LIGAYA MANIAGO vs ATTY. LOURDES I. DEDIOS,

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaintdated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seekingthe disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios forengaging in the practice of law despite having beensuspended by the Court.Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal caseagainst Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, beforethe Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City,Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No.603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. Theaccused was represented by Atty. De Dios, withoffice address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, OlongapoCity. Complainant then learned from the RTC staffthat Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspensionorder from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was,therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case(Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case(Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed againstMiyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134,where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel.Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to bedisbarred from the practice of law for her flagrantviolation and deliberate disobedience of a lawfulorder of the Supreme Court. In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that therewere cases filed against her client, Miyata. She,however, denied that she was under suspension whenshe appeared as his counsel in the cases. Respondent explained that an administrative case wasindeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted thepenalty of 6-month suspension. She served thesuspension immediately upon receipt of the CourtsResolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16,2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001,respondent formally informed the Court that she wasresuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001,which she actually did. A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in hercapacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC,Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive onMarch 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist frompracticing law and revoking her notarial commissionfor the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that thedirective was rather questionable, respondent,nonetheless, desisted from law practice in duedeference to the court order. Thereafter, respondentfiled a Motion for Clarification with the SupremeCourt on account of Judge Farrales letters to allcourts in Olongapo City and to some municipalitiesin Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. DeDios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of lawand that her notarial commission for the years 2007and 2008 is revoked. Acting on the said motion, theCourt issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in thiswise: A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I.De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion forClarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that theCourt declare her to have served her six (6) months(sic) suspension and her resumption of law practiceon 17 November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED. Considering the motion for clarification, the Courtresolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to haveSERVED her six (6) month suspension and her

recommencement of law practice on 17 November2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30January 2002. Respondent averred that for the period stated in theaffidavit of complainant Maniago, during which sheallegedly practiced law, she was neither suspendednor in any way prohibited from practice. Thecomplaint, she added, was baseless and malicious,and should be dismissed outright.In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, theCourt referred the matter to the Office of the BarConfidant (OBC) for evaluation, report andrecommendation. Initially, the OBC directed thecomplainant to file a supplemental affidavit, statingtherein the exact period of appearances of Atty. DeDios and the particular courts where respondentappeared as counsel in the following cases: (1)Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153. In compliance therewith, complainant submitted aSupplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, whichreads: 2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People ofthe Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang]mag[-]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9,2003, na [naka-]attach ang Certification mula saBranch 73[,] Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City. 3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang]mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10,2005, nakasaad din ito sa Certification mula saBranch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Atsa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito ay na[-]ifile ni Atty.de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggangngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals. 4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach angCertified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session ngSubic Municipal Trial Court na kung saan aynag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo, plaintiff, -versus-Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001. 5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment niAtty. de Dios, x x x - 5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Diosnoong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs.Danilo Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Itoay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa lamangmula magsimula ang kanyang suspension noon[g]May 16, 2001. 5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. PerlaTabasondra-Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos CivilCase No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mulamagsimula ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios noongMay 16, 2001. 5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a)affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noongMay 16, 2001, (b) Affidavit executed by JessicaMorales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isangStatement of non-liability of Alfredo C. Diaz on May16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawanoong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Diosnoong May 16, 2001.

6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na itobilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa akingpersonal na kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawakko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios angkanyang suspension base sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk ofCourt and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa namay petsang 12 February 2007 at sa admission niAtty. de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspensionnoong May 16, 2001. A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed byrespondent, stating that there were no new mattersraised in the Supplemental Affidavit, and assertingthat the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. CristinaB. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolutiondated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court.According to her, the resolution should be the finalnail to the coffin of this case.On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted itsMemorandum for the Courts consideration. The OBC explained that the letter adverted to bycomplainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply toan inquiry made by the Office of the CourtAdministrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.[1] Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting ofthe suspension order was not automatic, followingthe pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado andSons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesusand Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty.Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al.and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G.Encanto, et al., which states: The Statement of the Court that his suspension standsuntil he would have satisfactorily shown hiscompliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat thathis suspension could thereby extend for more than sixmonths. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is notautomatic upon the end of the period stated in theCourts decision, and an order from the Court liftingthe suspension at the end of the period is necessary inorder to enable [him] to resume the practice of hisprofession.[2] Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyermust first present proof(s) of his compliance bysubmitting certifications from the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines and from the Executive Judge that hehas indeed desisted from the practice of law duringthe period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, afterevaluation, and upon a favorable recommendationfrom the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the orderof suspension and thus allow him to resume thepractice of law. The OBC alleged that it wasunfortunate that this procedure was overlooked inA.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able toresume her practice of law without submitting therequired certifications and passing through the OBCfor evaluation. In order to avoid confusion andconflicting directives from the Court, the OBCrecommended that the Court adopt a uniform policyon the matter of the lifting of the order of suspensionof a lawyer from the practice of law. The Court notes the Report and Recommendation ofthe OBC. It must be remembered that the practice of law is nota right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow tothe inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Courtto exact compliance with the lawyers public

responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appearthat an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust andconfidence of his clients and of the public, it becomesnot only the right but also the duty of the SupremeCourt, which made him one of its officers and gavehim the privilege of ministering within its Bar, towithdraw that privilege.[4] However, as much as theCourt will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer,it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyermay not be deprived of the freedom and right toexercise his profession unreasonably. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is herebyRESOLVED that the following guidelines beobserved in the matter of the lifting of an ordersuspending a lawyer from the practice of law:1) After a finding that respondentlawyer must be suspended from the practice of law,the Court shall render a decision imposing thepenalty; 2) Unless the Court explicitly statesthat the decision is immediately executory uponreceipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within whichto file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Thedenial of said motion shall render the decision finaland executory;3) Upon the expiration of the periodof suspension, respondent shall file a SwornStatement with the Court, through the Office of theBar Confidant, stating therein that he or she hasdesisted from the practice of law and has notappeared in any court during the period of his or hersuspension; 4) Copies of the Sworn Statementshall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP andto the Executive Judge of the courts whererespondent has pending cases handled by him or her,and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel; 5) The Sworn Statement shall beconsidered as proof of respondents compliance withthe order of suspension; 6) Any finding or report contrary tothe statements made by the lawyer under oath shallbe a ground for the imposition of a more severepunishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. SO ORDERED.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENTOF IBP DUES.

This is a request for exemption from payment of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed bypetitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitionersought exemption from payment of IBP dues in theamount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaidaccountability for the years 1977-2005. He allegedthat after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Servicefrom July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, andworked in, the USA in December 1986 until hisretirement in the year 2003. He maintained that hecannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he wasworking in the Philippine Civil Service since theCivil Service law prohibits the practice of one'sprofession while in government service, and neither

can he be assessed for the years when he wasworking in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to theIBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted itscomment3 stating inter alia: that membership in theIBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that alawyer continues to be included in the Roll ofAttorneys as long as he continues to be a member ofthe IBP; that one of the obligations of a member isthe payment of annual dues as determined by the IBPBoard of Governors and duly approved by theSupreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity ofimposing dues on the IBP members has been upheldas necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated BarProgram; and that the policy of the IBP Board ofGovernors of no exemption from payment of dues isbut an implementation of the Court's directives for allmembers of the IBP to help in defraying the cost ofintegration of the bar. It maintained that there is norule allowing the exemption of payment of annualdues as requested by respondent, that what is allowedis voluntary termination and reinstatement ofmembership. It asserted that what petitioner couldhave done was to inform the secretary of the IBP ofhis intention to stay abroad, so that his membershipin the IBP could have been terminated, thus, hisobligation to pay dues could have been stopped. Italso alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in theprocess of discussing proposals for the creation of aninactive status for its members, which if approved bythe Board of Governors and by this Court, willexempt inactive IBP members from payment of theannual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitionercontends that what he is questioning is the IBP Boardof Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in thepayment of annual membership dues of lawyersregardless of whether or not they are engaged inactive or inactive practice. He asseverates that thePolicy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annualmembership dues suffers from constitutionalinfirmities, such as equal protection clause and thedue process clause. He also posits that compulsorypayment of the IBP annual membership dues wouldindubitably be oppressive to him considering that hehas been in an inactive status and is without incomederived from his law practice. He adds that hisremoval from nonpayment of annual membershipdues would constitute deprivation of property rightwithout due process of law. Lastly, he claims thatnon-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactivestatus is neither injurious to active law practitioners,to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to thecommunity where the inactive lawyers-membersreside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner isentitled to exemption from payment of his duesduring the time that he was inactive in the practice oflaw that is, when he was in the Civil Service from1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, towhich every lawyer must belong, as distinguishedfrom bar association organized by individual lawyersthemselves, membership in which is voluntary.Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by

which every member of the Bar is afforded anopportunity to do his shares in carrying out theobjectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear hisportion of its responsibilities. Organized by or underthe direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is anofficial national body of which all lawyers arerequired to be members. They are, therefore, subjectto all the rules prescribed for the governance of theBar, including the requirement of payment of areasonable annual fee for the effective discharge ofthe purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code ofprofessional ethics or professional responsibility,breach of which constitutes sufficient reason forinvestigation by the Bar and, upon proper causeappearing, a recommendation for discipline ordisbarment of the offending member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means theofficial unification of the entire lawyer population.This requires membership and financial support ofevery attorney as condition sine qua non to thepractice of law and the retention of his name in theRoll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer toassociate with anyone. He is free to attend or not toattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter orvote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.The only compulsion to which he is subjected is thepayment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, inorder to foster the State's legitimate interest inelevating the quality of professional legal services,may require that the cost of improving the professionin this fashion be shared by the subjects andbeneficiaries of the regulatory program – thelawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution thatprohibits the Court, under its constitutional powerand duty to promulgate rules concerning theadmission to the practice of law and in the integrationof the Philippine Bar8 - which power requiredmembers of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, topay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expensesof regulation of the profession to which they belong.It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed asa regulatory measure, designed to raise funds forcarrying out the noble objectives and purposes ofintegration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explainedin the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by themembers does not mean that the Court is attemptingto levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is anexaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is arevenue. If the judiciary has inherent power toregulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident toregulation, it may impose a membership fee for thatpurpose. It would not be possible to put on anintegrated Bar program without means to defray theexpenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarilycarries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulatethe privilege of law is that the regulation does notimpose an unconstitutional burden. The publicinterest promoted by the integration of the Bar faroutweighs the slight inconvenience to a memberresulting from his required payment of the annualdues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence ofmembership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.This means that the compulsory nature of payment ofdues subsists for as long as one's membership in theIBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, orthe type of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allowsexemption from payment of membership dues. Atmost, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could haveinformed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of hisintention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,his membership in the IBP could have beenterminated and his obligation to pay dues could havebeen discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment statedthat the IBP Board of Governors is in the process ofdiscussing the situation of members under inactivestatus and the nonpayment of their dues during suchinactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty boundto comply with his obligation to pay membershipdues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of thepenalty of removal would amount to a deprivation ofproperty without due process and hence infringes onone of his constitutional rights.

