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(Ferdinand Marcos – Historical/Contemporary Context)

Source: U.S. State Department - http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm#history

The history of the Philippines can be divided into four distinct phases: the pre-Spanish period (before1521); the Spanish period (1521-1898); the American period (1898-1946); and the post-independence

period (1946-present).

Pre-Spanish Period

The first people in the Philippines, the Negritos, are believed to have come to the islands 30,000 yearsago from Borneo and Sumatra, making their way across then-existing land bridges. According to popular belief, Malays subsequently came from the south in successive waves, the earliest by land bridges and later in boats by sea. In contrast, modern archeological, linguistic, and genetic evidencestrongly suggests that those successive waves of migrants came from Taiwan as the Austronesian sub-group, Malayo-Polynesians. From Taiwan, the Austronesians first spread southward across thePhilippines, then on to Indonesia, Malaysia, and as far away as Polynesia and Madagascar. Themigrants settled in scattered communities, named barangays after the large outrigger boats in whichthey arrived, and ruled by chieftains known often as datus. Mainland Chinese merchants and tradersarrived and settled in the ninth century, sometimes traveling on the ships of Arab traders, who

introduced Islam in the south and extended some influence even into Luzon. The Malayo-Polynesians,however, remained the dominant group until the Spanish arrived in the 16th century.

Spanish Period Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan reached the Philippines and claimed the archipelago for Spain in 1521, but was killed shortly after arriving when he intervened in a dispute between rivaltribes. Christianity was established in the Philippines only after the arrival of the succeeding Spanishexpeditionary forces (the first led by Legazpi in the early 16th century) and the Spanish Jesuits, and inthe 17th and 18th centuries by the conquistadores.

Until Mexico proclaimed independence from Spain in 1810, the islands were under the administrativecontrol of Spanish North America, and there was significant migration between North America andthe Philippines. This period was the era of conversion to Roman Catholicism. A Spanish colonialsocial system was developed with a local government centered in Manila and with considerableclerical influence. Spanish influence was strongest in Luzon and the central Philippines but less so inMindanao, save for certain coastal cities.

The long period of Spanish rule was marked by numerous uprisings. Towards the latter half of the19th century, European-educated Filipinos or ilustrados (such as the Chinese Filipino national heroJose Rizal) began to criticize the excesses of Spanish rule and instilled a new sense of nationalidentity. This movement gave inspiration to the final revolt against Spain that began in 1896 under theleadership of Emilio Aguinaldo (another Chinese Filipino) and continued until the Americans defeatedthe Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, during the Spanish-American War. Aguinaldodeclared independence from Spain on June 12, 1898.

American Period

Following Admiral George Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, the U.S. occupied the

Philippines. Spain ceded the islands to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Paris(December 10, 1898) that ended the Spanish-American war.

A war of resistance against U.S. rule, led by revolutionary General Aguinaldo, broke out in 1899.During this conflict fighting and disease claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Filipinos andthousands of Americans. Filipinos and an increasing number of American historians refer to thesehostilities as the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), and in 1999, the U.S. Library of Congressreclassified its references to use this term. In 1901, Aguinaldo was captured and swore allegiance tothe United States, and resistance gradually died out until the conflict ended with a Peace Proclamation

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on July 4, 1902. Armed resistance continued sporadically until 1913, however, especially among theMuslims in Mindanao and Sulu.

U.S. administration of the Philippines was always declared to be temporary and aimed to developinstitutions that would permit and encourage the eventual establishment of a free and democraticgovernment. Therefore, U.S. officials concentrated on the creation of such practical supports for democratic government as public education, public infrastructure, and a sound legal system. Thelegacy of the “Thomasites”--American teachers who came to the Philippines starting in 1901 andcreated the tradition of a strong public education system--continues to resonate today.

The first legislative assembly was elected in 1907, and a bicameral legislature, largely under Filipinocontrol, was established. A civil service was formed and was gradually taken over by the Filipinos,who had effectively gained control by the end of World War I. The Catholic Church wasdisestablished, and a considerable amount of church land was purchased and redistributed.

In 1935, under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Philippines became a self-governingcommonwealth. Manuel Quezon was elected president of the new government, which was designed to prepare the country for independence after a 10-year transition period. Japan attacked, however, andin May 1942, Corregidor, the last American/Filipino stronghold, fell. U.S. forces in the Philippinessurrendered to the Japanese, placing the islands under Japanese control. During the occupation,

thousands of Filipinos fought a running guerrilla campaign against Japanese forces.

The full-scale war to regain the Philippines began when General Douglas MacArthur landed on Leyteon October 20, 1944. Filipinos and Americans fought together until the Japanese surrendered inSeptember 1945. Much of Manila was destroyed during the final months of the fighting. In total, anestimated one million Filipinos lost their lives in the war.

Due to the Japanese occupation, the guerrilla warfare that followed, and the battles leading toliberation, the country suffered great damage and a complete organizational breakdown. Despite theshaken state of the country, the United States and the Philippines decided to move forward with plansfor independence. On July 4, 1946, the Philippine Islands became the independent Republic of thePhilippines, in accordance with the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. In 1962, the officialPhilippine Independence Day was changed from July 4 to June 12, commemorating the date

independence from Spain was declared by Emilio Aguinaldo in 1898.

Post-Independence Period

The early years of independence were dominated by U.S.-assisted postwar reconstruction. Thecommunist-inspired Huk Rebellion (1945-53) complicated recovery efforts before its successfulsuppression under the leadership of President Ramon Magsaysay. The succeeding administrations of Presidents Carlos P. Garcia (1957-61) and Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) sought to expandPhilippine ties to its Asian neighbors, implement domestic reform programs, and develop anddiversify the economy.

In 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-86) declared martial law, citing growing lawlessnessand open rebellion by the communist rebels as his justification. Marcos governed from 1973 untilmid-1981 in accordance with the transitory provisions of a new constitution that replaced the

commonwealth constitution of 1935. He suppressed democratic institutions and restricted civilliberties during the martial law period, ruling largely by decree and popular referenda. Thegovernment began a process of political normalization during 1978-81, culminating in the reelectionof President Marcos to a 6-year term that would have ended in 1987. The Marcos government'srespect for human rights remained low despite the end of martial law on January 17, 1981. Hisgovernment retained its wide arrest and detention powers, and corruption and cronyism contributed toa serious decline in economic growth and development.

The assassination of opposition leader Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino upon his return to the Philippines in1983 after a long period of exile coalesced popular dissatisfaction with Marcos and set in motion a

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succession of events that culminated in a snap presidential election in February 1986. The oppositionunited under Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino, and Salvador Laurel, head of the United NationalistDemocratic Organization (UNIDO). The election was marred by widespread electoral fraud on the part of Marcos and his supporters. International observers, including a U.S. delegation led by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), denounced the official results. Marcos was forced to flee the Philippinesin the face of a peaceful civilian-military uprising that ousted him and installed Corazon Aquino as president on February 25, 1986.

Under Aquino's presidency, progress was made in revitalizing democratic institutions and civilliberties. However, the administration was also viewed by many as weak and fractious, and a return tofull political stability and economic development was hampered by several attempted coups staged bydisaffected members of the Philippine military.

Fidel Ramos was elected president in 1992. Early in his administration, Ramos declared "nationalreconciliation" his highest priority. He legalized the Communist Party and created the NationalUnification Commission (NUC) to lay the groundwork for talks with communist insurgents, Muslimseparatists, and military rebels. In June 1994, President Ramos signed into law a general conditionalamnesty covering all rebel groups, as well as Philippine military and police personnel accused of crimes committed while fighting the insurgents. In October 1995, the government signed anagreement bringing the military insurgency to an end. A peace agreement with one major Muslim

insurgent group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was signed in 1996, using the existingAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as a vehicle for self-government.

Popular movie actor Joseph Ejercito Estrada's election as president in May 1998 marked thePhilippines' third democratic succession since the ouster of Marcos. Estrada was elected withoverwhelming mass support on a platform promising poverty alleviation and an anti-crimecrackdown. During his first 2 years in office, President Estrada was plagued with allegations of corruption, resulting in impeachment proceedings. Estrada vacated his office in 2001. In 2007, ananti-graft court convicted Estrada of plunder charges. He received a presidential pardon soon after theconviction.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, elected vice president in 1998, assumed the presidency in January 2001after widespread demonstrations that followed the breakdown of Estrada's impeachment trial. The

Philippine Supreme Court subsequently endorsed unanimously the constitutionality of the transfer of power. National and local elections took place in May 2004. Under the constitution, Arroyo waseligible for another term as president for a full 6 years, and she won a hard-fought campaign againsther primary challenger, movie actor Fernando Poe, Jr., in elections held May 10, 2004. Noli De Castrowas elected vice president.

Impeachment charges were brought against Arroyo in June 2005 for allegedly tampering with theresults of the 2004 elections, but Congress rejected the charges in September 2005. Similar chargeswere discussed and dismissed by Congress in later years.

In 2010 elections, Liberal Party Senator Benigno S. Aquino III (son of Ninoy and Corazon Aquino)ran for and won the presidency, campaigning against corruption and on a platform including jobcreation, provision of health care and education, and other domestic issues. Makati City Mayor

Jejomar Binay, a member of the PDP-Laban party, won the vice presidency. The election was the firstin the Philippines to feature nationwide use of automated ballot-scanners, and, despite uncertaintyabout the technical reliability of the machines in the run-up to the election, most opinion-shaperslauded the election process as among the best in the Philippines’ history, quickly producing resultsthat were widely accepted as legitimate.

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(Ferdinand Marcos – Personal History)

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica - http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364302/Ferdinand-

E-Marcos

Ferdinand E. Marcos, in full Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (born Sept. 11, 1917, Sarrat, Phil.—died Sept.

28, 1989, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.), Philippine lawyer and politician who, as head of state from 1966 to1986, established an authoritarian regime in the Philippines that came under criticism for corruption and for its suppression of democratic processes.

Marcos attended school in Manila and studied law in the late 1930s at the University of the Philippines,near that city. Tried for the assassination in 1933 of a political opponent of his politician father, Marcoswas found guilty in November 1939. But he argued his case on appeal to the Philippine Supreme Court andwon acquittal a year later. He became a trial lawyer in Manila. During World War II he was an officer withthe Philippine armed forces. Marcos’ later claims of having been a leader in the Filipino guerrilla resistancemovement were a central factor in his political success, but U.S. government archives revealed that heactually played little or no part in anti-Japanese activities during 1942–45.

From 1946 to 1947 Marcos was a technical assistant to Manuel Roxas, the first president of the

independent Philippine republic. He was a member of the House of Representatives (1949–59) and of theSenate (1959–65), serving as Senate president (1963–65). In 1965 Marcos, who was a prominent member of the Liberal Party founded by Roxas, broke with it after failing to get his party’s nomination for president. He then ran as the Nationalist Party candidate for president against the Liberal president,Diosdado Macapagal. The campaign was expensive and bitter. Marcos won and was inaugurated as president on Dec. 30, 1965. In 1969 he was reelected, the first Philippine president to serve a second term.During his first term he had made progress in agriculture, industry, and education. Yet his administrationwas troubled by increasing student demonstrations and violent urban-guerrilla activities.

On Sept. 21, 1972, Marcos imposed martial law. Holding that communist and subversive forces precipitated the crisis, he acted swiftly; opposition politicians were jailed, and the armed forces became anarm of the regime. Opposed by political leaders—notably Benigno Aquino, Jr., who was jailed and held indetention for almost eight years—Marcos was also criticized by church leaders and others. In the provinces

Maoist communists ( New People’s Army) and Muslim separatists undertook guerrilla activities intended to bring down the central government. Under martial law the president assumed extraordinary powers,including the ability to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos announced the end of martial law inJanuary 1981 but continued to rule in an authoritarian fashion under various constitutional formats. He wonelection to the newly created post of president against token opposition in June 1981.

