, as he did nothing to further facilitate culturallinks and political rapprochement.19

As Europe’s Renaissance progressed toward the Enlightenment, Russia stillremained a realm isolated from the West. It was only at the end of the seventeenthcentury that so far xenophobic Russians really began to be concerned with defin-ing themselves in terms of geopolitical location. This is not to say that they hadpreviously been ignorant of their geographical distinction between Europe andAsia, but that this distinction was not particularly relevant to them. This conditionof mind was about to change fundamentally as a result of the revolution inRussian society initiated by Peter the Great during his long reign. Petrine reformswere driven by the strong belief that Russia was, or at least ought to become, aEuropean country.20

In the space of two decades, Peter I forcibly opened his country to Westernways. He intended to ‘wake his people from what he understood to be a sleep oflethargy and barbarism, to make entrepreneurs of the traditionalist merchantry, tomake statesmen, administrators, generals, admirals and scientists of the gentry’.21

He therefore launched far-reaching economic, political and cultural reforms forthe purpose of Europeanising the Russian society.22

At a first stage, Peter’s rapprochement with the West generated in Russia anenthusiastic emulation of the West European model (mainly French), but by theend of the eighteenth century a process of resentment had emerged.23 In thisrespect, Petrine Russia stands as a striking example in the controversy about theWesternisation of the country. Russian intelligentsia, in particular, argued that theWestern model could not be easily transplanted in Russia.24

And yet, Peter the Great’s purpose was not to create slaves but rather to trans-form the old backward nobility into a modern, cultured and active ruling class.25

While his major concern was the elite, a by-product of these reforms was agrowing cleavage between this increasingly ‘European’ elite and the traditional,xenophobic peasant masses. As the former changed, the latter increasinglyregarded them as an ‘alien race of foreigners in their own land’.26 If it is true thatPeter’s achievement was significant among the aristocracy, which a century later

would push itself toward further Europeanisation, his efforts were neverthelessthe source of one of the great schisms to afflict Russian history. Adherents to theold and new systems, educated classes and the peasantry state and people: thesewere some of the gaps opened up by Peter’s reform. Montesquieu was veryexplicit in this respect:

Thus, when a prince wants to make great changes in his nation, he mustreform by laws what is established by laws and changes by manners whatis established by manners, and it is a very bad policy to change by lawswhat should be changed by manners. The law that obliged theMuscovites to shorten their beards and their clothing and the violence ofPeter I in trimming up to the knees the long robes of those who enteredthe towns were both tyrannical.27

The lack of conviction among Russians about the possibility to actually imple-ment a Western model in Russia consequently led to a relatively brief flirtationwith the West. Petrine reforms soon gave rise to vehement resistance amongRussians forced to change in dress, manners and customs. Opposition alsoarose among those required to accompany the tsar’s court from Moscow toSt Petersburg, Russia’s new ‘window on Europe’. Even the well known Marquisde Custine expressed his pessimism about Petrine upheaval:

It was Peter the Great, who, with all the imprudence of an untaughtgenius, all the temerity of a man the more impatient because deemedomnipotent, with all perseverance of an iron character, sought to snatchfrom Europe the plants of an already ripened civilization, instead ofresigning himself to the slow progress of sowing the seeds in his ownsoil. That too highly lauded man produced a merely artificial work: itmay be astonishing, but the good done by his barbarous genius wastransient, the evil is irreparable.28

However, the importance of Peter the Great’s reforms are now commonly admit-ted, albeit to various extent. Indeed, without these forceful and painful reforms,the Russian State would have been incapable of ensuring its sovereignty and itsfuture development.29

Peter I had sought to transform the Russian society on the basis of some set ofgoals foreign to and not understood by the people. His was the first cultural revo-lution from above in modern history, but the absence of transmission belts formodernisation as well as Russia’s underdeveloped social structures hamperedRussia’s Westernisation. If Russians were still passive and apolitical, while accept-ing that their rulers represented some higher values that gave them legitimacy, theywere now confronted with the problem of finding their own place in Europe.

When Catherine II came to power in 1762, many of Peter’s reforms had at leastbeen launched or even completed. She had modern European views and had been

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schooled in Peter the Great’s ideas which she drew upon for her own reforms.Most important was Catherine’s following advantage over Peter I: she was bornin and part of the civilisation she wanted to introduce within her people.30 Herown personal objective was to see Russia becoming a fully accepted member ofthe French–international court culture of the eighteenth century. In this context,St Petersburg continued to be the centre from which Western influence illumi-nated Russia. Catherine herself had acquired some kind of ‘French taste’ duringher education in Germany and enabled the Russian aristocracy to use Frenchculture to establish a common identity.31

By and large, the results of Peter’s, and to a lesser extent, of Catherine’s reformsappeared to be far more tangible in the cultural sphere than in socio-economicand political spheres. There was no more cultural isolation, and Russia founditself compatible with Western values. At its early stage of development, therewere merely powdered wigs and French aristocratic culture, but then came newbooks, new ideas, universities and academies; a new layer of society withEuropean education had emerged. This layer was far from being dominant, butnevertheless it represented a new material and spiritual culture within Russia’straditional society. Not only the noble estate, but Russia’s general populationbecame acquainted with Western values, especially in the period of theNapoleonic wars (1812–15), when Russian soldiers crossed Europe.32

The advance of the Russian armies through Germany and into France after1812–13 exposed officers and soldiers to the views of the French Revolution andGerman liberals. These wars thus brought more Russians into prolonged, closercontact with Europe than ever before and inspired them to compare Russian andWestern social and cultural patterns. As Anatole Mazour noted, ‘Russian nation-alism came as an answer to the fiasco of Napoleon to bring Europe to a federa-tion of states and bend Russia to that scheme’.33 For the foot soldiers, the mainconsequence was increased xenophobia. Russian officers, however, experiencedWestern freedoms and prosperity after Napoleon’s defeat and the majoritybecame convinced of the benefits of a relatively open society. Returning home,many of these ideas were developed in discussion groups and secret societies,which hoped for liberal changes, but the reactionary and mystical views of thetsar left them disappointed.

It is instructive to trace these movements, especially because they formed thebasis of the changes of the early twentieth century which influenced the reactionsof liberals, reactionaries and Bolsheviks in the turbulent revolutionary period1905–18. These ideas, events and structures provided the inheritance of the lead-ership of the communist party and set the structures of the Soviet regime whichin turn provided the present post-Soviet regime with modes of its thought andadministrative structures.

In 1825, some of those Russian officers, the so-called Decembrists, attempteda revolt, staged in St Petersburg’s Senate Square, in the city that symbolisedRussia’s receptivity to Western ideas. Their objective was to pre-empt Nicholas Ito the throne and call for a new constitution.34 This Decembrist uprising

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aborted and resulted in death and exile for these advocates of reforms. In thenear term, their revolt only brought more repression under the ‘Iron Tsar’,Nicholas I.35

Nicholas I ensured social order by declaring Pravoslaviye, Samoderzhaviye,Narodnost (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism)36 as the three principles of hisgoverning doctrine. As it turned out, this doctrine was able to hold theDecembrists’ heirs at bay,37 and order was restored for nearly a century.

Nicholas I’s doctrine was not suited for reform and economic development,which required local initiative and freedom of movement.38 As a logicalconsequence, Russia fell further behind the West. Nevertheless, the Decembristmovement had heralded a growing opinion for change and an important shift inthe evolution of national and self-identification psychology. The Iron Tsar’sautocracy had not been strong enough to bury Peter’s legacy.

With the death of Nicholas I, these pressures had grown so overwhelming thathis successor, Alexander II, launched a series of indispensable reforms.39 Theseso-called ‘Great reforms’, would finally include the abolition of serfdom andmove the country closer to Europe.40

Despite the formal emancipation of the serfs in 1861, not until 1907 were thepeasants entirely freed from their servitude. In any case, great though thesereforms were, they did not solve all Russia’s problems and led to other troublesand difficulties. These finally resulted in the murdering of the ‘Liberator Tsar’.

As long as Alexander II was on the throne, reforms and progress were on theright track, at least for the first part of his reign.41 This was no longer true withAlexander III whose xenophobia led him to push for so-called ‘counter-reforms’.42

The evolution of nineteenth-century Russian thought appears to have beenexcessively rapid. This was perhaps because Russia had somehow to catch upwith the whole history of Western thought in the course of a single century. Veryexplicit is the rapidity with which the Russian thinkers put on and then cast asidethe mantles of Shelling, Saint-Simon, even Schopenhauer, and finally turned toMarx and the Hegelians of the Left with an enthusiasm which left Westernphilosophers aghast.43 As at the turn of the twenty-first century, the late nine-teenth century was a time of profound unease in Russia about the relationshipwith the West, and Russian nationalism did rear its head several times. Still,Western influence was felt in powerful, though indirect, ways. At the end of thenineteenth century, when nationalism became a potent global force shaking thefoundations of all existing empires, the Russian people were ill-prepared toseparate their own identity from that of the empire in general and its Slavic corein particular. Despite the vast empire created in the name of Russia, the nationalidentity of its masses remained very weak. This topical question was intellectu-ally vital for both the Westernisers and the Slavophiles who dominated theRussian intellectual debate throughout the nineteenth century.

Nicholas II was equally opposed to any reform. He wanted to maintain autoc-racy at any cost and like his father initiated a reign of reaction. He lacked theindispensable qualities to face a situation where determination, strength of will

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and flexibility were urgently needed. If Nicholas II had been a wiser ruler willingto accept the reforms necessary for the survival of his regime, the Bolsheviksmight never have taken power.44 The Russian historian Nicholas Riasanovskyshared the same opinion:

Another Peter the Great could have saved the Romanovs and imperialRussia. There can be no doubt that Nicholas II did not. In fact, he provedto be both narrow-minded and weak, unable to remove reactionary blind-ers even when circumstances forced him into entirely new situationswith great potentialities, and at the same time unable to manage evenreaction effectively.45

The failure to provide a civilised future to the peasantry forced Tsar Nicholas IIto concede a form of parliament whilst retaining the powers of autocracy. CountWitte, probably one of the most liberal and intelligent ministers in Russia, becamePrime Minister but was powerless to prevent the Duma raising issues ofagricultural and social reforms.46 Other practical statesmen like Peter Stolypin47

who strove to bring order back to Russia after the events of 1905,48 thus had anextremely constricted arena in which to work. This period was merely dominatedby social unrest, armed repression, illiberal acts49 by the tsar and somereactionary ministers. The regime entered the world war and perished with it.

The Soviet period

After the October Revolution, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders tried to eradi-cate national values and to replace them with ideas of international proletarianbrotherhood. As a consequence, during the first two decades of the new regime,every single link to Russian national culture was suppressed. Thousands ofchurches were razed, and the few that remained had their bells removed ‘so thattheir ringing would not disturb the workers’.50 The establishment of a global com-munist ideology by the late 1920s resulted in a Manichaean conception of theworld divided into Marxist workers and capitalist Westerners.51 The regime’smonopoly on information had created a view of America (and the capitalist Westin general) as aggressive and bent on world domination.52 Shortly after theBolsheviks seized power, Moscow became the Soviet capital. In 1924,St Petersburg completely lost its symbolic ties to Europe when it was renamedLeningrad in honour of the Bolshevik leader. This name would remain until thefinal collapse of communism, when the city’s original designation was restored.

Another important aspect to note is that in reproving the reactionary capitalistworld, the communist regime was merely following the path of the tsarist regime,which was also distrustful of market forces and the bourgeoisie. Soviet Russiasoon transformed critical attitudes towards the West into ‘proletarian irreconcil-ability’ with the ‘bourgeois democracy’. Though urgently needed for the coun-try’s development, so-called capitalist industrialisation was viewed with suspicion

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and considerable hostility.53 In seeking to build a new society, the Soviet elite hadslid back into totalitarian rule, which could be envied by almost all despots in theworld’s history.54 In the 1920–30s, ‘revolutionary expediency’ helped justify gen-eral human rights violations. The new Soviet Russia soon became isolated fromthe outer world.55

In the 1930s, Stalin became more and more aware of the fact that the Sovietregime would be easier to defend by appealing to certain popular symbols.Obviously, clearly defined limits to this renewed national symbolism wereimposed. Nevertheless, the works of Russian literary classics, such as Pushkin,Lermontov, Tolstoy, Turgenev and Dostoevsky, initially banned as ideologists ofthe Russian nobility, reappeared in new editions stressing their revolutionarycontent.56 The same happened with pre-1917 Russian art, music, painting andballet.57 Revolutionary internationalism, though conserved in official parlance,was thus progressively giving way to great-power nationalism. Ideologically,it was nurtured by a slogan of advantages of socialism over hostile Westerncapitalism. Marxist internationalism was consequently supplanted by anincreasing anti-Western Russian nationalism.

After the Second World War, the Stalinist regime became endangered by thecomments of Soviet soldiers58 whom the war had brought to Europe. They were‘amazed to learn that, over there, it was nothing like what we’d been told for somany years before the war. They lived more dignified, richer and freer lives thanwe did’.59 The majority came out of the war with new, more positive than nega-tive, impressions of the West, together with hope that alliance could continue andcontribute to a better life at home.60 This reminds us of the Decembrist officerswho had rebelled against the autocracy after experiencing European liberties inthe post-Napoleonic occupation of Paris. Stalin too was mindful of history. Herapidly discouraged any expectation of rapprochement with the West by returningto rigid isolation. Anti-Western propaganda, investigations and arrests were alsopart of Stalin’s successful post-war campaign to undermine any positive image ofthe West. Even among well-informed people, a ‘majority were deformed bypervasive ideology, propaganda and fear’.61

After the Second World War, the division of the world into camps of ‘bourgeoisdemocracies’ and ‘people’s democracies’ also resulted in conflicts with the outerworld, including the 1956 and 1968 invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Acounter-example could be found in the Khrushchev thaw which opened a periodof exchanges with the West, thus undermining Soviet isolation. Every crack inisolation could be seen as an indirect step forward in the promotion of Westernvalues. We may put this in another way: any promotion of Western values was alsoa heavy blow at self-isolation. As a consequence, a ‘window of opportunities’opened, and Western mass culture began to penetrate through the ‘iron curtain’.Comparison of the Soviet and Western structures of consumption was a mortalblow to anti-Western stereotypes of Soviet official ideology. Stagnation of econ-omy and degradation of ideological norms in the 1960s led to a sort of culturalpluralism, though it failed to result in the Western-type ideological or political

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pluralism. Multiple West-oriented trends emerged together with dissidentspersecuted by official propaganda. The improvement of East–West relations inthe early 1970s, known as détente, was also the result of the military parityachieved by the Soviet Union with the United States.

New thinking and pro-Western orientation

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, one of the most influential factors at work wasan ideological turmoil within the Russian political and intellectual elite. It derivedfrom drastic re-orientation of the country’s leadership to a rapprochement withthe West, borrowing Western patterns in modernisation of Russia’s political andeconomic system. It was Gorbachev who initiated this shift as he tried to combinesocialist and ‘universal’ values in the framework of his ‘New Thinking’.

This ‘New Thinking’ first emerged in 1985 with the beginning of Gorbachev’sreforms and would last until the end of 1992. This new approach in Russian for-eign policy was mainly characterised by a new direction in East–West relations.The Brezhnev doctrine62 had become irrelevant, and the main objective was thenthe improvement of relations with the West. Very explicit examples include theconsent to German unification and its integration as such into NATO in 1990, theConventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the support for UN SecurityCouncil (UNSC) resolutions against Iraq during the Gulf crisis, but also the with-drawal of troops from Afghanistan and the non-intervention in the upheavals inCentral and Eastern Europe in 1989. During the first phase of Yeltsin’s rule, thisline in ideology and politics was considerably reinforced as the main drivingforces of Yeltsin’s revolution were anti-communist and liberal values. The failedcoup attempt of the communists in 1991 even reinforced the New Thinkingtrend and popularly elected President Yeltsin adopted an even more democratic,market-oriented and European–Atlanticist policy. His declared goals were fullparticipation in international economic institutions like the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), integration into the democratic community of states andeven NATO membership.

The pro-Western and liberal orientation of the new elite immediately facedgrowing resistance from hard-line communists, the military and special services,‘red directors’, especially in the military-industrial complex. Non-communistnationalist and anti-communist intellectual and political forces that had emergedeven before the perestroika, also challenged Western Liberalism. Since the oppo-nents of liberal reforms proved incapable to counter them in the field of economicrationalism and efficiency, they preferred a metaphysical sphere of nationalistmyths and emotions. Communists benefited therefore from the nostalgic mood ofthe general population referring to a happy life under communist rule. There weresome reasons for such a choice: first, the liberal orientation towards an alienWestern model was painful for national pride and self-esteem, and this made aliberal paradigm vulnerable; second, the bulk of Russian society suffered from thesyndrome of dismemberment stemming from the break-up of the Soviet Union

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and the collapse of its status as a great power; finally, Moscow’s euphoriaregarding prospects of its political rapprochement with the West and its joiningthe club of Western powers was replaced by disillusionment.

After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia engaged in a transition fromimperial power to a much more modest status and continuously tried to overcomesome ‘lost empire syndrome’63 by finding a new Russian identity. Undoubtedly,even though the disintegration of the Soviet Union was in a certain way ratherpeaceful, no one could expect such a tremendous transformation to proceedsmoothly. Russian society then tried to find explanatory reasons for the wide-spread annihilation of its national culture under the communist regime. Thisappealed to an inner-soul examination of the original cause of this situation anda reappraisal of old values. This quite ambivalent legacy is well described by theFrench Sovietologist Alain Besançon:

The alliance with Bolshevism that brought so much satisfaction toRussian nationalism – the pleasure of domination, the accomplishmentof Slavophile messianic prophecies, the extension of the language, andso on – has also produced an extraordinary diminution of the Russiannation.64

Moreover, the Russians’ sentiment of humiliation was exacerbated by their elite’sforeign policy, considered as pro-Americanism,65 contradicting Russian nationalinterests.

If in 1991–2, the Russian leadership had been quite open to the world andoffered many opportunities for intensified cooperation, it thus soon came underinternal pressure. In 1993, Yeltsin initiated a greater assertiveness in foreignpolicy by introducing his own ‘Monroe doctrine’,66 namely a neo-imperialisticpolicy towards the former Soviet republics, the so-called near abroad. Obviously,by putting on the opposition’s political clothes, Yeltsin played the card of pragmaticnationalism, but he also sacrificed the principles of liberal democracy.

Some explicit examples include bilateral treaties for continued Russian mili-tary presence in most states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):Georgia was practically compelled to accept CIS membership; and Azerbaijanwas forced to reduce its ties with Turkey, as well as oil and gas exploitationrights.67 Already confronted with a general loss of influence in world affairs,the Russian leadership simply refused to abandon the great power status left bythe Soviet empire. As a result, it attempted to establish its predominance in theentire area of the former Soviet Union. The near abroad thus represented a sphereof vital interests for Russia and we may even say that Russia’s own currentreforms depended for a great deal on progress in the newly independent states.

It is an established fact that Russia has special interests in its near abroad. Weshould not forget that about 25 million ethnic Russians are still living in theformer Soviet republics and suddenly find themselves beyond Moscow’s directprotection. In the present case, Russian peacekeeping in the near abroad seems to

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take the form of attempts to restore a former empire and to establish the formerSoviet Union as a Russian sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Yeltsin’s new foreignpolicy preserved its underlying orientation towards partnership with the West, yetwith more emphasis placed on the ‘Great Power’ rhetoric in the sense of someRussian-led re-integration of former Soviet republics.

It is also important to note that in the 1990s, the major goal of the society wasto get out of the economic crisis, a problem that overshadowed all others. Inthis context, the Westernising ideology assumed features characteristic oftechnocratism and economic determinism. Ideological and political opponents ofthis Westernising liberalism failed to challenge it with the same type of rationalargumentation. The ideology of the anti-liberal forces was primarily nurtured bynostalgic expectations of the former Soviet nomenklatura that has become anintegral part of the new post-Soviet elite. However, the main anti-Western politi-cal force, the communist party, having proclaimed its adherence to national patri-otic values, at the same time, failed to soften Egalitarianism and anti-capitalistPopulism nurtured by virulent Stalinism and its supporters and activists. Thecommunist leaders could not stop praising the ideals of the recent communistpast. The communist mythology was based on people’s memory of the lost para-dise (i.e. grandeur of the Soviet empire) and of their very modest and restrained,but nevertheless quiet and stable existence under communism. As for the modern‘social Capitalism’ of Gaidar, reforms resulted in a substitution of civil–politicalfor socio-economic rights. Under communism, the general population, lackingpolitical freedom, nevertheless benefited from social welfare. The reform erabrought in political freedom but almost demolished the old system of social guar-antees. Devoid of socio-economic rights, the general population was in a poorposition to benefit from political freedoms. Russians had thus to come to termswith the loss of empire in December 1991, and to clarify the new role and statusof their country in the international system. As Margot Light described it:

From the point of view of geopolitics, for example, the establishment ofnew, independent states to the west of Russia reinvoked an old identityproblem: was Russia part of Europe, or had the loss of empire turned itinto an Asian or Eurasian power? It was certainly geographically furtherfrom Europe than it had been for 300 years. Westernizers, who equatedprogress and prosperity with Europe, argued that Russia must beEuropean no matter how many miles or states separate the country fromthe rest of the continent. Others, however, claimed a unique Eurasianrole for Russia, bridging Europe and Asia.68

Russian national identity, the search for the Russian idea69

Russian historic experience is full of ambiguities and paradoxes. Undoubtedly,Russians have no difficulty in believing in a Russian civilisation when this is

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associated with the concept of empire. However, when referring to a distinctRussian national identity, the notion of ‘Russianness’ is often imbued with vague-ness and confusion. Debates over Russia’s national identity since the eighteenthcentury did not preclude the persistent view of Russia as a superior civilisationand a timeless empire with a universal mission. Obviously, a Russian nationalidentity without this perception has yet to appear. The implementation of such aconcept of national identity would enable Russia to make peace with itself and theinternational system. Various factors have made Russia’s search for a newnational identity particularly complex.

Rossiskii or Russkii:70 imperial identity and national identity

Russia became an empire under Ivan IV who for the first time incorporated largenumbers of people who were neither Orthodox nor Russian speaking.71 The earlyimperial expansion resulted in Russia acquiring an imperial identity before itdeveloped a national identity. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot even noted thatbecause the formation of the Russian nation did not precede the process of tsaristcolonial expansion, Russian nationality could hardly be defined and Russia’spolitical identity became dependent on the tsarist state’s imperial exploits.72

During most of the twentieth century, Russian identity continued to be based onthe international power of the state.73 It is also often mentioned that Russian tsarsrarely appealed to the notion of a Russian people to legitimate their rule.Alexander III,74 and after him Nicholas II, were the first tsars to promote Russiannationalism for their legitimisation. Even then contradictions were plentiful. Bothtsarist and Soviet empires resorted to nationalism when they eventually facedtheir decline. However, this was nothing more than the last gasp of a decadentregime.

The incapacity of tsardom to address either Russian or minority national aspi-rations left the Russian nation, despite the wealth of its language, arts and history,the ethnic group least prepared to develop a post-imperial identity. The lack ofevolutionary features in Russian historic development also contributed to the con-flicting and uncertain character of the Russian national identity. Short periods ofradical reforms (under Peter I, Catherine II, Alexander II, communism, pere-stroika and liberalisation), often gave place to periods of conservatism and stag-nation. Moreover, changes often did not derive from natural evolution of thesociety, but were planned and arranged by the top echelons of power. As a result,every stage of social transformation remained unfinished: new norms, values andorientations proved capable of only shattering the old ones but failed to replacethem. One of the ambiguities of Russian national identity was that though theempire was incapable of satisfying Russia’s national feelings, the Russiannational consciousness remained fused to the empire. Undoubtedly, the linkbetween Russia’s national development and this empire-consciousness remains afundamental characteristic of Russian national psychology.

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A very explicit example of the regime’s ambiguity regarding a distinct Russianidentity can be found in the Russian language. The tsar and all imperialinstitutions traditionally referred to themselves as rossiskii (of the land of Rus),rather than russkii (ethnic Russian). This helped to create a supranational imperialidentity, distinct from an ethnic identity.75

The equation of the term narod76 (the people) with gosudarstvo (the state) alsoreflects this ambiguity. The use of rossiskii persisted among the ruling classesuntil the very end of the Romanov dynasty. As David Laitin explained:

Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century state development inRussia compelled a distinction between a Russian as a subject of apolitical entity (Rossiia), which was itself a vast multinational state, andas a person of the nationality (russkii) that was at the core of the RussianState, but not the sole nationality of that state. A dual or ambiguousnational identity emerged: Russians were both ethnic Russians and sub-jects of a state that was Russia, in which Russians were ‘elder brothers’to a wide variety of nationality groups that were not russkie, but onlyrossiskie.77

Even today, the question whether Russians are russkie or rossiskie78 is still atopical question in Russia.79

The rather diffuse state of Russian identity had several long-lasting effects onthe formation of the Russian consciousness and its ability to create an identityseparate from the empire.80 Throughout their history, ethnic Russians have iden-tified themselves mainly with the state – the Russian empire or the Soviet Union.Thus they acquired what is often described as an ‘imperial mentality’. The meritof the tsarist and Soviet empires, if any, was that they presented the country’sdevelopment as a common cause of all their constituent peoples. A degree ofethnic tolerance was an indispensable part of the Russian imperial mentality – afeature that is also vital for maintaining stability in the Russia of today.Regardless of their specific orientation, Russian thinkers across the spectrumremained attached to the belief that Russia is a civilisation, rather than a nation,into which all peoples of the empire should be brought. In contrast to nineteenth-century Western and Central European nationalist historians, who increasinglyasserted an integralist nationalism, Russian historians continued to followKaramzin’s line praising Russia’s ability to absorb and Russify other peoples.Russia was to consolidate itself as a multinational state.81

Russian cultural superiority over the collective nations of the East has alwaysbeen a common belief. This provides explanation for Russia’s perceived missionto bring enlightenment and civilisation to those benighted zones of the empirelike Siberia. Russia’s mission of civilisation and spiritual salvation was to berealised not only through a programme of enlightened internal imperial adminis-tration, but through one of active political expansion as well. This aspect isclosely related to Russia’s messianic policy.

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Russian international messianism

The absence of any clear definition of their national identity left the Russianpeople without national egotism and thus made them particularly fit to carry outa universalist Christian mission.82 A common sense of Russia’s old religious past,contributed to the development of the idea that Russians as a people were distin-guished by a particular religiosity or a particular spiritual vocation. The Russianpeople admirably integrated this messianic idea, as did the Hebrew people.Russian messianism is present throughout the whole of Russian history, includ-ing the communist period. As Kartashev aptly observed, ‘the Russian has chosena very explicit name to designate his people, his land, his government and hisChurch: Holy Russia’.83 But this religious idea, while exerting a strong influenceon Russians, soon became a justification for imperial expansion.84 Moscow, theThird Rome,85 the last bastion of Christianity, had the unique mission of teachingthe world some great lesson. Unfortunately, the doctrine of the Third Romefurther complicated Russia’s national development and sacrificed a distinctRussian national identity to a universalist mission cum imperialism. While somemay find this debate an exercise in hair splitting, its impact on the formation ofRussian national identity should not be underestimated. The messianic idea wasto some extent the spiritus moves of the stardom.86

This messianic conception of national origins is also shared by such eminentfigures of Russian literature as Pushkin and Dostoyevsky. This latter, despite hisdeclared pacifism, exempted Russia’s military expansion from charges of aggres-sion. For him, wars were fought in the pursuit of a sacred idea, due to Russia’suniversalist mission, that would ultimately lead to perpetual peace. Some giants ofRussian literature like Tolstoy disagreed. Nikolai Berdyaev criticised this linkingof the Church with imperialism, observing that:

The whole idea of Moscow as the Third Rome contributed indeed tothe power and the might of the Moscow State and the autocracy of theTsar, but not to the well-being of the Church and not to the growth ofspiritual life. The vocation of the Russian people was distorted anddespoiled.87

However, authors who openly challenged the notion of mission civilisatrice werea minority. Russian messianism did not disappear with the end of tsardom.During the Second World War especially there was a revival of the Russianmessianic idea. According to Fred Barghoorn:

The Russian component of Soviet messianism placed particular empha-sis upon the claim that a Russian, Lenin, rendered unique service tohumanity by his application of Marxism. Russia was the chosen nationcharged to bring light and truth to the toilers of those parts of the worldwho have not yet been saved from capitalist slavery.88

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Peter’s tortuous legacy and anti-national post-Petrine Monarchy

Several factors hampered the success of Peter’s project to ‘Europeanise’ Russiansociety, contributing to an even more conflicting status of Russian national devel-opment. Among the most relevant of these was the final resentment generated byPetrine reforms. If in a first stage, Russian nobles copied the Western model withadmiration, this attitude soon led to a shamed feeling of inferiority. This feelingthen gave way to resentment and to the rejection of the West.89 In addition, Peter’sreforms were principally meant for the nobility and not for the peasantry. As aresult, the rural masses were almost completely ignored and kept away fromprogress and enlightenment.90

This moral and social unease was also present in politics, since the newlegislation looked entirely alien to Russian people. Additionally, Europeans wererelatively skeptical about whether the immense and almost unknown Russianempire had really come so suddenly to possess those indispensable qualitiesnecessary to be admitted into Western civilisation. These reservations of Europeitself to welcome and to recognise the validity of Russia’s Westernising endeav-our inevitably undermined the Russians’ own conviction about this new trend intheir national development. And, indeed, how could they possibly feel themselvesan inalterable part of Europe without the official and unconditional acceptance ofEurope itself?91 As Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu observed:

To Peter’s reforms are traceable many of the oppositions, or ratheranomalies, which, in Russia, caused contrast to become law. Institutionsand customs, ideas and facts find it hard work to get attuned together. Inthe nation as in the individual, dissonances of all kinds abound. TheRussian is divided against himself, he feels double; at times he does notknow what he believes, what he thinks, what he is.92

The post-Petrine Monarchy would have to live with this tormented legacy. In thenineteenth century, both tsars and people tended to oscillate between antipathyand sympathy for the Western model. Under Alexander I, Western influencewas predominant. Nicholas I then distanced himself from any furtherEuropeanisation. Alexander II began his reign with reforms that were later aban-doned. Alexander III and Nicholas II followed this last path. In any case, the tsar-dom’s misleading position resulted from the forced implementation of an alienmodel in Russia. The communist regime made the same mistake.93 Russia stillawaits a new concept of national identity that will heal the rift between Petrineand Muscovite traditions in Russian political culture.

The Soviet regime’s nihilism and post-communist Russia

Neither the late tsarist system, nor the communist regime was able to generate aviable alternative society, one with a new social logic and potentially authoritative

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new leaders, to replace the old system. In both cases, the replacement of the oldregime has been twisted and painful beyond expectation. The official ideology(both tsarist and Soviet) adhered to an instrumental view of nationalism, one thatserved the needs of the state and its ruling elite. After the collapse of theRomanov dynasty, Bolsheviks embarked upon a policy discrediting most Russiannational traditions. The fact that Bolsheviks had a very limited and simplifiedunderstanding of Russia’s particularities and national tasks resulted in a nihilisticattitude towards the country’s past. When the USSR disintegrated, the myth ofthe Soviet state fell apart as material flowed from the archives illustrating theatrocities and tragedies of this period. The wave of revelations about the Sovietpast had the most damaging effect on the Russian identity. Not only had theframework of Russian national identity been ruined, but the responsibility for thecreation of this framework was also undeniable. It was no longer possible to avoidthe complicity of the Russian population in the great Soviet experiment.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the ever thorny problems ofRussia’s national identity and destiny re-emerged with undiminished vigour, andas before, these problems were linked to a debate over how to define Russia andto establish its statehood. While Russians could hardly accept responsibility forthe policy of the Soviet Union, or for the conduct of imperial Russia, they madeclaims for the international status of the Soviet Union. The search for a Russianidentity took place within an external environment that proved less sympatheticthan liberal Westernisers had expected, since the results of their early pro-Westernpolicies were disappointing. Delays and difficulties contributed to the perceptionthat Western politicians patronised Russians and treated them as if Russia hadbeen vanquished in the Cold War. After 300 years as a great power, or as part ofa great power, Russia was now looking for financial aid and humanitarian assis-tance. Much of today’s Russian nationalist movement can be seen as a directresponse to this loss of pride and national self-confidence. Russians are currentlyputting an end to their self-depreciation and beginning to search for their newidentity in the post-Soviet world.

Russian schools of thought

In the last third of the eighteenth century, a growing number of Russian intellec-tuals tried to define who they were and what they believed in, independently ofthe court-sponsored Westernisation which had increasingly dominated Russianlife since the reign of Peter the Great. This phenomenon was not exclusivelyRussian and could be observed elsewhere in Europe. However, it was particularlyrelevant in Russia since questions of national identity were so acute. In contrastwith most Western European nations, these intellectuals merely represented asmall and isolated group. Nevertheless, out of their sense of Russia’s traditionsand customs, they began to promote a much more modern idea that Russiansas a people were distinguished by a particular religiosity or a specific spiritualvocation.

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The Slavophiles–Westernisers debate

The Slavophiles–Westernisers debate, that commenced in the nineteenth century,was but one episode in this struggle for the Russian consciousness that had beencontinuing for centuries.94 The long and tormented nature of Russian history hadcontributed to the emergence of the sentiment that there ought to be a Russianpath belonging exclusively to Russia itself. Ultimately, of course, this debate can-not be resolved, it can only be moderated by democratic institutions and a cultureof civic discourse. Its origins lie in vastly differing conceptions of Russia’snational ideal that will no doubt persist and even gather strength in democraticRussia.

The Slavophiles

The decades of the 1820s and 1830s saw the creation of the first really visiblecurrent of thinkers to develop a fairly consistent version of the Russian Idea.Scholars like Ivan Kireevsky, Aleksei Khomiakov, Iurii Samarin and especiallyIvan Aksakov emphasised the specific values of Russia’s past and traditions andprojected an ideal Russia distinct from and superior to the West. Interesting tonote is that the original fundamentals of Slavophilism were drawn on European,and especially German, romantic conservatism. The fact is that some of the lead-ing figures of the first generation of Slavophiles had studied in Europe with someeminent German philosophers, such as Hegel and Schelling, from whom theyabsorbed many of their ideas. As Nicholas Riasanovsky noted:

The Slavophiles were affected by numerous currents of Western thoughtwhich composed the cultural climate of the Romantic age. The periodimmediately preceding the development of Slavophilism was character-ized in Russia by the influence of Schelling [. . .]; but the growth ofSlavophilism itself corresponded with the spread of Hegelianism inRussia.95

The Slavophiles idealised and exalted certain institutions like Russian Orthodoxy.Their conception of the existing Church institution mostly relied on the Russianconcept of sobornost usually translated as ‘conciliarism’ or ‘communalism’. Thismajor aspect of Slavophile thought was first formulated by Alexis Khomiakov.96

As James Edie wrote:

Sobornost was primarily a theological conception: an organic concep-tion of ecclesiastical consciousness which, externally, placed theRussian conciliar or synodal system above the papal absolutism andProtestant individualism of the West, and which, internally, defined theChurch not as a centre of teaching or authority, but as a ‘congregationof lovers in Christ’. The Church is ‘polyhypostatic’; its members are

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united ‘organically’ rather than ‘organizationally’. The Church is not anauthority which can force obedience but a free union of believers wholove one another. The only source of faith (the highest and truest kind ofknowledge) is the consciousness of believers in their collectivity. NoCouncil or Church pronouncement has any force unless it is ratified bythe community of believers.97

In other words, the Russian sobornost differed from the religious autarchy of thepapal government, on one side, and from the anarchic and subjective individual-ism of the Protestant response on the other.98

Likewise, the Slavophiles advocated other Russian institutions that they viewedas being endangered by the Petrine reforms. One of the most striking examples isprobably the village/peasant-commune (obshchina)99 perceived as ‘the highestform of social, moral and political organisation because it emphasises theprimacy of the social over the individual, and yet guarantees the freedom of theindividual as a part of, not apart from, the community’.100

Some eminent figures of Slavophilism, like Dostoevsky, to some extentreworked and widened this Slavophile point of view and came to think that theRussian people was a ‘God-bearing people’. This revealed the potential messian-ism within Slavophilism and contributed to its further development. NicholasRiasanovsky described the Slavophiles’ messianism as follows:

The Russian future lays in a return to native principles, in overcomingthe Western disease. After being cured, Russia would take its message ofharmony and salvation to the discordant and dying West.101

Slavophiles also favoured individuals’ capacity for personal judgement andaccountability, so essential to civic responsibility in their conception of a systemof government. They strongly opposed Petrine absolutism where the emperorruled over his subjects, rather than by their consent. They preferred a Muscovitesystem of government customs rather than constitutions or legal rules restrainingan autocratical monarchy. If Slavophiles usually considered monarchy as a desir-able form of government, they truly believed in the need for reform. SomeSlavophiles even argued that ‘the state, not the people, would lead Russia touniversal glory’.102

The distinctive character of Russian history and development was also veryexplicit in the Slavophiles’ conception of ‘Nationalism’.103 For them, furtherEuropeanisation could only harm Russia’s civilisation. And yet, they did notoppose the Europeanisation of Russia because they wanted their country toremain backward. Their concern was more linked to a fear of Russians becom-ing overly pragmatic and materialistic, as they thought Europeans were.Generation after generation, various circles of Russian intelligentsia haveexpressed an apprehension that modernisation would entail the imposition on

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Russian society of an alien socio-economic model – namely, that of the West.In their perception:

The individualism, secularism, and rationalism of Europe – theaggregate mythologies of Faust and Prometheus – were leading theEuropean world in the direction of an Armageddon of national and classconflict, fuelled by rapacious industrialization. Beneath the overweeningand prideful façade of secular European culture were blight and decay,already far advanced.104

This Slavophile Manichaean view can also be described as follows: ‘In thefoundation of the Western state: violence, slavery and hostility. In the foundationof the Russian State: free will, liberty and peace’.105 While many nineteenthcentury Russian intellectuals were educated in Germany, they opposed somebasic concepts like the Eurocentric premise of the Hegelians. In this respect, theyeventually replaced the generated German hegemony with a Russian-centredworld.106 Nevertheless, the Hegelian influence proved to be powerful andcontributed to the assertive nature of Russian nationalism.

Since a parallel between Nicholas I’s Official Nationality107 and the Slavophiles’own characteristics can easily be drawn, it is hardly surprising that some scholarstried to link them. However, perspicacious critics soon noticed that, in contrast to‘official nationalists’ who endlessly celebrated the dynasty and the government, theSlavophile ideologues were far from glorifying the achievements of the Romanovdynasty.108

In fact, the Slavophile view that proper balance in the Russian political andsocial system had been terribly damaged by Peter the Great,109 contained a barelyconcealed subtext, critical of the autocracy of Nicholas I. It suggested that thedynasty’s frequently coercive sponsorship of Westernisation had been a mistakeand an affront to Russia’s past; despite the regime’s ostensible glorification ofOrthodoxy, it had humiliated and damaged the Church. This attitude may providean explanation for the fact that Slavophiles were nearly as bitterly persecuted asthe Westernisers during Nicholas’ reign.

Slavophiles were not just a group of utopian ideologues emulating Europeanromantic conservatism. They extensively referred to pre-Petrine Russia’s uniquequalities and stressed what the reforms of Peter, in this respect, had cost. Asthe first ideological structure in Russia, Slavophilism would resonate well into thetwentieth century. The reasons for its persistence lay not in the accuracy of itspolitical prescriptions or its historical analysis, but in the powerful attraction ofideals of an alternative political culture at the turn of the century.110

The Westernisers

At the outset, the Westernising movement was only a feeling or a tendency amongsome Russian intellectuals who were turning away from Russia and towards

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Western Europe for new rationales. The Westernisers111 (Zapadniki)112 believedthat Russia was a European nation and an integral part of the Western culturalmainstream. In their view, the long Mongol subjugation had separated them fromthe West and Russia should now mature as a nation, transform itself and return tothe European orbit.113

In this respect, Westernism followed the path of the Russian thought initiatedat the time of Peter the Great and Catherine II. Westernisers logically consideredthe Petrine reforms as part of a natural evolution and a useful guide for thefuture.114

As soon as they became fully conscious of their existence and influence as anorganised current of thought in Russia,115 the Westernisers immediately opposedthe Slavophiles. Although Westernisers and Slavophiles both originally relied onthe same philosophical inspiration,116 their perceptions of Russian identity werecompletely different. Westernisers, just like Herzen, Vissarion Belinsky andothers, were very critical about the Slavophile romance with Russia’s past. Theirrespective judgements of the value of Russian culture and its place in history werealso antagonistic. In contrast with the Slavophiles, Westernisers were either atheis-tic or at least felt no interest in religion. Bakunin, one of the leading figures ofWesternism, considered it necessary to choose between the existence of God andthe freedom of man: if God exists, man is a slave.117 Less extreme was Herzen’satheism, closer to eighteenth-century Voltairism. This focus on the study of manwas shared by all Westernisers and therefore constituted a common front against theSlavophiles.

The Westernisers’ attitude toward the monarchy was also entirely different asthey were requesting the destruction of the political and social system. Since themonarchy was impeding reforms, they came to view the tsarist regime as the rootcause of Russia’s evils. For them, it was better to renounce Russia’s historicaltraditions on the way to a brighter future based on the liberal or socialist inheri-tance of the French Enlightenment. The Westernisers wanted to save Russia froma dramatic backwardness by helping it to assimilate the Western civilisation inorder finally to take its place in Europe.

However, they soon realised the quasi-impossibility of transplanting aWestern model to Russia. In addition, their perception of the West was moreidealistic than realistic. They soon came to deal with a disillusioning image ofEuropean materialism and individualism. As a consequence, Westernisersprogressively abandoned their infatuation and took a large step towards theSlavophile orientation. As a result, ‘a succession of Westernisers from Karamzin(who reversed his positive attitude toward Peter’s domestic policies) to Herzen(the doyen of Russian Westernisers) migrated from unabashed admiration ofthe West to enthusiasm for the purity of the Russian village and rejection of thedecadent West’.118 This might provide some explanation for the stated factthat the Westernising tradition has almost always been weaker than that of theSlavophiles.

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Asianists, Scythians and Eurasianists

In Europe we are hangers-on and slaves, but in Asia we are masters.In Europe, we are Tatars, but in Asia we too are Europeans.119

In the twilight years of imperial Russia, much of the intelligentsia was scepticalabout Occidentalism.120 The implementation of European models was a matter ofconcern, not just in the way it challenged the old order, but also because it seemedto emphasise Russia’s inherent inferiority vis-à-vis such modern industrial rivalsas Great Britain and Germany. However, if Russia looked to the West from a posi-tion of relative weakness, it could still face the East with confidence and strength.

If enthusiastic Westernisers were still a minority, even the Slavophiles, whostressed Russia’s apartness from the West, had never considered themselves to bepart of Asia. During the Great War, educated Russians generally viewed theircountry as equal to the other powers in the Triple Entente: France and Britain.Like their allies, most Russians saw their racial roots as firmly planted inEuropean soil. Yet there were Russians who were more doubtful about their con-tinental allegiance. As we shall see, the Orient did at a certain period fascinate asmall but influential minority. By the fin-de-siècle, for some Russians the term‘Asiatic’ was not an insult and the Orient appealed to many poets in St Petersburgand Moscow.

Russia’s intellectual flirtation with the Orient coincided with a redirection east-ward of its imperial objectives. In the early 1890s, tsarist diplomats had negotiateda secret treaty of alliance with China, in addition to a leasehold and extensive eco-nomic privileges in Manchuria. As the twentieth century dawned, it appeared tomany influential political writers that Russia was fundamentally Eastern ratherthan Western in character. The tumult of revolution and war together with the mis-takes, compromises and ambitions of the country’s new leaders would bringRussia’s ‘Asiatic’ heritage to the fore and sweep away a still-fragile Westernism.121

From Asianism to Scythianism

At the turn of the century, those intellectuals who had begun to stress theirnation’s affinity with the East rather than the West were identified as vostochnikior Asianists. Like Slavophilism, Asianism122 reflected a profound unease withRussia’s sense of itself and its place in the world. But whereas the Slavophilesusually claimed their heritage from the more peaceful European Slavs, theAsianists ‘cast their gaze further east’. This Asian identity was also now cast in apositive rather than a negative light.

Some of Russia’s extreme attempts to redefine its national identity through theAsian lens resulted in a ‘cultural apotheosis’ known as Scythianism. Playing uponthe image of an aggressive inner Asian nomadic tribe that had roamed the southernsteppes and the Black Sea coasts in pre-Slavic times, a group of leading writersand poets at the turn of the century began to refer to themselves and to Russiansin general emphatically as ‘Scythians’. By claiming their Asian identity, these

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intellectuals were at long last acknowledging that they actually were the very‘Tatars’ who, as Dostoevsky insisted, Europe had always believed them to be.123

These active nationalists thus believed in the absolute necessity of separatingtheir native Russia from the all-too-civilised West. Russia’s emerging Scythianidentity was in consequence affirmed with passion and even hostility. AlexanderBlok portrayed with brio the rebellious face of Russia’s Scythian identity:

Of you, there are millions. We – are numberless,numberless, numberless.Just try to fight with us!Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we are Asiatics!With slanting and greedy eyes!124

Eurasianism125

Asianists and Scythians were among the first to suggest that the origins ofRussia’s differentiation from Europe were to be found in Asia. Yet their group wasnot prepared to press this insight very far since they were confronted with a greatdeal of antagonistic pressure and tension. If part of the Asianist convictions hadalready ‘foundered, along with the Baltic Fleet, in the Straits of Tsushima’,126

their advocates soon appeared to be entirely at a loss when facing the pervasiveEurocentric influences of the Petrine legacy. It therefore was left to others torestore some of the deeper implications of Asianism and to perpetuate its legacy.

In the chaotic aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, agroup of Russian émigré intellectuals in Prague set forth a new perspective onRussia’s relationship to the Europe–Asia juxtaposition, and with it declared thecreation of a new current of thought, Evraziistvo or Eurasianism.127 Whereas theAsianists focused on Russia’s fundamentally oriental nature, to underline its apart-ness from the Occident, the Eurasianists argued that their nation was an autonomouscultural–ethnographic complex, a sixth great continent called Eurasia. Indeed, forEurasianists, Russia was thus neither Asian nor European, but combined elementsof both. Nevertheless, most of Eurasia’s basic aspects were explicitly in oppositionwith the West. The Eurasian autocratic political nature, its spirituality and its rejec-tion of materialism predominantly referred to the same Asianist Europhobia. If thegeographical emphasis of the post-revolutionary Eurasianists was a little differentfrom that of the pre-revolutionary Asianists, they both shared a strong antipathy tothe West. Eurasianists also referred to some elements of the Slavophile thinking:very explicit was their perception of the Russian form of government which, theyargued, was superior to Western forms of rule. As Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu wrote:

The modern Scythian fancied he had found out the emptiness of thatGraeco-Latin culture whose splendour had dazzled him, and, with hisrace’s versatility and proneness to rush from one to the other extreme,with the bitter wrath of a believer undeceived and ashamed of his longcredulity, he blasphemed what he had worshipped yesterday.128

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Obviously, the discourse about Russia and Asia was moved to a completely newlevel. Eurasian Russia was irrevocably disengaged from the West and firmly fixedinstead in a kind of integration with the East. It was neither European, nor evenSlavic, but rather a complex amalgam characterised as Eurasian civilisation. Thedefining moment in the formation of this complex was the conquest of ancientRussia by the steppe nomads that had so fatefully ruptured the country’s earlyevolution, and the Eurasians focused upon the protracted experience of Mongoldomination as the essential crucible in the history of the Russian people and theRussian State.

Eminent Eurasianists such as Nicholas Trubetskoi even presentedlinguistic arguments to provide evidence of a Eurasian linguistic alliance.129

According to Trubetskoi’s analysis, the Russian verb verit (‘to believe’) wasformed on the Zoroastrian verb varayaiti (‘to choose’). The first Slavs viewedaccordingly the religious act as a ‘choice’ between good and evil, just like theZoroastrians. Another very explicit example can be found in the origins of theRussian word bog (‘God’), linked to the Russian baga (‘rich’), as in old-Persianlanguages.130

Despite the committed support it attracted during the interwar period fromsome of the Russian intelligentsia’s most illustrious representatives, Eurasianismfailed to receive broad support, and was accepted neither in the internationalémigré community nor indeed within the Soviet Union itself. Nevertheless, whilethe movement did not survive the Second World War in its original form, Eurasianideas have found contemporary adherents. In the last few years, a current ofthought has emerged which promotes the lasting importance of Russia’s connec-tions to Asia. Strongly opposed to Atlanticism, this new current of opinionclaimed that Russia’s path to the future could only be constructed on the basis ofthese connections and on their absolute prioritisation above relations with theEuropean and transatlantic West. In order to bolster this position ideologically,the doctrines of the original Eurasians were resurrected and freshly embraced, andthe term Evraziistvo became one of the most important political keywords of theday.131 The contemporary revival of Eurasianism is an unmistakable indicationof the persistence and enduring vitality in today’s Russia of that ideologicalprocess which we have attempted to trace in this section, namely the attempt toarticulate a vision of Russia’s own character and national identity in terms of itsjuxtaposition and relationship to Asia.

Russia’s Asian–Byzantine orientation resulted in a conservative and xenophobicworld conception that contributes to the permanence of the East–West division inpost-Cold War Russia. Many still believe that Russians are constitutionallyincapable of participating in Western culture. In this scheme, there is also a wide-spread opinion that the fundamental incompatibility of views between Russia andthe West derives from the idea that Russia’s conversion to Orthodoxy contributedto its isolation from the mainstream of European history for a number ofcenturies. In forming attitudes towards the West and by symbolising a specificallyEast Slavic worldview, the Russian Orthodox Church provides both a background

and a framework for understanding many of the issues in the present search for anew Russian identity.

Conclusion

Two main objectives motivated our analysis of the Russian identity. Thefirst aimed at providing, if not a perfect definition, at least sound features ofthis identity. As mentioned in the main introduction, this would permit us toassess whether or not the particularities of this identity were incompatiblewith those of the countries of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, and could thusconstitute an obstacle to enhanced relations. This also required our looking intowhether or not the Russian identity was of national nature, all the more as‘national identity’ is usually the concept used to define the identity of the Alliedmember states.

To reach these objectives, we followed a progressive approach consisting infirst considering the historical and geographical components of the Russianidentity; second, weighing the existence of a national dimension of that identitythrough the Russian thinking, culture and historic-political legacy; and third,taking into account the Russian theoretical approach to that subject.

What Russian geography has taught us is that the immensity of the Russianterritory, stretching from Europe to Asia, and the consequent heterogeneity of thatterritory and the people living there, has been the ground for an identity thatincludes the consciousness of plurality and the acceptance of differences. In otherwords, the Russian identity cannot be that of the Russian people in its ethnic senseonly; it must embrace a dimension that is broad enough for all the inhabitants ofthe Russian territory to identify themselves with. This conclusion was latersupported by our analysis of the meaning of ‘Russian’ in the Russian languagecontext. The co-existence of two different terms to refer to ‘Russian’, one –russkii – relating to the ethnic characteristic of the idea of being Russian, theother – rossiskii – pertaining to the rather territorial aspect of it, proved that theRussian identity was more inclusive than exclusive. In this context, one can evensay that rossiskii prevails over russkii: a Russian is first and foremost an individ-ual that was born on Russian territory; being of Russian ethnic origin is only ofsecondary importance. This proves that it would have been wrong to assume thatthe Russian identity was of national nature, as this would have meant giving moreimportance to russkii than to rossiskii.

Our study of the different approaches to the question of Russian identity laterproved that any attempt to define the Russian identity based on fixed references,should they refer to the belonging to the Slav people and culture or to the prox-imity with the Western or the Asian world, did not meet with success. In the end,none of the Westernisers, Slavophiles, Asianists, Scythians and Eurasianists man-aged to take real precedence over the others. Each of these trends only gatheredthe support of a minority, for the very reason that they were exclusive, focusingon only one aspect of the Russian identity.

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At the historic–political level, we also realised that the successive attempts toshape the Russian identity according to external identity references ended insound failures. Peter the Great’s tentative Europeanisation of Russia or theimposed Sovietisation of the Russian people failed because: (a) they implied thedestruction of all the existing identity references; (b) they consisted in the forcedintroduction of alien identities, one cultural and the other ideological; and(c) because these unilateral policies were not welcomed by the outside world. Theconsequences of these experiences were not felt immediately but re-emerged afterthe demise of the Soviet Union. Then the Russians were faced with a profoundidentity crisis, having either to resurrect identity references long annihilated or tofind their way in the midst of multiple and often contradictory alternatives.

At this stage of our research, several points can be made. First, we are now ina position to ascertain that the Russian identity is not one but plural, that it is notexclusive but inclusive, and that the prime nature of what we may call the Russiannational identity is not ‘national’ stricto sensu but multinational. Since it lieson inalterable factors and stands as the precondition to the existence of theRussian State in its present form, rossiskii prevails and will continue to prevailover russkii in the Russian mind. Second, we can say that because the alien identityreferences that were deliberately imported to Russia were of Western origin,the Russian identity today does have a greater Western connotation than theAsian one.

The other feature that survived the tortured path of the Russian identity is thestrongly anchored conviction within the Russian mind that it is a ‘chosen people’with a universal spiritual mission. What we started to study under internationalmessianism finds its roots in the dominant religion in Russia, Orthodoxy. Ourunderstanding of the Russian identity cannot be complete without exploring thefundamentals and the powers of Orthodoxy in Russia.

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3

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

In the modern world, religion is central, perhaps the central, forcethat motivates and mobilizes people . . . What ultimately counts forpeople is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith andfamily, blood and belief, are what people identify with and whatthey will fight and die for.1

Introduction

It is now common knowledge that the history of Russia is a long succession ofextreme events, throughout which the very identity of the Russian people was putin danger. In such turbulent times, there was an imperative need for some kind offorce that would be able to keep the Russian people united and to protect themfrom these ordeals. Only a force beyond down-to-earth considerations could playthat role. For this reason, religion can be seen as that central force ‘that motivatesand mobilizes people’.

Religion is thus not only another component of a given identity, it can alsobecome the one reference people think of when trying to define themselves. Thelatter formula applies perfectly to the Russian case. Orthodoxy, as the mainreligion in Russia, not only stands as a component of the Russian identity; it hasalso become, throughout this long and tortuous history, the primary referenceused by the Russian people to define themselves. As Robert C. Tucker wrote:

Until as late as the early twentieth century a peasant – and the vastmajority of Russians were peasants then – would speak of himself not asa ‘Russian’ but as ‘Orthodox’ ( pravoslavnyi). Russian was his language;Orthodoxy his identity.2

It is thus imperative for our understanding of the Russian identity to pay dueattention to Orthodoxy. First, our work will consist of determining the variousOrthodox components of the Russian identity, with special emphasis on theOrthodox impact on the Russian approach to foreign countries, more particularlythe West. Our goal will be to assess whether Orthodoxy’s place in the Russian

identity is so important that it has to be taken into account when building uprelations with Russia. We will also try to evaluate whether Orthodoxy has afavourable/unfavourable influence on Russia’s interaction with the West. Second,we will focus on the Russian Orthodox Church3 as an institution, and its positionin the Russian State system. Our objective there will be to determine whether theState/Church relationship in Russia is of a secular nature or if the Church shouldstill be regarded as a State actor. Again, the answer to that question will have animpact on what importance is worth giving to Orthodoxy when consideringrelations with Russia.