This question has been settled in the case of In reAtty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, inthe sense of its being one that entitles the holder of alicense to practice a profession, we do not here pauseto consider at length, as it [is] clear that under thepolice power of the State, and under the necessarypowers granted to the Court to perpetuate itsexistence, the respondent's right to practice lawbefore the courts of this country should be and is amatter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if thepower to impose the fee as a regulatory measure isrecognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce itspayment, which penalty may be avoided altogetherby payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of lawis not a property right but a mere privilege, and assuch must bow to the inherent regulatory power ofthe Court to exact compliance with the lawyer'spublic responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind thatmembership in the bar is a privilege burdened withconditions,11 one of which is the payment ofmembership dues. Failure to abide by any of thementails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereofwarrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemptionfrom payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is orderedto pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP asmembership fees for the years 1977-2005, within anon-extendible period of ten (10) days from receiptof this decision, with a warning that failure to do sowill merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION,petitioner, vs.CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Directorof the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla andSolicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer'sAssociation for prohibition and injunction againstCeledonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of thePhilippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued acircular announcing that he had scheduled for June27, 1957 an examination for the purpose ofdetermining who are qualified to practice as patentattorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, thesaid examination to cover patent law andjurisprudence and the rules of practice before saidoffice. According to the circular, members of thePhilippine Bar, engineers and other persons withsufficient scientific and technical training arequalified to take the said examination. It wouldappear that heretofore, respondent Director has beenholding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner PhilippineLawyer's Association that one who has passed the barexaminations and is licensed by the Supreme Court topractice law in the Philippines and who is in goodstanding, is duly qualified to practice before thePhilippines Patent Office, and that consequently, thecat of the respondent Director requiring members ofthe Philippine Bar in good standing to take and passan examination given by the Patent Office as acondition precedent to their being allowed to practicebefore said office, such as representing applicants inthe preparation and prosecution of applications forpatent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is inviolation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through theSolicitor General, maintains that the prosecution ofpatent cases "does not involve entirely or purely thepractice of law but includes the application ofscientific and technical knowledge and training, somuch so that, as a matter of actual practice, theprosecution of patent cases may be handled not onlyby lawyers, but also engineers and other persons withsufficient scientific and technical training who passthe prescribed examinations as given by the PatentOffice; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit thePatent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body fromrequiring further condition or qualification fromthose who would wish to handle cases before thePatent Office which, as stated in the precedingparagraph, requires more of an application ofscientific and technical knowledge than the mereapplication of provisions of law; . . . that the actiontaken by the respondent is in accordance withRepublic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the PatentLaw of the Philippines, which similar to the UnitedStates Patent Law, in accordance with which theUnited States Patent Office has also prescribed asimilar examination as that prescribed by respondent.. . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patentlaw of the United States of America authorizes theCommissioner of Patents to prescribe examinationsto determine as to who practice before the UnitedStates Patent Office, the respondent, is similarlyauthorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic ActNo. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, inthe past, would appear to have been holding tests orexaminations the passing of which was imposed as arequired qualification to practice before the PatentOffice, to our knowledge, this is the first time that theright of the Director of Patents to do so, specially asregards members of the bar, has been questionedformally, or otherwise put in issue. And we havegiven it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive andconstitutional power with respect to admission to thepractice of law in the Philippines1 and to anymember of the Philippine Bar in good standing maypractice law anywhere and before any entity, whetherjudicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in thePhilippines. Naturally, the question arises as towhether or not appearance before the patent Officeand the preparation and the prosecution of patentapplications, etc., constitutes or is included in thepractice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct ofcases or litigation in court; it embraces thepreparation of pleadings and other papers incident toactions and social proceedings, the management ofsuch actions and proceedings on behalf of clientsbefore judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.In general, all advice to clients, and all action takenfor them in matters connected with the lawcorporation services, assessment and condemnationservices contemplating an appearance before ajudicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy andinsolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedingsin attachment, and in matters of estate andguardianship have been held to constitute lawpractice as do the preparation and drafting of legalinstruments, where the work done involves thedetermination by the trained legal mind of the legaleffect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists inno small part of work performed outside of any courtand having no immediate relation to proceedings incourt. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legaladvice on a large variety of subjects, and thepreparation and execution of legal instrumentscovering an extensive field of business and trustrelations and other affairs. Although thesetransactions may have no direct connection withcourt proceedings, they are always subject to becomeinvolved in litigation. They require in many aspects ahigh degree of legal skill, a wide experience withmen and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation todifficult and complex situations. These customaryfunctions of an attorney or counselor at law bear anintimate relation to the administration of justice bythe courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns thequestion set forth in the order, can be drawn betweenthat part which involves advice and drafting ofinstruments in his office. It is of importance to thewelfare of the public that these manifold customaryfunctions be performed by persons possessed ofadequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,and acting at all times under the heavy trustobligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3(1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of theJustices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes suchappearance before the Patent Office, therepresentation of applicants, oppositors, and otherpersons, and the prosecution of their applications forpatent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcementof their rights in patent cases. In the first place,although the transaction of business in the PatentOffice involves the use and application of technicaland scientific knowledge and training, still, all suchbusiness has to be rendered in accordance with thePatent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rulesand Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office inaccordance with law. Not only this, but practicebefore the Patent Office involves the interpretationand application of other laws and legal principles, aswell as the existence of facts to be established inaccordance with the law of evidence and procedure.For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law providesthat an invention shall not be patentable if it iscontrary to public order or morals, or to public healthor welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall notbe considered new or patentable if it was known orused by others in the Philippines before the inventionthereof by the inventor named in any printedpublication in the Philippines or any foreign countrymore than one year before the application for a patenttherefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale inthe Philippines for more than one year before theapplication for the patent therefor. Section 10provides that the right to patent belongs to the trueand actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives orassigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of anymistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates thegrounds for cancellation of a patent; that althoughany person may apply for such cancellation, underSection 29, the Solicitor General is authorized topetition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30mentions the requirements of a petition forcancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a noticeof hearing of the petition for cancellation of thepatent by the Director of Patents in case the saidcancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at anytime after the expiration of three years from the daythe patent was granted, any person patent on severalgrounds, such as, if the patented invention is notbeing worked in the Philippines on a commercialscale, or if the demand for the patented article in thePhilippines on a commercial scale, or if the demandfor the patented article in the Philippines is not beingmet to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or ifby reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a licenseon reasonable terms or by reason of the conditionattached by him to the license, purchase or use of thepatented article or working of the patented process ormachine of production, the establishment of a newtrade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or ifthe patent or invention relates to food or medicine oris necessary to public health or public safety. Allthese things involve the applications of laws, legalprinciples, practice and procedure. They call for legalknowledge, training and experience for which amember of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of thebusiness and many of the act, orders and decisions ofthe Patent Director involve questions of law or areasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the veryPatent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61,provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registrationof a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel apatent or to obtain a compulsory license, and anyparty to any other proceeding in the Office may

appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order ordecision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. Ifthe transaction of business in the Patent Office andthe acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Directorinvolved exclusively or mostly technical andscientific knowledge and training, then logically, theappeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body,but rather to a board of scientists, engineers ortechnical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves theconsideration of the nature of the functions and actsof the Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholdingpatents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are publicrecords, and it is the duty of the Commissioner togive authenticated copies to any person, on paymentof the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasissupplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only originalinitiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the grantingand delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decidewhether the patent is new and whether it is the propersubject of a patent; and his action in awarding orrefusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing onan application the commissioner should decide notonly questions of law, but also questions of fact, aswhether there has been a prior public use or sale ofthe article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasissupplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicialor quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to holdthat a member of the bar, because of his legalknowledge and training, should be allowed topractice before the Patent Office, without furtherexamination or other qualification. Of course, theDirector of Patents, if he deems it advisable ornecessary, may require that members of the barpractising before him enlist the assistance oftechnical men and scientist in the preparation ofpapers and documents, such as, the drawing ortechnical description of an invention or machinesought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyerfiling an application for the registration of a parcel ofland on behalf of his clients, is required to submit aplan and technical description of said land, preparedby a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expresslyauthorized by the law to require persons desiring topractice or to do business before him to submit anexamination, even if they are already members of thebar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic ActNo. 165, is patterned after the United States PatentLaw; and of the United States Patent Office in PatentCases prescribes an examination similar to that whichhe (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. Heinvites our attention to the following provisions ofsaid Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register ofan attorneys and a register agents are kept in thePatent Office on which are entered the names of allpersons recognized as entitled to represent applicantsbefore the Patent Office in the preparation andprosecution of applicants for patent. Registration inthe Patent Office under the provisions of these rulesshall only entitle the person registered to practicebefore the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in goodstanding admitted to practice before any UnitedStates Court or the highest court of any State orTerritory of the United States who fulfills therequirements and complied with the provisions ofthese rules may be admitted to practice before thePatent Office and have his name entered on theregister of attorneys.

x x x x x x x x x

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person willbe admitted to practice and register unless he shallapply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on aprescribed form supplied by the Commissioner andfurnish all requested information and material; andshall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissionerthat he is of good moral character and of good reputeand possessed of the legal and scientific and technicalqualifications necessary to enable him to renderapplicants for patent valuable service, and isotherwise competent to advise and assist him in thepresentation and prosecution of their applicationbefore the Patent Office. In order that theCommissioner may determine whether a personseeking to have his name placed upon either of theregisters has the qualifications specified, satisfactoryproof of good moral character and repute, and ofsufficient basic training in scientific and technicalmatters must be submitted and an examination whichis held from time to time must be taken and passed.The taking of an examination may be waived in thecase of any person who has served for three years inthe examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rulesof Practice of the United States Patent Office inPatent Cases is authorized by the United States PatentLaw itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approvalof the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rulesand regulations governing the recognition of agents,attorneys, or other persons representing applicants orother parties before his office, and may require ofsuch persons, agents, or attorneys, before beingrecognized as representatives of applicants or otherpersons, that they shall show they are of good moralcharacter and in good repute, are possessed of thenecessary qualifications to enable them to render toapplicants or other persons valuable service, and arelikewise to competent to advise and assist applicantsor other persons in the presentation or prosecution oftheir applications or other business before the Office.The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice andopportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, eithergenerally or in any particular case from furtherpractice before his office any person, agent orattorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, orguilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to complywith the said rules and regulations, or who shall, withintent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, orthreaten any applicant or prospective applicant, orother person having immediate or prospectiveapplicant, or other person having immediate orprospective business before the office, by word,circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for anysuch suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.The action of the Commissioner may be reviewedupon the petition of the person so refused recognitionor so suspended by the district court of the UnitedStates for the District of Columbia under suchconditions and upon such proceedings as the said

court may by its rules determine. (Emphasissupplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 ofRepublic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisionsof law just reproduced, then he is authorized toprescribe the rules and regulations requiring thatpersons desiring to practice before him should submitto and pass an examination. We reproduce saidSection 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes ofcomparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Directorsubject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of allbusiness in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and byfar, are different from the provisions of the UnitedStates Patent Law as regards authority to holdexaminations to determine the qualifications of thoseallowed to practice before the Patent Office. Whilethe U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner ofPatents to require attorneys to show that they possessthe necessary qualifications and competence torender valuable service to and advise and assist theirclients in patent cases, which showing may take theform of a test or examination to be held by theCommissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silenton this important point. Our attention has not beencalled to any express provision of our Patent Law,giving such authority to determine the qualificationsof persons allowed to practice before the PatentOffice.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Codeauthorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe formsand make regulations or general orders notinconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious andefficient administration of his branch of the serviceand to carry into full effect the laws relating tomatters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff andCustoms Code of the Philippines, provides that theCommissioner of Customs shall, subject to theapproval of the Department Head, makes all rules andregulations necessary to enforce the provisions ofsaid code. Section 338 of the National InternalRevenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 asamended, states that the Secretary of Finance, uponrecommendation of the Collector of InternalRevenue, shall promulgate all needful rules andregulations for the effective enforcement of theprovisions of the code. We understand that rules andregulations have been promulgated not only for theBureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also forother bureaus of the Government, to govern thetransaction of business in and to enforce the law forsaid bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence ofan express and clear provision of law giving thenecessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit toand pass on examination prescribed by it before theyare allowed to practice before said Patent Office, thenthere would be no reason why other bureaus speciallythe Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, wherethe business in the same area are more or lesscomplicated, such as the presentation of books ofaccounts, balance sheets, etc., assessmentsexemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureauof Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation,etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also

require that any lawyer practising before them orotherwise transacting business with them on behalf ofclients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law,members of the Philippine Bar authorized by thisTribunal to practice law, and in good standing, maypractice their profession before the Patent Office, forthe reason that much of the business in said officeinvolves the interpretation and determination of thescope and application of the Patent Law and otherlaws applicable, as well as the presentation ofevidence to establish facts involved; that part of thefunctions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders anddecisions are, under the law, taken to the SupremeCourt.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibitionis granted and the respondent Director is herebyprohibited from requiring members of the PhilippineBar to submit to an examination or tests and pass thesame before being permitted to appear and practicebefore the Patent Office. No costs.

VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,vs.ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY.CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY. EMMANUELMARIANO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the April 30,2002 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch151, in JDRC Case No. 2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D.Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.

The facts follow.

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action fordeclaration of nullity of marriage against petitionerVinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151,docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner wasrepresented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo deJesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano.

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed asettlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rightsover their minor child and the separation of theirproperties. The proposal was accepted by petitionerand both parties subsequently filed a motion forapproval of their agreement. This was approved bythe trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriagebetween petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declarednull and void.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counselswere well-compensated.3 They, including theirrelatives and friends, even availed of free productsand treatments from petitioner’s dermatology clinic.This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additionallegal fees amounting to P16.5 million4 which thelatter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitionerissued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as"full payment for settlement."6

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trialcourt7 a motion

for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner topay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty.Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amountas follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 toAtty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. Themotion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, thisrecourse.

The issues raised in this petition are:

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 hadjurisdiction over the claim for additional legal feesand

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additionallegal fees.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees byfiling the necessary petition as an incident of themain action in which his services were rendered or inan independent suit against his client. The former ispreferable to avoid multiplicity of suits.9

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for thedeclaration of nullity of marriage was filed, hadjurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legalfees. Respondents sought to collect P50 millionwhich was equivalent to 10% of the value of theproperties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly,what respondents were demanding was additionalpayment for legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement betweenpetitioner and respondents was governed by theprinciple of quantum meruit which means "as muchas the lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorney’sfees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, wherethere is no express agreement for the payment ofattorney’s fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanismwhich prevents an unscrupulous client from runningaway with the fruits of the legal services of counselwithout paying for it. In the same vein, it avoidsunjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself.

Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversieswith clients concerning their compensation and toresort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should beavoided and should be filed only when circumstancesforce lawyers to resort to it.11

In the case at bar, respondents’ motion for payment oftheir lawyers’ fees was not meant to collect what wasjustly due them; the fact was, they had already beenadequately paid.

Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sumsand perks already given to them was an act ofunconscionable greed which is shocking to thisCourt.

As lawyers, respondents should be reminded thatthey are members of an honorable profession, theprimary vision of which is justice. It is respondents’despicable behavior which gives lawyering a badname in the minds of some people. The vernacularhas a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of lawis a decent profession and not a money-making trade.Compensation should be but a mere incident.12

Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was notjustified. They could not charge petitioner a fee basedon percentage, absent an express agreement to thateffect. The payments to them in cash, checks, freeproducts and services from petitioner’s business —all of which were not denied by respondents — morethan sufficed for the work they did. The "fullpayment for settlement"13 should have dischargedpetitioner’s obligation to them.

The power of this Court to reduce or even delete theaward of attorneys’ fees cannot be denied. Lawyersare officers of the Court and they participate in thefundamental function of administering justice.14When they took their oath, they submitted themselvesto the authority of the Court and subjected theirprofessional fees to judicial control. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLYGRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appealsdated April 30, 2002 in CA–G.R. CV No. 68080 ishereby MODIFIED. The award of additionalattorney’s fees in favor of respondents is herebyDELETED.

SO ORDERED.