Marcos’ wife from 1954 was Imelda Romuáldez Marcos, a former beauty queen. Imelda became a powerful figure after the institution of martial law in 1972. She was often criticized for her appointments of relatives to lucrative governmental and industrial positions while she held the posts of governor of Metropolitan Manila (1975–86) and minister of human settlements and ecology (1979–86).

Marcos’ later years in power were marred by rampant government corruption, economic stagnation, thesteady widening of economic inequalities between the rich and the poor, and the steady growth of a

communist guerrilla insurgency active in the rural areas of the Philippines’ innumerable islands.

By 1983 Marcos’ health was beginning to fail, and opposition to his rule was growing. Hoping to presentan alternative to both Marcos and the increasingly powerful New People’s Army, Benigno Aquino, Jr.,returned to Manila on Aug. 21, 1983, only to be shot dead as he stepped off the plane. The assassinationwas seen as the work of the government and touched off massive antigovernment protests. An independentcommission appointed by Marcos concluded in 1984 that high military officers were responsible for Aquino’s assassination. To reassert his mandate, Marcos called for presidential elections to be held in 1986.But a formidable political opponent soon emerged in Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, who became the

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http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/411949/New-Peoples-Army-NPA

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http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178491/economic-stagnation


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presidential candidate of the opposition. It was widely asserted that Marcos managed to defeat Aquino andretain the presidency in the election of Feb. 7, 1986, only through massive voting fraud on the part of hissupporters. Deeply discredited at home and abroad by his dubious electoral victory, Marcos held fast to his presidency as the Philippine military split between supporters of his and of Aquino’s legitimate right to the presidency. A tense standoff that ensued between the two sides ended only when Marcos fled the countryon Feb. 25, 1986, at U.S. urging, and went into exile in Hawaii.

Evidence emerged that during his years in power, Marcos, his family, and his close associates had lootedthe Philippines’ economy of billions of dollars through embezzlements and other corrupt practices. Marcosand his wife were subsequently indicted by the U.S. government on racketeering charges but in 1990 (after Marcos’ death) Imelda was acquitted of all charges by a federal court. She was allowed to return to thePhilippines in 1991; in 1993 a Philippine court found her guilty of corruption.

The annual salary of Ferdinand Marcos as president of the Philippines was 5,700 dollars. After 20 years inoffice, it was estimated that he had built a personal fortune in excess of 5 billion dollars. When he and his

wife, Imelda, were forced to flee the country in 1986, the economy of the Philippines was in ruins, the

treasury had been looted, and money from foreign aid had been siphoned off by Marcos and his friends.

(Ferdinand Marcos – Immediate Context, Use of Power)

Source: Time Magazine - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,960859-1,00.html

"Senator, what do you think? Should I step down?"

It was the second time that Paul Laxalt, the Nevada Republican and personal friend of Ronald Reagan's,had spoken that day with Ferdinand Marcos, the beleaguered President of the Philippines. At 2 o'clock (EST) last Monday afternoon, Marcos telephoned Laxalt, who had visited Manila in October as a specialemissary, with an urgent question: Was it true, as U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth had told him, thatPresident Reagan was calling for a "peaceful transition to a new government" in the Philippines? While thetwo men talked, Laxalt said later, it became apparent that Marcos was "hanging on, looking for a life preserver. He was a desperate man clutching at straws." He asked whether the reference to a "peacefultransition" meant he should stay on until 1987, when his current term was originally supposed to end, andhe wondered whether some sort of power-sharing arrangement with the Philippine opposition could beworked out.

Marcos spoke of his fear that his palace was about to be attacked, but seemed determined to stay on asPresident. At Marcos' request, Laxalt then went to the White House, where he discussed the conversationwith Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz. The President repeated his desire for a peaceful,negotiated settlement in the Philippines and said once more that Marcos would be welcome if he decided toseek sanctuary in the U.S. But Reagan said he thought the idea of power sharing was impractical and that itwould be undignified for Marcos to stay on as a "consultant."

At 4:15 p.m. Laxalt called Marcos, who immediately asked whether Reagan wanted him to step down.Laxalt said the President was not in a position to make that kind of demand. Then Marcos put the questiondirectly to Laxalt: What should he do? Replied the Senator: "Mr. President, I'm not bound by diplomaticrestraint. I'm talking only for myself. I think you should cut and cut cleanly. The time has come." Therewas a long pause that to Laxalt seemed interminable. Finally he asked, "Mr. President, are you still there?"Marcos replied, in a subdued voice, "Yes, I'm still here. I am so very, very disappointed."

In Manila it was after 5 o'clock in the morning of the longest day of Ferdinand Marcos' life. Before it wasover, he would attend his final inauguration ceremony, a foolish charade carried out in the sanctuary of hisMalacanang Palace. That evening, a ruler no more, he would flee with his family and retainers aboard four

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American helicopters to Clark Air Base on the first leg of a flight that would take him to Guam, Hawaii andexile.

That same night, to mark the end of his increasingly authoritarian 20-year rule, millions of his countrymenwould stage one of the biggest celebrations in the Philippines since its deliverance from the Japanese in1945 and its independence from the U.S. in 1946. At the Malacanang Palace, giddy with excitement,

hundreds of Filipinos would scale fences and storm their way through locked doors in order to glimpse--and in some cases to loot--the ornate Spanish-style palace that had served as Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos'seat of almost absolute power.

If there was something inexplicable about the mass phenomenon that rescued the island nation from afailing dictatorship, enabling thousands of unarmed civilians to protect one faction of the armed forcesfrom the other, there was no doubt when the process began. It was Aug. 21, 1983, on the tarmac at Manilainternational airport. On that day, Opposition Politician Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino Jr., 50, returning fromthree years of self-imposed exile in the U.S., was slain by a single bullet as he stepped off a jetliner into acrowd of soldiers and well-wishers. Though Marcos tried to put the blame on Communist agitators, oneFilipino civilian and 25 members of the military, including General Fabian Ver, the armed forces Chief of Staff and Marcos stalwart, were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit murder. The defendants wereacquitted in December after a yearlong trial, but few Filipinos doubted their guilt.

The Aquino murder shocked and angered the country, sparking popular demonstrations and intensifying thedisaffection with Marcos. It infuriated thousands of professional military men, who bitterly resented the politicization that the armed forces were undergoing and the hatred that this process was engendering. Of the assassination, Colonel Gregorio Honosan says today, "From a military viewpoint, it is technicallyimpossible to get inside a cordon of 2,000 men, so this reinforced our belief that nobody in governmentcould be safe."

The assassination produced a sharp increase in the size and intensity of Communist guerrilla activity by themilitary organization called the New People's Army. Though the insurgency is concentrated on Mindanaoand some other southern islands, it spread after the Aquino assassination to 60 of the country's 74 provinces. In addition, the killing of Aquino created a nationwide crisis of confidence that caused thealready stagnant economy to spiral downward, even as most other Southeast Asian nations were

prospering. After the assassination, says an American official, "all these concerns took a quantum leap."

Two of the most important elements of Philippine society, the church and the military, began quicklyturning against Marcos. The Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, is a powerful figure in a countrynominally 85% Roman Catholic, and his opposition to Marcos was clear. He increasingly and openlyencouraged opposition political figures.

The revolt in the armed forces began to take shape as long ago as 1977, when a power struggle within theMarcos government eroded the influence of the President's longtime political ally Defense Minister JuanPonce Enrile. "It began as a self-defense action," recalls Navy Captain Rex Robles, a spokesman for theReform the Armed Forces Movement, which Enrile now confirms he clandestinely helped establish.Realizing that he was being pushed aside in a power struggle with General Ver, Enrile, a Harvard-trainedlawyer, began to work secretly to protect himself and lay the groundwork for the inevitable post-Marcos

period.

Late last fall events began to move rapidly. In November, Marcos declared that he would hold a special presidential election to convince the Reagan Administration that he still enjoyed popular support. A monthlater, immediately following the acquittal of Ver, Corazon Aquino announced that she would challengeMarcos for the presidency. Cardinal Sin then helped persuade former Senator Salvador Laurel to join theAquino ticket. In the meantime Enrile had been building his reform-movement, a highly visible band of about 100 well-trained soldiers whose aim was not to topple Marcos but to pressure him to reorganize themilitary. Throughout the election campaign, while Enrile publicly supported Marcos, his reformers

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conducted a crusade for honest voting that angered the President and the Ver faction in the military. Thereformers in turn were enraged by the strong-arm methods used by the pro-Marcos forces in the votecounting, and even more by the assassination of Evelio Javier, a leading opposition figure. Nonethelessthey remained inactive because they wanted to appear impartial. The military men had already establishedlinks with Corazon Aquino, and before the campaign had helped train her security detail.

Once the voting was over, the reformers prepared to take a more active part in the efforts to topple Marcos.By this time they had won the support of some of the Marcos family's closest security forces. Says onereformist: "I don't think the President thought that so many of his praetorian guards would turn against him.He thought money could buy loyalty. He underestimated the basic decency of Filipinos." The group tested palace security by smuggling cars filled with empty boxes into the palace grounds. Since nobody botheredto stop them, they realized they would be able to bring in explosives if they should choose to do so. Twoweeks ago the reformers learned that they were in imminent danger. As the first step in a byzantinecrackdown, Marcos arrested a group of soldiers. Though these troops were not members of the reformmovement, the reformers theorized that the men would be used to incriminate them. The rebels suspectedthat the threatened crackdown was a maneuver by Ver and his supporters to reinforce their links withMarcos. At the same time, however, there were reports that some sort of coup might actually be in themaking.

Immediately the reformers decided to accelerate their plans. They reached Enrile, who was sitting in thecoffeehouse in the Atrium building in Makati, and informed him of what was happening. On Saturday, Feb.22, Enrile resigned from the government and announced that he was joining the opposition forces. Some of Enrile's reformist colleagues tried to convince him that such a move would merely forewarn Marcos of thegroup's intentions, but he insisted, "I just cannot do this to the President otherwise."

The decision made, he sought Lieut. General Fidel Ramos' help. "I called Eddie. I had never discussedanything with him over the years, except in terms of the reform movement's general lack of aggressiveintentions and its interest in institutional change. I told him, 'My boys are in this predicament, and I willhave to be with them. I would like to find out whether you will join us or not.' General Ramos said, 'I amwith you all the way.' "

At the moment of showdown, Cardinal Sin again played a crucial role. He publicly praised Enrile and

Ramos, and called on the Philippine people to take to the streets in peaceful support of them. Radio Veritas,the Catholic station, became the unofficial broadcaster of the rebellion, reporting on military units that had joined the opposition and giving instructions to crowds.

In the end the ailing Marcos, who is reported to be suffering from a form of systemic lupus erythematosus,a disease in which human antibodies attack the body's tissue, especially the kidneys, was woefullyuninformed as to what the reformers were really up to and how much support they had gained. Says Enrile:"Evidently the President was a captive of a group in the military. That was the sad thing about it."

