April 2015

Liberal Democrats in a

ConDemNation: Strategy, identity and survival

Alex Marsh

School for Policy Studies

University of Bristol

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Liberal Democrats in a ConDemNation: strategy, identity and survival1

Abstract

When the Liberal Democrats entered government in May 2010 it was already reasonably well-

known that coalition is not kind to the junior partner. That is the case in countries where multi-

party government is not unfamiliar: the political cost in the UK was always likely to be greater.

The risks were magnified by entering government at a time when making, or supporting,

unpopular decisions was almost inevitable.

This paper focuses upon the way in which the Liberal Democrats have managed their role in

Coalition with the Conservatives, how this has played out with the electorate, and how the party

moves on from the 2010-2015 Coalition.

The party adopted a two stage strategy: ownership followed by differentiation. This was always

going to carry significant risks in a low trust environment. Difficulties in reading the partys role

in coalition were further compounded by lack of clarity over the identity of the Liberal Democrat

political project, represented in popular discourse by the battle between Orange Bookers and

social liberal wing of the party.

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General

Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing

populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core liberal

concerns. While prominent liberal politicians might assert we have arrived in a Liberal Age, the

reception for a distinctively liberal agenda would appear to be characterised by growing sceptical.

The future of the party as an independent political force is by no means assured.

1 This is a revised version of a workshop paper presented to the Political Studies Association Annual

Conference, Sheffield, 30th March-1st April 2015. Thanks to participants in the panel organised by the

British Liberals and Liberalism Specialist Group for their questions and comments. And thanks, also, to

members of the Liberal Democrats for comments on an earlier draft. All remaining mistakes of substance

and interpretation are the responsibility of the author.

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1. Introduction

When the Liberal Democrats entered government in May 2010 it was already reasonably well

known that entering - and exiting - coalition is not necessarily kind to junior partners. The

history of the British Liberal party and experience elsewhere provide some salutary lessons. In

countries where multi-party government is relatively familiar the junior partner can find itself

bearing the brunt of voters dissatisfaction with coalition performance. The political cost in the

UK was always likely to be greater. There is no modern experience of Westminster coalition to

draw on, and the advent of coalition throws into question one of the great strengths claimed for

our electoral system that it delivers decisive results. The risks to the Liberal Democrats were

magnified by entering government in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. The rhetoric

of austerity had been embraced by both major political parties, albeit more fervently by the

Conservatives: it was almost inevitable that the Liberal Democrats would be making, or

supporting, unpopular decisions.

This paper focuses upon the way in which the Liberal Democrats have managed their role in

Coalition with the Conservatives, how this has played out with the electorate, and how the party

moves on from the 2010-2015 Coalition.

The party adopted a two stage strategy: ownership followed by differentiation. This was always

going to carry significant risks in a low trust environment. Difficulties in reading the partys role

in coalition were further compounded by lack of clarity over the identity of the Liberal Democrat

political project, represented in popular discourse by the battle between Orange Bookers and

social liberal wing of the party.

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General

Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing

populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core Liberal

Democrat concerns. While prominent liberal politicians might assert we have arrived in a Liberal

Age (Browne, 2014), the reception for a distinctively liberal agenda would appear to be

characterised by growing sceptical. The future of the party as an independent political force is by

no means assured.

2. Strategy

Junior partners contemplating going in to coalition face some profound strategic choices. The

most fundamental question is arguably the stance to adopt on the question of unity versus

distinctiveness (Boston and Bullock, 2010). The second key question is the strategy towards

portfolio allocation whether to go for breadth or depth in office holding. Clearly, the two

questions are interrelated: going for depth in office holding so that particular policy areas are

clearly owned by the junior partner - makes it easier to demonstrate distinctiveness and

influence when compared to the alternative strategy of seeking involvement across a range of

policy areas. On the other hand, it risks the junior partner being perceived as being narrowly

focused in its concerns and marginal to the broader programme of government.