Orthodox components of Russian national identity

Russia’s historical faith is Orthodoxy, which is deeply embedded in the Russiansoul. Aside from being the claimed religion of 60 per cent of Russia’s population,4

Orthodoxy also embodies a Russian sense of nation, history and identity, evenwhen the individual is not devout. Many Russians say that they are not believ-ers, but they do know which the true faith is. As Anatole Leroy-Beaulieuunderlined:

This bond between religion and nationality was tied by history and madefast and faster by time. In this respect Russia puts us in mind of Spain,with the difference that all her national struggles, all her political wars,be it in West or East, have been looked upon by people as religious wars.Whether Asia or Europe was to be dealt with, the North or the South, theMongol or the Turk, the Swede or the Pole, the German or eventhe French, the enemy was, first and foremost, the infidel, the heretic,the schismatic, the foe and contemner of God himself.5

In the new Russia, the Church stepped in to solidify the ideological definitions of‘Russia’ and degrees of ‘Russianness’. In August 2000, the ‘Social Conception’of the Russian Orthodox Church6 placed Orthodoxy at the top of this hierarchy,and Western ideals, especially American, at the bottom.

Orthodoxy as an element of Russianness

Orthodoxy and Russian national identity remain as closely interconnected todayas in the past.7 At the end of the tenth century, the need for a single religion tobring together the Russian tribes was fully recognised by Prince Vladimir.Paganism was inadequate for centralisation and Christianity was thereforeadopted from Byzantium. The Church then preserved the Russian nation duringthe Mongol yoke. During this critical period, ‘the Russian Orthodox Churchbecame the symbolic repository of national identity’.8 The importance of theChurch as a symbol of national unity again was very clear during the ‘Time ofTroubles’ (1598–1613), when Moscow was occupied by the Poles. The Church

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also mobilised Russian bravery against Teutonic Knights, Lithuanians,Frenchmen, Swedes and many others. Nikolai Petro exemplified Russian nationalresistance as follows:

It was Patriarch Ghermogen who kindled the spirit of national resistanceby refusing to surrender the monastery fortress of Smolensk to the Poles.Meanwhile, the stewards of St. Sergey Trinity Monastery, and theKirillov and Beloe Ozero Monasteries, initiated a letter-writing cam-paign to Russian cities, calling upon all citizens to take up arms andmarch for country and faith.9

During the Soviet period, the communist regime failed to erase the links betweenRussian national and religious identity. It appears that the regime was onlysuccessful in closing churches and in forbidding religious rituals. If it is true thatthe Church hierarchy submitted to the regime under constraint, many Orthodoxclergymen rebelled. The spiritual vacuum left by communism also explainsthe Church’s persistence during the Soviet regime. Indeed, the Party had no choicebut to admit that religion could act as a stimulus for people, inciting them to dothings, which otherwise they would not choose to do, and as such it was anindisputable aspect of the country’s development.10 In the words of Jane Ellis:

As thinking people in the Soviet Union attempt to rediscover andresurrect the culture in their past (in its pure, as opposed to its ideologicallydistorted form), they encounter Orthodoxy at every turn – in art,architecture, music, literature, poetry.11

By granting the Church greater predominance, glasnost and perestroika alsoserved to magnify Russian Orthodoxy as an instrument for ‘Russification, disci-pline, control, and order’.12 Soon thereafter, the resurgence of Russian national-ist thought became more apparent, together with various nationalist movementsidentifying themselves with Orthodoxy.13 Today, the Patriarchate seems to favoura modified version of the tsarist ideal (Orthodoxy, Unity, National Spirit), whilePan-Slavism and Russian nationalism are very convenient ideologies for findingallies within the Duma. Tsarist Holy Russia, Soviet Russia and DemocraticRussia, become a confusing blend for national identity and standardised values.However, it is this very confusion that brings the Church much of the respect itenjoys. The lack of a standardised national identity in Russian society often findssecurity in the traditions and values of the Church.

Orthodoxy, conservatism and xenophobia

In the words of the great Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyev, the centralcharacteristic of Byzantine Orthodoxy was – and continues to be – its vigorous

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adherence to the traditions of the past. As he pointed out:

In the East, the Church was understood and defended mainly as asanctuary, steeped in tradition – in its immobile static elements. Thistendency to preserve tradition corresponded to the general spiritualdisposition of the East.14

It was precisely this characteristic that helped the Church to survive the Mongolyoke, to endure the reign of Peter I, and to live through 70 years of the Soviet gov-ernment’s stubborn atheism. This also contributed to the preservation of valuespartly neglected by other Christians. Most striking is Orthodoxy’s opposition tothe revision of holy writings. Bitter accusations of betrayal15 thus accompaniedattempts to correct mistakes in the Russian translations of the Greek sacred texts,sanctified by the Russian Church Council of 1551. This Council, called theSto glav Council,16 was held in Moscow during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Itintroduced reforms designed to fight against sects and Western interference inreligious thought.

More recently, in 1993, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation passed anew law aimed at changing particular aspects of the 1990 law on Freedom ofConscience and Religious Belief, finally granting privileges of governmentsupport to Russia’s traditional religions. Moreover, in 1997, a new legislation onFreedom of Conscience and Religion, consolidating and legitimising theRussian Orthodox Church itself, was adopted. In this manner, Alexis II confirmedthe Orthodox Church’s place in Russia and neutralised home-grown competitors.This law is also very representative of the Russian xenophobic attitude that,together with an irremovable attachment to the past, to traditions, and a pro-nounced anti-Western feeling, characterises the Orthodox religion. All thisnotably explains why the Russians encounter so many difficulties in acceptingany novelty or change, be it a new world order, the supremacy of the UnitedStates, or a new world status for their country. Instead of striving to adjust to anever changing international environment, the Russians will tend to focus all theirefforts on the re-establishment of the reality that would reflect their inalterablevalues. In other words, in the Russian eye, Russia remains and ought to remain anempire and a superpower. The fact that these religious values, and, to a greaterextent, the Orthodox Church itself, benefit from a legal and political recognitionsince the early 1990s is also illustrative of a unique relationship between theChurch and the State.

The Russian Orthodox Church: a national and a State Church

According to the Western accepted concept of secularity, the Church, in interna-tional relations, is considered as a non-State actor. Such a title is a false assumptionin Russia for two reasons. First, the ambiguous state of democracy in Russia

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today complicates the definition of what is part of the State and what is not.Second, the pre-Soviet tradition of joint Church-State leadership as well as theSoviet infiltration of the Church both make the Church much more a State actorthan a non-State actor. In principle, the Russian Orthodox Church has never trulybeen free or separate from the State in Russia. Today, while enjoying religiousfreedom, its governmental ties and even partnership with the State makes it closerto the status of a semi-governmental institution.

Nationalisation of a faith

From the ninth to the sixteenth century, pagan Russia was being transformed,little by little, into Holy Russia,17 ‘the country of innumerable churches, incessantchiming of bells, long night services, strict periods of fasting, and zealousgenuflections, as pictured by foreign visitors’.18 Russian piety acquired a qualitydiffering as much from the West as from the East, and in its substance the Russianfaith became characteristically national. As religion was being nationalised, theRussian Church also became national in its form.

In so doing, it found valuable and fully reliable support in the universal theoryof Moscow, the Third Rome. At the end of the fifteenth century, this famoustheory was fully developed in Pholotheus’ letters,19 who wrote to Ivan III:

The church of ancient Rome fell because of Apollinarian heresy; as tothe second Rome – the Church of Constantinople – it had been hewnby the axes of Ishmaelites, but this third Rome – the Holy Apostolicchurch, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world morebrightly than the sun. All the Orthodox Christian realms have convergedin thine own. Thou art the sole Autocrat of the universe, the only Tsar ofthe Christians . . . Observe and hearken, O pious Tsar, [. . .] Two Romeshave fallen, but the third stands, and no fourth can ever be. Thy ChristianEmpire shall fall to no one’s lot.20

The Russian tsar had thus to preserve the only remaining fragment of trueOrthodoxy unscathed until the second advent of Christ. By the end of thesixteenth century, the theory of Moscow’s world importance was officiallyadopted. In the meantime, the Moscow authorities had finally obtained theRussian Church’s formal independence from Byzantium and its own Patriarch. Inthe charter confirming the Moscow Patriarchate, the theory of ‘Moscow, theThird Rome’ was once more proclaimed. According to this theory, Christianityfinds its true haven in Russia, after escaping the degeneration of Rome andConstantinople. This placed the Russian Orthodox Church in an even morenationalistic context, pushing the Moscow Patriarchate towards a heavier relianceon Russia, and away from its alleged multi-cultural version of Orthodoxy. Untilnow, the feuds of inter-church politics have furthered the split with the rest of theOrthodox world.

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Historical components of the State Church

As mentioned earlier, relations between the Church and the State have alwaysbeen closely interconnected.21 In the ninth century, the Russian Orthodox Churchhad much more influence than the State since the Church was both the critic andthe moral judge of secular power.22 One of the reasons for this can be found in thelimited political authority of Kievan princes. Another reason is that the Churchand the regional princes shared a common sense of responsibility for the Russianland and the well-being of the nation.23 Logically enough, many civil, legal andadministrative privileges were granted to the Church hierarchy. Orthodoxy hadthus no autonomy from the government: the Church diligently served the State,and the State protected the Church.

During the Mongol domination, the unity of the Church was not shattered and iteven remained the only functioning national institution. It is well known that, eventhough the Tatars destroyed the remains of the political cohesion of ancient Rus’,these believers in ‘multi-gods’ were tolerant to the Church and granted it certainprivileges.24 The Tatars had also understood that they could gain some benefits inreinforcing the influence of the Moscow princes on the clergy since most of themsubmitted to the Khans’will. The tradition of Church obedience to the State was thusprogressively established and the symphonic ideal of dyarchy25 was reaffirmed.

With its prestige and influence strengthened, the Church was able to influencethe tsar on both domestic and foreign policy, although their relations were oftenconflicting. While the principle of dyarchy was never seriously challenged, theprimacy of secular power was immovable. This was dramatically demonstratedboth in practice and in theory by Ivan the Terrible who treated the Church as theinferior it simply was.26 His successor, Boris Godunov, was also aware of the use-fulness of the Church as an instrument of the State. The decade of turmoil, knownin Russian history as the ‘Time of Troubles’ (1598–1613), that followed Boris’sdeath exposed the State to peril, and endangered the Church as well. In thesetimes of crisis, both partners of the dyarchy helped each other. The Churchprovided assistance to the State and, in return, the tsar recognised the moralauthority of the Church and transferred many administrative and politicalfunctions to it. The tsar’s sovereignty in political affairs was balanced by the patri-arch’s sovereignty in religious matters and the fact that the Church could benefitfrom an unlimited autonomy in its internal affairs.

Peter the Great would eradicate the symbols of symphonia by introducingabsolutism to Russia. The patriarchate was replaced by a Holy Synod submittedto the tsar. The Church became merely another branch State and its authorityweakened over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Peter and hissuccessors, however, never succeeded in fully eliminating the symphonicdoctrine. As Nikolai Petro noted:

By stressing that the monarch is ultimately accountable to God, and thatonly the Church reliably interprets God’s will, this doctrine implicitly

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limited the tsar’s authority [. . .] Still, this was meager consolation to aChurch that had traditionally seen itself as a sovereign power in society.27

For almost two centuries after Peter’s reign, the Church remained an obedientexecutor of the State’s will.28 This recalled the Byzantine era when the emperorwas considered the protector of all the Orthodox Churches. By and large, theChurch hierarchy was satisfied with this tacit agreement. Not only did the tsarsrefrain from interfering in the Church’s doctrine and dogma, they also ensured ittheir protection and imposed limits on the Catholics and the Protestants, as wellas on foreign and domestic sects. Not surprisingly, conservative statesmen suchas Count Uvarov proposed the tripartite formula of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, andNationality’ as a barrier against the spread of Western ideas. Uvarov’s formulawas rapidly adopted by the tsars and became a central element of the Russian offi-cial ideology until at least 1905.29 Although quite content with this state of affairs,the Russian Orthodox Church did not hesitate to try to restore a symphonic typeof relationship with the State once the autocracy’s strength started to decline. In1917, in an attempt to restore its own sovereignty, the Church convened the firstNational Council30 since the times of Peter the Great.

Bolshevik leaders rapidly came to consider the possible re-emergence of thesymphonic ideal as a threat. According to them, this would reassert the Church’sposition as a moral authority in the public arena and a restraint upon the govern-ment. Although the Church avoided opposing the regime directly, the Bolshevikscould not accept being held accountable for their actions by an independent voiceof moral criticism. As Nathaniel Davis pointed out:

From the start, the communist state grasped the reality of the church asa refuge for independent thought and a fortress for those who believedin a philosophy incompatible with the communists’ creed.31

While it is possible to draw correlations between the Bolshevik attitude towardsreligion and Church–State relations during Peter’s rule, the situation was never-theless different in many respects. Peter preserved the Church as an instrument ofthe State, whereas the Bolsheviks wished to annihilate it completely.32 Lenin’sabhorrence to religion is well known: he used to call it ‘spiritual booze’, an evensharper term than Marx’s ‘opium of the people’.33 In order to achieve thisdestruction, the Bolsheviks launched a massive anti-religious campaign aimed atdiscrediting the Church. After this attempt failed, they terrorised and isolated boththe population and the clergy.

In reaction, the Russian Church tried to resist and proclaimed an anathema onthe Bolshevik government. However, in 1925, the new patriarch Sergii sworeallegiance to the new regime ‘whose joys and successes are our successes, andwhose setbacks are our setbacks’.34 The new Church hierarchy thought that thisobedient attitude would stop Stalin’s persecution. Unfortunately, this proved to befalse. The years 1927–43 were characterised by the Soviet regime’s attempt to

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destroy the Church and all traces of religion. By the end of the first Five-Year plannearly 95 per cent of Orthodox churches had been closed.35

The situation changed completely in 1941 when Hitler invaded the USSR.Stalin could not afford to further alienate the Church since he needed its supportto mobilise patriotic courage. Anti-religious propaganda ceased and churchesreopened under the Nazi occupation. Most of the people, brought up for centuriesto respect traditions, had preserved their faith in Orthodoxy. Recognising thathis pre-war policy of eliminating religion had failed, Stalin decided to desistfrom anti-religious activity. The Church, which had helped win the war, thenexperienced a more settled period.

Stalin’s successors, however, renewed atheist propaganda, closing nearly two-thirds of all Orthodox Churches. From 1959–64, Khrushchev launched ananti-religion campaign aimed at undermining the institutional strength of theRussian Church. Soviet authorities also employed the State Security Committee(KGB) to infiltrate religious institutions and forced priests and seminarists tocollaborate with the communist government. Krushchev’s fall from power inOctober 1964 constituted another breathing space for the clergy. While thenumber of functioning Churches remained extremely low during the stagnant erasof Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, the first steps were taken to restore reli-gion in both rhetoric and policy. The regime had clearly failed in its attempt to sup-press the links between Russian national and religious identity. Moreover, althoughthe Church hierarchy submitted to the regime under duress, many individualmembers of the Orthodox clergy rebelled and several organisations, generallyknown as the ‘Catacombal Church’, continued their religious life underground.

The millennial celebration of the baptism of Rus’ in 1988 was a turning pointin Church–State relations. Many used this event to press the State for concessionsby underlining Orthodoxy’s importance to Russian national consciousness and toits formation as a nation. In this context, Gorbachev36 progressively relaxedrestrictions on religion. The Russian president also believed that an easing ofreligious persecution might help to restore the popularity of socialism. From thismoment on, the State stopped publicly declaring its enmity towards the Church.As Nikolai Petro pointed out:

In granting the Church greater opportunity to enter into the public dialogover the country’s future, the regime thus got far more than it bargainedfor. An emboldened civil society took advantage of perestroika to arguethat the Church was indispensable to the spiritual well-being of thecountry. It bolstered this claim by repeatedly bringing to public attentionthe role that the Church played during critical times in Russian history.37

The Russian Orthodox Church regained lost ground precisely while the SovietUnion was crumbling.38 Indeed, the disintegration of the Soviet State ‘set the stagefor radical changes in the challenges and opportunities confronting the RussianOrthodox Church after 1991’.39 The Church could now hope for a return to the

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symphonic relationship that had served Church and State so well throughoutRussian history. By restoring such a ‘partnership’, the Church could not onlyexpect State protection against religious rivals, but also a privileged position inthe country.

The Church’s increasing presence in public life was emphasised by the attentiongiven to its official statements during the failed coup of August 1991 and by its roleof mediator during the armed conflict between President Yeltsin and the Russianparliament in September–October 1993. By the mid-1990s, no politician couldafford to ignore the Church and this generated scepticism over the appearance ofpolitical leaders at Church services. Yet, resentment towards the Church leadership’scooperation with the Soviet regime persisted. Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Churchwas the only major institution in the former Soviet Union which had not experi-enced total changes in the clergy hierarchy. This was compounded by revelations ofdocuments of collaboration between Church leaders and the KGB.40

Since then, the Church finds in the Duma its most reliable collaborator in push-ing shared agendas into legislative action. As a lobby, the Church was successfulin bringing its will into federal legislation in 1997. As an external affairs lobby,the Church works through the promotion of ideas and values, particularly in themedia. Leaders of the Church, such as Patriarch Alexis II and Metropolitan Kirillactively meet with government officials, communicate Church interest and evendraft legislation. The undisclosed connections between the Church and thegovernment are an important, yet enigmatic source of influence for the Church.

The crucial feature of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Churchand the State is surely one of opportunistic mutual assistance, where each partycan use the other to act outside of their respective organisational limits. In termsof influence, the Church uses the State to override its own problems, and the Stateuses the Church to fight anti-Russian nationalism. The State also benefits fromthe capacity of the Church to assert Russian interests when normal diplomaticchannels are inefficient due to international political tensions. The RussianOrthodox Church thus benefits in many ways from the final removal of commu-nism. It has enjoyed new freedom and prerogatives. From the standpoint of theChurch, it seems, there is nothing wrong with Church–State symbiosis as long asthe Church is in the driver’s seat.

A totalitarian Church

In tsarist Russia, religious consecration was given to the ‘one Orthodox Tsarof the Universe’, who could then easily establish autocracy.41 As Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu stressed it:

To the peasant, the tsar is the representative of God, delegated by Heavento rule the nation. That is the source of the devout feeling with which thepeasant regards the anointed of the Lord. This is why he renders to thesovereign an homage almost superstitious, why he bows to the earth

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before him and sometimes crosses himself as he passes by, just as at thepassage of holy eïkons. This also accounts for the extreme docility whichabides in the masses, for the distaste which a large portion of the nationmanifests for political liberties. If the tsar rules in the name of God, isnot resistance against him impiety? And does not the Church, each year,anathematise those who dare to doubt the divine mission of the tsar andto rebel against his authority?42

The Russian Orthodox Church is not democratically oriented at all and has notradition of democratic thinking to which it can refer. It is not inclined todemocratic ideals and subscribes instead to ‘reactionary–romantic authoritarian’notions.43 The attitudes of the Russian Church are thus fundamentally totalitarian,a tendency from which it has to free itself.

When communism collapsed, many people in both Russia and the West thoughtthat Russia would adopt at once all democratic values. Freedom and liberty hadbeen prime aspirations of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Soviet era.Freedom of religion was welcomed, along with the ideals of a democratic society inRussia. However, liberalisation was a mixed blessing. Although the Churchcelebrated its restored freedom, it had to play in the tides of a free society and in themidst of globalisation. In other words, this new freedom of religion also meant allopposition could reign freely in society. Jane Ellis described this challenge to theChurch in her most recent book, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism andDefensiveness,44 in which she concluded that the key question in the new Russiansociety was ‘whether or not the Russian Orthodox Church will tolerate the equalityof all religions before the law’. Thus, while tolerance is preached, the Church ismore concerned with the amount of freedom to be granted to ‘other’ religions.

In the Russian Church–State culture, it becomes clear that the religious-political system is a unified web where the elements in the religious sphere andthose in the political sphere interact and tend to be mutually reinforcing. As aconsequence, Orthodoxy radically determined the Russian political culture,rooted in the same historical experience of autocracy and a paternal conceptionof State authority.

Conclusion

This chapter on the Orthodox religion and the Russian Orthodox Church hasgiven us further insight into what the Russian identity is about, but it alsoprovided us with valuable information as to how the Russians perceive the Westand how Western countries – and, in the present case, the Allied member states –should approach their relationship with Russia.

A historical overview of Orthodoxy first showed us that since the end of thetenth century, be it officially or in secret, Orthodoxy has always stood out as theliving force of Russianness. Throughout the successive invasions and occupationsof Russia, Orthodoxy kept the Russian people together and became the stimulus

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of Russian resistance. In these circumstances, Orthodoxy went beyond its purereligious nature; it was also the guardian of Russian traditions and culture. Noauthoritarian rule, not even communism ever managed to deprive the Russianidentity of its Orthodox references. This firm connection between religion andidentity has remained unchanged up to this day. Since 1991, one can notice thatthe Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly acted as a leading exponent of the‘Russian National Idea’.45 As Michael Bourdeaux stressed:

Events of the last decade prove that the systematic attempt to deprivehuman nature of its inclination to the divine failed abjectly. Religion isdestined to be an important factor in the new societies that are emerging.[. . .] Religion, at this time, faces the challenge of either contributing tothe process of destabilization or of fulfilling its potential as an agentof reconciliation. Meanwhile, the well-being of hundreds of millions ofpeople hangs in the balance.46

On that basis, no country willing to build up relations with Russia can ignorethe Orthodox element. This is all the more impossible as the values that characteriseOrthodoxy are very assertive, indeed even radical when it comes to its perceptionof the West. Our study first revealed Orthodoxy’s extreme attachment to the pastand its consequent extreme reluctance to accept modernity. This is what generatesan almost systematic resistance to change amongst the Russians. Such a closedattitude can only make Russia’s relations with the outside world more difficult.This is aggravated by the fact that Orthodoxy also bears strong anti-Westernfeelings. Since the fifteenth century and the emergence of ‘Moscow Third Rome’,Rome and Constantinople embody, in the Russian perspective, the degenerationof Christianity. And the association ‘Western world–modern world’ gains nocredit in their perspective either.

Turning to the Russian Orthodox Church, we learnt that this institution,because it represents one of the most – if not the most – important identity refer-ence for the Russian, still enjoys privileged relations with the Russian State. Onno account is it possible to say that Russia is a secular state. The separation ofpower between the State and the Church in Russia has never been made clear, forthe very reason that it is in the interest of the former to be assured of the Churchsupport, and in the interest of the latter to benefit from the protection of the State.It comes as no surprise that the Church and State pursue the same grandobjectives: the imperialistic aspirations of the Russian political system echoes theinternational messianism that we studied in Chapter 2.

Last but not least, we discovered that the Russian Orthodox Church is not ademocratic institution. On the contrary, it proves to be somewhat totalitarian inthe policies that it conducts and the values that it defends. In this context of inti-mate relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian State,one can easily imagine how influential the Church has been in Russian politicsand in forging the Russian political culture.

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44

4

RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish hisends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and commonsense of the citizens; the Russian centres all the authority of societyin a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom;of the latter servitude. Their starting-point is different, and theircourses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked outby the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of the globe.1

Introduction

The study of political culture is not new. The analysis of a particular politicalsystem in terms of its socio-cultural peculiarities is as old as the study of politicsitself. Eminent writers on political science found concern with such issues andtried to link their study of politics to sociological and anthropological works onculture. Montesquieu focused attention on the ‘general spirit’ or ‘morals andcustoms of a nation’ in his De l’esprit des Lois; Tocqueville in his Democracy inAmerica considered the habits, opinions and manners as factors determining anypolitical inclination; Bagehot’s English Constitution contributed likewise to thestudy of political culture. The political culture of a society consists of fundamen-tal beliefs and values determining the context of a political action. Politicalculture is of course merely one aspect of politics, but it is a highly significant one.Emerging from the specific historical experience of nations and groups, itprovides a subjective perception of history and politics. As Robert Daniels wrote:

Political culture should be approached as a system that is bothcontinuous and changeable, that steadily absorbs new infusions from itshistorical experiences and contacts, while older elements are eroded,metamorphosed, or sloughed off.2

Despite its failings, political culture still offers the best approach for understand-ing the collapse of communism and the prospects for Russian democracy. Itremains therefore a unique tool for understanding the future of Russian politics.

Our first task will be to look at the existing definitions and concepts for thenotion of ‘political culture’. Our objective will not only be to confront these exist-ing definitions and concepts and determine which one best suits the Russian case,but also to understand the rationale behind this unusual association of culture andpolitics. Once this first step is achieved, we will be able to test our findingswith Russian history. Our goal is to draw on Russian history, from the Mongolyoke to the demise of the USSR, to identify the main features of Russian politicalculture. This analysis will notably include an approach to the autocratic anddemocratic tendencies of Russian political culture, and to the reaction of localcivil society to these opposing variants.

Based on this study, we should be in a position to assess what remains fromthese historical experiences, and what characterises today’s Russian politicalculture. We will inter alia have to answer to the question of whether or not thisculture is of dominant autocratic or democratic nature. In doing so, we will makesure that our conclusions are underpinned by concrete examples, especially byapplying them to the case of the 1993 Russian constitution.

Definition and concept

Before taking the discussion any further, it is essential to make clear which meaningis to be attributed to ‘political culture’ in the present work, since this term hasbeen defined in all too great a variety of ways. According to Sidney Verba, as weuse the term ‘political culture’, it refers to the system of beliefs about patterns ofpolitical interaction and political institutions. It refers not to what is happening inthe world of politics, but how people perceive these happenings. And these beliefscan be of manifold kinds: they can be empirical beliefs about what the currentstate of political life is; they can be beliefs as to the goals that should be pursuedin political life; and these beliefs may have an important expressive or emotionaldimension.3

Lucian Pye argued similarly that political culture is a ‘set of attitudes, beliefsand sentiments which give order and meaning to the political process and whichprovide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the polit-ical system’, or to put it succinctly the ‘manifestation in aggregate form of thepsychological and subjective dimensions of politics’.4 By the same token, GabrielAlmond sees political culture as: ‘the particular pattern of orientations to politicalaction’. Every political system, he suggested, is embedded within a particularpattern and therefore constrained by it. Through the understanding of these con-straints, analysts might eventually learn to foresee the development of politicalsystems.5 Stephen White also viewed political culture as a behavioural as well asa psychological concept. According to this author, political culture may bedefined as:

the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the political systemis located. The political culture both expresses and influences the

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patterns of political belief and behaviour within a given political system:it informs the actions of political actors; comprehends political symbols,foci of identification and fundamental beliefs and values; and generallyboth reflects and influences popular orientations towards the institutionsand practices of government.6

According to White:

Political culture must be regarded as both ‘causing’ and ‘caused’: as avariable which mediates between the political system and its environ-ment, providing a framework within which patterns of political beliefand behaviour historically considered, can be located, and as a factorwhich will influence and constrain – though not determine – futurepatterns of development in a political system.7

Robert C. Tucker equally assumed that patterns of action and state of mindmutually influence one another and that both must form part of the definition ofpolitical culture.8 According to Tucker, ‘a culture is a society’s customary way oflife, comprising both accepted modes of thought and belief and accepted patternsof conduct. Political culture is everything in a culture that pertains to governmentand politics’.9

In so defining political culture, political scientists have parted company withmany anthropologists. The term ‘political culture’ links the study of politics tosociological and anthropological works on culture.10 It was Voltaire who first putaside dynasties, kings and battles, and sought what is fundamental in history,namely culture, as it is present in beliefs, in customs and in forms of government.11

‘Political culture’ is not unconnected with ‘culture’ in the widest social sense. Onthe contrary, it is closely related to cultural values and more general orientations.It focuses attention, however, on that part of a culture which bears relevance topolitics.12

By ‘culture’, we mean that historically created definition of the situation whichindividuals acquire by virtue of participation in or contact with groups that tendto share ways of life that are in particular respects and in their total configurationdistinctive.13 Cultures being matters of habit and its transmission through a soci-ety’s agencies of acculturation, they are relatively persistent through timealthough they do undergo changes, especially in the modern age. In no instanceof a revolution is the break with the past culture total. No matter how culturallyinnovative a revolution may be – in the sense of creating new institutions, beliefs,rituals, ideals and symbols – the national cultural ethos lingers on in many ways,and more persistently in some areas of life than in others. As a process of adapta-tion occurs, elements of the nation’s pre-revolutionary cultural past areassimilated into the revolutionary new culture, which thus take shape as anamalgam of the old and new. Fundamental political beliefs are particularlyrelevant to the study of change.

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The study of political culture leads invariably to the study of politicalsocialisation, to the learning experiences by which a political culture is passed onfrom generation to generation and to the situations under which political cultureschange. The study of political culture may also lead to a new perspective onthe political history of a nation by which one focuses on the ways in which basicpolitical beliefs are affected by the memories of political events. From the culturalpoint of view, we would look at political history not so much as a series ofobjective events, but as a series of events that may be interpreted quite differentlyby different people and whose effects on future events depend upon this interpre-tation. An event will thus be interpreted in terms of previously held beliefs.

Russian political–cultural heritage: from the Mongol yoke to the dissolution of the Soviet Union

But in seeking the roots of political culture one must look beyond the direct polit-ical experiences of the individual. The political memories passed from generationto generation and the ways these memories are formed are crucial. One is forcedto consider the historical experiences of a nation from the point of view of theirimpact on political beliefs.14

The importance of not neglecting previous political experiences lies in the factthat historical accounts are necessary for an understanding of how a particularculture has evolved. In this regard, Gabriel Almond suggested that ‘politicalculture can result from powerful historical experiences such as military collapse,occupation, forced migration, imaginative constitutional engineering, andeconomic reconstruction’.15 The often long and complicated historical events bywhich a nation was formed are thus likely to have a significant impact on subse-quent political behaviour.16

Autocracy

Oh yes, we must have a Republic, but we must have a good Tsar atits head.17

Russian political culture is primarily rooted in the historical experience ofcenturies of autocracy. Since at least medieval times, Russia has been succes-sively ruled by a series of powerful autocratic monarchs. Parliamentary and legalinstitutions remained weak and undeveloped. Stephen White even sees autocracyas the defining principle in Russia’s history: Russians have viewed citizenship notas a legal expression of independent spheres but as submission to a patrimonialauthority. Political institutions, especially those which might aggregate populardemands and constrain the exercise of monarchical power were always weak andpoorly articulated. The Russian government, by contrast, was highly centralisedand extensive in scope. Hence the political attachments of the majority of thecitizen body were predominantly to the tsar himself, rather than to institutions

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within which popular sovereignty might have reposed or to parties which mighthave competed for representation within them.18

Autocracy was also, to some extent, the price the Russian people had to pay fortheir self-preservation. The country’s geography undoubtedly favoured a develop-ment process of this kind: Russia is situated on an immense plain with no physicalbarriers to foreign invasions or cultural influences from East and West. Mongols,Poles, Germans and others have taken advantage of this geographical vulnerabilityto conquer and despoil the Russian land.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Russian opposition to the Tartaryoke contributed to the consolidation of power by the Moscow princes. Theirstruggle against foreign domination and internal dissent truly represents a pre-dominant theme of Russian political culture: the interplay between centralisedpower symbolising stability and security against anarchy. The danger of chaos anddisorder provided all necessary justifications for further concentration of powerin the hands of the State, with the explicit support of the people.19 Russia’shistorical experience is full of examples when eventual democratic maturationwas sacrificed to order and stability. In this respect, we should bear in mind thatmost of the Russian people are not really concerned about who establishes order,how it is to be achieved and what it implies. The Russian mass consciousnesstends to associate this kind of regime with implicit notions of order rather thanobvious dictatorship. As Russell Bova aptly suggested:

Authoritarianism is best viewed not as a fundamental but as an instru-mental value of the political culture, and non-democratic, hierarchicalpatterns of authority might be said to be the empirical manifestation ofthe primary importance attached to order.20

By the late fifteenth century, the Tartar power had collapsed and the political andcultural subordination of the Russians to the Mongols and to Byzantium came toan end. The Moscow princes, beginning with Ivan III, proclaimed themselvestsars and their autocratic power created the elementary requirements for a hugeexpansion of the Russian State in the next centuries.21 The principle of autocraticrule became identified with legitimate government for most Russians. In thisrespect, the famous historian Richard Pipes described the Muscovite system ofgovernment as patrimonial:

The tsar’s absolute and unconstrained authority rested upon his owner-ship of the country’s resources, down to his individual subjects. As aresult of this concept of patrimonial ownership, a tsar could demandunlimited service from his subjects, who, for their part, lacked any col-lective or individual rights.22

During the sixteenth century, Ivan IV completed the unification of Russia fromthe Caspian to the White Sea. The tsar already symbolised the unique source

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of authority and power. Under Ivan the Terrible the autocracy reached itsparoxysm.23

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Peter the Great introduced a numberof innovations designed to consolidate his view of an unconstrained monarchy.24

The main countervailing institution Peter rejected was the Orthodox Churchwhich lost its traditional function of acting as a moral restraint upon the monarch.The Russian Church became an instrument of the State purely designed tosupport the policies of the monarch.

Nevertheless, in times of relative governmental weakness, the autocratic powercould soon be endangered by the natural restoration of the traditional principles ofRussian political culture: an autocracy constrained by popular will and by religioustradition. In the nineteenth century, Nicholas I faced this same dilemma: how tocombine autocracy and a civil society indispensable to the State’s own purposes.In order to rejoin State and society, he provided an ideological justification for theregime based on the ideas of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality. The IronTsar’s attempt to impose a narrow view of autocratic privilege only exacerbatedpublic discontent, and led to an explosion of journals and societies that openlychallenged the very premises of the autocracy and asked what form of governmentbest suited Russia’s needs. His conservative approach also failed because of themore complex and independent nature of the Russian society than in Petrine times.Profound changes in Russian culture culminated in the Decembrist movement ofyoung officers who returned from the Napoleonic campaigns. The continuingdevelopment of the civil society also included the emergence of an educated pub-lic and the birth of an intelligentsia. Russian intellectuals divided into Westernisersand Slavophiles, and both recognised the need to constrain absolute autocracy,though they disagreed on what forms restriction should take.

If Nicholas I seemed to favour the Petrine solution to the dilemma, Alexander II(1855–81) tended to promote the ‘Catherine’ pole. The tsar ‘Liberator’, was moreaware of the urgent need to reform civil society, starting with the emancipation ofthe serfs. His far-reaching ‘Great Reforms’ also affected the military, the justicesystem, urban and rural administration and education. And yet, here again, thetsar’s enlightened autocracy was unable to define and control the reform processof the civil society from above.25

This inability to provide a model of autocratic rule for a rapidly developingcivil society further undermined Nicholas II’s reign. The last Romanov obstinatelyrefused to acknowledge Russia’s civil society. In Nicholas II’s view, Russian soci-ety was to be guided by the immutable rule of autocracy. As a Russian historianhas written of tsar Nicholas:

He believed that he alone was responsible for the destiny of Russia andthat he would answer for this trust before the throne of the Almighty.Some might assist and others might obstruct him, but God would judgehim alone for his custodianship of Russia. As the responsibility wassolely his, so was the power.26

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One consequence of the weak articulation of representative institutions was ahighly personalised attachment to political authority, and in particular to theperson of the tsar. It is not surprising therefore that the dramatic events of January1905 brought confusion into people’s minds. Indeed, popular uprisings whichperiodically convulsed Russian society in the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies were almost never directed against the tsar himself. Their target was farmore frequently the boyar aristocracy, which was typically supposed to haveremoved the tsar from effective control of the nation’s affairs and from whosemaleficent attentions the rebels generally proposed to deliver him.

This tendency to conceive political authority in personalised terms wasreflected also in the widely used term ‘Batyushka Tsar’ (or ‘little father Tsar’),emphasising the personal nature of the bond between the tsar and his subjects,and in popular proverb and folklore. Some proverbs of the nineteenth century ranas follows: ‘Without the Tsar, the country is widowed’; ‘God in the sky, the Tsaron earth’: ‘The people are the body, and the Tsar its head’.27 The personifiednature of political authority is apparent also in the words used to refer to entitiessuch as ‘the State’ and ‘government’. The Russian word for ‘state’, gosudarstvo,for instance, is simply a derivation from the word for ‘lord’ or ‘ruler’, gosudar.Gosudar is in turn a word of ancient origin, the original meaning of which wasthat of a lord or master (dominus) whose powers extended over both people andthings (occasionally it could even mean ‘slave-owner’). From the mid-fourteenthcentury it came to be used, in much the same sense, to connote political authority.The closest English equivalent of the word gosudarstvo might be ‘dominion’ or‘patrimony’; either term, at least, would better convey the notion that the Statewas not simply a legal expression but essentially the private property of its ruler.

Unfortunately, the Russians ‘had favoured a paternalistic state, with extremelywide powers which it vigorously exercised to guide and control the nation’s destiny,but which yet served the interests of the citizen benignly’.28 This paternalistic model,which likened social groups to wilful children, remained the implicit ideologicalfoundation of Nicholas II’s regime. In its lack of vision and inability to provide amodel of autocratic rule for a rapidly modernising society, it provided no adequaterationale for the regime’s own policy of rapid change. Nicholas II had a wealth ofpossible historical models of autocracy upon which to rely but his image of autoc-racy harkened back to the Muscovite period, shutting him off from the realities of thesociety he sought to rule.29 In the years leading up to the 1917 Revolution, the oldassumptions about the divine right to rule of tsar Nicholas II were challenged inpeople’s minds by the perceived incompetence of the ruling authorities as well as bythe increasing influence of Western liberal ideas and Marxist ideas. Nevertheless, theevents of October 1917 took everyone by surprise, not least of all the Bolsheviks.The inept handling of the war, of food distribution in the cities, the collapse of themonarchy and the internecine fighting within the ranks of the ProvisionalGovernment were testimony of the weakness of the declining institutions.

However, the autocratic–paternalistic ideal survived. This persistence canpartly be explained by the social chaos and vulnerability that engulfed Russia

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during the civil war. Many hoped to bring an end to this second ‘Time ofTroubles’ by supporting a strong central authority, since the monarchy had alwayssymbolised stability and continuity in times of crisis. Bolshevism subtly replacedthe monarchical principle with the notion of a guiding force represented by thecommunist party and thus succeeded in combining traditional conceptions oflegitimate autocratic authority with Soviet institutions. The political culture of theUSSR was thus naturally shaped by the patterns of orientations to governmentwhich were inherited from the pre-revolutionary period.30 Very explicit is Stalin’shighly selective embrace of tsarist symbolism and emphasis on Russian leader-ship that seemed to confirm that the communist regime now embraced the verysame values that it had been trying so hard to eliminate. Any account of Sovietpolitical culture must thus largely rest upon an assessment of the extent to whichdistinctively communist values and beliefs have absorbed and superseded pre-existing traditional patterns. Although the world of politics and political scienceare both in periods of rapid change, in both there is continuity with the past. AsStephen White aptly described:

The new Soviet regime inherited a large, heterogeneous and backwardempire from its tsarist predecessors. It also inherited a distinctive anddeeply-rooted pattern of orientation to government which we shall termthe traditional Russian political culture. It may be helpful at this pointbriefly to recall some of its essential features. Representative institutions,as we have noted, were weakly articulated and ineffective; levels of pop-ular participation and representation were low; and governing style wascentralised, bureaucratic and highly authoritarian. Popular politicalattachments, in consequence, were highly personalised; and politicalknowledge and experience, outside an extremely limited circle, wasvirtually non-existent. The scope of government was unusually broad: itextended not only to those spheres of life in which other governments ofthe time were active, but also into economic entrepreneurship andcontrol, religion and morals, and the administration of justice.31

The famous historian Richard Pipes shared quite the same opinion. According tohim, patrimonial institutions have survived for so long that they are now acceptedas legitimate by the Russian people. It is this legitimacy that explains thecontinuity of Russian political–cultural heritage. As Richard Pipes wrote in 1987:

A seventeenth-century Russian resuscitated today in Moscow . . . wouldnot find the system all that different or hard to understand. There is atsar, only he is called the general secretary, there are his boyars – thePolitburo, indeed the whole nomenklatura – and there is no privateproperty, naturally; law is what the authorities state they want to do and,if they can enforce it, you do it. Moreover, you can no more think ofchanging the government than you can of changing the climate.32

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Democracy

The voice of the people is the voice of God.33

Although the concept ‘autocracy’ in Russia embraces a rich historical experience,it did not go unchallenged. Confronted with the tsarist overall power, the Russiancivil society soon questioned autocratic claims. The seeds of liberal freedomalready emerged in feudal Novgorod and Pskov (1136–1478) with town–assembly(veche) democracy. Later, in pre-Petrine Russia with its strong peasant community(mir), then in post-reform Russia with the democratic apparatus of the localauthorities (zemstvos), and finally with the State Duma. We cannot thereforeconsider democracy in Russia as a pure Western invention.34

The country’s early political development saw the emergence of popularassemblies (veche) which were quite similar to those which existed in the sameperiod in the West, and which also placed important constraints upon the exerciseof princely rule.35 These veche, which existed in the major Russian towns ofthe twelfth century and later, were deliberative assemblies of towns’ populations.They contributed to the development of a reasonably stable political order andRussian towns avoided the degeneration into tyranny that befell so many Italiancity-states at the same time. The Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century,however, brought this pattern of development to an end in most Russian towns.

In the early tsarist period, a few popular institutions such as the mir (self-regulating peasant communities, increasingly common after the sixteenth century,responsible for preserving public order, regulating land use and collectingtaxes)36 sought independence from the state. But their autonomy was ultimatelyfrustrated by widespread ignorance, conservatism and a respect for patriarchalauthority. The mir endured in various forms until the early 1930s when it wasreplaced by yet another form of communal life, the Soviet collective farm.

The Muscovite autocracy was also limited by the tsar’s constant need to listento the Boyar Duma, a council of senior noblemen. These acted as advisers to thetsar and discussed matters of state with him. Early tsars felt thus morally boundby the established tradition to listen to the boyars. Although the Boyar Dumasurvived until the end of the seventeenth century, it was an institution of littlesignificance.37 In times of crisis, the tsar was also expected to consult a ‘Councilof All the Land’ to advise him on important issues. This council, known as zemskiisobor (sometimes referred to in English as ‘popular council’),38 was an assemblychosen by the people to advise the tsar on matters of domestic and foreign policy.Although the zemskii sobor had no formal authority, ‘it is only for such assem-blies in the seventeenth century that any serious comparison with the parliamentsof the West can be attempted’.39

As for Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, they exceeded their authority inmany ways and all institutions of democratic character were used as instrumentsof State power. Catherine II re-established the collective contract between thegentry and the monarch and Russian absolutism was restored in its pre-Petrine

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shape.40 Fully aware of the possibility of social unrest, Catherine II recognised thenecessity to give the gentry, townspeople and peasants some sense of involvementin politics. She therefore established social institutions to provide a connectinglink with and lever over society.

In the nineteenth century, Alexander II initially praised a certain democratic ori-entation and abolished serfdom. The emancipation of the serfs led to the inevitableexpansion of the local self-government. The first step in this direction came in1864, with the creation of local organs of government known in English as thezemstvo movement.41 Different segments of the population and social classes werenow participating in local government and could have an influence in the politicallife distinct from, and often opposed to, the government. Facing a newly born civilsociety with a threatening aspect, the government began to curb the zemstvos’autonomy through various decrees. And yet, most zemstvo leaders advocated themonarchy and saw in it a source of stability and continuity for Russia. Their inten-tion was to cooperate with the government in order to ease society’s transition fromabsolutism to constitutionalism.42 However, the government maintained its policyof regarding the zemstvo as its ideological enemy, delayed the institutionalisationof popular aspirations, and so did much to bring about the monarch’s demise.

The case of the zemstvos is a very explicit illustration of the dilemma of theRussian autocracy with respect to independent social institutions. Although itinitiated important reforms, the State proved unable to cope with the numeroustasks that fell upon it. As for the zemstvos, they were simply ill-prepared to createnew bonds between State and society. Had the reform process begun earlier, thezemstvo movement might have had more time to deepen the role of local govern-ment, and it might have been capable of providing the necessary support that theautocracy desperately needed in a period of modernisation and economic growth.

By the end of 1905, the monarchical principle could no longer pretend to beabsolute. The events surrounding the massacre of January 1905, remembered inhistory as Bloody Sunday, finally led to the transformation of the autocracy intoa constitutional monarchy.43 Surprisingly, the establishment of a representative,popularly elected assembly (the State Duma) was not perceived by the Russianpeople as a radical break with the past, but more as a restoration of the balancebetween autocratic and popular sovereignty. And yet, Russians had very littleknowledge of or attachment to the political institutions by which that centralstate authority was mediated. Comprehension of party programmes and politicalinstitutions, in consequence, appeared to be fairly rudimentary. In the elections tothe Third Duma in 1907, for instance, employers sent their clerks and husbandstheir wives to vote for them, and some voters left in indignation when the pollingclerks refused to tell them for whom to cast their vote.44

It was thus not until the early twentieth century that institutions of an embry-onically parliamentary character finally matured in Russia. Although the StateDuma was still a vulnerable body whose powers were constantly in danger ofcurtailment by a frustrated autocrat, its powers were very extensive indeed.In 1917, civil society45 finally replaced the tsarist regime with a republic

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committed to duly elected popular representation. Obviously, Russia’s politicalculture cannot be considered within the confined framework of a single autocratictradition. As the antithesis of the statist tradition in Russian political thought,democratic claims contradicted the political beliefs of the official ideology,whether it be tsarist or Soviet.

More recent examples are also very explicit. In the mid-1980s, before the startof political reform, most experts regarded Russians as having a distinctive set ofpolitical cultural attitudes which were exclusively supportive of a strong Statewhich restricted individual freedom. Perestroika, however, provided sufficientevidence of the inadequacy of this received wisdom. Civic activism after 1987demonstrated a strong pull from past authoritarian practices and was clearlyinconsistent with the image of a politically passive population. Undoubtedly, it ispossible to find democratic trends in Russian history and the struggle for Russiancivil society can be traced from Muscovite times through to the collapse ofcommunism and beyond.46

A political culture for Russia

When legislative power is united with executive power in a singleperson or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty,because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makestyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically. Nor is there libertyif the power of judging is not separate from legislative power andfrom executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, thepower over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, forthe judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to executivepower, the judge could have the force of an oppressor. All wouldbe lost if the same man or the same body of principal men, either ofnobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of makingthe laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging thecrimes of the disputes of individuals.47

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s view was that Russiawould never return to authoritarian forms of government.48 He truly believed thatthe Russian society was now more inclined to political freedoms it had inheritedduring the years of glasnost and perestroika. The experience of the early post-communist years imposes though a more cautious approach. It soon appeared thatthe same people were still in power, even if they no longer called themselvescommunists. They had very comparable privileges, and often the same buildingsand offices. Although democratic elections were held, the people could hardlyexercise any control over the actions of the government. The rule of law wassteadily ignored, political parties of all kinds were vulnerable and inefficientlysustained, the State itself was ruled by personal interests and appeared to beincompetent to provide stability. In spite of many similarities, this was no longercommunism, but neither was it democracy, at least in its conventional form.

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Russia’s competing political cultures

Two political cultures have existed side by side in Russia for centuries: anauthoritarian variant and a democratic variant. Most political attitudes were sup-portive of a strong State with little societal input and almost no mass participation.Historical vulnerability to invasion and the recurrent outbreak of civil unrest hadprogressively led to an autocratic form of government. To this standard interpretationof Russia’s historic political culture, some scholars opposed the existence of acounterculture based on democratic premises.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to think of a worst case for successfuldemocratisation than Russia. It is well known that the Russian democratic tradi-tion is weak and democratic claims have never had strong roots in the centralpolitical culture. There had been no radical break, not just between Soviet andpost-communist Russia, but between both of them and their tsarist predecessor.The consensus of opinion in the Soviet period was that this political culture hadlargely persisted, with the only important difference, once the fundamentals of theSoviet system had been incorporated in the 1920s and 1930s, being that the rulerswere the communist party elites rather than the tsar and his entourage.49 Supportfor democracy on this basis is thus shallow even if it stems from a long enduringculture of Russia’s.

Russia has thus a dominant political culture, the culture of autocracy and asubordinate democratic culture. As Harry Eckstein wrote, ‘the latter emergesperiodically, but only in relatively short-lived reactions against failures of thedominant culture. It is neither deeply rooted nor generally shared, its lack of depthbeing indicated by the fact that it has always been difficult to institutionalise’.50

He also added that this democratic culture was more some kind of ‘periodicprotest by the disaffected rather than a genuine alternative set of liberal orienta-tions throughout either the elite or the public’.51 Obviously, while historiansdebate the relative importance of subcultural variations from this dominanttheme, it is simply impossible to get away from the predominantly authoritarianpolitical nature of the Soviet and Russian political experience.

Russia’s political culture: between Charybdis and Scylla

Russia’s democratic institutions are not rooted in long democratic practice andcoexist with centuries-old traditions of authoritarian rule. There is no doubt thatRussia has developed a multi-party system, free press and has held democraticelections. However, paradoxically, while the elections were a triumph for theprocess of democratisation, the results threatened to undermine democracy itself:never in Russian history have the communists been as legitimate as during thatperiod. Their victory could symbolise the end of Western-type institutions and areturn to authoritarianism. Therefore, the emergence of Western-type democraticinstitutions is a crucial but not sufficient prerequisite for Russia’s transition todemocracy. Attitudes of the old period coexist with new values, in ways which are

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often contradictory. It follows logically that Russian politics in the immediatefuture is likely to continue to be dominated by this process of settling new waysof doing things, and it may be some time before Russia is governed by leaderswho articulate a new set of values which can motivate and inspire her citizens. Itshould be seen as something which is in a process of transformation, where wehave some idea of the starting point, but cannot know the final destination.What it is possible to do, however, is to identify some of the elements out ofwhich it is made, elements which might in some possible futures grow andbecome dominant.

The December 1993 Russian constitution is very explicit in this regard. Itconsolidates indeed some of the major democratic gains of the perestroika inRussia – freedom of speech, basic human rights, public elections and popularassemblies – but strongly reduces their influence upon the super presidentialpower.52 In this respect, the constitutional order of 1993 seems to have somepotential for being well adapted to the Russian authority culture. It is based on theconduct of elections but also locates extraordinarily strong, virtually autocratic,central powers in the president who is accountable and subordinate to no one.

Russia’s 1993 constitution: a case study for autocratic rule

When Boris Yeltsin’s constitution was presented to the Russian people inDecember 1993, there was no real alternative – it was either Yeltsin’s constitutionor political chaos. In the absence of any turnout, voters approved a constitution,tailor-made for Yeltsin, granting him broad powers reminiscent of those exercisedby Russian tsars such as Peter the Great. A system with a powerful president fittedwell into Russia’s history, replete with autocrats beginning with the tsars and endingup in the dictatorships of Lenin and Stalin. In this regard, the new constitution wasmerely restoring the autocratic rule of the past.

And yet, this new constitutional design was a real achievement in comparisonwith the 1978 Soviet Constitution.53 It referred to ‘ideological pluralism’, ‘politicaldiversity’ and a multiparty system; and there could be no ‘compulsory ideol-ogy’.54 At the same time, there were also serious flaws in the new constitution.First, it was not a document based on a broad consensus among the variousRussian political forces but a document unilaterally imposed by Yeltsin. Second,the huge amount of power granted to the president as the guarantor of theconstitution and the absence of any counterweight to executive power violated theprinciples of the separation of powers.55 This aspect was very explicit in the workof the Constitutional Court, designed so as to regulate the behaviour of the pres-ident as well as the highest levels of government. Its judges were independent andinviolable,56 but appointed via nomination by the president himself.57

Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution proclaims itself to be a document committed to therule of law and the separation of powers. In reality, it essentially legitimises theautocratic power of a president who ‘may act outside the written law and may,

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without any real possibility of reproach, disregard duly enacted laws’.58 Thepossibility for the president to rule the country as an autocrat also stems fromother various constitutional provisions. Besides his capacity to govern by decree,his power to dissolve the Duma without referring to public or parliamentaryopinion59 deprives the deputies of any autonomy, freedom or independence. As aconsequence, the only way for the Duma to avoid dismissal is to acquiesce to thepresident on a permanent basis. Under the 1993 Constitution, the president canhardly be impeached.60 As Christina McPherson wrote:

The Duma would have to accuse the president of treason or other seriouscrime, and the Supreme Court must confirm the crime. Since treason isdefined as advocating the overthrow of the government, and the presi-dent is the head of the government under the constitution, it is question-able whether the Duma could in fact bring treason charges against aRussian president, since the president may not commit treason againsthimself.61

The formal separation of powers thus appears to be almost completely fictive.During his presidential reign, Yeltsin governed as a tsar, rather than as a president.The emperor, the father of the nation is not supposed to share power with anyother institution. Moreover, Russia’s previous parliament had not responded to thenation’s needs and many people thought that a strong president was the onlyviable system.

The autocratic political tradition of leadership unconstrained by institutionalarrangements seemed to appeal to Yeltsin’s temperament, evident from hisrepeated references to himself as a ‘Tsar’. This was a rhetorical affirmation of hispreference for bypassing institutions, his personalisation of power and thecreation of a type of Byzantine court politics around his presidency. Criticism ofYeltsin’s constitution came from all sides. Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of thecommunist party in Russia, stated that ‘the pharaoh, the tsar, and the generalsecretary did not have such powers as the president in the constitution’.62 A polit-ical commentator of the Russian newspaper Izvestia said that the only real checksand balances in Russia are Yeltsin’s personal qualities and inclinations. Criticsclaimed that the composition of the Parliament after the elections would matterlittle if the constitution passed, since Yeltsin could overcome any objections to hispolicies.

It is commonly accepted that these broad powers given to the Russian president63

are most appropriate for a country still immature when dealing with democracy.A country that had elections but lacked the rule of law could only be a ‘pseudo-democracy’64 or to be more precise an ‘illiberal democracy’.65 This is not to saythat Russians are not supportive of democratic values, in that for example theyreply to pollsters that they approve of regular elections, of a range of civil andpolitical rights, of a multi-party system and so forth.66 However, as MargaretMead aptly described, long-standing psychological attitudes of the Russian

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people are ‘prone to extreme swings in mood from exhilaration to depression,hating confinement and authority and yet feeling that a strong central authoritywas necessary to keep their own violent impulses in check’.67 Support fordemocracy has no real roots in an accustomed central political culture and thesocial context is inhospitable to it in almost all respects.

Conclusion

Analysing NATO–Russia relations from a Russian perspective does not onlyrequire a fair understanding of the Russian identity solely. It also implies gettinga clearer picture of what the Russian political identity is about. The purpose ofthis chapter was to look at political culture as the manifestation of a country’spolitical identity, and to apply it to the Russian case.

We first based our study on the existing academic work that has so far beenproduced on the very question of political culture. Only by looking at thetheoretical and conceptual dimensions of political culture, would we be able toapply these generics to Russia’s special case. Our study permitted us to acknowl-edge the close links that bind political science with the sociological and anthro-pological approaches to culture. In other words, we proved that cultural factorsdid intervene in the determination of politics. In this context, given that culture iscomposed of permanent features, we can deduct that politics is also made ofpermanent elements, some of which are derived from culture itself. This, how-ever, on no account deprives either politics or culture and, to a greater extent,political culture, from its evolutionary nature.

Against this background, it became imperative for us to determine thesepermanent components of Russian political culture. Our previous work alreadyled us to the identification of one of these components. Indeed, Orthodoxy, as akey element of culture in general, and a major determinant of Russian culture inparticular, gave us some insights as to what some of these components may be. Inthis way, we can say that conservatism, totalitarianism and anti-Western feelings,which are characteristics of Orthodox values, will also mark Russian politicalculture. Of course, this will not appear in Russian political culture as such; it willinevitably evolve through interaction with the other defining parameters of thisculture. History was instrumental in helping us to identify these other parameters.

