Life after Lock-Up · Even more remarkable, nine local YouthBuild programs completed, in 2015, a...

Life after Lock-UpA Special Report on Successful Recidivism Reduction

The photos in this report are of YouthBuild students and program staff. Not all youth pictured are ex-offenders.

YouthBuild USA58 Day StreetSomerville, MA 02144(617) 623-9900

www.YouthBuild.org

Life after Lock-UpA Special Report on Successful Recidivism Reduction

Life after Lock-Up: A YouthBuild USA Special Report on Successful Recidivism Reduction

Contents

Introduction 1

Executive Summary 3

Life after Lock-Up 5

Appendix 14

References 17

Notes 18

1


Introduction

Seven years ago, Christian Berrios was a 20-year-old convicted drug dealer. By every measure he was likely to spend many years in and out of incarceration.

One incarceration routinely leads to another within a few years of release, as ex-offenders carry the burden of a criminal record on top of lack of education and other barriers to employment that may have landed them in jail to begin with.

But Christian found his way to the YouthBuild program in Fall River, Mas-sachusetts, and found a path to a new, constructive, crime-free life. Eventually he joined the staff of YouthBuild Fall River. And through a twist of fate the former holding-tank jail cell in which he was locked up has been renovated to become his office at that same YouthBuild program. “You come here as a rock, all jagged edges and messed up,’’ Berrios recently said, describing his Youth-Build experience. “And they’re Picasso. They take a mallet and a chisel and they knock you around until you’re a work of art.’’

There are hundreds of thousands of Christian Berrioses in America: young adults who come from poor families, never finish high school, develop anti-social behaviors, fall into life on the streets, and ultimately join the ranks of those behind bars or on probation.

As highlighted by the Coalition for Public Safety, a bipartisan organization that has focused on the corrosive impacts of mass incarceration on society, “in 2012, minority youth made up 24 percent of the under-18 population across the country, but have made up 35 percent of all arrests and 42 percent of youth put in residential placement.”i Once in the criminal-justice system, these ex-offenders are highly likely to be reconvicted—over 40 percent of ex-prisoners are reconvicted within three years of release.ii These repeat offenders have few alternatives to the typical pattern of being released back into the same commu-nities and situations that led them to being locked up to begin with.

With incarceration of a young adult costing as much as $100,000 or more per yeariii in high-cost states, there is an obvious need for programs that reduce recidivism and enable ex-offenders to achieve more education, job skills, and, ultimately, self-sufficiency.

Fortunately, Christian’s experience in YouthBuild was not a lucky or isolated success. For decades, YouthBuild programs have been engaging court-involved young people in ways that work to turn them from “ex-cons to icons,” as another formerly incarcerated YouthBuild graduate put it. As discussed in this

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report, dramatic reductions in youth recidivism are achievable through the YouthBuild model, which has been replicated in over 45 states and has served over 140,000 young adults in the past 23 years. Given that typically one-third of students were convicted of an offense prior to enrolling in YouthBuild, local YouthBuild programs have deep levels of experience with what works to keep highly at-risk young adults out of prison.

At a time when public officials across the political spectrum and law enforce-ment professionalsiv are increasingly looking for ways to reduce mass incar-ceration, save taxpayers vast sums of money, and keep crime rates low, YouthBuild is an obvious, proven, replicable, and cost-effective way to achieve all those goals.

Christian Berrios

3


Executive Summary

After decades of policies that have resulted in boosting prison populations, leaving roughly 70 million Americans with criminal records, the tide appears to be reversing. From presidential candidatesv to lead-ers in traditionally tough-on-crime states,vi public officials and policy experts are forging a growing consensus that the United States needs to reduce incar-ceration rates and find effective, proven alternatives that keep at-risk young adults out of the criminal-justice system. YouthBuild produces strong, repli-cable, effective results in reducing recidivism and offering post-incarceration paths to success. Taking the YouthBuild model to scale would directly address one critical aspect of the over-incarceration crisis facing America, while saving governments at all levels substantial taxpayer dollars.

For 37 years the YouthBuild program model has provided low-income young adults a pathway towards completing their secondary education and gaining job skills. There are currently over 260 local YouthBuild programs across the United States. These programs enroll low-income young men and women, ages 16 to 24, who have left high school without a diploma and are unemployed or underemployed. During a full-time program typically lasting roughly ten months on average, students spend half their time in an individualized and supportive classroom and the other half on a construction site learning con-struction skills by building affordable housing for homeless and low-income people in their communities. In some programs, training for growing job sec-tors such as health care, technology, and customer service is also offered. Com-munity service and leadership training are integral parts of the YouthBuild experience.