Reagan Administration policy during the final hours of the Marcos reign was set during a meeting lastSunday morning in the Bethesda, Md., home of Secretary of State George Shultz, at which the President'sspecial envoy, Philip Habib, who had returned from Manila only hours before, presented a report on histrip. In attendance were Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense; Admiral William Crowe Jr.,

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Gates, deputy director for intelligence of the CentralIntelligence Agency; and John Poindexter, the National Security Adviser. Also present were three officialswho had been preoccupied with the Philippine crisis for months: Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs;and Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

The group agreed on four principles, which were subsequently presented to President Reagan: Marcos'ability to govern with the consent of his people had ended; any effort by him to crush the reform movementwould only worsen the situation; it was of great importance to the U.S. that force not be used; and it would

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be damaging to U.S. standing in the world if Marcos were treated like the Shah of Iran, who was admittedto the U.S. for medical treatment but was not permitted by the Carter Administration to remain. As it turnedout, Marcos was less worried about the fate of the Shah than about what happened to Ngo Dinh Diem, theSouth Vietnamese President who was assassinated during a 1963 coup. Says one senior American official:"He wanted to make sure he did not leave with a bullet."

President Reagan, who had once solidly supported Marcos, quickly accepted the four-point policy.Reagan's views had already been shifting during the previous three weeks. Indeed, in response to Marcos'deteriorating situation, he had moved rapidly from his dismaying remark after the election that there had probably been voting fraud on both sides to a White House statement condemning the election as fatallyflawed by fraud, most of it on the part of the Marcos forces.

At a Sunday-afternoon meeting of the National Security Council, Special Envoy Habib reported flatly,"The Marcos era has ended." Shultz summarized the views of the participants by saying that "not a personhere" believed Marcos could remain in power, adding, "He's had it." President Reagan agreed but remainedconcerned about the fate of Marcos. Said Reagan: "We'll treat this man in retirement with dignity. He is notto wander."

By then the Administration was emphasizing as strongly as possible that Marcos should avoid a military

showdown. On Saturday, Reagan sent the Philippine leader an appeal not to use force to remain in power. Next day he dispatched a second message, advising Marcos that he as well as his family and closeassociates was welcome to live in the U.S. White House Spokesman Larry Speakes announced thatAmerican military aid to the Philippines would be cut off if troops loyal to Marcos used the army againstthe Philippine reform movement forces led by Enrile and Ramos. On Sunday evening, Shultz and Under Secretary of State Armacost met at the State Department with Blas Ople, Marcos' Minister of Labor, whohad come to Washington to plead the Philippine President's case. According to Ople, the Americandiplomats gave him a blunt message: Marcos had lost control of his army, the troops under General Ver were ineffectual, and if Marcos did not step down, the country could be heading for civil war. A similar statement was sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Manila, Stephen Bosworth, who took it to Marcos.

It was early Monday morning before Ople finally managed to talk to Marcos by telephone. The PhilippinePresident was angry that while his palace was being threatened and his television station taken over, the

U.S. was telling him not to defend himself. He told Ople that Mrs. Marcos was there beside him and "shedoesn't want to leave." Later that day, at about the same time Marcos was calling Senator Laxalt, ImeldaMarcos telephoned Nancy Reagan. The message was the same: Mrs. Reagan urged the Marcoses to avoid bloodshed, expressed concern for their family, and assured Mrs. Marcos that they were welcome to come tothe U.S.

The Administration was worried about General Ver, who on Monday was still in a position to attempt alast-gasp military move. There were reports that he was about to send tanks to attack the reformers.Accordingly, the National Security Council sent a message to Ver advising him that it would not be in his"interest" to make a military move. Translation: if he called out troops, he would forfeit his chance of beingincluded in the Marcos rescue operation. The warning was heeded.

In the period following the Aquino assassination, American policymakers had become increasingly

concerned about the Philippines' rapid political and economic decline. One particular concern was thefuture status of the two large U.S. military installations in the Philippines, Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. The leases on those facilities will run out in 1991, but the U.S. hopes that they can berenegotiated. Following a 1984 policy review by the National Security Council, which concluded thatMarcos would "try to remain in power indefinitely," the Administration began to work for economic, political and military reform in the Philippines. Shultz laid down the overriding principle: the U.S. must beloyal to the institutions of democracy, not to Marcos.

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In October, Reagan sent Senator Laxalt to Manila to tell Marcos that changes had to be made. Said Laxaltlast week: "He was getting messages through State, but he just wasn't believing them." Laxalt told him thatthe Philippine army had to spend more time dealing with the Communist insurgents.

Pressure on Marcos was also building in the U.S. Congress. Senator Richard Lugar, Indiana Republicanand chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who headed an official American team of poll watchers

that observed the elections, concluded that there had been many instances of fraud, vote tampering,violence and intimidation by Marcos partisans. In a telephone conversation with Marcos just after thevoting, Laxalt observed that certain aspects of the elections had been "rather strange," such as reports thatMarcos had carried one province by a vote of 13,000 to 0. That was not a province, it was a precinct, saidMarcos, and "it was family." When Laxalt answered, "I doubt very much if I ran in my home district Iwould get all the votes of my family," Marcos, who knew that the Senator's parents were French Basqueimmigrants, replied, "Well, Filipinos are more clannish than you independent Basques."

Washington's fear of a bloodbath was not unfounded. Early Monday morning a crowd of Marcos supportersarmed with batons and tear gas moved toward Camp Crame, where the reformers were gathered. Over transistor radios, Marcos was ! heard vowing, "We'll wipe them out. It is obvious they are committing arebellion." And over Radio Veritas came Enrile's reply, "I am not going to surrender."

Tanks arrived. When helicopters from the 15th strike wing of the air force began circling overhead, itlooked as if the reformist rebellion was all over. If the choppers had fired into the Enrile-Ramosheadquarters, the reformers would have been helpless. But then the choppers landed, and out came airmenwaving white flags and giving the "L" sign for laban (fight), a symbol of the opposition. Suddenly thecrowd, realizing that the air force was now defecting, went wild.

Perhaps the most ominous moment came that same morning, shortly after Marcos announced on a televisednews conference that he was declaring a state of emergency. At that point his armed forces Chief of Staff,General Ver, whispered to Marcos in a voice that was audible to the whole nation, "Sir, we are ready toannihilate them at your orders . . . We are left with no option but to attack." Marcos did not respond.Whether he knew it or not, his failure to move swiftly against Enrile and Ramos, one of the more honorableacts of his tarnished presidency, had already cost him the office he was fighting so desperately to retain.

Instead he went on with his press conference, but at 8:47 he was interrupted in mid-sentence as thegovernment-run television station, Channel 4, suddenly went off the air. When it reappeared three hourslater, the newscaster jubilantly declared, "This is the first free broadcast of Channel 4 . . . The people havetaken over." Beside him was Colonel Mariano Santiago, who until last year had been the Marcos-appointedchairman of the country's Board of Transportation. To many Filipinos, the seizure of Channel 4 was one of the most remarkable events of an endlessly astonishing week.

Tuesday was the day of the twin inaugurals. Aquino had wanted a daylight ceremony because, as she saidin her address, "it is fitting and proper that, as the rights and liberties of our people were taken away atmidnight 14 years ago (when martial law was declared), the people should formally recover those rightsand liberties in the full light of day." An hour later Ferdinand Marcos stepped onto the balcony atMalacanang Palace before a crowd of 4,000 cheering supporters and took the oath of office. "Whatever wehave before us, we will overcome," he promised, while Imelda vowed to serve the people "all my life up to

my last breath." Though she was choked with emotion, few people outside the palace sensed that this wasto be the Marcoses' farewell. Then the Marcoses sang favorite songs, at one point offering a duet to thecheers of the invited guests. Conspicuously absent was Marcos' Vice President, Arturo Tolentino, who later said that he had not wanted to take the oath of office because he hoped to play an intermediary role between Marcos and the reformists.

An hour after the ceremony, Marcos telephoned Enrile and demanded that he "stop firing at the palace."Enrile said he had no troops there. Marcos asked him to call Ambassador Bosworth to find out if the U.S.could provide the Marcoses with security in flying out of the palace. Enrile promised to do so. Marcos had

9



previously raised the possibility of retiring to Ilocos Norte, his home province in the northern Philippines, but had been discouraged from doing so by his family and by the new government. At 9:05 p.m., four American helicopters picked up the President, Imelda and a contingent of relatives and aides, includingGeneral Ver, and flew them to the U.S. air base.

As the week ended, Reagan Administration policymakers breathed a great sigh of relief that their plans and

strategies, so painstakingly worked out over the past two years, had gone so well. Both Republicans andDemocrats praised the handling of the Philippine crisis. Officials counted themselves incredibly lucky. Noting that events had passed without appreciable bloodshed, a senior U.S. official in Washington ruefullyremarked that the Lord surely looks after "fools, children, the Philippines and the U.S.A."

After its initial concern about how the inexperienced Corazon Aquino would fare as President, theAdministration was relieved that she gave important jobs to Laurel, Enrile, Ramos and other centrists, andadopted so conciliatory a tone toward her former opponents. Already there were hints of trouble ahead over the Marcoses' relocation, whether they decided to settle in Hawaii, California, New York or elsewhere, andover the legal status of Marcos' properties abroad. Though Marcos' only known income was his presidentialsalary of $5,700 a year, the Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly estimated the value of his family'sworldwide holdings at perhaps $2 billion. New York's Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz observedmildly last week, "There is a strong presumption that he had a very good financial adviser ^ or acquired the

millions of dollars he has through presumptively improper means." Aboard the plane that carried Marcos toHawaii, federal authorities found $1.2 million in Philippine currency, and another planeload of Marcos' personal effects arrived at week's end. Solarz said that while he thought it was appropriate for Reagan tooffer Marcos sanctuary, the President had certainly not offered Marcos "immunity against civil proceedings brought by the government of the Philippines to recover a fortune stolen from the Philippines."

But for the moment the Administration was relieved to have passed the center of the storm. Even as he praised Marcos for his "difficult and courageous decision" to step down, Reagan congratulated Aquino onthe "democratic outcome" of the elections and promised to work closely with her government in rebuildingthe Philippine economy and armed forces.

(Ferdinand Marcos – Ideas, Guiding Principles, Public Values)

Source: Time Magazine - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913829-1,00.html

When Ferdinand Marcos was elected the sixth President of the Philippines ten years ago, his island nationwas in political turmoil. Even his opponents concede that Marcos, 58, has revived the Philippine economyand brought the country safely through a period of "anarchy, public confusion, terror and despair. "But the price has been high. Three years ago, Marcos imposed martial law and made himself a virtual dictator.Today an estimated 6,000 political prisoners are still in jail, including former Liberal Party Secretary-General Benigno Aquino Jr., 43, who might have defeated Marcos if elections had been held in 1973according to the constitution. Last week TIME Correspondent David Aikman interviewed Marcos and hiswife Imelda, 46, at Manila 's Malacañang Palace and sent this report:

It is after 1 o'clock in the afternoon in the ornate, white stucco Spanish mansion that sits upon Manila'sPasig River. Malacañang's huge second-floor reception hall used to be filled with the guests andfunctionaries of Spain's colonial governors. Now the great men of Philippine national independence staredown from the walls—Aguinaldo, Quezon, Roxas, Magsaysay. The hall most conveniently serves as awaiting area for the diverse individuals and groups who daily seek audience with the President. SaudiArabian princes, American bankers, Jaycee delegations—all get their turn and are ushered one by one into

10





the simple, wood-paneled presidential office. Most of the day's visitors have gone, and Marcos, onlyslightly wearied, is preoccupied by year-end economic projections. Says he, as aides hover around withneat folders of documents: "We thought we were going to have a whopping $1 billion deficit in the balanceof payments, but we have been able to cut it by half. We made an across-the-board budget cut in alldepartments. Ruthless, but what can you do? There is no other way."