It soon became apparent that autocracy was one of the main characteristics ofRussian political culture. Indeed, successive reigns and rules in Russia were allof autocratic nature. This became so common throughout history that, in the eyes ofthe average Russian citizen, autocracy is inseparable from the notion of legitimategovernment. Added to the fact that paternalism is also a common way ofperceiving political power in Russia and its relations with the people, autocracywill be all the more accepted by the Russians as it is paternalist.

Turning to democracy and to Russia’s historical experience of that concept, werealised that the relative democratisation of the Russian political system through-out centuries did not result from a genuine desire to apply such a Western value,

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but rather derived from a slow and progressive internal evolution of Russian civilsociety, consisting at the same time in the questioning of the extent of autocracyand in a social inclination for ‘communalism’. What then motivated the Russianpeople was more of a practical/pragmatic nature than ‘confessional’. In otherwords, one cannot say that the Russians ever truly believed in democracy for theircountry. They, however, managed to take from democracy what could be useful tothe conduct of politics. As a Russian soldier said in 1917: ‘We must have aRepublic, but we must have a good Tsar at its head’. On no account did this showof democracy ever threaten autocracy.

This remains valid in the aftermath of the end of the Soviet Union. At that time,Russian governments opted for democracy only to gain Western support. Showingan acceptable appearance of democracy was thus a way of avoiding Russia’sisolation from the Western club. Again, pragmatism prevailed; and Russianpolitical culture remains today one of dominant autocratic and subordinatedemocratic nature.

The 1993 constitution is very explicit in this respect. Indeed, several demo-cratic values were reaffirmed in the wording of the new constitution. Freedom ofspeech, human rights, public pluralist elections and popular assemblies composedthat democratic touch of the Russian constitution. However, this democraticconnotation was always subordinated to numerous conditions; its influence wassignificantly weakened. At the same time, autocracy remained the rule for thefunctioning of the Russian State. Political power remained ultra-centralised,subordinated to no one, accountable to no one. The president retains the last wordin all events; one can hardly impeach him. In other words, he can decide on anyaction without referring to public opinion or the Parliament. The Russian Stateunder the 1993 constitution is thus one where separation and sharing of powersare only fictitious.

In conclusion, ‘illiberal democracy’ is probably the notion that best definesRussian political culture. Russia appears democratic from the outside but, indepth, it lacks some essential characteristics of other liberal democracies.

In order to assess to what extent the uniqueness of Russian identity affects itsrelations with the West, we will now look at NATO–Russia relations fromDecember 1991 to May 2002.

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60

5

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIANATTITUDE TO NATO

Treat your friend as if he will one day be your enemy, and yourenemy as if he will one day be your friend.

(Decimus Laberius, First Century BC)

Introduction

In the case of NATO and Russia, the greatest challenge in the aftermath of theCold War, was that of putting aside more than 50 years of confrontation andadversarial relations, and embarking on new relations of a cooperative nature.Let’s not forget that NATO’s initial raison d’être was the protection of its membersagainst the expansion of the Soviet Union; and that the grounds for Russia’ssupremacy in the Soviet time throughout the Cold War rested largely on its oppo-sition to NATO. Yet, the imperatives of the new international order gave no otherchoice to the two former enemies but to work together on a new type of relation-ship. It was simply impossible that, in a world ruled by globalisation, Russia couldbe excluded from the international scene, and from the different arrangements thatbound its Western neighbours together.

When it became obvious to both NATO and Russia that they would have tobuild some kind of cooperative relationship, the identity gap between Russia andthe countries composing the North Atlantic Alliance came suddenly to the fore.At that time, many experts advocated that this identity gap would always be animpediment to a true rapprochement between the two parties.

In our first part, we identified the main features of Russian identity, and deter-mined the extent to which these features differed from what we can present as thecommon identity aspects of the Allied countries. We concluded that Russia couldbe defined as an illiberal democracy as opposed to the liberal democracies thatcharacterise the Euro-Atlantic countries. We also learnt that Russia is by naturerather anti-West. In this context, the perspective of cooperative relations betweenNATO and Russia indeed seems full of pitfalls.

It is therefore crucial at this stage to assess the impact of this identity gapbetween Russia and the NATO countries on their relations. Not only will we tryto see how this identity gap has manifested itself in NATO–Russia relations since

the end of the Cold War, but we will also try to determine whether or not thisundeniable identity gap stands as the major obstacle to cooperation between thetwo parties.

The approach that we will follow in this chapter will be a chronological one,spanning a period from the end of the Cold War to the creation of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002. First, we will focus on the immediateaftermath of the Cold War and the subsequent transition through which Russia onthe one hand, and NATO on the other, had to go through until the final signatureof the Founding Act in May 1997. Our objective will be to demonstrate howRussia and NATO finally came to the conclusion that cooperation was inevitable.Second, we will look at the Kosovo conflict as the first event that challengedthe very existence of this newly born relationship of not yet true cooperativenature. We will see how fundamental differences between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic countries re-emerged suddenly in the face of difficulties. Third, we willanalyse what impact the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United Stateshad on NATO–Russia relations, and how this event changed radically the turn ofthese relations. More specifically, we will try to understand why the Kosovoconflict was detrimental to NATO–Russia relations and why, on the other hand,the 11 September 2001 events gave a real impetus to enhanced cooperationbetween the two parties. In that context, we will ask ourselves whether the -peculiar Russian identity was really the stumbling block, or whether otherreasons may better explain the difficulty of building cooperation between NATOand Russia.

From the end of the Cold War to the Founding Act

Russia in transition and evolution of Russian foreign policy

On 12 June 1990 the parliament of the RSFR (Russian Soviet FederativeRepublic) proclaimed the sovereignty of Russia, which, though as a separateentity, continued to be part of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1991, the USSRhad ceased to exist and was replaced by the CIS.1 Russia progressively receiveddiplomatic recognition from about 160 states and inherited the international rightsand obligations of the former Soviet Union, including permanent membership ofthe UNSC as well as the seat of the USSR in other international organisations.2

Russia also declared itself responsible for the Soviet Union’s nuclear legacy andhad therefore to ensure the observance of nuclear non-proliferation by the othermembers of the CIS.

Russia was both psychologically and politically ready to integrate the emergingEuropean security architecture that was to replace the bipolar organisation of thecontinent. In the words of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, NATOwas not an aggressive military bloc but a force for stability in Europe and theworld, which should continue its role as the only defence organisation capableof contending with threats to peace.3 For him and those of similar attitude, new

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Russian foreign policy was to be oriented mainly towards the West becauseWestern states were Russia’s natural partners and allies. In presenting hisarguments, Kozyrev explicitly made reference to the historical legacy of Peterthe Great’s diplomacy towards the West. The ideas of Russian messianism and thepursuit of an independent role in line with its great power heritage were eitherunderstated or even denied.4 Kozyrev was actually following Mikhail Gorbachev’sNew Thinking as expressed in the optimistic concept of the ‘Common EuropeanHome’.5 Like Gorbachev, Kozyrev understood that the improvement of relationswith the West would require certain sacrifices from Russia. These were along thelines of Russia’s past consent to German unification and to united Germany’sNATO membership in 1990, the support for UNSC resolutions against Iraq duringthe Gulf Crisis, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.6

The failed coup attempt of the Communists in 1991 also reinforced the NewThinking trend and the popularly elected president of the Russian Federation,Boris Yeltsin, adopted an even more democratic, market-oriented andEuropean–Atlanticist policy. His declared goals were full participation in inter-national economic institutions like the IMF, integration into the democratic com-munity of states and even NATO membership. All these concessions were basedon the assumption that Russia would be fully integrated into the club of greatpowers with equal rights. This, however, had neglected the fact that such integra-tion would follow the Western terms because of the ‘asymmetry which existedin the West’s favour; the pillars of all-European security were, and could onlybe, based on Western structures’.7 On most issues, Russia merely followed theWestern lead. As Nadia Arbatova stressed it, ‘this policy became a vulnerabletarget of right-wing opposition, attacking Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del[Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (MID) for selling out Russian interests to theWest’.8 Any condescending action toward Russia was brought to the fore andexploited by the opponents of a pro-Western policy. These antagonist forcessought to provoke a crisis in Russia’s relations with the West, so that the countrywould once again find itself in a malign encirclement, tormented by the ‘complexof the besieged’. The Russian leadership, but also society as a whole, couldtolerate no longer ‘the millenarian omniscience and cultural insensitivity of manyWesterners proffering democracy, coupled with the self-congratulatory rhetoricof victory in the West and the Western tendency to dictate to Russia on foreignpolicy matters’.9

We should not forget that losing the Cold War had generated a feeling ofnational humiliation. After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russia had engagedin a transition from imperial power to a much more modest status and continu-ously tried to overcome a sort of ‘lost empire syndrome’ through the definition ofa new Russian national identity. In this respect, Russia had difficulty in decidingwhether it was part of, or in contradistinction to the West.10 Considering theircountry’s long and close relationship with Asia, Russians were unclear onwhether their identity was irreducible to the Western community or a combina-tion of, and bridge between, Western and non-Western identities. Russia was also

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affected by the actual loss of lands and the fact of being relegated to the status ofa poor state as opposed to the wealthy United States and Western Europe. TheRussian Federation appeared to be a pale shadow of the former powerful SovietUnion and despite vast military capabilities, its negotiating position on the inter-national scene was fundamentally affected by internal instability and economictroubles.11 Moscow lost its former predominant influence in the Middle East.Likewise, in Angola, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola) preferred to sign an agreement with the United States; and in Nicaragua,the defeat of the Sandinistas affected Russia’s position in Latin America. In Asia,while the dispute over the Kuril Islands still hampered the normalisation ofrelations with Japan, former close ties with Vietnam and North Korea had becomelittle more than memories. This loss of influence would soon translate into arevived imperialist foreign policy.

From the Second World War until the early 1980s, this course had guidedSoviet foreign policy and was based on a close relationship between power andideology. In the pure realist tradition, the State had to enhance its own powerconstantly, while at the same time diminishing that of its competitors. Militaryand geopolitical aspects were more important than economic considerations andideology was used to justify this yearning for power. But the proportion ofmilitary costs in the gross national product cannot rise ad infinitum. In the 1980s,the economic decline could no longer ensure the necessary modernity of thearmed forces and thus their effectiveness. For example, the Soviet Union provedincapable of responding to the high technological level of US president Reagan’sStrategic Defence Initiative and the so-called ‘Star Wars’ programme.

Already confronted with a general loss of influence in world affairs, theRussian leadership refused to simply abandon the Great Power status left bythe Soviet empire. As a result, it attempted to re-establish its predominance in theentire area of the former Soviet Union. In 1993, Russian President Yeltsin initi-ated a greater assertiveness in foreign policy by introducing his own ‘MonroeDoctrine’, namely a neo-imperialist policy towards the former Soviet republics,the so-called ‘near abroad’. By putting on the opposition’s political clothes,Yeltsin played the card of pragmatic nationalism, but he also sacrificed the prin-ciples of liberal democracy.12 Very explicit were bilateral treaties for continuedRussian military presence in most states of the CIS,13 increasing tensions withUkraine over the Black Sea Fleet14 and Crimea,15 Georgia almost compelled toaccept CIS membership and Azerbaijan forced to reduce its ties with Turkey.Greater activism in the near abroad could be perceived as the first signs of‘military adventurism’, which might lead to confrontation. An unpopular isolatedleadership coupled with anti-Western feelings could push it further down thatroad. Nevertheless, Yeltsin’s new foreign policy preserved its underlying orienta-tion towards partnership with the West. The fact that this policy change wasparticularly manifest in Russia’s attitude towards the newly independent states ofthe former Soviet Union resulted from the historical links that bound these statesto Russia. It was also caused by the c.25 million ethnic Russians living in the

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former Soviet republics and suddenly finding themselves deprived of Moscow’sdirect protection.16 Like any country, Russia had the legitimate right to defend itsnational interests – including the protection of Russian minorities in neighbouringcountries – by non-military means. In Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan, however,these interventions were justified on the ground that Russia had traditionalgeopolitical interests in the region and therefore had a legitimate right to inter-vene in its own ‘back yard’. It is commonly accepted that a peacekeeping forcemust be neutral, requires the consent of the parties and normally forbids immediateneighbours to take any part at all in peacekeeping operations. Russia’s peace-keeping in its near abroad could thus hardly be considered as neutral since itclearly served Russian interests.

In 1993, the Russian political leadership adopted a more assertive nationalistattitude based on neo-imperialist convictions, and aimed at restoring the Sovietempire in one form or another. At that time, the new advocates of Russian ‘great-ness’ argued that a strategic partnership with the West was pure fiction17 andstressed the Russian legitimate use of force in the ‘near abroad’ and potentially inthe ‘far abroad’. These developments were associated with the intensification ofan anti-Western sentiment among the Russian elite and the Russian populace.They took place at the very moment when the West struggled to integrate Russiainto a comprehensive European order.18

NATO in transition and Russia’s perception of NATO’s initiatives

The break up of the Warsaw Pact19 and the subsequent dissolution of the SovietUnion were bound to lead to the self-dissolution of NATO as a military alliancethat had completed its initial tasks. However, the Atlantic Alliance did not see anyreason why it should share the fate of the Warsaw Pact as an act of fair play.Western countries suggested that NATO should be preserved as a stabilisingfactor on the international scene. At odds with many theoretical assumptionsabout alliances dissolving in the absence of a threat, NATO moved to the core ofan emerging European cooperative security system.

At the London Summit in 1990, the NATO Heads of State and Governmentacknowledged the recent revolutionary changes in Europe and extended ‘the handof friendship to former Warsaw Pact adversaries’.20 They invited Gorbachevand other political leaders from Eastern Europe to establish diplomatic liaisonand military contacts with NATO. Regrettably, there was at the time no realaccord within the Atlantic Alliance over how broad such contacts would be.In December 1990, the North Atlantic Council also recognised the necessity of‘interlocking institutions’ including NATO, the European Union (EU), the WesternEuropean Union (WEU) and the CSCE, which ‘in accordance to their respectiveresponsibilities and purposes could effectively contribute to the creation of a newEuropean security framework’.21 In November 1991, the Rome meeting of theNorth Atlantic Council adopted a ‘new Strategic Concept’ defining a broader

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approach to security based on the ‘unlikely possibility of a major conflict’.22

Post-Cold War threats were less likely to result from ‘calculated aggressionagainst the territory of the Allies’ than from ‘the adverse consequences ofinstabilities that might arise from the serious economic, social and political diffi-culties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which were faced bymany countries in Central and Eastern Europe’.23 Consequently, NATO decidedto reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and to streamline and reorganise itsarmed forces.24 In this sense, the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept underlinedthe importance of effective ‘interoperability’ towards ‘smaller but more flexibleand mobile forces’.25 Nevertheless, NATO retained Article 5 on collective self-defence26 and stressed that ‘the Alliance would maintain an adequate militarycapability and a clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence’.27

The Alliance also considered new opportunities for a cooperative dialoguewith the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and by December 1991, created theNACC.28 The NACC brought together NATO members, the former Warsaw Pactstates, and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the members of the CIS. NATO’sdecision to create the NACC was connected, not least, to the necessity ofpreserving the CFE Treaty which suffered from a radical change in the militarybalance on which it was founded. At that time, satisfying the aspirations ofCentral and Eastern European countries for NATO membership was apparentlyonly of secondary importance.29 As the then permanent representative to NATO,Ambassador William Taft, described it, the NACC was ‘a temporary mechanismto deal with former adversaries’. The objective was rather to ‘promote extendedsecurity based on assessments of self-interest by the NATO members’.30 TheNACC was a step toward the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countriesin NATO, but it was also a way of putting them off when they asked for member-ship in NATO. It is interesting to note that in December 1991, in a letter to thefirst meeting of the NACC, Yeltsin declared that Russia, too, had the goal of join-ing NATO. This letter got no real answer, except for a few comments which statedthat inviting new members would make things more complicated for NATO. Wecannot but acknowledge that this response was not up to the measure of thehistoric opportunities and responsibilities at stake.31

From the Russian perspective, although potentially useful as a consultativeforum, the NACC presented three major disadvantages. First, its role andobjectives were not well defined. Second, it had no decision-making power.Finally, it missed the opportunity of granting Russia the special status that itthought it could claim. Indeed, Russia still believed in its great power status. Asthis could not be justified economically, Russia was trying to gain, in a rathererratic manner, a distinctive role in the post-Cold War security institutions.32

Furthermore, in the Russian view, Western leaders, although seeking cooperativearrangements with Russia, had de facto decided to reduce the power of anysecurity institution in which Russia had equal status, while at the same timestrengthening NATO and the EU in which Russia did not enjoy full equity andwas unlikely to do so. This explained Russia’s persistent reproof of NATO’s

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decision to remain a ‘defensive alliance’ rather than to initiate the ‘creation of amechanism for the support of international security’33 to be integrated in theOSCE – where Moscow had substantial decision-making power.34 In the words ofVladimir Baranovsky:

The OSCE is by far the most attractive multilateral institution forRussia. It corresponds to many of Russia’s concerns regarding theorganisation of the continental political space, and one would expectRussia to make consistent efforts to promote this institution. However,Russia’s attempts to increase the role of the OSCE are often perceived asmotivated by the intention to oppose it to NATO – an effort which cannotbut discredit any pro-OSCE design.35

It is indeed commonly recognised that ‘the CSCE/OSCE resulted from a Sovietinitiative, while NATO has been the main vehicle for US influence in Europe’.36

However, promoting the CSCE/OSCE as the superstructure of the post-Cold WarEuropean security system was rather utopian and had no immediate perspective.No major country would have agreed to fully confide its security to such a loosearrangement. Moreover, the CSCE/OSCE requirement for consensus severelyinhibits its capacity of action and could render it as ineffective as the formerLeague of Nations in the interwar period.37

Nevertheless, a strengthened OSCE vested with additional mechanisms and thecapacity to take practical measures would be more effective in matters like con-flict prevention,38 disarmament and minority rights. In addition, there is no doubtthat the OSCE has a key role to play in avoiding Russian isolation and in inte-grating Russia as an equal partner in the European security framework.

Most of NATO and Central and Eastern European countries had actually lostinterest in the CSCE/OSCE and were unwilling to support this project. TheRussian leadership therefore concluded that it had no choice but to enhance for-mal relations with NATO in order both to influence the Alliance’s transformationand to generate its support for a pan-European security system more appealing toMoscow. On the Western side, the challenge was to find a creative way to keepRussia facing West, without granting too much authority to the CSCE/OSCE. Thesolution was found in the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The Partnership for Peace

The PfP was probably the first real far-reaching NATO initiative towards formerWarsaw Pact and other CSCE/OSCE countries since the NACC in 1991. LesAspin, former US Secretary of State for Defence and chief of the Pentagon,enumerated the different advantages of the PfP as follows: ‘Firstly, it does notredivide Europe. Secondly, it sets up the right incentives for those wishing to join.Thirdly, the PfP requires partners to make a real contribution (financial resources,personnel, equipment). Fourthly, it keeps NATO at the centre of European

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security concerns, and thereby keeps American involvement at the centre ofEurope. Fifthly, possible NATO membership comes where it belongs, at the endof the process rather at the beginning’. The PfP had the required flexibility tocope with an uncertain strategic environment without ‘leaving Russia in the cold’.The programme also offered a ‘differentiated approach’ for each Participant,which in practice resulted in several different levels of cooperation. This princi-ple of ‘self-differentiation’ was one of the central elements of the PfP. Throughthe Individual Partnership Programme (IPP)39 to be agreed between the Partnerand NATO, cooperation was tailor-made to suit each country’s needs and wishes.The PfP had to be put into the perspective of NATO’s response to deal with thenew European security landscape. The Alliance had to consider claims from statesseeking NATO membership (e.g. the Visegrad Four);40 those that were unlikely tobe part of any enlargement, but feared isolation (Russia); and finally NATO mem-bers themselves who did not share the same views on very important issues.

Russia had first cancelled the signing of the agreement, which should havetaken place on 21 April 1994. These delays over signing the Partnership for Peacewere clearly motivated by Yeltsin’s need to get domestic political cooperationfrom the opposition.41 Furthermore, even those advocating Russia’s participationin PfP were not completely satisfied with the programme. They suggested thatRussia should clarify some points and set some conditions before joining PfP. Themost important of these conditions was Russia’s special status within the pro-gramme. It was widely accepted that a nuclear power like Russia should be a spe-cial partner of the Alliance in promoting security and stability in Europe.42 Inaddition, Russian policymakers were increasingly anxious about the participationof members of the CIS in PfP, seen as a challenge to Russian interests in its nearabroad. The PfP arrangement was clearly perceived by Russia as ‘an infringementon its sphere of influence, one sign of which was the Russian refusal in Novemberto sign documents creating military links between it and NATO’.43

Russia’s reluctance was also due to NATO’s intention to expand the Alliance byadmitting Central and East European countries. Although officially presented asa compromise over enlargement, the PfP would rapidly become the first step inprogressively gaining full consensus within NATO towards enlargement.44

Indeed, PfP had been initially launched as a compensation for NATO membershipbut ‘just as partners in Central Europe felt that PfP was not sufficient to assuretheir security and ties to the West, so did Russia believe that PfP was a subterfugeto paper over the dividing line between East and West’.45 It was clear enough that,for some partners, PfP was merely a path to membership. Indeed, by 1993 majorCentral and Eastern European states felt that ‘only full NATO membership wouldresolve their perceived security dilemmas, promote stability to attract economicinvestment and membership in the EU and provide reassurance for democraticand market reform-oriented political leaders’.46 This connection between PfP andNATO enlargement – strongly opposed by the Russian leadership for bothdomestic and foreign political reasons – hampered to a significant extent Russianparticipation within the PfP programme.

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After new negotiations, in which it accepted that it would not have a right ofveto, Russia finally signed the PfP document on 22 June 1994. The main idea wasthat through its participation in the programme, Russia would be able to influencethe process of NATO enlargement. As Oksana Antonenko, a Russian scholar,underlined:

Russia finally joined PfP in June 1994, hoping to transform it into a sub-stitute for NATO membership for Central and East European states,rather than a mechanism to prepare them for membership. PfP wasabove all a political instrument: in effect, Russia wanted to raise the costof enlargement by threatening to pull out of the partnership. Even at thetime, Russia saw its main leverage not in active partnership but in thethreat of complete disengagement.47

From the Russian perspective, although PfP was potentially a useful channel forpromoting military cooperation with various countries, cooperation in prepara-tions for peacekeeping operations and reciprocal confidence, it was still toolimited and technical a programme to serve as a basis for NATO–Russia relations.48

The PfP initiative actually originates from suggestions by the then SACEUR(Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) General John Shalikashvili in 1993, toestablish military cooperation with partner states for peacekeeping operations.49

Numerous peacekeeping exercises with NATO’s Allies and partners have sincethen been organised and Russia has also participated in several of these. On28 April 1994, a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) was inaugurated at theSupreme Allied Command in Europe (SHAPE) headquarter in Mons. The PCC isresponsible for coordinating joint military activities within the PfP and for carry-ing out the military planning necessary to implement partnership programmesbetween NATO and individual PfP partners.

The partnership between NATO and Russia must also be viewed in the contextof Russian and Western policy towards the conflict in the former Yugoslavia andtheir collaboration within the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the StabilisationForce (SFOR). The peacekeeping operations in Bosnia were NATO’s first jointoperations with PfP partners as well as being NATO’s first land operations.50 Itwas composed of the UN Peace Forces already in place51 and troops of NATOcountries and PfP members. The deployment of the IFOR began in December1995 with the signature of the Dayton accords. The IFOR was to ensure compli-ance with the implementation of the military aspects of the Bosnian PeaceAgreement.52 In practice, it had to create enough stability in Bosnia to allowthe peace force to withdraw without the Bosnian government being left vulnerableto the Serbs and the Croats.

NATO–Russia military cooperation really began on 15 October 1995 whenRussian General Shevtsov and his staff arrived in Belgium to work with GeneralJoulwan, the then NATO SACEUR. Their mission was to define the conditions ofthe participation of Russian troops in IFOR. On 8 November 1995, the Russian

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and the US Defence Ministers agreed to a special command and control mechanismfor the Russian troops involved in IFOR missions.53 Russian troops were to be putunder the command of the IFOR Supreme Commander through the Deputy forRussian Forces. The unity of command was consequently preserved withoutRussian troops being directly subordinate to NATO and the Commander ofMultinational Division North (MDN).54 Following these special agreements,about 1,500 Russian soldiers were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina on13 January 1996. The Russian troop contingent was involved as part of the USDivision in Sector North. The first battalion was situated on the territory ofthe Muslim–Croat Federation, while the other was on the Bosnian Serb side. Thelocation of the two Russian battalions headquarters indubitably provided evidenceof Russia’s impartiality. An operational group under the control of GeneralShevtsov was also established at SHAPE for communication, liaison anddecision-making, and was charged with the task of guiding the Russian contin-gent in theatre. With the termination of IFOR’s mandate in December 1996,Russia continued to contribute to the follow-up SFOR.55

While the NATO–Russia experience in Bosnia was taken as an example inthe West as the model for future cooperation, few in Russia considered theIFOR/SFOR joint peacekeeping operations as a political success. Despite thepractical experience of effective cooperation between troops on the ground,Russia’s participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia waswidely criticised. Nadia Arbatova accurately listed two major points of friction:

First, having accepted NATO’s invitation to IFOR, Russia committeditself to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the process of its implementa-tion, regardless of all visible shortfalls. More hard-nosed opponentsasserted that Russia’s presence in the NATO-led operation was nothingmore than recognition of the emerging NATO-centred status quo inEurope, which undermined all arguments against NATO’s expansioneastward. Therefore, they claimed, Russia should leave Bosnia. Second,Russia’s participation was regarded by Moscow as unequal andhumiliating, since Russia did not have any say in NATO.56

In spite of the practical experience gained on the ground, no real strategy fordeveloping interoperability with NATO was truly envisaged.57 The failure torealise a genuine partnership left Russia profoundly disillusioned and gave theimpression that the concessions made had only further contributed to Russia’sweakness. The publication of the NATO enlargement study in September 1995also contributed to the intensification of anti-NATO rhetoric. The study appearedto completely ignore Russia’s interests and concerns.58 In order to satisfy, to someextent, the demands of the opposition in the Duma and of the Russian media,Yevgeny Primakov was appointed as the new Russian Foreign Minister, replacingthe pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev. Primakov’s doctrine of multipolarity saw theinternational situation through the prism of conflicting interests with NATO.

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His first decision was thus to reverse Russia’s excessive orientation towards theWest. In reaction to this political shift and in view of the reluctance of certainEuropean countries to antagonise Russia, NATO members finally conceded a‘special status’ to Russia that would nevertheless avoid granting the country asphere of influence in the East and a veto within the Alliance. On the Russianside, as Vladimir Baranovsky noted, ‘a special relationship with NATO wasconsidered a more practical strategy than promoting the re-emergence of theconfrontational model’.59

The Founding Act and the PJC

In order to establish a basis for the new relationship, NATO suggested an agreementthat would assure Russia’s participation in European affairs through a mechanismof regular consultations. Negotiations were long and difficult but ultimately pro-duced the NATO–Russia Founding Act, creating a separate forum, the PermanentJoint Council (PJC),60 for bilateral NATO–Russia discussions. The Founding Acton mutual relations, cooperation and security between the NATO and the RussianFederation represented an institutionalised framework on which to seek commonapproaches and solutions to common concerns. Initially, ‘the signing of theFounding Act in May 1997 was interpreted by Russia as an indication that NATOwas ready to grant Moscow a new mechanism to influence Alliance policies’.61

In addressing the Duma, Primakov even presented the agreement as the bestexample of successful Russian diplomacy.62

Since this second generation of efforts to enhance NATO–Russia cooperationalso coincided with the formal decision to enlarge the Alliance to Central Europe,this participation in NATO institutions and structures was primarily viewed by theKremlin as a way of minimising the effects of NATO expansion. In this respect,the Russian political elite was notably motivated by ‘its wish to prevent thecentral security role in Europe being played by a structure to which Russia wouldnot have direct access’.63 On the Western side, one way of securing Russia’snon-opposition to enlargement was for the Atlantic Alliance to reaffirm in theFounding Act that it had ‘no intention, no plan and no reason’ to station nuclearweapons on the territory of new member states. In short, the ultimate aim of theAct was to reassure Russia that it could have a partnership with NATO regardlessof the enlargement process.

The Act, however, fell far short of Russian expectations. First, it was adocument that was binding in a mere political sense, and not in the juridical sensethat Russia had wanted.64 As for the NATO–Russia PJC,65 it was establishedseparately from the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s own decision-makingbody.66 In other words, Russia had no say in NATO’s internal affairs, this newconsultation forum gave it ‘a voice, not a veto’.67

In addition, the fact that all the terms of the Founding Act had been dictated byNATO was interpreted by many Russians as a failure by the Kremlin to achieveits objectives.68 Russia would not be able to block the NATO actions it opposed.

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It would not even have a say on the operations where its own interestswere engaged, as in the former Yugoslavia. Obviously, these elements did notallay the country’s opposition to enlargement. As Irina Isakova, a Russian scholar,stated:

The Founding Act was a painful compromise that has not changedRussia’s negative view of NATO enlargement plans or of NATO itself.Russia regards as its main task the implementation of the provisionsof the NATO–Russia Founding act that would guarantee the non-advancement of NATO forces into the territory of non-member states.Russian tactics tend to focus increasingly on criticism of specificintegrative efforts by the established NATO states, newcomers andprospective members, particularly with regard to the extension ofmilitary multi-national groups and joint command centres to the CentralEuropean states and the Baltic region.69

Nationalists and communists within the extremist anti-NATO block in the Dumaconsidered the Founding Act as a betrayal, holding NATO and its advocatesresponsible for Russia’s problems. Most Russian officers also shared quite thesame opinion. They could not see NATO but as an adversary and a potentialthreat. Furthermore, the Founding Act had formalised the end of NATO as the‘enemy’ and thus made it difficult for the military to find a new rationale for theirjob. In addition, the Yeltsin government was openly criticised for accepting thisvague charter in exchange for financial and economic rewards from the West,including Russia’s entry into the Group of Seven (G7) and the World TradeOrganisation (WTO), and support from the IMF.70

As provided for in the Founding Act, Russia’s Permanent Mission to NATO wasset up in Brussels, including the office of Russia’s Chief Military Representativeto NATO to be responsible for coordination with NATO military structures.Cooperation was initiated on issues like ‘preventing proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, exchanging information on security and defence policies andforces, as well as conversion of defence industries, defence-related environmentalissues and civil emergency preparedness’.71 With regard to the enhancement ofinformation exchange between the two parties, a NATO European SecurityDocumentation Centre72 was opened in Moscow, within the Institute of ScientificInformation for Social Sciences (INION) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. TheCentre was opened on NATO’s initiative and was designed to promote a better pub-lic understanding of NATO’s role in the European security system, and provideinformation about the Alliance’s activities and the new partnership with Russia.

Some of the opportunities for cooperation, contained in the Founding Act werebeyond imagination. This notably concerned the ‘joint decisions and joint actionswith respect to security issues of common concern to NATO and Russia’73 whichcould include peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UNSC or theresponsibility of the OSCE.

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Other promising suggestions from the Founding Act, ‘where the two partieswill consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree’74 including:conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict reso-lution and other activities); combating terrorism; exchange of information andconsultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO andRussia; preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponsand their means of delivery, combating nuclear trafficking and strengtheningcooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspectsof proliferation; cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence; association of Russiawith NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), conversionof defence industries and cooperative projects in defence-related economic,environmental and scientific fields; combating drug trafficking; and civilemergency preparedness and disaster relief.

Unfortunately, despite these novelties, the Founding Act soon proved to bemerely an empty basket.75 The political obligations of the parties – not securedfrom a juridical point of view – stated in the document often had general formu-lations creating the possibility of different interpretations. In other words, theFounding Act could serve as a good basis for Russia–NATO cooperation as longas it was strategically and politically beneficial for both parties and as long asrelations remained friendly. In contrary circumstances, the Founding Act wouldfall into oblivion. The vulnerability of these political arrangements wereillustrated when NATO decided to bomb Serbia despite Russia’s strong oppositionand – in the Russian view at least – without any attempt to accommodate Russia’slegitimate concern.

The Kosovo crisis

From the outset, Russia did not share the Allies’ view on the possible use ofmilitary force to end the conflict and to enforce the international community’sdemands reflected in the relevant UNSC Resolutions. Nevertheless, in February1999, both NATO and Russia emphasised their full support for the Rambouilletpeace talks. On 23 March 1999, after the talks had failed and all diplomaticavenues to end the conflict had been exhausted, NATO decided that there was noalternative to the use of force.76 NATO’s military intervention in the formerYugoslavia, as from 24 March 1999, indubitably opened a new period in Russia’srelations with NATO.77 It put an end to Russia’s ‘great expectations’ and tarnishedthe very idea of cooperation with the West.78

The Russian government unanimously condemned NATO air strikes, requestedtheir suspension and asked for a political solution. Its disapproval was first basedon the inadmissibility of the use of force against a sovereign state without theconsent of the UNSC. According to Moscow, UNSC Resolution 1199 containednothing which gave authorisation for military attacks. Despite humanitarianarguments provided by NATO, the Alliance’s military adventure in the Balkanswas perceived as an act of aggression and a rude violation of the UN Charter, the

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Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as well as the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act. Inaddition, NATO military action unsanctioned by the UN created precedents forsubjective intervention in ethnic disputes elsewhere, as in conflicts in Russia’sNorthern Caucasus Republics.

Moreover, the April 1999 revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept to enable theAlliance to intervene in out-of-area situations beyond the borders of memberstates, such as in Kosovo, heightened Moscow’s concern that this new strategicfocus would establish the basis for possible intervention in Russia’s near abroador even in Russian territory.79 In the Russian view, NATO was giving a badexample of illegal action, allowing expediency and idealism to override the ruleof law. The West had demonstrated that it was willing to follow internationalagreements only as long as countries like Russia or China in the UNSC did notoppose its goals. Otherwise, the West was ready to go it alone, ignoring the rulesof international law and the UN Charter. As Dmitri Trenin underscored:

The use of force without the express sanction of the United Nation’sSecurity Council resolution dramatically devalued not only the Russianveto right but also the former superpower’s actual international weight.Moscow was shown to be impotent to prevent major international mili-tary operation in an area, which it traditionally regards as crucial to itsentire position in Europe.80

While principally supporting Belgrade, Russia had its own self-imposed limits.Milosevic attempted to drag Moscow into his war with NATO, but Russiaoverlooked the traditional Slav and Orthodox ties to pursue its own interests. Inreality, Russian historic sympathy towards Serbs, as Slavic Orthodox brothers,81

was groundless and proved to be an empty and facile explanation for Russia’sapparent support.82 Moscow essentially tried to protect the interests of Yugoslaviaby peaceful diplomatic means. Its support finally ruled out sanctioning arms salesto Belgrade.83

Major arguments that worked against any direct military aid to Milosevicincluded the danger of a global confrontation between Russia and the West – withconsequences far outreaching the initial stakes in the Balkan conflict – but alsobasically the practical unfeasibility of such support.84 Furthermore, despite itsstrong rhetoric, the Russian political elite did not have much sympathy forMilosevic and did not trust him. As for the Russian people, they were, as a rule,more concerned about their daily lives than about Kosovo and the humanitarianaspects of the problem. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership could not accept asituation in which NATO was acting as the global policeman, a situation whichwas also potentially demonstrating Russia’s impotence in international politicsand challenging its claim to power status. In an atmosphere of anti-Westernnationalist hysteria, the Kremlin faced a difficult situation: it could neither ignorehard liners calling for tough response – thus increasing the chances of Yeltsin’simpeachment in the Parliament – nor start a new confrontation with the West.

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Nevertheless, since Yeltsin’s political survival and Russia’s prestige were at stake,the Russian political leadership had to take decisive measures.

Immediately after the beginning of NATO air strikes, Yeltsin endorsedMilosevic’s proposal of Yugoslavia joining the Russia–Belarus Slavic Union –based on shared Slavic Eastern Orthodox ties and geopolitical interests as aresponse to the perceived threat from the West – and announced the retargeting ofRussia’s nuclear weapons at the NATO members taking part in the air strikes. Inaddition, Russia suspended its military contacts (inter alia the withdrawal of theRussian Senior Military Representatives and the Russian officers at SHAPEresponsible for the Russian SFOR contingent,85 as well as the abeyance ofPfP activities) and its civilian contacts (inter alia expulsion of the two NATOinformation officers in Moscow, request to discontinue NATO information workin Russia in general and the closure of the NATO Documentation Centre inMoscow) with the Alliance. All forms of Russia–NATO cooperation supposedlyinstitutionalised by the Founding Act were terminated.

NATO operations also aggravated the problems resulting from NATO’s expansioneastwards.86 It was indeed:

hardly reassuring that NATO action came just a few weeks after the firstwave of enlargement, a circumstance that only reinforced the view ofthose in Russia who from the beginning expected enlargement to be astage in the creation of a more aggressive Alliance.87

Last but not least, the Kosovo operation precipitated a revision of Russia’smilitary doctrine and its related defence policies. A new draft, published on9 October 1999, reflected important changes in the assessment of threats toRussian security. The blueprint pointed to external concerns and especially apotential threat of direct military aggression against Russia and its allies; thisthreat was to be deterred by all means, including the use of nuclear forces.88 Otherofficial documents such as Russia’s new National Security Concept (January2000)89 and Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000),90 both issued in the immediateaftermath of the crisis, incorporated significant changes reflecting the evaluationsthat Moscow’s foreign/military defence establishment conducted in relation withthe Kosovo campaign.91 The enhanced strategic threat perception after Kosovowas reflected almost immediately with the holding in June 1999 of the militaryexercise – codenamed ‘Zapad 99’ – involving preparation for a hypotheticalNATO attack.

Internal power struggles were another determinant factor influencing Russia’spolicy on Kosovo. Hostility to the West in general, and NATO in particular, inten-sified and as a consequence strengthened support for the Communists and theNationalists. Even pro-Western Liberals found themselves disillusioned andadopted a more diffident stance.

The virulent internal press campaign on Kosovo in Russia also contributed tothis increased anti-NATO feeling. The Russian media actually made little effort to

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present objective reports of Serb ethnic cleansing and persistently describedNATO as an aggressive, predatory grouping.92 Despite the fact that many hadaccess to Western media, the press in Russia was quite effective: all the principalpolitical parties (including the Democrats), public opinion (including the intelli-gentsia and university students) and all branches of the government rallied tothis reaction of indignation and hostility towards NATO and sympathy towardsthe Serbs.

In this regard, support for Yugoslavia was the Russians’ response to the US andNATO’s arrogant policy vis-à-vis Belgrade and to the Western disregard of viewsand interests of other states, above all Russia. A prolonged inability to reach asettlement in the crisis could have generated illiberal political change in Russia.Indeed, the communists and the Nationalists were more and more successful inmobilising popular support for a stronger defence policy and the reassertion ofRussia’s great power status. As the political balance was shifting in favour ofthose hostile to NATO, Russia’s constructive political engagement in the crisisproved to be essential in ending the war. The Russian government decided that itwas in Russia’s national interest to constrain the Serbs to accept the NATOdemands but did so after considerable internal struggle.93

The dispatch of former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as a keyinterlocutor with Milosevic was indeed more than helpful.94 As a rule, it wasbetter to have Russia as part of the solution than part of the problem in this timeof international crisis. As Alton Frye, a British expert, pointed out:

Having catered to Serbian sensibilities in many ways, the Russians werein the best position to make clear to the Serbian demagogue that he[Milosevic] was completely isolated and could not rely on Moscow tointervene further in his behalf. No one can say what course the warwould have followed without the multilateral diplomacy to whichChernomyrdin contributed.95

If there was a degree of pride in the Russian mediation being determinant inresolving the crisis, there was a more glorious moment of widespread jubilation on11 June 1999 when Russian troops, originally from SFOR, moved pre-emptivelyto establish themselves at Pristina Airfield (named Slatina). This surprise march‘underscored the disenchantment of the Russian military with what they perceiveas NATO aggressiveness, offensiveness as opposed to defensiveness, outrightbullying and arrogance toward Russia’.96 Although the manoeuvre involved only200 men, and was largely symbolic in nature, it ‘guaranteed Russia its place in theNATO-led force even before the actual rules of participation were worked out’97

and ‘speeded up negotiations between Moscow and NATO commanders onRussia’s role in Kosovo force (KFOR)’.98 However, this sensational gesture did notchange the principal guidelines of the final agreement. The UNSC resolution 1244of 12 June 1999 was based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, implying an actionenforced against the will of one of the parties, and the peacekeeping operation wasnot a UN action but a NATO mission by authorisation of the UN.

Russia’s participation in KFOR was made possible by the signing of a separateagreement worked out in Helsinki. Under this agreement, Russian peacekeeperswere deployed in three sectors: the US-led Multinational Brigade East, theFrench-led Multinational Brigade North and the German-led MultinationalBrigade South. Russia also shared the responsibilities for Pristina airport,together with NATO forces. The Russian General at SHAPE was, at the sametime, the deputy to SACEUR responsible for the Russian participation in SFORand the representative of the Russian Ministry of Defence for Russian KFORmatters.99 The integrated force became operational as Serb forces withdrew fromthe province and the work of restoring peace and stability began. Russiacontributed about 3,250 troops to the 43,000-strong KFOR.

For Russian political leaders and military commanders, the costly participationin KFOR was justified for several reasons. First, it demonstrated that Russia wasstill a world power with force projection capabilities which must be involved inpeacekeeping planning and operations in the Balkans. In this respect, Moscowwanted to play a key role within KFOR from the outset in order to retain politi-cal influence in the region and to prevent NATO from unilaterally establishing apermanent military presence. Second, it showed its support to Serbia afterRussia’s perceived loss of credibility following the failure to provide tangible sup-port to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the bombing campaign.In this regard, Moscow intended to obtain a defined Russian sector within KFORin an area where it would be able to give credible protection to remaining Serbminorities against the Albanian ‘terrorists’. Third, it permitted monitoring theimplementation of the UN resolution on Kosovo Liberation Agency (KLA)disarmament and the preservation of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.

However, Moscow was quite frustrated about Russia’s participation in KFOR.During June–July 1999, as about 40,000 NATO peacekeeping troops enteredKosovo, the arrival of the Russian contingent – beside the unit in Slatina – washeld up because of delays by Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in providing aircorridors. Unlike SFOR, KFOR posed a much greater problem for both parties,given the conditions of renewed mistrust and likely clash of important strategicinterests in the Balkans. The 3,000-strong Russian contingent did not actuallyprovide any leverage over NATO policies in the region. Russia had to renounce toa special sector in Kosovo, independent of NATO’s chain of command.Furthermore, Russian troops were not granted control over heavily Serb-populatedareas. Besides, Russian contingents were separated from each other and, except forone unit, they were not near the border with the rest of Serbia, and located in areasmainly populated by Albanians. Likewise, keeping control over Slatina airport hadpoor significance since all air traffic, as well as ground communications in allsectors, was commanded by NATO. In the words of Vladimir Baranovsky:

Russia’s peacekeepers are welcomed to participate in KFOR – but,unlike leading Western countries, they do not get their own sector ofresponsibility. By and large the Cold War logic of ‘keeping Russians out’

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seems to many of them to have mutated into a double-track task: how toprevent Russians from becoming disengaged, without however actuallyletting them in.100

Nevertheless, the KFOR experience finally helped restore relations between NATOand Russia101 with the latter resuming its official contacts on a limited basis. Bymid-2000, the Russian representatives had returned to NATO Headquarters.Russian Foreign Ministry statements concerning PJC consultations102 took on anincreasingly positive tone as the Kosovo affair receded.103 In February 2001,NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson presided over the re-opening ofNATO’s representation in Moscow. A NATO Information Office was establishedunder the aegis of the Belgian embassy and fully staffed in December 2001. Itsmain missions include inter alia: liaising with Russian media; organising visits byRussian delegations to NATO HQ and SHAPE; supporting initiatives of otherNATO Directorates (Scientific Affairs, Economic); and facilitating the politicallink between NATO and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As for theNATO Military Liaison Mission, it was only opened in May 2002. Its mainmissions include inter alia: liaising with the Russian Ministry of Defence onissues covered by the NRC’s Military Work Plan and by PfP programmes; assistingthe NATO Information Office in explaining NATO policies; and helping toimplement decisions taken by the NRC.104

Russia–NATO after 9/11

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States brought about ashift in both Russian and Western policies, which were both conducive to greaterrapprochement and interaction in the struggle against international terrorism.105

From the outset, Russia actively and positively participated in the anti-terroristcoalition, not only providing diplomatic support to the campaign, but also sharingintelligence on sources and methods used to finance terrorist groups, and applyingsanctions against the countries harbouring terrorists. This cooperation gave rise tofrank exchanges on the entire spectrum of the terrorist threat – including therisk of nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation, and included joint exer-cises addressing the consequences for the civilian population of a large-scaleterrorist attack.

When the United States initiated a campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaidain Afghanistan,106 Moscow opened Russian airspace to US planes and enhancedmilitary assistance to the Northern Alliance.107 Considering Russia’s key roleand military experience in Central Asia and Afghanistan, its participation wasparamount to the success of the coalition against terrorism and the post-11September international order.108 Indeed, Russia’s endorsement of US OperationEnduring Freedom facilitated the provision of practical support by the formerSoviet Central Asian states. Furthermore, reluctant states like China, India andIran finally decided to follow the Russian stance and to grant political support.

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It is fairly easy to misinterpret the changes of the Russian position bydisregarding crucial nuances. Indeed, it should be observed that, regardless ofwhat has been the real motivation of President Putin and his team, the main trendin the wider discourse has been not towards greater solidarity with the UnitedStates and the West as a whole, but about a reassertion of the Russian position onthe international stage. In that sense, the Russian attitude has not changed an iota.It is rather the West that has adopted a new attitude towards Russia. From theRussian perspective, it looks as if the West, as it were, has become ‘more Russian’and not vice-versa.

Internally, this support and Putin’s strongly pro-Western rhetoric soon facedcriticism amongst Russian political and military representatives,109 as well aswithin large sections of the public. Apparently, many did not share his ‘confi-dence in the American and European commitment to reward Moscow for its sup-port’.110 In their perception, the US still viewed Russia as an obstacle to itsinterests in a number of issues: missile defence;111 NATO enlargement; spread ofUS influence in central Asia; relations with rogue states like Iraq, Iran, NorthKorea, etc. They also wanted Putin to avoid repeating the mistakes of figures suchas Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who had made concessions to the West and receivedvery little in return.112 Their position was further reinforced by severe US blowsto Russian interests on issues of vital strategic concern: US withdrawal from theABM Treaty and NATO’s expansion to the East. In addition, the prospect of along term US military presence in the near abroad Central Asia was stronglyopposed, not least by the Russian military.

President Putin’s policy was not without risks to his political career, especiallyin the event of an economic slowdown. Yet, he was able to pursue his strategy.113

Huge popularity, strong determination and personal authority gave him anunquestionable legitimacy for his undertakings. Unlike Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin isnot only seen by the public as a firm leader with no credible rival, but also as aman of action flexible enough to overcome political setbacks.114 He is swift inexplaining his stance to the average Russians, and less concerned about theconfused and grudging elite, which has finally no other choice than going alongwhen confronted with the opinion polls.

Many reasons justify Putin’s decision to maintain a pro-Western line.115 The11 September events came about at a time when Putin’s dual-track strategy –relations with the West and at the same time attempts to counterbalance UShegemony by developing relations with the European Union – was not meetingits expectations. This tragedy appeared as a unique opportunity for Russia toconvince the West, but especially the United States, of the necessity of a strategicpartnership. Putin’s decision to call George Bush on 11 September was thus notmerely a political statement, but also a way of showing that Russia belonged tothe same security community. In other words, the attacks on the United Stateshelped Russia to complete the building of what is now named the ‘threat bridgeto the West’.116 By embarking on the campaign, Russia succeeded in imposingitself on the post-11 September world order.

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This very recognition of common security concerns with the West, and sharedvulnerability to threats such as global terrorism – and more particularly SunniIslamist extremism – constituted another reason that comforted Putin in hisdecision. The fact that the United States was so preoccupied with building aninternational anti-terror coalition, with Russia playing a central role, seeminglyimproved Russia’s chances of regaining some influence in international politicsand of being treated as an almost equal partner by the US administration.

Indeed, the success of the US operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan largelydepended on the position of Russia, both in terms of its possible participation in thecoalition and with regard to its influence on such neighbouring countries asTajikistan, Kyrgistan and Iran. Not only does Russia possess military bases and unitsin the area close to the Afghan theatre, and exert strong influence on at least some ofthe local Central Asian regimes (Tajikistan), it also has strong personal interest incontaining the Taliban threat.117 Given its tense relations with Iran and Pakistan,Washington could hardly dispense with Russian facilities in the region. For its part,Russia’s strategy was dictated by the perspective of short and long term benefits.

Should its troops be forced to stay in Central Asia, the United States would finditself in a situation where, like the Soviet Army in the 1980s, it could be defeated.This could eventually lead to an erosion of American hegemony, its withdrawalfrom the region and the consequent strengthening of Russia’s position in CentralAsia as the sole guarantor of security in a region still facing a growing Islamicthreat. However, should the United States manage to defeat the Taliban regime, itwould help Russia to eradicate the Islamic threat along its southern border. In thisscenario, the US troops would then withdraw and Russia’s strategic interests inthe region could be preserved. Russia’s calculations thus aimed at strengtheningits position in Central Asia and making it safer with limited resources and withoutdirectly engaging its forces.118

Had Russia decided not to grant the US access to its military facilities inCentral Asia, certain local leaders (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,Kyrgizstan) might have seized this opportunity to use the US position on theirground as a leverage with Russia.119 Such a situation would have set the limits ofRussia’s real influence in Central Asia and of its ability to control developmentsin the region. Russia would also miss out on the opportunity to influence theUnited States and – to a greater extent – Western policy in the region, and losecredibility as a strategic partner.

Third, and for Russia a related point, was the Western endorsement of Russia’swar in Chechnya120 and the recognised legitimacy of this official anti-terroristcampaign.121 Many Western political representatives soon put the Chechen rebelson a par with the organisers of the 11 September attacks.122 In this context, theWest adopted a new attitude towards Russia, and this change has confirmed, inthe eyes of the Russian public, that the Russian policy in Chechnya, for example,has been the right one. Of course, Western human rights campaigners hadexpressed their concern about a softening of criticism towards the conduct ofRussia’s military operations in Chechnya.123

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Another important element was Russia’s desperate need for Western investment.Although the Russian economy recovered rapidly from the massive roubledevaluation of August 1998 – largely due to high oil and gas prices – there was stilla strong need for further economic reform and restoring international investors’confidence in the Russian market. In return for its cooperation in the fight againstterrorism, Putin expected US and European support for Russia’s economy.

In this context, the importance of oil and energy resources did not go unnoticedin Russia’s decision to join the anti-terrorist coalition. Indeed, the campaignagainst terrorism in Central Asia risked placing Russia as an alternative and amore reliable source of energy to the West. In other words, while not expectingshort term economic or political benefits from its cooperation with theWest, Russia could expect future Western investments and gains from the saleof oil and gas to the West, and could then potentially dominate its main Arabcompetitors – who were definitely more reluctant than Russia to join the anti-terrorcoalition – on the global energy market. Among the Russian people, however,there was widespread resignation and disillusionment regarding any Westernsupport for Russia’s economic difficulties.

We should bear in mind that, in acting in this way, Russia did not look atdemocracy and market economy as goals per se, but the best available instru-ments in making the Russian State stronger and more efficient. By becoming amember of the Western community, Russia would be able to save money thecountry would otherwise have spent on building a strategic parity or at least acredible and sufficient anti-Western defence.

Russia’s choice meant a significant departure from traditional Soviet and – toa very large extent – post-Soviet thinking on Russia’s place in the internationalsystem. In other words, it would mean departing from Primakov’s policy of coun-terbalancing the Western influence by building strategic anti-Western allianceswith alternative centres of power of a wishful multipolar world.

The Russian leadership was also aware of the fact that Russia was too weak tocounter all these threats on its own and to achieve its long term goals by openlyconfronting the West. Joining the West in this campaign was therefore not a mani-festation of an identity choice, but rather a sort of survival strategy at a time whenthe country had to concentrate on its domestic economic revival. Russia hadneither the means nor interest to undertake the very costly foreign and securitypolicy that direct rivalry with the West would entail. Only a sound economy wouldpermit Russia to rebuild its military power necessary to the conduct of a realisticpolicy aimed at rehabilitating the country’s status on the international scene.

Finally, the Russian elite watched with extreme interest NATO’s transformationinto a wide-spectrum security organisation focusing increasingly on asymmetricthreats like terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.According to Russian experts, if NATO’s destiny was to ‘go global’, it would haveto be reformed in the direction of greater emphasis on political functions.124 Thiscould lead to NATO’s marginalisation as a military alliance, as exemplified by theUS operations in Afghanistan. Indeed, NATO did not lead the campaign and

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the collective defence provision of the Washington Treaty – the famousArticle 5125 – was invoked for pure symbolic reasons. Whatever changes NATOwent through, Russia hoped that its participation in the international fight againstterrorism would help further its integration into NATO’s structures.

Relations with NATO also improved significantly as a result of Putin’s strategicchoice. This confirms that the nature of Russia’s relations with the AtlanticAlliance is closely dependant on the degree of interaction with the United States,the latter still being viewed as using NATO as a personalised foreign policy tool.Only two days after the attack on the United States, the PJC met and issued astatement on the event, calling for closer and more intensive cooperation betweenNATO and Russia in defeating the terrorist scourge.126 A number of Russianpoliticians called for a boost in Russian–NATO relations and suggested thatexpanding Russian cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorismwould require a redefinition of Russia’s relationship with NATO. The PJC metagain on 19 September and reconfirmed the need for intensification ofRussia–NATO cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. Putin’svisit to Brussels on 3 October and his talks with Secretary-General LordRobertson marked a new beginning in Russian–NATO relations.

The dilemma that NATO was facing when discussing closer cooperation withRussia can be summed up as follows: NATO had to be convinced that Russia wasreally interested in developing constructive cooperation. NATO nations stillfeared that Russia might block the Alliance’s decision-making process and thusmake it powerless, should it be given access to it. By undermining NATO’scredibility as an efficient security provider and turning it into a new version ofthe inefficient OSCE, Russia could also distract certain countries from NATOmembership as the best protection against the revival of Russia’s great powerambitions in the region. As for Russia, it fears that under the formula of a ‘voicebut not a veto’, it does not have enough influence to make a difference and thatNATO will never give it any real influence.

Details on the further deepening of cooperation between Russia and NATOwere discussed at a series of meeting that took place in December 2001 inBrussels. On 6 December, the NATO Defence Ministers decided to explore anddevelop ‘new effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision,and coordinated/joint action’ between Russia and NATO. The final communiquéissued after the 6 December NAC meeting listed areas in which NATO was todeepen its cooperation with Russia. It was decided that the results of this workwould be presented at the Foreign Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002.

The same issues were also discussed with Russian representation at a PJCmeeting at the level of foreign ministers that took place in Brussels on7 December, as well as at the PJC meeting at the level of defence ministers on18 December. In the communiqué issued after this last meeting, the ministerscommitted themselves to forging a new relationship between NATO and Russiaand to enhancing their ability to work together in areas of common interest and tostand up to new threats and risks to security. They also agreed to the holding of

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a NATO–Russia conference on the military role in combating terrorism in February2002, and recognised the importance of defence reform as a key instrument toensure adequate military capabilities.

In Reykjavik on 14 May 2002, PJC Foreign Ministers thus approved the draftdeclaration on ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality’, including a work pro-gramme and the rules of procedure for a NRC. The Declaration was subsequentlyadopted and signed at the inaugural session of the NRC, which took place at thelevel of Heads of State and Government in Rome on 28 May 2002.