YouthBuild was not launched to be a recidivism reduction and re-entry pro-gram. Nonetheless, for the past two decades roughly one-third of YouthBuild students have been previously adjudicated, either as juveniles or as adults. Data collected by YouthBuild USA, Inc. from over 140 locally sponsored YouthBuild programs receiving federal grants consistently shows reconviction recidivism rates averaging roughly 10 percent in recent years, measured one year from enrollment in the YouthBuild program. This recidivism rate is substantially lower than the 25- to 33-percent rate shown by relevant comparative cohorts measured over comparable time periods.

Even more remarkable, nine local YouthBuild programs completed, in 2015, a pilot program of the YouthBuild SMART (Start Making a Real Transforma-tion) Initiative funded by the Department of Labor’s High Poverty/High Crime Youth Offender grant award to YouthBuild USA. The SMART programs built on the already comprehensive YouthBuild model by working with ex-offenders

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In light of the overall low recidivism rates of YouthBuild

and YouthBuild SMART students, the country would

benefit from expanded use of the YouthBuild model

to reduce recidivism.

pre-release (“behind the walls”) and through other enhanced approaches to recidivism reduction and re-entry. After three years of operation involving a total of over 500 ex-offenders, the SMART YouthBuild programs demonstrated a reconviction recidivism rate of only one percent after one year from release from the program.vii The YouthBuild SMART Initiative will be discussed in more detail in this report.

The low recidivism rate of YouthBuild students and graduates has been mea-sured over many years at hundreds of YouthBuild programs in over 45 states. In light of this overall low rate and the more recent even lower rates achieved under the YouthBuild SMART Initiative, the country would benefit from expanded use of the YouthBuild model to reduce recidivism. YouthBuild’s approach offers numerous other crime-reduction benefits in a variety of set-tings where young adult ex-offenders are being released back to their commu-nities, while also providing opportunities for young adults to fundamentally change the trajectory of their lives and that of their families.

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Life after Lock-Up

Background

It is estimated that in the United States there are at least 2.3 million low-income young men and women ages 16 to 24 who have not finished secondary school and are unemployed.viii Commonly known these days as “opportunity youth,” this cohort of Americans is also at high risk of involvement in the criminal-justice system, leading to incarceration.

There is growing recognition that high rates of incarceration increase rates of spending of taxpayer money on direct costs such as criminal prosecution and jail, and prison costs. Higher incarceration rates also lead to longer-term social and economic costs such as creating barriers to employment.ix

The YouthBuild model aims to change the lives of disconnected low-income youth through an approach that balances education, job training, community service, personal counseling, peer-group development, leadership training, and community-asset building. All young adults who enter the YouthBuild program are, at a minimum, low-income, out of school, and unemployed or underemployed. Roughly one-third of them have been adjudicated for an offense in either the juvenile- or criminal-justice system. Typically, nearly 30 percent have drug and alcohol abuse issues. Many are teen parents.

YouthBuild engages its students full-time for about one school year. The stu-dents spend half of their time completing their secondary education in sup-portive individualized academic classes, and the other half working in paid, well-supervised construction-training teams building affordable housing for homeless and low-income people in their communities. Academic and con-struction components are woven together in a strong, positive peer culture. Caring adult staff mentors counsel students individually and in groups.

Leadership development, community service, peer-group development, and personal counseling are featured in the YouthBuild model, elevating the pro-gram to go beyond mere job skills or education training to reach each young person as an individual who matters and as someone who contributes to the community. Often the opportunity for personal asset building is also a part of the model: Many YouthBuild students earn AmeriCorps Education Awards for their service building affordable housing. Taken as a whole, this approach helps graduates emerge with a sense of possibility and responsibility.

The vast majority of YouthBuild students complete the program ready for college, other postsecondary education, registered apprenticeships, or jobs,

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often in construction but increasingly in other growth sectors. They have also internalized YouthBuild’s ethic of service. This holistic, multifaceted approach consistently produces positive annual outcome data and numerous research studies of YouthBuild have confirmed these results.