Front Men. When Marcos grins, it is hard to believe that the man could be ruthless. He has charm andaccessibility in equal abundance. But his steely quality emerges clearly when he discusses his seizure of absolute power and the imposition of martial law. "I am one of those who felt guilty about the old system,"he says. "But I realized I was a captive of it and so did a lot of other people. The [earlier] Presidents seemedto me as if they were just front men for the oligarchs behind them and, well, I wasn't going to be a frontman for anyone. I wanted to reform and bring about a new society." He insists that even opposition leadersurged him to impose martial law in order to prevent chaos.

One of Marcos' curious attributes is his refusal to become emotional or defensive when accused of dictatorial methods. He does not meet criticism or serious problems head-on, but either lets them peter outor attacks them from the side. Thus Marcos has adopted a strangely non-confrontational approach to theMoslem insurgency movement in the southern Philippines. He refused to allow the military anuntrammeled hand in putting down the revolt and agreed to recognize the Moro National Liberation Front.

Then he undercut its leadership by coaxing Moslem local field commanders into surrendering withgenerous amnesty conditions and promises of "utmost autonomy" in the Moslem areas.

(Nelson Mandela – Historical/Contemp. Context)

Historical and Contemporary Contexts

Beck, R.B. (2000). The History of South Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood PressDeluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics.

Westport, CT: Praeger.Chamber, D.L. (2000). “Civilizing the Natives: Marriage in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Daedelus,

vol.129, Issue 4, 2000.Kitchen, J.C. (1994). South Africa: Twelve Perspectives on the Transition. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Historical Context: Economic, Social, and Political Forces

11



Beck, 77-83, 87-101, 107-09

Discovery of Diamonds and Gold: Transformation of Economy and SocietyFor over three hundred years the great powers of Europe had little interest in South

Africa except for its strategic value and ability to service their passing fleets. Then, in April 1867,two children playing along the banks of the Orange River found a shiny pebble. That pebbletransformed South Africa into one of Britain's most valuable possessions. The pebble was adiamond, the first evidence of a deposit of mineral riches unrivaled anywhere in the world. (77)

… The large quantity of diamonds produced, and the unregulated market for their sale, precipitated a dramatic price drop. Making a profit became difficult without investing hugeamounts of capital… Cape officials initially tried to protect the small, independent miners. Theyalso enforced laws guaranteeing Coloured [mixed-race] and African claims, which caused bitter resentment among White miners. Some small-scale White miners formed a Defense Association to protest these developments. In June 1875 imperial troops suppressed an open revolt at Kimberley[mines]. Soon thereafter officials instituted a color bar [known as the Kimberley Color Bar] to prevent Coloureds and Africans from making claims, and they lifted the limitation on the number of claims an individual might have. Small-scale mining quickly came and went. (78)

… In 1886 Frederick and Henry William Struben discovered gold along theWitwatersrand (White Water Reef) 30 miles south of Pretoria… What made South African gold

mining commercially viable was the immense, unequaled quantity of gold ore. Gold eventuallyhad a far greater impact on South Africa than diamonds did, transforming its economy fromagricultural to industrial and its society from rural to urban. Gold also became the underlyingcause for war between the British and the two Afrikaner [Dutch] republics, and the eventualunification of the country. (78-79)

The discovery of diamonds and gold also created secondary industries, such as railroads, ports, and various public works, to support mining. The enormous infusion of people and newcapital into the country also bolstered economic activity in other areas. Agricultural production,for example, increased to feed the growing immigrant population and provided African farmerswith enough income that for a while they could continue to live independently and not work for Whites as wage laborers. But the greatly expanded need for mine, railroad, and farm laborers puteven greater strains on the always limited African labor supply… The labor shortage soon forcedWhite employers to draw in migrant African workers from areas in South Africa that were not

under White control, and from neighboring regions in the area of modern Botswana, Mozambique,and Zimbabwe. A migrant labor system thus developed at an early date, with Africans leavingtheir families and working as contracted laborers for periods ranging from several months to ayear or more. (79-80)

Kimberley Color Bar: Racial Discrimination Institutionalized[The] Kimberley color bar…not only prevented Africans and Coloureds from staking

claims but also created a racially divided labor force. Whites took the skilled, supervisory, andother high-paying positions, whereas Africans performed all the unskilled and semi-skilled tasksfor low wages. Well-paid Whites moved about freely, lived with their families, and receivedsubsidized housing. Africans came to the mines alone, lived in all-male compounds, and slept indormitories with dozens of men to a room. They had to carry passes and were closely watched bytheir supervisors. They could advance only so far before encountering a color bar. White protests

led to higher wages, job protection, and better working conditions. African protests were violentlycrushed. (79)

British Tribal ConquestsThe discovery of South Africa's enormous mineral wealth came just as Europe began its

great age of colonization and imperialist acquisitions. European powers scrambled for some of what King Leopold II of Belgium called "that magnificent African cake," and Britain took the biggest slice. In South Africa the British, with some Afrikaner help, conquered one African peopleafter another, culminating in the defeat of the last independent African society, the Venda, in

12



1897. Britain then conquered the two Afrikaner republics and brought all of South Africa into theempire. (80)

By the 1860s the Xhosa [the main native South African tribe] had already lost their independence… (80)

The Zulu possessed the strongest African military force in southern Africa but weretroubled by internal factionalism and segmentation of royal families. Despite the Mfecane [the‘crushing’ or ‘scattering’ of clans], Shaka's assassination, Blood River [site of battle betweenAfrikaner emigrants and the Zulu], and a subsequent civil war, the Zulu had managed to holdtogether and maintain their independence... (81)

… When the British became serious about winning the war, their superior militarytechnology and more efficient supply systems gave them the advantage… Having defeated theZulu army, the British tried to destroy the Zulu nation. They split Zululand into thirteen separatechiefdoms under thirteen appointed chiefs… (82-83)

South African [a.k.a. Boer] War: British Conquest of Afrikaner RepublicsThe new spirit of nationalism popular in western Europe in the late nineteenth century

also touched the Afrikaners [Whites of Dutch descent]… A Cape Dutch Reformed minister, S.J.du Toit, founded a newspaper…and wrote a book… (The History of our country in the languageof our people), which gave expression to this new spirit…In them he argued that the Afrikaner…were a unique people, chosen by God to rule over the "heathen" peoples of southern Africa. Du

Toit garnered little support for his views at the time, but National Party ideologues adopted hisnationalist philosophy in the 1930s and 1940s. (88)

… During the 1880s and 1890s southern Africa became a great chess board, with the twoAfrikaner republics [Transvaal and Orange Free State] and the British making move andcountermove… (89)

…The South African War began…on 11 October 1899. (91)The British called it the Boer (or Anglo-Boer) War, and the Afrikaners referred to it as

the Second War of Freedom (the first being the Anglo-Transvaal War). The British fought to bringall of South Africa under imperial rule and to gain total control over South Africa's mineralwealth. The Afrikaners fought to defend their independence. Initially a war between Afrikaner andBritish, all South Africans were eventually pulled into it, White and Black. It divided families, pitted region against region, and left a legacy of animosity that continues to the present. It was animperialist war but also a civil war. For these reasons, many historians today call it the South

African War. (91)… Lord Kitchener [British commander] responded to [Afrikaner] guerrilla warfare in a

manner that makes the South African War the twentieth century's first "total war." He ordered histroops to wage war against the entire Afrikaner population, not just its army. They adopted ascorched earth policy, destroying an estimated 30,000 farmsteads, burning the crops andconfiscating the livestock. They sent captured commandos into exile and imprisoned Whitecivilian women, children, and the elderly in concentration camps… Lord Kitchener's tactics, particularly the camps, stirred a humanitarian outcry in Britain and left a bitter memory in theAfrikaner community. (93-94)

South African Unification: Guarantee of White Supremacy… The Treaty of Vereeniging required that the [Afrikaner] republics surrender their

independence. In return, they were promised eventual political autonomy, the right to maintain

their language in schools and courts, and massive economic assistance for postwar reconstruction.Afrikaner prisoners-of-war were to be released. Bowing to Afrikaner sensitivities, the Britishturned their backs on South Africa's African population… (94)

… It took the last armed rebellion organized by a traditional ruler in South Africa,however, for Whites finally to see the value of a political union. (96)

… The four colonies [Cape, Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free State] all agreed that someform of centralized federal government was necessary.... All parties…wanted a centralgovernment that would regulate railroad, trade, and tariff issues and legislate countrywide lawsguaranteeing White supremacy…

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The 1910 Act of Union created a single nation with a population of 1,275,000 Whites,150,000 Indians, 500,000 Coloureds, and 4 million Africans. Only White South Africans,however, were truly citizens… (101)

Poor Whites v. Blacks: Effects of Afrikaner Voting Block During the [next] forty years the South African economy prospered, driven by the

enormous wealth produced by the gold mining industry. English-speakers initially benefited themost from this prosperity, as they dominated the commercial and financial sectors and the professions. The majority of Afrikaners still farmed, although in the early 1900s many lost their land to commercial agricultural interests. Refusing to do common farm labor, menial "kaffir work"as they termed it, they became impoverished "poor Whites" instead. Forced to the cities, theyformed a largely unskilled and poorly educated labor pool that competed with Blacks for jobs. Thegovernment could not ignore Afrikaner votes, however, for they made up more than 55 percent of the electorate. Job reservations, artificial wage levels, government subsidies and loans, andeconomic growth caused White poverty to diminish over the next four decades, but always atBlack expense. (101)

… The worldwide Great Depression that began in October 1929 caused a dramaticdownturn in the South African economy… (109)

The economic state of both rural and urban Afrikaners had been deteriorating since the

late 1800s, but the Depression worsened their plight… …government policies [instituted toaddress Afrikaner concerns] such as job reservations, wage bars, social welfare programs, andcredit loans that gave preferences to Whites only made Black South Africans' lives more wretched.(109)

Deluca, 68

The election of 1948 was a major turning point in the history of South Africa and thestruggle for black freedom and independence. The surprising triumph of a Nationalist DutchAfrikaans government [reflecting beliefs of the Afrikaner subculture]…and the introduction of apartheid [legal classification and separation of races] sent shock waves throughout SouthAfrica… … What followed was a new wave of racist legislation, including the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act; the Immorality Act, outlawing sexual relations between blacks and whites;

the Population and Registration Act, which defined groups by race; and the Group Areas Act,which divided living areas within cities on the basis of race. (68)

… When the government announced its plan to create "bantustans" or homelands on marginal land with poor soil and inhospitable living conditions as separateterritories of development for the black people of South Africa [similar to Indianreservations in the U.S.], the intention was clear. The Nationalist government haddecided to turn South Africa into a patchwork of "ethnic enclaves" or "Reserves" in"poverty-stricken areas" in violation of the principles of "democracy ," "sovereignty ," and"self-determination" Supported by the tribal chiefs, who viewed their authority ashereditary and not elective, the government exploited the divisions within the Africancommunity and pursued a policy of apartheid on a grand scale by relegating 70 percentof the population to live on only 13 percent of the land. (72)

[Note from Dr. Perkins: Black South Africans were considered citizens of their Bantustan, not of South Africa, so they had no right to vote on South African leaders or laws.]