The objective behind the replacement of the PJC by the NRC was quite clear:to provide a fresh stimulus to NATO–Russia relations, drawing on the positivecooperation generated by the post-11 September fight against terrorism. It wasthe British Prime Minister, Blair, who first suggested the establishment of a newmechanism of cooperation. At that time, the Pentagon was quite reluctant tosupport this idea. The United States’ main concern, shared by NATO’s CentralEuropean members, was that the new council would allow Russia to ‘sneak in byNATO’s back door, split the allies and veto military decisions’.127 Although Putinsurely did not have an easy time selling the NRC either, he finally supported theidea, proposing that it could replace the existing PJC. Its main goals includeda determination to further intensify the common struggle against the terroristthreat; strengthening of cooperation by way of a multi-faceted approach, includingjoint assessment of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focusing onspecific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft andto critical infrastructures.128

The NRC operates on the principle of consensus; members take joint decisionsand bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation;the Council is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO;129 meetings are held atvarious levels: Foreign and Defence Ministers (twice annually), Heads of Stateand Government (as appropriate), Ambassadors (at least once a month with thepossibility of more frequent meetings, at the request of any Member or the NATOSecretary General); establishment of a Preparatory Committee, at the level of theNATO Political Committee, with Russian representation (meeting twice monthly,or more often if necessary); the possibility of establishing committees or workinggroups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation (ad hoc or permanentbasis), drawing upon the resources of existing NATO committees; meetings ofmilitary representatives and Chiefs of Staff, taking place no less than twice a year,meetings at military representative level at least once a month (with the possibilityof more frequent meetings if needed), meetings of military experts may beconvened as appropriate.

In fact, the NRC does resemble the PJC in many ways. All the 19 areas – frompeacekeeping and monitoring weapons of mass destruction to combating inter-national terrorism – for possible cooperation, as listed under Section III of theFounding Act, remain valid in the framework of the NRC. In addition, the workprogrammes for 2002 agreed on in December 2001 in the framework of thePJC continued to be implemented under the auspices and the rules of the NRC.

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Furthermore, except for the principle of consensus (actually the essential feature ofthe NRC differing from the PJC’s 19 � 1 format), the NATO Secretary General’schairmanship, and the Preparatory Committee at the level of the NATO PoliticalCommittee, the functioning of respectively the NRC and the PJC is quite identical.

This parallelism apparently does not bode well, since the PJC has had atroubled life. From the Russian perspective, meetings of the former PJC havetended to be pro forma, not taking the Russian views seriously. Nevertheless, thedifferent new features introduced in the new Council exemplify an important stepforward. First, meetings at ‘20’ would supplant the earlier ‘19 � 1’ dialoguebetween NATO and Russia. Joint political debates at 20 on equal footing woulddefeat the charge posed sometimes against the PJC forum that it was not a debateof 19 � 1 but of 19 against 1. Unlike the PJC, the NRC gives Moscow an equalvoice on decisions concerning counter-terrorism, arms control, civil emergencies,crisis management, peacekeeping, maritime safety and the spread of nuclear,chemical and biological arms.

However, it continues to deprive Russia of a veto on security issues. Indeed, incase of disagreement, full NATO members can decide to remove the issue fromthe NRC and to discuss it ‘at 19’. Likewise, they retain veto rights on subjects, onwhich they may consider that a debate with Russia may act against their interests.Second, joint political decisions should be eventually implemented in order tostress joint action and finally, the agenda of the new NRC formula should bebroadened. A greater focus would be put on threats such as international terrorismand weapons of mass destruction.

It should also be noted that, although the creation of the NRC represented afundamental change in Western dealings with Russia and a move in the directionof a genuine cooperation, the key issue is still Russia’s relationship with NATO,and not – at least for the time being – Russia’s role fully integrated within NATO.This new NRC is again all about trust and confidence. The new partnership mayevolve into a sort of associate membership in which Russia, along with other con-cerned non-NATO countries, is increasingly involved in NATO decisions andactions, short of Article 5 commitment.

Though the new body was only granting Russia with relative decision-makingpower within the Alliance, this was compensated, in the Russian perspective, bythe possibility of operating inside the NATO decision-making framework. Indeed,the joint decision-making process without adequate prior consultations within theAlliance itself would give Russia the possibility to make use of eventual differ-ences among NATO Allies for its own benefit. Moscow also hoped to link the newNRC to other matters like, for example, NATO enlargement.130 On the NATOside, the agenda for joint debates within the NRC had thus to be specified withextreme clarity in order to avoid any faux pas.

Putin’s view of the necessity of a renewed cooperation with NATO facedcritics, coming, as usual, from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. These were concerned that the development of new forms offormal cooperation, such as the NRC, would be seen in the West as primarily

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‘compensation’ to Russia’s acquiescence for NATO enlargement, as occurred inthe past with the Founding Act and the PJC. NATO–Russia renewed partnershipcould thus be used as a weapon against Putin in the domestic battle, if he wasunable to provide evidence of concrete benefits and advantages.

The situation would be different if Russia became a full member of NATO. Atfirst sight, numerous factors seem to justify the full integration of Russia intoAtlantic structures. As a NATO member, Russia would no longer regard its ownsecurity as being under threat and as a consequence it would also view NATO’seastward expansion as a positive development. Moreover, this would symbolisethe ultimate stage of NATO’s transformation and the effective end of the ColdWar. In addition, it could eventually result in the end of the dominant role of theUnited States within the Alliance and the situation in Europe would be stabilised,Russia providing the counterbalance to the growing weight of a unitedGermany.131 However, a realistic assessment of this possibility attests to its lowfeasibility. To begin with, NATO countries are not interested in such a perspec-tive, at least until the situation in Russia becomes more stable, and especiallymore predictable. The problem is also that, in many instances, Russia is viewedas a Partner, not an Ally.132

Furthermore, Russia simply cannot be compared to most Central and EasternEuropean states which have rapidly acquired a certain stability and are alreadyfamiliar with democratic institutions. These countries have clearly identifiableproblems while Russia’s problems are considerable and too diffuse. Russia hasbeen the heart of an immense empire for centuries, it has a long history and acultural heritage. It has huge potential and a geostrategic position and cannotbecome a member of the European family overnight. Russia remains in transition,and while it increasingly shares many values with Western democracies, democ-ratisation is far from complete. Furthermore, the political elite and publicopinion of Central and Eastern Europe countries, unwilling to find themselvesonce again in Russia’s shadow even within NATO, would oppose the attributionof NATO membership to Russia. Finally, many sections of the Russian society –primarily the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Ministry ofForeign Affairs – are still against such a development. Nevertheless, as PhilipGordon noted:

Being unready for membership today is very different from beingrejected as a potential candidate for all time. The symbolic message of aNATO open to Russia would, at a minimum, underscore the point thatNATO has been trying to make for a long time, and that in the wake ofthe terrorist attacks may finally be sinking in – that NATO and Russiaboth need to get beyond the Cold War mindset and work together forpeace across the continent.133

The key issue is thus Russia’s relationship with NATO, not – at least for now –Russia’s role fully integrated within NATO.134 Nevertheless, the 11 September 2001

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terrorist attacks on the United States led to a turning point in relations betweenRussia and NATO.

Conclusion

To those who may argue that 10 years are not enough to draw firm con-clusions on what a relationship entails and what it is leading to, our study of the10-year-relationship between NATO and Russia shows, on the contrary, that muchcan be learnt from it. Of course, we may be lacking a bit of that distance that isnormally necessary to analyse events in the most objective manner. However, thelessons learnt from even the most recent developments in NATO–Russia relationsfollowing the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, if maybe not exhaustive, arealready very enlightening as to what these relations are made of, and how theymay develop in the future.

At the end of the Cold War, very few could predict what directionNATO–Russia relations would take, or if there would be any relations at all. Atthat time, both NATO and Russia were faced with a matter of survival. Russia, asthe main heir of the Soviet Union, had to ensure itself what could be regarded asa decent status on the international scene. This task was complicated by the factthat Russia no longer had the means to live up to its imperialistic/superpowerstandards, and that the acknowledgement of this weakened status implied thatRussia, just like any average power, associate itself with others.

NATO, on the other hand, had to find a raison d’être after the demise of itsenemy number one. This endeavour was complicated by the fact that NATOwould have to review downwards its collective defence nature and evolve towardsa more collective security posture,135 and that this evolution, to be successful inthe long term, would have to involve the former members of the Warsaw Pact,including Russia itself. These circumstances served as the basis for the beginningof relations between NATO and Russia, first through the PfP in 1994 until thesignature of the Founding Act and the creation of the PJC in 1997.

At that time, the reasons advocated to explain the failure of the PJC were thepeculiarities of the Russian identity and NATO’s inability to take them intoaccount. Above all, Russia did not accept being pushed into a status where it hadno say over NATO’s policies. The Kosovo conflict, and NATO’s neglect ofRussia’s standpoint in the resolution of the crisis, brought miscomprehensionbetween NATO and Russia to its paroxysm. Not only did Russia have some diffi-culties in accepting its loss of power and having to take orders from its formerenemy, but NATO member states also could not understand or believe in Russia’sconstant demand for equal partnership, fearing a Russian conspiracy to damagethe Alliance. The most striking point in these conflicting times between NATOand Russia is that the freeze of relations was the only thing that did not last.Russia’s participation in SFOR was maintained throughout the conflict; Russianforces soon joined NATO’s force in Kosovo; and contacts between the two partiesresumed hardly one year after they were interrupted.

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The events of 11 September 2001 and their subsequent positive consequenceson NATO–Russia relations could have come as a surprise. Without comparingthese circumstances to those of the Kosovo conflict, we could wonder how anexternal event could have such an opposite effect on NATO–Russia relations.Furthermore, how could certain experts still present the Russian identity as themain cause of failure in NATO–Russia relations if these took such a positive pathafter 11 September 2001? Indeed, one cannot say that the Russian identitysuffered such a shift between 1999 and 2001 that cooperation with NATOsuddenly appeared as feasible. In other words, identity cannot be the one elementthat once blocked any perspective of relations between NATO and Russia andnext made it possible. Other reasons must explain the difficulties that NATO andRussia encounter when interacting together. Richard Pipes looked at the role ofRussian identity in determining Russia’s future after the Cold War and then cameto the following conclusion:

Doubts linger because so much about post-communist Russia isunfinished and unsettled. Fledging democracy contends with ancientauthoritarian traditions; private enterprise struggles against a collectivistculture; frustrated nationalist and imperialist ambitions impede theenormous task of internal reconstruction. Russians, bewildered by thesuddenness and the scope of the changes they have experienced, do notknow in which direction to proceed. A veritable battle for Russia’s soulis in progress. Its outcome is of considerable concern to the rest of theworld, if only because Russia’s geopolitical situation in the heartland ofEurasia enables it, weakened as it is, to influence global stability.Whether it indeed joins the world community or once again withdrawsinto its shell and assumes an adversarial posture will be decided by anunpredictable interplay of domestic and external factors.136

It is probably more in this ‘interplay of domestic and external factors’ and theinteraction of individual interests between NATO and Russia, than in mere iden-tity or cultural clash, that we should find the explanation for such difficulties inbuilding cooperation between the two.

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6

RUSSIA’S PERCEPTION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

A case study

There is no problem in Europe that is not more manageablethrough Russian cooperation, and none that does not become moreintractable if Moscow finds its interests in ways that opposeWestern interests.1

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we concluded that the identity gap between Russia andNATO member states was not an obstacle to their relations. We also evoked thepossibility that conflict of interests between the two parties might be a moreplausible explanation. In order to test the validity of this assumption, there is nobetter way than to single out a situation in which Russia and NATO may haveopposed interests and to see to what impact this opposition has on their relations.

In this respect, NATO’s enlargement eastwards has long been presented as theone policy that Russia would never tolerate from the Alliance. More than NATO’sintervention in Kosovo, the question of enlargement drives a nail into fundamen-tal Russian interests. At the same time, it constitutes for NATO a matter of sur-vival. As mentioned earlier, NATO’s gradual transformation from an exclusivelycollective defence organisation into a collective defence and security institutionimplied the integration of former Warsaw Pact members. In this way, security inthe Euro-Atlantic area would be guaranteed by the assurance of the definiteremoval of the Soviet threat.

At the time when this research work was completed, NATO had alreadyengaged in a second wave of enlargement eastwards, with seven Central andEastern European countries – all former Warsaw Pact members – preparing fordefinite integration into the Alliance.2 Although this might well forebode the out-come of our present case study, we decided to focus only on the first wave ofenlargement eastwards, which led to the integration of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland into NATO in 1999. However, it is evident that our conclu-sions from this case study will be made bearing current developments in mind.

Again, it is the Russian approach – not that of the Alliance – that will beadopted when looking into this critical phase in NATO–Russia relations. Our first

goal will be to identify what the Russian reaction to NATO’s enlargement was,and what motivated this position. Special emphasis will be put on the analysis ofRussian interests when enlargement was first envisaged in 1994, and their evolu-tion throughout the enlargement process. Our second objective will be to assessthe effectiveness and the realism of the Russian policies developed in reaction toNATO’s decision. In so doing, we will have at heart either the confirmation orrefutation of the arguments that the perspective of NATO’s enlargement eastwardswould toll the bell of its relations with Russia.

Evolution of the Russian perception of NATO enlargement

The idea that the Central European countries should become members of NATOdid not even cross any Western leader’s mind in 1989, when all the communistregimes collapsed: the Soviet Union was still around, and its military mightappeared unshakeable. For the West, the immediate concern was to ensureSoviet approval for a reunified Germany in NATO.3 After gradual and cautiousrapprochement with the Alliance during the Gorbachev era, the new democraticRussia engaged itself in the framing of a strategic partnership with itsformer adversary. NATO’s enlargement first emerged as a key political issue inRussia in the aftermath of Yeltsin’s August 1993 visit to Warsaw. During his visit,President Yeltsin stated that he understood well enough Poland’s intention tointegrate with NATO structures. Many observers interpreted these words asRussia’s unconditional consent to Polish membership of NATO. However, in lightof the subsequent protests in Moscow, Yeltsin revised his position and retractedhis earlier declarations. In a letter sent to Western leaders in September 1993,Yeltsin stated that he opposed the eastward expansion of the Alliance and that thiswould provoke negative reactions in Russia. He also argued that enlargementwould be illegal in view of the terms of German unification.4

NATO’s decision on enlargement in December 1994 gave a new impetus to theRussian domestic debate on this issue.5 Some experts believed that enlargement wasinevitable and that Russia should acquiesce to this process on acceptable terms.According to them, NATO was likely to make the following concessions: the spread-ing out of the integration process in order to permit Russia to adapt itself to the newsituation; the provision of guarantees for Russian borders including that of theKaliningrad region; the commitment not to station any nuclear weapons systems andallied troops on the territory of the new member states in peacetime; the acceptancenot to conduct any military exercises on the territories adjacent to Russian borderswithout prior consultation with Moscow; Russia’s equal participation in military pro-curement for the former Warsaw Pact and new NATO candidate countries. In theseexperts’ views, these obligations should be legally binding and recorded in aNATO–Russia Treaty. However, this approach overlooked the fact that the applicantcountries were aspiring to full membership and would thus be reluctant to renounc-ing the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their territory.

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The publication of the NATO enlargement study6 in September 1995 alsocontributed to the intensification of anti-NATO rhetoric. In the view of theKremlin, the study appeared to completely ignore Russia’s interests and concerns.Furthermore, this publication coincided with the launch of the first large-scaleNATO offensive in history with the extensive bombardment of Serb installationsin Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia strongly criticised NATO’s increasingactivism and warned that it would have to reconsider its relationship with NATO,should the air strikes continue. Although the Dayton Peace accords of November1995 contributed to alleviating the Russian concerns and led to Russia’s decisionto participate in NATO’s IFOR, the operations in Yugoslavia had seriouslyaffected the Alliance’s image in Russia. In particular, its failure to consult withRussia over its actions and the conclusive evidence that it had ceased in practiceto subscribe to its proclaimed purely defensive functions stood as worryingdevelopments for Moscow and were taken as another instance of Western betrayaland duplicity.

In 1996 and 1997, NATO enlargement was the leading issue in Russia’srelations with the West. Russian opposition began to intensify in response to USSecretary of State Madeleine Albright’s strong support for NATO’s eastwardexpansion. As Laurence Black pointed out, ‘all political groups in Russia claimedthat their country had been stabbed in the back, or kicked when it was down, bya NATO that had promised not to do precisely what it was now doing’.7

On 24 January 1997, an anti-NATO association8 was formed within the Duma,gathering, in a few weeks, more than one hundred deputies. It more than doubledits membership in very short order. This raised the obvious concern that NATO’senlargement could be exploited by diehard nationalist forces against the Yeltsingovernment.9 Indeed, NATO’s expansion represented a defeat for Yeltsin’sstrategy of conciliation and reliance on the West:

Accordingly, a dominant note in Moscow discourse on NATO is thatRussia was compelled to accept something to which it had strenuouslyobjected. This usually makes for a politics of anguish and vindictiveness:somebody has to take the blame for defeat and something has to be donein response to the challenge. The opposition, naturally, blamed Yeltsinand his policy of reliance on the West. Yeltsin, just as naturally, has toblame the West and thus adopt more elements of the hardline analysisand programme. Under NATO pressure, he could ill afford to challengethe hardliners; indeed, he needed them to rally around the Kremlin.10

Given his precarious political situation and the need to preserve the support of theforeign-policy bureaucracy and the power ministries, Yeltsin could hardly ignorethe opinion expressed by his conservative establishment. In March 1997, hesummarised Russia’s position as follows: Russia remained opposed to NATOenlargement plans and especially to the possible eastward advance of theAlliance, which risked leading to a new confrontation. For the Russian leader, his

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political survival depended largely on his ability to provide evidence of thesuccess of engagement with the West. On the other hand, should his opponentsmanage to prove that his pro-Western policies were damaging for Russia, hispolitical career would be doomed to failure. In this very tense political atmos-phere, Yeltsin soon understood that he could use the nationalist card as leveragein his negotiations with the West, by showing that Russian pro-Western orienta-tion needed to be encouraged.11

Yeltsin warned that the NATO policy could provoke a backlash from Russiaand thus presented this state of affairs to his Western counterparts as a choicebetween the democrats and the reactionaries, between a government representingthe force of peace and the Red–Brown nationalist opposition, the party of war. Healso warned that even those political forces inclined to further engaging with theWest12 might be forced to adopt tougher policies and that Russia might betempted to revert to a more self-assertive or nationalist course if this permittedreviving its prestige and power.

Alarmed by Moscow’s growing opposition to enlargement, NATO sought torepair relations. The idea – mainly advocated by the Clinton Administration – wasto convince the Russian elite that it could build a partnership with NATO despiteits disagreement over enlargement. However, the simultaneous achievement of twoapparently mutually exclusive goals – NATO enlargement and the maintenance ofpartner relations with Russia – was far from easy. In the Russian view, a renewedNATO – Russia relationship was a separate issue that could never be traded againstenlargement. Furthermore, Moscow was still expecting clearly worded guaranteesfor Russia’s security regarding the non-expansion of the NATO military infra-structure eastwards and the non-deployment of Allied nuclear weapons and foreignforces on the territories of the prospective new member states.

The Kremlin also had at heart discussion of NATO’s progressive transforma-tion from a military alliance into a political organisation. Indeed, although offi-cially declared in Berlin in June 1996, NATO’s adaptation to the new securityenvironment was far from being implemented. According to the Russian leader-ship, such discussions should also permit the development of a joint approach toall European security-related issues, and allow joint-decision on issues of partic-ular interest to Russia on a basis of consensus. However, it soon became clear thatenlargement would proceed along NATO’s terms.13 Only this was viewed byRussia as a way for NATO to contain Russia’s political influence and prevent itfrom re-emerging as a strong regional power. The Founding Act was a poorcompensation insofar as NATO, the PJC notwithstanding, remained an organisa-tion where Russian opinion counted for little.14

Despite Russia’s fear of see its partnership with NATO be the price of enlarge-ment, the signing of the Founding Act did pave the way for NATO’s expansioneastwards. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Allied leaders formally invitedPoland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to start accession talks with theAlliance, to step across the old Yalta division and become NATO’s first inde-pendent new recruits from what was once Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, in

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time for its 50th anniversary in 1999. Russia accepted this enlargement, ‘albeitgrudgingly and conditionally’.15

In the perception of the Russian government and increasingly of the wholepopulation, a new world order was emerging while their country stood by ashelpless observer. Even the most outspoken Nationalists were caught off guard astheir most rhetorical predictions finally came true. For the Russian policy plan-ners, this meant rethinking their country’s place in this new world order. Theyobserved with fear the execution of NATO’s first out-of-area operations, whichthey considered to stand in full violation of international law and the structure ofthe UNSC. The old image of a rapacious West re-surfaced on Russian streets in away that was, this time, more spontaneous than orchestrated. NATO policy wasprobably not entirely responsible for this unfortunate state of affairs, becauseoverwhelming economic and political disarray are still the main sources ofRussian grievance. Yet NATO provided a convenient backboard against whichangry Russians of all strata could vent their spleen. At any rate, it is paramountto comprehend fully the Russian understanding of NATO expansion eastwards.

Why Russia opposed NATO’s enlargement

Russia’s strong objection to NATO’s enlargement created some nervousness in theWest. Some experts like Philip Zelikow interpreted this as the rebirth of a Russianimperialistic policy towards Central and Eastern Europe.16 Yet, this reaction mustbe put into perspective to be properly understood and assessed. A number of fac-tors contributed to hardening Russia’s stance vis-à-vis this eastward expansion ofthe Alliance. These include the terms of German unification;17 Russia’s loss ofsuperpower status; NATO membership for ex-USSR republics, especially theBaltic States and Ukraine; and domestic politics.

German unification and broken promises . . .

In 1989, in view of the unacceptability of German neutrality to the West, theSoviet government had initially put forward what it thought to be a compromisesolution: a dual German membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, withthe membership of NATO framed along the lines of the French status within theAlliance.18 The reasons that finally led the Soviet Union to concede to the inte-gration of a reunified Germany into NATO were diverse. First, the Soviet leader-ship soon realised that it could hardly prevent this process from happening andthat any confrontational attitude would be useless and self-defeating. Moreover,such an attitude would be in contradiction with Gorbachev’s New Thinking andhamper the rapprochement process between the East and the West. Second, theSoviet Union needed friendly relations with a Germany that now stood as a majorEuropean power; and in this context, it could not ignore the will of the Germans.19

Third, Moscow needed the West to take its interests and concerns into account.Actually, apart from security guarantees, the USSR desperately needed financial

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aid that the West was willing to offer for the pursuit of domestic reforms. Last butnot least, Soviet leaders aspired to the emergence of a new European order, basedon mutual trust and cooperation, a project to which any confrontational attitudewould again be detrimental.

Despite all these arguments, hardliners continued to oppose reunification ofGermany and its membership in NATO. In their opinion, Western economic aidin return for Moscow’s, acceptance of a reunified Germany within NATO couldnot guarantee Soviet security. However, these critical voices failed to change theofficial Soviet position, which was based on the pragmatic calculation of thecountry’s security and economic interests.

On 12 September 1990, the ‘Two Plus Four’ Treaty was signed in Moscowbetween the two German states and the four powers (the United States, the USSR,Great Britain and France). Clearly, the admission of a reunified Germany intoNATO precluded further enlargement since a provision of the internationaldeal foreclosed the stationing of foreign troops within the Federal Republic ofGermany (FRG)’s Eastern lands. Moscow agreed to this decision on theunderstanding that the West would not seek further expansion eastwards.20

Gorbachev would also later reiterate that Western leaders had then promisedto observe Russia’s geopolitical interests, to take its security into account andnot to put them under threat.21 Such assurances take on obligatory force indiplomatic practice and their revocation inevitably generates an atmosphere ofdistrust and suspicion. The question of whether such promises had been madewas the subject of considerable controversy. Nevertheless, as Jonathan Eyalpointed out:

Throughout this decade various Russian leaders have claimed with moreor less conviction that the Kremlin was promised by Germany’sChancellor Kohl that NATO would never expand in central Europe if aunited Germany were allowed to remain within the alliance. Germanofficials have repeatedly denied these allegations. The reality isprobably that both sides are at least partly right. Helmut Kohl did notformally promise anything about NATO’s future intentions. But at thesame time there is no doubt that the main thrust of the German–Sovietdiscussions – and, indeed, the discussions between the United States andthe Soviet Union at the time – was precisely in the direction of reassur-ing Moscow that its loss in central Europe would not be translatedinto a Western gain. From the east European perspective, informalreassurances are just as effective as treaties.22

Gorbachev himself later referred to his conversations with the Western statesmen,including German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, US President George Bush, and USSecretary of State James Baker. According to the former USSR president, the factthat the promises were not part of some written agreement was irrelevant sincethe expansion itself crudely violated the spirit of the Paris Charter.23

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Not surprisingly, there was a persistent consensus in Moscow that NATO’sstated intention of developing a genuinely cooperative partnership with Russiacould not be trusted since the Alliance had made promises, especially over theissue of enlargement, which it had then reneged upon.

Loss of superpower status and strategic isolation

After the sense that NATO could not be trusted, the second driving force behindRussia’s fierce opposition to NATO enlargement is the bitter Russian sense of lossof its superpower status – the feeling of being humiliated, driven out of Europeand outcast. Anything that was perceived as denying Russia a respectable place inan evolving European security space, or which relegated it to the sidelines ofEuropean developments and undermined attempts by Moscow to reassert itsinfluence on the Continent provoked a painful reaction in the Russian mind.Russia was still experiencing considerable difficulties in adapting itself to thecountry’s radically changed geopolitical situation.

The loss of superpower status and the sudden emergence of new states onRussia’s periphery were sources of considerable unease and confusion.24 Thispost-imperial frustration was exacerbated by the fact that Russia’s position withrespect to a number of traditional security parameters – such as access to the highseas and availability of critical resources, etc. – had significantly deterioratedwith the disintegration of the former USSR a decade ago. Furthermore, new prob-lems of the utmost sensitivity had emerged, and particularly the plight of tens ofmillions of ethnic Russians who suddenly found themselves living outside theircountry. All this reinforced Russia’s feeling of being marginalised both fromEurope and Asia. The former superpower was now facing exclusion from inter-national affairs. This relates to the ‘perception that the process of NATO enlarge-ment is symptomatic of a broader policy of undermining Russia’s capability topursue national objectives in its domestic, regional and international policies’.25

This fear of strategic isolation was as much psychological as geopolitical.Since 1992, Russians had been discovering that history was being made aroundtheir borders and those of the Soviet Union, but that it was no longer being madeby them. This was an extremely difficult reality for those people who continuedto view their country as a great power. Furthermore, one could not discount thehistorical consciousness behind this. Historically, Russian philosophers and his-torians had pondered their country’s place in Europe for centuries, some of themconsidering that Russia should expect rejection from a combined Europe. Tsaristideologies, in particular, laid a firm basis for a ‘them versus us’ approach longbefore the Marxist–Leninist assumptions that the world was divided into twoimmutably hostile camps, one capitalist and the other socialist.

The explanation that NATO’s expansion was the continuation of an historicalcontest between East and West might not be correct, but to humiliated Russiansit rings true. This discourse also refers to the definition of Russian national iden-tity. Since the fall of Marxism–Leninism, some Russian politicians have used the

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concept of the ‘Russian idea’ to provide both society and the political elites withsome intellectual support for building a foreign policy consensus.26 As LaurenceBlack explained:

Neo-communist and nationalist thinkers have used the concept to provideRussians with a sense of uniqueness and purpose, often explained inanti-Western syllogisms. Extremists quickly turn such views into xeno-phobic and messianic diatribe. In short the nineteenth-century debateamong Russian thinkers about the relative worth of Russian and Westerncultures – Slavophile vs. Westernizer – is back in Russian intellectualand political circles. For Westernizer, however, one can now read pro-American. The NATO question is peripheral of the philosophizing side ofthe debate, but often is seen as a symptom of Western distrust of Russia’scharacter. NATO expansion to the east had been the greatest obstacle inthe way of greater Russian integration with Europe. The NATO questiontook up so much diplomatic energy that it obscured such important issuesas expanding the mandate of the OSCE, Russian admission to the EU,and even the notion of any other basis for European security.27

The collapse of the USSR left Russians scrambling to resurrect their organichistory from the shadow into which the Communist Party of Soviet Union(CPSU) had cast it. Evidence that a Slavophile vision28 lurked beneath the surfaceof even the most openly Westernising groups emerged when the least aggressiveopponent of enlargement among Russia’s major political leaders, G. Yavlinskii,drew a parallel with German imperialism. For obvious reasons, the image of anew version of Drang nach Osten – German Drive to the East – comes quicklyand readily to the Russian mind. The origins of this term can be traced to the daysof Aleksander Nevskii who defeated the Teutonic Knights in 1242. More recently,it refers to the Nazi expansion into the USSR in 1941.29

Moreover, one should not forget that the majority of the Russian politicians andjournalists of the 1990s were products of the USSR. A mistrust of Western, espe-cially American motivation was inculcated in them during their childhood schooldays and in their early professional careers. The stereotypes learnt from the Sovietsystem of upbringing cannot be discounted fully unless there are compelling rea-sons to cast them aside. By the same token, Russia’s state of national humiliationmakes the search for scapegoats inevitable. The perception that NATO was at bestindifferent to Russia’s troubles, at worst delighted about them, was a psychologi-cal variable that happened to have enormous implications for European security.Not surprisingly, the NATO enlargement issue led to a sense of defeat among theRussian population and the political leadership.30

Altering the military balance

In the misfortune of the disappearance and the demise of the Warsaw Pact in1991, the liberation of Central and Eastern European countries from the yoke of

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Russia led to the creation of a de facto security buffer zone between Russia andNATO, that was finally perceived in Russia as the worst conceivable solution. Inthis context, the perspective of an integration of these countries into Euro-Atlanticinstitutions would not only deprive Russia of this security guarantee but might alsolead to the revival of old fears and play into the hands of militarists both in Russiaand NATO.31

While few people believed NATO was indeed planning large scale militaryaggression against Russia, the modernisation of Central and Eastern Europe’smilitary infrastructure was perceived as creating dangerous bridgeheads fromwhich massive air strikes could be launched against Russian targets. CentralEurope would now link the NATO northern (Norway) and southern (Turkey)flanks, making the expansion enormously important strategically even if troopcontingents from other countries are not stationed in Eastern European countries.Moreover, as Laurence Black stressed:

From the strategic perspective, the danger of new members makingfurther inroads against Russia was highlighted. Romania might make agrab for Moldova, for instance, and the Baltic States could follow theVisegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) into theAlliance, creating an insurmountable barrier between Russia and the restof Europe. NATO enlargement was already perceived, therefore, as thecreation of a buffer zone in reverse, a means to isolate the new Russiafrom continental Europe.32

The Russian leadership was convinced that the integration of East and CentralEuropean countries into NATO would not enhance their security. On the contrary,these countries might then be perceived as a potential threat to Russia’s nationalinterests and security.33 Some experts even invoked the logic of the securitydilemma in order to highlight that efforts to make Central and Eastern Europesecure would inevitably reduce Russia’s perceived security. Although Russia maynot pose a threat now, the expansion could induce her to adopt more aggressivepolicies.34

Russian concerns over the alteration of the global security balance were rein-forced by the perception that NATO’s strategy was notably intended to weaken oreven supplant Russian influence in its near abroad, particularly in the Balticregion and Ukraine.35 Central and Eastern European countries had never stoppedbeing the subject of Russia’s interests and, while Russia had finally cast aside itsformer imperialist policies, it could not ignore the fact that it was the biggest statein the Eurasian region.

Drawing a red line: the Baltic States and Ukraine

Russia’s national security concept, approved by Yeltsin on 17 December 1997,clearly stated that the prospect of NATO expansion to the East was unacceptable

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to Russia and represented a threat to its national security. Consequently, the factthat Russia vehemently opposed Baltic membership of NATO did not come as asurprise. On the other hand, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also posed particulardifficulties for the Alliance’s open door policy. Indeed, the Baltic region had atumultuous history, in the course of which Russia and key European powers hadcompeted simultaneously or consecutively for its strategic and ideological con-trol.36 Since their incorporation into the Russian empire at the end of the eigh-teenth century, the Baltic nations had been the subject of cultural oppression andsubstantial Russification. Their independence in the aftermath of First World Warwas of short duration and was gradually annihilated by the Molotov–RibbentropPact in 1939, subsequent Soviet annexation and the Yalta Accords in 1945. Thenew Baltic parliaments then requested inclusion of their states in the SovietUnion.

Despite decades of forced Sovietisation, the deportation and loss of tens ofthousands of Baltic citizens and the successive waves of Russian immigration, theBaltic republics had always viewed themselves as part of Western Europe andmaintained their sense of national identity and separateness; they finally regainedtheir independence and international recognition in 1991, following the failedAugust coup in Moscow. This background explained the feeling of fear that theleaders of the Baltic countries shared concerning Russia’s toehold in the region.37

In June 1996, President Yeltsin stated that Russia was willing to provide secu-rity guarantees to the Baltic States, jointly with NATO if necessary. However, hereiterated that even the hypothetical possibility of extending NATO’s sphere ofoperation to the Baltic states was out of the question and absolutely unacceptableto Russia. For their part, the three Baltic republics were only interested in secu-rity guarantees emanating from the West, not from Russia. In their view, mem-bership of NATO remained the only guarantee of their security and of stability inthe region. This was also seen through the prism of prospective Western invest-ment in the region, something that was hoped would counterbalance the stillstrong Russian economic predominance. Having said that, the Baltic Statesviewed NATO’s possible transformation into a political security organisation witha cautious eye. Indeed, they needed assurance that the defensive nature of theAlliance would continue to prevail in the near future. Likewise, they hoped thatRussia would not be given any role in NATO’s decision-making process thatmight affect Baltic security.38

As for the Russians, they had always believed, from the time of Peter the Great,that their natural Western borders were on the Baltic Sea, which provided themwith warm-water ports, a strategic position for the defence of northern Russia,and a window on Europe. During the Soviet era, the three Baltic States formed anintegral part of the USSR’s cordon sanitaire in the event of an attack from theWest, a fact which in itself helped to explain why Russia was far from keen at theprospect of any, if not all, of the Baltic republics becoming members of NATO.39

Obviously, there was a strong psychological dimension to the questions relatingto the territory of the former USSR.

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Furthermore, Moscow was preoccupied by more practical security issues such asaccess to the Baltic Sea, border disputes40 and the maintenance of ties with the strate-gically important Russian minorities (especially in Estonia and Latvia). The fact thatRussia had defined the Baltic region as part of its near abroad drew a red line throughany possible NATO enlargement to the region. The signing of the Charter ofPartnership between the United States and the Baltic States in January 1998 was thusseen in Moscow as another step towards Baltic entry into the Alliance. In reply, theState Duma passed a resolution urging the president and the government to work outa programme to counter NATO’s expansion. While NATO enlargement is the singleissue that looms largest over the Baltic region, there were issues which, while notdirectly related to NATO’s enlargement, posed problems between the Baltic countriesand Russia and needed to be addressed separately. Among these figured the Russianminorities issue, but also the case of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

Kaliningrad Oblast, a small piece of Russian territory sandwiched betweenPoland and Lithuania, posed a special problem. Formerly part of East Prussia, theenclave had been part of Russia since the end of the Second World War and its nativepopulation was overwhelmingly Russian. The planned NATO enlargement – aswell as that of the EU41 – seriously complicated Kaliningrad’s special geopoliti-cal situation, insofar as it would completely isolate the enclave from the Russianmainland, and surround it with new NATO members. Kaliningrad’s strategic andpsychological importance – the latter perhaps not immediately obvious – largelyoutweighed other aspects.42 Indeed, given both its physical and population size, itwould be fallacious to suggest that the Oblast was vital to the economic well-being of Russia. Even its pure military importance needed to be relativised.43

In other words, regardless of the existence of the Kaliningrad enclave, Russiaremained a major power in the Baltic region, a status that it had enjoyed for over300 years and would be quite reluctant to give up. In this context, Russia’s pres-ence in the Baltic States could not be conditional. As an expert noted, ‘by geog-raphy, history and culture, Russia has been there, is there and will continue to bethere for a good number of reasons’.44

The interpretation of Russia’s relationship with Ukraine should not be limitedto that of a power trying to exert influence on its neighbour for its own purposes.The two states not only shared a long common history, but Russia also felt emo-tionally linked to Ukraine, insofar as it found its historical origins in the ancientKievan Rus’. Therefore Russia and especially the Russian leadership found it dif-ficult to accept the developments following the disintegration of the USSR. Therewas a clear perception that Ukraine was seeking to establish a foreign policy thatwas independent from Moscow. Not surprisingly, the country’s attempts to estab-lish a West-orientated policy were considered by the Russian political elite andmost of the population as a betrayal of their common history. Furthermore,Ukraine’s immediate post-independence situation was extremely uncertain. Manyhad predicted, even desired, that Ukraine would reunite with Russia, and many inUkraine feared that it would not be able to withstand the political, economic andindustrial might of the big brother.45

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The relationship with Ukraine reached an all-time low in the course of thenegotiations for the revision of the Black Sea Fleet and for the rights of station-ing armed forces in the Crimean peninsula. In both fields, Kiev demonstrated itsautonomy. It was only when Russia started to exert growing economic pressurethat Ukraine agreed to soften its position. The NATO–Ukraine Charter and theimproved relations with the European Union reflected Ukraine’s ambitions todefend its interests and to demonstrate its independence from the RussianFederation. The foundation of the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan andMoldova (GUUAM) alliance,46 designed to curb Russia’s influence on the suc-cessor states of the former USSR, should be considered in the same context. InMoscow, this was obviously considered as a hostile organisation acting againstthe interests of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine’s approach towards NATO fundamentally reflected its overall foreignand security policies aimed at seeking closer ties with the West while being mind-ful of its continued dependence on Russia. Since independence, Ukraine hadsought to benefit from both the West and Russia, while looking for opportunitiesto bolster Ukraine’s sovereignty. As Jonathan Eyal wrote:

For quite some time Ukraine opposed NATO’s enlargement principallybecause it feared the effects of a potential Russian backlash. TheUkrainian position has undergone some subtle changes, but the authori-ties in Kiev have ultimately concluded that NATO’s enlargement can beto their advantage. An alliance bordering Ukraine is the best proofUkraine has that its survival as an independent state is now of crucialimportance to the rest of Europe. The main problem for the West is howto make it clear to Ukraine that the country’s viability ultimately dependsjust as much on what the Ukrainians accomplish at home, particularly ineconomic reform. Maintaining a balance between sustaining Ukrainepolitically and simultaneously urging the country’s leaders to take chargeof their own affairs will not be easy.47

Therefore, unlike Russia, Ukraine welcomed the idea of NATO’s enlargement.Unlike President Yeltsin, President Kravchuk never opposed the expansion of theAlliance or the possibility of future NATO membership for Ukraine. On thecontrary, the Ukrainian president tended to favour military cooperation withEuro-Atlantic security structures at the expense of other cooperation opportuni-ties with Eurasian structures such as within the CIS Collective Security Treaty. Inthis context, Kiev paid utmost attention to NATO–Russia relations. Indeed, theUkrainian view was that NATO–Russia rapprochement might soften Moscow’sstance with regard to a developing NATO–Ukraine relationship. Reciprocally,should Russia–NATO relations break down and Moscow vehemently opposeUkraine’s integration efforts long before its making any robust inroads into NATOstructures, Ukraine would be compelled to sideline its NATO membershipambitions.

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On the Western side, despite Ukraine’s pro-NATO policy, the Alliance initiallypaid little attention to the country and its security concerns. Russia remainedthe Allies’ focal point of attention, something that only further raised Ukrainiansecurity concerns. This lack of Western interest added to the necessity of pursu-ing close economic and political links with Russia – especially in energy andtrade matters – making it difficult for Ukraine to embark on a strict pro-Westernpath. For Russia, this was a very effective way of hindering its neighbour’s Euro-Atlantic integration and of increasing its dependence on Russia.48

According to Russian geopolitical thinking, maintaining Ukraine within itssphere of influence was crucial to ensuring Russia’s predominant role on thecontinent and to a greater extent to rebuilding its superpower status. Ukraine notonly fell within the Russian sphere of interests, but also soon became the mostimportant country of the post-Soviet area.49

When the question of the West’s stake in the security of the Baltic States andUkraine arises, ‘an uncomfortably large percentage of politicians, significantportions of the media, and even some parts of the policy-making communityinstinctively viewed Western policies as not merely ill-advised or insensitive toRussian concerns but as aimed at diminishing or endangering Russia’.50 Notsurprisingly, as NATO representatives continued to declare that the issue ofNATO expansion was already predetermined and remained out of Russia’s scope,Russia felt constrained to take certain steps in order to protect its own interests.

Russia’s countermeasures

NATO’s decision to enlarge was followed by a series of formal statements byRussia expressing its opposition and pointing to countermeasures including newstrategic directions based on multipolarity; military integration within the CISand the Slavic Union; and abandonment of arms control agreements.

The multipolar world and new strategic partners

Once Russia recognised that it could not stop enlargement and that its position onthis process could hardly bear any influence, it sought to ‘limit it numerically andgeographically and hollow it out militarily’.51 NATO’s expansion forced Russia tore-examine its entire foreign policy, including the initiation of negotiations withother states such as China and India.52 Until late 1996, this policy remainedhesitant.53 It was then gradually integrated into a broader political approach inwhich the United States would not be the single dominant power. This idea of anew multipolar world54 was partly rhetorical, in that it helped President Yeltsin’steam to alleviate the sentiment of humiliation conveyed by Washington’s attitude,and appealed to Russia’s nationalists. In December 1998, Russian Prime MinisterPrimakov suggested the creation of a Moscow–Beijing–Delhi strategic triangle.The idea was not to create a military block but rather to build a diplomatic andeconomic counterweight to the current unipolar US-dominated world.

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NATO’s air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999 marked the firstmanifestation of a combined response by Russia, China and India to an interna-tional crisis. They subsequently announced that they would coordinate theirefforts to seek peaceful solutions to the Balkan dismantlement. While imple-menting this doctrine, Primakov not only gained internal approval for his policies,he also introduced a well-founded justification for them that gathered support forits key positions such as the rapprochement with China. He also provided newand more viable grounds for imparting an ideological dimension to the competi-tion with Washington and a good cover for regional involvement in Asia.

The Sino-Russian partnership was also linked to important economic andpolitical reasons. From an economic perspective, China and India – but alsoIran55 – were very valuable markets for Russian military weapons; India and Iran,in particular, were consumers of Russian nuclear technology.56 The Indo-Russiantechnical military agreement was finalised at a meeting held in Moscow on 5–6October 1997. Russian policy based on the principles of multipolarity and con-structive or strategic partnership gave these countries opportunities to get accessto certain types of sophisticated technologies which were denied to them in theWest for political reasons. From a political perspective, this common battleagainst NATO’s enlargement was fought in Cold War language and image-making.The agreement signed between Russia and China on 23 April 1997 was presentedto the media as a new partnership for the twenty-first century and includedstrongly worded criticism of NATO’s enlargement. Yeltsin and Jiang Zeming re-emphasised the prominent role of the UNSC and reaffirmed their oppositionto a world increasingly dominated by the United States. Moscow defined thisaccord as a step towards a multipolar world and a positive alternative to a lingeringCold War syndrome. To many, this was a direct consequence of NATO’s inter-vention in an out-of-area regional conflict and of its expansion eastwards.

Obviously, we cannot deny that both sides embraced a range of common inter-ests. The two countries were pursuing the same strategy for achieving long termsecurity within their immediate region. Russia was trying to create a peaceful andstable environment on its periphery, while China wanted to establish a good-neighbour zone around its territory. In purely geostrategic terms, Russia andChina shared a strong interest in preserving stability in the regions along theircommon border.57 Furthermore, the two countries also shared many interests inthe Central Asian region. China hoped to develop friendly and mutually beneficialrelations with the newly independent Central Asian States. As for Russia, it soughtto maintain strategic axes to Central Asia, through multilateral mechanisms suchas the Shangai Five,58 the Treaty of the Four59 or the ASEAN Regional Forum,60

but also through bilateral arrangements with key states such as Kazakhstan andArmenia. Russia and China, as large continental powers with abundant resources,were likely to have roughly similar interests with regard to economic and strate-gic developments in the region. In this regard, the Chinese leadership wasunlikely to object to any future Russian moves aimed at promoting politicalstability and economic normalisation in the Central Asia region. Finally, in the

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sphere of international security, Russia and China could indeed, by workingtogether, exert enormous influence on the evolution of a multipolar internationalsecurity structure. Both hoped to carve out a position of influence largely inde-pendent of predominant Western security arrangements.61

And yet, one should bear in mind that China remained a great uncertainty inRussia’s security environment. Despite this new cooperative and strategic part-nership, China’s military build-up, geostrategic situation and unsettled territorialdispute with Russia made it almost impossible for Moscow to exclude any threatwhatsoever from that direction.62 For their part, the Chinese leaders were per-fectly aware of the fact that Russia might use their country as a bargaining chipwith Europe. At the same time, on the level of practical policy, China could try toplay the Russian card in its complicated relations with its Western partners.63

Although Moscow and Beijing seemed to speak a common language, there werethus clear limits to this solidarity.64

In addition, the two countries had different views on key Asian matters. WhileChina expressed concern over the April 1996 Japan–US Security Treaty, Russiakept responding to Japan’s moves towards closer relations. Second, Russian diplo-macy and media exaggerated chances for a triangular Russian–Chinese–Indianrelationship to restrain US world hegemony. Although Indo-Chinese dialoguehad resumed and both sides were willing to improve their bilateral relations,Chinese leaders were quick to protest. After all, only six months earlier India hadbecome a nuclear power with the justification that it needed these weaponsbecause of the threat from China, as well as its dispute with Pakistan. Indo-Chinese rivalry was too deep and extensive to be overcome by such transparentmeans. Therefore the potential of such a triangle was not to be overestimated:65

cooperation was handled pragmatically and limited to concrete fields of sharedinterests.

Russia’s and China’s perceptions of their bilateral relations also differedsubstantially. While Russia was trying to convert common interests into somekind of mutual and binding cooperation, China preferred a multilateral approachconfined to the framework of the rather abstract 1997 Declaration on MultipolarWorld. It was also ready to support multilateral security arrangements, but onlyin the framework of inter-state Asian organisations. The partnership betweenRussia and China resulted in only very modest exchanges of support on regionaland international issues. For example, China’s opposition to NATO expansion waslargely symbolic and did not evoke the passion it aroused in Moscow. It was onlywhen the Kosovo operation started in apparent defiance of UN mandates thatChina began to share Russia’s fear of the NATO enlargement process. Theunfortunate bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999 furtherintensified this sentiment.66 Added to NATO’s perceived breach of UN rules, thisincident was another illustration of what actions an enlarged NATO could under-take against non-member nations and especially possible rivals.

Even though they officially attacked US policy in their joint commitment toan anti-hegemonic stance in world politics, matters essentially stopped there.

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For sure, there was no sign of a pledge of future military support for each otherin the case of conflict.67 As in the past, China rejected the idea of entering into anexclusive alliance with any power or group of powers. By the same token, Russiafocused on both the West and the East to preserve its status of essential actor inworld security affairs. Both were perfectly aware that ‘an exclusive alliance wouldserve the long term interests of neither since it would provoke other nations intodeveloping a hostile stance towards them, and would run counter to the interestsof stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region and globally’.68

In the end, the strategic partnership did not amount to a closely coordinatedpolicy and did not impose any obligations on either side in its dealings with thirdcountries. Many of their joint statements on international affairs were only decla-rations of their interests and intent. The significance of this relationship should beneither exaggerated nor dismissed. The most likely future of the relationship isthat Russia and China will continue to deepen their cooperation. In the words ofSherman Garnett:

Each will see bilateral ties not as a grand alliance or an alternative to tieswith the United States and the West, but rather as something thatincreases its own options. Political linkages, growing economic ties, andarms sales give the relationship durability. Yet substantial constraintswill allow the evolving relationship to go only so far.69

Undoubtedly, the Russian government did not expect to resurrect a defensive blocin the spirit of the Warsaw Pact. These multilateral agreements were also drivenby reasons that were more compelling than NATO expansion, including the needfor trade, arms market requirements and Caspian Sea oil concerns. In terms ofsecurity, the Kremlin strongly believed that Russia’s security could not be dis-associated from good relations with China, India and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the importance accorded to preserving relationswith the West would in the end undermine Russia’s strategic partnership withChina.70

Despite various grievances against the United States, both Russia and Chinavalued their relationship with the superpower more highly than their bilateralentente. For Russia, the United States was essential in its efforts to attract foreigninvestment and continued support from international financial institutions. As forChina, despite its frequent disagreements with US policy, its political and espe-cially economic relations with Washington71 are more important than anyprospects of an alliance with a troubled and at present relatively weak Russia.72

In the post-Cold War international security setting, Russia will, as it has forcenturies, look to the East as well as to the West to safeguard its vital nationalsecurity interests. Cooperation with China and Central Asian states in all spheres isa necessary element in the perspective of its self-preservation and self-enhancement.The causal drive behind Sino-Russian relations was, and will continue to be, theprotection of the national interests of each. Both Russia and China have a vested

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interest in securing cooperative bilateral relations with each other over thelong term. The existing distribution of capabilities also generated incentives forcooperation between them. The current international system is unambiguouslyunipolar, and as Kenneth Waltz stressed, ‘in international politics, overwhelmingpower repels and leads other states to balance against it’.73 Countries like Russiaand China want to counterbalance US hegemony in order to strengthen multipo-lar and multilateral tendencies in the world. Many Russian and Chinese expertsargued that, just as NATO was instrumental in imposing American will onWestern Europe during the Cold War, it could likewise permit the United Statesto extend its influence to Eastern Europe. NATO enlargement could be seen aspart of the United States’ overall strategy to preserve its global preponderance andthe unipolar world that emerged in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise.

However, in a unipolar structure, counterbalancing is almost impossible toachieve and is often doomed to permanent failure. To be effective, counter-hegemonic alliances must not merely content with the existing pro-USbandwagon.74 They must be reliably binding; should aggregate economic poten-tial into the concrete capabilities necessary to be a pole; and permit the mergingof armed forces, defence industries and strategic decision-making.75

This is indeed the fate that befell Russia and China when they tried tocounterbalance. Notably absent was any willingness on either part to accept anysignificant political or economic costs in countering US power. TheBeijing–Moscow strategic partnership did not entail any costly commitments orserious risks of confrontation with the United States. Their policy was mainly oneof ambiguity: to talk about creating a counterbalance while working with theUnited States on important issues. Their promotion of multipolarity as a govern-ing principle of international relations was merely a means to pursue concretenational interests, and to get the best bargains given the distribution of power. Indoing this, they advocated foreign policies not limited to a single direction or areaof concern but active in all areas.

The multipolar world and the evolution of Russia’s security concepts

On 21 April 2000, President Putin signed a decree approving a New MilitaryDoctrine. The document, which replaces one approved by former President Yeltsinin 1993 is a revised version of the blueprint published in the official DefenceMinistry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on 9 October 1999. In this document, themilitary security of the Russian Federation rests upon strategic, political and eco-nomic factors. Therein, the threats to the military security of the country areassessed as having clearly increased since 1993. Although there is no explicitmention of the threat posed by the United States or by NATO expansion, the doc-ument refers to the expansion of military blocs and alliances as detrimental toRussia’s military security. In addition, NATO’s actions are indirectly criticisedwhen listing actions characterised as destabilising the political–military situation,

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such as the use of military measures as a means of humanitarian interventionwithout UNSC sanction in circumvention of generally accepted principles andnorms of international law. According to Henrikki Heikka:

If the unipolar ambitions of the US are seen as the main threat to thestability of the international system, then the attempts by Russia’s Balticneighbours to gain formal security guarantees from NATO are not per-ceived by Moscow primarily as a regional security problem, but as anintegral part of the most important threat to Russia’s national security.76

To sum up, the New Doctrine reflects a gloomier and more militarised world-view than the previous one. This more assertive doctrine can be regarded as areaction to the continuing decline of Russia’s standing in international politics.This is particularly apparent in the paragraph addressing the lowering of thedeployment threshold of nuclear weapons:

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons inresponse to an attack on itself or its allies by nuclear weapons or otherweapons of mass destruction, and also in response to large scale attackby conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security ofthe Russian Federation.77

This new nuclear policy can also be found in the New National SecurityConcept78 approved by President Putin on 10 January 2000 in replacement of theNational Security Concept79 signed by President Yeltsin in December 1997.While recognising that the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia in theforeseeable future is practically absent, the document underlines that Russia hasto conduct its policy from a position of relative weakness. In other words, theweakening of the Russian Federation justifies the repositioning of nuclear armsas the only guarantee of security.80

In this context, nuclear deterrence becomes the most important task of theRussian armed forces. One of the major changes in Russia’s declared nuclear pos-ture is probably the reconsideration of the long disregarded option of nuclear firststrike.81 However, the new nuclear policy does not define the use of nuclearweapons clearly,82 nor does it specify whether nuclear weapons are to be consid-ered instruments of war-prevention or war-fighting.83 Indeed, according to theNew National Security Concept, ‘all forces and facilities available, includingnuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all othermeans of resolving the crisis have been exhausted or have proved to be ineffec-tive’. In the 1997 version of the National Security Concept, this article read dif-ferently: ‘Russia reserves the right to use all forces and means at its disposal,including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to thevery existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state’. Thismeans that nuclear weapons are no longer reserved solely for extreme situations

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as in the event of a threat to Russian national survival, but can also potentially beused in a small-scale war that does not necessarily threaten Russia’s existence.These formulations thus show that Russia is trying to compensate its conventionalweakness by moving beyond a nuclear doctrine based exclusively on deterrence.

In both documents, the motives of the West with respect to NATO enlargement,Kosovo, or missile defence are – at least implicitly – condemned, and militaryforce is still presented as by far the most relevant instrument of power in interna-tional relations. As a consequence, the level and posture of the military potentialof the state is to be enhanced to a sufficiently high level. Thus, while the 1993Military Doctrine mainly consolidated the view of Russia as a regional hegemon,the New Military Doctrine and the New National Security Concept both reflect aconsensus on the imperative to counterbalance Western power in order to promotea multipolar international system.

CIS military integration and the Slavic Union

On many occasions, Russia had warned that any NATO enlargement would notonly entail stronger alliances with other countries in Eastern asia, but also withits existing partners within the CIS. Russia had a specific agenda with respect tothe CIS, which represented Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence. Indeed,Moscow believed that it had more chances than anyone else to contain instabili-ties in that region. However, its efforts to promote integration with the formerSoviet republics raised apprehension in those nations, where Russia was sus-pected of turning the CIS into its ‘velvet empire’. Such a suspicion existed evenmore so in the light of Russia’s obvious inclination to treat the CIS as its exclu-sive zone of influence to which other international actors should be denied orenjoy significantly limited access. This revived interest in the CIS area was notwithout risk for European security. On the one hand, this had the potential todestabilise the whole region, something that would have implications forEuropean security. On the other hand, if successful, these efforts might resurrectthe Cold War division of Europe. Moreover, Moscow’s insistence only furtherenticed the CIS countries to distance themselves from Russia. As RolandDanreuther underscored:

It is however, in Russia’s relations with the CIS countries, and its failureto construct a countervailing CIS alliance against NATO, that the limita-tions of Moscow’s anti-NATO policies have been more apparent. As ageneral rule, the greater the pressure that Moscow applied on other CISstates to oppose NATO, the more these countries sought closer coopera-tion with NATO. Most CIS countries refused to adopt the requisite anti-NATO stance.84

The only exception to this complete failure of Russia’s foreign policy wasBelarus. Minsk had indeed adopted a suitably anti-Western posture and sought

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full integration with Russia. A joint statement issued by Yeltsin and BelarusPresident Lukashenko on 7 March 1997 showed that opposition to NATO’sexpansion was an essential factor in negotiations about further rapprochementbetween the two countries.85

And yet, any integration with Belarus and further association with the author-itarian and vehemently anti-Western Belarussian President AlexanderLukashenko, could be more a hindrance than an advantage to Russia. Indeed, thiswould mean that the Russian leadership would have to turn a blind eye to theBelarus president’s dictatorial rule.86 In addition, considering Lukashenko’smachiavelism, it was quite likely that Belarus would in the end try to evadeRussia’s overall dominance within the Slavic Union. In the end, the Russianattempt to build a countervailing anti-NATO alliance within the CIS has beenprimarily notable for its failure.

