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Lecture 1
Financial Market Frictions and Real Activity:
Basic Concepts
Mark Gertler NYU
June 2009
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First Some Background Motivation.....
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Old Macro
Analyzes pre versus post 1984:Q4.
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New Macro
Analyzes pre versus post August 2007
Post August 2007:
• End of the Great Moderation
• Downturn Precipitated by Disruption of Financial Intermediation
• Unconventional Monetary Policy
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04Real GDP growth
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20050
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
core inflation
federal funds rate
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Figure 1: Selected Corporate Bond Spreads
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0
200
400
600
800Basis points
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0
200
400
600
800Basis points
Avg. Senior UnsecuredMedium-Risk Long-MaturityBaa
Quarterly Q4.NBERPeak
Note: The black line depicts the average credit spread for our sample of 5,269 senior unsecuredcorporate bonds; the red line depicts the average credit spread associated with very long maturitycorporate bonds issued by firms with low to medium probability of default (see text for details);and the blue line depicts the standard Baa credit spread, measured relative to the 10-year Treasuryyield. The shaded vertical bars denote NBER-dated recessions.
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008−100
−50
0
50
100
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
lending standards (left)
real GDP growth (right)
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New Macro (con’t)
However, existing quantitative models not adequate:
• Baseline models (Christiano/Eichenbaum/Evans, Smets/Wouters) have friction-less capital markets
• Models with financial frictions (Bernanke/Gertler/Gilchrist, Christiano/Motto/Rostagnoneed updating:
Basic financial accelerator("adverse feedback loop") mechanism relevant, but
— Frictions only on non-financial firms; intermediaries typically just a veil.
— Only consider conventional monetary policy:
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Objective
Illustrate the following key concepts:
1. Asymmetric information and/or costly contract enforcement as foundations offinancial market imperfections
2. Premium for external finance
3. Rationing vs. non-rationing equilibria
4. Balance sheets and the external finance premium
5. Idiosyncratic risk and the external finance premium.
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Objective (con’t)
Illustrate with two simple models:
1. Costly State Verification Model (CSV) (Townsend, 1979)
2. Costly Enforcement Model
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Basic Environment
• Two Periods: 0 and 1.
• Risk Neutral Entrepreneur:
Has project that requires funding in 0 and pays off in 1.
• Competive Risk Neutral Lender:
Has opportunity cost of funds R.
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Basic Environment (con’t)
Project Finance:
QK = N +B
K ≡ Capital Input
N ≡ Entrepreneurs’s Net Worth (Equity Finance)
B ≡ Debt Finance
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Basic Environment (con’t)
Period 1 Payoff
eωRk ·QK
Rk ≡ Average Gross Return on Capital
eω ≡ Idiosyncratic Shock
Entrepreneur takes eωRk as given, but K is a choice variable.
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Basic Environment (con’t)
Idiosyncratic Shock Distribution:
E{eω} = 1eω [ω, ω]
H(ω) = prob(eω ≤ ω)
h(ω) =dH
dω
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Perfect Information and Perfect Contract Enforcement
• Given E eωRk = Rk, entrepreneurs operates if
Rk ≥ R
where R is the opportunity cost.
• If Rk > R, entrepreneur’s demand for funds is infinite
Competitive market forces ⇒ Rk = R in equilibrium.
• Miller-Modigliani theorem applies:Real Investment Decision is independent of financial structure
Financial Structure is indeterminate
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Private Information and Limited Liability
• Private Information:
Only entrepreneurs can costlessly observe returns.
Lenders must pay a cost equal to a fixed fraction μ of the realized return ωRkK.
Interpretable as a bankruptcy cost.
• Limited Liability:
Entrepreneurs minimum payoff bounded at zero.
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Private Information and Limited Liability (con’t)
Implications:
• Entrepreneur has incentive to misreport returns.
• Financial structure matters to real investment decisions, due to expected bank-ruptcy costs.
• Financial structure determinate: Designed to reduce expected bankruptcy costs.
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Entrepreneur’s Optimization Problem:
1. Investment Decision (choice of K)
2. Financial contract: payment schedule baced on ω and decision to monitor
3. Constraint: Lender must receive opportunity cost in expectation.
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Optimal Contract
1. Induce Truth-Telling (revelation principle)
2. Minimize Expected Monitoring Costs
⇒
• For any choice of Optimal Contract is Standard Debt: i.e, Debt with bankruptcy
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
Let D ≡face value of debt and ω∗ ≡ the cutoff value of ω
D = ω∗RkQK
The contract then works as follows:
• If ω ≥ ω∗:
Lender’s payoff is D = ω∗RkQK; Borrower’s payoff is (ω − ω∗)RkQK
• If ω < ω∗,
The borrower announces default and then the lender monitors.