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A number of authors have analysed in detail the formation of the Conservative-Liberal

Democrat coalition, the strategy adopted by the Liberal Democrats, and the implications of

coalition for the machinery of government (eg. Lee and Beech, 2011; Matthews. 2011). David

Camerons apparent repositioning of the Conservatives towards the political centre ground

during the latter 2000s, coupled with the Liberal Democrats being nudged by their leadership

away from the centre-left (Jones, 2011) had increased the plausibility of a sustainable coalition

between the two parties. There was a narrowing of the political distance between the parties, as

indicated by their manifesto commitments (Debus, 2011): indeed there was a notable degree of

policy overlap. While major barriers to forming coalition had to be overcome in particular

reconciling the parties positions on voting reform - arriving at a coalition agreement was

perhaps less painful than expected. This was a period in which David Cameron was championing

liberal conservatism and the coalition was going to place freedom, fairness and responsibility

at the heart of its agenda. The parties appeared to share an ideological commitment to enhancing

freedom, while the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives placed relatively greater emphasis

upon fairness and responsibility respectively. The resulting coalition agreement represented a

genuine combination of policy proposals shared by the parties, proposals distinctive to the

Conservative manifesto, proposals distinctive to the Liberal Democrat manifesto, and proposals

that had featured in neither manifesto (Matthews, 2011). In terms of portfolio allocation the

Liberal Democrats appeared to be more strongly represented in the Government than might

have been predicted on the basis of strict proportionality (Debus, 2011). Cameron was making

his big, open and comprehensive offer to the Liberal Democrats.

The Liberal Democrat strategy towards forming the coalition was, firstly, to opt for breadth

rather than depth in portfolio allocation and, secondly, to prioritize unity over distinctiveness.

Given that the Liberal Democrats were seeking to overturn the popular perception that as the

third party they lacked experience of government it is perhaps understandable that they opted to

seek to demonstrate the ability to work productively in partnership with the Conservatives across

a range of policy areas by placing junior ministers in several departments. Similarly, given the

Liberal Democrats emphasis upon constitutional reform, it made sense for the Nick Clegg to

take the role of Deputy Prime Minister. However, while the Liberal Democrats may have done

relatively well numerically out of portfolio allocation they held only one of the core executive

roles (DPM) and by spreading themselves relatively thinly across departments, typically working

under a Conservative Secretary of State, they set themselves a significant challenge in

demonstrating distinctiveness and effectiveness. Whether the alternative depth strategy was ever

a serious proposition is a separate question: the major policy areas where the Liberal Democrats

might have seen a possibility of demonstrate a distinctive agenda if they were allowed complete

control education, home affairs, work and pensions, perhaps are policy areas the

Conservatives were never likely to countenance stepping back from entirely.

We could get a hint of what might have been possible by looking at the activities of the Liberal

Democrat-led departments: DECC and BIS. Here there are initiatives such as the Green

Investment Bank that are genuinely innovative and bear a clear Liberal Democrat stamp. But, we

might argue, these are relatively peripheral areas of policy from the Conservatives perspective:

whether the Liberal Democrats would be allowed to pursue a similarly distinctive strategy closer

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to the heart of government is a moot point. Equally, we can look at totemic policies such as the

rise in tuition fees and see that Liberal Democrat-led departments were obliged, in a spirit of

coalition unity, to implement and defend Conservative policy commitments at substantial

political cost.

McEnhill (2015) has recently discussed the challenges that the breadth strategy presented to the

Liberal Democrats in demonstrating distinctiveness in policy areas dominated by the

Conservatives, focusing on the area of welfare reform. One important point is that the sort of

roving brief that the Liberal Democrats envisaged for their junior ministers is not one that

formally exists. So while some Liberal Democrat ministers were kept in the loop by their

Conservative Secretary of State, others were not: they were expected to stay within the

boundaries of their ministerial brief (Harvey, 2015). This meant that even though there was a

Liberal Democrat presence in the department, Liberal Democrat influence over policy could be

tightly bounded.

In contrast, where a Conservative-led department has implemented a headline Liberal Democrat

policy such as the pupil premium or raising income tax thresholds the policy has not only

been owned by the Conservatives but credited to the Conservatives by substantial sections of the

public.

The debate over the wisdom of the breadth rather than depth strategy will no doubt continue.

Harvey (2015) takes the view that it was precisely the right strategy and that the Liberal

Democrats should pursue the breadth strategy more vigorously in a future coalition negotiation.