Arms control: the CFE and START agreements

Enlargement was also presented as a threat to the existing and prospective arms-control agreements, such as START II and the Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE) Treaty. Since June 1993, Moscow had insisted on the review of theflanks limits of the CFE Treaty, which restricted the number of Russia’s conven-tional weapons in strategically important areas – the Leningrad and the NorthCaucasian military districts. The war in Chechnya made this problem even moreurgent for Russia. In February 1997, NATO proposed the elimination of theanachronistic CFE framework in favour of a new structure replacing the old 1990NATO–Warsaw Pact Treaty’s group limits in favour of national and territorialceilings. Moreover, in order to ensure interoperability with the Alliance, aspirantcountries were building smaller armies more in line with those of the westEuropeans. The combination of these lower national force levels and NATOadditional members was still below the authorised force level under the CFEmechanism.87

These proposals, however, fell short of Russian calls for a complete ban ofpermanent stationing of all ground and air CFE-regulated equipment outside theterritory of present NATO members, as well as for binding guarantees against thedeployment of nuclear weapons.

At that time, Russia was also engaged with the United States in a processaimed at drastically reducing their respective strategic nuclear weapons. TheSTART I, signed in July 1991 and in force since 1994, aimed at reducingdeployed strategic weapons of both sides from well over 10,000 to 6,000. Duringthe Washington Summit of June 1992, Yeltsin agreed with Bush to reduce strate-gic weapons well below START I ceilings and proposed the reduction of nuclearwarheads of long-range missiles to between 3,000 and 3,500 and the signing ofthe START II Treaty for such a reduction.88

However, NATO’s expansion reinforced the value of nuclear deterrence inthe Russian military mind, thereby reducing the odds of a ratification of the

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START II Treaty by the Duma.89 The military then pointed out that enlargementwould not only increase the military potential of the Alliance and the existingimbalance of conventional forces in Europe, but also NATO’s ability to strikeRussia’s strategic facilities with tactical aircraft. Although Moscow had reaffirmedthe general reorientation of Russia’s threat perception over the past few years –from the West to the South – and recognised the impossibility of a conventional ornuclear war with NATO, this position was not definite and could be reconsideredin light of NATO’s enlargement and/or NATO’s use of force outside its area ofresponsibility. By the same token, all arms control agreements between Russiaand NATO/USA could be at stake.90 The reality, however, proved to be different.On 14 April 2000, the Duma finally ratified START II.91 Shortly thereafter, theUnited States and Russia indicated that they were prepared to engage in START IIInegotiations to further reduce strategic weapons to 2,000–2,500.

The evolution of the arms control negotiations between Russia and the West isa clear example of the limits of Russia’s margin of action against the West’s pol-icy in general, and NATO’s enlargement in particular. Although at first resolute touse the arms control treaties as a leverage against NATO’s initiative, Russiafinally found itself with no other alternative but to pursue, and even enhance, thearms reduction process. This tactical failure adds up to the other vain measuresthat Russia had resorted to in order to counter NATO’s expansion eastwards.Soon, cooperation appeared to be the only possible framework for NATO–Russiarelationship.

Opting for cooperation

In choosing cooperation despite the circumstances, the Russian leadershipdemonstrated that it had learnt the lessons from the past. Russia’s confrontationalposture during the first round of enlargement proved to be vain and extremelydamaging to Moscow. It only pushed Central and Eastern states further towardsNATO and marginalised Russia from its near abroad. President Putin’s early state-ments thus asserted that Russia would no longer rely on extreme countermeasures –even in the case of accession of the Baltic states – since such a policy would becounterproductive and would jeopardise Russia’s crucial interests. The Kremlinhad finally accepted – although reluctantly – that it had neither the power nor theinfluence to oppose NATO membership for aspirant countries. The experience ofthe past years had also progressively proven to many in Russia that they could livewith an enlarged NATO. This was notably reflected in the recent improvement inRussia’s relations with the former Warsaw Pact and new NATO member states.92

In addition, there were now more pressing issues for the Russian foreign policyelite, including the reinforcement of control over regions; the protection of terri-torial sovereignty threatened by the Chechen conflict; and, of course, economicconsiderations depending inter alia on increased Western investment. We shouldalso bear in mind that a successful relationship with NATO would only be praisedif beneficial for the Russian Federation. A positive dialogue with the Alliance

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could also partly contribute to the building of a strategic partnership with theUnited States which is now viewed by the Russian leadership as predominant.Nevertheless, any faux pas or a persistent low-profile status could be easily usedas a weapon in domestic politics. Russian power ministries and especially themilitary establishment are still very sceptical about any renewed partnership withNATO. As Dmitri Trenin observed:

President Putin’s decision not to challenge the West on traditional geopo-litical issues rests on high pragmatic calculations related to Russia’s eco-nomic needs and on the realization that defending the indefensible is alost cause. However, much of the foreign and defence establishment andthe public at large are less visionary. To them, the West remains deviousand their own leadership is hopeless naïve not to oppose further Allianceenlargement, with the result that Russia is gradually being encircled byNATO. The critics need to be convinced that the country’s interests arestill taken care of.93

Conclusion

We started this case study with the aim of assessing to what extent potentialconflict of interests between NATO and Russia may constitute a more plausibleexplanation of the difficulties encountered by the two parties when attempting tointeract together. In this respect, the question of NATO’s enlargement eastwardsappeared as a relevant matter for analysis.

Beyond the sole anti-NATO feelings that persisted within the Russian popula-tion in the early 1990s, the perspective of NATO’s enlargement posed more seri-ous problems in terms of Russian power over the former Soviet sphere ofinfluence, and the consequent impact that this would have on its status on theinternational scene and on its foreign policy priorities and strategy. In the Russianview, NATO’s enlargement would be another step towards the establishment of aunipolar world, in which the Alliance would act as an instrument of Americanglobal hegemony. Such a perspective was in total contradiction with Moscow’saspirations for a multipolar world, in which the United Nations and the OSCEwould be the only institutions of reference. Furthermore, Russian strategistsfeared that NATO’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe might underminetheir country’s influence over the former Warsaw Pact area. In their view, such apolicy from NATO member states was mainly directed at further isolating Russiafrom the international arena. For their part, NATO Allies never doubted thatenlargement would have a powerful impact on Russia and Russian politics. On thecontrary, the decision to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe was made in fullknowledge of a strong reaction from Russia.

At that time, all Russian political decisions were made in reaction to NATO’senlargement. From the tentative strengthening of the CIS, the contingency part-nerships with China, India and Iran, to the adoption of new security and military

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concepts, all these decisions aimed at counterbalancing NATO’s expansion. Inaddition, our analysis also revealed that the extent of Russian opposition toNATO’s enlargement was largely motivated by domestic reasons. In other words,if we cannot deny that NATO’s enlargement did run counter to some of Russianinterests, the strength with which Russian opposition was expressed largely aimedat securing the internal political stability of the country, and assuring the Russianpublic opinion that its fears and expectations were still fully taken into account bythe leadership. Changing policies and adopting new ones does not happen inone day; it requires a sufficient level of consensus between a government and itselectorate:

In the world of practical politics, however, even the most powerfulimperatives are not recognized immediately or fully if they involve sharpdepartures from the past. Redirecting the thoughts and emotions of largenumbers of people usually requires substantial time and often a crystal-lizing crisis. Fundamental changes in security policy can occur only if anew consensus is formed.94

If consensus between the leadership and its population is essential for a shift inpolicies to be successful, it is also imperative for two parties engaging in relationstogether to agree on some kind of common ground on which they will be able tobase these relations. In the case of enlargement, it first seemed impossible thatNATO and Russia would find such a common ground. Individual interests werethen too conflicting for this to happen, and, inevitably, enlargement did affectNATO–Russia relations. However, individual interests are never fixed. A giveninterest can even vary in importance depending on circumstances and on otherinterests that may motivate a country at exactly the same time. In the context ofNATO’s first enlargement eastwards, Russia was soon faced with a difficultchoice between two different interests. On one hand, Russia intended to maintaininfluence over its near abroad; on the other, it attached the utmost importance toits rapprochement with the West and to its inclusion in the new internationalorder. When the Kremlin finally realised its powerlessness vis-à-vis NATO’sexpansion, it nevertheless decided to maintain its relations with the Alliance. Thisis simply the result of a change in Russia’s priority interests. Maintaining rela-tions with NATO, and through it, with the West in general, appeared of greaterimportance than the fight for outdated policies or a lost cause. This point wasmore recently corroborated by President Putin’s reaction to the announcement ofthe second wave of NATO’s enlargement eastwards. While not denying his oppo-sition to enlargement in principle, President Putin also made it clear that Russia’sinterests rested primarily on the pursuit of good relations with the West, and inparticular with NATO.

Against this background, we can conclude that, if individual interests of NATOand Russia can sometimes be conflicting and can indeed hamper their relations,the ability of NATO and Russia to work on their common interests will prove to

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be beneficial to each of them and to their relations. Beyond enlargement, Russiadid not want to be excluded from the international scene. Regardless of enlarge-ment, NATO member states did not want to break off relations with Russia. It isthis common ground that permitted the two to survive the enlargement trial andtake their relationship forward. Robert Jervis aptly described this mechanism bywhich powers have to moderate their individual interests for their cooperativerelations to be optimised:

They did not seek to maximize their individual power positions, they didnot always take advantage of others’ temporary weaknesses and vulner-abilities, they made more concessions than they needed to, and they didnot prepare for war or quickly threaten to use force when others wererecalcitrant. In short, they moderated their demands and behavior as theytook each other’s interests into account in setting their own policies.95

For such a relationship to develop into true and equal cooperation, it remains tobe seen what cooperative arrangements would best fit both Russia and NATO.

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7

THEORIES OF COOPERATION

We shall see how the counsels of prudence and restraint maybecome the prime agents of mortal danger; how a middle courseadopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found tolead direct to the bull’s eye of disaster. We shall see how absoluteis the need of a broad path of international action pursued by manystates in common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flowof national politics.1

Introduction

Our analysis of this first decade of NATO–Russia relations has shown to whatextent cooperation between these two parties was not to be taken for granted – tothe contrary, it required a great deal of adjusting and concessions on both sides tobecome viable. And yet, this analysis further confirmed the assumption thatcooperation between NATO and Russia is not only possible but can even meet theindividual interests of both. At this stage, the question is thus no longer to provethe utility and the necessity of such cooperation, but to identify the model basedon which it could best develop. NATO already offers one model of cooperation inthe form of a collective defence and security alliance. However, as we willdemonstrate in the forthcoming chapter, collective defence and security arrange-ments imply a number of conditions, including membership of the concernedinstitution, that cannot apply, at least at this stage, to Russia’s case. In this context,it is necessary to seek other cooperation models, and possibly find the one thatwould best apply to NATO and Russia.

In this chapter, we will thus look at a number of theories of internationalrelations addressing the question of multilateral cooperation. Special emphasiswill be placed on the study of the realist strand and its variants.2 This personalchoice is first motivated by the conviction that, as underlined by Robert Keohane,‘any approach of international relations has to incorporate, or at least to come togrips with, key elements of Realist thinking. Since Realism builds on fundamentalinsights about world politics and state action, progress in the study of interna-tional relations requires that we seek to build on this core’.3

Furthermore, it appears that NATO–Russia relations resemble in many respectsthe interstate relations depicted by the realist approach. Since the creation ofNATO in 1949, both parties have been placed in a context of continuous powerstruggle, where the actions of one were always the object of the other’s suspicion,and where individual security could only be preserved if ensured against the otherrather than with its cooperation. In this context, the prospect of cooperationbetween actors like NATO and Russia seems as unlikely as the perspective ofcooperation between states in the realist approach.

Closer analysis of specific realist strands will help us to identify in what cir-cumstances cooperation can take place, and whether this can be applied to thecase of NATO–Russia relations. The theories of simulated gaming obviously con-stitute the most direct and systematic approach to questions of strategic interac-tion. In looking at the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt experiments, we willseek evidence that cooperation is preferable to free-riding. We will also look atthe notion of Security Dilemma in those circumstances where cooperationremains improbable.

The study of Structural Realists or Neorealists will permit us to move beyondclassical Realism and to consider a systemic approach to cooperation, the ideabeing to assess the impact of the international system on relations between inde-pendent actors. Our aim there will be to prove that NATO–Russia relations are notdefinitely set on a competitive basis, but can embrace a cooperative dimensionbecause the system in which they now evolve is conducive to it.

The theory of international regimes will provide insights as to the conditionswhere mutual interests may emerge. With this study, we will try to confirm theassumption that cooperation is the optimal strategy whenever independent actorsshare common interests. In so doing, we will be in a position to underpin our pre-vious conclusions that the emergence of terrorism as a common threat to bothNATO and Russia and the acknowledgement that cooperation is the optimal strategyto counter that threat do provide solid grounds for NATO–Russia cooperation tobe successful.

This theoretical analysis cannot end without closer examination of the notionsof collective defence, collective security and cooperative security. This study shallshed some light on the reasons why the first two are less suitable to the case ofNATO–Russia cooperation, and why the last presents the greatest number ofadvantages.

Realism and cooperation

In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because oftheir independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state andposture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyesfixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns uponthe frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon theirneighbors; which is a posture of war.

(Thomas Hobbes)4

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Origins and fundamental assumptions

The realist approach to world politics can be traced back as far as Thucydides,the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War who wrote that ‘right, as the worldgoes, is in question only between equals in power, while the strong do whatthey can and the weak suffer what they must’.5 Ever since then, Realists of anystripe have emphasised that ‘the use of war and diplomacy by states is asimportant to the international system today as they were to the Greek city–stateworld 2,500 years ago’.6 Contemporary realist assumptions thus represent theculmination of thinking about international relations over the centuries. ForRealists, the nature of interstate politics has not changed significantly over themillennia, nor is it likely to do so any time soon. Modern Realism began as areaction to the breakdown of the post-First World War international order inthe 1930s. The utopian idealism of the interwar period and the collapse ofgreat power cooperation after the Second World War helped establish it as thedominant approach to the theory and practice of international politics. AsJames Rosenau commented:

Traditional Realism holds that we live in a world of opposing interestsand of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized,but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancingof interest and the very precarious settlement of disputes.7

For Realists, states are the principal actors, and the study of international affairsfocuses on these units. Non-state actors such as transnational organisations andother multinational corporations are either downplayed or even excluded in therealist perspective.8 Few people would actually question the importance of theState in world politics. States are also conceived as rational: any of their deci-sions derives from calculations in which means and ends are linked in a logicalfashion. States seek to maximise their expected utility and will not act in anyway that might injure their own self-interests. As Kenneth Waltz9 stressed it,‘force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there existsno consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests thatinevitably arise among similar units. A foreign policy based on this image ofinternational relations is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a rea-soned response to the world about us’.10 To most Realists, the struggle forpower among states is at the core of international relations. In the words ofMorgenthau: ‘International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the imme-diate aim’. He further argued that political Realism understands politicsthrough the concept of ‘interest defined as power’.11

Realists argue that the absence of a central and overriding authority helps toexplain why states come to rely on power, seeking to maintain or increase their powerpositions vis-à-vis other states. Consistent with the world as described by Hobbes,

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there is really nothing to keep a supposed ally from betraying a security agreementor any other international pact. There is no world governmental authority toenforce covenants or agreements among states. The absence of a higher author-ity and of any hierarchy within the system leads to what is known as anarchy.12

In this sense, it does not mean chaos, violence, and destruction. For Realists, itimplies that states have to protect and look out for themselves – that they mustrely on themselves to ensure order and obtain the resources needed.13 Without aLeviathan (or a hegemonic power or world state), suspicion, distrust, conflict,and war are seemingly inevitable. In the absence of any social contract among– or authority over – them, there are no moral obligations to govern the relationsof states.14 In this context, competition appears to be the one and only rule inrelating with other states. And cooperation, although not impossible, will beconfined to a second-rate priority.15 And yet, Realists, using game theory andits attendant assumptions of unified rational state actors, have tried to explainhow cooperation in an anarchic international system can be achieved. Althoughcommon interests are stressed more than in some forms of Realism, the basicassumptions are consistent with the hard core of this school: attention isconcentrated on the state as an actor and cooperation is presented as a meansfor states to further their own self-interests.

The game theory

The game theory, which originated in economics after Second World War,16 hasindisputably a direct bearing on the study of foreign policy choice and the majorityof scholarly work on cooperation.17 Theorists who deal with simulated gamingretain the rationality assumption under conditions of uncertainty: ‘each actorattempts to maximise expected value across a given set of consistently orderedobjectives given the information actually available to the actor or which he couldreasonably acquire in the time available for decision’.18 Applied to our subject,this means that states act according to a strategy aimed at optimising their owninterests. In this context, a state’s behaviour will also partly depend on the antic-ipated behaviour of others, something that game theorists explain as follows:‘Issues arise against distinctive backgrounds of past experience; they are linkedto other issues being dealt with simultaneously by the same actors; and they areviewed by participants through prisms of their own expectations about thefuture’.19 Two particular games – The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt – offerstriking realist paradigms.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the game of Stag Hunt

Political theorists draw on the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to ‘explain thecontractarian-coercion conjunction at the root of the modern state, arguing thatthe state of nature is a prisoner’s dilemma in which individuals have a dominant

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strategy of defecting from common action but in which the result of this mutualdefection is deficient for all’.20 The Prisoner’s Dilemma21 was named after a storycommonly used to illustrate the above logic. According to this story, two thievesunder arrest are separately confronted with two antinomic options, one that isfundamentally cooperative (‘cooperate’), and one that is essentially competitive(‘defect’). In the event that both of them opt for ‘cooperation’, namely neitherconfesses the crime, they may be freed for lack of evidence. However, any con-fession of the crime by one of the thieves will result in a heavier sentence for theone who refused to confess.22 Under these conditions, and no matter whatthe other does, each player will immediately obtain an advantage by defecting.The dilemma is that if both defect, the reward resulting from that attitude remainssmaller than if they had cooperated.23

For sovereign, self-interested states, assuming substantial aversion to risk,mutual defection seems to be the clear solution to the dilemma, the only strategi-cally sensible outcome. But it leaves both players in a sub-optimal position.24

As Robert Jervis noted, ‘states often fail to cooperate, not because they cannotsurmount the Prisoner’s Dilemma, because they are in Deadlock and prefermutual defection to mutual cooperation’.25 The Prisoner’s Dilemma actuallyexemplifies international relations, marked by conflict, competition and insecu-rity even where there are strong incentives to cooperate. When initial gains areexpected to create positive feedback, each state will have strong incentives todefect, irrespective of whether its ultimate intentions are aggressive; moving firstmay endanger the other, but it is necessary in order to protect the state. As a result,mutual restraint will be difficult to maintain even if both sides are satisfied withthe status quo.26

As noted, the central question for the work on anarchy is how cooperation ispossible when actors are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma – that is, when they have the fol-lowing preference order: exploiting or taking advantage of the other, mutualcooperation, mutual defection and being exploited. If cooperation is to arise in therigid setting27 of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, its sources often lie in the iterative con-ception of the game.28 In a world governed by anarchy, self-interested states facedwith the Prisoner’s Dilemma will opt for cooperation only once the spirallingeffect of defection has been recognised. As Keohane put it:

It requires, that these egoists expect to continue to interact with eachother for the indefinite future, and that these expectations of future inter-actions be given sufficient weight in their calculations. This argumentreinforces the practical wisdom of diplomats and arms controllers, whoassume that state strategies, and the degree of eventual cooperation, willdepend significantly on expectations about the future.29

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, concern about the future helps to promote coopera-tion. According to Robert Axelrod, ‘the more future payoffs are valued relative to

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current payoffs, the less incentive to defect today – since the other side is likelyto retaliate tomorrow’.30 Axelrod went beyond this assumption and showed that astrategy of cooperation based on reciprocity (the so-called ‘tit for tat’) can fosterthe emergence of stable cooperation among egoists.31 Theorists following hislead and modelling politics as a Prisoner’s Dilemma, conceptualise cooperationas a single alternative, the only one that is better over the long run than mutualdefection. Governments may have incentives to practice reciprocity in a varietyof situations that are characterised by mixtures of conflicting and complemen-tary interests – that is, in certain non-zero sum games. The key conditions for thesuccessful operation of reciprocity are that mutual cooperation can yieldbetter results than mutual defection, but that temptations for defection also exist.In such situations, reciprocity may permit extensive cooperation withoutmaking cooperative participants inordinately vulnerable to exploitation by others.Furthermore, such a strategy helps the whole community by punishing playerswho use uncooperative strategies.32 In other words, states agree to coerce oneanother in order to guarantee that no individual would take advantage of another’scooperation by defecting from the pact and refusing to cooperate.33 The dilemmacan thus be evaded, or made less severe, since players make a mutual cooperationpact and establish some mechanisms to enforce it, increasing the likelihood ofcooperation by reducing the risk of being suckered.

These findings obviously bear on a central issue in international relationstheory: the role of institutions and rules. What is rational for states to do, and whatstates’ interests are, depend on the institutional context of action as well as onthe underlying power realities and state position upon which realist thinkingconcentrates.34 By providing both insurance against undesirable behaviour andadditional incentives to cooperate, international norms and institutions may thusameliorate the dilemma or even transform the game, even where Prisoner’sDilemma logic does operate.35

The role of institutions, however, is hampered by the very existence of states askey actors and the persistence of anarchy.36 Realists usually believe that institu-tions are primarily instruments of statecraft, reflecting mainly state interest.37 Inpondering the state’s retreat, Susan Strange used the same argument and observedthat an ‘international organization is above all a tool of national government, aninstrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means’.38

In a system of self-help, states are likely to stress the objective of bindingothers to keep their commitments and will be quite reluctant to bind themselves.For Realists, ‘states can take themselves out of anarchy if they choose to cede muchof their sovereignty to a central authority’.39 In this context, they may overcometheir reluctance to binding themselves through international agreements.Nevertheless, even where enforcement is available, some mutually beneficial out-comes may be missed because of bargaining dynamics and miscalculations.40

This is due to the fact that states often do not perceive each other accurately andthus interpret the other’s behaviour in such a way that their respective strategiesare found totally incorrect or misleading.41

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In political interactions, the major impediment to cooperation is psychologicaland lies in the tendency that decision-makers have to underestimate the extent towhich their actions may harm others. In other words, what they would perceive asa cooperative action may be seen as defective by a disinterested observer. AsRobert Jervis noted, ‘in several cases security regimes may have been ruled outnot by the fact that a major power was an aggressor but by the fact that othersincorrectly perceived it as an aggressor’.42 In the same vein, states tend to over-estimate the others’ aggressiveness and will often consider their counterparts’actions as defective. This misperception issue repeats itself in a number of situa-tions. Indeed, states tend also to consider their concessions to be greater than thecompensations that they obtain in return. In addition, when statesmen realise thatthe other side has cooperated, they often believe that it did not have much choice.In this respect, decision-makers underestimate the ability of others to defect, andtherefore frequently falsely believe that they can get away with some exploitation.A statesman’s understanding of the other’s behaviour is thus heavily influenced byhow he thinks his own state is behaving towards the other, and so they both takeactions they might not have taken had they understood the consequences and alsomisinterpret others’ reactions as evidence of unprovoked hostility.43

The importance of cognition and beliefs in any perception-building is obviousenough. Perception defines interest and amplifies the statesman’s dilemma indeciding whether to cooperate or not. Therefore, it is crucial to understand theprocess by which interests are perceived and preferences determined.44 Each statefaces uncertainty about the other’s motives, something that might lead it tofavour undesirable competition.45 Uncertainty about the other’s true motives isdangerous insofar as it may fuel a feeling of insecurity, something that Realismidentifies as the key source of international conflict. It may also propel countriesinto undesirable competition. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that this samecompetition may be an incentive for essentially rational actors to use cooperativeor unthreatening policies when the risks of competition exceed the risks ofcooperation. In other words, ‘cooperation is particularly valuable if it reduces theadversary’s uncertainty, convincing it that the first state is motivated more byinsecurity than by greed; this would further reduce the probability of conflictcaused by an opponent’s insecurity’.46 As Robert Jervis notes:

Strategies that are robust in the face of misperception are extremelyvaluable, but it is far from certain that they exist. Stable cooperation ismost likely to result when the decision-makers’ preconceptions providean accurate fit with what the other side is like; that may be as much theproduct of luck, however, as of sensitivity and statesmanship. It is clearlyimportant to determine the extent to which strategies that would workwell when information is accurate can also serve in a world permeatedby ambiguity and strong perceptual and decision-making biases. Neitherscholars’ analyses nor statesmen’s policies can safely be based on theassumption that either side understands the other.47

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A variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, with special application to internationalrelations, is what John Herz first called the ‘Security Dilemma’.48 Given theirreducible uncertainty about the intention of others, states often seek their ownsecurity through means which challenge the security of others. When a stateunilaterally improves its own security, and another state responds in kind, thisresults in both states being less secure than before. As an example, two countriesface the same choice: to arm or not to arm. If one side arms, and the otherdoes not, the former gains a unilateral advantage. It is therefore, rational for bothsides to arm. Put another way, the more one state arms to protect itself from otherstates, the more threatened all these states become and the more prone they are toresort to arming themselves to protect their own national security interests. Thedilemma is that even if a state is sincerely arming only for defensive purposes,the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security ofothers. Here again, the combination of anarchy, misperception and mutual suspi-cion can be detrimental to security, even though all parties involved may sincerelydesire peace.49

The only way for the Security Dilemma to be resolved is for states to find legaland diplomatic means to keep an eye on each other. Arms control agreements areone approach,50 usually providing fruitful ground for cooperative security.51 TheSecurity Dilemma, however, remains. Superpower strategies designed to deterwar by developing counterforce capabilities exacerbate the Security Dilemma andmake cooperation more difficult. Although no post-Cold War state is pursuingworld domination, the Security Dilemma could lead states into competition, eventhough they might prefer cooperation.

Cooperation may arise either from a commitment on the part of the individualto the welfare of the collectivity or as a result of perceived self-interests. Theinforming image for some Realists is also provided by the classic story of the StagHunt, taken from the writings of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau.This game presents a model in which the stag is most likely to be captured if allparticipants in the chase work together in pursuit of a collective goal: meeting thehunger needs of the group. If one or more of the hunters, for the sake of individ-ual gain, defect – say to chase a rabbit – the stag is more likely to escape. Thus,with cooperative behaviour, the stag will be subdued, and all will benefit in theform of a good meal. Cooperation should occur if the countries believe they areplaying stag hunt. In both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt, the key tocooperative behaviour rests on the ability to believe that the others will coope-rate.52 Of central importance for a theory of cooperation is here again the extentto which the incentives for, or benefits from, cooperation can be seen to supplantthe incentives to act unilaterally and compete.53

Rousseau’s allegory demonstrates that states, just like individuals, can quiterationally abandon collective duty for the sake of individual gain.54 In this con-text, the free rider’s behaviour is based on the assumption that others would actlikewise in the moment of temptation. He will thus ask why he should assume therisk and bear the burden for the others to profit from his gullible commitment.55

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Classical Realism makes us aware of the difficulties for states trying to pursuecooperative policies. However, it provides us with only a part of the assistanceneeded to establish a theory of cooperation. To reach our goal, we need a multi-dimensional approach to world politics that incorporates other theoretical frame-works. One of these should be that of Neorealism or Structural Realism,56 whichhas the virtues of parsimony and clarity.

Neorealism

Neorealist Theory, predominantly embodied in the work of Kenneth Waltz, ismore systematic and logically more coherent than that of its classical realistpredecessors. While sharing much with traditional Realism, Neorealism has astronger theoretical foundation and surpasses Realism in rigour and sophistica-tion.57 Waltz actually maintains that Neorealism goes beyond Realism and devel-ops a superior understanding of the primary determinants of the internationalsystem. For Waltz, understanding the structure of an international system allowsus to explain patterns of state behaviour, since states evaluate their ability toachieve security on the basis of calculations about their own positions in thesystem. In his own words, structure is ‘the principal determinant of outcomes atthe system level; structure encourages certain actions and discourages others’.58

The link between system structure and actor behaviour is forged by the rational-ity assumption, which enables the theorists to predict that leaders will respond tothe incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. Based on theseassumptions, the characteristics of the actor become constant rather than variable,and systemic theory becomes possible.59 Neorealism thus departed from a realisttradition that gave the statesman or policymaker greater freedom from constraintand thus greater ability to affect international events.60 It shows that the inter-national system shapes behaviour as well as vice-versa.

Similar to their classical realist counterparts, Neorealists believe that competi-tion between the major powers in the international system is a normal state ofaffairs. The neorealist argument is also driven by the implications of internationalanarchy. It is the lack of central authority in the international system that forcesstates to behave the way they do: without an international authority capable ofprotecting them, states must look out for themselves.61 Charles Glaser was veryexplicit in this respect:

Anarchy discourages cooperation because it requires states to worryabout the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility thatadversaries will cheat on agreements. In short, the standard neorealistargument predicts that cooperation between adversaries, while notimpossible, will be difficult to achieve and, as a result, will be rare andcontribute relatively little to states’ well-being.62

Neorealists are thus pessimistic about the prospects for international cooperation.And yet, they foresee that under certain conditions, states will best achieve their

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security objectives through cooperative rather than competitive policies.63 Sincestates do not seek to maximise their power in a relentless search for universaldomination when they are not in danger, they are more likely to choose coopera-tion when specific conditions prevail.

In short, Neorealism helps us to understand world politics as a systemicphenomenon and provides us with a logically coherent theory that establishes thecontext for state action. In the words of Robert Keohane, ‘systemic theory isimportant because we must understand the context of action before we can under-stand the action itself’.64 Neorealist approaches are essential in understandinglong term forces that determine international politics independently of the actionsof particular decision-makers. Nevertheless, if we are to promote a successfultheory of cooperation, we also need to focus on variables such as rules, norms andinstitutions that to some extent can be shaped by political action. Theories ofInternational Regimes have attempted to address this question and should furtherhelp us to understand how to create essential patterns of cooperation.

Theories of international regimes

The basic analytical assumptions of this theory partly derived from neorealistthought. The regime concept accepts the fundamentals of Neorealism insofar asits focus is state-centric. As we have already mentioned, realist theories hold thatinternational behaviour is based predominantly on interests defined in termsof power, and that the international system is anarchic. The conceptualisation ofregimes developed here is fully consistent with the traditional characterisation ofinternational politics as relations between sovereign self-reliant states, ultimatelyable to depend only on themselves, and prepared to resort to force whenconfronting dilemmas. In this view, states are autonomous entities that ‘developtheir own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions’.65 Theregime approach actually does not reject these assumptions out of hand, it merelyaims to refine them. While the realist theories did not dismiss the possibility ofconciliation as a means of resolving conflicts, ‘the regime concept adds anexplicit and extended analysis of national interest and politics in which competi-tive elements produce cooperative behavior’.66 International regimes shouldtherefore be seen as complementary to, rather than in contradiction with, realistfundamentals.

The analysis of regimes represents in itself also an effort to address thequestion of international norms and institutions. We have long understood that incertain contexts, self-interested states forgo independent actions and favour thejoint decision-making that leads to regime formation. International Regimesencompass the idea that, as Robert Keohane suggested, ‘cooperation is explicableeven on narrowly self-interested, egoistic assumptions about the actors in worldpolitics’.67 The following argument constitutes an attempt to improve our under-standing of international cooperation, through an interpretation of internationalregime-formation that refers mainly to the rational-choice principle.

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John Ruggie first introduced the concept in 1975 and defined a regime as ‘a setof mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies andfinancial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states’.68

Subsequently, international regimes have been defined as ‘sets of implicit orexplicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around whichactors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.69

This conceptualisation is consistent with other formulations. Robert Keohaneand Joseph Nye, for example, defined regimes as ‘sets of governing arrange-ments’ that include ‘networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularizebehavior and control its effects’.70 Hedley Bull, using a somewhat differentterminology, refers to the importance of rules and institutions in internationalsociety where rules refer to ‘general imperative principles which require or author-ize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways’.71 In anycase, regimes should not be seen as ‘quasi-governments – imperfect attempts toinstitutionalize centralized authority relationships in world politics. Regimes aremore like contracts, when these involve actors with long term objectives who seekto structure their relationship in stable and mutually beneficial ways’.72

The condition for regimes to be formed is ‘that sufficient complementary orcommon interests exist so that agreements benefiting all essential regime mem-bers can be made’.73 As long as international behaviour results from independentdecision-making, there is no international regime. There is a need for a regimewhen states cannot obtain their most preferred outcome by making unilateraldecisions.74 The most powerful actors create regimes that serve their particularinterests, and others are constrained to accept them because their options arelimited.75

The theoretical analysis of the regime concept thus begins with what firstappears as an anomaly from the realist point of view: the existence of institution-alised patterns of cooperation around which the actor’s expectations converge ina variety of areas of international relations. Obviously, unlimited competition canharm all actors. Confronted with a Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the rationalpursuit of self-interest leads to a solution that is not Pareto-optimal,76 states willbenefit by setting up regimes to control competition among them. Governmentswill enter into international negotiations in order to reduce the conflicts thatwould otherwise break out. In this respect, the regime concept will contribute toenhance our ability both to describe and to account for patterns of cooperationand to understand the basis for discord.

Robert Jervis argued that the concept of regimes implies not only norms andexpectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is morethan the following of short-run self-interest.77 International regimes entail agreedrules to work together for certain goals and to refrain from certain actions whencollaboration represents an optimal strategy for participants. In order to assure thePareto-optimal outcome, such collaboration requires a certain degree of formali-sation. The regime must determine specific cooperative patterns of behaviour andshould also insure that no participant cheats. All regimes therefore rest on some

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form of sanctioning. As Keohane underscored, ‘strategies that involve threats andpunishments as well as promises and rewards are more effective in attainingcooperative outcomes than those that rely entirely on persuasion and the force ofgood example’.78 But regime-governed behaviour must not be based solely onsanctioning. States must also accept some sense of general obligation andreciprocity.79

World politics lack authoritative governmental institutions and are determinedby pervasive uncertainty. International regimes and the principles and norms thatdevelop in conjunction with them, contribute to reduce uncertainty and risk byimproving the quantity and the quality of information. Information in this contextmainly refers to the knowledge of the other state’s intentions, preferences andwillingness to enter into an international regime. As noted earlier, internationalpolicy coordination is not a function only of interests, power and negotiatingskills, but also of perception and misperception. According to Keohane, ‘theinformation that is required in entering into an international regime is not merelyinformation about other governments’ resources and formal negotiating positions,but rather knowledge of their internal evaluations of the situation, their intentions,the intensity of their preferences, and their willingness to adhere to agreementeven in adverse future circumstances’.80 Within this setting, the most importantfunctions of international regimes are to ‘establish stable mutual expectationsabout others’ patterns of behavior and to develop working relationships, that willallow the parties to adapt their practices to new situations’.81

Both the incentives for establishing international regimes and the obstacles todoing so are particularly great in the security arena because of the SecurityDilemma. A state may forgo taking advantage of another not because it expectsreciprocation, but because it fears that unless it exercises self-restraint others willsee it as a menace, increase their arms, and coalesce against it.82 Robert Jervisargued that for regimes to develop in the security area, the great powers mustbelieve that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation.83

Security regimes are very rare indeed. Reaching back to the early nineteenthcentury, some would even call the Concert of Europe a global security regimesince it was based on common national security concerns among the majorpowers. But as another scholar pointed out, ‘the basic point still stands: general-ized security regimes are exceptional’.84 Statesmen nearly always perceive them-selves as constrained by principles, norms and rules that prescribe and proscribevarieties of behaviour.85 The concept of regime moves beyond a realist perspec-tive, which is too limited to explain an increasingly complex and interdependentworld.86

Finding a mechanism to promote international cooperation is a seriouschallenge in dealing with the political cleavages of the post-Cold War world.Multilateral initiatives seem more promising paths to checking competition inworld politics and enhancing cooperative engagement. In the next section, we willexplore the various collective approaches available and assess their potentialcontribution to the development of cooperative patterns of behaviour. But before

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we look at how to construct a realistic and effective approach to cooperativesecurity, it might be helpful to briefly examine two of the other major securityconcepts that came into prominence in the twentieth century: collective securityand collective defence.

Multilateral approaches to security

Collective security and collective defence

Though the concept of cooperation and alliances between states in peace and warhas been a common feature in the history of mankind, the terms ‘CollectiveSecurity’ and ‘Collective Defence’ are inventions of the last century. Both con-cepts imply a long term, formal engagement between groups of states to protecttheir common security interests. The concept of collective security first came intouse after the First World War, referring to the scheme developed during the war,championed by President Wilson, for keeping the peace by setting up legal com-mitments and organisational arrangements designed to guarantee that aggressionby any state against any other would be effectively resisted by the combinedaction of the other members of the multistate system. Every potential aggressorshould be intimidated by the threat of overwhelming collective resistance; everypotential victim of aggression should be reassured by the promise of the commu-nity’s protection.87

Collective security looks inward to attempt to ensure security within a group ofsovereign states. The first modern collective security organisation was the Leagueof Nations88 founded in the aftermath of the First World War. Its members pledgedto protect each other from attack by other nations within that organisation. Theidea was simple: an act of aggression by one or more members against anotherwould be opposed, if necessary by force, by the other member states of the League.For a variety of reasons, the League of Nations was ultimately not successful inachieving security and stability. This was almost certainly due in large part to thefundamental incompatibility of liberal democracy, Fascism and communism thatco-existed within its membership. Its members did not share values and there wasno agreement on how European countries should organise themselves politically.The League collective security system presumed a global security community – agroup of states with a clear common identity. The League failed because it couldnot develop that identity. This historic example suggests that collective security ispossible among states that are not liberal democracies, but that such security com-munities may be unstable. At the end of the Second World War the newly formedUnited Nations took up the mantle of collective security from the League ofNations. At best, however, this organisation has been only partially effective.

The study of past collective security systems reveals that certain specificconditions improve their effectiveness. For many theorists, the supremacy ofcollective obligation above national interests is foremost among the conditions forthe successful operation of collective security. As Morgenthau remarked, ‘nations

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must be willing to subordinate whatever conflicting political interests may stillseparate them to the common good defined in terms of the collective defence ofall member states’.89

A second correlate of success is said to lie in the existence of a threat commonto and recognised by all. Common threats contribute to hold collective securitysystems together. All systems require the presence of a threat to make themcohere. Nations need to cooperate against something as well as for something.90

Only if it is assumed that all nations are equally vulnerable to a breach of peace,can one deduce the validity of the famous axiom that peace is indivisible.These conditions contain lessons about the extent to which states can look tomultilateral systems as an approach for dealing with future security problems.

Collective security is a design for providing a more effective mechanism ofinstitutionalised balancing against aggressors when they emerge, on the notionthat ‘all against one’ ensures more stability than unregulated and self-reliantbehaviour. Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms andrules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.91

By building confidence among states about each others’ intentions, collectivesecurity promotes a more cooperative environment and inter alia ameliorates theSecurity Dilemma, thereby enhancing stability and reducing the likelihood ofunintended downward spirals to hostility. Many scholars have tended to considercollective security as a middle course between the terminal points of internationalanarchy and global governance.92

The case for collective security, as opposed to collective defence, is not a func-tion of predetermined alliances or predetermined enemies. In such a system,‘none would be designated as enemy, each would assume the role of peace-keeper, and all (minus one) would be ready to move against the aggressor in theirmidst when so authorized by the collective’.93 David Yost defended the same posi-tion: ‘In contrast to collective defence, operations in support of collective securityentail actions on behalf of non-allies. The fundamental idea of collective security isthat of universally shared responsibility for international security’.94

And yet, the distinction between collective security and collective defence isoften quite vague. Collective defence organisations blossomed during the days ofthe Cold War. A system based on collective defence looks outward to defend itsmembers from external aggression: it commits all nations, bound by treaty, tocome to each other’s defence whenever any member is subjected to, or threatenedby, a military attack by a state or states outside the treaty area. Collective defenceis also another word for alliance, since this latter ‘implies a determinate structurefor a determinate purpose, and requires, although not always named, a determi-nate foe’.95 The principle of alliance tends to inject into international relations aconcept of the advanced identification of friends and enemies that is alien to thebasic proposition of collective security. Membership in a collective securitysystem involves alliance with nobody in particular but with everybody in general.96

A key weakness of collective security is that the principle of ‘one for all and allfor one’ requires all members of the system to sacrifice their particular interests

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on the altar of universal justice. States, however, always follow their own interests.A standard criticism of collective security is that it has not produced an operatingsystem where any wrongdoer will be subjected both to multilateral resistanceand multilateral condemnation. Such unsuccessful developments would notnecessarily invalidate the concept altogether. But it would mean that the collectivesecurity model we have discussed had failed to clear the obstacles of indecisivepolitical leadership, insufficient military capabilities and the inevitable compro-mises inherent in many cooperative and consensual relationships between states.It has also sometimes been used so loosely that it appeared as a honorificdesignation for almost any multilateral activity conducive to peace or world order.In this usage, ‘it refers not to a method for producing a result, but to the presumedresult itself, conflating means and ends’.97 Collective security also rests on theclaim that states are amenable to moral appeals against the misuse of force andthat a highly developed moral consensus exists among members of the system. Inreality, ‘collective security might either operate on the basis of dubiously validmoral judgments, or be reduced to inactivity by the difficulty of making nicemoral distinctions’.98 Even states that otherwise would wish to pursue moralobjectives are compelled by anarchy to define their national interests in terms ofpower.

Although Fukuyama’s end of history99 has not arrived, the collective consider-ation of virtually every problem in the intercourse of states has neverthelessbecome an established feature of world politics. Disputes are expected to occur,but they are expected to do so within the limits of established norms and proce-dures. While collective security arrangements were meant to deter aggression anddefeat it if it occured, a cooperative security system ‘replaces preparations tocounter threats with the prevention of such threats in the first place and replacesthe deterring of aggression with actions to make preparation for it more diffi-cult’.100 Cooperative security thus differs from the traditional idea of collectivesecurity as preventive medicine differs from acute care.101 However, the one strat-egy does not exclude the other and both are complementary to each other.

Cooperative security

Contrary to conventional wisdom, multinational cooperative efforts are not apurely modern phenomenon. The Western literary tradition began with Homer’sversion of the just war waged collectively against Troy. Crusades and holy warsfought by forces from multiple states or principalities abound in historicalrecords. Traces of the concept of cooperative security can be found in a numberof early discussions to impose collective decisions. These were inescapably inter-twined with general developments in East–West relations.

The term ‘Cooperative Security’102 has become a popular catchphrase since theend of the Cold War. It has been generally used to describe a more peaceful, butrather idealistic, approach to security through increased international coopera-tion. Many strategic thinkers, in the early 1990s, caught up in a tide of optimism

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generally hailed as the New World Order, initially relied on this concept to eschewnarrow Cold War ‘zero-sum’ strategies and replace them with a new approach tosecurity. But cooperative security is not a recent invention. Indeed, EmmanuelKant introduced the idea in the late eighteenth century in his ‘Second DefiniteArticle of Perpetual Peace’, stating that the law of nations should be founded ona federation of free states. Today, at the start of the twenty-first century, scholarsusually describe cooperative security as a strategic principle that seeks toaccomplish its purposes through institutionalised consent rather than throughmilitary preparation. It can only take place when states truly develop mechanismsfor the peaceful resolution of conflicting issues between states within the system.Cooperative security does not mean that participants are treaty-bound to offerassistance. If that were the case, we would speak about collective, not cooperativesecurity.

As mentioned earlier, the insecurity in interstate relations stems from uncer-tainty about the intentions of others. Based on this assumption, the idea behindcooperative security is to regulate attitudes that might generate misperception anderroneous interpretations. In this regard, the concept requires common normsand standards of conduct. Within the system, countries must be answerable for fail-ing to observe these norms and standards and there must be instruments to allowactions to be taken to prevent violation and freeriding. The political intentionsof states have to be as transparent and open as possible. In the same vein, thegreater the readiness to exchange information, the easier it is to reassure others ofone’s non-aggressive posture.103 Frequent and regular meetings between decision-makers also contribute to mutual understanding about concerns and interests.

Efficient cooperative security should link states in many ways. Itpresupposes initially the existence of compatible security objectives.Statesmen must also sometimes craft consensus for a cooperativeintervention strategy outside their common space if their welfare andstability is threatened. Historically, the perception of a common threatwas the most frequent, as well as the most effective, basis for establish-ing a security system. Just as the Concert of Europe long outlasted thedanger of another French revolution, so NATO has adapted itself sincethe fall of Communism and the progressive integration of ancientSoviet satellites into the transatlantic society. NATO even appears for thetime being as the world’s only working model of a cooperative securitysystem.104

The argument of cooperative security inevitably generates scepticism about itsachievability. Many exclusively rely on the assumption that ‘sovereign nationswill always have an inherent propensity for armed conflict and that they cannotbe expected to conform to cooperative standards that renounce the projection ofpower as a way of promoting state interest’.105 However, cooperative securitydoes not aim at establishing global governance through the resolution of all

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conflicts. The attention is ‘on preventing the accumulation of the means for mass,deliberate, and organized aggression, such as seizure of territory by force or thedestruction of vital assets by remote bombardments for unilateral gain’.106

Today the threats to Europe are increasingly transnational phenomena. Theyinclude corruption, organised crime, migration, epidemic diseases, environmen-tal catastrophes and terrorism. For all these reasons, cooperative procedures forenhancing international accountability can be considered the most promisingresponses to the challenges facing states under the anarchic international system.Freeriding states would not gain any offsetting benefits and, even more signifi-cantly, would risk costly isolation within the international community. As AdamRotfeld stressed:

Cooperative security is the most desirable and adequate concept for thechallenges ahead. Cooperative engagement is a strategic principle thatseeks to accomplish its purposes through institutional consent ratherthan through threats of material or physical coercion. The importantthing is that a new global system is being formed not as a result of war,in the wake of which victors impose on the vanquished a new order andrules of conduct, but through negotiations and agreement on commongoals, norms, institutions and procedures.107

Conclusion

The supreme task for statesmen in the final decades of thetwentieth century is to build on the positive forces of our age inthe creation of a new and more stable international order.

(Robert Gilpin)108

At the beginning of this chapter, we knew that the Russian identity, thoughradically different from the Western one, did not constitute an obstacleto NATO–Russia cooperation. We had also realised that the cooperation betweenNATO–Russia that has been taking shape since the early nineties is still topicaltoday despite a series of frustrations, pitfalls and failures. What remained to beidentified was the model of cooperation that would best apply to NATO andRussia.

The study of the theories of international relations, and more precisely thedifferent strands of Realism that tackled the question of cooperation, provedenriching in many respects. We first acknowledged that the configuration ofNATO–Russia relations was, at its inception in 1949, one that fit fully into therealist theory. At that time, both entities evolved in a situation of self-help, recip-rocal mistrust, and vital need to survive within the existing international system.In these circumstances, cooperation was far from innate and would require anumber of significant incentives to be envisageable.

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Some of these incentives became apparent in the study of the Prisoner’sDilemma and the Stag Hunt Game theories. These theories demonstrate that, incertain circumstances, independent actors may prefer cooperation to competition,on the grounds that it best serves their individual interests. The history ofNATO–Russia relations appears as a sound illustration of this argument.Throughout the Cold War, states in NATO and within the Soviet bloc found them-selves in a situation of competition and reciprocal mistrust. The more the formerwere protecting themselves against the latter, the more threatened the latter feltand the more likely they were to protect their own national security interests. Inthese circumstances, the enemy’s actions were perceived as suspicious andaggressive, even though these may have been motivated by defensive intentionsonly. However, the Cold War showed the limits of the logic of competition, andNATO consequently embodied all the merits of cooperation. While Russia had toface the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dismantlement of the USSR, theEuro-Atlantic Allies can see in their cooperation within the North AtlanticAlliance over half a century of peace and security. In this regard, it is worth under-lining that NATO never stopped expanding since its inception in 1949, with12 members, to 2004, when it counted 26 states within its ranks.

The merits of cooperation become even more apparent after the study ofNeorealism. This theory notably emphasises the role of the international systemin interstate relations, and supposes that a change in the configuration of the inter-national system may alter the nature of these relations. Again, this finds quite asound illustration in NATO–Russia relations. With the end of the Cold War, theinternational system ruling over NATO–Russia relations was radically altered.The post-Second World War balance of power and international order no longerexisted. The new international system was characterised by the disappearance ofthe USSR as the main enemy. This change compelled both NATO and Russia toreview their approach to one another, the former willing to avoid the re-emergenceof the enemy, and the latter wishing not to be isolated from the new internationalorder. As advocated by Neorealists, the rise of a new post-Cold War internationalsystem did impact on the course of NATO–Russia relations, this time in apositive manner.

The study of International Regimes permitted approaching cooperation from adifferent angle. Indeed, this theory emphasises the need for certain mechanismsand/or arrangements to regulate cooperation between independent actors. Onereason for this is the necessity of mitigating competition amongst these actors.Applied to NATO, this theory could explain why the principle of consensus is sovital to the success of the Alliance. This principle not only places member nationson equal footing, but it also compels them to integrate the notion of concessionas an integral part of their cooperation, and to accept the rule that the interests ofthe collectivity should prevail over the interests of the individuals.

This conclusion is the premise of the study of the collective security andcollective defence concepts, which both characterise the very nature of theNorth Atlantic Alliance. We learnt that both concepts imply a long term formal

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commitment between groups of states to protect the security interests ofindividual members within a common sphere. Both also follow the principlethat ‘all against one’ ensures more stability than unregulated and self-reliantbehaviour, the only difference being that, unlike collective defence, collectivesecurity arrangements are not based on the concept of the pre-identification offriends and enemies.

In the Cold War context, the inception of NATO as a collective defence andsecurity alliance resulted from the idea that cooperation would act as the bestimpediment to war in Europe and would best protect the Euro-Atlantic countriesagainst the Soviet-dominated communist bloc. With the 11 September 2001terrorist attacks against the United States, and the emergence of terrorism as acommon threat to the NATO countries and Russia, cooperation again appears asthe optimal solution. However, the degree of commitment implied by membershipof NATO cannot meet the requirements of a country that, like Russia, remainstendentially imperialistic and autocratic. In other words, it is not the question ofsecurity or defence arrangements that poses problem to Russia, but rather thenotion of collectiveness that lies with it.

To the contrary, the concept of cooperative security does not require such alevel of commitment by participating parties. A cooperative security systemrequires from its members a willingness to closely cooperate with each other andto potentially intervene in remote areas whenever international peace and securityare threatened. However, it does not require high institutional mechanisms suchas the definite membership of an organisation, or the acceptance of supranationalpolicies.109

While cooperative security arrangements will need a framework in whichthey will be carried out, this framework will not need to follow the model of post-Second World War international organisations and could adopt looser formssuch as the ‘coalition of the good will countries’ or even the specific partnershipbetween NATO and Russia. Indeed, while this partnership responds to the regimerequirement posed by Realism and is carried out within a specific frameworkbased on commonly agreed rules, it does apply to only a number of activities anddoes not prevent one or the other party to act independently from the other. Notsurprisingly, this is the kind of cooperative security relations that Russia longpleaded for. Analysing the Russian approach towards cooperative security isan integral part of our assessment of the odds for this concept to become aframework for security relations between Russia and the West.

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8

THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TOCOOPERATIVE SECURITY

Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of policy bydifferent means, which was classical in his time, has grown hope-lessly out of date. It now belongs to libraries. For the first time inhistory, basing international politics on moral and ethical normsthat are common to all humankind, as well as humanizing interstaterelations, has become a vital requirement.1

Introduction

In the current security environment, finding tailored cooperative solutions tomutual security concerns is a real strategic imperative.2 It is now clear to us thatit is of a vital importance to both Russia and NATO not only to maintain goodrelations, but also to develop them into true and equal cooperation. As mentionedearlier, the key for these two parties is to find the cooperative arrangements thatbest suit them.

Given that the purpose of our present study is to demonstrate that cooperativesecurity is the most appropriate model for NATO–Russia cooperation, we willnow concentrate on supporting this assumption with sound arguments.

Before going any further, let us recall some of the fundamentals that define thenotion of cooperative security, which we identified in our theoretical work. Asopposed to collective security, cooperative security is not treaty-bound. It can bedescribed as a federation of free states that seek to achieve security through con-sented cooperation. Furthermore, cooperative security is not fixed in time, butshould rather be regarded as an ad hoc imperative for a number of nations, at agiven time and under given circumstances, to ensure security by cooperativemeans.

The objective of this chapter will be to verify to what extent cooperative secu-rity is not only a familiar concept for Russia, but also the one that best embodiesRussia’s understanding of security relations with other states. In other words, iscooperative security only a fashionable concept of the post-Soviet times as intro-duced by Gorbachev’s Common European Home, or is it possible to prove thatthis approach to security relations enjoys some kind of continuity throughout

Russian history? To that end, we will single out specific Russian experiences ofcooperative security in each of the main periods of Russian history, namely: thetsarist, the communist, and the post-communist periods. Each time, we will try tounderstand what led Russia to opt for this model and what results each of theselected cases yielded. At this stage, it is important to stress that the chosen exam-ples do not represent the totality of Russia’s experience of cooperative security.Other initiatives could have been used to illustrate our thinking. Our choicesimply went for what we consider to be the most explicit examples.

Gorbachev’s Common European Home will serve as our case study for thischapter. By looking at this most recent Russian initiative in terms of cooperativesecurity, we will try to draw the lessons necessary for such a concept to be appliedsuccessfully to NATO–Russia relations. Special emphasis will then be placed onWestern reactions to the Common European Home.