In the Matter of the IBP Membership DuesDelinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBPAdministrative Case No. MDD-1)

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensedpracticing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP for short) Board of Governorsunanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 inAdministrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter ofthe Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MarcialA. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removalof the name of the respondent from its Roll ofAttorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay hismembership dues" to the IBP since the latter'sconstitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its thenPresident Liliano B. Neri, submitted the saidresolution to the Court for consideration andapproval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, ArticleIII of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until thefollowing June 29, the Board shall promptly inquireinto the cause or causes of the continued delinquencyand take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,including a recommendation to the Supreme Courtfor the removal of the delinquent member's namefrom the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action takenshall be sent by registered mail to the member and tothe Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required therespondent to comment on the resolution and letteradverted to above; he submitted his comment onFebruary 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay themembership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBPPresident and the IBP Board of Governors to reply toEdillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, theysubmitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3,1976. After the hearing, the parties were required tosubmit memoranda in amplification of their oralarguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted forresolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of therespondent's pleadings would show that the proprietyand necessity of the integration of the Bar of thePhilippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,however, objects to particular features of Rule ofCourt 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the CourtRule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of thePhilippines was integrated — and to the provisions ofpar. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors torecommend to the Supreme Court the removal of adelinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneysis found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBPBy-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Courtto issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 ofthe Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subjectto the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default inthe payment of annual dues for six months shallwarrant suspension of membership in the IntegratedBar, and default in such payment for one year shall bea ground for the removal of the name of thedelinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope ofmembership in the IBP is stated in these words of theCourt Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is herebyorganized an official national body to be known asthe 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed ofall persons whose names now appear or mayhereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of theSupreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched inthe following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of theIntegrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as theBoard of Governors shall determine with theapproval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that theabove provisions constitute an invasion of hisconstitutional rights in the sense that he is beingcompelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a memberof the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, andthat as a consequence of this compelled financialsupport of the said organization to which he isadmittedly personally antagonistic, he is beingdeprived of the rights to liberty and propertyguaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, therespondent concludes, the above provisions of theCourt Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and ofno legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction ofthe Court to strike his name from the Roll ofAttorneys, contending that the said matter is not

among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but israther of an "administrative nature pertaining to anadministrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reachedthe Court relating to constitutional issues thatinevitably and inextricably come up to the surfacewhenever attempts are made to regulate the practiceof law, define the conditions of such practice, orrevoke the license granted for the exercise of thelegal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very sameissues raised in a previous case before the Court,entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matterof the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of thePhilippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." TheCourt exhaustively considered all these matters inthat case in its Resolution ordaining the integration ofthe Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,1973. The Court there made the unanimouspronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoingconscientious study of all the arguments adduced inAdm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materialsand the mass of factual data contained in theexhaustive Report of the Commission on BarIntegration, that the integration of the Philippine Baris 'perfectly constitutional and legallyunobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the postureof the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, towhich every lawyer must belong, as distinguishedfrom bar associations organized by individuallawyers themselves, membership in which isvoluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially aprocess by which every member of the Bar isafforded an opportunity to do his share in carryingout the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged tobear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized byor under the direction of the State, an integrated Baris an official national body of which all lawyers arerequired to be members. They are, therefore, subjectto all the rules prescribed for the governance of theBar, including the requirement of payment of areasonable annual fee for the effective discharge ofthe purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code ofprofessional ethics or professional responsibilitybreach of which constitutes sufficient reason forinvestigation by the Bar and, upon proper causeappearing, a recommendation for discipline ordisbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviouslydictated by overriding considerations of publicinterest and public welfare to such an extent as morethan constitutionally and legally justifies therestrictions that integration imposes upon thepersonal interests and personal convenience ofindividual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that alllegislation directing the integration of the Bar havebeen uniformly and universally sustained as a validexercise of the police power over an importantprofession. The practice of law is not a vested rightbut a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed withpublic interest because a lawyer owes substantialduties not only to his client, but also to his brethren inthe profession, to the courts, and to the nation, andtakes part in one of the most important functions of

the State — the administration of justice — as anofficer of the court. 4 The practice of law beingclothed with public interest, the holder of thisprivilege must submit to a degree of control for thecommon good, to the extent of the interest he hascreated. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affectedwith a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject tothe exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. NewYork, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rulesof court to effect the integration of the Philippine Barunder such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so inthe exercise of the paramount police power of theState. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards ofthe legal profession, improve the administration ofjustice, and enable the Bar to discharge its publicresponsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congressin enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining theintegration of the Bar through its Resolutionpromulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President ofthe Philippines in decreeing the constitution of theIBP into a body corporate through PresidentialDecree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were promptedby fundamental considerations of public welfare andmotivated by a desire to meet the demands ofpressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare,may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,property and occupations. Persons and property maybe subjected to restraints and burdens in order tosecure the general prosperity and welfare of the State(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latinmaxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." Thepublic welfare is the supreme law. To thisfundamental principle of government the rights ofindividuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessingwithout which life is a misery, but liberty should notbe made to prevail over authority because thensociety win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams,70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State torestrain some individuals from all freedom, and allindividuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining theconstitutionality and validity of Bar integration in thePhilippines is the explicit unequivocal grant ofprecise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5)of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of thePhilippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the followingpowers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and theadmission to the practice of law and the integration ofthe Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval ofthis Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Courtto effect the integration of the Philippine Bar undersuch conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise thestandards of the legal profession, improve theadministration of justice, and enable the Bar todischarge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that evenwithout the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),and looking solely to the language of the provision ofthe Constitution granting the Supreme Court thepower "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,practice and procedure in all courts, and theadmission to the practice of law," it at once becomesindubitable that this constitutional declaration veststhe Supreme Court with plenary power in all casesregarding the admission to and supervision of thepractice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon thelegal profession, his practice of law and his exerciseof the said profession, which affect the society atlarge, were (and are) subject to the power of the bodypolitic to require him to conform to such regulationsas might be established by the proper authorities forthe common good, even to the extent of interferingwith some of his liberties. If he did not wish tosubmit himself to such reasonable interference andregulation, he should not have clothed the public withan interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent mustalready fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension,however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondentis that the Court is without power to compel him tobecome a member of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule isunconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutionalright of freedom to associate (and not to associate).Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member ofthe Integrated Bar is not violative of hisconstitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of anygroup of which he is not already a member. Hebecame a member of the Bar when he passed the Barexaminations. 7 All that integration actually does is toprovide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group ofwhich every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer toassociate with anyone. He is free to attend or notattend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter orvote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.The only compulsion to which he is subjected is thepayment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in orderto further the State's legitimate interest in elevatingthe quality of professional legal services, may requirethat the cost of improving the profession in thisfashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries ofthe regulatory program — the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in asense compel a lawyer to be a member of theIntegrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as anexercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent isthat the provision of the Court Rule requiringpayment of a membership fee is void. We see nothingin the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under itsconstitutional power and duty to promulgate rulesconcerning the admission to the practice of law andthe integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which powerthe respondent acknowledges — from requiringmembers of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to

pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expensesof regulation of the profession to which they belong.It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as aregulatory measure, designed to raise funds forcarrying out the objectives and purposes ofintegration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that theenforcement of the penalty provisions would amountto a deprivation of property without due process andhence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.Whether the practice of law is a property right, in thesense of its being one that entitles the holder of alicense to practice a profession, we do not here pauseto consider at length, as it clear that under the policepower of the State, and under the necessary powersgranted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, therespondent's right to practise law before the courts ofthis country should be and is a matter subject toregulation and inquiry. And, if the power to imposethe fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then apenalty designed to enforce its payment, whichpenalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is notvoid as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of lawis not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and assuch must bow to the inherent regulatory power ofthe Court to exact compliance with the lawyer'spublic responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/orjurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the nameof a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficientto state that the matters of admission, suspension,disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and theirregulation and supervision have been and areindisputably recognized as inherent judicial functionsand responsibilities, and the authorities holding suchare legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), inwhich the report of the Board of Bar Commissionersin a disbarment proceeding was confirmed anddisbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the BarIntegration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power toregulate the conduct and qualifications of its officersdoes not depend upon constitutional or statutorygrounds. It is a power which is inherent in this courtas a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to theproper administration of justice ... the argument thatthis is an arbitrary power which the court isarrogating to itself or accepting from the legislativelikewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It haslimitations no less real because they are inherent. It isan unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brothermember of the Bar, particularly where, as here, thefacts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to beassumed only with a determination to uphold theIdeals and traditions of an honorable profession andto protect the public from overreaching and fraud.The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty thatthe power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to theCourt the power to "Promulgate rules concerningpleading, practice ... and the admission to the practiceof law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X,Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of therespondent to remain a member of the legalprofession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions ofRule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of areneither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is theunanimous sense of the Court that the respondentMarcial A. Edillon should be as he is herebydisbarred, and his name is hereby ordered strickenfrom the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUEUSE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ.GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SANJUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G.GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOELA. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA,TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, andALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FORAUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRMNAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON,MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO,BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA,JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC,EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

R E S O L U T I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1)by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the survivingpartners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died onFebruary 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed tocontinue using, in the names of their firms, the namesof partners who had passed away. In the Court'sResolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions wereordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the followingarguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is notprohibited from continuing its business under a firmname which includes the name of a deceased partner;in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitlysanctions the practice when it provides in the lastparagraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The use by the person or partnership continuing thebusiness of the partnership name, or the name of adeceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itselfmake the individual property of the deceased partnerliable for any debts contracted by such person orpartnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such asaccountancy and engineering, the legislature hasauthorized the adoption of firm names without anyrestriction as to the use, in such firm name, of thename of a deceased partner; 2 the legislativeauthorization given to those engaged in the practiceof accountancy — a profession requiring the samedegree of trust and confidence in respect of clients asthat implicit in the relationship of attorney and client— to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicatesthat there is no fundamental policy that is offendedby the continued use by a firm of professionals of a

firm name which includes the name of a deceasedpartner, at least where such firm name has acquiredthe characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are nottransgressed by the continued use of the name of adeceased partner in the firm name of a lawpartnership because Canon 33 of the Canons ofProfessional Ethics adopted by the American BarAssociation declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... The continued use of the name of a deceased orformer partner when permissible by local custom, isnot unethical but care should be taken that noimposition or deception is practiced through thisuse. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition ordeception because the deaths of their respectivedeceased partners were well-publicized in allnewspapers of general circulation for several days;the stationeries now being used by them carry newletterheads indicating the years when their respectivedeceased partners were connected with the firm;petitioners will notify all leading national andinternational law directories of the fact of theirrespective deceased partners' deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued useof a deceased partner's name in a professional firm'sname; 6 there is no custom or usage in thePhilippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area,which recognizes that the name of a law firmnecessarily Identifies the individual members of thefirm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner'sname in the firm name of law partnerships has beenconsistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is anaccepted practice in the legal profession of mostcountries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first cameunder consideration by this Court in 1953 when a lawfirm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice ofincluding in its firm name that of a deceased partner,C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with thisCourt advising the firm to desist from including intheir firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,who has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Registerof Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation.The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved tointervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, theCourt, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it"would like to be informed why the name of Perkinsis still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins isalready dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21,1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile,raising substantially the same arguments as thosenow being raised by petitioners, prayed that thecontinued use of the firm name "Perkins & PonceEnrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£

After carefully considering the reasons given byAttorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates fortheir continued use of the name of the deceased E. G.Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from thepolicy it adopted in June 1953 when it requiredAttorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of CebuCity to desist from including in their firm

designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.The Court believes that, in view of the personal andconfidential nature of the relations between attorneyand client, and the high standards demanded in thecanons of professional ethics, no practice should beallowed which even in a remote degree could giverise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys areaccordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS"from their firm name.

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of thepolicy thus far enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart fromthe rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, DeLeon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the usein their partnership names of the names of deceasedpartners will run counter to Article 1815 of the CivilCode which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operateunder a firm name, which may or may not include thename of one or more of the partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership,include their names in the firm name, shall be subjectto the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names ina firm name of a partnership must either be those ofliving partners and. in the case of non-partners,should be living persons who can be subjected toliability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Codeprohibits a third person from including his name inthe firm name under pain of assuming the liability ofa partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a lawfirm cannot be held liable as the old members to thecreditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons ofProfessional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for thepayment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyerof a percentage, either gross or net, of the feesreceived from the future business of the deceasedlawyer's clients, both because the recipients of suchdivision are not lawyers and because such paymentswill not represent service or responsibility on the partof the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow northe heirs can be held liable for transactions enteredinto after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. Therebeing no benefits accruing, there ran be nocorresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practicalobjections to allowing the use by law firms of thenames of deceased partners. The public relationsvalue of the use of an old firm name can tend tocreate undue advantages and disadvantages in thepractice of the profession. An able lawyer withoutconnections will have to make a name for himselfstarting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who canjoin an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm'sreputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, thefirst factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 ofTitle IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution andWinding Up." The Article primarily deals with theexemption from liability in cases of a dissolvedpartnership, of the individual property of thedeceased partner for debts contracted by the personor partnership which continues the business using the

partnership name or the name of the deceased partneras part thereof. What the law contemplates therein isa hold-over situation preparatory to formalreorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercialpartnership with a good will to protect rather than ofa professional partnership, with no saleable good willbut whose reputation depends on the personalqualifications of its individual members. Thus, it hasbeen held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in acommercial partnership and cannot arise in aprofessional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of acommercial partnership the succeeding partners orparties have the right to carry on the business underthe old name, in the absence of a stipulationforbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercialpartnership is a partnership asset inseparable from thegood will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115)(Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£

... a professional partnership the reputation of whichdepends or; the individual skill of the members, suchas partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has nogood win to be distributed as a firm asset on itsdissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skilland reputation may be, especially where there is noprovision in the partnership agreement relating togood will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115)(Emphasis supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannotbe likened to partnerships formed by otherprofessionals or for business. For one thing, the lawon accountancy specifically allows the use of a tradename in connection with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legalentity. It is a mere relationship or association for aparticular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formedfor the purpose of carrying on trade or business or ofholding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade namein law practice is improper. 12

The usual reason given for different standards ofconduct being applicable to the practice of law fromthose pertaining to business is that the law is aprofession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution tothe Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyerfrom Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines aprofession as "a group of men pursuing a learned artas a common calling in the spirit of public service, —no less a public service because it may incidentallybe a means of livelihood."

xxx xxx xxx

Primary characteristics which distinguish the legalprofession from business are:

1. A duty of public service, of which theemolument is a byproduct, and in which one mayattain the highest eminence without making muchmoney.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to theadministration of justice involving thorough sincerity,integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degreefiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the barcharacterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingnessto resort to current business methods of advertisingand encroachment on their practice, or dealingdirectly with their clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural orconstitutional right but is in the nature of a privilegeor franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moralcharacter with special qualifications duly ascertainedand certified. 15 The right does not only presupposein its possessor integrity, legal standing andattainment, but also the exercise of a specialprivilege, highly personal and partaking of the natureof a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons ofProfessional Ethics of the American Bar Association"in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethicalthe continued use of the name of a deceased orformer partner in the firm name of a law partnershipwhen such a practice is permissible by local custombut the Canon warns that care should be taken that noimposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no localcustom permits or allows the continued use of adeceased or former partner's name in the firm namesof law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom,Identify the more active and/or more senior membersor partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the historyof the firms of petitioners and of other law firms inthis country would show how their firm names haveevolved and changed from time to time as thecomposition of the partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death ofone or more of the partners designated by it is properonly where sustained by local custom and not whereby custom this purports to Identify the activemembers. ...