Cultural Context: Race, Religion, and Subcultures

Demographics of South Africa

14



Beck, 3-4… South Africa's population in 1999 was 40.5 million. Of these, there were 31.1 million

Africans, one million Asians, 3.6 million Coloureds (mixed-race), 4.4 million Whites, and 0.4million others/unspecified. South Africa has eleven official language groups, with Zulu-speakers being the largest at 22.9 percent of the total population, followed by Xhosa (17.9%), Afrikaans(14.4%), Pedi (9.2%), English (8.6%), Tswana (8.2%), Sotho (7.7%), Tsonga (4.4%), Swazi(2.5%), Venda (2.2%), Ndebele (1.5%), and others (0.6%). Afrikaans, which evolved from Dutch,is the first language of nearly all Afrikaners (mainly of Dutch descent) and of many Coloureds.Afrikaners make up about two-thirds of the White population. English is the first language of about one-third of the White population and of the majority of Coloureds. English is also the mostwidely used language for all peoples. Most Indians speak English as well as one of the languagesof India. (3)

… Nearly 80 percent of the South African population is Christian, mainly Protestant.Many…Africans attend syncretic churches that combine elements of traditional African religious beliefs with those of Christianity. Many Africans continue to adhere to traditional African belief systems. The majority of Indians are Hindus or Muslims, and the extensive Malay population practices Islam. South Africa's Jewish community numbers about 100,000. (4)

Afrikaner Subculture: Foundation of Apartheid Deluca, 68

… In brief, apartheid, meaning segregation, was built upon the [Afrikaner] premise of baasskap or "boss-ship" and by way of extension the much larger notion of white supremacy. Theformula was simple: " Eie volk, eie taal, eie land -Our own people, our own language, our ownland," and it obviously echoed in tone and spirit the pernicious words and message of Adolf Hitler's venomous racism. The Dutch Reformed Church also played a prominent role inunderwriting the government's racist message, as did a powerful, influential "secret society, theBroederbond," meaning Band of Brothers. (68)

South African Tribal SubcultureChambers (online article excerpts)

… Nearly half of all black Africans still live in rural areas, the great majority intraditional groups headed by hereditary kings or chiefs and by headmen and subchiefs. The largest

of these groups are the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Pedi, the Sotho, the Tswana, the Tsonga, and theSwazi. All are hierarchically organized, and, in nearly all, only men can be chiefs or senior counselors.

Each of these cultural groups has its own customs and rules--rituals and practices at birth,at the coming of age, at marriage, and at death… Whether these practices are appropriatelyregarded as "law" is debatable, for they have no definitive textual form and are modified over time by the actions of those who adhere to them. Still, Africans of all sorts speak as if these practiceswere "law"…. The chiefs, of course, also believe in customary laws and consider themselves theauthoritative voice of their content. They or other senior leaders preside over local customarycourts where they apply their view of the "law" to resolve disputes. Most black South Africanswho live in rural areas follow customary practices in their daily lives. For them, the chiefs still play central roles as the keepers and promoters of traditions and as political leaders.

Kitchen, 5-6

Christian Churches: Social and Moral Focal Point… Among Africans, Christian churches have long played an influential role. Early

missions, many of them American in origin, were the first to bring Western education to blacksand remained the bulwark of African education until the 1950s… (5)

Today, as in the past, and particularly in rural areas, much of white social life revolvesaround Sunday worship and after-church gatherings. In black townships, the churches are jammedon Sundays. Among both whites and blacks, the church is the venue for elaborate ladies' hats,spitshined shoes, and the best clothes one can afford. Even in the white suburbs where black

15



domestic workers are far from their congregations, one sees them, decked out in bright, cleanuniforms, holding Sunday services in small groups in an open field… They have provided alanguage, a set of values, and a historical focal point around which South Africans cancommunicate. (5-6)

These factors are reflected in the moral values that predominate in both white and black society. (6)

Black and Afrikaner FamilyTraditional African and Afrikaner family and social units not only have a strong religious

focus but are morally conservative. The central, patriarchal family is the norm. Men rule andelders are sacrosanct. Promiscuity is not acceptable (although definitions of promiscuity maydiffer). Extended families are the rule and are accepted as responsibilities and opportunities. Theyoung and the old are cared for. Hospitality is a social obligation and no one is turned away or goes unfed. One does all one can to help a family member or a neighbor. (6)

(Nelson Mandela – Personal History)

Mandela, N. (2000) Long Walk to Freedom. Holt, Rinehart & WinstonDeluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics.

Westport, CT: Praeger.

Personal History

Mandela, 3-4, 10-11(excerpts)

Rolihlahla: Son of a Village Chief Apart from life, a strong constitution, and an abiding connection to the Thembu royal

houses, the only thing my father bestowed upon me at birth was a name, Rolihlahla. In Xhosa,Rolihlahla literally means ‘pulling the branch of a tree,’ but its colloquial meaning moreaccurately would be ‘troublemaker’… My more familiar English or Christian name was not givento me until my first day of school… (3)

I was born on the eighteenth of July, 1918, at Mvezo, a tiny village…in…the Transkei…

Mvezo…was a place apart, a tiny precinct removed from the world of great events, where life waslived much as it had been for hundreds of years. (3)

The Transkei is eight hundred miles east of Cape Town, five hundred fifty miles south of Johannesburg…. It is home to the Thembu people, who are part of the Xhosa nation, of which Iam a member. (3)

My father…was a chief by both blood and custom. He was confirmed as chief of Mvezo by the king of the Thembu tribe, but under British rule, his selection had to be ratified by thegovernment, which in Mvezo took the form of the local magistrate… Although the role of chief was a venerable and esteemed one, it had…become debased by the control of an unsympatheticwhite government. (3-4)

Tribal HeritageThe Thembu tribe reaches back for twenty generations…. According to tradition, the

Thembu people…migrated toward the coast in the sixteenth century, where they wereincorporated into the Xhosa nation. The Xhosa are part of the Nguni people…. The Nguni can bedivided into a northern group – the Zulu and the Swazi people – and a southern group, which ismade up of… [eight tribes], and together they comprise the Xhosa nation. (4)

The Xhosa are a proud and patrilineal people with…an abiding belief in the importanceof laws, education, and courtesy. Xhosa society was a balanced and harmonious social order inwhich every individual knew his or her place. Each Xhosa belongs to a clan that traces its descent back to a specific forefather. I am a member of the Madiba clan…. I am often addressed asMadiba, my clan name, a term of respect. (4)

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… Although I was a member of the royal household, I was not among the privileged fewwho were trained for rule. Instead, as a descendant of the Ixhiba house [a minor house whose task was to settle royal disputes], I was groomed, like my father before me, to counsel the rulers of thetribe. (4)

[Note from Dr. Perkins: Mandela’s tribal heritage is as follows: Ixhiba HouseMadiba

Clan

Thembu Tribe

Xhose Nation (comprised of eight tribes)

Nguni People]

Knowledge through ObservationLike all Xhosa children, I acquired knowledge mainly through observation. We were

meant to learn through imitation and emulation, not through questions. When I first visited thehomes of whites, I was often dumbfounded by the number and nature of questions that childrenasked of their parents – and their parents’ unfailing willingness to answer them. In my household,questions were considered a nuisance; adults imparted information as they considered necessary.(10)

My life, and that of most Xhosas at the time, was shaped by custom, ritual, and taboo…All of these beliefs seemed perfectly natural to me. (10)

I came across few whites as a boy…. …I was aware that they were to be treated with amixture of fear and respect. But their role in my life was a distant one, and I thought little if at allabout the white man in general or relations between my own people and these curious and remotefigures. (10)

Deluca, 64 (excerpts)

… In elementary school his English-speaking teacher provided him with a proper Britishname, Nelson, which he believed derived from the celebrated British hero, Lord Nelson. As theson of a chief, he was groomed from childhood to serve as a leader of the people of the Xhosanation. Nestled amidst the lovely hills and fertile valleys of the Transkei, the secure surroundingsof the village …provided Mandela with an idyllic opportunity to play at will, experience the beauty of nature, herd sheep and cattle, expose himself to the values of tribal culture, and learn asa boy to respect his opponents and refrain from humiliating them in defeat… (64)

Mandela, 11 (excerpts)

Christian Faith…Despite the proselytizing…, my father remained aloof from Christianity and instead

reserved his own faith for the great spirit of the Xhosas… (11)While the faith…did not rub off on my father, it did inspire my mother, who became a

Christian… …I myself was baptized into the Methodist, or Wesleyan Church as it was thenknown…. (11)

Deluca, 64-67, (excerpts)

Death of Father: Life in the Royal CourtWhen Mandela was nine years old his father died and his life suddenly changed. He left

behind his comfortable life among the village huts to live in the palace of the Chief JongitabaDalindyebo, the chief regent of the Thembu people. Uprooted from his humble origins and thrust

into the life of the tribal court, the chief and his wife raised him as if he were their own son. His presence at the royal court also exposed him to a life of wealth and authority and to the politicalculture of the Thembu tribe. As a young man he was able to attend meetings and learn how to giveadvice and counsel to a king. For example, when comparing the leader's role to that of a shepherd,who directs the flock from behind, Mandela remarked how the regent protected the right of everyone to speak and listened carefully to what his people had to say. The process was open anddemocratic. No opinions or decisions were forced, nor was the majority allowed to impose its willupon the minority. As a member of the royal family, he participated in the ritualistic passage into

17



manhood, including the painful ceremony of circumcision, which he described as "a trial of bravery and stoicism." (64)

British Education: Part of the Black EliteAs part of his formal training, Mandela was sent to Clarkebury, a Methodist boarding

school, where he followed in the footsteps of the distinguished black leader and educator, Z. K.Matthews, who believed that education provided the best means of integrating South Africansociety and achieving the goal of racial peace and harmony. …he enthusiastically immersedhimself in the tradition of disciplined study, competitive games, and team sports… Since many of his peers could also lay claim to their own distinguished lineages, he also discovered that his privileged background was by no means unique. (64-65)

He eventually left boarding school to attend Healdtown, a Methodist college [secondaryschool], whose character and physical presence exceeded Clarkesbury's. The "rigorous" academicand genteel social atmosphere also bred in Mandela and his classmates the same desire Gandhihad experienced in wanting to acquire the respect and status of an educated Englishman. ButMandela's search for his own identity was by no means limited to his quest for the virtues of aBritish education.... By mingling with students from different tribes and backgrounds, he wasexposed to new ideas, including intertribal marriage, which, when combined with his strongXhosa roots, produced a powerful "feeling of kinship with other Africans." (65)

By the time he had arrived at the University College of Fort Hare at the age of twenty,

Mandela felt in his own words that “I was being groomed for success in the world." Representingthe apex of scholarship and learning for young black Africans, who came from near and distant parts of the continent, Fort Hare bred in its faculty and students a sense of elitism. Mandela was noexception... (65)

Young Man of PrincipleWhile Mandela was at Fort Hare, the Second World War broke out. The conflict, which

further politicized many of the students, also led to a discussion over Britain's fortunes in the war and the real meaning of the term "black Englishmen." More militant voices now came forward toargue that the British had oppressed the African people at the same time they were trying to"civilize" them. But as fate in an institution of higher learning would have it, the fortunes of theGreat Powers were not the only issue of power at stake at Fort Hare. Student dissatisfaction withthe food at the university led members of the student council to resign and call for a boycott of

new elections if their demands were not met. As an elected representative to the council, Mandelaresigned. When the authorities accepted the resignations and cleverly called for new elections, theclimate shifted. As the one remaining dissident voice within the council, Mandela resigned for asecond time, because he believed that while the majority of the student body had been present, themajority of those in attendance had not voted. Threatened with expulsion, he was allowed to gohome over the summer break and rethink, in his words, the question of "sabotaging [his] academiccareer over an abstract moral principle that mattered very little." And in what eventually becamethe hallmark of his political career, he remained true to himself and refused to compromise. (65-66)

A few weeks after his return home, Mandela faced a new conflict over principle, and inthis instance the potential for domestic bliss. The regent confronted him and Justice, the regent'sson, with plans for arranged marriages for both the young men. Unequivocally opposed to thethought of such a marriage, Mandela, accompanied by Justice, managed to flee from the prospect.