Russian cooperative security initiatives

Alexander I: from the Holy Alliance to the Concert of Europe3

After the allies defeated Napoleon, Alexander I became known as the saviour notjust of Russia, but of Europe too. He was ‘the soul of the European coalitionagainst Napoleon and the chief manager of all military activities’.4 It wasAlexander who insisted among his fellow monarchs not only to crush the Frenchmenace, but also to reject Napoleon’s model of Europe, and to establish a newEuropean political system in its place.5 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, thetsar inevitably played a prominent role and influenced the resettlement ofEuropean political boundaries to suit his own interests. In the same year, encour-aged by his pre-eminence and fame, Alexander made a significant attempt tointroduce new rules into international diplomacy and to create an ethical basis forEuropean solidarity. Under the influence of messianism and religious mysticism,the tsar initiated the creation of the Holy Alliance6 signed on 26 September 1815,by the rulers of Russia, Austria and Prussia. In November, the king of Franceadhered to it, followed by most of the other Christian monarchs.7 With this looseagreement the great majority of European powers pledged to act according toChristian morality. George Vernadsky aptly described this peculiar andremarkable document:

In its form and spirit the act was an unusual diplomatic document,religious rather than political. The undersigned solemnly declared theirdetermination ‘to take as their sole guide . . . the precepts of religion,namely the rules of justice, Christian charity and peace . . . Consideringeach other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in allplaces lend each other aid and assistance . . .’ They will considerthemselves as members of one and the same Christian nation.8

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Although this unbinding document was intended to preserve peace and stabilityin Europe, it could hardly provide the Christian monarchs with any help to solveany international question. The Pope and George IV of England even refused tofollow suit and were very critical of the Alliance. According to NicholasRiasanovsky, ‘Castlereagh9 could well describe it as a piece of sublime mysticismand nonsense, while the pope remarked dryly that from time immemorial thepapacy had been in possession of Christian truth and needed no interpretation ofit’.10 As for the Russian people, they were ‘encouraged to believe that the evan-gelical ideal of the Holy Alliance should be kept alive; that Russia should remaina new supra-political force dedicated to healing the spiritual wounds of Europe’.11

Actually, the Holy Alliance proved to be of little relevance in internationalaffairs, as politics were at this time managed by the more pragmatic QuadrupleAlliance (Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia), also known as the Concertof Europe to which France was also admitted later on12 (the Quintuple Alliance).Signed on 20 November 1815, the Quadruple Alliance initially represented acontinuation of the wartime association of the allies designed to prevent theresurgence of an expansionist France. In the aftermath, the Quintuple Alliancefostered regular consultations among Europe’s monarchs and established an inter-national system based on cooperative security.13 The Concert of Europe actuallyrepresented the first prototype of international organisation. As merely a power-balancing arrangement, it had no peace-enforcement power and could notguarantee united armed action, but the great powers cooperated to prevent wars,maintain the territorial status quo and impose their decisions on lesser powers.14 Itspurpose was thus to maintain peace among the great powers, to prevent unavoidableconflicts of interest from degenerating into actual hostilities. The Concert wasrealistic in trying to manage rather than to eradicate international dissension.15

The tsar’s proposals were also aimed at preventing and crushing any incipientrevolutionary movement.16 Obviously, a concerted action among the great powershad more chance to fight and ultimately defeat menaces of revolution and athe-ism. The most explicit example of these potential threats can be found in the lateremergence of a Russian revolutionary group, which came to be known as theDecembrists17 after their unsuccessful uprising in December 1825. Following thedestruction, with Russian help, of the centres of revolutionary ferment in Centraland Eastern Europe, the West decided that it no longer needed Russia’s support.

Brezhnev and the thaw in East–West relations18

We have no plans for autarky but instead seek growth of broadcooperation with the outside world.

(Leonid Brezhnev)19

The confrontation between the United States and the USSR in October 1962over the Soviet missiles in Cuba, which resulted in a stunning Soviet defeat,

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strengthened the argument for peaceful coexistence and enhanced caution andconsultation in foreign policy.20 The theme of coexistence as a complex processof competition and cooperation appeared in Soviet official thinking, and détentewith the West became an intermittently pursued goal. The gradual winding downof United States involvement in the war in Vietnam after 1968 paved the way fornegotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject ofnuclear arms.21

A period of détente, or relaxation of tensions, between the two superpowersemerged, with a further agreement concluded to establish ceilings on the numberof offensive weapons on both sides in 1974. The crowning achievement of the eraof détente was the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Accords, which legitimised thepost-war political status quo in Europe and bound the signatories to respect basicprinciples of human rights. However, because of the Soviet Union’s concerns withregard to the protection of its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the Helsinkiprovisions on human rights had only limited effects.22 The Helsinki Final Act23

was in the first place a compromis:24 the East sought international recognition ofEurope’s post-war borders, while the West sought to open those same borders tothe freer flow of individuals, information and ideas.

In this international context, a number of political elements contributed toBrezhnev’s shift towards détente. The political division of Europe, which had pre-cipitated the Cold War between the two victors in the struggle against NaziGermany, was now acknowledged as a fait accompli. The Soviet Union hadfinally obtained formal recognition of its supremacy in the east European bufferzone. The sovereignty of East Germany conceded de facto by Bonn through itsbilateral Basic Treaty was another significant political achievement of the Sovietleadership. Undoubtedly, this remarkable progress was largely due to the prepara-tory groundwork laid by bilateral agreements concluded between West Germanyand the communist bloc.25

This deeper rethinking of Soviet official policy and the steady growth of anti-isolationist and reformist thought was also favoured by another development: asharp deterioration in relations with China. Brezhnev had decided to reinforceSoviet pre-eminence in the community of communist states by undermining theinfluence of China. Although Khrushchev’s successor initially approached Chinawithout hostility, Mao’s condemnation of Soviet policy as ‘revisionist’ and hiscompetition for influence in the Third World soon led to a worsening of relationsbetween the two countries. The Sino-Soviet relations reached an all time low inMarch 1969 when border clashes broke out along the disputed Amur-Ussuririvers in the Far East. These events highlighted the increasingly bitter territorialdisputes between those two erstwhile communist allies. Last but not least, thespectacular visit to China in July 1971 by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’snational security adviser, suggested an improvement of Sino-American relationsat Russia’s expense. Confronted by a hostile, independent China on its Asianfrontier, the Soviet Union could not fail to recognise the advantages of détenteand stability on its European flank.26

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In addition to these cherished political considerations, the acquisition ofstrategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States also played acrucial role in the détente. The 1970s could be characterised as a period of over-extension for the USSR. As another scholar noted, ‘the military-imperial appetiteconsumed more than a quarter of the country’s wealth – that neither international,power-centered analyses, nor domestic, interest-group models, offer adequateexplanation’.27 The most pressing East–West problems were certainly armscontrol. According to Brezhnev, détente was the consequence of the nuclearstalemate and the acquisition of strategic parity between Washington andMoscow. The growing cooperative engagement between the United States and theUSSR to establish control over their nuclear arsenals28 was probably the centre-piece of this new détente.

These breakthroughs in arms control led to the development of Soviet–Westernties in the economic and trade sector. The military détente was indeed comple-mented by an ‘informal economic détente consisting of the unclogging of com-mercial and financial channels between East and West’.29 The Soviet leadershipwas now all for expanding economic relations with the West and this bifurcationin traditional Soviet thinking gave way to a significant increase in trade andinvestment between the two blocs. In this context, a changed relationship withRussia’s main adversary, the United States, was essential.30

Economic considerations were thus determinant factors in the Soviet Union’sbid for détente in Europe. So were industrial shortfalls. Once a huge industrialmight, the USSR by the 1970s found it more and more difficult to maintain thehigh rates of growth in the industrial sector that it had enjoyed in earlier years.Targets and goals remained largely unmet and inputs were becoming moredifficult to obtain. The industrial shortfalls were felt most sharply in the sphere ofconsumer goods, where the public steadily demanded improved quality andincreased quantity. As William Keylor noted:

Rumblings of discontent within the communist bloc reflected a growingawareness of the marked disparity between the prosperity of WesternEurope and the economic stagnation of Eastern Europe. Brezhnev andhis associates had come to believe that the only hope of satisfying themounting consumer demands of the eastern European peoples, andindeed of the Russian population itself, was a massive influx of foreignindustrial products, technology, and investment capital that only theadvanced economic powers of the non-Communist world couldprovide.31

Brezhnev had finally admitted the fact that the autarkic course of the Soviet econ-omy had excluded the USSR from Western rapid economic growth and conspic-uous prosperity. Although Moscow and its satellites at first dismissed theEuropean Community as an imperialist plot, the absence of ‘bloc’ terminology inthe Treaty of Rome and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik helped the Soviet leader to find

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rationales for bringing a slight warming in East–West relations. In any case, theCouncil for Mutual Economic Assistance or COMECON,32 initially conceived asa counterweight to the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for EuropeanEconomic Cooperation in the West, could hardly compete with the successfuleconomic integration of Western Europe. The COMECON remained little morethan ‘an instrument for perpetuating the Soviet Union’s stranglehold on theeconomic life of its Eastern European satellites’.33

All these steps were valuable in Soviet eyes not only for their innovations orbecause they went considerably farther than had the earlier epoch of Lenin’s‘peaceful existence’, but also because of concrete benefits of rapprochement interms of moderating political and military tensions and economic cooperation.The European Community enlargement and its successful economic integration,as well as the Helsinki Accords negotiations, also contributed to the Kremlin’sacknowledgement of the USSR’s need to change either its domestic or foreignpolicy, and to the gradual lifting of certain ideological and political barriers of theCold War.34

The CSCE: Russia in search of Cooperative Security

As the Cold War came to an end, the CSCE was the only European or transatlanticorganisation in which Russia enjoyed an equal status with the other members.35

At that time, an active role in the CSCE was a way of demonstrating Russia’sgood intention and natural belonging to the West in this initial pro-Westernperiod.36 Not surprisingly, most of the Russian proposals concerning an undi-vided Europe were connected with the CSCE. In Russia’s vision, the Conferencehad to be placed at the very centre of the new European system, moving beyondthe initial political process aimed at setting out common values and principlesneeded to build confidence between the two blocs.

The next step towards a new European Security Architecture was the signatureof the CSCE Paris Charter in November 1990,37 which marked the formal end ofthe Cold War. In the aftermath of the Summit, Moscow realised that the West wasmore interested in preserving NATO than in developing joint replacement struc-tures for mutual or common security.38 The 1992 Helsinki follow-up meeting ledto the establishment of rather bland but symbolically significant institutions,including the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), the High Commissioner onNational Minorities, and the Economic Forum.39

In June 1994, Russia put forward the idea of institutionalising the Conferenceinto an all-inclusive European security organisation.40 This was aimed at respond-ing to NATO’s PfP. According to Moscow, such an organisation would be entitledto play a central role in Europe, responsible for coordinating actions of all mem-ber states and security organisations, including NATO, the CIS, the Council ofEurope and the WEU. As a unique all-inclusive cooperative security arrangement,the CSCE would also acquire an organ akin to the UN Security Council in whichRussia would have a permanent seat.41 Although the Conference was indeed

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transformed into an organisation after the Budapest Summit in December 1994,42

the idea of vesting the new OSCE with a superior character than NATO43 wasrejected by the Allies as a Russian conspiracy to undermine the AtlanticAlliance.44

Russia nevertheless succeeded in inserting into the 1994 OSCE work plan a‘Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-FirstCentury’. In Russia’s vision, this Security Model was meant to prevent Russiafrom being marginalised from European affairs. It would also allow Moscow toemphasise its opposition to NATO expansion and to have a voice in the Alliance’sdevelopment.45 This Russian proposal was however left vague: it was to be ‘a dis-cussion’ – which US officials emphasise – not a proper negotiation. The SecurityModel was officially accepted at the Lisbon Summit in 1996 where the ‘OSCEHeads of State and Government reaffirmed that European security requires thewidest cooperation and coordination among participating states’.46

In the meantime, Russia also brought forward extensive proposals for a‘Charter on European Security’ to be the basis of the Common andComprehensive Security Model for the twenty-first century. Although thisCharter47 was finally adopted by the leaders of 54 states at the Istanbul Summitin November 1999,48 it soon fell into oblivion because of two conflicting issues:Kosovo and Chechnya.

The OSCE’s failure to solve the crisis in Kosovo, be it due to its ineptitude, itslack of resources, or its lack of will, entailed that Russia’s purported aim ofendowing OSCE with a primus inter pares role to coordinate other organisationson a legally and not only politically binding basis, became even further out ofreach.49 NATO’s Operation Allied Force finally circumvented the OSCE andsymbolised de facto a marginalisation of Russia’s role in European security.Russian representatives blamed NATO countries for ‘pushing the Balkan war, areal source of concern, to the back burner to concentrate on criticizing Russia’sactions in Chechnya’.50 The Russian Federation, which considered the final set-tlement of the Chechen crisis a domestic problem, perceived Western statementsas interference with its anti-terrorist operation. Again, most Western observersargued that Russia had been willing to transform the OSCE into a pan-Europeansecurity organisation with broad powers of intervention, but would not consideran OSCE activity as a desirable solution to its policy dilemmas in its own region.

Over the decades since the Helsinki process, Russia used the CSCE/OSCE toinfluence the security arrangements and alliances among its European neigh-bours. Unfortunately, the OSCE’s institutional transformation never came close toempowering it with a leading role in promoting European stability, although theOSCE presents the advantage of including almost every country in Europe andNorth America and forms as such the widest forum for security concerns.However, this advantage is at the same time the Achilles’ heel of the OSCE.During the Cold War, neither of the two blocs ever envisaged risking importantinterests in the procedures of an organisation that included the other bloc.Furthermore, the fact that decision-making rested on unanimity rendered the

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institution powerless with regard to security issues. After the Cold War, unanimitywas replaced by ‘unanimity minus one’ in cases of clear, gross and uncorrectedviolations of OSCE commitments relating to human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.51 This small concession was nevertheless of very limited value and didnot constitute a sufficient guarantee for security in the eyes of most of thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe.52

Beyond the problem of decision-making, the fact that the OSCE was composedof heterogeneous powers and national interests contributed to depriving it of realmeans to exercise pressure. The organisation does not have the military forces,except for those that NATO might put at its disposal. In the eyes of internationalpublic opinion, it is overshadowed by other organisations like NATO and the EU.Even as a forum for discussions between the countries of NATO and those of theformer Warsaw Pact, the OSCE was in danger of being substituted by the NACC,which was of greater interest to East European countries because of the weight ofNATO’s authority.53 Last but not least, the OSCE suffers from not being grantedany legal status under international law and thus from being compelled to takingpolitical decisions only with no legal binding.54

It is commonly recognised that all-inclusive cooperative security arrangementssuch as the OSCE have proved impotent faced with the local conflicts that havebroken out already in the formerly communist parts of Europe,55 and are asunlikely to prevent major destabilisations as the League of Nations in the 1930s.For example, one can hardly expect the OSCE to prevent or reverse some hypo-thetical Russian invasion of Ukraine or the Baltic republics. While adapted tohandle low-intensity, peace-keeping or human rights problems, such institutionsprove rather incapable of providing cooperative security. The only institution inEurope that has a real capability to cover the power vacuum so as to prevent majordestabilisation is the Atlantic Alliance. Finding little support for their projectamong the Europeans, the Russian government thus concluded that it had nochoice but to develop formal relations with NATO.

Gorbachev and the ‘Common European Home’: case study

We are not conducting a Metternichian ‘balance of power’ policy,setting one state against another, knocking together blocs andcounter-blocs, . . . but a policy of global détente, strengthening worldsecurity and developing international cooperation everywhere.

(Mikhail Gorbachev)56

Gorbachev’s new political thinking

When Gorbachev rejected the Marxist–Leninist doctrine of class struggle,57 heredefined Soviet national priorities and completely revolutionised Soviet foreignpolicy.58 This so-called ‘New Political Thinking’ was a shift from hard-nosed

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communism to a way of thinking based on the idea of an international society ofshared interests and values.59 Reformers embraced the fundamentals of Europeansocial democracy and soon referred to the concept of cooperative security.According to Gorbachev:

The new political outlook calls for the recognition of one more simpleaxiom: security is indivisible. It is either equal security for all or none atall. The only solid foundation for security is the recognition of the inter-ests of all peoples and countries and of their equality in internationalaffairs. The security of each nation should be coupled with the securityfor all members of the world community. [. . .] So, adversaries mustbecome partners and start looking jointly for a way to achieve universalsecurity.60

Having adopted the concept of a ‘contradictory but interconnected, interdepend-ent and, essentially, integral world’,61 Gorbachev seemed to build his policy onthis foundation.62 For Robert Tucker:

Gorbachev grounds his call for reform in the international sphere not onideological texts but on the existence of historically unprecedented ‘realtasks’, namely, those of saving mankind from nuclear self-annihilationand from succumbing to global environmental, demographic and otherproblems that in our time are getting out of hand. And here lies the linkbetween the internal perestroika of which Gorbachev has become thechampion and the new thinking that faces the need to address globalproblems of a supra-class nature and recognizes that security in thenuclear age can only be mutual.63

Calling for a comprehensive system of international security, Gorbachev deemedit vital to ‘base international politics on moral and ethical norms that are commonto all humankind, as well as humanizing interstate relations’.64 According to him,the backbone of the New Political Thinking was ‘the recognition of the priority ofhuman values, or, to be more precise, of humankind’s survival’.65 The Sovietleadership was thus ready to ‘cast away the false considerations of “prestige”, andacknowledge that all of us in the present-day world are coming to depend moreand more on one another and are becoming increasingly necessary to one another’.66

Through perestroika67 and the New Political Thinking, Gorbachev stood up asa leader for reform in his country and an eminent figure in world affairs. It shouldalso be observed that his revolutionary policies were notably induced by urgentnecessities. Gorbachev’s essential objectives aimed also at achieving a new qual-ity of cooperation with the leading Western countries, especially the UnitedStates. Communist struggle against, and at the expense of, the West had beenreplaced by Soviet admission to the elaborate panel of institutions that constitutedthe Western political system and to which the Soviet Union had been denied

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admission in the aftermath of the Second World War. This recognition of theSoviet Union’s great status and legitimate interests was crucial for Gorbachev andhis reform-minded allies in their fight against powerful conservatives.Membership in Western institutions would also help to dissipate the Sovietperception of encirclement.

Just like Brezhnev before him, the disastrous economic consequences of over40 years of isolation and autarky in the Soviet Union, urged Gorbachev to turn tothe West and seek massive economic assistance. As Leon V. Sigal noted:

Economically, Gorbachev and his allies wanted to integrate the SovietUnion into the global economy, putting an end to the autarky that hadlong sheltered its firms from competition at the price of prolonging itsbackwardness. They needed American aid to negotiate the perilous tran-sition from a command to a market economy, especially to introducemonetary reforms and head off hyperinflation. They also needed tradewith the West to satisfy pent-up popular demand for consumer goodswhile keeping Soviet-style monopolies from gouging customers. Aboveall, they needed the West to lift the cold war embargo in order to obtainthe technology and investment that would permit factories to retool.68

The Soviet Union had never been admitted within the important international eco-nomic organisations. Moscow had simply disregarded the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade (GATT), IMF, the World Bank and the Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as detestable symbols ofWestern capitalism with which the Kremlin did not want anything to do.However, the continuing slowdown of economic growth within the USSR did notgive it any other option but cooperation. Only by joining Western-led interna-tional economic organisations could Russia rebuild its shattered economy andsociety. Trade and investment69 from the West were essential to Soviet economicreform. Neither would be forthcoming without a new détente in the bipolarantagonism. Neil Malcolm also shared this view:

In the economic sphere, the scale of East-West European cooperationwas defined more ambitious than before. Instead of emphasizing thebenefits of national planning, he stressed the importance for East-Westeconomic rapprochement of the Soviet Union’s transition to a more openeconomy, similarities in the functioning of economic mechanisms,strengthening ties and economic incentives and mutual adaptation.70

Other clear signs of closer economic links between the Soviet Union and thecapitalist West could be found in the negotiations on arms controls and disarma-ment. Here again, these developments would provide the Soviet economy withsome highly needed breathing space in the field of civilian production. In thisrespect, Gorbachev needed the United States to agree to arms reductions and not

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to take advantage of deep cuts in Soviet defence spending and the resultingdisintegration of the Red Army.71 The USSR had no other choice but to integratethe world community through international recognition. Gorbachev’s NewPolitical Thinking was thus also driven by the need to transform the Soviet Unionpolitically, economically and militarily.

However, Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking did not suffice to fully addressthe challenges that the Soviet Union was faced with. This new approach neededto be underpinned by a more concrete structure that would integrate the countryin a broader European dimension. Gorbachev’s answer to this appeared in theform of the ‘Common European Home’.

The ‘Common European Home’

A Russian-Soviet initiative72

The vision of the Common European Home implied that, while belonging toantagonist political blocs, countries from Western Europe and the Soviet Unionshared common ‘problems and opportunities’. It is interesting to observe thatGorbachev’s idea was in many respects similar to the Holy Alliance initiated byTsar Alexander I. Both shared the assumption that insecurity stemmed fromuncertainty about the intentions of others. Furthermore, both advocated acooperative system in order to regulate the military capabilities and practices atthe origin of these uncertainties. Other meaningful similarities includedrestrained diplomacy and political flexibility, compatible long term nationalinterests and idealistic moral principles.

In this new architecture, the European Community, Eastern Europe, and theSoviet Union would all have a place, and would be able to cooperate on security,economic and human rights related issues as illustrated hereunder:

Europe is indeed a common home where geography and history haveclosely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations.Of course, each of them has its own problems, and each wants to live itsown life, to follow its own traditions. Therefore, developing themetaphor, one may say: the home is common, that is true, but eachfamily has its own apartment, and there are different entrances, too. Butit is only together, collectively, and by following the sensible norms ofcoexistence that the Europeans can save their home, protect it againsta conflagration and other calamities, make it better and safer, andmaintain it in proper order.73

Gorbachev found it not so hard to sell his idea of a Common European Home tothe Soviet public.74 Indeed, the term ‘Europe’, as opposed to the ‘EuropeanCommunity’, had always remained a positive label in the Russian–Soviet mind:‘the Soviet propaganda preferred to depict the European Communities as a sort

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of false Europe, a capitalist bloc acting against the true interests of Europe andits peoples’.75 Contrary to the Atlantic Alliance, which was perceived as theembodiment of US hegemony, Europe was presented as an entity to which tsaristRussia had once belonged, and to which the new Russia should once morereturn.76 According to Gorbachev:

Russia’s trade, cultural and political links with other European nationsand states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia wasunited with Europe by Christianity, and the millennium of its arrival inthe land of our ancestors will be marked next year. The history of Russiais an organic part of the great European history.77

The orientation towards universal values and global concerns embodied inGorbachev’s original idea received extraordinary attention in the West, both in themedia and from policymakers and academics. But, his public disavowal of theBrezhnev Doctrine78 and his proposals for the creation of a comprehensivesystem of security were greeted with perplexity and scepticism by WesternEuropean and American leaders. As the Common European Home idea radicallydiffered from traditional Soviet policy thinking, this was to be expected.

Western reactions: between realism and suspicion

I think the cold war is not over.(National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft,

22 January 1989)

The Common European Home project left Western governments astounded andquite unsatisfied. In their view, the first unacceptable feature was that this newarchitecture would include the Soviet Union by right, but exclude the UnitedStates and Canada. As Neil Malcolm aptly described it, Gorbachev’s initiativewas perceived as ‘an element in the well-worn Soviet tactic of playing up discordinside NATO at times of superpower tension in the hope of exerting a moderatinginfluence on American policy’.79 Malcolm further explained that it was also con-sidered as a ‘rhetorical device intended to appeal to anti-American sentiment inWestern Europe, whether on the left (hence the accompanying denunciations ofPentagon belligerence and of its doctrine of limited nuclear war) or on the neo-Gaullist right (hence the accusations of American arrogance and culturalimperialism)’.80 Peter Van Ham also exemplified this perception:

Gorbachev’s concept of a ‘European Home’ was just one more try todisengage western Europe from the United States by offering an ‘All-European’, or ‘Pan-European’, alternative to the previous structure ofEast-West separation and confrontation. Although both the United States

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and Canada were participating within the context of the CSCE process,there was no obvious role for them to play within the ‘Common Home’,thereby also leaving unclarified what the future position and functionof NATO would be and what kind of security arrangement wouldeventually replace the Atlantic Alliance.81

We cannot but recognise that many Russian experts had indeed underscored thedanger of increased pressure from the United States on Western Europe:

The countries of Western Europe are living through a complex and con-tradictory period. They increasingly feel the political, economic andfinancial pressure from the USA which is trying to bind West Europeansto its own policy and sometimes even acts from the positions of uncon-cealed domination. ‘Cultural expansion’ from across the ocean, or, inother words, the penetration of the American way of life with all its illsinto Western Europe, has grown to large proportions, which is fraughtwith an irreparable loss of West European independence. And all thishappens to countries with millennium-old cultures.82

However, Gorbachev’s response was that he had no intention to pull WesternEurope and America apart:

We are far from ignoring or belittling the historic ties that existbetween Western Europe and the United States. It is preposterous tointerpret the Soviet Union’s European line as some expression of anti-Americanism.83

In his famous speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 6 July 1989, heonce more officially declared that the USSR and the USA were a natural part ofthe European international political structure.

Obviously, Gorbachev’s ideas were also motivated by the need to influence theWest European discussion on the future structure of the European Community. Tocalm the fear that Moscow would be left aside from the successful process of eco-nomic integration in Western Europe, the Soviet leader brought up the need forsome form of mutually advantageous cooperation. Indeed, despite its repudiationof the idea of a free internal market, the Soviet Union was now constrained tocope with the European Community’s new economic dimension.

As for European governments, most of them were politically unwilling to paythe price of cooperation. The Twelve thus favoured a rather passive Communitypolicy towards the USSR, mainly based upon the assumption that the situation inthe Soviet Union was still highly unpredictable and, most importantly, not yetirreversible. Moreover, although European leaders were willing to consider thesituation in Soviet Russia less worrying in terms of global security, they refused

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to view this unexpected partner as a full member of the European society. ValéryGiscard d’Estaing’s comments exemplify this perception:

Relations with the Soviet Union will continue to be characterized by theambiguity attendant upon the actions of a superpower with a global (andnotably Asian) outlook which seeks to recognize for itself a Europeandimension. The Soviet Union’s European dimension cannot be political,since it will wish to continue to conduct a global diplomacy directedtowards other continents. It will not be economic, because the SovietUnion is neither disposed nor equipped to take on the conditions of theCommunity’s single market and the competition it will bring. The SovietUnion’s European dimension will therefore be limited to the Europeanspace – the fact that we inhabit the same continent. There is no such thingas a Common European home but there is a common European space –or, to put it another way, a ‘roof for Europe’. The problems that Easternand Western Europe have to solve together are those which derive fromour common space, from the fact that we inhabit the same continent.84

European countries also pointed out that, although Russian culture is an integraland significant part of a common European culture, Russia could not be auto-matically considered an heir to the same occidental tradition shared by theGermans, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Balts as well as the vast majority ofAmericans and Canadians. As Berndt von Staden underlined:

Europe never was, or only to a very limited degree, a united whole. It isRussia to become aware of the enormous differences which havedeveloped throughout European history and still exist today. Turkishrule in the Balkans, for example, cut off this region from the develop-ment in the rest of Europe for five hundred years and the effects are stillfelt today. At the beginning of the 18th century two major Europeanwars, the Spanish war of Succession and the Great Nordic War, tookplace at the same time without there being any significant connectionbetween the two. Most of all, against the background of the commonGraeco–Judaic heritage there are two different historico–culturaltraditions: a Latin–Catholic – and subsequently Protestant – tradition inthe West and up until the eastern part of central Europe, and theByzantine–Orthodox tradition, which encompassed Russia, but alsoincludes Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece.85

The US administration remained equally reluctant to reciprocate and put politicallimits on cooperation. American officials had preconceptions about Sovietbehaviour and international relations in general. These beliefs and assumptionswere essentially based on Realism. To most of the conservatives who held powerin Washington, Soviet proposals were designed to buy the Soviet Union time,

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a brief breathing space to revive itself for a new assault or to lull the West intolowering its guard.86 It appeared to them highly implausible that a system heldtogether for 40 years principally by coercion could transform itself quickly into aspontaneously cooperating alliance. Nuclear abolition in particular soundedvery suspicious. President George Bush, a Realist and a conservative, was alsosceptical about Gorbachev’s intentions.87

Caution and scepticism in the US foreign policy establishment would stillprevail after the transformation process in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s reactionsto these events were interpreted in Washington as another sign of weakness, atemporary expediency designed to buy time for the Soviet Union to regain itsstrength. In a larger sense, the United States refused to adopt cooperative policiestowards Russia. Only in the Persian Gulf did the United States cooperate, enablingit to assemble a winning coalition against Iraq that included the Soviet Union.Even the media preferred at the time to concentrate on the persisting differencesbetween Russia and the United States rather than on their potential resolution.According to journalist practices, ‘tough talk makes headlines’. In other words,stories about conflict are more newsworthy than stories about cooperation,and stories about war, even cold war, are the best news-sellers.88

Western and US governments thus finally dismissed the very idea of a CommonEuropean Home. They argued that some parts of the programme were alarminglyradical, others were vague, and that there was little detail on the concrete steps thatwould have to be taken in the short term. Furthermore, its underlying connotationof exclusiveness,89 although officially denied by Gorbachev, only reinforced initialsuspicions. They maintained that this proposal lacked conceptual clarity and thatthe Soviet plans for East–West cooperation were far too ambiguous:

The ‘Common European Home’ is the wrong metaphor. This expressiondistorts the reality of the present and blurs, whether intentionally orotherwise, our vision of the future. The concept of the CommonEuropean Home undoubtedly serves to blur the two distinct historicdevelopments currently unfolding on the continent of Europe: the unionof a group of sovereign states bringing together their resources and theirhistorical and cultural values and seeking a common approach to afederalism that can be adapted to their nature and to modern times; andthe expansion of relations of all kinds between all the states situatedwholly or partly on the European promontory of the continent of Asia.90

Conclusion

The oracle of our times has proclaimed unity,Which can be forged only with iron and blood

But we try to forge it with love,Then we shall see which is the more lasting.

(Fedor Tyutchev, nineteenth century Russian poet)

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Our study of the Russian approach to cooperative security has provided us with anumber of different examples, stretching from the early tsarist period to the mostrecent events of 1999. At first, all these examples of Russian experience of coop-erative security seem too different from one another for common conclusions tobe drawn. However, our study has proved otherwise.

With regard to the very notion of cooperative security, these examples demon-strated that cooperative security is indeed to be meant as a non-legally bindingarrangement. Even Alexander I’s Holy Alliance should not be seen under itscontemporary and rather military interpretation. If a treaty was signed by the suc-cessive members of this Alliance, what mattered most was not the existence of thattreaty, but more the religious dimension of that arrangement. Neither the treaty northe Alliance were then perceived as a contractual arrangement by which partici-pating powers would have to abide by rights and obligations. Only moral and ethicprinciples were to guide this endeavour. Likewise should the OSCE not be seen asa contradiction to our argument. If the OSCE is indeed an institution, it is never-theless ruled by the principle of equal status for all its members. This notion ofequal status or balance of power is also very characteristic of the Russian approachto cooperative security. This is very much in line with Russia’s inclination formultipolarity. Finally, these examples showed that Russia’s different cooperativesecurity initiatives constitute a continuity throughout Russian history, somethingthat comforts us in the idea that cooperative security is not pure fantasy, but is trulyanchored in Russia’s approach to its relations with other states.

In terms of results, however, one cannot say that any of Russia’s cooperativesecurity initiatives ever proved to be completely successful. On the contrary, allthese initiatives failed. From the Western point of view, the reasons usually putforward to justify such failures were either that these initiatives were too idealis-tic (the Holy Alliance), too vague (the Common European Home), or that theymight conceal some kind of Russian conspiracy against the West (Brezhnev’sthaw). In fact, Western leaders could be blamed for these failures, in that theychose to abandon each of the Russian cooperative security initiatives in whichthey were involved.

A priori, this observation bodes no good for our work. How can we decentlyconsider that cooperative security is the best arrangement for NATO–Russiarelations, if the former never seemed to be seriously receptive to this principle?Some may say that this is again due to a cultural clash between Russia and theAllied countries. Indeed, we cannot deny that the importance of the ‘given word’is a typical Russian preference, and that Western/NATO countries traditionallyconceive their relations in a contractual way. Others may advocate that the notionof equal status is unrealistic when considering interstate relations and that conse-quently cooperative security is nothing but utopian. They would most likely stressthe incompatibility of that principle with our current unipolar order. To thesecomments, we can say that the loss of this equal status principle could indeedbe a cause of failure, not because it distorts the power ratio between the partici-pating nations, but rather because this loss of equal status generates a shift of

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these countries’ individual interests. For example, the Holy Alliance did not failbecause of the decline of Russian power and the simultaneous rise of Prussianpower, but because these facts changed the nature of the interests that had firstbrought them together.

Conflicting interests were also responsible for the abortion of the other Russiancooperative security initiatives. With regard to the OSCE, it is clear that theWestern nations have always been reluctant to giving it a role that would competewith that of NATO. As far as the Common European Home is concerned, it wasobviously difficult for the same Western countries to envisage cooperation with acountry that still stood as their main rival. At that time, the West’s interests werefocused more on opposition with Russia/Soviet Union than cooperation with it.

Turning to NATO–Russia relations, it is very unlikely that such a pattern mayoccur. Indeed, let us not forget that NATO–Russia cooperation only concernsfields of common interests. Members of the NRC will always address issues forwhich they have already acknowledged having shared interests. Should an issueof conflicting interests between Russia and NATO arise, each of them still retainsthe possibility of addressing it separately from the other. On that basis, the NRCdoes provide good grounds for the establishment of cooperative security arrange-ments between NATO and Russia. It will continue to be so as long as NATO andRussia are able to find common interests.

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CONCLUSION

Melians But it is for this very reason that we now trust to theirrespect for expediency to prevent them [the Lacedaemonians] frombetraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing theconfidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.

Athenians Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goeswith security, while justice and honour cannot be followed withoutdanger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little aspossible.

Melians But we believe that they would be more likely to faceeven danger for our sake, and with more confidence than forothers, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them toact, and our common blood insures our fidelity.1

(Thucydides’s Dialogue between the Melians and the Athenians)2

When starting our research, we found ourselves confronted with a number ofpreconceived ideas or unfounded views about Russia, its relations with NATO andthe turn that these may take in the future. To many, Russia was still that ‘riddlewrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’, the heir of the Cold War main enemy, andan unreliable partner. As for NATO–Russia relations, these were often seen as‘mission impossible’, a partnership with no future, where integration of Russiainto NATO seemed at the same time the only solution and the most inconceivableone. Similarly, the notion of cooperative security was still perceived as utopian andvague, as a concept that could hardly be put into practice successfully, one that, ifinitiated by Russia, should be regarded as pure conspiracy. In other words, thechallenge ahead of us was not easy, all the more as the Russian approach was theangle that we deliberately decided to adopt to conduct this research.

Now that the research is complete, we are able to discard many of the precon-ceived ideas mentioned earlier and to provide well-argued reflections. In the firstpart of our work, our objective was to develop a better understanding of theRussian identity. Our analysis of the historical and geographical components of

that identity showed that the Russians had to conciliate sometimes antagonisticparameters to forge their identity. The latter had to embrace the diversity of theRussian population and come to terms with the successive legacies of foreigninvasions, occupations and influences. Of course, this led to an unusual mix that,if looked at from the outside, can well appear as totally contradictory. This con-tradiction, however, is the key to understanding the Russian identity. As GeorgeF. Kennan pointed out:

Contradiction is . . . the essence of Russia. West and East, Pacific andAtlantic, Arctic and tropics, extreme cold and extreme heat, prolongedsloth, and sudden feats of energy, exaggerated cruelty and exagger-ated kindness, ostentatious wealth and dismal squalor, violent xenopho-bia and uncontrollable yearning for contact with the foreign world, vastpower and the most abject slavery, simultaneous love and hate forthe same objects . . . The Russian does not reject these contradictions. Hehas learned to live with them, and in them. To him they are the spiceof life.3

This also forced the Russians to have a rather inclusive approach of their nationalidentity, in that any individual born on the Russian territory can define himself asRussian. This corresponds to the predominance of rossiskii over russkii.

The controversy over the definition of the Russian identity was not the doingof the West alone. Our study of the different Russian theoretical approaches tothat question underscored the difficulty that the Russian nationals themselvesencountered while trying to associate themselves with other cultural trends.Again, this is only due to the fact that the Russian identity is unique and does notfollow any exogenous standards.

Orthodoxy was found to play a primary role in reinforcing that Russian unique-ness. Russian history showed that Orthodoxy often acted as the only identitybenchmark, even for those who were not devout. As a unifying force againstinvaders, the only long-lasting cultural reference, and sometimes the only institu-tion of reference, Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church soon went beyondtheir pure religious status. In this way, they also mark the Russian identity ofsome of their distinctive features, such as an attachment to the past and anextreme reluctance to modernity; an inclination for anti-Western feelings; and theconviction of being vested of a universal spiritual mission. With regard to the rela-tions between the Russian Church and the Russian State, we came to the conclu-sion that these were not of a secular nature. Both are tightly intertwined in theconduct of Russian politics; they proved to be mutually reinforcing, driven by asimilar approach to it. Indeed, if the Russian Orthodox Church can be qualifiedas a non-democratic institution, we later found out that the Russian State wasmore marked by autocratic than democratic principles.

Consequently, nations engaging in relations with Russia must be preparedto deal with the ideas, values and positions of the Russian Orthodox Church.

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At present, there is no reason to believe that the role of the Church will decrease.As Michael Bourdeaux underlined:

Events of the last decade prove that the systematic attempt to deprivehuman nature of its inclination of the divine failed abjectly. Religion isdestined to be an important factor in the new societies that are emerging.[. . .] Religion, at this time, faces the challenge of either contributing tothe process of destabilization or of fulfilling its potential as an agent ofreconciliation. Meanwhile, the well-being of hundreds of millions ofpeople hangs in the balance.4

For NATO, this means that the actions and views of the Russian Orthodox Church,as well as its influence on the Russian State, should be well taken into account wheninteracting with Russia. One way of doing this is to include Russian Orthodoxrepresentatives in the community of relations between NATO and Russia.

The intimate relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and theRussian State also highlights the influence that the Church has exerted on the for-mation of the Russian political culture. Our study of Russian political culture wasinitially based on the principle that long and complicated historical events bywhich a nation is formed are likely to have a significant impact on its subsequentpolitical behaviour. The use of historical analysis permitted us not only to iden-tify views consistently held over long periods, or in varying contexts, or both, butalso to explain the occurrence of such attitudes from the circumstances in whichthey arose, and thus postulate the changed circumstances in which one mightexpect these attitudes also to change. Major features of Russian political cultureinclude the compelling tradition of centralism and the lack of a sense of individ-ual or group rights against the central power; fear of chaos and abhorrence of pub-lic dissent; caution or resignation in the face of questions that the central authorityis expected to decide; and xenophobic sensitivity.

Russian political culture is primarily rooted in centuries of autocracy. Eventhough the concept of autocracy in Russia embraces a rich historical experience,it did not go unchallenged. As a result, the Russian people tend to be submissivecitizens, accustomed to a top–down governance, in which they are told what to doand what to think. While scholars debate the relative importance of sub-culturalvariations, it is quite impossible to get away from the predominantly authoritariannature of Soviet and Russian political patterns. The 1993 Russian constitution isvery explicit in this regard.

Though instituting the principle of free, democratic and pluralistic elections, italso places extraordinarily strong, virtually autocratic, central powers in the handsof the president, who is accountable for and subordinate to none. Therefore, it iswrong to take the Russian constitution as the embodiment of democracy.Contrary to the West, the constitution in Russia is a façade only; it does notwork democratically in practice. In short, Russia can be qualified as an illiberaldemocracy.

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At this stage of our research, if any recommendation should be made, we cansimply caution the West/NATO against any desire to transform the Russian iden-tity into something that sounds more familiar. This is not only doomed to failure,but would also be harmful to the relations between the two parties. Indeed, theWest’s tendency to remodel the entire world according to its own values has onlyfurther reinforced the Russians in their resistance against it. In this context, what-ever the West may bring to Russia’s attention will be perceived as tentativeWesternisation. This explains why the North Atlantic Alliance is still perceived byRussia as an instrument of this ‘totalizing Westernization’.

Another lesson to be drawn from this is that NATO should abandon any pater-nalistic and professorial attitude towards Russia, for their relationship to continueon good grounds. In all its uniqueness, Russia has as much to teach the world asthe world has to teach Russia. In other words, this uniqueness should be dulyrecognised as a quality, a privilege.

More can be drawn from this study of Russian identity and be applicable to theWest/NATO’s dealings with the country. In order to assess to what extent theuniqueness of Russian identity affects its relations with the West, we have lookedat NATO–Russia relations from December 1991 to May 2002.

In 1991, the point of departure for a new relationship between a transformingRussia and a modernising NATO was the mutual understanding that security wasnot a zero-sum game one could play at the expense of others, and that, in thischanging world, cooperation was inevitable. This cooperation was difficult at firstbecause states find themselves in a competitive environment in which survival isnever assured. Russia’s delayed entry into the PfP programme in 1994, contra-dictory interpretations of the 1997 Founding Act, and Russia’s condemnation ofNATO enlargement created an atmosphere of increasing mistrust. And yet, inter-actions between the two parties continued. Russia proved to be a real – albeit self-limiting – participant in PfP and a willing interlocutor within the PJC. Likewise,the involvement of Russian military contingents in NATO’s peace support opera-tions in Bosnia–Herzegovina showed that military cooperation was possible,although many Russians were disappointed at NATO’s reluctance to initiate jointcoordination and joint decision-making. NATO air strikes on Kosovo, despiteMoscow’s opposition, gave a serious chill to bilateral relations and put a tempo-rary end to partnership activities. However, once again, NATO–Russia relationssurvived these diverging political views. The changing security environmentfollowing the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States presented anunprecedented opportunity for NATO and Russia, not only to review their part-nership with each other, but also to recognise their interdependence concerningthe safeguarding of vital security needs that neither can meet alone.

Viewed in this light, the creation of the new NRC in May 2002 is theconfirmation that NATO and Russia have entered a new era in their relationship.Of course, this should not give rise to premature optimism. Indeed, it willalways remain difficult to predict the exact course of relations not only betweenNATO and Russia, but, to a larger extent, among states and between states and

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international organisations. Having stated this, it must be recognised that the basisof the new post-11 September NATO–Russia relations is far more solid thanbefore. What changed is not really an increased understanding of each other’sculture, but the respect of certain principles that are key to Russia. Indeed, the trueand equal partnership launched by the creation of a Council at 20, including prac-tical cooperation in fields of core interest to Russia, constitutes a major differencecompared with the unequal relationship of a Council at 19 � 1 deprived ofany concrete possibility of any joint decision-making, and where cooperation onlyconcretised in areas of lesser significance. For the first time, Russia’s requirementsfor cooperation are met. By finally taking them seriously and admitting that Russiacould be right on a number of issues such as the threat of terrorism and prolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruction, NATO allies found the key to a more positiveand more reliable relationship with Russia. At this stage, it is important to pointout that the NRC format meets in many respects the fundamentals of cooperativesecurity. Such an observation is for us an indication that this principle may indeedbe the most suitable one for successful NATO–Russia relations.

The case study of NATO’s enlargement mainly proved that, contrary to whatmany experts advocated, it was not an obstacle to NATO–Russia relations. Thefact that Russia voiced publicly against the first wave of enlargement eastwards,and even resorted to countermeasures against that process, should not be mysti-fied or misinterpreted. These were the expression of national positions. As suchthey could not have any substantial impact on NATO’s policies. Enlargement didoccur again in 2004. Throughout the process leading to the new wave of enlarge-ment, the Putin administration made it clear that it did not support it, but wouldnot oppose it either. In the same vein, NATO Allies should accept that Russiamight not agree with all their decisions or policies, reassured by this case studythat such circumstances would on no account put a final end to their cooperationwith Russia.

However, before coming to any hasty and assertive conclusion, we decided tounderpin our work on a theoretical approach. In so doing, we looked at variousstrands of International Relations theory that offer insights concerning those con-ditions in which mutual interests can be utilised. By building confidence amongstates about each other’s intentions, cooperative security regulates attitudes thatmight lead to misperception. The closer the interaction among states, the morethey will find ways to further their security cooperatively. Statesmen will stillsometimes misperceive the consequences of their own actions or of others’stances, and thus distance themselves from a policy motivated by the primacy ofthe international interest. But this only provides evidence of the fact that theconduct of international relations is an art rather than a science. Older traditionalconcepts of security have proved inadequate to deal with modern security chal-lenges. Self-help and old-style balancing behaviour have given way to cooperativeefforts to promote stability.

There is one question frequently asked about cooperative security systemsinitiated by Russia: were they dictated by necessity or by a real and honest desire

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to embrace multilateral security arrangements? Actually, there is no prima faciereason why these two factors should be mutually exclusive. There is no need torecall that, as stated in the realist approach, the first objective of states is to ensuretheir survival in the international system. This, however, is not in contradictionwith the desire to develop cooperative security arrangements. In this regard, wehave seen that rational self-interested calculation sometimes leads actors toeschew individualistic decision-making in favour of a more cooperative standbecause independent behaviour can potentially result in sub-optimal or undesir-able outcomes. If we can recognise Russia’s sincerity about the establishment ofcooperative security arrangements with the West, we may wonder whether theWest shows equal readiness in following this direction.

History actually shows that the West has repeatedly dismissed the idea ofcooperation with Russia once its immediate and apparent usefulness ended. Ashighlighted in our analysis, the failure of the three Russian initiatives to build acooperative security system with the West – namely the Holy Alliance,Brezhnev’s détente, and the CSCE/OSCE – was partly, if not mainly, due to theWest’s lack of responsiveness. One of the reasons for the Western leaders not toreciprocate Russia’s proposals for cooperative security rests on the fear thatMoscow may plan a trick to lull the West’s vigilance and then to overrun it.However, above all, it was a shift in the West’s interests that usually caused thefailure of Russian cooperative security initiatives. History showed us that Russia’sinclination for cooperative security was not pure fantasy. The fact that divergingindividual interests may be the explanation for the failures of all these initiativesdoes not mean that cooperative security is not a valid principle. What it does meanis that the parties involved – in the present case, NATO and Russia – must findcommon ground on which they can then establish cooperative security arrange-ments. Such common ground between NATO and Russia became more apparentfollowing the 11 September 2001 events. As mentioned earlier, these events thenserved as the basis for the creation of the NRC, which we have already assessedas a good cooperative security framework.

For this to become an effective and long term solution to NATO–Russia rela-tions, two questions need to be addressed. First, one will have to make sure thatRussia is truly willing to pursue relations with an organisation that it considers tobe largely dominated by the United States, something that many perceive as thelogical result of US supremacy in international affairs. Second, one will also haveto assess NATO’s relevance to Russia in view of the recent and still ongoingtransformation that is affecting the Alliance.

Russia’s position vis-à-vis its relations with NATO, more particularly if thelatter is considered to be dominated by the United States, will mainly depend onthe nature of Russia’s relationship with the American superpower. In other words,NATO–Russia relations will act as a mirror of the level of cooperation betweenthe United States and Russia. As long as Russia is considered to be a privilegedinterlocutor for the United States, including an active role in the administering of

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important issues, and the possibility of acting on an equal footing on theseoccasions, the extent of US predominance over NATO affairs will be of secondaryimportance.

This became even more apparent on the wake of the 11 September 2001 attackson the United States. The recognition of Russia’s key role in the fight against ter-rorism and in the successful conduct of the coalition operations in Afghanistan,and the subsequent emergence of a new and unique partnership between theUnited States and Russia, were definitely beneficial to Russia’s involvementwithin NATO. Not only did Russia prove to be a strong ally in the US-led cam-paign, but it also proved to be a strong supporter of NATO’s activities in theframework of the fight against terrorism. This pattern has every chance to con-tinue in the future, and, in this context, no one should expect Russia to concretelyoppose the United States’ status within NATO. Washington could even become agood ‘go-between’ between Russia and the other NATO Allies, notably to addressRussia’s suggestions with the other NATO members. The possibility that Russiamay, on specific occasions, rally with the European allies against the UnitedStates should not be looked at with extreme concern. If Russia may not see anyinterest in openly opposing the United States’ status within NATO, it will equallynot be willing to openly side with it. Furthermore, one should not forget that, justlike every nation, Russia will give priority to its national interests, and will natu-rally side with those other countries either sharing similar interests or the mostable to support those of Russia.

Along these lines, one can say that the implications of NATO’s transformationfor NATO–Russia relations will vary depending on whether this transformation isbeneficial to Russia’s own interests. The fact that NATO is taking on new func-tions such as peacekeeping and peace-support operations, or engages itself in theinternational fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction, may be seen as denaturing NATO’s initial raison d’être. Many caneven fear that NATO’s gradual shift from a collective defence to a collective secu-rity organisation may be the first signs of the end of the Alliance. In Russia’s eyes,however, these changes are much of an added value, first because Russia hasalways advocated for NATO’s transformation into a security organisation; andsecond because issues like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction havealways been of greatest interest to the country. In other words, what can beregarded as a loss of relevance from a general point of view, happens to be a gainof relevance of NATO for Russia.

This favourable context for Russia’s greater involvement in NATO’s activitieswill, however, still depend on the degree of Russia’s conviction in the sincerity ofthe Alliance’s intentions to restore relations and in NATO’s readiness to take intoaccount Moscow’s vision of European security. In the same way as the UnitedStates managed to establish good relationships with a country that is so differentand, above all, was its number one enemy for over 50 years, there is no reason whyall Euro-Atlantic Allies within NATO would not manage to do so.

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Their first task will thus be to regard Russia just like any other valuable partnerand to initiate a relationship that is truly the one provided for by the Founding Act,one of equal and mutually reinforcing partnership. Concretely, this will meandevising policies that are simple, consistent, sustainable over the long run andmutually beneficial. Once this is achieved, the Allies will have to grapple with theother issues still hampering their relations with Russia. Why is it so difficult andtime-consuming to reach agreements with the Russians? Why do they alwaysseem to be delaying decisions instead of being reasonable and meeting ushalfway? Why are they so mistrustful of others, and can they be trusted to honouragreements? Obviously, some of these difficulties will not be changed easily, if atall, as they are the result of the Russian nature per se. However, let us not over-estimate these difficulties and bear in mind how easy it finally was for the UnitedStates to establish a good relationship with Russia.

At the practical level, a few recommendations can be made to facilitate boththe Allies’ and Russia’s work. First, it is essential to be more conscious of thedifferences existing between the Russian people and the Russian leadership’sapproach to NATO. Obviously, very few Russians have a fair understanding ofwhat NATO really is and how it works. On the other hand, many still view theAlliance as a military tool under the leadership and at the service of the UnitedStates. While these ideas are widespread among the Russian population, they maynot coincide with the thinking of the Russian decision-makers. In reality,President Putin is well aware of what NATO is about, and of the need for Russiato maintain cooperation with it. Likewise, the fact that the Alliance may be a toolin the hands of the United States may not necessarily be to the disadvantage ofRussia. It is thus most important to raise public awareness of NATO, changing theAlliance’s image in the Russian mind, and to ensure that these efforts are made incoordination with the Russian leadership. This idea is based on the principle thatthe Russian leadership, more than anyone else, knows what momentum to adoptin introducing any new thinking, and that any introduction of new ideas in anauthoritarian system like the one in Russia will be successful if conveyed by theleadership itself.

In practical terms, the success of this undertaking will depend on the profes-sionalism demonstrated by the NATO and Allied representatives in Russia. Thismeans that standard propaganda through the mass media should be avoided. Thisalso means that maximum openness, transparency, sincerity and goodwill willhave to be observed. On no account should Russian interlocutors be made to feelthat ‘need to know’ or ‘need not to know’ policies are being resorted to. These arethe fundamental principles for any relations with Russia in that they will act as theguarantee of mutual understanding and, above all, mutual trust.

This will have to be an all-out approach, not only including personal contactswith the top level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence andthe members of Parliament, but also addressing the representatives of theacademic community, business people, professors and students of universities andcolleges, even high school students in the capital, as well as in the provinces.

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Lectures, conferences, seminars and discussions sponsored jointly by NATOrepresentatives and Russian public and political organisations prove to be highlyeffective. A huge quantity of work has already been done with the establishmentof a NATO Information Office and a NATO Military Liaison Mission.

For its part, the NRC may be considered an embryo of a peaceful Europeanorder, and it is up to NATO and Russia to exploit this new instrument with itsconsiderable possibilities. Above all, it is an opportunity for frequent and directpersonal contact that will make a difference, as it is more than well-known amongthe Russophiles how important personal contacts are for the Russians. One caneven say that the Russians will want to know their interlocutors before evenenvisaging any relations with them. This explains why this instructive ground-work is often seen as a long and exacting task. Time is indeed an important factorin dealing with Russia; it cannot be overlooked or underestimated.

Second, it is impossible not to address the linguistic issue when it comes toimproving mutual understanding between NATO and Russian officials. Mutualunderstanding is often hampered by the language problem. This problem, techni-cal at first sight, strongly constrains cooperation between Russia’s and NATO’srepresentatives. The recourse to interpreters only raises an additional barrier,especially for the Russians, who praise direct contact. Promoting the grasp of theRussian language at NATO will thus permit eliminating these unnecessarybarriers, and showing the Alliance’s goodwill to establish trustful relationships –in this respect, the NATO–Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political andMilitary Terms can be considered as an encouraging example. This will also allowthe partners to identify their differences of understanding more easily.

A very basic – and yet very explicit example – is the use of nyet in Russiandiscourse. Nyet is a simple Russian word that is often misunderstood. Nyet seemsto be an almost automatic response by officials when asked if something can bedone; what, in the West, is usually perceived as an obvious sign of unwillingness.One should know that an initial ‘no’ in Russia is never definite. This is rather asimple – but effective – tactic aimed at gradually coercing the interlocutor toalter his position until the latter finally meets the Russians’ satisfaction. Thispractice is very much stamped with the Russian culture. For the understanding tobecome mutual, language education should not only apply to NATO officials.The Russians too should be encouraged to learn English. Both sides shouldexchange their methods of teaching foreign languages, organise advancedtraining programmes, etc.

Third, NATO officials who believe in their own superiority and mission shouldbe sensitive to Russian concerns. Without great-power status, Russians fear thatother countries will no longer give them the respect they are due and Russia willlose its influence in the world. Furthermore, Russia’s dire economic straits are acause of embarrassment, and its need for foreign aid is perceived as publiclyhumiliating. Russians do need aid from the West, but they do not wish to appearas beggars seeking charity. Those who are able to provide such assistance shouldrespect Russian officials as the representatives of a great culture and avoid

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appearing as condescending. Equality and mutual respect are watchwords thatneed to be kept in mind. Russians and Westerners negotiate as equals, andRussians are very sensitive to any intimations that they are not being treated withsufficient respect and dignity. Western advice has been proffered in plenty, butmuch of it has been in the form of nostrums, which are of limited value becausethey ignore the other side’s political, economic and psychological baggage.

Last but not least, if we wish the NATO–Russia relationship to develop rapidly,agreements reached should provide for reciprocity – what is done in one countryshould be matched by similar action in the other, and under equal conditions. Andmost importantly, the benefits to each side should be comparable. For this reason,current and future areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia will have tomeet the interests of both parties. In the same way, any decision to initiate coop-eration in a specific field will have to be followed by action. Mutual trust betweenNATO and Russia will only consolidate if NATO can prove to Russia that it cango beyond political statements, and if Russia can prove to NATO that it can be areliable partner.

Provided that NATO representatives adopt the adequate attitude, its future rela-tions with Russia could be much more stable, balanced and cooperative. In thiscontext, discrepancies between Russia and NATO would be nothing more thanroutine differences between partners. Just like Rome was not built in one day, onecannot expect NATO–Russia relations to be ideal at once. Given that thisrelationship had to be built on antagonistic grounds, the progress that has beenachieved in only 10 years is far from disappointing.

Looking at the long term perspective, and provided that the earlier practicalrecommendations are implemented, the prospects of NATO–Russia relationsappear in a rather favourable light. Indeed, at this point, we are able to assert thefollowing:

● The Russian identity is unique, but this uniqueness is not an obstacle to thepursuit of NATO–Russia relations;

● The evolution of NATO–Russia relations over the past 10 years should beconsidered with cautious optimism, but definitely with neither scepticismnor pessimism; past and future enlargement of NATO eastwards is not anobstacle to the pursuit of these relations; and NATO does provide a suitableframework for cooperative security arrangements with Russia;

● The general question of NATO’s role in the post-Cold War environment is notnecessarily a matter of concern for Russia; on the contrary, many aspects ofNATO’s transformation meet the expectations that the country has long nour-ished about the Alliance;

● The United States’ supremacy and its possible predominance over NATO affairsis not an impediment to Russia’s greater involvement in NATO activities, solong as relations between the United States and Russia will continue to followthe same positive pattern that they have since 11 September 2001;

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● The concept of cooperative security is not just rhetoric in Russia’s eyes; thispossibility, if taken seriously by the West, can well be the ideal framework forrelations with Russia.