Today there are over 260 local YouthBuild programs operating in the United States in 45 different states, the District of Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands. Collectively these programs serve roughly 9,000 opportunity youth in America’s poorest urban, rural, and tribal communities each year. In 1992, a federal YouthBuild program was enacted through bipartisan legislation signed into law by President George H. W. Bush. Since 1994, when federal YouthBuild funds first reached communities, more than 140,000 students have helped to revitalize their communities. This has included providing valuable healthcare and IT-based services to residents and businesses through student training programs and internships, the production of more than 30,000 units of afford-able housing, and millions of hours of community service.

More background on the YouthBuild model, current programs in the United States and around the world, related research, and other aspects of the pro-gram can be found at www.YouthBuild.org.

YouthBuild Approach to Recidivism

The YouthBuild model is not limited to focusing just on any one aspect of the opportunity youth that enroll. Rather, recognizing the myriad challenges faced by low-income, unemployed youth who often have dropped out of school, YouthBuild takes a comprehensive approach to the needs of opportunity youth, as described briefly above. This approach has long produced many positive, measurable outcomes. YouthBuild USA tracks these outcomes for all programs in its affiliated network.

The following charts show the demographics of YouthBuild enrollees, and the major program outcomes, as of the 2014 reporting cycle:

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Demographics of YouthBuild students in the United States, 2014 At time of enrollment. Based on data submitted to YouthBuild USA.

Male 64% Lacked GED or HSE at entry 92%

Female 36% Criminally adjudicated 30%

African American 46% Convicted of felony 11%

Latin American 32% Are parents 28%

Caucasian 20%

Asian American 3%

Native American 2%

Female36%

Male64%

African American

46%Latin

American32%

Caucasian20%

Asian American

3%

Native American

2%

Outcomes for YouthBuild enrollees in the United States, 2014 Based on data submitted to YouthBuild USA.

Program completion rate 81%

GED/HSE or industry-recognized certificate attainment rate 76%

Recidivism (reconviction rate) 11%

Literacy gains 61%

Placement in job or higher education 59%

Retention of placements 80%

The national recidivism results should be understood in this context—as a strong, positive by-product of an approach that targets the full range of issues facing opportunity youth.

The YouthBuild SMART Initiative, therefore, was launched to take advan-tage of what was already working in the basic YouthBuild model, and to test whether by focusing on court-involved youth in particular ways the outcomes could be improved still further.

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The SMART Initiative incorporated a number

of features already found within the YouthBuild USA

support system. Other key features of the SMART

Initiative’s successes include partnerships with

correctional institutions, flexible programming, and

trauma training and mental-health support.

The YouthBuild SMART Initiative

As noted above, the YouthBuild SMART (Start Making a Real Transformation) Program was a pilot program involving nine local YouthBuild programsx made possible through a 2011 grant from the US Department of Labor under its ex-offender initiative.xi The SMART program started with the assertion that the YouthBuild model is by design a comprehensive model bolstered by a focus on leadership development, a caring and supportive staff, counseling, vocational training, postprogram placement, and graduate support. The resulting SMART integrated model incorporated best practices for reducing recidivism cited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (www.bja.gov), Council of State Governments (www.csgjusticecenter.org), and other organizations. Those best practices include individualized service delivery (also known as flexible programming), retention incentives, and customized re-entry planning.

All core SMART Initiative staff and coaches had experience with court-involved youth through the juvenile-justice system, direct service, research, or previous national or community-based technical assistance. In addition, YouthBuild USA leveraged learnings and resources developed through other funding to support the technical assistance offered to the nine program sub-grantees. Through those grants, YouthBuild USA developed expertise in key areas of the programs’ particular resources, including the recruitment and retention of court-involved youth, the provision of services inside correctional facilities (“behind the walls”), and flexible programming. This content knowl-edge was enhanced by YouthBuild USA’s framework for national technical

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assistance seated in electronic resources, coaching, training and events, data collection, and fiscal support.

The SMART Initiative incorporated a number of features already found within the YouthBuild USA support system. For example, a SMART START student advisory council was created in line with similar student and alumni councils already in place at YouthBuild USA. This youth leadership council was formed specifically for SMART students. The council:

■ Provided peer support, goal achievement, and leadership development through “personal challenges”

■ Strengthened program services through policy input to YouthBuild USA on program standards, design, and development

■ Emphasized leadership and professional development

■ Empowered youth to be proactive in their communities and program

■ Raised awareness of juvenile-justice and criminal-justice issues on local and national levels

Monthly SMART START meetings were facilitated by YouthBuild USA via conference calls, and individual check-ins were conducted by text, videocon-ferencing, phone, and e-mail. SMART START members remained active with the council postgraduation, staying tethered to YouthBuild program staff, YouthBuild USA, and fellow council members.