Lender’s payoff is (1− φ)ωRkK; Borrower’s payoff is 0.
• — Observe that the deadweight bankruptcy cost is φωRkQK.
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
Intuition for Optimal Contract
1. There is no incentive for the entrepreneur to lie:
In non-default states the payment to lenders is fixed
In default states there is monitoring.
2. Expected bankruptcy costs are minimized.
By giving the lender everything in the default state, the non-default payment D isminimized.
Given D = ω∗RkK, the bankruptcy probability H(ω∗) is
H(ω∗) = H(D
RkQK)
which is increasing in D.
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
Given the form of the optimal contract:
Lender’s expected gross payment:Z ω
ω∗ω∗RkQKdH +
Z ω∗
ωωRkQKdH ≡ Γ(ω∗)RkQK
with
Γ(ω∗) =Z ω
ω∗ω∗dH +
Z ω∗
ωωdH
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
Γ(ω∗) is increasing and concave:
Γ0(ω∗) = [1−H(ω∗)] > 0
Γ00(ω∗) = −h(ω∗) < 0
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
Lender’s expected net payment
Z ω
ω∗ω∗RkQKdH +
Z ω∗
ω(1− μ)ωRkQKdH = [Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]RkQK
with
G(ω∗) =Z ω∗
ωωdH
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Optimal Contract (con’t)
• G(ω∗) is increasing and convex, assuming ω∗h(ω∗) is increasing
G0(ω∗) = ω∗h(ω∗) > 0
•
G00(ω∗) > 0
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Entrepreneur’s Decision Problem
• Objective:
maxω∗,K
,max{[1− Γ(ω∗)]RkQK −RN, 0}
• subject to
[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]RkQK = R(QK −N)
with
• λ ≡ constraint multiplier = shadow value of N
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Entrepreneur’s Decision Problem
Combining equations:
maxω∗,K
,max{[Rk −R− μG(ω∗)Rk]QK, 0}
• where μG(ω∗)Rk ≡ expected default costs ≡ related to premium for externalfinance
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Entrepreneur’s Decision Problem (con’t)
F.O.N.C:
• ω∗
λ = 1 +μG
0(ω∗)
Γ0(ω∗)− μG
0(ω∗)
• K
Rk −λ
{[1− Γ(ω∗)] + λ[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]}R = 0
• λ
[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]Rk = R(1− N
K)
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Entrepreneur’s Decision Problem (con’t)
Three observations:
1. λ is increaing in ω∗ (from top eq.)
2. ω∗ increasing in Rk/R.(from middle equation)
3. λ{[1−Γ(ω∗)]+λ[Γ(ω∗)−μG(ω∗)]} > 1 is the premium for external finance.
(Note that the premium is increasing in ω∗).
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Non-Rationing vs. Rationing Solution
• Lender’s voluntary participation constraint:
[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]Rk = R(1− N
QK)
• The expected return on debt per unit capital (the left side)depends on ω∗
Γ0(ω∗)− μG0(ω∗) = (1−H(ω∗))− μω∗h(ω∗)
which in genereal has an ambiguous sign.
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Non-Rationing vs. Rationing Solution (con’t)
• Non-Rationing Solution: Lender’s expected return increasing in ω∗, i.e.,
Γ0(ω∗)− μG0(ω∗) > 0
• Rationing Solution: Just the opposite
Γ0(ω∗)− μG0(ω∗) ≤ 0
Under reasonable parametrizations, the non-rationing solution holds.
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Rationing Equilibrium
The following two equations determine ω∗ and QK :
• Lender’s voluntary participation constraint:
[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]Rk = R(1− N
QK)
• Maximum feasible ω∗
Γ0(ω∗)− μG0(ω∗)] = 0
• Observe that QK varies proportionately with N and with Rk/R.