Against this background, one decisive factor in shaping the future ofNATO–Russia relations are obviously the developments in Russian domesticpolitics. One cannot deny that a lot of what has been achieved since the freeze ofNATO–Russia relations during the Kosovo conflict is due to President Putin, hispolitics, and his vision of Russia’s relations with the West in general. The extentto which these achievements will be anchored or even deepened in the futuredepends largely on the future of President Putin in Russia. In the absence of anyserious political challenge, Putin won comfortably the last presidential electionsin March 2004. In principle, this will give him four additional years to pursue therehabilitation of Russia on the international scene and to further cooperationwith NATO. Whoever his successor may be, it will then be even more difficult tobacktrack.

Another important element is of course the evolution of relations betweenRussia and the United States, and more precisely the evolution of US policytowards Russia. As mentioned earlier, so long as Russia will be regarded as a keypartner by the United States, and be actively involved in the activities derivingfrom US foreign policy, it will be difficult to see Russia undermine this coopera-tion. As far as NATO is concerned, one will have to look carefully at the USpolicy in Euro-Atlantic affairs. Should the United States gradually decide to go italone, leaving NATO at a second-class rank, and should Russia be given theopportunity to play in the same courtyard as the United States, it is possible thatthe state of NATO–Russia relations may suffer a new radical change.

In any event, now that the Cold War is over and that NATO and Russia haveengaged in cooperative relations, the key to the success of that endeavour will bethe degree of interaction between the two parties. In this context, true interactionimplies constant knowledge, respect and understanding of one another, oneanother’s expectations as well as one another’s possible disagreement, disapprovaland opposition. As Friedrich Nietzsche rightly wrote: ‘Never ignore, never refuseto see, what may be thought against your thought’.

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NOTES

1 INTRODUCTION

1 Research implied regular and frequent stays in Russia and interviews with eminentRussian experts and scholars including inter alia Dr Dmitri V. Trenin, DeputyDirector of the Carnegie Moscow Centre; Professor Victor B. Kuvaldin, Member ofthe Executive Board of the Gorbachev Foundation; Dr Dmitri A. Danilov, Head of theDepartment for European Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences;Dr Nadia K. Arbatova, Director of Research Programs at the R.U.E (Russia in theUnited Europe); Dr Tatyana G. Parkhalina, Deputy Director of the INION (Instituteof Scientific Information for Social Science) at the Russian Academy of Sciences andHead of the NATO Documentation Centre for European Security Issues; Dr Lilia F.Shevtsova, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Moscow Centre; Dr Irina Kobrinskaya,Former Head of the Moscow East-West Institute; Professor Dr Elena Nemirovskaya,Director of the Moscow School of Political Studies; and Professor Dr Youri A. Borko,Head of the Centre on European Integration Studies at the Institute of Europe.

2 RUSSIAN IDENTITY

1 A. Solzhenitsyn, Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 38, 18 September 1990, pp. 3–6.2 In this study, ‘identity’ not only refers to the state of having unique intrinsic

characteristics, but it also designates the nature of an actor in relation to others. Theunderstanding of identity formation is also very useful for explaining a number ofbehaviours. See especially A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 227–35 and pp. 261–3.

3 See Z. Sikevich, Natsionalnoye soznaniye russkikh [Russians’ NationalConsciousness], Moscow: 1996.

4 See E. Chinyaeva, ‘The Search for the “Russian Idea” ’, Transitions, June 1997, p. 40.5 This enumeration is not exhaustive and could well include other identity components.

However, this study will limit itself to those elements that permit differentiating theRussian identity from others.

6 It is indeed of common logic to whoever looks into the identity of a given people toassume that this identity is a national one. One cannot afford to make such an assump-tion in the case of Russia, for the very reason that the notion of Russia is far too vagueat this stage of our study to be defined as national. Only after a thorough analysis ofall the components of the Russian identity will we be in a position to assess whether‘national’ is a term that characterises it correctly.

7 G. Vernadsky, A History of Russia, New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1961, p. 10.8 Ibid.

9 M. Bassin, ‘Asia’, in N. Rzhevsky (ed.) Modern Russian Culture, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 58.

10 See especially M. Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris: ChampsFlammarion, 2000.

11 As Nicholas Riasanovsky aptly explained: ‘The question of the origin of the Kievanstate is very closely connected with a group, tribe, or people known as the Rus,and it is also from the Rus that we derive the later name of the Russians.’ SeeN. V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 24.See also I. Ia. Froianov, Kievskaia Rus: ocherki sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii [KievanRus’: Essays on Sociopolitical History], Leningrad: Izdatelstvo LeningradskogoUniversiteta, 1980.

12 N. V. Riasanovsky, ‘Asia through Russian Eyes’, in W. S. Vucinich (ed.), Russia andAsia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples, Stanford: HooverInstitution Press, 1972, p. 5.

13 A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, New York:G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1893, p. 249.

14 Cf. Infra.15 N. Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, New York: Lindisfarne Press, 1992, pp. 22–3.16 For this argument, see also C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, La paix mongole, Paris:

Flammarion, 1970.17 For a thorough analysis of the influence of the cultural impact and the historic impli-

cations of the Mongol conquest and rule of Russia from the thirteenth to the fifteenthcentury, see especially C. J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, Bloomington,IN: Indiana University Press, 1985.

18 G. Nivat, Russie-Europe, la fin du schisme, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1993, p. 297.

19 See A. A. Zimin, Reformy Ivana Groznogo: ocherki sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi ipoliticheskoi istorii Rossii serediny XVI veka [Reforms of Ivan the Terrible: Essays onSocioeconomical and Political History of mid-XVI Century’s Russia], Moscow:Izdatelstvo Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960.

20 See Leroy-Beaulieu, op.cit., p. 282.21 A. Gleason, ‘Ideological structures’, in Rzhevsky, op. cit., p. 103.22 See especially E. Anisimov, Vremia petrovskikh reform [Time of Petrine Reforms],

Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1989. See also W. C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia1600–1914, New York: The Free Press, 1992, p. 35.

23 See N. V. Riasanovsky, The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 304.

24 For a useful analysis of the Petrine reforms, see V. O. Kliuchevskii, in E. V. Anisimov(ed.), ‘Petr I: Rozhdenie imperii’ [Peter I: Birth of Empire], Voprosy istorii, 1989,no. 7, 3–20. See also V. O. Kliuchevskii, Kurs Russkoi Istorii [Course on RussianHistory], Moscow: 1911.

25 See R. D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West, New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 2000, pp. 19–20.

26 N. Berdyaev, The Origins of Russian Communism, Ann Arbor, MI: University ofMichigan Press, 1972, pp. 110–35.

27 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989,book XIX, chapter 14, p. 315. Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, BasiaCarolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone.

28 Marquis de Custine, Empire of the Tsar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia,New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1989, p. 602.

29 See N. Berdyaev, The Russian Idea, New York: Lindisfarne Press, 1992, p. 32.30 Nivat, op. cit., pp. 200–1.

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31 J. H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture,New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1970, pp. 218–19.

32 See A. K. Dzhivelegov, Otechestvennaia voina i russkoe obshestvo [The Patriotic Warand the Russian Society], Moscow: I. D. Sytin, 1912.

33 A. G. Mazour, Russia Past and Present, New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1955, p. 30.34 See M. V. Nechkina, Dvizhenie dekabristov [The Decembrists’ Movement], Moscow:

Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1955.35 For an interesting description of Nicholas I, see Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 302.36 Famous formula of Nicholas I’s Education Minister Uvarov (1833–45). Those princi-

ples were more intended to keep out Western (mainly liberal French) ideas than topromote a sense of a Russian nation.

37 See W. C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914, New York: The Free Press,1992, p. 224.

38 See M. Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris: Champs Flammarion,2000, p. 710. See also N. K. Shilder, Imperator Nikolai I: ego zhizn i tsarstvovanie[Emperor Nicholas I: His Life and Reign], vol. I, St Petersburg: 1903.

39 The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War (1853–5) also convinced the tsar of thenecessity of major reforms since his regime was on the brink of political collapse.Other foreign woes of Russia’s included the revolt in Poland (1863) and thediplomatic defeat that followed military victory in the Balkans (1878). See alsoM. Heller, op. cit., p. 756; and S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksander II: ego zhizn itsarstvovanie [Emperor Alexander II: His Life and Reign], vol. I, St Petersburg: 1903.

40 For a positive assessment of these reforms, see Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 303.41 For thorough analysis of Alexander II’s reforms, see especially Riasanovsky,

A History of Russia.42 See G. Sokoloff, La puissance pauvre. Une histoire de la Russie de 1815 à nos jours,

Paris: Editions Fayard, 1996, p. 134.43 See J. M. Edie, Russian Philosophy, Chicago, IL: University of Tennessee Press,

1994, pp. 158–9.44 T. Mc Daniel, The Agony of the Russian Idea, Princeton, IL: Princeton University

Press, 1996, p. 15.45 Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p. 396.46 S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia [Memoirs], Moscow: Izadelstvo Sotsialno-ekonomich-

eskoi Literatury, 1960.47 The Stolypin reforms, aimed at creating a stable and independent middle-class peas-

antry, suffered a defeat. See A. V. Zenkovskii, Pravda o Stolypine [The Truth AboutStolypin], New York: Vseslavionskoe Izdatelstvo, 1956.

48 The revolution of 1905 really began Sunday 22 January when policemen opened fireon a huge workers’ mass demonstration. After this day known as the ‘bloody Sunday’or ‘red Sunday’, the tsar definitely lost the support of the workers who up to then hadremained loyal to him. The same year, other events would finally lead to theestablishment of a constitutional monarchy in Russia.

49 It is also important to note that by the late nineteenth century, tsarist colonial policyconsisted of systematic Russianisation of groups including the Baltic Germans, theFinns and other Western borderlands people, populations that had been sparedprevious policies of Russianisation.

50 M. Heller, Utopia in Power, New York: Summit Books, 1986, p. 224.51 For a Soviet view of the capitalist society, see A. A. Galkin, Sotsialnaia struktura

sovremennogo kapitalisticheskogo obshchestva i burzhuaznaia sotsiologiia [SocialStructure of the Contemporary Capitalist Society and Sociology of the Bourgeoisie],Voprosy Filosofii, no. 8, 1972.

52 R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles and C. Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System works, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 124–5, 133.

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53 See Mc Daniel, op. cit., p. 50.54 For this argument, see especially the analysis of Lenin’s leadership in Adam B. Ulam,

The Bolsheviks, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 414–48.55 See M. Heller and A. Nekrich, Utopia i vlast: istoriia Sovetskogo Soiuza s 1917g do

nashikh dnei [Utopia and Power: History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to today],New York, 1986.

56 N. N. Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1997, p. 96.

57 Ibid.58 These mainly included soldiers who fought to Berlin, and the occupying forces and

support personnel who followed.59 E. S. Seniavskaia, Frontovoe pokolonie. 1941–1945. Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issle-

dovanie [The War Generation. 1941–45. Historical and Psychological Research],Moscow: Institut Rossisskoi Istorii, 1995, p. 164.

60 See V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 36–7.

61 G. Arbatov, The System, New York: Times Books, 1992, p. 292.62 The Brezhnev doctrine foresaw that a socialist state should intervene in the affairs of

another should its socialism be threatened by internal or external attack or subversion.63 Losing the Cold War had generated a feeling of national humiliation. Numerous

examples include loss of lands as well as the fact of being relegated to the status ofpoor state with regard to the wealthy United States and Western Europe.

64 A. Besançon, ‘Nationalism and Bolshevism’, in R. Conquest (ed.), The Last Empire:Nationality and the Soviet Future, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1986, p. 9.

65 It is especially the then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev who has been criticised forhis liberal pro-Western policies. He had been called ‘Mister Da’ for his willingness tomake concessions to the United States.

66 This expression is commonly used to designate the Russian policy towards the nearabroad, aimed at the protection of national interests.

67 See H. Adomeit, ‘Russia as a Great Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality’,International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995.

68 M. Light, ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’, in N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison andM. Light (eds), Internal Factors of Russian Foreign Policy, New York: OxfordUniversity Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 36.

69 The ‘Russian Idea’ can be summarised as the messianic predestination of the Russiannation and its selection to fill an extraordinary role in world history. In contemporaryRussian journalism and intellectual circles, the Russian Idea means the cultivation ofthe special interests and a special role for Russians, both within the RussianFederation and across the territory of the former Soviet Union. For a thoughtful dis-cussion of the Russian Idea, see inter alia A. Gulyga, Russkaia ideia i ee tvortsy [TheRussian Idea and its creators], Moscow: Soratnik, 1995; M. A. Maslin, Russkaia ideia[The Russian Idea], Moscow: Respublika, 1992.

70 Cf. infra for the translation and the explanation of those two Russian words.71 Between 1552 and 1556, Ivan the Terrible captured the Tatar cities of Kazan and

Astrakhan. But it was the incorporation of Ukraine following the Pereiaslav Accords(1654) that fused Russia’s national identity with an imperial identity where the entirelegitimisation of the Russian State rested on the possession of the Western borderlands.

72 See K. Dawisha and B. Parrot, ‘Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics ofUpheaval’, in R. Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and theNew States of Eurasia, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 26.

73 Ibid.74 The crown then introduced ‘State Nationalism’ (‘Kazennyi natsionalizm’). See

S. G. Pushkarev, Rossiia v XIX veke, New York: Chekhov, 1956, p. 287.

NOTES

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75 See D. Pospielovsky, ‘Ethnocentrism, Ethnic Tension, and Marxism-Leninism’, inE. Allworth (ed.), Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance, New York:Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 125.

76 It is important to note that this word is in some ways untranslatable, for as comparedwith the English word people it has strong normative overtones.

77 D. D. Laitin, ‘Russian Nationalism in Russia and the Near Abroad’, in Identity inFormation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 308.

78 See also V. A. Tishkov, ‘What is Rossia?’, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 1, 1995,pp. 41–51.

79 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the consequent disappearance ofsovietskii (Soviet), rossiskii has assumed many of that adjective’s functions. SeeL. Ryazanova-Clarke and T. Wade, The Russian Language Today, London: Routledge,1997, p. 293.

80 Given this historic association of statehood with empire, it is not surprising that bothdemocrats and nationalists found it difficult to accept that some areas of the USSRwere no longer part of Russia.

81 The multinational character of Russia and this empire-consciousness help to explainthe rather uncomplicated cover of a ‘Soviet’ mentality after the Bolshevik Revolution.

82 Dostoevsky shared this view, as did many Slavophiles (cf. infra).83 A. Kartashev, ‘Pravoslavye i Rossiya’ [Orthodoxy and Russia], in S. Vershovskoy,

Pravoslavye v jizny, New York: 1957, p. 192.84 In this respect, Ivan IV’s rule is very representative.85 See especially Berdyaev, op. cit.86 See T. Spidlik, L’idée russe, Troyes: Editions Fates, 1994, p. 186.87 Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 28.88 F. C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956,

pp. 231–3. See also Nivat, op. cit., p. 230.89 See Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 297.90 Ibid., p. 298.91 See M. Bassin, Imperial Visions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, June 1999,

p. 67.92 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 300.93 See N. Trubetskoi quoted in Nivat, op. cit., p. 300.94 N. V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles, Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 87.95 Ibid., p. 31. See also Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 228.96 Chaadayev had already spoken of ‘sobornoye-consciousness’, and the idea is implicit

in the writings of Kireyevsky.97 Edie, op. cit., p. 161. For Russian sources dealing with the importance of communal

traditions, see N. Arsenev, Iz russkoi kulturnoi i tvorcheskoi traditsii [On RussianCultural and Creative Traditions], Frankfurt/Main: 1959.

98 See also Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p. 362.99 This notion of village-commune actually refers to the Russian obshchina.

100 Edie, op. cit., p. 161.101 Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p. 363.102 See A. Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.103 The term ‘Nationalism’ is a rather imperfect translation of the Russian word samobyt-

nost, which one could translate as ‘one’s own way of being’. See especiallyL. Schapiro, Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century PoliticalThought, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981, p. 5.

104 Abbott Gleason, ‘Ideological Structures’, in Rzhevsky, op. cit., p. 109.

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105 Konstantin Aksakov, quoted in Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching ofthe Slavophiles, p. 76.

106 See Mazour, op. cit., p. 30.107 Cf. supra. See also N. V. Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia,

1825–1855, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1961.108 See in particular Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles,

p. 11.109 See Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 231.110 See L. Schapiro, op. cit., p. 83.111 The leading Westernisers included Piotr Y. Chaadayev, Aleksander I. Herzen and

Vissarion G. Belinsky.112 Zapadniki is the Russian word for ‘Westernisers’.113 See Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 227.114 Ibid., pp. 236–7.115 Approximately around 1845.116 In this regard, the Hegelian influence was really predominant.117 See Edie, op. cit., p. 277.118 A. Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism, Palo

Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979, p. 162–3.119 F. Dostoevsky, Dnevnik pisatelia za 1877, 1880 I 1881 god [Diary of a Writer for the

years 1877, 1880 and 1881], Moscow and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo,1927, p. 454.

120 ‘Occidentalism’ can be defined as the quality or customs characteristic of Westernculture. It often refers to an image of the West constructed by non-Western societiesand designed to exemplify the contrast with ‘Orientalism’ or the vision of the Orient.For a useful conceptual discussion, see especially J. Carrier, Occidentalism: Imagesof the West, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

121 At a conference given on 21 February 2001 at the Catholic University of Louvain,Professor Georges Nivat provided us with very useful comments on this question. Seealso G. Nivat, ‘Du panmongolisme au mouvement eurasien’, in Vers la fin du mytherusse, Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1988, p. 127.

122 For the Asian influence on Russian culture, see notably N. S. Borisov,Otechestvennaia istoriografia o vliianii tataro-mongolskogo nashestviia na russkuiukulturu [Russia’s Historiography about the Influence of the Tatar–Mongolian invasionon Russian Culture], Moscow: 1976 and A. N. Nasonov, Mongoly i Rus. Istoriiatatarskoi politiki na Rusi, Moscow-Leningrad: 1940.

123 See G. Nivat, ‘Du panmongolisme au mouvement eurasien’, in Vers la fin du mytherusse, pp. 135–6.

124 A. Blok, ‘Skify’, in Stikhotvoreniia i poemy, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia Literatura,1968, pp. 231–2.

125 For a thorough analysis of Eurasianism, see especially O. Böss, Die Lehre derEurasier, ein Beitrag zur Russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhundert,Wiesbaden: Universität München, Ost-Europa Institut, Band 15, 1961.

126 Nicholas II had undertaken an extremely adventurist course in the East, culminatingin the disastrous confrontation with Japan in Manchuria in 1904 and 1905. SeeD. Schimmelpennik van der Oye, ‘Russia’s Asian Temptation’, International Journal,Autumn 2000.

127 Relevant Russian sources include inter alia M. G. Vandalovskaia, Istoricheskaianauka rossiiskoi emigratsii: Evraziiskii soblazn [The Historiography of the RussianEmigration: The Eurasian Temptation], Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskii mysli,1997; I. A. Isaev, Puti Evrazii: Russkaia intelligentsia i sudby Rossii [The EurasianPaths: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Fate of Russia], Moscow: Russkaia Kniga,

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1992; I. N. Sizemskaia and L. N. Novikova (eds), Rossiia mezhdu Evropii i Aziei:Evraziiskii soblazn [Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Eurasian Temptation],Moscow: Nauka, 1993.

128 Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., pp. 23–4.129 See especially N. S. Trubetskoi, ‘O Turanskom elemente v russkoi culture’ [On the

Turanian element in Russian Culture], Evraziiskii vremennik, 1925, no. 4, pp. 351–77.130 See G. Nivat, ‘Les paradoxes de l’affirmation eurasienne’, in Russie-Europe, la fin du

schisme, p. 293.131 The Russian ultra-nationalist and geopolitician Alexander Dugin founded on 21 April

2000 the ‘Eurasianist Movement’, which advocates an empire of all Eurasia,dominated by Russia. The goals of this Neo-Eurasian doctrine are to ensure Eurasianhegemony against the United States. This movement has undoubtedly exerted acertain influence on modern Russian political science, sociology and philosophy.

3 RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

1 S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

2 R. C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia, New York:W. W. Norton, 1987, pp. 116–17.

3 ‘Russian Orthodox Church’ designates here the official Russian Orthodox ChurchMoscow Patriarchate as recognised today by the government of the RussianFederation.

4 See L. Beauvisage, La Croix et la Faucille. La Religion à l’épreuve du Postsoviétisme,Paris: Editions Bayard, 1998.

5 A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and the Russians, London: G. P. Putnam’sSons, 1902, Part III: The Religion, pp. 46–7.

6 See the official web site of the Russian Orthodox Church, available athttp://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru

7 See S. B. Filatov and D. E. Furma, Religiia i politika v massovom soznanii[Religion and Politics in Popular Consciousness], Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia,vol. 7, pp. 3–15.

8 S. W. Baron, Modern Nationalism and Religion, New York: Harper and Bros., 1947,p. 167.

9 N. Petro, ‘Orthodoxy’s Symphonic Ideal: The Russian Church in Search of Tradition’,in The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1997, p. 65.

10 See C. Kelly and D. Shepherd, Russian Cultural Studies, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1998.

11 J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness, London:Macmillan, 1996, p. 288. See also D. Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR,New York: New York University Press, 1978, p. 468.

12 See N. Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of RussianOrthodoxy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

13 See S. Carter, Russian Nationalism, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, London:Editions Pinter, 1990.

14 V. Solovyev, ‘Velikii spor i khristianskaia politika’ [Great Discussion and ChristianPolitics], in Sobranie sochinenii, St Petersburg: 1911–14, vol. IV, p. 164.

15 See J. Witte and M. Bordeaux, Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia, The New Warfor Souls, New York: Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 2000, p. 234.

16 The minutes taken at this Council were written in a hundred chapters and that is whytheir compilation and the conference itself took on the name ‘Sto glav’ or ‘HundredChapters’.

NOTES

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17 From the ‘baptism of Russia’ when Prince Vladimir converted Rus’ to Christianity inthe tenth century, Russia has considered itself a holy, Christian land.

18 P. Miliukov, Religion and Church in Russia, Philadelphia, PA: University ofPennsylvania Press, 1960, p. 11.

19 Pholoteus was the Abbot of a Pskov monastery.20 Quoted in Miliukov, op. cit., p. 15.21 See V. S. Rusak, Istoriia russkoi tserkvy: so vremeni osnovaniia do nashikh dnei

[History of the Russian Church: From the Foundation to Today], New York:Jordanville, 1993.

22 For the early period, see E. Golubinskii, Istoriia russkoi tserkvy, The Hague: 1969,vol. 2, chapter 1. First published in 1900 in Moscow.

23 This very particular partnership is known in Eastern Christian theology as symphonia.24 See D. S. Likhachev, ‘Religion: Russian Orthodoxy’, in N. Rzhevsky, Modern

Russian Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 42.25 Dyarchy basically relates to the simultaneous government by two independent author-

ities. Etymologically, it can be split into di- and Greek arkhia ‘rule’, on the pattern of‘monarchy’.

26 See R. G. Skrynnikov, Gosudarstvo i tserkov na Rusi XIV–XVI vv. [State and Churchin Russia. XIV – XVI Centuries], Novosibirsk: 1991.

27 N. N. Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1997, p. 67.

28 See M. Bulgakov, Istoriia russkoi tserkvi [History of the Russian Church], Ann Arbor,MI: Ann Arbor Publishers, 1963.

29 See John Witte and Michael Bordeaux, Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia, TheNew War for Souls, New York: Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 2000.

30 Finally acting independently from the state, the Council elected a patriarch.31 Davis, op. cit., p. 212.32 See L. Regelson, Tragediia russkoi tserkvi 1917–1945 [Tragedy of the Russian

Church. 1917–1945], Paris: YMCA Press, 1977, p. 188.33 Quoted by Jane Ellis, ‘Religion and Orthodoxy’, in C. Kelly and D. Shepherd (eds),

Russian Cultural Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 275.34 P. Ramet, Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, Durham, NC:

Duke University Press, 1988, p. 73.35 See N. N. Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1997, p. 71.36 It is important to note that Gorbachev had merely done nothing during his first few

years in power.37 Petro, op. cit., p. 86.38 Ibid., p. 87.39 See S. P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central

Europe and Russia, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998, p. 236.40 Documents from the Central KGB archives in Moscow – now held by one of the

KGB’s successors, the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) –reveal that the Patriarch and other senior bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church hadcollaborated with the KGB. All bishops were bound to communicate with the Councilfor Religious Affairs which forwarded all its materials to the KGB. These documentswere seen by a number of researchers after these archives were briefly opened in thewake of the failed August 1991 coup, but access was closed again after the RussianOrthodox Church protested against the extent of the revelations.

41 See Miliukov, op. cit.42 Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., pp. 48–9.43 D. E. Furman, ‘Religion and Politics in the Contemporary Mass Consciousness’,

Russian Social Science Review, September–October 1994.

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165

44 See J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness,London: Macmillan, 1996.

45 See S. P. Ramet, op.cit.46 M. Bourdeaux, The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,

New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995.

4 RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Delran, NJ: The Legal Classics Library,1988, p. 414.

2 R. V. Daniels, ‘Russian Political Culture and the Post-Revolutionary Impasse’, TheRussian Review, vol. 46, 1987, p. 168.

3 L. Pye and S. Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton NJ:Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 516–17. For an early use of the term, see alsoS. Beer and A. Ulam, Patterns of Government, New York: Random House, 1958.

4 Pye and Verba, op. cit., pp. 513–16.5 See G. Almond, ‘Comparative Political Systems’, Journal of Politics, vol. 18, 1956,

pp. 391–409.6 See S. White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, London: MacMillan Press, 1979.7 White, op. cit.8 See R. C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri

Press, 1995.9 See R. C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia, New York:

W. W. Norton, 1987.10 For an extensive work on ‘culture’, see especially that of the anthropologist,

C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana Press, 1973.11 See A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and

Definitions,Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1901.12 See A. Brown and J. Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist

States, London: Macmillan Press, 1977.13 See C. Kluckhohn, ‘The Concept of Culture’, in R. Kluckhohn (ed.), Culture and Behavior:

Collected Essays of Clyde Kluckhohn, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.14 Pye and Verba, op. cit., p. 554.15 G. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science, London:

Sage Publications, 1990, p. 150.16 For a thorough analysis of the evolution of Russian political culture, see especially

V. S. Gidkov and K. B. Sokolov, Deciat vekov rossiiskoi mentalnosti: kartina mira ivlast [Ten Centuries of Russian Mentality: Picture of Peace and Power], St Petersburg:Izdatelstvo Aleteiia, 2001.

17 As a Russian soldier is reported to have told Sir George Buchanan, the Britishambassador to Russia in 1917. Quoted from Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels. 1600–1800,London: The Norton Library, 1973, p. 257.

18 White, op. cit., p. 40.19 See T. Daniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 16.20 R. Bova, ‘Political Culture, Authority Patterns, and the Architecture of the

New Russian Democracy’, in H. Eckstein, F. J. Fleron, E. P. Hoffmann andW. M. Reisinger (eds), Can Democracy take root in Post-Soviet Russia?United States: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 185. See also V. Lapkinand V. Pantin, Russkii poryadok [The Russian Order], Polis, no. 3, 1997.

21 For the structure of pre-Petrine governments, see V. Stroev, Ocherki gosudarstvamoskovskogo pered reformami [Essays on the Moscovite State Before the Reforms],Rostov/Don: 1903.

NOTES

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22 See R. Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1974.23 See A. Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars and The Russians, New York:

G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1893, p. 268.24 See N. N. Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1997, p. 34.25 See P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870–1880-kh godov

[Crisis of Autocracy at the dawn of 1870–80], Moscow: Izdatelstvo MoskovskogoUniversiteta, 1964, pp. 451–60.

26 S. S. Oldenburg, Last Tsar: The Autocracy, 1894–1900, United States: AcademicInternational Press, 1975.

27 V. Dal, Poslovitsy Russkogo Naroda [Russian Proverbs], Moscow: 1970, pp. 244–7.28 A. Inkeles and R. A. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in Totalitarian Society,

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. 246–7.29 See R. Wortman, ‘Moscow and Petersburg: The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist

Russia, 1881–1914’, in S. Wilentz (ed.), Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, andPolitics Since the Middle Ages, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1999.See also G. Freeze, Reforma ili revolutsiia? Rossiia, 1861–1917 gg [Reform orRevolution? Russia, 1861–1917], St Petersburg: Nauka, 1992, pp. 32–5.

30 See B. V. Ananich, Vlast i reformy: ot samoderzhavnoi k sovetskoi Rossii [Power andReforms: From Autocracy until Soviet Russia], St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 1996,pp. 158–9.

31 S. White, ‘The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism’, in A. Brown andJ. Gray (eds), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, London:Macmillan Press, 1977, p. 34.

32 R. Pipes, ‘The USSR or Russia?: The Historical Perspective’, in U. Ra’anan andC. M. Perry (eds), The USSR Today and Tomorrow: Problems and Choices,Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Co., 1987, p. 30.

33 S. Pushkarev, Self-Government and Freedom in Russia, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1988, p. 19. Translated from the Russian ‘Glas bo naroda – glas Bozhiy’.

34 We had a very stimulating discussion on this subject with Dr Nadia Arbatova, a wellknown Russian scholar. During the interview, she even stated that after a period oftransition/adaptation, Russia would be in a position to experience the same kind ofdemocracy as in the West.

35 See V. I. Sergeevich, Veche i kniaz: russkoe gosudarstvennoe upravlenie vo vremenakniazei riurikovichei [Town-Assemby and Prince: State Power at the time of theRussian Princes], Moscow: 1867, pp. 50–80.

36 Mir in fact has three meanings in Russian – village commune, world and peace – andfor its members it symbolised all three.

37 The Boyar Duma was merely an advisory, not a representative institution.38 These councils, which met from the mid-sixteenth until the mid-seventeenth

century, more closely resembled an institution of an embryonically parliamentarycharacter. See L. V. Cherepnin, Zemskie sobory russkogo gosudarstva v XVI–XVII vv.[Popular Councils of the Russian State in the XVI–XVII Centuries], Moscow:Nauka, 1978.

39 A. R. Myers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789, London: Thames andHudson, 1975, p. 41.

40 See O. A. Omelchenko, Zakonnaia monarkhiia. Ekateriny II: prosveshchennyiabsoliutizm v Rossii [Legal Monarchy. Catherine II: Enlightened Absolutism inRussia], Moscow: Iurist, 1993, pp. 30–45.

41 See Petro, op. cit.42 The October 1905 Manifesto was, in no small measure, the result of the preparatory

work of the zemstvos.43 N. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 408.

NOTES

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44 A. Levin, The Second Duma. A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the RussianConstitutional Experiment, Hamden: Hamden Press, 1966, pp. 63 and 234.

45 Successful democracy is underpinned by civil society, through the autonomousorganisation of voluntary associations that have high participation levels and sharedvalues. A vibrant civil society is widely seen as a fundamental check against the re-emergence of an authoritarian state power.

46 Ibid.47 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989,

p. 157. Translated and edited by A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller and H. S. Stone. Firstpublished 1748.

48 As he explained in a speech on 9 September 1991, the August events had confirmed the‘irrevocable character of the changes to which democratization and glasnost had led’.

49 See M. Wyman, in M. Bowker and C. Ross (eds), Russia and the Cold War, Harlow:Pearson Education Ltd., 2000.

50 H. Eckstein, ‘Russia and the Conditions of Democracy’, Can Democracy take root inPost-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations, United States: Rowmanand Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 372.

51 Ibid.52 M. Urban, The Rebirth of Politics in Russia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1997, p. 291.53 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation had continued

to operate under the 1978 Soviet Constitution, which had been amended over 300times.

54 Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,p. 277. See also ‘Russian Constitution’, available at http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/constit.htm, article 13

55 The international practice recognises that governmental power should be separatedamong several different branches of government. This modus operandi prevents onebranch of the government from exercising control over another.

56 See ‘Russian Constitution’, available at http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/constit.htm, articles 120 and 122.

57 Ibid., article 128.58 C. M. McPherson, ‘Russia’s 1993 Constitution: Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a

Return to Autocracy?’, Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 163.59 Yeltsin sacked the government three times in 1998 and 1999.60 In August 1998, Yeltsin and Duma leaders reached a tentative agreement by which the

Duma agreed to refrain from attempts to impeach Yeltsin or pass votes of noconfidence in Yeltsin’s government. In return, Yeltsin promised not to dismiss theParliament.

61 McPherson, op. cit., p. 162.62 See T. Barber, ‘Russia: Yeltsin Invites Vote Against Democracy’, Independent,

London, 6 December 1993.63 The new ‘Tsar’ Putin also introduced a key instrument to strengthen the vertical

power axis by appointing seven Authorised Representatives with whom he can shapehis regional policy and enforce federal laws. These Representatives implementexclusively the policy of the centre and coordinate the regional governments on thepresident’s behalf.

64 R. Rose, W. Mishler and C. Haerpfer, Democracy and Its Alternatives: UnderstandingPost-Communist Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 1998, especiallychapter 2.

65 This definition can be attributed to Professor Rob de Wijk in his recent work on thesubject.

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66 See the data of the socio-political orientation survey held in 1992–3 by the RAS, theRussian Institute of Sociology.

67 M. Mead, Soviet Attitudes toward Authority, New York: William Morrow, 1955, p. 26.

5 THE EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TO NATO

1 It was indeed absolutely indispensable to establish a coordinating body used as aninstrument regulating areas of common interest and capable of ensuring ‘controlleddisintegration’. See R. W. Piotrowicz, ‘The CIS: Acronym as Anachronism’,Coexistence, vol. 29, 1992, pp. 377–88.

2 See V. Matveyev, ‘The New Russian Diplomacy: The First Months’, InternationalRelations, 1992, pp. 77–94. See also I. I. Lukasuk, ‘Russland als Rechtsnachfolger inVölkerrechtliche Verträge der UdSSR’, Recht, 39. Jahrgang, Heft 4, 1993.

3 A. Kozyrev, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, no. 1, 15 January 1992, p. 12.4 S. N. MacFarlane, ‘Russia, the West and European Security’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 3,

Autumn 1993, p. 9.5 This concept had a different meaning in Russia than it had in the West. For the West,

the Common European Home first and foremost meant freedom for central Europeanstates and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. The Western elite did not seriouslyconsider either dissolving NATO or accepting Russia into the Alliance. Cf. infra.

6 See also F. Carr and K. Infantis, NATO in the New European Order, London:Macmillan, 1996, chapter 1.

7 J. Surovell, ‘Post-Soviet Russia: In from the Cold in Europe – or Kept Out in theCold’, European Security, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1997, p. 22.

8 N. A. Arbatova, ‘Russia and NATO: a Russian View’, in R. de Wijk, B. Boxhoorn andN. Hoekstra (eds), NATO After Kosovo, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 2000, p. 45.

9 S. N. MacFarlane, ‘Russia, the West and European Security’, Survival, vol. 35, no. 3,Autumn 1993, p. 20.

10 See V. Baranovsky, ‘Russia: Insider or Outsider?’, International Affairs (Moscow),vol. 46, no. 3, July 2000, pp. 443–5.

11 H. Adomeit, ‘Russia as a “Great Power” in World Affairs: Images and Reality’,International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, pp. 35–68.

12 See M. Khrustalev, ‘Evolutsiia SNG i vneshnepoliticheskaiia strategiia Rossii’[Evolution of the CIS and Russia’s Foreign Politics’ Strategy], DiplomaticheskiiVestnik, no. 21–2, 1992, pp. 39–40.

13 Although it formally recognises the full sovereignty of the CIS members, Russia stillinsists towards the newly independent states that those military bases are indispensa-ble and must remain exclusively under Russian control. Russia is implicitly expectingthat the CIS states give up part of their sovereignty and independence. This obviouslyproves that Russia does not consider its direct neighbours as having equal rights.See S. Karaganov, ‘Problemy zashchity interesov rossiisko-orientirovannogo nase-leniia v blizhnem zarubezhye’ [Problems related to the Defence of the Interests ofRussophile Populations in the Near Abroad], Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21–2,1992, pp. 44–5.

14 In July 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a Friendship Treaty recognising Ukraine’sindependence which settled the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet: Ukraine got a fifth,while Russia would pay a 20-year lease on the Crimean port of Sevastopol.

15 The Crimea was taken from the Turks by Russia in the 1780s and was only attachedto Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954. The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was at the timecontested by the Russian government.

16 These include the northern territories of Kazakhstan which are mainly populated byRussians, but also those living in Moldova and in the Baltic States.

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17 The victory of ultranationalists and communists in parliamentary elections inDecember 1993 reflected widespread dissatisfaction with both domestic reforms andone-sided pro-Western foreign policy.

18 See also S. N. MacFarlane, ‘NATO in Russia’s Relations with the West’, SecurityDialogue, vol. 32, no. 3, September 2001, p. 284.

19 During the extraordinary meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of theWarsaw Pact in Budapest on 25 February 1991, it was decided to dissolve the mili-tary organisation of the alliance. It is interesting to note that some of the proponentsfor the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact began to declare their intention of integratingthe Western Euro-Atlantic structures.

20 See ‘London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance’, NATO Office ofInformation and Press, 1990.

21 See North Atlantic Council, 1990.22 See North Atlantic Council, 1991.23 Ibid.24 US forces stationed in Europe were for example cut by over 60 per cent.25 See the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) Concept as a ‘key means of responding

quickly and effectively to a wide range of eventualities’. When the CJTF was formallyendorsed at the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO’s former Secretary General ManfredWörner described it as ‘a logical step in adapting NATO’s force structures’.

26 The well-known Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on ‘the right of indi-vidual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter’ andstates that ‘an armed attack against one or more of the Parties in Europe or NorthAmerica shall be considered an attack against them all’.

27 North Atlantic Council, 1991.28 On 30 May 1997, at their meeting in Sintra, NATO Allies and Partner Heads of State

and Government launched the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) whichreplaced the NACC. This decision aimed at combining the positive experience of theNACC and the PfP by providing an overarching framework for political and security-related consultations and for enhanced cooperation under the PfP programme.

29 See B. Meyer, ‘Study on NATO’, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, no. 38.30 S. Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, Boston, MA: Rowman and

Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 66. See also Andrei Kozyrev’s speech at the extra-ordinary meeting of the NACC in March 1992, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, no. 7, 1992.

31 See R. de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium. The Battle for Consensus,London: Brassey’s, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, 1997, p. 64; D. S. Yost, NATOTransformed. The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, Washington, DC:United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p. 150.

32 Adomeit, op. cit., p. 36.33 See the study made by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and published in

Izvestia, 26 November 1993.34 See my comments in ‘La Russie face à l’OTAN au-delà du syndrome du Kosovo’, in

T. de Wilde and L. Spetchinsky (eds), Les relations entre l’Union européenne et laFédération de Russie, Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d’études européennes, 2000,pp. 192–3.

35 V. Baranovsky, ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart From Europe’, InternationalAffairs, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 453.

36 S. R. Sloan, ‘NATO’s Future in a New Europe: An American Perspective’,International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, 1990, pp. 495–511.

37 Indeed, the OSCE cannot take any measure against an offending state if this latterdisagrees. The US and Malta have theoretically the same equal rights and the sameinfluence. Moreover, traditional antagonisms like those between Greece and Turkeywould frequently block consensus. See Jonathan Dean, ‘The Post-Cold War Security

NOTES

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System in Europe – An Evaluation’, Cornell International Journal, vol. 24, 1991,pp. 457–73.

38 In 1990, the Paris Summit established in Vienna a Conflict Prevention Center coordi-nating all information on armed forces and confidence-building measures (CSBM).

39 Russia formally accepted the IPP and the ‘areas on pursuance of broad, enhancedNATO–Russia dialogue and cooperation’ on 31 May 1995.

40 The Visegrad Four is an unofficial name given to the four central European post-communist countries: the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republicof Poland and the Slovak Republic. For more information, see http://www.visegradgroup.org

41 Elections of the State Duma were due in the latter half of 1995 and NATO was an easytarget for bitter diatribes from all sides. For arguments put forward by PfP opponents,see V. Chernov, ‘Moskva dolzhna khorosho podumat, prezhde chem otvechat na pred-lozheniye NATO’ [Moscow must think before answering to NATO’s Proposition],Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 February 1994; A. Migranyan, ‘Zachem vstupat, yesliluchshe ne vstupat?’ [Why should we integrate if it’s better not to?], NezavisimayaGazeta, 15 March 1994.

42 See ‘Boris Yeltsin – za spetsialnoye soglasheniye s NATO’ [Boris Yeltsin – for aspecial agreement with NATO], Izvestiya, 7 April 1994.

43 J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? Boston,MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 11.

44 Kay, op. cit., p. 71.45 L. Cooper, Russia and NATO, London: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 160.46 Kay, op. cit., p. 68.47 O. Antonenko, ‘Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo’, Survival,

vol. 41, no. 4, Winter 1999–2000, p. 128.48 A. Arbatov, ‘NATO and Russia’, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 2, June 1995, p. 140.

See also N. A. Arbatova, op. cit., p. 52.49 It is worth noting that at its December 1992 Oslo Meeting, NATO – not least because

it was looking around for new collective tasks – stated its readiness to ‘supportpeacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council which has theprimary responsibility for international peace and security’. Moreover, ‘the UN is thesole international organization that provides the legal authority for peacekeeping oper-ations’. A UN authorisation is therefore needed before a NATO operation can be inter-nationally accepted. See NATO Handbook, NATO Information Office and Press, 1995.

50 The NATO-led operation in Bosnia was called ‘Joint Endeavour’ and was alsoNATO’s first ‘out-of-area’ deployment. It was then renamed ‘Joint Guard’.

51 These forces came under NATO command and control following a transfer ofauthority on 20 December 1995 and the termination of UNPROFOR’s mandate.

52 UN Security Council Resolution 1031 foresees that the IFOR operates under ChapterVII of the UN Charter (i.e. Peace Enforcement).

53 General Shevtsov, ‘Russian–NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia’, NATO Review,March 1997.

54 The Commander of the MDN was General William L. Nash. The MDN headquarterswere established in Tuzla.

55 SFOR had originally been established for a planned period of 18 months. It had tofulfil tasks similar to those of its predecessor, but with ‘more emphasis on the civil-ian component’ and half the number of soldiers (30,000). SFOR’s mandate wasrenewed in June 1998.

56 Arbatova, op. cit., p. 52.57 Antonenko, op. cit., p. 128.58 A. Golts, ‘Rasshireniye NATO: taim-aut ili dlinnyi razbeg?’ [NATO Enlargement:

Time Out or Long Run-Up?], Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 October 1995.

NOTES

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NOTES

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59 Baranovsky, ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart From Europe’, International Affairs,vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 452. See also S. M. Rogov, ‘Rossiia i NATO’ [Russia andNATO], Ssha, no. 10, October 1996, pp. 3–8.

60 The first PJC meeting at the level of Ambassadors was held at NATO Headquarterson 18 July 1997.

61 Antonenko, op. cit., p. 130.62 The decision to sign the NATO–Russia Founding Act was pushed through by

Primakov against considerable domestic opposition. See also his interview onNATO’s expansion in Novoe vremya, no. 15, 20 April 1997, pp. 24–6.

63 Baranovsky, ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe’, p. 452.64 See L. Ivashov, ‘Russia–NATO: Matters of Cooperation’, International Affairs

(Moscow), vol. 44, no. 6, 1998, p. 112.65 See U. Brandenburg, ‘NATO and Russia: A Natural Partnership’, NATO Review,

July–August 1997, pp. 20–1.66 See ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between

NATO and the Russian Federation’, NATO Office of Information and Press, 27 May1997.

67 Although the Founding Act stipulated that Moscow was to be consulted on all securityissues affecting its interests, another part of the agreement indicated that suchconsultation confers no authority and would not enable Russia to veto NATOdecisions. See ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and SecurityBetween NATO and the Russian Federation’ (NATO Office of Information and Press,27 May 1997). See also M. Light, S. White and J. Löwenhardt, ‘A Wider Europe: theView from Moscow and Kyiv’, International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, 2000, p. 80.

68 See R. Ovinnikov, ‘Akt o kapitulyatsii Rossi’, Pravda, 23–30 May 1997.69 I. Isakova, ‘Relations with Russia: Go Slow, Don’t Spoil the Illusion . . .’, RUSI

Journal, February/March 1999, p. 30.70 Surovell, op. cit., p. 32.71 Quoted from the NATO Review, July–August 1997.72 The Centre began its activities in February 1998, first as NATO Documentation

Centre for European Security Issues, then as Centre for European Security Studies.During one interview, Dr Tatyana G. Parkhalina, the current Head of the Centre,provided us with useful information on the creation of the Centre.

73 ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO andthe Russian Federation’, NATO Office of Information and Press, 27 May 1997.

74 ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO andthe Russian Federation’, Section III, Areas of Consultation and Cooperation, NATOOffice of Information and Press, 27 May 1997.

75 See N. Afanasevskii, ‘Osnovopolagaiushchii akt Rossiia–NATO’ [The Russia–NATOFounding Act], Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, no. 6, 1997, pp. 8–12.

76 See NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, pp. 84–5.77 During several interviews, Dr Tatyana G. Parkhalina, Head of the NATO

Documentation Centre for European Security Issues in Moscow, gave us a very clearpicture of the impact of the Kosovo crisis on NATO–Russia relations from a Russianpoint of view.

78 Arbatova, op. cit., p. 43.79 See Y. Morozov and I. Nekipelyi, ‘Mirotvorcheskaya agressiya NATO’ [NATO’s

Pacific Aggression], Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 6 November 1998.80 D. Trenin, ‘Russia–NATO Relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces’, NATO Review,

Spring 2000, p. 19.81 See I. Zevelev and S. Cross, ‘Moscow and the Yugoslav Secession Crisis’, in

C. P. Danopoulos and K. G. Messas (eds), Crisis in the Balkans: Views from theParticipants, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.

82 For an interesting discussion of this argument, see A. Arbatov, The Kosovo Crisis: TheEnd of the Post-Cold War Era, The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 2000,pp. 3–4. For earlier work on the importance of traditional Russian–Serbian ties inRussia’s policy towards the Balkans, see C. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and BalkanNationalism, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958.

83 In the end, the Russian government did not provide advanced anti-aircraft systemsand other forms of military support to Belgrade. See V. Gobarev, ‘Russia–NATORelations after the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications’, The Journal of SlavicMilitary Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, September 1999, p. 4.

84 Although supported by Nationalists, radical Communists and the large part of publicopinion, Russia’s direct intervention in favour of Yugoslavia was hampered bypractical obstacles. Either ground or air communications could be easily blockadedby NATO forces.

85 Russia did not, however, suspend its deployment to Bosnia as an adjunct to theNATO-led peacekeeping force. A de facto boycott of Russia’s participation in the PfPwas combined with practical cooperation in SFOR and occasional consultations onsuch issues as defence–industrial cooperation and peacekeeping doctrine.

86 See infra for an extensive analysis of NATO enlargement.87 Antonenko, op. cit., p. 131. See also V. I. Dashichev, ‘Natsionalnaia bezopasnost

Rossii i ekspansiia NATO’ [Russian National Security and the Expansion of NATO],Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, no. 11/12, 1997, pp. 20–6.

88 See A. Arbatov, ‘The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons LearnedFrom Kosovo and Chechnya’, The Marshall Center Papers, no. 2, George MarshallEuropean Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2000, pp. 10–11.

89 ‘National Security Concept of the Russian Federation’, www.scrf.gov.ru90 ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, www.mid.ru/mid/eng/

econcept.html91 These changes will be examined in the case study on NATO enlargement. Cf. infra.92 This interpretation persisted even after the press started to convey a more balanced

view by mid-April 1999.93 Yeltsin appointed Chernomyrdin as his Special Envoy in part to limit the power of

Primakov and in part to regain control of foreign policy. Primakov was indeedsuspected of playing games with the Communists in the Duma and becoming toopopular in Russia as a possible successor to Yeltsin. While Primakov was an expertdiplomat who officially opposed NATO’s action against Yugoslavia, the appointmentof Chernomyrdin was a clear signal for Primakov that his time was running short.Indeed, a month and a half after the beginning of the war, Primakov was dismissedfrom his post. Yeltsin and the Russian Democrats were at the time strongly attackedinside the country for the failure of economic reform (August 1998 default) and forinfinite unilateral concessions to the West on the international scene.

94 Nevertheless, when Chernomyrdin agreed to NATO’s terms of settling the conflictand managed to get Milosevic’s consent to them, hardliners in Moscow accused himof having betrayed Russian and Yugoslav interests. See G. Zyuganov, N. Ryzhkov,N. Kharitonov, ‘Mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost pod ugrozoi. Zayavleniye fraktsiiGosdumy’ [International Security Threatened. Declaration of a Duma Fraction],Pravda, 10 June 1999.

95 A. Frye, ‘The New NATO and Relations with Russia’, in T. Galen Carpenter (ed.),NATO Enters the 21st Century, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 97.

96 Gobarev, op. cit., p. 6.97 Antonenko, op. cit., p. 138.98 Ibid.99 See ‘NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping’, NATO Office of Information and

Press, February 2001.

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100 Baranovsky, ‘Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe’, p. 446.101 The KFOR experience contributed indeed to the development of military-to-military

relations on the ground and to increases in Russia’s participation in operationalplanning. In addition, NATO and Russian troops alike soon recognised that theircooperation on the ground was effective and very useful.

102 The first PJC meeting dealing with KFOR issues took place two months after the endof NATO air strikes.

103 Professor Dr Elena Nemirovskaya, Director of the Moscow School of PoliticalStudies, provided us with valuable information regarding NATO–Russia relations inthe aftermath of the Kosovo conflict.

104 Several meetings with both Dr Rolf Welberts, Director of the NATO InformationOffice, and Major General Peter Williams, Head of the Military Liaison Mission,were extremely useful for improving our understanding of these NATO representa-tions in Moscow.

105 See O. Antonenko, ‘Putin’s Gamble’, Survival, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001–2, p. 49.106 Moscow supported UNSC resolution 1373 which in effect endorsed the US military

action against the Taliban.107 It is important to note that Russia viewed Afghanistan under the Taliban rule as an

acute source of destabilisation in the region and a key exporter of Islamic terrorismto Chechnya. From 1996, Russia was the main supplier of military support to theNorthern Alliance, and provided it with large quantities of weapons and warequipment in the aftermath of 11 September.

108 A. Lieven, ‘The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States, Russia and the InternationalOrder after 11 September’, International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, 2002, p. 251.

109 This confrontational stance was mainly advocated by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader ofthe Liberal Democratic Party LDPR (nationalist extremist); and Gennady Zyuganov,leader of the communist party Communist Party of Russian Federation (KPRF).

110 Antonenko, ‘Putin’s Gamble’, Survival, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001–2, p. 49.111 From a Russian perspective, the building of more substantial defences on the US side

would erode Russia’s deterrent and pose serious impediments to further reductions inmissiles (cf. Strategic Arms Reduction Path (START) agreements).

112 See Anatol Lieven, op. cit., p. 253.113 Dr Lilia F. Shevtsova, Senior Associate of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, provided

us with relevant information on Putin’s policies.114 For example over his handling of the Kursk disaster. When in August 2000, the

Russian nuclear submarine with all its 118 crewmen sank to the bottom of the BarentsSea, the Allies immediately offered assistance. This tragic event had a significantimpact on the development of Russia–NATO cooperation in the field of ‘search andrescue at sea’.

115 Some of the ideas presented here are based on J. M. Godzimirski, 11 September 2001and the Shift in Russia’s Policy Towards NATO, Oslo: The Norwegian AtlanticCommittee, Security Policy Library, 7–2002. Comments made by Dr IrinaKobrinskaya, a well known Russian scholar, were also extremely helpful in trying toget a better understanding of Putin’s strategy.

116 B. Piadyshev, ‘After the Terrorist Attacks’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 47,no. 5, 2001, p. 6.

117 See Godzimirski, op. cit., p. 13.118 Ibid., p. 14.119 Since the central Asian governments had officially declared that they could decide to

cooperate with the US-led coalition in the fight against terrorism, the only possibleand effective strategy for Russia was to secure its interests by cooperating with theanti-terror coalition.

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120 We should bear in mind that Putin’s popularity and his political ascension were basedon his uncompromising stance regarding the conflict in Chechnya.

121 See Nodari Simonia and Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘What is in Store for the World’,International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 48, no. 1, 2002, p. 15.

122 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, for instance, in his interview published inRussia on the day of the Rome Summit, described the Chechen rebels as a branch ofthe global terrorist network.

123 See Antonenko, ‘Putin’s Gamble’, p. 52.124 See Arbatov, ‘NATO and Russia’, p. 138.125 Article 5 refers to the right of collective self-defence as laid down by the UN Charter.

It states that an armed attack on one or more members of NATO will be deemed anattack against them all.

126 See the NATO Web Site for the official PJC statements: www.nato.int127 J. Dempsey and R. Wolffe, ‘In From the Cold’, Financial Times, 14 May 2002.128 See ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality’, Declaration by Heads of State and

Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, Rome Summit,28 May 2002.

129 Since the NATO Secretary General chairs the discussion, the Russian representativesits around the table between Portugal and Spain. This new formula aims at givingRussia an equal status with the NATO countries. It allows Russia to be part of thesame compromising trade-offs so characteristic of the daily policy-making withinNATO based on the idea of reaching a consensus on issues of importance to thealliance. This solution grants Russia a right of equality, but also a responsibility andan obligation that come from taking part in the consensus-building.

130 For this question, see V. Baranovsky, ‘11 septembre: une vision russe’, Politiqueétrangère, vol. 1, 2002, p. 18.

131 See ‘Russia must join NATO’, Izvestia, 6 September 1994.132 See M. Stoyanov, Moskovskaya Pravda, 17 September 1994.133 P. H. Gordon, ‘NATO After 11 September’, Survival, vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2001–2,

p. 97.134 It is important to note also that Russia’s entry into NATO would require the Alliance

to adopt special provisions such as geographically limited defence guarantee –because of Russia’s long border with China and central Asia – before full member-ship could even be considered. See V. Sobell, ‘Russia Turns West’, The World Today,vol. 57, no. 11, November 2001, p. 19.

135 Instead of collective security, the Allied countries have usually preferred the term‘cooperative security’ as evidenced in the NATO 1991 Strategic Concept. See D. Yost,‘Collective Defence and Collective Security after Kosovo’, in R. de Wijk,B. Boxhoorn and N. Hoekstra (eds), NATO after Kosovo, Tilburg: Tilburg UniversityPress, 2000, p. 23.

136 R. Pipes, ‘Is Russia Still an Enemy?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 5, September–October 1997, p. 66.

6 RUSSIA’S PERCEPTION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: A CASE STUDY

1 R. D. Blackwill, Engaging Russia: A Report of the Trilateral Commission, New York:The Trilateral Commission, 1995, p. 25.

2 At its Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO member states invited Bulgaria,Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to accession to NATOmembership. The accession process was scheduled to be achieved in time for the nextSummit in June 2004.

3 Cf. infra.4 Ibid. See also R. Danreuther, ‘Escaping the Enlargement Trap in NATO–Russian

Relations’, Survival, vol. 41, no. 4, Winter 1999–2000, p. 151.5 See inter alia Yeltsin’s statement at the CSCE Summit in Budapest in December 1994,

in Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 1, 1995, p. 5.6 Following a decision by Allied Foreign Ministers in December 1994, the ‘why and

how’ of future admissions into the Alliance were examined by the Allies during 1995.The resulting ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’ was shared with interested partnercountries in September 1995 and made public. See NATO Handbook, NATO Officeof Information and Press, 2001, pp. 61–3.

7 J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? Boston,MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 14. See also A. A. Sergounin,‘Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to DamageLimitation’, European Security, vol. 6, no. 4, Winter 1997, p. 55.