On the other hand, Goes (2015) labels the Liberal Democrats strategy of taking the role of

DPM rather than Foreign Secretary as would often be the case in coalition governments in

continental Europe - a mistake because it meant that the party ended up with limited leverage

over the coalitions rather unsubtle populist policy towards Europe. A strongly pro-European

party finds itself in the awkward position of being part of a government that significantly

increased the risk of Brexit.

The fact that during the early phases of the coalition the Liberal Democrats prioritized unity over

distinctiveness meant that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was able to address one

criticism of multi-party government. The agreement of May 2010 did not deliver weak

government as a result of perpetual horse-trading and compromise. Strong party discipline from

the Liberal Democrats in particular meant that the government was able to pursue a radical

agenda renegotiating the role of the state. It set in train structural changes in a whole range of

policy areas on welfare reform, the National Health Service, planning deregulation, social

housing, and the defunding of local authority services - that have yet to fully work themselves

through the system. This was possible in large part because for much of the Parliament the

Liberal Democrats were willing to put aside dissent, in public at least, and support a wide range

of Conservative projects.

As Atkins (2015) has pointed out, this unity relied upon deploying powerful narrative strategies

that emphasized the parties shared values, the importance of placing the national interest above

party interest, and the need to put aside inter-party difference in order to battle with the deficit

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created by a fiscally irresponsible Labour party. In so doing it required the Liberal Democrats

to abandon some well-established policy positions or suppress a concern for core ideological

principles for the sake of coalition unity.

The Liberal Democrats early commitment to coalition unity led to them paying a substantial

price. Voters and members who had supported the party because its policy platform was to the

left of Labour abandoned the party. The negative electoral consequences of coalition quickly

became apparent in substantial losses in local elections and lost deposits in by-elections.

Only in the last year of the Parliament has the party made any real effort to differentiate from the

Conservatives. Whether that was the plan from the outset or a response to the fact that the

Liberal Democrats seemed to be absorbing the vast majority of the political fallout from the

implementation of the Coalitions austerity-dominated agenda is not entirely clear.

This two stage strategy of fully owning the coalition agenda of hugging the Conservatives close

- and then seeking to differentiate was always going to carry significant, and rather obvious, risks

in an environment where trust in politicians is low. As the junior partner, supporting policies that

you would in other circumstances oppose comes with coalition territory. Explaining that you are

doing so under sufferance would at least make it clear what was happening. But keeping your

disagreements private while showing a unified front with the Conservatives in public, and doing

so with seeming enthusiasm, means all distinctiveness is rendered invisible. Viewed from the

outside unity in the national interest and a coup by Orange Book liberals/Cleggite faction of

yellow Tories can look rather similar, if the party is unable or unwilling to provide a convincing

narrative to accompany its actions. Liberal Democrat support collapsed as a consequence.

And once the junior partner moved to differentiate it opened itself up to accusations of

hypocrisy. The party starts disagreeing with policies that it only a few weeks previously it had

enthusiastically voted in to law. Sceptical voters might reasonably ask: does that mean you

werent telling us the truth back then? After the initial damage caused by reneging the key tuition

fees pledge and reorienting the position on the desirability of rapid deficit reduction (Dommett,

2013), trust is potentially further undermined. The credibility of all future public

pronouncements is likely to be questioned.

3. Identity

The difficulties in reading the partys role in coalition were further compounded by lack of clarity

over the identity of the Liberal Democrat political project. This is frequently represented in

popular discourse as a battle between the Orange Bookers and the social liberal wing of the party

(referring to Marshall and Laws, 2004, and, for example, Brack et al, 2007, respectively), although

we can arguably trace debates about whether the party looks predominantly left or right much

further back into the partys history.