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Non-Rationing Equilibrium
The following two equations determine ω∗ and QK :
• Lender’s voluntary participation constraint:
[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]Rk = R(1− N
QK)
• Optimal Choice of Captial
Rk − χ(ω∗)R = 0
with
χ(ω∗) =λ(ω∗)
{[1− Γ(ω∗)] + λ(ω∗)[Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]}> 1; χ0(ω∗) > 0
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Non-Rationing Equilibrium (con’t)
Inverting the lender’s voluntary participation constraint:
QK
N=
1
1− [Γ(ω∗)− μG(ω∗)]Rk/R
ω∗ is increasing in Rk/R from FONCs for ω∗ and K.⇒QK
N= φ(
Rk
R)
• with
φ0(Rk
R) > 0
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The Demand for Capital
• Capital demand
QK = φ(Rk
R)N
where φ(RkR ) is the optimal leverage ratio.
• φ(RkR ) does not depend on firm specific factors ⇒
Can aggregate capital demand across entrepreneurs:
QK = φ(Rk
R)N
where N is aggregate net worth and K is aggregate capital demand.
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Figure 2: Leverage Ratio
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 20071.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0Ratio
Quarterly Q4NBERPeak
Note: The black line depicts the time-series of the cross-sectional averages of the leverage ratiofor U.S. nonfinancial corporations. Leverage is defined as the ratio of the market-value of the firm’stotal assets (V ) to the market-value of the firm’s common equity (E), where the market-value ofthe firm’s total assets is calculated using the Merton-DD model (see text for details). The shadedvertical bars denote NBER-dated recessions.
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Balance Sheet Strength and the Spread
• Inverting yieldsRk
R= χ(
QK
N)
with
χ0(QK
N) > 0
where χ is the gross spread.
Thus, in the market equilibrium, the spread is inversely related to aggregate balancesheet strength.
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Increasing Idiosyncratic Risk
• Let ξ be an index of the spread of the distribution of ω.
Then consider a mean-preserving increasing in the spread.
• Under reasonable parametrizations:∂H(ω∗)
∂ξ> 0
i.e. everyting else equal, a mean-preserving spread increases the default probabilityH(ω∗)
∂h(ω∗)∂
> 0
i.e., the density at the default cutoff also goes up.
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Increasing Idiosyncratic Risk (con’t)
• Lender’s voluntary participation constraint:
[Γ(ω∗, ξ)− μG(ω∗, ξ)]Rk = R(1− N
QK)
with ∂Γ(ω∗,ξ)∂ξ < 0 and ∂G(ω∗,ξ)
∂ξ > 0.
• Optimal Choice of Captial
Rk − χ(ω∗, ξ)R = 0
with ∂Γ(ω∗,ξ)∂ξ > 0.
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Increasing Idiosyncratic Risk (con’t)
QK
N= φ(
Rk
R, ξ)
with
∂φ(RkR , ξ)
∂ξ< 0
• Increasing idiosyncratic risks reduces capital demand by "tightening margins."
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Costly Enforcement Model
• Same basic setup as in CSV model, except the financial market friction is moti-vated by costs of enforcing contracts as opposed to private information: ⇒
• Borrower may decide to renege on debt.
• Lender can only recover the fraction (1− λ) of the gross returnRkQK,
with (1− λ)Rk < R
• Borrower is able to keep the rest,: λRkQK
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Costly Enforcement Model (con’t)
• Value of the project V
V = RkQK −R(QK −N)
= (Rk −R)QK +RN
• Incentive Constraint:
V ≥ λRkQK
• Binding Incentive Constraint:
(Rk −R)QK +RN = λRkQK
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Costly Enforcement Model (con’t)
QK = [1
1− (1− λ)Rk/R]N
⇒
QK = φ(Rk/R)N
with ∂φ(Rk/R)∂Rk/R
> 0
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Costly Enforcement Model (con’t)
• Advantages
Less complicated but similar predictions to CSV model:
1. QK depends positively on N
2. φ(Rk/R) is increasing in Rk/R.
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Costly Enforcement Model (con’t)
Disadvantages
• 1. No default
2. No credit spreads (as debt is riskless)
3. Can’t analyze shifts in idiosyncratic risk.
4. Less obvious how to calibrate or estimate parameters.
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Moving to General Equilbrium
Need to endogenize:
1. The external finance premium Rk/R
2. Net Worth N.
3. The price of capital Q
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Moving to General Equilbrium (con’t)
• Financial Accelerator =⇒
• — Procyclical Movements in N induce countercyclical movements in Rk/R
• — Unexpected movements in Q induce movements in N , leading to feedbackbetween the real and financial sectors.
• FInancial Crisis— Sharp drop in N
— Tightening net worth constraint (i.e., capital demand shrinks for a given N.)
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