There would seem to be a question, under theworking of the Canon, as to the propriety of addingthe name of a new partner and at the same timeretaining that of a deceased partner who was never apartner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit.,supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real orconsequential, where the name of a deceased partnercontinues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person insearch of legal counsel might be guided by thefamiliar ring of a distinguished name appearing in afirm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts haveconsistently allowed the continued use of a deceasedpartner's name in the firm name of law partnerships.But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable LifeAssurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) whichpetitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in theirmemorandum, the New York Supreme Courtsustained the use of the firm name Alexander &

Green even if none of the present ten partners of thefirm bears either name because the practice wassanctioned by custom and did not offend anystatutory provision or legislative policy and wasadopted by agreement of the parties. The Court statedtherein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanctionof custom and offends no statutory provision orlegislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons ofProfessional Ethics of both the American BarAssociation and the New York State Bar Associationprovides in part as follows: "The continued use of thename of a deceased or former partner, whenpermissible by local custom is not unethical, but careshould be taken that no imposition or deception ispracticed through this use." There is no question as tolocal custom. Many firms in the city use the names ofdeceased members with the approval of otherattorneys, bar associations and the courts. TheAppellate Division of the First Department hasconsidered the matter and reached The conclusionthat such practice should not be prohibited.(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Lawprohibits the practice in question. The use of the firmname herein is also sustainable by reason ofagreement between the partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no localcustom that sanctions the practice. Custom has beendefined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition ofacts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take nojudicial notice of custom. A custom must be provedas a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 Alocal custom as a source of right cannot beconsidered by a court of justice unless such custom isproperly established by competent evidence like anyother fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of alocal custom, and of the elements requisite toconstitute the same, wanting herein. Merely becausesomething is done as a matter of practice does notmean that Courts can rely on the same for purposesof adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridicalcustom must be differentiated from social custom.The former can supplement statutory law or beapplied in the absence of such statute. Not so with thelatter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpretingthe laws form part of the legal system. 22 When theSupreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issuedits Resolutions directing lawyers to desist fromincluding the names of deceased partners in their firmdesignation, it laid down a legal rule against whichno custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven,can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil lawwhich clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolvedby the death of any partner. 23 Custom which arecontrary to law, public order or public policy shall notbe countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarlyrelated to the administration of justice and should notbe considered like an ordinary "money-makingtrade." têñ.£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it ispracticed in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aimsprimarily at personal gain; a profession at theexercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the

era of wide free opportunity, we think of freecompetitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyerand grocer and farmer may seem to be freelycompeting with their fellows in their calling in ordereach to acquire as much of the world's good as hemay within the allowed him by law. But the memberof a profession does not regard himself as incompetition with his professional brethren. He is notbartering his services as is the artisan nor exchangingthe products of his skill and learning as the farmersells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing asa lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service ofthe professional man is often rendered for noequivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is hispride to do what he does in a way worthy of hisprofession even if done with no expectation ofreward, This spirit of public service in which theprofession of law is and ought to be exercised is aprerequisite of sound administration of justiceaccording to law. The other two elements of aprofession, namely, organization and pursuit of alearned art have their justification in that they secureand maintain that spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity oftheir firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legaland ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein aredenied and petitioners advised to drop the names"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firmnames. Those names may, however, be included inthe listing of individuals who have been partners intheir firms indicating the years during which theyserved as such.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez,Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur

Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votesfor granting them, seven of the Justices being of thecontrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion ofJustice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out ofdelicadeza that the undersigned did not participate inthe disposition of these petitions, as the law office ofSycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillostarted with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late RamonQuisumbing, being the father-in-law of theundersigned, and the most junior partner then,Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite theattention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners,to the last sentence of the opinion of JusticeAmeurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycipand Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listingof individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm,Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in

their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority tocontinue the use of that firm name, notwithstandingthe death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder ofthe firm which was originally known as the SycipLaw Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of thelaw firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayedthat they be allowed to continue using the said firmname notwithstanding the death of two partners,former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was acontinuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which wasestablished in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son andthat, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta hasacquired an institutional and secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of theuse by the partnership of the name of a deceasedpartner as part of the partnership name, is cited tojustify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon thatthe continued use by a law firm of the name of adeceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,is not unethical" as long as "no imposition ordeception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 ofthe Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be grantedwith the condition that it be indicated in theletterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) thatAlexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta andHerminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when theyserved as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuingthe use of the names of their deceased founders is toretain the clients who had customarily sought thelegal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and tobenefit from the goodwill attached to the names ofthose respected and esteemed law practitioners. Thatis a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. Thatpractice was followed before the war by the law firmof James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of JudgeRoss the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in thefirm name with an indication of the year when hedied. No one complained that the retention of thename of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal orunethical.

# Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votesfor granting them, seven of the Justices being of thecontrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion ofJustice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out ofdelicadeza that the undersigned did not participate inthe disposition of these petitions, as the law office ofSycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillostarted with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late RamonQuisumbing, being the father-in-law of theundersigned, and the most junior partner then,Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law.For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the

attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners,to the last sentence of the opinion of JusticeAmeurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycipand Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listingof individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm,Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, intheir petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority tocontinue the use of that firm name, notwithstandingthe death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5,1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder ofthe firm which was originally known as the SycipLaw Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of thelaw firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayedthat they be allowed to continue using the said firmname notwithstanding the death of two partners,former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio,on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was acontinuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which wasestablished in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son andthat, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta hasacquired an institutional and secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of theuse by the partnership of the name of a deceasedpartner as part of the partnership name, is cited tojustify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon thatthe continued use by a law firm of the name of adeceased partner, "when permissible by local custom,is not unethical" as long as "no imposition ordeception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 ofthe Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be grantedwith the condition that it be indicated in theletterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) thatAlexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta andHerminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when theyserved as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuingthe use of the names of their deceased founders is toretain the clients who had customarily sought thelegal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and tobenefit from the goodwill attached to the names ofthose respected and esteemed law practitioners. Thatis a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. Thatpractice was followed before the war by the law firmof James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of JudgeRoss the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in thefirm name with an indication of the year when hedied. No one complained that the retention of thename of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal orunethical.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs.ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'aDistrict Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a salesrepresentative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate andhousing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbentexecutive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'aDistrict in Marawi City, They were classmates, andused to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract wasexecuted for the purchase on installments by Alauyaof one of the housing units belonging to the abovementioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.);and in connection therewith, a housing loan was alsogranted to Alauya by the National Home MortgageFinance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President ofVillarosa & Co. advising of the termination of hiscontract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from andnotifying you of my intent to terminate theContract/Agreement entered into between me andyour company, as represented by your SalesAgent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of yourcompany's branch office here in Cagayan de OroCity, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated bygross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty andabuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agentwhich made said contract void ab initio. Said salesagent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal andunauthorized acts which made said contract anOnerous Contract prejudicial to my rights andinterests. He then proceeded to expound inconsiderable detail and quite acerbic language on the"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit,fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse ofconfidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" andclosed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree forthe mutual rescission of our contract, even as Iinform you that I categorically state on record that Iam terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not haveto resort to any legal action before said onerous andmanipulated contract against my interest be annulled.I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence theneed to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-Presidentof Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan deOro City. The envelope containing it, and whichactually went through the post, bore no stamps.Instead at the right hand corner above the descriptionof the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26,"had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya alsowrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit& Collection Group of the National Home MortgageFinance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void hiscontract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking forcancellation of his housing loan in connectiontherewith, which was payable from salary deductionsat the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things,he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, asI hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the"manipulated contract" entered into between me andthe E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as representedby its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, whomaliciously and fraudulently manipulated said

contract and unlawfully secured and pursued thehousing loan without my authority and against mywill. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void abinitio in view of the attending circumstances, that myconsent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and thatthere was no meeting of the minds between me andthe swindling sales agent who concealed the realfacts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated insome detail what he took to be the anomalousactuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of theNHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996,and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the samereasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellationof his housing loan and discontinuance of deductionsfrom his salary on account thereof. a He also wroteon January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez,Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office,and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of thisCourt, to stop deductions from his salary in relationto the loan in question, again asserting the anomalousmanner by which he was allegedly duped intoentering into the contracts by "the scheming salesagent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFCwrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stopdeductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . .the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. ofDecember 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with thisCourt a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 —to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of theabove mentioned envelope bearing the typewrittenwords, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1 In that complaint,she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelouscharges with no solid grounds through manifestignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishingher honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege offree postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," whichonly regular members of the Philippine Bar mayproperly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as"unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) hisallegations with the essence of truth," denouncing hisimputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance andevident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealingswith Alauya had been regular and completelytransparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "bedismissed from the senice, or be appropriatelydesciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment onthe complaint, Conformably with established usagethat notices of resolutions emanate from thecorresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice

of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. AlfredoP. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 inwhich he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasiganto require an explanation of him, this powerpertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst.Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerkof Court." but only to the District Judge, the CourtAdministrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced thesuspicion that the Resolution was the result of a"strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.Marasigan's office. He also averred that thecomplaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious ofhim for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Courtand ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and DistrictRegistrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but thistime in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy ofthe complaint in order that he might commentthereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of courtwere done in good faith and within the confines ofthe law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent ofVillarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature,fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contractentailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from hissalary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under dateof June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he whohad suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleeplessnights, wounded feelings and untold financialsuffering," considering that in six months, a total ofP26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 Hedeclared that there was no basis for the complaint; incommunicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merelyacted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse ofthe franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom heentrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that thewords: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten onthe envelope by some other person, an avermentcorroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to beforerespondent himself, and attached to the comment asAnnex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinatemailed the letters with the use of the money he hadgiven for postage, and if those letters were indeedmixed with the official mail of the court, this hadoccurred inadvertently and because of an honestmistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by theassertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyershave a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the titleof "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistakenfor "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to themayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging thatwhat he did "is expected of any man undulyprejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he wasmanipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, aclassmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign ablank contract on Alawi's assurance that she wouldshow the completed document to him later forcorrection, but she had since avoided him; despite"numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does notknow where the property — subject of his supposedagreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. —is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS

policy from his wife, and although she promised toreturn it the next day, she did not do so until afterseveral months. He also claims that in connectionwith his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forgedhis signature on such pertinent documents as thoseregarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were donewithout malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of thecomplaint for lack of merit, it consisting of"fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." andcomplainant Alawi having come to the Court withunclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulenthousing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2)letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (datedApril 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2)earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all ofwhich he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — inhis Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use thetitle but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M.ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the CourtAdministrator for evaluation, report andrecommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in hisaforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelouscharges (against Alawi) with no solid groundsthrough manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing herhonor and established reputation." In those letters,Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contractsin question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . .illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . .(his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and"swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty andabuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulentlymanipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., andunlawfully secured and pursued the housing loanwithout . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making thesestatements, he was merely acting in defense of hisrights, and doing only what "is expected of any manunduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelingsand untold financial suffering, considering that in sixmonths, a total of P26,028.60 had been deductedfrom his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards forPublic Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter aliaenunciates the State policy of promoting a highstandard of ethics and utmost responsibility in thepublic service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commandsthat "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all timesrespect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doingacts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,public policy, public order, public safety and public

interest." 17 More than once has this Courtemphasized that "the conduct and behavior of everyofficial and employee of an agency involved in theadministration of justice, from the presiding judge tothe most junior clerk, should be circumscribed withthe heavy burden of responsibility. Their conductmust at all times be characterized by, among others,strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keepthe respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent withgood morals, good customs or public policy, orrespect for the rights of others, to couchdenunciations of acts believed — however sincerely— to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, inexcessively intemperate, insulting or virulentlanguage. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has aright of action against Sophia Alawi. The lawrequires that he exercise that right with propriety,without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm toanyone; in a manner consistent with good morals,good customs, public policy, public order, supra; orotherwise stated, that he "act with justice, giveeveryone his due, and observe honesty and goodfaith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication ofright cannot justify resort to vituperative language, ordownright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'aBar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to astandard of conduct more stringent than for mostother government workers. As a man of the law, hemay not use language which is abusive, offensive,scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 Asa judicial employee, it is expected that he accordrespect for the person and the rights of others at alltimes, and that his every act and word should becharacterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy,dignity. His radical deviation from these salutarynorms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot beexcused, by his strongly held conviction that he hadbeen grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," thisCourt has already had occasion to declare thatpersons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledgedmembers of the Philippine Bar, hence may onlypractice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one whohas been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who hasbeen admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both beconsidered "counsellors," in the sense that they givecounsel or advice in a professional capacity, only thelatter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" isreserved to those who, having obtained the necessarydegree in the study of law and successfully taken theBar Examinations, have been admitted to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and remainmembers thereof in good standing; and it is they onlywho are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in hisregion, there are pejorative connotations to the term,or it is confusingly similar to that given to locallegislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of nomoment. His disinclination to use the title of"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title ofattorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized useof the franking privilege, 22 the record contains noevidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya ishereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessivelyintemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for

usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned thatany similar or other impropriety or misconduct in thefuture will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICEOF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitionerBenjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume thepractice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar inMarch 1960. He practiced law until he migrated toCanada in December 1998 to seek medical attentionfor his ailments. He subsequently applied forCanadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s freemedical aid program. His application was approvedand he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Actof 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippinecitizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath ofallegiance as a Filipino citizen before the PhilippineConsulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, hereturned to the Philippines and now intends to resumehis law practice. There is a question, however,whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost hismembership in the Philippine bar when he gave uphis Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, thispetition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of theBar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneysand Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants foradmission to the bar. – Every applicant for admissionas a member of the bar must be a citizen of thePhilippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of goodmoral character, and a resident of the Philippines; andmust produce before the Supreme Court satisfactoryevidence of good moral character, and that no chargesagainst him, involving moral turpitude, have beenfiled or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the BarConfidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisitionof Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner hasagain met all the qualifications and has none of thedisqualifications for membership in the bar. Itrecommends that he be allowed to resume thepractice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on hisretaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his dutiesand responsibilities as a member of the Philippinebar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of theBar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened withconditions.2 It is so delicately affected with publicinterest that it is both a power and a duty of the State(through this Court) to control and regulate it in orderto protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness,maintenance of the highest degree of morality,faithful observance of the rules of the legalprofession, compliance with the mandatorycontinuing legal education requirement and paymentof membership fees to the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) are the conditions required formembership in good standing in the bar and forenjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach bya lawyer of any of these conditions makes himunworthy of the trust and confidence which thecourts and clients repose in him for the continuedexercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any personheretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, orthereafter admitted as such in accordance with theprovisions of this Rule, and who is in good andregular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member ofthe Philippine bar in accordance with the statutoryrequirements and who is in good and regular standingis entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications.The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant foradmission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, atleast twenty-one years of age, of good moralcharacter and a resident of the Philippines.5 He mustalso produce before this Court satisfactory evidenceof good moral character and that no charges againsthim, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or arepending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves variousphases such as furnishing satisfactory proof ofeducational, moral and other qualifications;7 passingthe bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 andsigning the roll of attorneys and receiving from theclerk of court of this Court a certificate of the licenseto practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ―membership in good standing ― is a continuingrequirement. This means continued membership and,concomitantly, payment of annual membership duesin the IBP;11 payment of the annual professionaltax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuinglegal education requirement;13 faithful observance ofthe rules and ethics of the legal profession and beingcontinually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost hisFilipino citizenship still practice law in thePhilippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of allprofessions in the Philippines shall be limited toFilipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement foradmission to the bar, loss thereof terminatesmembership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In otherwords, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jureterminates the privilege to practice law in thePhilippines. The practice of law is a privilege deniedto foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost byreason of naturalization as a citizen of anothercountry but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who

become citizens of another country shall be deemednot to have lost their Philippine citizenship under theconditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipinolawyer who becomes a citizen of another country isdeemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenshipif he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.Although he is also deemed never to have terminatedhis membership in the Philippine bar, no automaticright to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice thelegal profession in the Philippines and he reacquireshis Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions"(he) shall apply with the proper authority for alicense or permit to engage in such practice."18Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquiresFilipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resumehis law practice, he must first secure from this Courtthe authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annualmembership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours ofmandatory continuing legal education; this isspecially significant to refresh theapplicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine lawsand update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will notonly remind him of his duties and responsibilities as alawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renewhis pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic ofthe Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore hisgood standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M.Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject tocompliance with the conditions stated above andsubmission of proof of such compliance to the BarConfidant, after which he may retake his oath as amember of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant, vs.ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the administrative complaint filed byVictoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo(Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on BarDiscipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath,docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts

Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejothrough her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon).Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoriathat Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of moneyand wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousandpesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortlythereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for ameeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the

terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introducedto her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found noreason to distrust the former. Hence, during the samemeeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejoand there and then handed to the latter the amount ofPhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty.Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over toVictoria a check1 dated February 2, 2009 for twohundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000)covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On duedate, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay thedeposit of the check for the reason that she was stillwaiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loanto fund the check. However, after a couple of monthsof waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty.Espejo as to whether or not the check was alreadyfunded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received anEspejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in theamount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2representing the interest which accrued due to the latepayment of the principal obligation. Victoriadeposited the said check but, to her dismay, the checkbounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejofailed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated demands.Worried that she would not be able to recover theamount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to heraccount the first check in the amount of PhP 275,000,but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact.However, the said check was also dishonored due toinsufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter becamemore aggressive in her efforts to recover her money.She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo ademand letter dated August 3, 2009.3

When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed acriminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 andEstafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’sOffice.4

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenasissued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office whichshe personally received and continued to ignoreVictoria’s demands. She attended only one (1)scheduled preliminary investigation where shepromised to pay her loan obligation.5

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another checkdated December 8, 2009 in the amount of twohundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.).However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check wasagain dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.6 Atty.Espejo did not file any counter-affidavit or pleadingto answer the charges against her. On November 17,2009, the case was submitted for resolution withoutAtty. Espejo’s participation.7 Victoria thereafter filedthe instant administrative case against Atty. Espejobefore the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD,through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo tosubmit her Answer to Victoria’s administrativecomplaint failing which would render her in default.The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did notsubmit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBPCommissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala(Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified theparties to appear for a mandatory conference set onJune 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearanceof either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver ofher right to participate in further proceedings.9

At the mandatory conference, only Victoriaappeared.10

Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued anOrder11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear duringthe mandatory conference and her failure to file anAnswer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared indefault. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed tofile her verified position paper, which she filed onJune 11, 2010.12

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15,2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of Atty.Espejo from the practice of law and as a member ofthe Bar for a period of five (5) years.

The CBD reasoned:

The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint fordisbarment despite due notice and to appear on thescheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistanceto lawful orders of the court and illustrates hisdeficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, whichdeserves disciplinary sanction.

Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks withinsufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she]failed to comply with her obligation and herdisregard and failure to appear for preliminaryinvestigation and to submit her counter-affidavit toanswer the charges against her for Estafa andViolation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct thatalso warrant disciplinary action against respondent.

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governorspassed a Resolution14 adopting the Report andRecommendation of the CBD with the modificationlowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5)years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also orderedto return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice withlegal interest reckoned from the time the demand wasmade. The Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it ishereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,with modification, the Report and Recommendationof the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution asAnnex "A", and finding the recommendation fullysupported by the evidence on record and applicablelaws and rules, and considering respondent’s gravemisconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)years and Ordered to Return to complainant theamount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand(P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days fromreceipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from thetime the demand was made.

On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Courtthe Notice of the Resolution pertaining to ResolutionNo. XX-2012-419 along with the records of thiscase.15

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt itsrecommendation in part. Atty. Espejo did not denyobtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse allegationsthat she issued unfunded checks to pay herobligation. It has already been settled that thedeliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance ofworthless checks constitute gross misconduct, forwhich a lawyer may be sanctioned.16

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully performtheir duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and totheir clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explainedthat the prompt payment of financial obligations isone of the duties of a lawyer, thus:

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetaryobligations to the complaint but offered no justifiablereason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainantmade several demands, both verbal and written, butrespondent just ignored them and even made himselfscarce. Although he acknowledged his financialobligations to complainant, respondent never offerednor made arrangements to pay his debt. On thecontrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doingnor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, anact constituting gross misconduct. Respondent mustbe reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer tofaithfully perform at all times his duties to society, tothe bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of hisduties, he must promptly pay his financialobligations.17

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan andissued the worthless checks in her private capacityand not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment.As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may bedisciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty inhis profession but also for gross misconduct outsideof his professional capacity. While the Court may notordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconductcommitted in his non- professional or privatecapacity, the Court may be justified in suspending orremoving him as an attorney where his misconductoutside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is sogross in character as to show him morally unfit andunworthy of the privilege which his licenses and thelaw confer.18

In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance ofa series of worthless checks, which is exactly whatAtty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests alawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her oath,for which she may be disciplined. Thus:

We have held that the issuance of checks which werelater dishonored for having been drawn against aclosed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for thetrust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lackof personal honesty and good moral character as torender her unworthy of public confidence. Theissuance of a series of worthless checks also showsthe remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful tothe deleterious effects of such act to the publicinterest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’slow regard to her commitment to the oath she hastaken when she joined her peers, seriously andirreparably tarnishing the image of the profession sheshould hold in high esteem.

x x x x

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondentwho issued worthless checks for which he wasconvicted in the criminal case filed against him. InLao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure topay just debts and the issuance of worthless checksconstitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer maybe sanctioned with one-year suspension from thepractice of law. The same sanction was imposed onthe respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino havingbeen found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing badchecks in payment of a piece of property the title ofwhich was only entrusted to him by thecomplainant.19

Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravatedby her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of theIBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint ofVictoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatoryconference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for theIBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer.In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyermust maintain respect not only for the courts, but alsofor judicial officers and other duly constitutedauthorities, including the IBP:

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by hisunjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBPrequiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatoryconference. Although respondent did not appear atthe conference, the IBP gave him another chance todefend himself through a position paper. Still,respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatantdisrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly chargedwith conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer isexpected to uphold the law and promote respect forlegal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe andmaintain respect not only to the courts, but also tojudicial officers and other duly constitutedauthorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B ofthe Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBPto conduct proceedings for the disbarment,suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20

Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthlesschecks and her blatant refusal to heed the directivesof the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the IBPcontravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03;and Canon 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THECONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THELAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAWAND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyershall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALLAT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY ANDDIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ANDSUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEINTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall notengage in conduct that adversely reflects on hisfitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in publicor private life, behave in a scandalous manner to thediscredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 – ALAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAINTHE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TOJUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ONSIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

We find the penalty of suspension from the practiceof law for two (2) years, as recommended by the IBP,commensurate under the circumstances. We,however, cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendationordering Atty. Espejo to return the money sheborrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedingsagainst lawyers, the only issue is whether the officerof the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as amember of the Bar. Our only concern is thedetermination of respondent’s administrative liability.Our findings have no material bearing on otherjudicial action which the parties may to choose meagainst each other. Furthermore, disciplinaryproceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial ofan action, but rather investigations by the Court intothe conduct of one of its officers. The only questionfor determination in these proceedings is whether ornot the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as

a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule onthe issue of the amount of money that should bereturned to the complainant.22

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. EspejoGUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons1, 7 and 11 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from thepractice of law for two (2) years affectiveimmediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office ofthe Court Administrator for dissemination to allcourts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and theOffice of the Bar Confidant and recorded in thepersonal files of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FORDISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs.SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the correspondingexaminations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao wasadmitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez chargedhim with having falsely represented in his applicationfor such Bar examination, that he had the requisiteacademic qualifications. The matter was in duecourse referred to the Solicitor General who causedthe charge to be investigated; and later he submitted areport recommending that Diao's name be erasedfrom the roll of attorneys, because contrary to theallegations in his petition for examination in thisCourt, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking uplaw subjects, the required pre-legal educationprescribed by the Department of Private Education,specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training;and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, andnever obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — whichcontradicts the credentials he had submitted insupport of his application for examination, and of hisallegation therein of successful completion of the"required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint,Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge:but he claims that although he had left high school inhis third year, he entered the service of the U.S.Army, passed the General Classification Test giventherein, which (according to him) is equivalent to ahigh school diploma, and upon his return to civilianlife, the educational authorities considered his armyservice as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year highschool.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of thisclaim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit anycertification to that effect (the equivalence) by theproper school officials. However, it is unnecessary todwell on this, since the second charge is clearlymeritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. fromQuisumbing College; and yet his application forexamination represented him as an A.A. graduate(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had

obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano Universityin April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified,due to confusion, as a graduate of QuisumbingCollege, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that theforegoing stipulation of facts be admitted andapproved by this Honorable Court, without prejudiceto the parties adducing other evidence to prove theircase not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason thatthe "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his ownmaking. Had his application disclosed his havingobtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would alsohave disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, therebyshowing that he began his law studies (2nd semesterof 1948-1949) six months before obtaining hisAssociate in Arts degree. And then he would not havebeen permitted to take the bar tests, because ourRules provide, and the applicant for the Barexamination must affirm under oath, "That previousto the study of law, he had successfully andsatisfactorily completed the required pre-legaleducation(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department ofPrivate Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was notqualified to take the bar examinations; but due to hisfalse representations, he was allowed to take it,luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to theBar. Such admission having been obtained underfalse pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. Thefact that he hurdled the Bar examinations isimmaterial. Passing such examinations is not the onlyqualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking theprescribed courses of legal study in the regularmanner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the rollof attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And thelatter is required to return his lawyer's diploma withinthirty days. So ordered.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OFATTORNEYS

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, CJ.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll ofAttorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado(Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of thePhilippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in19791 and passed the same year's bar examinationswith a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at thePhilippine International Convention Center (PICC)together with the successful bar examinees.3 He wasscheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice toSign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Officewhen he went home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his oldcollege files, Medado found the Notice to Sign theRoll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he

had not signed in the roll, and that what he hadsigned at the entrance of the PICC was probably justan attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was alreadyworking. He stated that he was mainly doingcorporate and taxation work, and that he was notactively involved in litigation practice. Thus, heoperated "under the mistaken belief that since he hadalready taken the oath, the signing of the Roll ofAttorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to hisstatus as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in theRoll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended MandatoryContinuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, hewas required to provide his roll number in order forhis MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he wasunable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he beallowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted aclarificatory conference on the matter on 21September 201212 and submitted a Report andRecommendation to this Court on 4 February2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instantpetition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 Itexplained that, based on his answers during theclarificatory conference, petitioner could offer novalid justification for his negligence in signing in theRoll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grantMedado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to thepayment of a fine and the imposition of a penaltyequivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado tosign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin toimposing upon him the ultimate penalty ofdisbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for themost serious ethical transgressions of members of theBar.