It would be wrong to see the arrival of Nick Clegg as party leader as representing the dawning of

an entirely new era in policy or ideological term for the Liberal Democrats. Some of the currents

in policy thinking that have emerged to prominence were arguably already developing under

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Charles Kennedy and earlier. Equally it is wrong to think that Orange Bookers or social

liberals for that matter cleave to a coherent and tightly specified philosophy. In fact, the

contributions to the Orange Book itself take a range of different positions on questions such as

the desirability or otherwise of state action and intervention. What is typically referred to as

Orange Book liberalism that is, the promotion of economic liberalism alongside or, critics

might argue, above personal, political and social liberalism is most clearly articulated by David

Laws contribution to the edited collection (Laws, 2004). It is largely a belief in the benefits of

market mechanisms, driven by non-state actors, in delivering desirable social outcomes. It would

perhaps be more illuminating to focus on some of the work of the think tank CentreForum or

the ginger group Liberal Reform in taking this agenda forward than to keep referring back to the

Orange Book.

The idea that the Liberal Democrat policy agenda has been taken over by the Orange Bookers

that there has been a Clegg Coup tends to be treated as relatively uncontroversial in the

academic literature (Dommett, 2013). Certainly many of the contributors to the Orange Book

now occupy senior, frontline positions in the party. The assertion of a coup is perhaps more

controversial in internal party debate. But that is, perhaps, explicable. On the one hand, a core

tenet of liberalism is tolerance and therefore self-professed liberals tend to be treated as such,

even where the content of that liberalism starts to look suspiciously like market fundamentalism.

On the other hand, if one were seeking to effect a coup then a useful discursive strategy would

be to deny that that is what is happening: that differing policy positions represent no more than

differences of emphasis. The party leadership has tried to defuse these debates by seeking unity

behind slogans arguing the party is neither left nor right but liberal. This does not, however,

bring much greater clarity regarding what the party stands for in a context where most of the

public debate is framed in one (left-right) dimension.

Less controversial is the argument that the Liberal Democrats have gone through a process of

professionalization (Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011). The party has a federal structure and

formally policy making sits with biannual Federal Conferences. However, over time the

professionalization process has meant that the party has moved from a largely bottom-up

process towards a more top-down process where the party leadership and the parliamentary

party are able to shape policy agendas in ways seen as beneficial, using the Federal Conferences

primarily to ratify such positions and commitments:

The reality is that increasingly spokespeople are adopting [this] approach to their

parliamentary portfolios, leaving the conference as more of a washing up exercise that

brings parliamentarians statements and written policy together (Senior party official cited

in Evans and Sanderson-Nash, 2011, p486)

This structural issue has increased salience under the coalition government. While it can plausibly

be argued that the Liberal Democrats were the party best prepared for the coalition negotiations

of May 2010, they were less well-prepared for the rigours of policy making in government.

Biannual Federal Conferences were obviously not going to be sufficiently nimble. It was

inevitable that in government the party was going to have to respond to emerging issues about

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which it had no settled policy. But it took a while to develop mechanisms that allowed the party

to input into decisions so they were not based primarily on views within the leaders inner circle.

This issue of top-down versus bottom-up goes to the heart of the Liberal Democrats identity.

On the one hand, the Liberal Democrats internal Bones Commission on party structure noted:

Leaders define and deliver political strategy, appoint the best teams to support delivery

and are the focus of the party nationally to communicate and sell our vision of a liberal

democrat Britain. They need professional support and to be given the freedom to act;

but they too should continue to face scrutiny (Bones Commission, cited in Evans and

Sanderson-Nash, 2011, 471).

That is, the leader is not there to represent the collective views of the membership but to define

political strategy and articulate a vision of liberal democracy in a way that will resonate with the

electorate.

On the other hand, activists emphasize the Liberal Democrats as a federal party because this is a

key strength which brings authenticity and genuine internal democracy. The party is different

from the Conservatives and the Labour party because the members make policy: it is central to

the partys self-identity and self-understanding.

Coalition has placed the leadership into conflict with the activist base on a number of occasions.

The parliamentary party has supported a number of policy measures into law only for Federal

Conference to pass motions either condemning those policies or calling for them to be modified.

Several motions critical of welfare reform, cuts to legal aid and advice services, and the bedroom

tax would fall into this category. The party leadership is then in the dilemma of supporting a

policy in government that conflicts with official party policy. Here again the leadership has

tended to favour unity over overt conflict with their coalition partners. This is felt particularly

sharply around the edges of the coalition agreement: policy areas which do not feature in the

coalition agreement, where Conservative policy proposals conflict with some principle deeply

held by Liberal Democrat activists, and yet the party leadership supports the proposals into law.