Other key features of the SMART Initiative’s successes include partnerships with correctional institutions, flexible programming, and trauma training and mental health support.

■ Partnerships with Correctional Institutions

SMART programs built relationships with their local correctional facilities. While at times staff turnover and other factors made this challenging, such relationships improved transitions for the enrolled students. For exam-ple, the director of the Brooklyn, New York, D.R.E.A.M.S. program that worked with incarcerated youth at the Riker’s Island jail noted that

there is a special set of relationships that you need to foster at the jail for your efforts to work, and relationships of trust with guards and others naturally develop slowly. It also was important for us to have a good relationship with the school inside Rikers, which was our point of contact with participants in the SMART program. The teachers and social workers there got to know us well, and only then made referrals to us once we had earned their trust.

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■ Flexible Programming

Many aspects of the SMART Initiative were geared towards the adoption of a flexible programming model. Working with correctional facilities and youth upon release of these facilities required programs to adjust their traditional cohort model to allow for unpredictable release dates. This meant crafting new ways to integrate youth into the existing YouthBuild community at various entry points throughout the program year. The abil-ity to offer services when and for the length of time needed for individual SMART students allowed a level of individual participant customization not often afforded on other youth-development models. This was critical in programs serving youth still under correctional supervision.

■ Trauma Training and Mental Health Support

YouthBuild USA provided customized trauma training and support to local YouthBuild programs. Support for each program was shaped based on requests from the programs, and catered to staffing structures and roles, staff expertise, student juvenile and criminal offenses, and events or activities occurring on- or off-site that were likely to contribute to student or gradu-ate recidivism. YouthBuild USA offered guidance on in-program and post-program student support. YouthBuild program staff at SMART programs were also trained in national models for building trauma and mental health support through staff education and community partnerships. Program staff were introduced to several pieces of research including some sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, and by the Boston Public Health Commission. This research centered on the effects of violent injury on youth, the effects of recurrent trauma on African American males, and informed community practices that were then shared with the SMART programs.

Recidivism in a Larger Context

An obvious question about the YouthBuild SMART Initiative outcomes, and about the national YouthBuild recidivism rates more broadly, is: How does this compare with the alternatives? As discussed in a growing body of literature,xii recidivism measures vary widely by state, as well as within externally con-ducted studies, and there is little consistency or standardization of what those measures should be. In some respects, recidivism is simply one data point that is muddled by a lack of measurement standardization and little consensus about what actually constitutes recidivism.

Nevertheless, in putting YouthBuild recidivism outcomes in context, we can look to some existing research and data. The chart below, for example, reflects a 33-percent multistate reconviction one-year recidivism rate for youth released from incarceration.xiii

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The direct costs of crime and incarceration are only a portion of the cost to taxpayers and society at large.

Average One-Year Recidivism Rates: Youth Released from Incarceration in Several States

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

ReincarcerationReconvictionReferralRearrest

55%

45%

33%

25%

Source: Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Recidivism in Virginia as cited by CJCA presentation, 2011

Another fairly recent review of the data was a Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study from 2014 that found that between 2005 and 2010, approximately 21 percent of the overall state prison population released in 30 states was con-victed of a new crime within one year of being released from prison.xiv (Note that the population in the BJS study was entirely an adult prison population, as opposed to the mixed juvenile and adult population found within YouthBuild.)

Additionally, throughout the five-year tracking period included in the BJS study, 84.1 percent of the population who were rearrested were 24 years old or younger, compared to 78.6 percent for the 25-to-39-year-old bracket and 69.2 percent for the 40-or-older bracket. While these figures are for rearrests, this pattern and results of other recidivism studies suggest that the 16-to-24-year-old population tends to recidivate at higher rates than older age groups. Accordingly, the age group served by YouthBuild programs could be expected to have a one-year reconviction rate higher than 21 percent, as indicated by the 33-percent rate reflected in the Virginia study shown in the chart above.