In this case, the records do not show that this actionis warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and goodmoral character when he finally filed the instantPetition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note thatit was not a third party who called this Court’sattention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it wasMedado himself who acknowledged his own lapse,albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. Whenasked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this longto file the instant petition, Medado very candidlyreplied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at thetime, what can you say? Takot ka kung anongmangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonnahappen. At the same time, it’s a combination ofapprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen.And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to comehere … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to anyaction for disqualification from the practice of law,17

which is more than what we can say of otherindividuals who were successfully admitted asmembers of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, thisfact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere tothe strict requirements of the ethics of the profession,and that he has prima facie shown that he possessesthe character required to be a member of thePhilippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competentand able legal practitioner, having held variouspositions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron,Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National OilCompany, and the Energy DevelopmentCorporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become afull-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1While the practice of law is not a right but aprivilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedlywithhold this privilege from individuals who haveshown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand therigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpatepetitioner Medado from all liability for his years ofinaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of lawsince 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years,without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 Hejustifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as"neither willful nor intentional but based on amistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used toexcuse a person from the legal consequences of hisacts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 amistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawfuljustification, because everyone is presumed to knowthe law and its consequences.25 Ignorantiafactiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medadomay have at first operated under an honest mistake offact when he thought that what he had signed at thePICC entrance before the oath-taking was already theRoll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realizedthat what he had signed was merely an attendancerecord, he could no longer claim an honest mistake offact as a valid justification. At that point, Medadoshould have known that he was not a full-fledgedmember of the Philippine Bar because of his failureto sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act ofsigning therein that would have made him so.26When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose tocontinue practicing law without taking the necessarysteps to complete all the requirements for admissionto the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorizedpractice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practiceof law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officerof the court, and acting as such without authority,may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which ispunishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such afinding, however, is in the nature of criminalcontempt29 and must be reached after the filing ofcharges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,while it appears quite clearly that petitionercommitted indirect contempt of court by knowinglyengaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrainfrom making any finding of liability for indirect

contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto hasbeen filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of lawlikewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merelyprohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorizedpractice of law, the unauthorized practice of law bythe lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty toprevent the unauthorized practice of law. This dutylikewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound tocomport themselves in accordance with the ethicalstandards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previousviolations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty ofsuspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado isnot yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend himfrom the practice of law. However, we see it fit toimpose upon him a penalty akin to suspension byallowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)year after receipt of this Resolution. For histransgression of the prohibition against theunauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit tofine him in the amount of P32,000. During the oneyear period, petitioner is warned that he is notallowed to engage in the practice of law, and issternly warned that doing any act that constitutespractice of law before he has signed in the Roll ofAttorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in theRoll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. PetitionerMichael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Rollof Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of thisResolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to paya FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice oflaw. During the one year period, petitioner is NOTALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLYWARNED that doing any act that constitutes practiceof law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneyswill be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Officeof the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the CourtAdministrator for circulation to all courts in thecountry.

SO ORDERED.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, vs.EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he mustpossess the requisite moral integrity for membershipin the legal profession. Possession of moral integrityis of greater importance than possession of legallearning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed

only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who ismorally unfit cannot practice law even if he passesthe bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") wasamong those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled massoath-taking of successful bar examinees as membersof the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna MarieAguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent aPetition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.Complainant charged respondent with unauthorizedpractice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law,and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as amember of the Bar during the scheduled oath-takingon 22 May 2001 at the Philippine InternationalConvention Center. However, the Court ruled thatrespondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneyspending the resolution of the charge against him.Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on thescheduled date but has not signed the Roll ofAttorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorizedpractice of law and grave misconduct. Complainantalleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001elections before the Municipal Board of ElectionCanvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.Complainant further alleges that respondent filedwith the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in theCanvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Officeof Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondentrepresented himself as "counsel for and in behalf ofVice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," andsigned the pleading as counsel for George Bunan("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claimsthat respondent is a municipal government employee,being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan ofMandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is notallowed by law to act as counsel for a client in anycourt or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct andmisrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent ofacting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidateGeorge Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engagingrespondent’s services. Complainant claims thatrespondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent theproclamation of the winning vice mayoraltycandidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolutionallowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath butdisallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneysuntil he is cleared of the charges against him. In thesame resolution, the Court required respondent tocomment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunansought his "specific assistance" to represent himbefore the MBEC. Respondent claims that "hedecided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyerbut as a person who knows the law." Respondentadmits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading thatobjected to the inclusion of certain votes in thecanvassing. He explains, however, that he did not

sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himselfas an "attorney" in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the SangguniangBayan, respondent claims that he submitted hisresignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedlyaccepted on the same date. He submitted a copy ofthe Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignationdated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor NapoleonRelox. Respondent further claims that the complaintis politically motivated considering that complainantis the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losingcandidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed forlack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Rollof Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply torespondent’s Comment and refuted the claim ofrespondent that his appearance before the MBEC wasonly to extend specific assistance to Bunan.Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 EmilyEstipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition forproclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao inthis petition. When respondent appeared as counselbefore the MBEC, complainant questioned hisappearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had nottaken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was anemployee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’sComment) reiterating his claim that the instantadministrative case is "motivated mainly by politicalvendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to theOffice of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation,report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appearedbefore the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May2001 elections. The minutes of the MBECproceedings show that respondent activelyparticipated in the proceedings. The OBC likewisefound that respondent appeared in the MBECproceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’smisconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitnessto be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believesthat respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is aground to deny his admission to the practice of law.The OBC therefore recommends that respondent bedenied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainantfailed to cite a law which respondent allegedlyviolated when he appeared as counsel for Bunanwhile he was a government employee. Respondentresigned as secretary and his resignation wasaccepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized byBunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of theOBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorizedpractice of law and thus does not deserve admissionto the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.However, the records show that respondent appearedas counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before

respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleadingentitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in theCanvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Officeof Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondentsigned as "counsel for George Bunan." In the firstparagraph of the same pleading respondent stated thathe was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalfof Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L.Rana as his counsel to represent him" before theMBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate EmilyEstipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as hercounsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D.Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Ranahas been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as thelegal counsel of the party and the candidate of thesaid party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance ascounsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Haoin the petition filed before the MBEC praying for theproclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winningcandidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took thelawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in thepractice of law without being a member of thePhilippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 theCourt elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct ofcases or litigation in court; it embraces thepreparation of pleadings and other papers incident toactions and special proceedings, the management ofsuch actions and proceedings on behalf of clientsbefore judges and courts, and in addition,conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and allaction taken for them in matters connected with thelaw, incorporation services, assessment andcondemnation services contemplating an appearancebefore a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy andinsolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedingsin attachment, and in matters of estate andguardianship have been held to constitute lawpractice, as do the preparation and drafting of legalinstruments, where the work done involves thedetermination by the trained legal mind of the legaleffect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that"practice of law" means any activity, in or out ofcourt, which requires the application of law, legalprocedure, knowledge, training and experience. Toengage in the practice of law is to perform acts whichare usually performed by members of the legalprofession. Generally, to practice law is to render anykind of service which requires the use of legalknowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of lawwhen he appeared in the proceedings before theMBEC and filed various pleadings, without license todo so. Evidence clearly supports the charge ofunauthorized practice of law. Respondent calledhimself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was nota member of the Bar. Having held himself out as"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to

practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness tobe a member of the Philippine Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural orconstitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited topersons of good moral character with specialqualifications duly ascertained and certified. Theexercise of this privilege presupposes possession ofintegrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment,and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer ofthe court. A bar candidate does not acquire the rightto practice law simply by passing the barexaminations. The practice of law is a privilege thatcan be withheld even from one who has passed thebar examinations, if the person seeking admissionhad practiced law without a license.5

The regulation of the practice of law isunquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 acandidate passed the bar examinations but had nottaken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. Hewas held in contempt of court for practicing law evenbefore his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person whoengages in the unauthorized practice of law is liablefor indirect contempt of court.7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 BarExaminations and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneysthat finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The factthat respondent passed the bar examinations isimmaterial. Passing the bar is not the onlyqualification to become an attorney-at-law.8Respondent should know that two essential requisitesfor becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by thisCourt and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainantcontends that the law does not allow respondent toact as counsel for a private client in any court oradministrative body since respondent is the secretaryof the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary ofthe Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complainedof as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In hisletter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to NapoleonRelox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of theSangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he wasresigning "effective upon your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignationeffective 11 May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence doesnot support the charge that respondent acted ascounsel for a client while serving as secretary of theSangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct andmisrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeedauthorized respondent to represent him as his counselbefore the MBEC and similar bodies. While therewas no misrepresentation, respondent nonethelesshad no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana isDENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, PresidingJudge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique,and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People'smotion seeking reconsideration of our August 13,1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, weheld that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Macedacommitted no grave abuse of discretion in issuing theorder of August 8, 1989 giving custody over privaterespondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Courtof the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during thependency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At thattime, sufficient reason was shown why privaterespondent Javellana should not be detained at theAntique Provincial Jail. The trial court's orderspecifically provided for private respondent'sdetention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario.However, private respondent was not to be allowedliberty to roam around but was to be held as detentionprisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly compliedwith because private respondent was not detained inthe residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about hisnormal activities as if he were a free man, includingengaging in the practice of law. Despite ourresolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting privaterespondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No.4262,1 the latter accepted cases and continuedpracticing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F.Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motionseeking clarification on the following questions: "(1)Does the resolution of this Honorable Court datedJuly 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana fromappearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No.4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias delRosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3)Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosarionever really held and detained Atty. Javellana asprisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellanaconsidered an escapee or a fugitive of justice forwhich warrant for his arrest should forthwith beissued?"2

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" theabove motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration onSeptember 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearingCriminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2,1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motionseeking the revocation of the trial court's custodyorder and the imprisonment of private respondentJavellana in the provincial jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellanafiled with the Supreme Court an urgent motionseeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997resolution finally terminated or resolved the motionfor clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested basedon the filing of criminal cases against him. By sucharrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of thelaw. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario

the custody of private respondent Javellana with theobligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. delRosario's residence in his official capacity as theclerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, whenAtty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased tobe the personal custodian of accused Javellana andthe succeeding clerk of court must be deemed thecustodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to privaterespondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus, thetrial court's order dated August 8, 1989 givingcustody over him to the clerk of court must berecalled, and he shall be detained at the ProvincialJail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as adetention prisoner private respondent Javellana is notallowed to practice his profession as a necessaryconsequence of his status as a detention prisoner. Thetrial court's order was clear that private respondent "isnot to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to beheld as a detention prisoner." The prohibition topractice law referred not only to Criminal Case No.4262, but to all other cases as well, except in caseswhere private respondent would appear in court todefend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for anoffense is arrested, he is deemed placed under thecustody of the law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actualrestraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound toanswer for the commission of the offense.3 He mustbe detained in jail during the pendency of the caseagainst him, unless he is authorized by the court to bereleased on bail or on recognizance.4 Let it bestressed that all prisoners whether under preventivedetention or serving final sentence can not practicetheir profession nor engage in any business oroccupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,while in detention. This is a necessary consequenceof arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accusedin Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confinedin the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal CasesNos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten(10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered tocontinue with the trial of said criminal cases with alldeliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trialcourt is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in CriminalCases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T.Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordereddetained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,Antique, effective immediately, and shall not beallowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise,except, upon prior written permission of the trialcourt for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to theProvincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial PoliceOffice, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial JailWarden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THELAWYERS OATH

R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the barexaminations held in 1993. The Court howeverdeferred his oath-taking due to his previousconviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting InHomicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner'sconviction, arose from the death of a neophyte duringfraternity initiation rites sometime in September1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initiallyentered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. Theeight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas andupon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to recklessimprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court renderedjudgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on eachof the accused a sentence of imprisonment of fromtwo (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four(4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted hereinpetitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an orderapproving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted bythe Probation Officer recommending petitioner'sdischarge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court apetition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath basedon the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then SeniorAssociate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued aresolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino tosubmit to the Court evidence that he may now beregarded as complying with the requirement of goodmoral character imposed upon those seekingadmission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitionersubmitted no less than fifteen (15)certifications/letters executed by among others two(2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)members of religious orders. Petitioner likewisesubmitted evidence that a scholarship foundation hadbeen established in honor of Raul Camaligan, thehazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter'sfamily and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty.Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment onpetitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer'soath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty.Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severephysical injuries which led to the death of his sonwas deliberate rather than accidental. The offensetherefore was not only homicide but murder since theaccused took advantage of the neophyte'shelplessness implying abuse of confidence, takingadvantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guiltto the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resultingin homicide only out of pity for the mothers of theaccused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused

who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 andMaundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion.They also told him that the father of one of theaccused had died of a heart attack upon learning ofhis son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitionerand his co-accused for the death of his son. However,as a loving father who had lost a son whom he hadhoped would succeed him in his law practice, he stillfeels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigmaof the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whetherpetitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.He therefore submits the matter to the sounddiscretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only tothose who possess the strict intellectual and moralqualifications required of lawyers who areinstruments in the effective and efficientadministration of justice. It is the sworn duty of thisCourt not only to "weed out" lawyers who havebecome a disgrace to the noble profession of the lawbut, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits"from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby furthertarnishing the public image of lawyers which inrecent years has undoubtedly become less thanirreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us requiredweighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowingor disallowing petitioner's admission to the practiceof law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon RaulCamaligan constituted evident absence of that moralfitness required for admission to the bar since theywere totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindlessphysical behavior, [which] makes impossible afinding that the participant [herein petitioner] wasthen possessed of good moral character. 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that theCourt is prepared to consider de novo the question ofwhether petitioner has purged himself of the obviousdeficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands andshares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. Thedeath of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumaticexperience. The suffering becomes even morepronounced and profound in cases where the death isdue to causes other than natural or accidental but dueto the reckless imprudence of third parties. Thefeeling then becomes a struggle between grief andanger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court-manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no lessthan praiseworthy and commendable. It isexceptional for a parent, given the circumstances inthis case, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still notin a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit tobe a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, weresolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino totake the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and

practice the legal profession with the followingadmonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is notinherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, thevarious certifications show that he is a devoutCatholic with a genuine concern for civic duties andpublic service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exertedall efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,taking judicial notice of the general tendency ofyouth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath isNOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicinglaw. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh hisactions according to the sworn promises he makeswhen taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyersconducted themselves strictly according to thelawyer's oath and the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, the administration of justice willundoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyoneconcerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino willcontinue with the assistance he has been giving to hiscommunity. As a lawyer he will now be in a betterposition to render legal and other services to the moreunfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al CaparrosArgosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer'soath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Rollof Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legalprofession.

SO ORDERED.