Civil liberties have provided a number of flash points.

One of the most intricate examples of the way these tensions play out is the case of the bedroom

tax. The Liberal Democrats supported the policy into law as part of the welfare reform agenda,

in the face of criticism. Federal Conference passed a two motions calling for the policy to be

substantially modified and for mechanisms to mitigate the worst negative impacts to be put in

place. The first of these motions put the leaderships position of support for the policy in its

(then) current form at odds with party policy. However, it did allow leverage to be exerted to

secure some increased protections via Discretionary Housing Payments. Nick Clegg also stated

that support for the policy would be reviewed when the results of the official interim evaluation

became available. When these results were finally released having been available within

government for several months Nick Clegg publicly withdrew the partys support for the policy

in its current form because it was felt to be perpetrating unacceptable unfairness and hardship. In

doing so he did little more than bring his public position in line with what was already official

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party policy. This looked like solidly evidence-based policy, except that almost all the problems

identified in the interim evaluation had been identified by expert commentators even before the

policy was implemented. The evaluation provided very little new information. But it provided

cover for a realignment of policy position in a period where differentiation was becoming a more

pressing concern.

There are also lessons here about how and where power is most effectively exercised by the

junior partner. For example, McEnhill (2015) argues that it was Simon Hughes as deputy party

leader, outside the Government, who was able to push for concessions on the implementation of

the bedroom tax rather than Steve Webb as DWP pensions minister. We might reflect on how

much leverage Hughes was subsequently able to exercise over Chris Graylings agenda which

many Liberal Democrats roundly condemn for being fundamentally illiberal - once he joined the

government as an MoJ minister.

One of the biggest challenges for the Liberal Democrats in coalition has been the realization that

the foundation upon which it was built a convergence in policy position between the Liberal

Democrats and David Camerons liberal conservatism or compassionate conservatism was

shaky. It turned out that the Conservatives modernisation was only skin deep. It also became

apparent that while the coalition agreement may well have played to Liberal Democrat priorities

when it came to delivering on that agreement the Conservatives were going to approach it

through the lens of their own party interest. One trigger for the fraying of coalition relations was

the way the Conservatives campaigned to ensure that the move to the Alternative Vote was

rejected. It was a campaign that was conducted in precisely the opposite of the non-partisan and

non-personal spirit that had been hoped for.

Coalition politicians have spent five years emphasizing the difficult decisions they have had to

make to cut the deficit. In 2010 the claims were that fairness is at the heart of those decisions

and those most in need are most protected. As the threat from the populist right strengthened

and geopolitical threats from ISIS emerged the Conservative party reverted to a more

authoritarian and divisive stance. The way in which new compassionate conservatism

manifested itself in implementation looked rather familiar. In welfare reform it has entailed a

stigmatising rhetoric and increasingly harsh compulsion and sanctioning. The early coalition

commitment to freedom, fairness and responsibility has played out rather differently in

practice (Bell, 2015; Lakin, 2013). As more evidence is gathered it becomes clearer that criticisms

of policies such as welfare reform are well-founded. The argument that fairness is at the heart of

policy becomes harder, if not impossible, to sustain.

The Preamble to the Liberal Democrat constitution states that: We champion the freedom,

dignity and well-being of individuals and that no one shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance

or conformity. Many of the reforms that the Coalition has overseen for example, changes to

disability benefits, work capability assessments, the benefit sanctioning regime, the effective

removal of rights to many types of legal redress - are policies that can be seen as challenging core

principles. Had the Liberal Democrats been in opposition they would most likely have

condemned these policies in the strongest possible terms.

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As a consequence, while most party members continue to support the decision to enter coalition

with the Conservatives, fewer are content with the way the coalition has gone about

implementing its agenda.

4. Survival

Issues of strategy and unstable identity intersect in the preparations for the 2015 General

Election, which will be conducted in the febrile atmosphere associated with rising right wing

populism. The political environment is, arguably, increasingly hostile to many core Liberal

Democrat concerns. The 2014 European Elections which the Liberal Democrats approached

from an unambiguously pro-European perspective demonstrated the scale of the problems

facing the party. Similarly, messages on migration, drug liberalisation, or prioritising freedom

over the desires of the security state would appear to run against the grain.