Policymakers at all levels of government are also paying increased attention to the cost of incarceration in all its dimensions. It is hard to generalize about incarceration costs, which are highly dependent on the type of facility in which offenders are housed and the jurisdiction managing the facility. The federal government currently spends roughly $6.8 billion on the US Bureau of Pris-ons—nearly double the amount spent in 2000—with an average annual cost per prisoner approaching $30,000.xv In 2013, states collectively spent over $51 billion on incarceration, with high recidivism rates.xvi

At the state level, there are even wider variations. For example, 2008 data from the American Correctional Association shows that “[t]he per diem costs of locking up one young person in a juvenile facility ranges from $24 in Wyo-ming to $726 in Connecticut, but the American Correctional Association estimates that, on average, it costs states $240.99 per day—around $88,000 a

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If we reconnect someone under age 25

with an opportunity to finish his or her

education, we create a self-reliant citizen.

year—for every youth in a juvenile facility.”xvii Furthermore, cost figures reflect-ing only the correctional department budgets may be greatly underestimating total costs, as there is signification variation in the proportion of incarceration costs that are outside a state’s prison budget. For example, while Pennsylvania and Minnesota have comparable incarceration costs per inmate—at approxi-mately $42,339 and $41,364 per inmate, respectively—nearly 23 percent of Pennsylvania’s costs are outside of its corrections budget, compared to only 7.5 percent in Minnesota.xviii

More importantly, the direct costs of crime and incarceration are only a por-tion of the cost to taxpayers and society at large. The direct cost approach is sometimes referred to as a “bottom-up” estimate—measuring primarily the police and court process costs, and the cost of actual incarceration and parole or probation follow-up. However, bottom-up approaches lead to much lower estimates, as they do not account for many of the other costs arising out of criminal activity—the many so-called externalities such as the impact on vic-tims, the post-incarceration loss of earnings potential by the ex-offender, the increased incidence of dependence on public benefits, and similar indirect costs. (See the appendix for cost estimates of different offenses.)

Accordingly, projections of the cost-benefit return on investment from reducing criminal activity by an ex-offender are at best approximations. Still, such approx-imations prove useful in measuring the economic potential for investing in scal-ing up and replicating models like YouthBuild that consistently prove effective at reducing ex-offenders returning to criminal activity and being reincarcerated.

One noteworthy effort at calculating return on investment in reducing recidivism and offering opportunity to young adults estimated that there are 2.3 million low-income opportunity youth in America—those who are out of school and not working.xix If we reconnect someone under age 25 with an opportunity to finish his or her education, we create a self-reliant citizen. Economically, we also avoid a direct taxpayer burdenxx estimated to be $235,680 and a full social burden of $704,020, over the lifetime of each disconnected young person.xxi Similarly, an earlier cost-benefit analysis of YouthBuild’s impact on youthful offenders calculated that reduced recidivism and improved educational outcomes produced a positive benefit-to-cost ratio of at least $7.20 for every dollar spent on the YouthBuild program.xxii

Both of these approaches to a return-on-investment analysis validate the intui-tive observation that a model that can reduce recidivism to one-half—or even one-third—of what it would otherwise be, at a cost roughly equivalent to a year of traditional high school (plus a stipend for work), offers substantial criminal-justice cost reduction potential to policy makers willing to scale up YouthBuild to meet the demand.

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Conclusion

“America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life,” President George W. Bush declared in his 2004 State of the Union address, while calling for an expanded federal Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative to expand job training and placement services to help newly released prisoners get mentoring for successful postincarceration return to society.

A decade later, the best current thinking on how to achieve the goal of enabling ex-offenders to “lead a better life” was recently summarized by the director of the Council of State Governments:

In short, simply connecting a person to a job won’t alter those behaviors. Cognitive behavioral interventions are highly effective in reducing recidivism because they target a person’s thoughts, choices, and attitudes associated with criminal behavior, and help the person develop new coping strategies. However, changing the habits and attitudes that contribute to criminal behavior can be challenging and complicated, particularly given factors such as addiction and mental illness that are common among people involved with the criminal justice system.xxiii

YouthBuild’s consistently low national recidivism rates—underscored by the even lower rates achieved through the YouthBuild SMART initiative—demonstrate a mastery of the “challenging and complicated” process of changing lives. At a time when policymakers are searching for ways to reduce incarceration, expanding use of the YouthBuild model as a means to greatly reduce recidivism reduction would be a wise public investment.

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AppendixExcerpts from Advancing the Quality of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Justice Programs, a white paper prepared by the Vera Institute of Justice, March 2014.