When the regent foiled their attempt to take a train to Johannesburg, they opted for a ride in a car that cost more than a train ticket and left them virtually broke… (66)

Johannesburg: Birth of a Political Dissident and Founding of ANC Youth LeagueBut the glitter that was Johannesburg had been built upon the back of black Africans….

[The] contrast between affluent Johannesburg with its "For Europeans Only" signs and the local poor in the townships was stark and overwhelming… … Mandela met Walter Sisulu, a gentle,highly respected community leader.... Sisulu and his wife Albertina had turned their home into ameeting place and refuge for political dissidents. Sisulu remained Mandela's friend for life andarranged for Mandela to get a job as clerk at his law firm of Witkin, Sidelsky, and Eidelman.

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There, Mandela's "gadfly" role [questioner of society norms] led him to the world of politicalactivism by associating with members of the African National Congress (ANC), meeting withradical whites, and attending local meetings of the Communist party… (66)

While working at the law firm, Mandela continued his studies through correspondencecourses and passed his final examination from the University of South Africa in 1942, enablinghim to receive his B.A…. To prepare for his entry into South Africa's political life, he became theonly black student enrolled in the law faculty at the Afrikaans University of Witwatersrand, wherehe forged some of his most important lifelong relations with white Marxists…. (67)

Mandela's circle of friendships also extended to Indian students, who along with hiswhite companions enabled Mandela to broaden his political vision and realize that there were people of privilege who were willing "to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the oppressed."Moreover, Mandela discovered that he too had occasionally acquiesced to "paternalistic" Britishattitudes and the creation of a black elite, which helped to perpetuate British rule by coopting blacks and encouraging them to feel welcome as "cultured," "civilized" members of the colonialsystem… (67)

The vehicle for his protest was the formation of a Youth League within the ANC whoseconservative leadership continued to function in keeping with British thinking and manners…During this period he also met his first wife, Evelyn Mase. Their marriage, which produced twochildren, did not survive an elegant Mandela's wandering eye or his consuming commitment to his political work… (67)

(Nelson Mandela – Ideas, Guiding Principles, Public Values)

Ideas, Guiding Principles, and Public Values

Deluca, A.R. (2000), Gandhi, Mao, Mandela, and Gorbachev: Studies in Personality, Power, and Politics.Westport, CT: Praeger.

Mandela, N. “Address to a Rally in Cape Town on His Release from Prison” in Copeland, Lamm, &McKenna, The World’s Greatest Speeches, 4th ed.

Deluca, 67-69, 72, 75 (excerpts)

Views on Nationalism

Mandela's circle of friendships also extended to Indian students, who along with hiswhite companions enabled Mandela to broaden his political vision and realize that there were people of privilege who were willing "to sacrifice themselves for the cause of the oppressed."Moreover, Mandela discovered that he too had occasionally acquiesced to "paternalistic" Britishattitudes and the creation of a black elite, which helped to perpetuate British rule by coopting blacks and encouraging them to feel welcome as "cultured," "civilized" members of the colonialsystem. Although he viewed nationalism as an "unreliable friend and an unsafe historian" in anage in which technology and communication had begun to eradicate the "imaginary differencesamong people," he willingly embraced the cause of "militant African nationalism." But he alsoadopted Gandhi's more global view that "no people in one part of the world could really be freewhile their brothers in other parts were still under foreign rule." (67)

Guiding Principle: Grassroots Movement of Civil Disobedience

… In response to the government's political offensive, the Youth League urged the ANCleadership to take action and engage the masses through a nonviolent, political campaign. In this particular context, it is important to note that Gandhi's failure to concern himself with Africanrights did not prevent Mandela from studying Gandhi's campaigns of civil disobedience in SouthAfrica and realizing the symbolic importance of passive resistance and the political meaning of going to jail for violating the law… (68)

Views on Communism: Appealing Ideology and Practical PartnersMandela, who now found himself totally consumed by the struggle, also discovered that

his attitudes toward communism were changing. By expanding upon his earlier exposure to Fabian

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socialism [socialism through gradual reform] and reading the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin,Stalin, Mao, and other Marxist thinkers, he discovered in Marxism the virtues of a communal lifehe had already encountered in African culture, the appeal of an analytical perspective, based upondialectical materialism with its emphasis on built-in profit mechanisms within a capitalisteconomy, and the desirability of reallocating wealth and resources from the haves to the have-nots. He also acknowledged the Soviet Union's support for the liberation of colonial peoples, andwhile he did not convert to communism, he realized that he could work with communists. (69)

Political Views: Racism and FascismMandela turned to the pen and published a series of articles in the left-leaning journal

Liberation from June 1953 to May 1959, outlining his political views. He cataloged thewidespread human suffering brought about by inadequate food, disease, poor medical care, and people's hunger for land. He also condemned the abusive labor policy, which contributed to thecycle of misery and frustration among South Africa's blacks. He openly criticized thegovernment's desire to create a pool of migrant laborers, separated from their families and forcedto live in hostels as a means of undermining the emergence of a powerful African labor movement. And he condemned the "forcible detention of Africans . . . for spurious statutoryoffenses" as a means of creating a "vast market of cheap labor" to feed South Africa's economicexpansion. He and his colleagues also exposed white reluctance to advocate the "democratic principle [of]' one adult, one vote'" and labeled the Liberal Party's "high-sounding principles" of

economic growth and expansion reactionary, because they perpetuated the de facto existence of the underclass. Moreover, he openly accused the white Liberal government, despite its denials of being inspired by any of Hitler's ideas, of being a "fascist regime" and of raising the "specter of Belsen and Buchenwald" in South Africa. (72)

Mandela (in Copeland, Lamm, & McKenna), 884-85 (excerpts)

Speech upon release from prison in 1990

Guiding Principle: Flexibility in TacticsToday the majority of South Africans, black and white, recognize that apartheid has no

future. It has to be ended by our own decisive mass action in order to build peace and security.The mass campaign of defiance and other action of our organization and people can onlyculminate in the establishment of democracy… Our resort to the armed struggle in 1960 with the

formation of the military wing of the ANC…was a purely defensive action against the violence of apartheid. The factors which necessitated the armed struggle still exist today. We have no option but to continue. We express the hope that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement will becreated soon so that there may be no longer the need for the armed struggle… (884)

Public Values: Democracy and Equality… On the question of democratic practice, I feel duty bound to make the point that a

leader of the movement is a person who has been democratically elected at a national conference.This is a principle which must be upheld without any exceptions. (884)

… Negotiations on the dismantling of apartheid will have to address the overwhelmingdemand of our people for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa. There must be an endto white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political andeconomic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our society

thoroughly democratized. (885)

Vision for South Africa… It is only through disciplined mass action that our victory can be assured… Universal

suffrage on a common voters roll in a united democratic and non-racial South Africa is the onlyway to peace and racial harmony. (885)

... In conclusion I wish to quote my own words during my trial in 1964…[“I have fought against white domination and I fought against black domination. I have

cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmonyand with equal opportunities…”] (885)

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(Nelson Mandela – Immediate Context)


Immediate Context

Deluca, 69-91, 165

Leader Strength: Political Strategist and TacticianTo counteract the government's campaign of formal, legal segregation, the ANC [African

National Congress] with Mandela serving as Youth League president agreed to join with SouthAfrican communists and Indians in a Defiance Campaign scheduled for June 26, 1952....Admitting to having some reservations about the newly expanded political alliance, Mandelanonetheless participated fully in the protest. But he was careful to acknowledge that hiswillingness to embrace nonviolent protest based on Gandhi's model of "passive resistance" wasnot absolute but conditional, since the government's overwhelming military and police superioritydictated the choice to be one of nonviolence as a "practical necessity." He also realized that he had

to convey to his followers that the very nature of nonviolent conflict ultimately required "morecourage and determination" than more violent forms of aggressive political action. In his role as a political strategist, he also maintained that a boycott had to be viewed as a "tactical weapon to beemployed if and when objective conditions permit" and not as an inflexible principle to be appliedirrespective of the immediate circumstances. Since Mandela also believed that the British in Indiawere far "more realistic and farsighted" than the Afrikaners in South Africa, he viewed the boycottmore as a question of tactics than principle, because the approach could readily be changed toaccommodate changes in the political situation. (69)

Leader TraitsResponsible for the nationwide effort to recruit volunteers for the Defiance Campaign,

Mandela constituted a "magnificent figure," handsome and "immaculately dressed" in hiselegantly tailored three-piece suits. Both blacks and whites found him attractive.... It quickly

became apparent to friend and foe alike that Mandela "was a born mass leader" who possessed acommanding, magnetic appeal… (69)

… Mandela was a "passionate," "combative" man, who asserted himself whenever theoccasion presented itself. He would, for example, intentionally enter court through the whites-onlyentrance, much to the dismay of court officials. And although practicing law in South Africa wasnot an easy task for a black man, he somehow managed to draw from the "racial tension in thecourtroom" and distinguish himself by his wry wit, defiant manner, and "flamboyant" courtroomstyle. (70)

Transforming LeadershipBut the campaign had an equally powerful impact within the ANC, which was

transformed from an elitist group into "a mass-based organization," where the previous "stigma"of imprisonment now became an emblem of courage. In reviewing his own role in recruiting,

organizing, and speaking on behalf of the Defiance Campaign, Mandela recalled how he feltempowered by the events and his ability to "walk upright like a man, and look everyone in the eyewith the dignity that comes from not having succumbed to oppression and fear." (69-70)

Problem: Government Banning Leads to MPlanThat dignity was tested again when Mandela and fifty-one other leaders of the ANC were

banned. The detested practice of banning meant that the government could severely restrict thetravel of individuals and prevent them from speaking or participating in the activities of namedorganizations. In Mandela's view banning was a form of "walking imprisonment".... Thegovernment's smothering tactics also led to a dramatic change in ANC strategy and to Mandela's

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drafting of the MPlan, which was named for its author. According to the plan, the ANC wouldestablish an intricate network of underground cells to prepare for the time when the governmentwould outlaw its activities and force its membership to alter the nature of the struggle… (70)

In the atmosphere of "increasing repressiveness," Mandela emerged as a "rabble-rousing"speaker who ignited the crowds, redefined the movement, and moved in the direction of endorsingviolence… (71)

Problem: Bantu Education ActIn 1953 the passage of the Bantu Education Act extended the policy of racial subjugation.