The Liberal Democrats can identify a long list of Coalition policies that have the Liberal

Democrat stamp all over them. But most of the headline policies upon which the coalition

government will be judged on NHS reorganisation, welfare reform, immigration, security, and

most notable on the economy carry the Conservative hallmark. That is perhaps inevitable for

the junior partner. It comes as no surprise. Indeed, writing presciently not long after the

formation of the coalition Stuart (2011, p51) argues:

The Liberal Democrats became too fixated on the minutiae of what they had gained in

terms of policy concessions from the Conservatives, particularly their long-term

obsession with electoral reform. What they seemed unable to realize at the time was that

their central concession to the Conservatives on the economy agreeing to cut the

deficit further and faster than Labour trumped all their anorak manifesto commitments

put together. Nor were they able to foresee that they would take nearly all of the blame

and gain virtually none of the political credit for taking the tough decisions on spending

within the Coalition.

While it may not be a surprise that the coalition agenda has a Conservative flavour, in many cases

those policies not only conflict with principles that Liberal Democrats hold dear but are badly

thought through and/or poorly implemented.

The challenge for the Liberal Democrats is to tell the story of coalition in ways that get beyond

the accusation that they have been useful idiots propping up a radically illiberal Conservative

government and highlight the Governments positive, liberal achievements. In the public mind

these are unlikely ever to outweigh the broader thrust of policy originating with the dominant

partner. But that highlights the point that the UK electorate is yet to fully recognise and accept

the nature and limitations of coalition government.

It is hard, in this context, to see beyond the party suffering badly at the polls in May 2015. The

main question is how badly. While the political commentariat might argue that the party is going

to suffer a collapse in support, examination of its presence on the ground in key seats with an

incumbent MP at least indicates that it remains relatively healthy (Johnson, 2014). Its

performance at the General Election might therefore turn out to be better than that assumed on

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the basis of national opinion polling. It may well be that one of the Liberal Democrats most high

profile failures in constitutional reform the AV referendum will mean that the party does not

do quite as badly as it otherwise might.

The partys challenge now and for the future is how to reconcile its actions in coalition with its

fundamental principles and how to credibly rearticulate what the party stands for in a way that

will be given a hearing by the electorate.

At the same time, given that the likely outcome of the May 2015 general election is a hung

parliament there is a question of how it should respond. If the Liberal Democrats were to

participate in another coalition then how can they retain greater distinctiveness and a stronger

sense of identity? A second coalition with the Conservatives that isnt conducted on different

terms could spell the end of the Liberal Democrats as an independent party, in a replay of the

history of the Liberal party. Would a coalition with Labour mean that the party will be branded

unprincipled and only interested in clinging on to power? Or does the partys survival ultimately

depend on it not participating in a second coalition and rebuilding its identity in opposition?

It is clear that thoughts within the party are turning to who will succeed Nick Clegg, either if the

party loses a lot of seats, Clegg himself loses his seat, or his head is the price for the formation of

a coalition. A clear component of the manoeuvres that are being played out in public by potential

successors is the future direction of the party. Tim Farron is seen as centre-left, looking towards

Labour, and a favourite among many activists and members. He could be seen as taking the

party back in the direction from whence it has come. The other potential leaders Norman

Lamb or Ed Davey are much more likely to be seen as trusted with the stewardship of the

worldview Nick Clegg has tried to promote. The outcome of the election in May will very likely

have a profound effect the future trajectory of the party both in terms of where it locates itself

ideologically and whether it has a long-term future.

If the electoral arithmetic is such that the party is in a position to opt for coalition the party

needs to think carefully about how it makes sense of itself. There are unresolved issues about

how party policy relates to coalition policy. Greater thought needs to be given to how the party

at large can be helped to understand what is going on when the Parliamentary party not only

doesnt follow party policy but actively votes against it. There may well be reasons. It may well be

tied up with strategy and the long game; with tactics and the realpolitik of coalition. But there

needs to be a better way of communicating this. Otherwise, Federal Conferences increasingly

become a charade. The alternative is to recognize that the bottom-up model is being supplanted

for a top-down model that looks rather more like those used by the other parties. This may be

judged the only way to ensure clarity of vision and message discipline. But it would precipitate an

identity crisis in the party.