1. Bottom-Up

Estimated Tangible Plus Intangible Costs Per Crime Using a Bottom-Up Approach

Offense category Roman (2010) Cohen & Piquero

(2009)

McCollister, French & Fang

(2010)

Murder/manslaughter $1,673,679 $5,106,000 $9,032,940

Rape $167,236 $149,850 $213,617

Armed robbery $320,543a $32,190 n/e

Robbery n/e $13,320 $24,155

Aggravated assault $155,260b $41,070 $101,675

Assault n/e $4,995 n/e

Arson n/e $63,270 $5,492

Larceny/theft $2,841 $500 $11

Motor vehicle theft $20,301 $6,105 $280

Burglary (household) $5,945 $2,220 $343

Fraud n/e $1,221 n/e

Vandalism n/e $411 n/e

n/e = Not estimated

Sources: John K. Roman, “How Do We Measure the Severity of Crimes? New Estimates of the Cost of Criminal Victimization,” Measuring Crime and Criminality: Advances in Criminological Theory 17, no. 37 (2010), 37-70; Mark A. Cohen and Alex R. Piquero, “New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk Youth.” Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-07, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 25, no. 1 (2009), p. 33, Table 5; and Katherine E. McCollister, Michael T. French, and Hai Fang, “The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 108, nos. 1-2 (2010), p. 105, Table 5, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20071107 (accessed February 3, 2014). The authors’ estimates have been adjusted to 2012 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm, accessed August 21, 2013.

a This calculation uses Roman’s estimate for robbery for the cost of armed robbery.

b This calculation uses Roman’s estimate for assault for the cost of aggravated assault.

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2. Top-Down

Estimated Tangible Plus Intangible Societal Costs Per Crime Using a Top-Down Approach

Offense category Cohen & Piquero (2009)

Murder/manslaughter $13,098,000

Rape $321,900

Armed robbery $310,800

Robbery $43,290

Aggravated assault $94,350

Assault $21,090

Arson $127,650

Larceny/theft $4,440

Motor vehicle theft $18,870

Burglary (household) $38,850

Fraud $6,105

Vandalism $2,220

Source: Mark A. Cohen and Alex R. Piquero, 2009, p. 33, Table 5. The authors’ estimates have been adjusted to 2012 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (accessed August 21, 2013).

3. Victim Costs

Victim Costs of Crime

VICTIM COSTS

Type of offense Tangible Intangible Total

Murder $737,517 $8,442,000 $9,179,517

Rape/sexual assault $5,556 $199,642 $205,085

Aggravated assault $8,700 $95,023 $96,254

Robbery $3,299 $22,575 $24,211

Motor vehicle theft $6,114 $262 $6,352

Arson $11,452 $5,133 $16,127

Household burglary $1,362 $321 $1,653

Larceny/theft $480 $10 $489

Source: Katherine E. McCollister, Michael T. French, and Hai Fang, “The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 108, nos. 1-2 (2010), 98-109, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20071107 (accessed February 3, 2014).

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4. Lost Wages

Estimated Costs of Crime to Offenders, in Foregone Earnings

Offense category McCollister et al. (2010)

Cohen & Piquero

(2009)

Rajkumar & French (1997)

Murder/manslaughter $158,954 $155,400 n/e

Rape $9,857 $4,995 n/e

Armed robbery n/e $8,880 n/e

Robbery $4,571 $4,440 $1,747

Aggravated assault $2,275 $7,104 $1,284

Assault n/e $1,443 n/e

Arson $625 $777 n/e

Larceny/theft $174 $777 $74

Motor vehicle theft $592 $1,110 $186

Burglary (household) $729 $1,110 $366

Embezzlement $706 n/e n/e

Fraud $706 $777 n/e

Stolen property $1,211 n/e n/e

Forgery $706 n/e $183

Vandalism $750 n/e n/e

n/e = Not estimated

Sources: McCollister, French, & Fang (2010), page 7, Table 4; Cohen & Piquero (2009), page 33, Table 5. Rajkumar & French (1997), page 301, Table 1. These authors’ estimates have been adjusted to 2012 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator (http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm; accessed August 21, 2013.)

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References

“Home Page - Law Enforcement Leaders.” Law Enforcement Leaders. 2015.

“Juvenile Justice Archives - Coalition for Public Safety.” Coalition for Public Safety. 2015.