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUELMASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,ROLDAN, petitioners, vs.THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, PresidingJudge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA,VICENTE CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDOCRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge RegionalTrial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

VITUG, J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al.,instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition,relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief,with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction,asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desistfrom further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketedCivil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by privaterespondent Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as

plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants,with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (BranchX). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985, renderedjudgment; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is herebyrendered ordering the defendants and all personsclaiming right under them to vacate the premises andto remove their house/apartment and surrenderpossession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to payto the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month fromJanuary 1987 as the reasonable compensation for theuse and occupation of the premises until the land isactually vacated, and the costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgmentbecame final and executory. On 22 August 1985,petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before theRegional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXXII)seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in theejectment case and to set aside an order of itsexecution. The petition was in due time dismissed.Again, no appeal was taken therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment ofJudgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filedby petitioners before the Regional Trial Court ofManila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for thenullification of the judgment in the ejectment case.The complaint was dismissed on the ground of resjudicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissalto the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ ofexecution was issued by the MTC for theenforcement of its decision. The writ, however, washeld in abeyance when petitioners deposited with theCourt of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plusan amount of P100.00 to be paid every monthbeginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, theCourt of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal ofthe lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Courtwas to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and anentry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTCfor execution. When petitioners refused to removetheir house on the premises in question, upon motionof private respondent, an order of demolition wasissued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began.Before the completion of the demolition, a restrainingorder was issued by the Regional Trial Court ofManila (Branch XIX) following a petition forcertiorari, with preliminary injunction and restrainingorder, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, thetrial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of theircomplaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anewthe MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, withpreliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief(docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before theRegional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV),which, again, issued a restraining order. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an aliaswrit of execution with the MTC. An ex-parte motionof petitioners for the issuance of a second restrainingorder was this time denied by the RTC (BranchXXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court,ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs againstpetitioners.

In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC ofManila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce itsdecision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No.107203, when the property in question was

proclaimed an area for priority development by theNational Housing Authority on 01 December 1987 byauthority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to ourresolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No. 98446,entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs.Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case isintimately related, where we ruled:

. . . The singular question common to both casessubmitted for resolution of this court is theimplication of Presidential Decree No. 1517,otherwise known as the "Urban Land Reform Law,"and its amendments or ramifications embodied inProclamation No. 1893, as amended by ProclamationNo. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016. All theabove statutes are being implemented by the Housingand Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housingand Urban Development Coordinating Council,Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangsthe resolution of this case. On May 20, 1992, thisCourt required the National Housing Authority tosubmit a Comment on the status of the program ofacquisition by the Government of the land area whichincludes the disputed property, as part of the Areasfor Priority Development (APD), under theaforementioned decrees and proclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr.Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the Metro ManilaProject Department of the National HousingAuthority, submitted the following report on thestatus of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890Obesis Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as theCarlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions of thereport read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 locatedat No. 1890 Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which isthe subject matter of the case and located within theCarlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant toPresidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not foracquisition by NHA.

The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHAprojects under the Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP)and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,however, is under the administration of thePresidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) foracquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertaintyconcerning the status of the alleged negotiation forthe acquisition by the government of certain areas inMetro Manila. The NHA is definitely NOT acquiringthe said lot for its program.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition forReview is to set aside the decision of the respondentCourt of Appeals which affirmed the decision of thelower courts, in order to avoid eviction from thedisputed premises and to be allowed to acquire thesame allegedly under the Community MortgageProgram of the National Housing Authority, we findthe petition without merit and deny the same.Consequently, the petition is DISMISSED. 5

What immediately catches one's attention to this caseis the evident predilection of petitioners, throughdifferent counsel, to file pleadings, one after another,

from which not even this Court has been spared. Theutter lack of merit of the complaints and petitionssimply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners toprolong and delay the inevitable execution of adecision that has long become final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance ofcounsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision beforedifferent branches of the court, trifling with judicialprocesses. Never, again, should this practice becountenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed insolemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to thepursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, driftand hollow, but a sacred trust that we must upholdand keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are herereminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintainallegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I willsupport and defend its Constitution and obey the lawsas well as the legal orders of the duly constitutedauthorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consentto its commission; I will not wittingly or willinglypromote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suitnor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delayany man's cause for money or malice and willconduct myself as a lawyer according to the best ofmy knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity aswell to the courts as to my clients and I impose uponmyself this obligation voluntary, without any mentalreservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms thatany act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court,which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede anddegrade the administration of justice is contumaciouscalling for both an exercise of disciplinary action andwarranting application of the contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby stronglyCENSURED and WARNED that a similar infractionof the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt withmost severely. Double costs against petitioners.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City,

Petitioner,

- versus -

JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, MetroManila,

Public Respondent.

BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,

Private Respondent.

G.R. No. 154464

Present:

TINGA, J.,*

CHICO-NAZARIO,

Acting Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,*

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition andMandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt. It was directly filed with this Court assailingthe Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31,20022 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of theplaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as partylitigant, and the refusal of the public respondent,Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herselffrom trying the case. No writ of preliminaryinjunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner)sought permission to enter his appearance for and onhis behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City,as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, forAbatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year lawstudent, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138of the Rules of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appearbefore any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares requiredthe petitioner to secure a written permission from theCourt Administrator before he could be allowed toappear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty.Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr.,filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial briefto which petitioner Cruz vehemently objectedalleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed afterthe Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares thenremarked, "Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa saHuwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pendingMotion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearingon May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed aManifestation and Motion to Inhibit,4 praying for thevoluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motionalleged that expected partiality on the part of therespondent judge in the conduct of the trial could beinferred from the contumacious remarks of JudgeMijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge,in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negativeframe of mind, which engenders the belief that justicewill not be served.5

In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijaresdenied the motion for inhibition stating that throwingtenuous allegations of partiality based on the saidremark is not enough to warrant her voluntaryinhibition, considering that it was said even prior tothe start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration7 of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motionwith finality.8 In the same Order, the trial court heldthat for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit thepromised document and jurisprudence, and for hisfailure to satisfy the requirements or conditions underRule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance wasdenied.

In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiteratedthat the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A,but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that thetwo Rules were distinct and are applicable todifferent circumstances, but the respondent judgedenied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in anOrder10 dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed withthis Court, the instant petition and assigns thefollowing errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURTGRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITSDISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THEAPPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR ANDIN THE LATTER’S BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO.01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138,SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT,PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERREDAND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DIDNOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THEADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCHAN INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THEPEOPLE’S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THECOURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1)whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari,prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether therespondent court acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when itdenied the appearance of the petitioner as partylitigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herselffrom trying the case.

This Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,prohibition, mandamus and injunction is notexclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with theRTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence ofjurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as anabsolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the courtwhere the application therefor will be directed.11 Abecoming regard of the judicial hierarchy mostcertainly indicates that petitions for the issuance ofextraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filedwith the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courtsis determinative of the appropriate forum for petitionsfor the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptionalcases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by

the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court takecognizance of petitions filed directly before it.13

Considering, however, that this case involves theinterpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizanceof herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner iscautioned not to continue his practice of filingdirectly before this Court petitions under Rule 65when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatchby the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigantswho make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as itnecessarily delays more important concerns beforeus.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative readingof Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A lawstudent who has successfully completed his 3rd yearof the regular four-year prescribed law curriculumand is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinicallegal education program approved by the SupremeCourt, may appear without compensation in any civil,criminal or administrative case before any trial court,tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clientsaccepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the lawstudent authorized by this rule, shall be under thedirect supervision and control of a member of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited bythe law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, mustbe signed by the supervising attorney for and inbehalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner couldnot appear for himself and on his behalf because ofhis failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denyingpetitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely findsrefuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, thisCourt issued Circular No. 19, which eventuallybecame Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to proveon record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’sclinical legal education program and is undersupervision of an attorney duly accredited by the lawschool.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of hisappearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, whichprovides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In thecourt of a justice of the peace, a party may conducthis litigation in person, with the aid of an agent orfriend appointed by him for that purpose, or with theaid of an attorney. In any other court, a party mayconduct his litigation personally or by aid of anattorney, and his appearance must be either personalor by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of theRules, it will have to be conceded that the contentionof the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right ofan individual to represent himself in any case to

which he is a party. The Rules state that a party mayconduct his litigation personally or with the aid of anattorney, and that his appearance must either bepersonal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar.The individual litigant may personally do everythingin the course of proceedings from commencement tothe termination of the litigation.14 Considering that aparty personally conducting his litigation is restrictedto the same rules of evidence and procedure as thosequalified to practice law,15 petitioner, not being alawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snaresand hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz asplaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conductthe litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He wouldthen be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as aparty exercising his right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact thatthe petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, besubject to the conditions of the Law Student PracticeRule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basisof the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138.The former rule provides for conditions when a lawstudent may appear in courts, while the latter ruleallows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a partyrepresenting himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-Asuperseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 ismisplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule138 when it released the guidelines for limited lawstudent practice. In fact, it was intended as anaddendum to the instances when a non-lawyer mayappear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules ofCourt through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to theconstitutional right of an accused to be heard byhimself and counsel,16 this Court has held thatduring the trial, the right to counsel cannot bewaived.17 The rationale for this ruling wasarticulated in People v. Holgado,18 where wedeclared that "even the most intelligent or educatedman may have no skill in the science of law,particularly in the rules of procedure, and withoutcounsel, he may be convicted not because he is guiltybut because he does not know how to establish hisinnocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with thepetitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concernthat the Constitution accords the accused in acriminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in acivil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, whoinsists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance,effectively undertake the successful pursuit of hisclaim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,petitioner alleges that he is a law student andimpliedly asserts that he has the competence tolitigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of theperils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in BarMatter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, alaw student may appear as an agent or a friend of aparty litigant, without need of the supervision of alawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a lawstudent who, as party litigant, wishes to representhimself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that therespondent judge committed manifest bias andpartiality by ruling that there is no valid ground forher voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negativedemeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay

naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?"Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, therespondent judge already manifested conductindicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causingpetitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith andconfidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, thepetitioner filed an administrative case19 against therespondent for violation of the Canons of JudicialEthics, which we dismissed for lack of merit onSeptember 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’sfindings of fact in the administrative case and rulethat there was no grave abuse of discretion on thepart of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herselffrom the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove theground for bias and prejudice by clear andconvincing evidence to disqualify a judge fromparticipating in a particular trial,20 as voluntaryinhibition is primarily a matter of conscience andaddressed to the sound discretion of the judge. Thedecision on whether she should inhibit herself mustbe based on her rational and logical assessment of thecircumstances prevailing in the case before her.21Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rulein favor of the presumption that official duty has beenregularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order ofthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City areMODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry ofAppearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN,accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Where an accused was not duly represented by amember of the Philippine Bar during trial, thejudgment should be set aside and the case remandedto the trial court for a new trial. A person whomisrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liablefor indirect contempt of court.

Subject of the present appeal is the decision datedOctober 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court ofIloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellantof the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer thepenalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him topay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 andto pay the costs.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged withthe crime of rape 1 of a girl less than nine (9) years

old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town ofBarangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of notguilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented asits witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer whoexamined the victim.

For the defense, appellant presented one GermanToriales and himself. Appellant denied committingthe rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop thetwo girls, the victim and her playmate, fromquarreling.

On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered adecision 2 finding appellant guilty as charged. Thedispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape andsentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua together its accessory penalty. The accusedis ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to thecomplainant and another amount for costs, withoutsubsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civilliability and the cost.

If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code,as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he hasagreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposedupon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited withthe full duration of his preventive imprisonment;otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 of thesame.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal. 3 Inhis brief, 4 appellant made the following assignmentof errors:

I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURTCOMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR INFINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OFRAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTINGTESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATECOMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ONMATERIAL POINTS.

II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WASDEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWNTO BE DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZEDTO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIALOF DUE PROCESS.

Considering the importance of the constitutional rightto counsel, we shall now first resolve the issue ofproper representation by a member of the bar raisedby appellant.

Appellant contends that he was represented duringtrial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, whofor all intents and purposes acted as his counsel andeven conducted the direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty.Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that GualbertoC. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar.Further verification with the Office of the BarConfidant confirmed this fact. 5 Appellant thereforeargues that his deprivation of the right to counselshould necessarily result in his acquittal of the crimecharged.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the otherhand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact thatappellant's counsel during trial was not a member ofthe bar, appellant was afforded due process since hehas been given an opportunity to be heard and therecords reveal that said person "presented theevidence for the defense with the ability of aseasoned lawyer and in general handled the case ofappellant in a professional and skillful manner."However, the right of the accused to be heard byhimself and his counsel, in our view, goes muchdeeper than the question of ability or skill. It lies atthe heart of our adversarial system of justice. Wherethe interplay of basic rights of the individual maycollide with the awesome forces of the state, we needa professional learned in the law as well as ethicallycommitted to defend the accused by all means fairand reasonable.

On the matter of proper representation by a memberof the bar, we had occasion to resolve a similar issuein the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals. 6 InDelgado, petitioner and two others were convicted bythe trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsificationof public and/or official documents. One accused didnot appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, whichaffirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After entry of judgment, petitionerdiscovered that her lawyer was not a member of thebar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. TheCourt of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence,she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. TheCourt set aside the assailed judgment and remandedthe case to the trial court for a new trial, explainingthat —

This is so because an accused person is entitled to berepresented by a member of the bar in a criminal casefiled against her before the Regional Trial Court.Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is greatdanger that any defense presented in her behalf willbe inadequate considering the legal perquisites andskills needed in the court proceedings. This wouldcertainly be a denial of due process. 7

Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordialimportance that even if an accused was representedby three successive counsels from the PublicAttorney's Office, the Court has ordered the remandof a rape case when it found that accused was givenmere perfunctory representation by aforesaidcounsels such that appellant was not properly andeffectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recenten banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420,April 21, 1999, the Court, speaking through JusticeVitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for failingto genuinely protect the interests of the accused andfor having fallen much too short of theirresponsibility as officers of the court and as membersof the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where theaccused was not even duly represented by a certifiedmember of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealoushis representation might have been.