8 On the founding of the anti-NATO group, see ‘Dumtsi formiruiut “antinato” ’ Duma’sDeputies form an ‘Anti-NATO’ Group], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31 January 1997. On17 April an anti-NATO commission was established in the Duma. See ‘Anti-NATOnachinaet deistvovat’ [Anti-NATO Begins to Act], Rossiskaya Gazeta, 17 April 1997.The leading organisers of this anti-NATO movement were initially deputies from theopposition ‘Power to the People’ faction (Narodovlastie) in the Russian FederalAssembly’s State Duma. Members of the communist–nationalist opposition, particu-larly the KPRF, later also joined the association. In addition, there were also manyrepresentatives of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s centrist ‘Our Home isRussia’ party (NDR), as well as independent deputies. This further exemplified thebroad opposition to NATO’s expansion.

9 See C. L. Ball, ‘Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be aGood Thing’, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, 1998, p. 62.

10 S. Plekhanov, ‘NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics’, in C. P. David andJ. Lévesque (eds), The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security,London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999, p. 181.

11 Ibid., p. 179.12 These included mainly democratic parties such as Yabloko led by Grigorii Yavlinksii and

represented by its ally First Deputy Prime Boris Nemtsov and foreign policy experts suchas Vladimir Lukin – former Russian Ambassador to Washington and then Chairman ofthe Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs – and Alexei Arbatov – member of the Duma’sDefence Committee; the ‘Democratic Choice’ party led by Yegor Gaidar and AnatoliiChubais; and ‘Forward Russia’ led by former Minister of Finance Boris Fedorov.

13 Cf. infra.14 This opinion is clearly expressed by N. K. Arbatova, ‘Samyi tiagostnyi urok posled-

nego vremeni’ [The Most Difficult Lesson of the Last Times], Nezavisimaia Gazeta,6 April 1999.

15 Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 169. See also R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How theAlliance Remade Itself for a New Era, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002,p. 188.

16 See P. Zelikow, ‘Beyond Boris Yeltsin: Following America’s Enduring Interests’,Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January–February 1994, pp. 44–55.

17 For one of the best accounts of the negotiations leading to German unification, seeP. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1996.

18 This kind of integration would have been limited to political cooperation, without,however, precluding consultations and interfacing on specific military matters.

19 See J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know, Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1997, pp. 150–1.

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20 M. Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, United Kingdom:Dartmouth, 1997, p. 216.

21 See V. K. Volkov, ‘Expanding NATO Eastward: A View From Moscow’, Problems ofPost-Communism, May–June 1997, p. 63.

22 J. Eyal, ‘NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision’, International Affairs, vol. 73,no. 4, 1997, p. 699.

23 Black, op. cit., p. 42. See also R. Danreuther, op. cit., p. 151.24 See also J. L. Nogee and R. Judson Mitchell, Russian Politics: The Struggle for a

New Order, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1997, p. 163.25 Ibid., p. 151. See also Volkov, op. cit., p. 63.26 Sergounin, op. cit., p. 68.27 Black, op. cit., p. 96.28 See supra for my account of the Slavophile political thought.29 Black, op. cit., p. 17.30 See Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 171.31 M. McGwire, ‘NATO Expansion: A Policy Error of Historic Importance’, Review of

International Studies, vol. 24, 1998, p. 38.32 Black, op. cit., p. 9.33 Nicole Gnesotto, ‘Elargissement de l’OTAN: une responsabilité européenne’,

Politique étrangère, Printemps 1997, p. 133.34 See Ball, op. cit., pp. 45–6.35 Danreuther, op. cit., p. 153.36 See E. Bajarunas, ‘A View From Lithuania’, in J. Simon (ed.), NATO Enlargement:

Opinions and Options, Auckland: University Press of the Pacific, 2002, pp. 101–2.37 See S. Main, ‘Instability in the Baltic Region’, in C. Dick and A. Aldis (eds), Central

and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects, United Kingdom: Strategic andCombat Studies Institute, December 1998, p. 186.

38 See F. Labarre, ‘NATO–Russia Relations and NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region’,Baltic Defence Review, no. 7, Tartu: Baltic Defence College, 2002, pp. 48 and 65.

39 C. Dick and A. Aldis (eds), Central and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects,United Kingdom: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, December 1998.

40 Lithuania is the only republic of the three that has signed the border treaty with Russia(concluded in October 1997) and, due to its relatively small ethnic Russian popula-tion, has no real problem with the Russians living on its territory. The same cannot besaid, however, for either Estonia or Latvia which claim certain areas of Russia asbelonging to them.

41 EU membership implies that these countries have to impose strict visa restrictions,which render it difficult for the transport of both goods and citizens from Kaliningradto the rest of Russia.

42 See C. Dick and A. Aldis (eds), op. cit., p. 189.43 D. Trenin, ‘Silence of the Bear’, NATO Review, Spring 2002.44 See C. Dick and A. Aldis (eds), op. cit, p. 196.45 For this argument, see especially P. J. D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence in

Ukrainian-Russian Relations, New York: University of New York Press, 1999; andI. S. Koropeckyj, The Ukrainian Economy: Achievements, Problems, and Challenges,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

46 The GUUAM gathers Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. TheGUUAM group reverted to GUAM after Uzbekistan suspended membership in theorganisation in July 2002.

47 J. Eyal, ‘NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision’, International Affairs, vol. 73,no. 4, 1997, pp. 715–16.

48 Y. Bilinky, Endgame in NATO’s Enlargement: The Baltic States and Ukraine, London:Praeger Publishers, 1999, p. 36.

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49 For analysis, see also A. Karatnycky, ‘The Ukrainian Factor’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 71,no. 3, Summer 1992.

50 Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 180.51 R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era,

New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 192.52 For a thorough analysis of these partnerships, see also G. Rozman, M. G. Nosov and

K. Watanabe (eds), Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment,London: M. E. Sharpe, East West Institute, 1999. See also G. Bogoliubov,‘Rasshirenie NATO na vostok i rossisko-kitaiskie otnoshenia’ [NATO Expansion tothe East and Russian–Chinese Relations], Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, no. 6, 1997,pp. 31–41.

53 Except for the Beijing Declaration of 1992 which formulated the fundamentalprinciples for the conduct of relations between Russia and China. This documentemphasised the friendly and cooperative basis of relations between the two states, andformalised the Russian and Chinese commitment to observe international standardsand norms in their relations with one another.

54 The underlying assumption is that the post-Cold War world is moving objectivelytowards multipolarity, and that Russia is one of its poles. In this paradigm, the threatto the stability of the international system comes from unipolar ambitions.

55 Nevertheless, we should not forget that Iran’s attempt to export its ideology, its poorrecord on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and its modest pretensions toreconsider its military role in the Caspian Sea raised significant concerns in Russia.

56 See Jerome M. Conley, Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation:Implications for U.S. Security Interests, USAF Institute for National Security Studies,2000.

57 Very explicit is China’s recognition of Russia’s leading role in the CIS. China wishesthat Russia exercises its leadership in the interests of stability along China’s border.Russia, for its part, has no interest in seeing separatism grow in either Tibet orXinjiang. For this argument, see S. W. Garnett, Limited Partnership, Russia–ChinaRelations in a Changing Asia, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 1998, p. 24.

58 In April 1996, in Shangai, leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan andTadjikistan signed the first regional Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures inBorder Areas, and in April 1997, in Moscow, leaders of the same countries signed aTreaty on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas.

59 On March 1996, the presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgistan signedin the Kremlin an agreement on deeper integration among their countries within theCIS. The quadripartite document envisages a Community of Integrated States with acommon market of goods, services, capital and labour; unified transport, energy andinformation systems; coordinated price formation and industrial and agriculturalpolicies; uniform social security policies; and support for a single cultural space(meaning certain privileges for the Russian language and special facilities for theRussian diaspora’s contacts with the metropolis).

60 The ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum is primarilyintended to gain a secure and legitimate basis for defending Russia’s interests and per-spectives regarding all major issues of Asian security and reducing United States’ability to proclaim itself a unipolar force or to act in such and unconstrained fashion.

61 See V. S. Miasnikov, ‘Russia and China’, in R. D. Blackwill and S. A. Karaganov(eds), Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World, London:Brassey’s, 1994, p. 232.

62 See I. Facon, ‘La Russie, l’OTAN et l’avenir de la sécurité en Europe’, Politiqueétrangère, no. 3, 1997, p. 304.

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63 See V. N. Pavliatenko, ‘Russian Security in the Pacific Asian Region. The Dangers ofIsolation’, in G. Rozman, M. G. Nosov and K. Watanabe (eds), Russia and East Asia.The 21st Century Security Environment, New York: M. E. Sharpe, East West Institute,1999, pp. 40–1.

64 See G. Rozman, M. G. Nosov and K. Watanabe, Russia and East Asia. The 21st CenturySecurity Environment, New York: M. E. Sharpe, East West Institute, 1999, p. 63.

65 S. Blank, The Strategic Context of Russo-Chinese Relations, Sandhurst: RoyalMilitary Academy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 1999, p. 2.

66 NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade resulted in the killing of threeChinese civilians and the wounding of more than 20 others. The United States andBritain contended that the embassy bombing was the result of intelligence sourceshaving used an old and unreliable map. However, other reports stated that the Chineseembassy was targeted after it was discovered that it was relaying Yugoslav militarysignals and that the conscious attack was covered up thereafter by US officials.

67 Ibid., p. 1.68 Li Jingjie, ‘China and Russia’, in R. D. Blackwill and S. A. Karaganov (eds), Damage

Limitation or Crisis. Russia and the Outside World, London: Brassey’s, 1994, p. 255.69 Garnett, op. cit., p. 41.70 Danreuther, op. cit., p. 148.71 China’s trade with Russia was about one-tenth of its trade with the United States.72 See Pavliatenko, op. cit., p. 30.73 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, pp. 7–8.74 For a remarkable analysis of balancing and bandwagoning behaviour, see S. M. Walt,

The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 17–49.75 See W. C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security,

vol. 24, no. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 29–30.76 H. Heikka, Beyond the Cult of the Offensive. The Evolution of Soviet/Russian

Strategic Culture and its Implications for the Nordic-Baltic Region, Helsinki: TheFinnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 79.

77 See ‘Voyennaya doktrina Rossii’ [Russia’s Military Doctrine], Rossiyskie vesti,no. 224, 18 November 1993. For the New Military Doctrine, see ‘Voyennaya doktrinaRossiyskoy Federatsii’ [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], Rossiyskayagazeta, 25 April 2000. For the Draft of the New Military Doctrine, see ‘Voyennayadoktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation],Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 September 1999. See also V. Yermolin, ‘Military Signs a NewDoctrine’, Izvestiya, 13 October 1999; A. Korbut, ‘Draft Military Doctrine’,Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 October 1999; and V. Chugunov, ‘We Discuss the DraftMilitary Doctrine. With Consideration for the Potential of the Country’, KrasnayaZvezda, 19 October 1999.

78 The text may be found at the official site of Russia’s Security Council,http://www.scrf.gov.ru. See also Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 14 January2000.

79 See ‘National Security Concept of the Russian Federation’, http://www.acronym.org.uk/43nsc.htm. See also ‘New Look at National Security Concept’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta,6 October 1999.

80 See Pavliatenko, op. cit., p. 20.81 See A. V. Zagorski, ‘Traditional Russian Security Interests in the Caucasus and

Central Asia. Perceptions and Realities’, in R. Menon, Y. E. Fedorov and G. Nodia(eds), Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The 21st Century SecurityEnvironment, New York: M. E. Sharpe, East West Institute, 1999, p. 62.

82 In this regard, we were told by Dr Dmitri A. Danilov, Head of the Department forEuropean Security Studies at the Institute of Europe in Moscow, that the vagueness

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of the New National Security Concept, but also of the New Military Doctrine, isundoubtedly a matter of concern.

83 See H. Heikka, op. cit., p. 82.84 Danreuther, op. cit., p. 149.85 See Black, op. cit., p. 33.86 Plekhanov, op. cit., p. 183.87 Asmus, op. cit., p. 195.88 See NATO Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001.89 Although signed in January 1993, START II was only ratified by Russia in

April 2000.90 See R. L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russian Factor, Santa Monica, CA: Rand,

1996, pp. 55–6.91 The ratification of START II demonstrated the political capacity of President Putin

who was able to gather the necessary votes despite anti-Western sentiment in theDuma generated by strong Western criticism of the war in Chechnya.

92 A. Karkoszka, ‘Following in the Footsteps’, NATO Review, Spring 2002.93 Trenin, op. cit.94 A. B. Carter, W. J. Perry and J. D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative

Security, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 6.95 R. Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring

1982, pp. 178–9. The focus of Jervis’ analysis is the Concert of Europe.

7 THEORIES OF COOPERATION

1 W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Boston, MA: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1947,p. 18.

2 It will appear that the scope of this theoretical chapter is restricted to work publishedin English, principally in the United States. This reflects almost exclusively Americanthinking and could, at first sight, be seen as an unfortunate limitation. However, thischoice was made intentionally, insofar as our approach is based on Realism, for whichtheory Russian scholars have often followed the lead of their American counterpartswhose work appears to be more penetrating and more mature. They onlydeparted from the Western/American stance when it came to practical applications oftheoretical assumptions.

3 R. O. Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, inP. R. Viotti and M. V. Kauppi (eds), International Relations Theory: Realism,Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 154.

4 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, New York and London: Collier Macmillan, 1974, edited byM. Oakeshott. Book 1, chapter 13, p. 101.

5 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982, p. 351.6 J. N. Rosenau and M. Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to

an Incoherent World, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p. 11.7 Ibid., p. 10.8 See P. R. Viotti and M. V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism,

Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 55.9 Although Waltz’s contribution to the study of world politics is called Neorealism or

structural Realism, it shares much with classical Realism.10 See K. Waltz, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia

University Press, 1959, p. 238.11 See H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf, 1966, p. 5.12 The term ‘anarchy’ comes to us from the Greek, meaning, literally, absence of

government or rule (arche).

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13 See J. N. Rosenau and M. Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approachesto an Incoherent World, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p. 14.

14 See Viotti and Kauppi, op. cit., p. 61.15 See J. M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff

Barriers to Trade, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 4. See alsoC. L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, InternationalSecurity, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994–5, p. 71.

16 See J. Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000, p. 19.

17 See G. Gerasimov, ‘Teoriia igr i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia’ [Game Theory andInternational Relations], Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 7,1966.

18 G. H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Makingand System Structure in International Crises, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1977, p. 181.

19 R. Axelrod and R. O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategiesand Institutions’, in D. A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: TheContemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 86–7.

20 A. A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, inS. D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1995, p. 122.

21 The Prisoner’s Dilemma was invented in about 1950 by Merrill Flood and MelvinDresher, and formalised by A. W. Tucker shortly thereafter. For a thorough analysis ofthe concept, see R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books,1984, p. 7.

22 See J. E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of InternationalRelations: A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Longman, 2001, p. 506.

23 Robert Jervis aptly described the preference ordering available in this particulargame, highlighting both the potential gains from cooperation and the temptations toprevent it. See R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, World Politics,vol. 40, April 1988, p. 318.

24 See Donnelly, op. cit., p. 20.25 Jervis, op. cit., p. 324.26 See Axelrod, op. cit., pp. 8–9.27 Indeed, all its rules are completely specified and defined in advance. All players

understand the rules, the number of variables is highly limited and the emphasis is onabstract structure rather than on institutional or environmental detail.

28 See C. Lipson, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs’, WorldPolitics, vol. 37, no. 1, October 1984, p. 4.

29 Keohane, op. cit., p. 176.30 Axelrod, op. cit.31 These arguments are summarised in Axelrod, op. cit.32 Axelrod and Keohane, op. cit., p. 104.33 See Stein, op. cit., p. 122.34 See Keohane, op. cit., p. 176.35 It is useful to note for example that if NATO began as a balance against a common

threat, a strong case can be made that the members of the alliance today prefer mutualcooperation to temptation, mainly due to their history of institutionalised cooperation.See Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 152–4.

36 See R. O. Keohane, ‘Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the ColdWar’, in D. A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The ContemporaryDebate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 277.

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37 See Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, p. 165.38 S. Strange, Retreat of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996,

pp. 192–3.39 Jervis, op. cit., p. 56.40 This assumption is aptly described in the remarkable work of R. Jervis, Perception

and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1976. See especially, pp. 69–72, 88–9, 95–6 and 352–5.

41 See Axelrod, op. cit., pp. 182–3. See also Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, andCooperation’, World Politics, vol. 40, April 1988, pp. 324–7.

42 R. Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 177.

43 See Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, p. 338.44 Ibid., p. 88.45 See Glaser, op. cit., p. 86.46 Ibid., p. 59.47 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 109–13. See also

Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, p. 340.48 J. H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics,

vol. 5, no. 2, January 1950, pp. 157–80. See also Stein, op. cit., pp. 136–7.49 See Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, p. 349. See also R. Jervis,

‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2, January1978, pp. 167–214.

50 See J. N. Rosenau and M. Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approachesto an Incoherent World, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p. 14.

51 See infra for an analysis of this concept.52 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 506.53 The game of Chicken provides another appropriate case in point. In Chicken, mutual

cooperation is only the second best outcome for both players, but mutual defection isadvantageous for both. For a comprehensive analysis of this game, see Axelrod andKeohane, op. cit., p. 114. See also J. Joffe, ‘Collective Security and the Future ofEurope: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends’, Survival, Spring 1992, p. 42.

54 See J. E. Goodby, ‘Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War’, Journal ofInternational Affairs, vol. 46, no. 2, 1993, p. 307.

55 See also Glaser, op. cit., p. 82.56 Some scholars claim that Neorealism and Structural Realism are distinct enough to

be treated as separate variants. In their view, Neorealism should primarily refer to thetheory as articulated by Waltz, while Structural Realism should refer to a broaderfamily of systemic theories. For a conceptual discussion on this topic, see B. Buzan,C. Jones and R. Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 9. Since this argument is not of particularrelevance here, we will, for more convenience, globally use the term Neorealism.

57 See A. Linklater, ‘Neo-realism in Theory and Practice’, in K. Booth and S. Smith(eds), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press,1995, p. 242.

58 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979,pp. 104–11.

59 Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, p. 159.60 See P. R. Viotti and M. V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism,

Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999, p. 73.61 See Waltz, op. cit., p. 105.62 Glaser, op. cit., p. 50.63 Ibid., p. 51.

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64 Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, p. 175.65 Waltz, op. cit., p. 96.66 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 140.67 R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political

Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 109.68 J. G. Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’,

International Organization, vol. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975, p. 570.69 S. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening

Variables’, in International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2.70 R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, New York: Longman,

2001, p. 17.71 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York:

Columbia University Press, 1977, p. 54.72 R. O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, in S. Krasner (ed.),

International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 146.73 Ibid., p. 146.74 See A. A. Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’, in

S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983,p. 127.

75 Ibid., pp. 137–8.76 Pareto optimality is a concept used in game theory and refers to an allocation of

resources in which no individual can be made better off without another being madeworse off. See also supra for a detailed analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

77 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, p. 173.78 Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,

p. 53.79 See also S. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as

Intervening Variables’, in S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 3.

80 Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, p. 162.81 Ibid., p. 147.82 Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, pp. 186 and 177.83 See Ibid., p. 177.84 C. Lipson, ‘International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs’, World

Politics, vol. 37, no. 1, October 1984, p. 12.85 See D. J. Puchala and R. F. Hopkins, ‘International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive

Analysis’, in S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983, p. 86.

86 For an extensive analysis of this argument, see Bull, op. cit., especially chapter 5.87 An excellent definition of collective security can be found in I. L. Claude, ‘The

Collectivist Theme in International Relations’, International Journal, vol. 24, no. 4,Autumn 1969, p. 640.

88 For a valuable discussion of the League of Nations, see R. E. Osgood, ‘Woodrow Wilson,Collective Security, and the Lessons of History’, in E. Latham (ed.), The Philosophy andPolicies of Woodrow Wilson, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

89 Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 389. See also I. L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: TheProblems and Progress of International Organization, New York: McGraw-Hill,1956, p. 251.

90 See C. W. Kegley and G. A. Raymond, A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics inthe Twenty-First Century, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 234.

91 See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘The Promise of CollectiveSecurity’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, Summer 1995, p. 397.

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92 See Claude, op. cit., p. 246.93 Joffe, op. cit., p. 37.94 D. Yost, ‘Collective Defence and Collective Security After Kosovo’, in R. de Wijk,

B. Boxhoorn and N. Hoekstra (eds), NATO After Kosovo, Tilburg: Tilburg UniversityPress, 2000, p. 21.

95 Joffe, op. cit., p. 37.96 See Claude, op. cit., p. 255.97 I. L. Claude, S. Simon and D. Stuart, Collective Security in Europe and Asia,

Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 2.98 Claude, op. cit., p. 280.99 See F. Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man, New York: The Free Press,

1992.100 J. E. Nolan, Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century,

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994, p. 4.101 Ibid., p. 5.102 For a useful discussion of ‘Cooperative Security’, see R. de Wijk, NATO on the Brink

of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus, London and Washington, DC:Brassey’s, 1997, pp. 143–4.

103 See Kegley and Raymond, op. cit., p. 218.104 See David Yost, ‘The New NATO and Collective Security’, Survival, vol. 40, no. 2,

Summer 1998, p. 138.105 Nolan, op. cit., p. 8.106 Ibid., p. 8.107 A. D. Rotfeld, ‘The Search for a Cooperative Security System’, International Affairs

(Moscow), no. 12, 1994, p. 50.108 R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1981, p. 238.109 See Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, p. 352.

8 THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO COOPERATIVE SECURITY

1 M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World,New York: Harper and Row, 1987, p. 127.

2 See A. B. Carter, W. J. Perry and J. D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of CooperativeSecurity, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 6.

3 As far as the tsarist period is concerned, we also could have examined the First HaguePeace Conference of 1899. This Conference was actually convened by the TsarNicholas II ‘with the object of seeking the most effective means of ensuring to allpeoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, above all, of limiting the pro-gressive development of existing armaments’. See the Russian note of 30 December1898/11 January 1899 in the Final Act of the International Peace Conference, TheHague, 29 July 1899. The Conference, at which 26 governments were represented,assembled on 18 May 1899 and adjourned on 29 July 1899. It failed to reach agree-ment on the primary object for which it was called, namely the limitation or reductionof armaments, but adopted the three Conventions and the other acts mentioned in theFinal Protocol. See D. Schindler and J. Thoman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts,Boston, MA: Martinus Nihjoff Publisher, 1988, pp. 50–1; V. S. Ivanienko, Centenaryof Russian Initiative: From the First Peace Conference of 1899 to the Third PeaceConference of 1899. Collection of Documents, St Petersburg: St PetersburgUniversity, 1999.

4 G. Vernadsky, A History of Russia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961, p. 202.

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NOTES

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5 See G. Hosking, Russia and the Russians. A History, Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 2001, p. 252.

6 The name of the Alliance was taken from a prophetic passage in the Book of Daniel:the dedication is to the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity. See J. H. Billington, TheIcon and the Axe. An Interpretive History of Russian Culture, New York: VintageBooks, 1970, pp. 283–4.

7 See M. Heller, Histoire de la Russie et de son empire, Paris: Champs Flammarion,2000, pp. 673–5.

8 Vernadsky, op. cit., p. 203.9 Lord Castlereagh, British Foreign Secretary from 1812 to 1822, was also the

representative of Great Britain at the 1815 Congress of Vienna.10 N. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000,

pp. 314–15.11 Billington, op. cit., pp. 283–4 and 317.12 In November 1818, at the Conference in Aix-la-Chapelle, with the payment of the

indemnity and the withdrawal of allied occupation troops, France shed its status as adefeated nation and joined the other four great European powers in the QuintupleAlliance. See Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 315.

13 See J. B. Duroselle, L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours, Paris: Presses Universitaires deFrance, 1996, p. 105.

14 T. G. Weiss and L. S. Hayes Holgate, ‘Opportunities and Obstacles for CollectiveSecurity after the Cold War’, in D. Dewitt, D. Haglund and J. Kirton (eds), Buildinga New Global Order. Emerging Trends in International Security, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993, p. 261.

15 See R. B. Elrod, ‘The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System’,World Politics, vol. 28, January 1976, pp. 166–70.

16 Metternich, the famous Austrian diplomat, would strongly support these ideas.17 Essentially, the Decembrists were Liberals in the tradition of the Enlightenment and

the French Revolution; they wanted to establish constitutionalism and basic freedomsin Russia, and to abolish serfdom. See Riasanovsky, op. cit., pp. 319–22.

18 More particularly, with regard to the communist period, we could have explored someof Lenin’s views on international relations, particularly his policy of ‘peaceful coex-istence’, which also fall into this category. See L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway, Lenin.The Man, the Theorist, the Leader. A Reappraisal, New York: Frederick A. Praeger,1967, p. 251. Other relevant sources include J. E. Connor, Lenin. On Politics andRevolution, New York: Western Publishing Company, 1968, especially pp. 354–9;R. Palme Dutt, Life and Teachings of V. I. Lenin, New York: International Publishers,1934, especially pp. 63–7. Although the word ‘coexistence’ (sosushchestvovanie)cannot be found in Lenin’s writings and speeches, we may note expressions such as‘existence side by side’, ‘parallel existence’, or the like. Lenin’s concept of peacefulcoexistence was actually concretised during Brezhnev’s détente. For Russian sources,see in particular V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [Complete Works], Moscow:Gospolitizdat, 1962; and F. M. Burlatskii, Lenin. Gosudarstvo. Politika [Lenin. State.Politics], Moscow: Nauka, 1970. In 1934, Maksim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar ofForeign Affairs, also advocated disarmament and cooperative security with the West.Litvinov’s purposes were primarily designed to oppose the threat of fascist militarism.But the West proved unwilling to counter German provocative behaviour, and afterFrance and Britain acceded to Hitler’s demands to Czechoslovak territory at Munichin 1938, Stalin abandoned Litvinov’s idea to forge an alliance with the West. For athoughtful analysis of this argument, see V. Mastny, ‘The Cassandra in the ForeignCommissariat. Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, no. 2,January 1976, pp. 366–76. See also M. Jabara Carley, 1939. The Alliance that never

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was and the Coming of World War II, Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, September1999. These initiatives were nevertheless not explicit enough and deductivearguments could not easily be drawn. For this reason, we preferred to focus onBrezhnev’s thaw.

19 Pravda, 22 May 1973.20 See C. Roosens, Les relations internationales de 1815 à nos jours, Louvain-la-Neuve:

Academia Bruylant, 2001, vol. I, p. 210.21 Treaties like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty (ABM Treaty) were signed respectively in 1968 and 1972 and the same year,the two countries began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

22 N. Malcolm, ‘The Common European Home and Soviet European Policy’,International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 4, Autumn 1989, p. 661.

23 The Helsinki Final Act encompassed three main sets of recommendations. The firstset was related to politico-military aspects of security: principles guiding relationsbetween and among participating States and military confidence-building measures.The second set concerned cooperation in a number of fields including economics,science and technology and the environment. The third dealt with cooperation inhumanitarian fields such as human rights issues, culture and education. See the‘Helsinki Final Act’, Helsinki: CSCE, 1975.

24 In exchange for the Western nations’ endorsement of the Soviet proposal for aEuropean Security Conference (CSCE), Brezhnev had agreed in principle to partici-pate in a Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). After a yearof preparatory discussions these two parallel conferences began, the CSCE inHelsinki on 15 January 1973, and the MBFR in Vienna on 30 October. See alsoN. Werth, Histoire de l’Union soviétique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,2001, p. 524.

25 For a thorough analysis of Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik, see P. Bender, NeueOstpolitik: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag, München: DeutsherTaschenbuch Verlag, 1989.

26 See W. R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World. An International History, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 338.

27 R. D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West, New York: Columbia University Press,2000, p. 123.

28 The most important agreements essentially froze the two countries’ existingstockpiles of strategic defensive and offensive weapons.

29 Keylor, op. cit., p. 340.30 Above all, the USSR needed a relationship with the United States that would ensure

the regular flow of American grain to a Russia whose agricultural economy waschronically ailing because of the regime’s refusal to relinquish those hopelessly failedinstitutions, the State and the collective farm. See R. C. Tucker, Political Culture andLeadership in Soviet Russia, New York: W. W. Norton, 1987, p. 128.

31 Keylor, op. cit., p. 339.32 The COMECON was established in January 1949.33 See Keylor, op. cit., p. 339.34 This part dedicated to the Brezhnev’s thaw might be perceived as too much one-sided

or too idealistic. Western scholars often believe that détente was also a tactic used bythe Soviets to expand their influence and that this initiative concealed some kind ofSoviet conspiracy against the West (cf. conclusion in infra). The Soviet leadershipgathered indeed committed Communists with strong belief in their ideology, butthe Western leaders might also be held responsible for abandoning this Russiancooperative security initiative.

35 For a Russian analysis of the CSCE/OSCE, see K. S. Benediktov, ‘Rossiia i OVSE’[Russia and the OSCE], in D. Trenin (ed.), Rossiia i osnovnie instituty bezopasnosti v

Evrope: vstypaia v XXI vek [Russia and European Security Institutions: Enteringthe twenty-first Century], Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2000.

36 See H. Hurlburt, ‘Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture’, HelsinkiMonitor, vol. 6, no. 2, 1995, p. 7.

37 See ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’, Paris, CSCE, 1990. The Paris Summit(19–21 November 1990) also welcomed the signature of the Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe (CFE) and representative democracy was recognised as theonly acceptable political system by all 35 signatory states.

38 See Heather Hurlburt, ‘Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture’,Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 2, 1995, p. 7.

39 The Helsinki Summit, 9–10 July 1992 ended with the CSCE Helsinki Document1992, entitled ‘The Challenges for Change’.

40 See Adam Daniel Rotfeld, ‘The Future of the CSCE. An Emerging Agenda’, StudiaDiplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4, 1994, pp. 95–6.

41 See Hurlburt, op. cit., p. 10.42 The Budapest Summit (5–6 December 1994) adopted the CSCE Budapest Document

1994, entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’ and changed the nameof the CSCE into the OSCE, effective 1 January 1995, reflecting the fact that theCSCE was no longer simply a Conference.

43 See A. D. Rotfeld, ‘The Future of the CSCE. An Emerging Agenda’, StudiaDiplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4, 1994, pp. 102–3; Y. V. Ushakov, ‘Perspectives for theCSCE. A View from Russia’, Studia Diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4, 1994.

44 These proposals were also difficult to accept not the least for central European stateswhere clearly negative assessments of CSCE activity appeared from time to time.They stem from the fact that the CSCE was often seen as a security structurecompeting with NATO. See also R. Zaagman, ‘A Limited Partnership. The Relationbetween NATO and the OSCE’, in R. de Wijk, B. Boxhoorn and N. Hoekstra (eds),NATO after Kosovo, Tilburg University Press, 2000, p. 111.

45 See E. Niemtzow, ‘The OSCE’s Security Model: Conceptual Confusion andCompeting Visions’, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 3, 1996, pp. 41–4.

46 See ‘Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europefor the Twenty-First Century’, Lisbon, OSCE, 1996. See also N. Afanasievsky, ‘TheOSCE Summit in Lisbon’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 1, May 1997.

47 See ‘Charter for European Security’, Istanbul, OSCE, 1999. The Charter reviews thenew risks and challenges to security on the European continent in the post-Cold Warstrategic environment, reaffirms some basic general principles and provides for thestrengthening of the OSCE’s operational capacities in conflict prevention, crisis man-agement and post-conflict rehabilitation. In addition, in its appended Platform forCooperative Security, the Charter offers a kind of partnership contract to mutuallyreinforcing security-related institutions based on mutual comparative advantages,complementarity, pragmatic synergy and transparency. This Platform also aims at fur-ther strengthening and developing reciprocal cooperation with complement organisa-tions. Indeed, at Istanbul, Heads of State and Government expressed readiness inprinciple to deploy the resources of international organisations and institutions ofwhich they are members in support of the OSCE’s work.

48 See ‘OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration’, Istanbul, OSCE, 1999.49 See B. George, A Better Peace: The Cooperative and Collective Security Fusion of

OSCE and NATO in the New Europe, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November1999, pp. 3–4.

50 V. Chizhov, ‘The Istanbul Summit’, International Affairs (Minneapolis), vol. 46,no. 1, 2000, p. 69.

51 It was invoked in July 1992 to suspend Yugoslavia from the CSCE.

NOTES

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52 If, for example, the OSCE was in effect in 1939, Hitler could have blocked a decisionnegative to himself with the vote of Mussolini.

53 Although the NACC was not created to rival the CSCE, its expanding functions andcomposition constitute an additional obstacle to the CSCE. See V. Y. Ghebali, ‘CSCEBasic Needs Before the 1994 Budapest Review Meeting’, Studia Diplomatica,vol. XLVII, no. 4, 1994, p. 79.

54 However, having been signed at the highest political level, OSCE summit documentshave an authority that is arguably as strong as a legal statute under international law.

55 It must be granted, though, that the CSCE/OSCE did contribute by its human rightsefforts to discredit the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe.

56 M. Gorbachev, Pravda, 4 October 1985.57 This doctrine holds that international politics are inherently antagonistic, opposing

two irreconcilable social systems, Capitalism and Socialism, against one another.58 For useful Russian sources, see inter alia G. Shakhnazarov, Tsena svobody.

Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika [The Price of Freedom.Gorbachev’s Reforms from the Point of View of his Associate], Moscow: Rossiska-Zevs, 1993; A. S. Cherniaev, Shest let s Gorbachevym i po dnevnikovym zapisiam[Six Years with Gorbachev and his Diary’s Notes], Moscow: Kultura, 1993.

59 See Vadim Zagladine, ‘Notre Maison Commune’, Politique internationale, no. 44, été1989, pp. 30–2. See also Fedor Burlatskii, Novoe myshlenie [New Thinking],Moscow: Politizdat, 1989.

60 M. S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World,New York: Harper and Row, 1987, p. 128.

61 Ibid., p. 125.62 See M. S. Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stati [Selected Speeches and Articles],

Moscow: Politizdat, 1987–90.63 Tucker, op. cit., p. 206.64 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, p. 127.65 Ibid., p. 132.66 Ibid., p. 123.67 See V. E. Vuchetich, Demokratisatsiya – sut perestroika, sut sotsialisma

[Democratisation – Essence of Perestroika, Essence of Socialism], Moscow:Politizdat, 1988; V. A. Kozlov, Perestroika i istoricheskii opyt [Perestroika andHistorical Experience], Moscow: Mysl, 1989.

68 L. V. Sigal, Hang Separately. Cooperative Security between the U.S. and Russia,1985–1994, New York: The Century Foundation, 2000, p. 7.

69 See also V. Zagladine, ‘Notre Maison Commune’, Politique internationale, no. 44, été1989, p. 28.

70 N. Malcolm, ‘The Common European Home and Soviet European Policy’,International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 4, Autumn 1989, p. 668.

71 See P. Van Ham, The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity: Discord,Collaboration and Integration since 1947, London and New York: Pinter Publishers,June 1995, p. 150.

72 Comments made to us by Professor Viktor B. Kuvaldin from the GorbachevFoundation were very helpful for the understanding of this initiative.

73 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, p. 181.74 See Borko, ‘Obshchii evropeiskii dom: chto my o nem dumaem?’ [The Common

European Home: What Do We Think About it?], Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,Moscow, 1991.

75 V. Morozov, ‘Evolving Russian Attitude to NATO and EU Enlargement:Westernization, Europe, and the War against Terrorism’, Militaert Tidsskrift, vol. 131,

NOTES

188

NOTES

189

no. 3, July 2002, p. 281. See also I. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Studyof Identity and International Relations, London: Routledge, 1996.

76 See inter alia Zagladine, op. cit., p. 25.77 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, p. 183.78 The Brezhnev Doctrine foresees that a socialist state should intervene in the affairs

of another should its Socialism be threatened by internal or external attack orsubversion.

79 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 662.80 Ibid., p. 669.81 Van Ham, op. cit., p. 156.82 Y. Karelov, ‘USSR–Western Europe: Guidelines of Cooperation’, International

Affairs, Moscow, no. 11, November 1995, p. 24.83 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, p. 195. See also

Zagladine, op. cit., p. 30.84 V. Giscard d’Estaing, ‘The Two Europes, East and West’, International Affairs,

vol. 65, no. 4, Autumn 1989, p. 657.85 B. von Staden, ‘Nothing less than the whole of Europe will do . . . ,’ Aussenpolitik,

vol. 41, no. 1, 1990, p. 189. See also supra the part on Russian National Identity.See also F. de Rose, ‘Maison commune ou maisons mitoyennes?’, Politique interna-tionale, no. 46, Winter 1989–90, pp. 125–6.

86 See G. P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, New York:Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993, p. 1003.

87 See L. V. Sigal, Hang separately. Cooperative Security between the United States andRussia, 1985–1994, New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000, pp. 11–12.

88 Ibid., p. 307.89 While the Soviet Union would be inside the Common European Home by right, the

United States would be merely invited on special occasions.90 V. Giscard d’Estaing, op. cit., p. 654.

9 CONCLUSION

1 The Melians were a colony of the Lacedaemonians. Besieged by Athens, they wereconvinced that the Lacedaemonians would ‘come to the aid of their kindred’. But inthe end, strong and profound civilisational ties did not play any role. The Melianswere abandoned by their allies and their island was devastated by the Athenians. Seealso F. Ajami, ‘The Summoning’, in The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate,New York: Foreign Affairs, 1996.

2 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, New York: McGraw-Hill, The Modern Library,1982, p. 354.

3 G. F. Kennan, Memoirs, quoted in Yale Richmond, From Nyet to Da – Understandingthe Russians, Boston, MA: Intercultural Press, 1996, p. 43.

4 M. Bourdeaux, The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995.

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208

INDEX

ABM Treaty 78absolutism 25, 38, 52–3Afghanistan 8, 16, 62, 77, 79, 80, 153Albright, Madeleine 89Alexander I, Tsar 22, 131–2, 140, 145Alexander II, Tsar 13, 19, 22, 49, 53Alexander III, Tsar 13, 19, 22Alexis II, Patriarch 36, 41anarchy 115, 116, 119, 125Andropov, Yuri 40anti-western feelings 15, 36, 43, 58,

64, 148Armenia 100arms control 134, 139–40; agreements

106–7ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian

Nations) Regional Forum 100Asianism (vostochniki) 28, 31Aspin, Les 66assemblies (veche) 52atheism 27, 36, 40, 132Austria 131, 132autocracy, Russian 13, 14, 39, 41–2,

47–51, 53, 55, 58, 59, 149Azerbaijan 17, 63, 98

Baker, James 92Bakunin, Mikhail 27Balkans 72, 76, 100, 143Baltic States 71, 91, 95, 96–7, 99,

107, 137Batyushka Tsar (‘little father Tsar’) 50Belarus 105–6Belinsky, Vissarion 27Berdyaev, Nikolai 6, 9, 21Black Sea Fleet 63, 98Blair, Tony 82Blok, Alexander 6, 29

Bolsheviks/Bolshevism 14, 17, 51;attitude towards Orthodox Church39–40; nihilistic attitude towardscountry’s past 23

Bosnia–Herzegovina 68–9, 89, 150Boyar Duma 52Brandt, Willy 134Brezhnev, Leonid 40Brezhnev doctrine 4, 16, 133–5, 141,

145, 152Bulgaria 76, 143Bush, George, H. W. 92, 106, 144Bush, George, W. 78Byzantine 30, 35, 39, 143

Canada 141–2Catacombal Church 40Catherine II 11–12, 19, 27, 52–3Central and Eastern European countries 3,

65, 66, 67, 84, 87, 94–5Central Asia 77, 78, 79, 80, 100, 102Chechnya 79, 106, 136Chernenko, Konstantine 40Chernomyrdin, Viktor 75China 73, 77, 99; see also Sino . . .CIS Collective Security Treaty 98civilisation, Russian 8, 18–19, 20civil society 49, 52, 53–4, 59coexistence 2, 132–3, 140Cold War 2, 4, 60, 61, 62, 76–7, 100,

103, 105, 124, 128, 129, 133, 135, 147

collective defence 4, 81, 85, 87, 111, 123,124, 128–9, 153

collective security 4, 85, 111, 123–5,128–9, 130, 153

COMECON (Council for MutualEconomic Assistance) 135

Common European Home 4, 62, 130,131, 140–4, 146

Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) 17, 61, 63, 65, 67, 99, 108, 135;military integration 105–6

communism 14–15, 18, 19, 41, 42, 43,44, 54, 123; threat 1

Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU)12, 18, 51, 55, 94

Concert of Europe 122, 126, 132Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (CSCE) see Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE)

confidence building measures 124, 135, 151

Congress of Vienna 131conservatism 19, 35–6, 52, 58constitution: 1978 Soviet 56; 1993

Russian 4, 45, 56–8, 59, 149Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

Treaty 16, 65, 106cooperation 3, 4, 61, 107–8, 109–10, 112,

127, 130, 146cooperative security 3, 125–7, 129, 130,

147, 151; Russian experiences 130–7,145; Russian initiatives 4, 145; Russianinitiatives, failure 145–6, 152; Russianinitiatives, reasons for 151–2

cordon sanitaire 96Council of Europe 135, 142Crimea 63, 98culture, Russian 3, 7, 43, 97, 143Czechoslovakia 15Czech Republic 87, 90, 95

Dayton Accords 68, 69, 89Decembrists 12–13, 15, 132Declaration on Multipolar World

(1997) 101democracy 55; Russia’s historical

experience 52–4, 58–9; Russia’stransition to 55–6

détente 4, 16, 133–5, 139, 152diplomacy, Russian 70, 101Dmitry, Prince 9Dostoevsky, Fyodor 6, 7, 15, 21,

25, 29Drang nach Osten (German Drive to the

East) 94Duma 14, 35, 41, 52, 53–4, 57, 97;

ratification of START 106–7dyarchy 38

East 8, 20, 28, 30, 34, 37, 91, 102East Germany 133Economic Forum 135energy resources 80Estonia 96, 97ethnic Russians 17, 20, 63–4, 93Eurasianism (Evraziistvo) 9–10, 29–31Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

170 n.28Europe 9, 12, 15, 26, 140–1, 143;

current threats 127; Russia’s place in 3, 18, 93

European Community 134, 135, 140;policy towards Soviet Union 142–3

Europeanisation 10–12, 32; resentmentgenerated by 22; Slavophiles views 25–6

European security 61, 62, 64–5, 66, 67,71, 93, 105, 135–6, 153

European Union (EU) 64, 65, 67, 78, 94,97, 98, 137

Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) 135

Founding Act see NATO–Russia Founding Act (1998)

France 7, 12, 28, 92, 131, 132Freedom of Conscience and Religious

Belief (1990) 36

game theory 112, 114–19, 128General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT) 139George IV 132Georgia 17, 63, 64German unification 16, 62, 91–3Germany 10, 12, 28, 84Ghermogen, Patriarch 35Godunov, Boris, Tsar 38Gorbachev, Mikhail 16, 40, 54, 62, 64, 78,

92, 130, 137–40, 140–2, 144Great reforms 13, 49Greece 143Group of Seven (G7) 71GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and

Moldova) alliance 177 n.46Gulf crisis 16, 62, 144GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,

Azerbaijan and Moldova) alliance 98

Helsinki Final Act of 1975 73, 133Herzen, I. 6, 27

INDEX

209

Holy Alliance 4, 131–2, 140, 145Holy Russia 21, 35, 37Hungary 15, 76, 87, 90, 95

illiberal democracy 57, 59, 60, 149imperialism, Russian 21, 63–4, 91imperial mentality 20Implementation Force (IFOR) 68–9India 77, 99–100, 101, 102, 108Individual Partnership Programme

(IPP) 67Institute of Scientific Information for

Social Sciences (INION) 71intelligentsia, Russian 10, 24–5, 28, 49internationalism 15International Monetary Fund (IMF) 16,

71, 139international regimes 4, 112, 120–3, 128international relations theories 4, 111–12,

127, 151Iran 77, 78, 79, 100, 108Iraq 16, 62, 78, 144Ivan III, Tsar 9, 37, 48Ivan IV, Tsar (Ivan the Terrible) 10, 19,

36, 38, 48–9, 52

Japan 63, 101Japan–US Security Treaty (1996) 101Joulwan, General 68

Kaliningrad 88, 97Kazakhstan 79, 100KGB (State Security Committee) 40, 41Khomiakov, Aleksei 24Khrushchev, Nikita 15, 40Kievan Rus’ 8–9, 97Kireevsky, Ivan 24Kirill, Metropolitan 41Kissinger, Henry 133Kohl, Helmut 92Kosovo crisis 4, 61, 72–7, 85, 136, 150Kosovo Force (KFOR) 75–7Kosovo Liberation Agency (KLA) 76Kozyrev, Andrei 61, 62, 69Kravchuk, Makarovich 98Kyrgizstan 79

Latvia 96, 97leadership 17, 51, 57, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67,

73, 80, 91, 95, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109,134, 138, 154

League of Nations 66, 123, 137; see alsoUnited Nations

Lenin, Vladimir 14, 21, 39, 56, 135Leningrad 14, 106; see also

St PetersburgLermontov, Mikhail 15liberal democracy 17, 60, 63, 123liberalisation 19, 42Liberalism 16, 18Lithuania 96, 97Lukashenko, Alexander 106

Manchuria 28Mao Tse Tung 133Marshall Plan 135Marx, Karl 13messianism: Russian 7, 20, 21, 32, 62;

Slavophiles 17, 25military balance 94–5military cooperation 68–9, 150military doctrine, Russian 74, 103, 105military security 103–4Milosevic, Slobodan 73, 74, 75mir (peasant community) 52Moldova 64, 95Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 96monarchy: constitutional 53; Slavophiles’

attitude 25; Westernisers’ attitude 27;zemstvo advocacy 53

Mongol yoke 8–10, 34, 48Monroe Doctrine 17, 63Montesquieu 11, 44Moscow 11, 14; Third Rome 21, 37Moscow–Beijing–Delhi strategic triangle

99–100, 101multipolar world 99–101, 103,

108, 145

Napoleonic wars 12, 49National Security Concept 74, 95–6,

104–5NATO 126; admission of reunified

Germany 92; air strikes 72, 89, 100,150; raison d’être 1, 60, 85, 153;recommendations for Russia’s greaterinvolvement in 154–6; Russiansperception 154–5; transformation 66,80, 84, 87, 90, 96, 152–3, 156;transition 64–5, 80–1, 153

NATO enlargement 4, 67, 87, 151;China’s reaction 101; Russiancountermeasures 99–107; Russianopposition 88–91, 108–9, 150; Russianopposition, reasons 91–9, 109; study69, 89; and US hegemony 103

INDEX

210

NATO European Security DocumentationCentre 71

NATO Information Office (NIO) Moscow77, 155

NATO Military Liaison Mission (MLM)77, 155

NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 70,81–2, 150; NRC’s parallelism 82–3

NATO–Russia Council (NRC) 2, 61, 77,82–3, 146, 150, 152, 155

NATO–Russia Founding Act (1998) 70–2,73, 90, 154

NATO–Russia Glossary of ContemporaryPolitical and Military Terms 155

NATO–Russia relations 1–3, 85–6, 147;decisive factors in shaping future of157; first decade 111, 150–1; identitygap 60–1, 87; impact of US-Russiarelations 152–3; implications ofNATO’s transformation for 153;linguistic issue 155; phases 4; post-11 September 151

NATO-Russia relations: A New Quality 82

NATO Strategic Concept 64–5, 73Neorealism 112, 119, 128New Military Doctrine (2000) 103–4, 105New National Security 74, 104–5New Political Thinking 4, 16–18, 137–40Nicholas I, Tsar 12, 13, 26, 49Nicholas II, Tsar 13–14, 19, 22, 49–50nihilism 22–3North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC) 2, 65, 137; see also Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

nuclear weapons 65, 74, 88, 104–5, 106

obshchina (village/peasant-commune) 25Occidentalism 28Operation Enduring Freedom 77Organisation for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) 139Organisation for European Economic

Cooperation 135Organisation for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) 4, 64, 66, 71, 94,108, 135–7, 142, 145, 146, 152;Istanbul Summit 136

Orthodoxy 13, 30, 32, 35–6, 42–3, 58;component of Russian identity 3–4,33–5, 148; Slavophiles idealisation24–5

Ostpolitik 134

Pakistan 79, 101Pareto-optimal solution 121parliament, Russian 14, 41, 57, 59, 61Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) 68Partnership for Peace (PfP) 66–70, 85,

135, 150patriarchate 35, 37, 38peacekeeping operations 71; Bosnia

68–9; Kosovo 75–7; Russian17–18, 64

perestroika (reconstruction) 16, 19, 35,40, 54, 56, 138

Peter the Great (Peter I) 7, 19, 26, 38, 52,56, 62; reforms 8, 10–12, 22, 27, 32;rejection of Orthodox Church 49

Poland 87, 88, 89, 90, 95political culture 44–5; definition and

concept 45–7political culture, Russian 4, 45, 47, 54,

58–9, 149political institutions 116Primakov, Yevgeny 69–70, 99, 100Prisoner’s Dilemma 112, 114–17,

121, 128pro-Western orientation 16, 23, 78,

90, 135Prussia 131, 132, 146pseudo democracy 57public opinion 154–5Pushkin, Alexander 15, 21Putin, Vladimir 78–9, 80, 81, 82, 84, 103,

104, 109, 154, 157

Al-Qaida 77Quadruple Alliance see Concert of

EuropeQuintuple Alliance see Concert of

Europe

Rambouillet peace talks 72Realism 111–12, 116, 119, 127, 152;

origins and fundamental assumptions113–14

religion 3–4, 33, 36; nationalisation 37;relaxation of restrictions on 40, 42;shamanistic-pagan 8; see alsoOrthodoxy

Robertson, Lord 77, 81Romania 76, 95, 143rossiskii (of the Land of Rus’) 7, 20–1,

31, 32, 148Russia 1, 17–18, 36, 98; common security

concerns with West 78–9; domestic

INDEX

211

Russia (Continued)politics 67, 74–5, 84, 88, 108, 109,136, 157; economy 80, 108, 134,139–40, 155; geography 7–8, 31, 48;great-power status 18, 23, 63, 65, 75,93, 155; history 7, 8–10, 19, 24, 45, 97,130–1, 141; isolation 30, 59, 66; loss ofsuperpower status 62–3, 93–4; post-communist 22–3, 55, 86; post-Soviet12, 130; strategic interests in UnitedStates 102; see also Soviet Union

Russian Church Council (Sto glavCouncil) 36

Russian Federation see RussiaRussian foreign policy 16, 17; evolution

61–4; impact of NATO enlargement 99Russian Foreign Policy Concept 74Russian idea 9, 18–19, 24, 94Russian identity 3, 31–2; definition 6–7;

geographic and historical components7–8, 31; Mongol yoke and 8–10;Orthodoxy’s place in 33–4, 42–3; roleof religion 3–4, 33; schools of thought23–31; Soviet period 14–16; TsaristRussia 10–14; understanding 147–8

Russian language 155Russian national identity 3, 7, 18–19, 31,

32, 148; messianic conception 21;Orthodox components 34–6, 42–3

Russian nationalism 12, 13, 19, 26Russianness 19, 34; Orthodoxy as an

element of 34–5, 42–3Russian Orthodox Church 3, 30–1, 34,

36–7; Bolshevik government and 35,39–40; post-Soviet Union 40–1; andRussian State 38, 43, 148–9; state actor36–7, 38–9, 49; as symbol of nationalunity 34–5; totalitarian attitude 41–2

Russian Soviet Federative Republic(RSFR) 61

Russian State: gosudarstvo(dominion/patrimony) 50; OrthodoxChurch and 34, 35, 36–41, 43, 49,148–9

Russian thought 13, 27; schools 23–31russkii (ethnic Russian) 7, 20–1, 31,

32, 148

SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander inEurope) 76

St Petersburg 11, 12, 14, 28Saint-Simon, Henri de 13

Samarin, Iurii 24Schelling, F. W. J. 13, 24Schopenhauer, Arthur 13Scythianism 28–9, 31security: multilateral approaches 123–7;

regimes 117, 122–3Security Dilemma 112, 118, 122, 124self-help systems 116, 151September 2001 terrorist attacks 129,

150, 153; impact on NATO–Russianrelations 61, 77–85, 86, 152

Serbia 72, 74–5, 76, 143Sergii, Patriarch 39Shalikashvili, John 68Shangai Five 100Shevtsov, Leontiy Pavlovich 68, 69Siberia 20Sino-American relations 102, 133Sino-Russian relations: 1890s 28;

deterioration 133; partnership100–3, 108

Slavic Union 74, 99, 106Slavophiles 7, 13, 24–6, 27, 28, 31,

49, 94; –Westernisers debate 24, 94sobornost (conciliarism/communalism)

24–5Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 7Soviet Union 1, 14–16, 88, 91–2;

alienation of Orthodox Church 35,39–40; demise 61, 103; foreign policy63; isolation 15, 139; nihilism 22–3;and Orthodoxy 35; political culture 51,53–4; thaw in East–West relations132–5; see also Russia

Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 68, 74, 75, 85

Stag Hunt game theory 112, 118, 128Stalin, Josef 15, 39, 40, 51, 56START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)

agreements 106–7‘Star Wars’ programme 63Stolypin, Peter 14Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 63strategic isolation 93strategic partnership 64, 78, 88, 99–103,

107–8Structural Realism see NeorealismSupreme Allied Command in Europe

(SHAPE) 68, 69, 74, 76, 77

Tajikistan 64, 79Taliban 77, 79

INDEX

212

Tatars 29, 38terrorism 112, 127, 129, 151; fight

against 77, 153; see also September2001 terrorist attacks

Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 72Third Rome see Moscow, Third RomeTime of Troubles 34, 38, 51Tolstoy, Leo 15, 21Treaty of Rome 134Treaty of the Four 100Trubetskoi, Nicholas 9, 30tsar 20, 22, 37, 38–9, 41–2, 48–50, 52;

Batyushka Tsar 50; see also names ofspecific Tsars

Tsarist Russia 10–14, 19, 20, 41Turgenev, Ivan 6, 15Turkey 17, 63, 95Turkmenistan 79Two Plus Four Treaty (1990) 92

Ukraine 63, 97–9United Nations (UN) 123United Nations Charter 72, 73, 75United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) 16, 61, 72, 73, 100, 135;Resolution 1199 72; Resolution 1244 75

United States 132–3, 139, 156; dismissalof Common European Home proposal143–4; lack of role in CommonEuropean home 141–2; and NATOenlargement 103; policy towards Russia152–3, 157

USSR see Soviet UnionUvarov, Count 39Uzbekistan 79

Vietnam 63, 133Vladimir, Prince 34Voltaire 46

Waltz, Kenneth 119–20Warsaw Pact 1, 64, 91, 94, 106, 128Washington Treaty 81weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 71,

80, 82, 83, 104, 151, 153West 8, 13, 15–16, 62, 73, 91; lack of

responsiveness to Russian cooperativeinitiatives 145–6, 152; Peter the Great’srapprochement with 10; thaw in East–West relations 132–5

Western Europe 10, 63, 96, 103, 134,135, 140–1

Western European Union (WEU) 64Westernisers 13, 23, 24, 26–8, 31, 49, 94Wilson, Woodrow 123Witte, Count 14World Bank 139World Trade Organisation (WTO) 71

xenophobia 10, 12, 13, 30, 36, 94, 148

Yeltsin, Boris 6, 16, 17, 41, 56, 57, 62,63, 65, 67, 73–4, 78, 88, 89–90, 95, 96,103, 104, 106

Yugoslavia 68, 71, 89, 100; see alsoKosovo crisis

Zapad 99 74Zeming, Jiang 100zemskii sobor (Council of All the Land) 52zemstvo movement 53Zyuganov, Gennady 57

INDEX

213