The new legislation clearly reflected the racist premises of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the Minister of Bantu education, who rigidly believed that "There is no place for the Bantu in the Europeancommunity above the level of certain forms of labor"… (71)

Problem: Revolutionary Program of Action Leads to Treason TrialIn 1955 the ANC was instrumental in coordinating the Congress of the People. A

multiracial gathering that included Indians, Coloureds, and whites within a predominantly black audience, the congress was a unique event in South African history… The congress itself created a"South Africa in micro-cosm" and openly reflected the socialist orientation of its leadership… Bycalling for the nationalization of wealth and its distribution among the people, the Charter set fortha revolutionary "programme of action." (71-72)

On December 5, 1956, Mandela and other members of the ANC leadership were arrestedfor high treason and sent to jail… Faced with the charge of violent revolution and aware that thescales of justice were tilted against them in a predominantly Afrikaner court, the defendants choseto turn their trial into a countertrial and indict the government, its unjust racial policies, and thetyrannical domination of 13 million blacks by 3 million whites. (73)

During a recess in the preparatory phases of the trial, Mandela happened to spot a beautiful young woman, Winnie Nomzano, on the streets of Johannesburg, only to see her again inhis office a few weeks later. What followed was a whirlwind romance in which Mandela by hisown admission both courted Winnie Nomzano and politicized her… Their union produced threechildren, who possessed their father's warmth and magnanimity, despite his reputation as a sternauthority figure and disciplinarian, and the crusading, restless spirit of their mother. (73)

[The] Treason Trial…became, in Mandela's words, "a test of the power of a moral ideaversus an immoral one." He, in fact, used the trial as a platform to denounce imperialism, lecture

on commercial exploitation, and expose the fallacy of foreign investment as a means of raising people's standard of living by citing "low wages, … poverty, . . . misery, . . . illiteracy," and therise in "squalid tenements" as proof to the contrary. When the government, basing sections of their case on Mandela's writings and speeches, tried to portray him as a communist, he took theopportunity to thank the communists in his testimony for the support the ANC had received, whilescrupulously making the point that he was not a communist… When the court finally rendered itsverdict and declared the accused not guilty, it did so on the grounds that the government had failedto prove that the ANC had "acquired or adopted a policy to overthrow the state by violence,"irrespective of all its inflammatory rhetoric. The victory, however, was bittersweet becauseMandela and his colleagues realized that in future proceedings the government would make surethat the courts would return a guilty verdict. (74)

Life Underground Leads to Chang of Tactics – Sabotage

[He] also came to the conclusion that since he had been forcibly "denied the night to livea normal life," he had no choice but to go underground, "live the life of an outlaw," organize aguerrilla campaign, and embrace the use of violence as a political weapon. (75)

For Mandela "living underground require[d] a seismic psychological lift," which turnedhim into a "creature of the night." As South Africa's "Black Pimpernel," an obvious adaptation of the fictional Scarlet Pimpernel of the French Revolution, he surreptitiously made his way throughthe country in an assortment of motley disguises. With all his energy now focused on making thecase for revolution in the immediate political environment, he believed, as had Fidel Castro, thatthe movement should not rigorously follow "textbook conditions" or slavishly adhere to the

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Marxist concept of inherent contradictions in the social structure to justify the use and timing of violent political action… (75)

… Mandela found temporary "sanctuary" in the Liliesleaf Farm located in Rivonia, anorthern suburb of Johannesburg, which provided a temporary safe haven for MK's guerrillaswithin the confines of what he described as an "idyllic bubble." The decision to pursue sabotage asthe primary form of violence reflected the movement's desire to inflict as little harm as possible onindividuals and to focus its attack on military targets, communications, and transportation as ameans of frightening away foreign capital and investments and calling attention to the plight of South Africa's black community… (76)

… On his way home [from travel that took him to Egypt and England] he stopped inEthiopia for military training and affirmed his belief that military training must be combined withappropriate forms of political training "to create a just and fair society." (77)

Problem: End of FreedomMandela's brief freedom ended abruptly on August 5, 1962, after his return to South

Africa. Charged with having left the country illegally and having incited workers to strike,Mandela decided to represent himself in court to accentuate the symbolic plight of a "black man ina white man's court"… (77)

… The five-year sentence he received might have led some to question his resolve, particularly when confronted with the deplorable conditions in South African jails.... (77)

In the summer of 1963 [while in prison on Robben Island] Mandela learned thatgovernment authorities had discovered Rivonia, the small farm outside Johannesburg that hadserved as a safe haven for the ANC leadership. Mandela also learned that he and his colleagueshad been charged with sabotage and that they now faced the death penalty. The evidence includedthe plans for guerrilla warfare, known as Operation Mayibuye, and documents in Mandela's ownhandwriting… (78)

… [In making his plea before the court] On the thorny question of violence and plans for sabotage, Mandela emphasized that once the government denied the black community an avenueof "peaceful protest," the movement decided to undertake "violent forms of political struggle.... Healso managed to contextualize the source of black unrest when he spoke of poverty, malnutrition,disease, unequal education, the lack of a "living wage," and job practices that separated workersfrom their families and the implacable perpetuation of the hated pass laws, all of whichcontributed to the degradation of human values and the deterioration of individual and collective

morality. Moreover, the blind pursuit of these benighted policies resulted in the institutionalizationof black inferiority and a growing fear of democracy among the white minority population… (79)

… As the world watched, Judge Quartus de Wet rendered his verdict and pronounced allof the defendants guilty on all counts. The next day the defendants appeared before the judge for sentencing. When he declared that this was not a case of "high treason" and sentenced them to lifein prison, the men, who had just looked death directly in the face, were jubilant…. (79)

Problem: Degradation of Prison LifeUpon his return to [prison on] Robben Island, Mandela continued to confront the layers

of institutional racism and the degrading nature of prison life. Deprived of hot showers andsharing his cell with a lightbulb that burned both day and night, Mandela confronted the inhumaneconditions, psychological abuse, and "corrupt and demeaning" classification system, which placed black political prisoners at the bottom of the prison hierarchy..... Cut off from the outside world

and allowed to write only one letter of 500 words to his family every six months, Mandela and hisfellow prisoners waged their own internal war against routine, repression, and despair. (80)

Task: Improve Prison Conditions – Personality Traits Revealed… As conditions slowly improved over the years, it was Mandela who emerged as the

natural spokesman for the group, and his persistent demands to the prison administration gainedvaluable privileges for the inmates, including the right to enroll in correspondence courses andstudy for degrees… They even established a system in which inmates taught courses to oneanother and established their own university… (80)

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They also devised ingenious means of communications to coordinate their protests andair their complaints, including the use of false bottoms in matchboxes to relay messages, the placing of messages wrapped in plastic tape under the lip of toilet bowls, and the use of milk towrite invisible messages in a "tiny, coded script." They even established a "clandestinecommunications committee," which enabled them to share information through the assistance of some sympathetic warders… As an advocate of prisoners' rights, Mandela drew upon one of hisfavorite strategies, dating back to his early law office experience, when he learned to pepper authorities with so many requests and interrogatories that a hostile accusation would be dropped or a basic need would be met. But his forceful personality and unforgiving candor also revealed the"dogmatic," "overbearing" side of his personality, which he frequently visited upon his colleagueswhen they engaged in fierce political discussions and debate. (80-81)

Task: Record the Struggle… [The sea] continued to serve as the "uncrossable moat" surrounding Robben Island."

In an attempt to straddle that barrier and provide people with a record of the struggle, Mandela began work on his memoirs, only to have a buried draft accidentally discovered by prisonofficials, which led to the suspension of his study privileges for no less than four years. (82)

Problem: Generation Gap between Leaders and Young FollowersIn the wake of the brutal suppression of the Soweto uprisings in 1976, Mandela also

received his first look at some of the young militants who made up the Black ConsciousnessMovement of the 1960s. Stephen Biko, who led the BCM, managed to fill the vacuum created bythe imprisonment of the ANC leadership by appealing directly to the concept of "black assertiveness".... Beginning as a "cultural awakening process" designed to provide blacks withhope for the future, the movement soon became overtly political and challenged the government'sauthority. The violent circumstances surrounding Biko's death in the custody of police officialsonly served to antagonize and radicalize Biko's followers. The rise of the Black Consciousnessmovement, however, created a generation gap between the ANC and Biko's followers. Mandela,for example, remained uncomfortable with the attitudes, tactics, and style of this new breed of black revolutionary… Rejecting their "exclusionary . . . philosophy," he continued to mediateamongst the various prison factions and stress to the newcomers the importance of taking a moreinclusive approach. (82)

Problem: International Criticism of TacticsThe physical beginning of Mandela's deliverance began in 1982, when he unexpectedly

left his craggy island home of eighteen years and was transferred to the Pollsmoor Prison in CapeTown on the South African mainland. Compared to the prison at Robben Island, Pollsmoor was a"five star hotel" with "palatial" accommodations… In 1984 the new minister of justice, KobieCoetsee, whom Mandela both liked and admired, began testing the waters by allowing Mandela tovisit with prominent foreign political and legal officials. (83-84)

But despite the changed mood and circumstances, Mandela still waged the politicalstruggle. For example, in an interview with journalists from the conservative Washington Times,Mandela had to defend himself against claims that he was a communist and point out thedifference between Martin Luther King's ability to work within a democratic system, whichaffirmed constitutional rights and upheld "nonviolent protest," and the nature of the South African"police state with a constitution that enshrined inequality." When faced with a government offer of

freedom in return for his unconditional rejection of "violence as a political instrument," Mandeladeclined. He insisted, as he would throughout the entire process leading up to his release, that itwas the government that had initiated the violence and that the ANC had been forced to reply inkind. Moreover, given the genesis of the problem, he believed that the government should be thefirst to give guarantees that it would refrain from violence. He also insisted that the existing process of discussions was fatally compromised, since "only free men can negotiate." (84)

Leadership Style… Mandela's attitude did not mean, however, that he was reluctant to act independently

from the members of his group. When he wrote that "there are times when a leader must move out

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ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way,"he clearly staked out his position. Part of Mandela's political genius also lay in his ability to"revert to a more moderate position" and seek out "unifying points among people of differingviews," a gift that mirrored his tolerance and ability to listen. And it was the combination of his"diplomatic strength and refusal to accept a conditional release," coupled with [President] deKlerk's open style and risk-taking leadership, that initiated the historic change in South African politics. (84)

As his relationship with Coetsee [Minister of Justice] continued to grow, Mandela became more convinced of the government's goodwill and his own independent role in achieving asolution and having to present his colleagues with a "fait accompli"… He…reassured hisinterlocutors that their fear of majority rule was misplaced and stated that in a multiracial state, belonging to both white and black South Africans: "We do not want to drive you into the sea."(84-85)

Problem: Follower Opposition to Peace and Reconcilliation… [In the summer of 1989, President] De Klerk quickly sent out signals that the future

was now. He opened South African beaches to blacks and put an end to segregated parks,restaurants, theaters, and government facilities. De Klerk also decided to give Mandela hisfreedom.... (85)

On February 11, 1990, Mandela walked through the gates of Pollsmoor Prison with aclenched fist victory salute from his right hand.... After twenty-seven years in prison he wasgreeted by a swarm of international media and an audience of exuberant supporters, who saw"their hour of deliverance in his face." Once again, his charismatic presence exuded hope and self-confidence. To cite the words of Archbishop Tutu, Mandela had what black South Africans called"shadow," "substance," or "presence," which contributed to his "regal" stature and demeanor. In anemotional speech to his followers, he thanked them for the sacrifices they had made to obtain hisrelease.... The next morning he spoke before a crowd of more than 100,000 people in a soccer stadium in Soweto. By no means a great orator, he addressed the yearnings of the gathered throngin disciplined, schoolmasterly tones… He did, however, face a new and different enemy amongsuspicious blacks, who viewed his elegant suits, cultivated tastes, and enthusiastic receptionsabroad as a sign that he had compromised with the white establishment. By focusing his criticismon the apartheid system and not on the "white community," his message of peace, reconciliation,

and forgiveness caught many of his supporters off guard. But it also reinforced his moral stature athome and his reputation abroad. (85-86)

Mandela also had to deal with fractious internal issues dividing different generations of leadership within the ANC. By exercising his legendary "authoritarian streak" and invoking the power of his moral standing, he managed to allay the fears of radicals and conservatives within hisown party as well as those of extremists within the white political community… (87)

Tasks: “Negotiated Revolution” and Reinvention of South AfricaDespite the clearly less than euphoric mood within the country, the tortuous process of

negotiations between the ANC and white South African parties began on December 20, 1991,under the auspices of CODESA, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa… (88)

… With an agreement in place, South Africa was ready to plan for its first free, open, andtruly democratic election on April 27, 1994. As a candidate, Mandela emphasized a new political

realism, telling crowds not "to expect to be driving a Mercedes the day after the election or swimming in your own backyard pool." But he also focused upon the thrill of enjoying a newsense of "self-esteem" and earnestly urged whites not "to leave the country." (89)

Going to the polls for the first time was obviously a liberating experience for blacks…The ANC won a resounding victory.... (89)

Once he had secured a "negotiated revolution" and led his country in jubilant celebration,Mandela faced the daunting task of having "to reinvent the South Africa." The economic chasm between whites and blacks was enormous, the disparity in incomes overwhelming, with whitesearning eight times as much as blacks. While wealthy whites lived in the affluent suburbs andmiddleclass whites lived in dean, well-serviced residential communities, a large number of blacks

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inhabited meager shacks without clean water, sanitation, or electricity and faced a diet of unemployment, lawlessness, and violent crime. As he had during the campaign, Mandelacautioned his followers not to expect a quick, effortless trip to a land of milk, honey, and luxurycars. But he now went one step further, urging his followers to "shed their bad habits" and raisethemselves from poverty by working hard, learning how to cook a decent meal and polish floors,as he did. But the "lack of urgency" within Mandela's government to address the fundamentaleconomic causes of the problem bred a new wave of disillusionment.