5. Conclusion

The Liberal Democrats experience of coalition government 2010-2015 has highlighted the

potential costs of coalition for the junior partner. However, those costs must be interpreted in

the lightly of the strategies adopted breadth not depth, unity followed by differentiation. These

were distinctive choices, for reasons that were plausible at the time. But they are clearly not the

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only choices. In light of the difficulties the Liberal Democrats are having demonstrating the

difference they have made in coalition restraining the worst impulses of the Conservatives may

be a valuable service, but it isnt an easy sell to the electorate it is tempting to argue that the

party made strategic mistakes. It is, however, hard to see whether the alternative approaches

depth, differentiation would have played out any better either for the party or the country.

The choices that may face the party after the election in May 2015 are no more obvious. There

are risks in all directions. Entering coalition again will mean continued influence over policy in

the short term but a more problematic long term future. Returning to opposition might allow the

party to recover some of its distinctive identity, but means that it foregoes the opportunity to

influence policy in a period where a concern for fairness and liberty are going to be a key

counterweight, whichever major party emerges as the biggest after the election.

The Liberal Democrats have undergone a crash course in coalition government since 2010. How

or indeed whether they get the opportunity to put that knowledge to use after May 2015

remains to be seen.

I am reminded of the words of John Curtice concluding a piece written in the late 1980s:

Its ability to regain a long-term position as a party of government must be in doubt for

so long as there is a widespread ignorance amongst the electorate of just what the British

Liberal Party and the Alliance believe in. (Curtice, 1988, p122)

It may be that we find ourselves back where the party began.

6. References

Adkins, J. (2015) Together in the national interest: the rhetoric of unity and the formation of

the Cameron-Clegg government, The Political Quarterly, online first.

Bell, E. (2015) Soft power and freedom under the coalition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Boston, J. and Bullock, D. (2010) Multi-party governance: Managing the unity-distinctiveness

dilemma in executive coalitions, Party Politics, 1-20.

Brack, D., Grayson, R. and Howarth, D. (eds) (2007) Reinventing the state: social liberalism for the 21st

century, London: Politicos.

Browne, J. (2014) Race plan, London: Reform.

Curtice, J. (1988) Great Britain Social liberalism reborn?, in E.J. Kirchner (ed) Liberal parties in

Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Debus, M. (2011) Portfolio allocation and policy compromises: How and why the Conservatives

and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government, The Political Quarterly, vol 82, no 2,

293-304.

Dommett, K. (2013) A miserable little compromise? Exploring Liberal Democrat fortunes in the

UK coalition, The Political Quarterly, 84, 2, 218-227.

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and the Liberal Democrats, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, 459-473.

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heard in government, London: Institute for Government.

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MacMillan.

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476-490.

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Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) (2011) The Cameron-Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity,

Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

McEnhill, L. (2015) Unity and distinctiveness in the UK coalition government: Lessons for

junior partners, The Political Quarterly, online first.

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Books.

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Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, vol 49, no 4, 486-509.

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About the author

Alex Marsh is Professor of Public Policy at the University of Bristol. He has been Head of the

School for Policy Studies since 2007. Alexs research and writing has encompassed a wide

range of topics in the fields of housing studies, public policy and regulation. He is currently

on the Advisory Board for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Housing and Poverty Programme

and for What Works Scotland.

Between 2005 and 2009 Alex has been managing editor of Housing Studies, the leading

international academic journal in the field. He continues as a member of the journals

Management Board. He is a trustee of the Housing Studies Charitable Trust.

Alex worked part-time as a Visiting Academic Consultant to the Public Law team at the Law

Commission between 2006 and 2010. His work with the Commission addressed compliance

issues in the private rented sector and systems of redress against public bodies.

Between 2004 and 2012 Alex was a trustee of Brunelcare, a Bristol-based charity providing

housing, care and support for older people. For six years he chaired Brunelcare's Audit and

Scrutiny Committee. In October 2013 he joined the board of Curo Group as a Non-Executive

Director.

All views expressed here are personal. They should not be attributed to any of the

organisations with which Alex is associated.

www.alex-marsh.net

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