“Texas Shows How to Reduce Both Incarceration and Crime.” National Review Online. May 18, 2015.

“Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice - 2014.” Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, USDOJ/OIG. November 10, 2014.

Baker, Peter. “2016 Candidates Are United in Call to Alter Justice System.” The New York Times. April 27, 2015.

Belfield, C. R., Levin, H. M., & Rosen, R. “The Economic Value of Opportunity Youth” 2012.

Burd-Sharps, Sarah, and Kristen Lewis. “One in Seven: Ranking Youth Disconnection in the 25 Largest Metro Areas.” Measure of America. September 1, 2012.

Cohen, Mark A., and Alex R. Piquero. “Costs and benefits of a targeted intervention program for youthful offenders: The YouthBuild USA offender project”. 2008.

Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators. “Defining and Measuring Juvenile Recidivism.” Presentation, Council of Correctional Association, Braintree, MA, January 31, 2011.

Council of State Governments Justice Center. “Measuring and Using Juvenile Recidivism Data to Inform Policy, Practice, and Resource Allocation.” Council of State Governments Justice Center, New York, July 2014.

Henrichson, Christian, and Ruth Delaney. “The price of prisons: What incarceration costs taxpayers.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25, no. 1. (2012): 68-80.

Justice Policy Institute. “The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense”. May, 2009.

King, Ryan, and Brian Elderbroom. “Improving Recidivism as a Performance Measure.” The Urban Institute. 2014.

Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, Ph.D., and Howard N. Synder, Ph.D. “Recidivism of Prisoners Released In 30 States In 2005: Patterns From 2005 To 2010” Recidivism of Prisoners Released Series, Bureau of Justice Statistics. April 2014.

Matthies, Carl. “Advancing the Quality of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Justice Programs.” New York: Vera Institute of Justice. 2014.

Nathan, James. “The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Overview, Policy Changes, Issues, and Options.” CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2013.

Sneed, Tierney. “What Youth Incarceration Costs Taxpayers.” US News. December 9, 2014.

The Pew Charitable Trust. “Measuring Juvenile Recidivism.” 2014.

The Sentencing Project: Research and Advocacy for Reform. 2013.

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Notes

i. http://www.coalitionforpublicsafety.org/issue/juvenile-justice/

ii. Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, Ph.D., and Howard N. Synder, Ph.D. “Recidivism Of Prisoners Released In 30 States In 2005: Patterns From 2005 To 2010” Recidivism of Prisoners Released Series, Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2014. found at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4987

iii. http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/09/what-youth-incarceration-costs-taxpayers

iv. http://lawenforcementleaders.org/

v. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/us/politics/being-less-tough-on-crime-is-2016-consensus.html?_r=0

vi. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418510/texas-shows-how-reduce-both-incarceration-and-crime-ken-cuccinelli

vii. Under applicable Department of Labor grant guidelines, the recidivism measure is the percentage of Students enrolled in the SMART program who entered the program within 3 months of release from incarceration or within 3 months of the start of parole/probation who were convicted of a new crime within 12 months of release from incarceration or within 12 months of the start of parole or probation.

viii. http://ssrc-static.s3.amazonaws.com/moa/MOA-One_in_Seven09-14.pdf

ix. Belfield, C. R., Levin, H. M., & Rosen, R. “The Economic Value of Opportunity Youth” (2012)

x. YouthBuild SMART program Sponsoring organization Location

YouthBuild Fresno Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission

Fresno, California

Antelope Valley YouthBuild Advancing Communities Together

Palmdale, California

D.R.E.A.M.S. YouthBuild and Young Adult Training Program

Settlement Housing Fund Brooklyn, New York

Franklin County YouthBuild Youth Over Us, Inc. Columbus, Ohio

CTI YouthBuild of Greater Lowell

Community Teamwork, Inc. Lowell, Massachusetts

YouthBuild Newark (YouthBuild Newark is not sponsored. Independent.)

Newark, New Jersey

San Gabriel Valley Conservation Corps YouthBuild

San Gabriel Valley Conservation Corps

San Gabriel Valley, California

YouthBuild San Jose San Jose Conservation Corps San Jose, California

YouthBuild SoBro South Bronx Overall Economic Development Corp.