The presence and participation of counsel in criminalproceedings should never be taken lightly. 8 Even themost intelligent or educated man may have no skill inthe science of the law, particularly in the rules ofprocedure, and, without counsel, he may be convictednot because he is guilty but because he does notknow how to establish his innocence. 9 The right ofan accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize theimbalance in the adversarial system where theaccused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory

machinery of the State. 10 Such a right proceedsfrom the fundamental principle of due process whichbasically means that a person must be heard beforebeing condemned. The due process requirement is apart of a person's basic rights; it is not a mereformality that may be dispensed with or performedperfunctorily. 11

The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in noless than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate isreflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rulesof Criminal Procedure which declares the right of theaccused at the trial to be present in person and bycounsel at every stage of the proceedings from thearraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In turn,Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutionvests the power to promulgate rules concerning theadmission to the practice of law to the SupremeCourt. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Courtexplicitly states who are entitled to practice law in thePhilippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly providesfor the requirements for all applicants for admissionto the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that "the rightto practice law is not a natural or constitutional rightbut is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It islimited to persons of good moral character withspecial qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The right does not only presuppose in its possessorintegrity, legal standing and attainment, but also theexercise of a special privilege, highly personal andpartaking of the nature of a publictrust." 12 Indeed, so strict is the regulation of thepractice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 13 a Barcandidate who has already successfully hurdled theBar examinations but has not yet taken his oath andsigned the roll of attorneys, and who was caught inthe unauthorized practice of law was held incontempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 ofthe Rules of Court, a person who undertakes theunauthorized practice of law is liable for indirectcontempt of court for assuming to be an attorney andacting as such without authority.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE,and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial courtfor new trial.

With respect to the unauthorized practice of law bythe person named Gualberto C. Ompong inconnection with this case, the local Chapter of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City isDIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thoroughinvestigation regarding this matter and to report itsrecommendations to the Court within ninety (90)days from notice of this, order. Let all concernedparties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, beeach furnished a copy of this Decision for theirappropriate action.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs.Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th MunicipalCircuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo,respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from their

posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as wellas appear for and on their own behalf as plaintiffs ordefendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalfof a co-plaintiff subjects the employee toadministrative liability.

The Case and the Facts

A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed byImelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto H.Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court(MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In theComplaint, the judge was charged with "grossignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct"for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule onSummary Procedure" in Civil Case No. 252.2

On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo --presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action forforcible entry with a prayer for preliminaryinjunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) anddamages3 covered by the Rule on SummaryProcedure. Because complainant was the clerk ofcourt in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibitedherself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge TitoGustilo designated respondent judge to hear anddecide the case.

In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondentrequired the defendants in the civil case to showcause why the preliminary injunction should not begranted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing onSeptember 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed aManifestation5 on September 17, 2001, praying thatthey be given an additional period of ten days to filean answer. After the September 21 hearing,respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.6Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition7 tocomplainant’s prayer for preliminary injunction andTRO. The September 28 hearing was held inabeyance after the defendants’ lawyer questioned theauthority of complainant to appear on behalf of andas counsel for her co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave thedefendants ten days9 to file a motion to disqualifycomplainant from appearing as counsel and thereafterto complainant to file her opposition thereto.

In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondentdenied the defendants’ Motion11 to disqualifycomplainant from appearing on behalf of and ascounsel for her co-plaintiff.

Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 prayingfor judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In anOrder13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent deniedcomplainant’s Motions because of the pendinghearing for the issuance of a restraining order and aninjunction. He likewise denied the defendants’Motion for extension of time to file an answer.14Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of thedenial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.

In his Comment15 on the Complaint, respondentcontends that complainant filed a Petition for hisinhibition after filing two administrative cases againsthim. He argues that the mere filing of administrativecharges against judges is not a ground fordisqualifying them from hearing cases. In theexercise of their discretion, however, they mayvoluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth notingthat respondent later inhibited himself from CivilCase No. 252. The case was then reassigned to JudgeLoida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.

Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution ofthe case cannot be attributed to him, considering thathe was mandated by law and the rules of procedure topass upon every motion presented before him.16Besides, complainant allegedly failed to presentevidence necessary for the immediate resolution ofher prayer for preliminary injunction.17 Moreover,she supposedly failed to exhaust the remediesavailable to her to question the validity of his Orders.Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decisionon the case.18

Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertionthat she appeared as counsel on her own behalfbecause she could not afford the services of a lawyer.Such claim was allegedly without basis, since hercompensation and other benefits as clerk of courtwere more than enough to pay for the services ofcounsel.19 He further alleges that she did not secureauthority from this Court to appear as counsel, andthat she failed to file her leave of absence every timeshe appeared in court.20

Evaluation and Recommendation of the CourtAdministrator

The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance ofthe preliminary injunction prayed for in theComplaint should first be resolved before judgmentshould be rendered in the principal action. However,it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunctionshould have been decided within 30 days from thefiling thereof. It noted that both the motion forpreliminary injunction and the principal action forforcible entry remained unresolved even after fourmonths had already lapsed since the filing of CivilCase No. 252.1a\^/phi1.net

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondentjudge be fined in the amount of P1,000 with a sternwarning that a similar infraction in the future wouldbe dealt with more severely.21

It did not, however, find complainant completelyfaultless. It therefore undertook another round ofinvestigation, the subject of which was complainant’sappearance in court as counsel for herself and onbehalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.

According to the OCA, officials and employees ofthe judiciary must devote their full time togovernment service to ensure the efficient and speedyadministration of justice. Although they are notabsolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation ora profession, they should do so only with priorapproval of this Court. The OCA added that"[e]ngaging in any private business, vocation orprofession without prior approval of the Court istantamount to moonlighting, which amounts tomalfeasance in office."22

Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada befined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing ascounsel without authority from this Court, with astern warning that any similar infraction in the futurewould be dealt with more severely. The OCA alsorecommended that she be directed to file herapplication for leaves of absence on the days she hadappeared in court to litigate her case.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations ofthe OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to therules.

Administrative Liability

The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions forforcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of theamount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to berecovered, shall be governed by the Rule onSummary Procedure.23 These actions are summaryin nature, because they involve the disturbance of thesocial order, which should be restored as promptly aspossible.24 Designed as special civil actions, they aregoverned by the Rules on Summary Procedure todisencumber the courts from the usual formalities ofordinary actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities ordetails of procedure that may cause unnecessarydelays should be carefully avoided.26 The actions forforcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed toprovide expeditious means of protecting actualpossession or the right to possession of the propertyinvolved. Both are "time procedures" designed tobring immediate relief.27

Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in anaction for forcible entry, parties are entitled to theprovisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at anystage of court actions or proceedings prior to thejudgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,an agency or a person to refrain from doing aparticular act or acts.28 It may also require theperformance of a particular act or acts, in which caseit is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.29Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment orfinal order, we agree with both the OCA andrespondent that the prayer for preliminary injunctionshould first be resolved before the main case offorcible entry is decided.

However, respondent should have resolved theMotion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 daysfrom its filing. There can be no mistaking the clearcommand of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules ofCourt, which reads:

"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court maygrant preliminary injunction, in accordance with theprovisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent thedefendant from committing further acts ofdispossession against the plaintiff.

"A possessor deprived of his possession throughforcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five(5) days from the filing of the complaint, present amotion in the action for forcible entry or unlawfuldetainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction to restore him in hispossession. The court shall decide the motion withinthirty (30) days from the filing thereof." (Italics ours)

Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, theprovision uses the word "shall" to evince itsmandatory character. We cannot subscribe to thebelief of respondent that since there was a prayer forthe issuance of a preliminary injunction, the maincase for forcible entry would have to wait until afterhe shall have decided the injunction plea, no matterhow long it took. If that were so, then the main casewould lose its summary nature.

Respondent should have known that since a prayerfor preliminary injunction is merely a provisional

remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lenditself to the summary nature of the main case. This isthe very reason why the Rules of Court mandate thata preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case bedecided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminaryinjunctions and TROs are extraordinary remediesprovided by law for the speedy adjudication of anejectment case in order to save the dispossessed partyfrom further damage during the pendency of theoriginal action.

Time and time again, this Court has impressed uponjudges the need to decide, promptly and judiciously,cases and other matters pending before theircourts.30 To a large extent, the public’s faith andconfidence in the judicial system is boosted by thejudicious and prompt disposition of cases andundermined by any delay thereof.31 Judges are thusenjoined to decide cases with dispatch.

Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiencyand warrants the imposition of administrativesanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of JudicialConduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of thecourt’s business promptly and decide cases within therequired periods. Often have we ruled that theirinability to decide a case within the required period isnot excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.32 Toavoid sanction, they should ask this Court for anextension and give their reasons for the delay.

Although respondent is correct in asserting that he ismandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use thisexcuse to evade the clear command of the rule thatcases should be decided within the prescribed period.This Court notes with concern the plethora ofmotions and pleadings filed in this case, whichshould have been tried under the Rules of SummaryProcedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsedsince the filing of the original Complaint for forcibleentry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and themain case remained unresolved.

Respondent is reminded that in order to meet thedeadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at alltimes remain in full control of the proceedings intheir sala.33 They should not be at the mercy of thewhims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latter’sconvenience that should be the primordialconsideration, but the administration ofjustice.341awphi1.nét

To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of thecourt’s business promptly and to decide cases withinthe required period. They are called upon to observeutmost diligence and dedication in the performanceof their judicial functions and duties. As held by thisCourt in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:35

"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judgeespecially at a time when the clogging of courtdockets is still the bane of the judiciary whosepresent leadership has launched an all-out program tominimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestionand undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judgesare called upon to observe utmost diligence anddedication in the performance of their judicialfunctions and duties."36

The prompt disposition of cases becomes even morepronounced when a municipal trial court is calledupon to decide a case governed by the Rules ofSummary Procedure. As eloquently put by JusticeJose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v.Judge Joven:37

"x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the firstinstance, a municipal trial court judge, more than anyother colleague on the bench, is the immediateembodiment of how that trust is carried out. In theevolvement of the public perception on the judiciary,there can likely be no greater empirical data thatinfluences it than the prompt and proper dispositionof cases before the courts."38

We have often held that failure to decide cases andother matters within the reglementary periodconstitutes gross inefficiency and warrants theimposition of administrative sanctions against erringjudges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000is appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence39and Rule 140.40

As to Complainant Maderada, the OCArecommended that she be fined in the amount ofP1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocationor profession without prior approval of the Court.The Office of the Court Administrator held that herappearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of herco-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, aspecies of malfeasance in office.

Since complainant was charged with engaging in aprivate vocation or profession when she appeared onher own behalf in court, the necessary implicationwas that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. Aparty’s right to conduct litigation personally isrecognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of theRules of Court provides:

"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In thecourt of a justice of the peace a party may conduct hislitigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friendappointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid ofan attorney. In any other court, a party may conducthis litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, andhis appearance must be either personal or by a dulyauthorized member of the bar."

This provision means that in a litigation, parties maypersonally do everything during its progress -- fromits commencement to its termination.41 When they,however, act as their own attorneys, they arerestricted to the same rules of evidence and procedureas those qualified to practice law; otherwise,ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.42Individuals have long been permitted to manage,prosecute and defend their own actions; and whenthey do so, they are not considered to be in thepractice of law.43 "One does not practice law byacting for himself any more than he practicesmedicine by rendering first aid to himself."44

The practice of law, though impossible to defineexactly, involves the exercise of a profession orvocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney byacting in a representative capacity and as counsel byrendering legal advise to others.45 Private practicehas been defined by this Court as follows:

"x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,for it consists in frequent or customary action, asuccession of acts of the same kind. In other words, itis frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fallwithin the prohibition of statute [referring to theprohibition for judges and other officials oremployees of the superior courts or of the Office ofthe Solicitor General from engaging in privatepractice] has been interpreted as customarily orhabitually holding one's self out to the public, as a

lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x xx."46 (Citations omitted)

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was notcustomarily or habitually holding herself out to thepublic as a lawyer. Neither was she demandingpayment for such services. Hence, she cannot be saidto be in the practice of law.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines profession in thecollective sense as referring to "the members of sucha vocation."47 In turn, vocation is defined as "aperson’s regular calling or business; one’s occupationor profession."48

The law allows persons who are not lawyers byprofession to litigate their own case in court. Theright of complainant to litigate her case personallycannot be taken away from her. Her being anemployee of the judiciary does not remove from herthe right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of aright cannot make one administratively liable. Thus,we need not go into a discussion of the Court’s rulingin Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the extent of thepractice of law.

However, it was also clearly established thatcomplainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the formercannot be completely exonerated. Representingoneself is different from appearing on behalf ofsomeone else.

The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to representthemselves in court will not apply when a person isalready appearing for another party. Obviously,because she was already defending the rights ofanother person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant wasmerely protecting her rights. That their rights may beinterrelated will not give complainant authority toappear in court. The undeniable fact remains that sheand her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. Theformer may be impairing the efficiency of public

service once she appears for the latter withoutpermission from this Court.

We cannot countenance any act that wouldundermine the people’s faith and confidence in thejudiciary, even if we consider that this was the firsttime complainant appeared in court, that sheappeared for her own sister, and that there was noshowing she did so for a fee. Again we should bereminded that everyone connected with an office thatis charged with the dispensation of justice carries aheavy burden of responsibility.50 Given thesecircumstances, the penalty of reprimand51 issufficient.

This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate orcondone any conduct, act or omission that falls shortof the exacting norms of public office, especially onthe part of those expected to preserve the image ofthe judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from itsresponsibility of imposing discipline upon itsemployees in order not to diminish the people’s faithin our justice system. But when the charge has nobasis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent courtemployee from any groundless accusation that trifleswith judicial processes,52 and that serves only todisrupt rather than promote the orderly administrationof justice.53

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H.Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of grossinefficiency in failing to observe the reglementaryperiods in deciding cases, and is FINED in theamount of P10,000 with a stern warning that arepetition of the same or of a similar act in the futureshall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand,Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED forappearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiffwithout court authority and is likewise warned that afuture similar act shall be sanctioned moreseverely.1awphi1.nét

SO ORDERED.___________________________________