Inspirational Leadership… Faced with the enormous, seemingly insurmountable obstacles at hand, Mandela

preferred to turn to personal diplomacy and make "national reconciliation [a] personal crusade"…But one gesture more than any other stood out as a mark of Mandela's inspirational leadership.Making it a practice of adopting national sports teams, Mandela extended the same support to thenational rugby team during the Rugby world cup held in Cape Town in 1995, when he openly proclaimed how "proud" he was of "our boys." Since rugby had always been viewed as a "Boer [Afrikaner] game," symbolizing "white supremacy," Mandela's appearance in the stadium,sporting a green rugger's cap and the number 6 jersey of the team captain, Françoisl Pineaar,electrified the white crowd, who shouted in response "Nel-son! Nel-son!" Contributing mightily tothe legend of "Madiba magic," his actions also inspired members of an all-white team, with theexception of a single black player, to win the championship. When Mandela congratulated Pineaar

for "what you have done for South Africa," the team captain eloquently replied, "Thanks for what you have done to South Africa." (90)

Enigmatic but Principled Leader [Despite] the waves of public adulation, Mandela still remained the same enigmatic,

"intensely private," and austere individual he was during the decades of resistance, and his punctilious manners and courteous behavior continue to frame his personality… On the diplomaticfront it also came as no surprise that his distinctively maverick approach to politics extendedequally to matters of foreign policy. For example, he would later stir the diplomatic pot byacknowledging the support of Libya and Cuba for the black liberation movement. And he refusedto disavow Moammar Khadafi's and Castro's leadership, because he refused to compromise his principles and jettison those who had rendered assistance while others had barely lifted a finger toadvance the black cause in South Africa… (91)

Leader Assessment: Revolutionary, Political Prisoner, and PresidentAlthough his term of office has come to an end, the debates concerning his presidency

will continue. One thing is clear, and that is that the assessment of Mandela’s career as anunderground revolutionary and political prisoner differs significantly from the assessment of hisyears as South Africa's first black president. There can be no doubt that the political atmosphere of the first appealed more directly to the cast of his character and psychological makeup. As a moralleader he was without rival. But as a head of state and of the government of South Africa, hesuddenly had to face the more practical side of administrative affairs. This is not to suggest thatdespite a seemingly chronic economic slump, scant capital investment, high unemployment, andcontinued violence that Mandela did not leave his mark. From his support of the Truth andReconciliation Commission to his government's ability to expand both the scope and the quality of public services in many areas of South Africa, Mandela demonstrated qualities of presidential

leadership. (165)For the most part, however, Mandela was concerned with the symbolic and ceremonial

aspects of his office, and not with the day-to-day administration of things. And as had been thecase during the struggle for freedom, it was Mandela’s charismatic presence that served as theindispensable link during the period of political transition… (165-66)

As a leader, Mandela was tall and splendid in his appearance. He was a powerful speaker who inspired his listeners with unwavering conviction and a real sense of purpose. He also possessed the rare and wonderful gift of being able to listen patiently to the fears and anxieties of his white opponents and address those concerns with sincerity and compassion. Throughout it all,he somehow managed to emerge with his sense of humor and his aristocratic demeanor intact. He

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also provided his people with an extraordinary model of cultural, individual and national pride.His courage and ability to set a moral example in the face of overwhelming odds also served as asymbol for the struggle to overcome personal humiliation through political activism and honor acommitment to the demands of one's own individual conscience. It also endowed him with his political legacy and enabled him to leave his ultimate gift to his countrymen in the form of anation-maker, who was above all else committed to justice and the construction of a new SouthAfrica. (166)

(Nelson Mandela – Use of Power)


Use of Power and Decision Making

Deluca, x, 69-70, 86-87, 91-92, 163-66 (excerpts)

Utilitarian and Machiavellian Decision Making: Practical and TacticalTo counteract the government's campaign of formal, legal segregation, the ANC with

Mandela serving as Youth League president agreed to join with South African communists andIndians in a Defiance Campaign scheduled for June 26, 1952, in the spirit of the first Day of National Protest. Admitting to having some reservations about the newly expanded politicalalliance, Mandel nonetheless participated fully in the protest. But he was careful to acknowledgethat his willingness to embrace nonviolent protest based on Gandhi's model of "passive resistance"was not absolute but conditional, since the government's overwhelming military and policesuperiority dictated the choice to be one of nonviolence as a "practical necessity"… In his role as a political strategist, he also maintained that a boycott had to be viewed as a "tactical weapon to beemployed if and when objective conditions permit" and not as an inflexible principle to be appliedirrespective of the immediate circumstances. Since Mandela also believed that the British in Indiawere far "more realistic and farsighted" than the Afrikaners in South Africa, he viewed the boycottmore as a question of tactics than principle, because the approach could readily be changed toaccommodate changes in the political situation… (69)

Sources and Use of Power

Mandela’s search for his own political identity, his views on revolution and politicalchange, communism, violence, his espousal of Marxist principles, his long imprisonment, and hisultimate political victory were a testament to his strength of character in the pursuit of his ownidentity, the political identity of his people, and their common struggle for freedom. (x)

It quickly became apparent to friend and foe alike that Mandela "was a born mass leader"who possessed a commanding, magnetic appeal. And while the campaign failed to reverse any of the government's repressive racist legislation, it provided the government with cause for concernabout the future of African-Indian cooperation. It also led to the arrest and trial of the campaign'sleaders, including Mandela, under the terms of the Suppression of Communism Act. But the

campaign had an equally powerful impact within the ANC, which was transformed from an elitistgroup into "a mass-based organization," where the previous "stigma" of imprisonment now became an emblem of courage. In reviewing his own role in recruiting, organizing, and speakingon behalf of the Defiance Campaign, Mandela recalled how he felt empowered by the events andhis ability to "walk upright like a man, and look everyone in the eye with the dignity that comesfrom not having succumbed to oppression and fear." (69-70)

… By focusing his criticism on the apartheid system and not on the "white community,"his message of peace, reconciliation, and forgiveness caught many of his supporters off guard. Butit also reinforced his moral stature at home and his reputation abroad. (86)

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… Mandela also had to deal with fractious internal issues dividing different generationsof leadership within the ANC. By exercising his legendary "authoritarian streak" and invoking the power of his moral standing, he managed to allay the fears of radicals and conservatives within hisown party as well as those of extremists within the white political community… Mandela alsoemerged as a national leader, following the assassination of Chris Hani, whom Mandela greatlyadmired and who served as a "legendary . . . hero to millions of black youths." At a time when deKlerk's government seemed to disappear into the political shadows, it was Mandela who emergedas a model of statesmanship and restraint. When many clamored for revenge, he called for calmand peace in the streets as the best means of expressing one's honor to Hani's memory. The themewas not new to Mandela. On many occasions, when faced with an angry crowd boiling over withfrustration, he would advocate a similar approach, maintaining that "the solution is peace; it isreconciliation; it is political tolerance"… (87)

To see Mandela in his eighties, however, one would think that, despite his less thannimble pace and his long history of personal suffering, he had led a charmed, privileged existence.He was in his ascendancy the world's most respected living monument to resilience, humancourage, and the strength of individual conscience… As a leader in our time, Mandela has truly been without peer, because no contemporary political figure possessed the distinctive character trait that made Mandela truly exceptional, namely his moral authority. Moreover, his generousspirit, tenacious personality, and passion for tolerance have enabled him to transform the racial

politics of South Africa and bequeath to his country a rare legacy of political compassion and newhope for racial harmony. Out of his own deep suffering and that of his people, Mandelaconstructed his own political statement, grounded in the virtues of "humanity" and "solidarity." Itis one that builds character from the "depth of oppression" and defines courage not in the "absenceof fear" but in the ability to triumph over fear. What is more, Mandela sees in "goodness . . . aflame that can be hidden but never extinguished," a flame that generates power in times of adversity, a flame that ensures victory over oppression and frees both the oppressed and theoppressor. (91-92)

[In] the case of…Mandela, issues of identity represent a major consideration in ananalysis of [his] political development. As [a member] of [the] local [elite] who aspired to [a]leadership [role], [he] found [himself] attracted to the West through European education, socialhabits, foreign [lifestyle], and political power… (163)

[The] careers of Gandhi and Mandela…combined a deep interest in the Western worldwith preservation of native traditions. Yet, despite their educational opportunities as members of the British empire and their genuine respect for the values of an English education, both Gandhiand Mandela broke with the British model and proceeded to create political movements thatidentified with the native cultural traditions of India and South Africa… (163)

… By all accounts, including his own, [Mandela] was impressed with British culture andstudied to become a lawyer in British South Africa. Like Gandhi, who also trained as an English barrister, Mandela too wore Western suits and was drawn to the lights of the city. In his case, the primary attraction was the vibrant, urban culture of Johannesburg. But he never lost therecollections of his youth, of his tribal upbringing, of his ritualistic passage into manhood, and of his having been trained to serve someday as a chief to his people. …the trials of his political

passage weighed so heavily upon the man that his political leadership and his struggle to obtain justice for his people bore the joint insignia of pride and prejudice. [It} is the sheer strength of Mandela’s personality and the power of his convictions that provide the deepest form of inspiration. This becomes particularly apparent when reading the sections on his seeminglyinterminable years of imprisonment. These passages, in which he faithfully describes his ownordeal, poignantly reveal the depth of his own pride and humility and his enormous reservoirs of personal strength. One realizes immediately that one is in the presence of a truly unique historicalfigure who was able to transform the strengths of his personality into a rare and charismatic political persona. (164-65)

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It should also be clear that it was the power of his intelligence and his ability to outwitand withstand his British and Afrikaans opponents--not to mention his ability to outlast them after a grueling twenty-seven years in prison--that gave shape to his remarkable personality andconferred upon him the title of the leader of a movement for a free South Africa rooted in human justice and tolerance… [Like] Gandhi, he too managed to merge the world of two differentcultures. Where they differed, however, was in the style of the two mergers. Gandhi's representedthe strength of passive, nonviolent resistance, whereas Mandela avowed the use of force againstthe political establishment as a means of overcoming tyranny and racism and providing the vastmajority of South Africans with an opportunity to live in peace, dignity, and freedom. For example, when he openly entered the public arena, he brought with him the same independenceand legendary self-control that had served him for nearly three decades as the silent but legendaryvictim of South Africa's cruel and inhumane system of apartheid. Once again, his moral rectitude,his capacity for forgiveness, and his ability to listen to friend and foe alike made him theindispensable man, the only figure who was capable of bridging the gap between black and whiteSouth Africans. (165-66)

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