South Bronx, New York

xi. The criteria specified by the Department of Labor for youth eligibility included the following:

“An individual may participate in a project funded under these grants if they: • Areatleastage16yearsofageandnoolderthan24yearsofageonthedateof

enrollment

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• Arecurrentlyinvolvedorhavebeeninvolvedwiththejuvenilejusticesystemwithin 12 months before enrollment, which includes those:

■ under the supervision of the juvenile justice system, either in out-of-home placements or on probation or parole

■ placed in an alternative sentence by the juvenile justice system ■ placed in a diversion program as an alternative to juvenile prosecution by the

juvenile justice system • Currentlyresidein(orresidedinbeforeconfinementinacorrectionalfacility)the

community to be served identified by the sub-grantee”An exception was allowed for up to 10 percent of participants who have not been involved in the juvenile justice system within the prior 12 months of enrollment but who otherwise had high risk of offending characteristics. Under the SMART grant criteria, the communities to be served had to be ones with “a poverty rate of at least 30 percent for urban areas and 25 percent for rural areas” and also ones where “the felony crime rate in the police precinct that most closely overlaps with the community to be served is higher than the overall felony crime rate of the city (for urban areas) or of non-metropolitan counties in the state (for rural areas).” Additionally, chosen programs had “to provide data from the local juvenile justice agency on the number of youth from the community who in the past year returned from juvenile correctional facilities, were placed on probation, were placed in alternative sentences, and the number of youth who are expected to return to the target community over the next two years.”

xii. See, e.g., Council of State Governments Justice Center. “Measuring and Using Juvenile Recidivism Data to Inform Policy, Practice, and Resource Allocation.” (New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2014); King, Ryan, and Brian Elderbroom.

“Improving Recidivism as a Performance Measure.” The Urban Institute, (2014).

xiii. Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators. “Defining and Measuring Juvenile Recidivism.” (presentation for the American Correctional Association, January 31, 2011), p.8, found at http://pbstandards.org/cjcaresources/15/RecidivismACA_1-31-11.pdf

xiv. Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, Ph.D., Howard N. Synder, Ph.D. “Recidivism Of Prisoners Released In 30 States In 2005: Patterns From 2005 To 2010” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2014), found at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4987

xv. https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2014.htm

xvi. http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/statedata.cfm?abbrev=NA&mapdata=true

xvii. Justice Policy Institute. “The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense” (May 2009), at p.4, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_rep_costsofconfinement_jj_ps.pdf

xviii. Henrichson, Christian, and Ruth Delaney. “The price of prisons: What incarceration costs taxpayers.” Vera Institute of Justice, 2012.

xix. Burd-Sharps and Lewis, 2014. “One in Seven; Ranking Youth Disconnection in the 25 Largest Metro Areas,” a p. 7, found at http://ssrc-static.s3.amazonaws.com/moa/MOA-One_in_Seven09-14.pdf. See also Belfield, C, Levin, H, and Rosen, R. 2012. “The Economic Value of Opportunity Youth” found at http://www.americaspromise.org/sites/default/files/legacy/bodyfiles/Econ_Value_Youth_Jan_11_2012.pdf

xx. These are lump sum amounts expressed in 2011 present value dollars. As used by Belfield, Levin and Rosen, the taxpayer (or fiscal) burden is composed of lost taxes, additional health care paid for by the taxpayer, expenditures for the criminal justice system and corrections, and all welfare and social service payments regardless of whether they are transfers, less savings in lower education spending – because opportunity youth are not in college. The social burden is composed of economic losses and not directly absorbed by taxpayers, such as lost gross earnings, all additional health expenditures, and all crime costs (such as impact on victims) not directly paid for by the criminal justice system.

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xxi. According to Belfield, Levin and Rosen, these dollar amounts are lump sum amounts expressed in 2011 present value dollars. They were calculated based upon a larger estimated pool of a 6.7 million total “opportunity youth” population, which includes the low income 16-24 year old addressed here as well as young adults above the poverty line who are neither enrolled in school nor participating in the labor market. Thus the actual savings for the low-income YouthBuild students is actually greater, but this analysis was not provided in the study.

xxii. Mark A. Cohen and Alex R. Piquero (2015). “Benefits and Costs of a Targeted Intervention Program for Youthful Offenders: The YouthBuild USA Offender Project.” Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6, pp 603-627. doi:10.1017/bca.2015.50.

xxiii. https://csgjusticecenter.org/reentry/posts/how-federal-investments-make-us-smarter-about-reducing-recidivism/

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