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A Brief History of Terrorismin the United States

Ann Larabee

Three seasoned radicals sit down in a dingy New York hotel room to decidewhat to do about a cash offer they cant refuse. The donor intends the moneyas the start-up for a fund-raising campaign that will eventually be used to trainand arm missioners for a terrorist holy war against an evil empire that ex-ploits their impoverished homeland. The three men debate how the moneyshould be spent. Should they use the latest weapons to blow up the enemyswarships? Should they seize the jails where their political prisoners are kept?Or should they dare to imagine the greatest feat of all: to simultaneously set offfifty state-of-the-art bombs in their enemys city and reduce its financial centerto ashes.

The time: 1876. The men: Irish nationalists who see it as their sacred duty tofree their homeland from English rule using high explosives, the cutting-edgeweapons of their day. The outcome: A series of bombing attacks on Londonthat terrorize its inhabitants, leaving more than 100 people injured and sixdead.

Despite popular misconceptions, terrorism is not a recent phenomenon inAmerican life. Nor does terrorism consist solely of foreign attacks or domesticeruptions of isolated, pathological rage. Rather, terrorism is a current of vio-lence, in a violent culture, on the shadowy side of militarism. As the nine-teenth-century anarchist and pacifist Auberon Herbert once wrote of therevolutionary terrorists of his day, Dynamite is not opposed to government; itis, on the contrary, government [by force] in its most intensified and concen-trated form.1 The September 11th attacks, though unprecedented in scale, arenot unprecedented in motivation or design. The Al Qaeda terrorists are not thefirst to operate in the United States through secret cells, attempt to destroy an

Ann Larabee teaches American Studies at Michigan State University. She is the author of Decade ofDisaster (University of Illinois Press, 2000) and numerous essays that explore the ways in which U.S.society has made meaning of technological disaster. She is currently working on a biography of nine-teenth-century bomber William King Thomas and a full-length history of technology and terrorism in theUnited States. She can be reached at .

Knowledge, Technology, & Policy, Spring 2003, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 21-38.

22 Knowledge, Technology, & Policy / Spring 2003

economic center, target a transportation system, organize significant funds,plan for mass death, run training schools, produce weapons manuals, and masternew weapons technologies. Fantasies of stealing high technologies and usingthem to destroy a larger, more powerful enemy are as old as the nation itself.

Violent radical groups are often at odds with each other, and even internallydivided over political ideas, but they are astonishingly consistent in their tech-nological enthusiasms. They dream of being able to cook up powerful weap-ons at home, translating complicated technical information into a commonlanguage that can be easily understood by amateurs. And they have some-times succeeded. In the United States, where technological development haslong been valued as the very spirit of republican liberty and independence,military technologies have not been protected from this strong democraticimpulse. Throughout the nations history, radical individuals and groupshave claimed a right to information about even the most dangerous weap-ons so that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few. And the offi-cial domains of military research and development have rarely been ableto keep secrets. Information eventually leaks from these domains and cir-culates through an underground of amateurs and enthusiasts, including politi-cal extremists. When a group organizes to carry out such technological projects,it becomes militarized in other ways. Military technologies come with a price:a group must reorganize into a secret military research unit and harden itself toviolence.

For the purposes of this essay, I am limiting my investigation of terrorism toorganized groups that use technological means to violently confront a rulingpower. Four kinds of terrorist groups have operated in the United States. Do-mestic terrorists, like Tim McVeigh and his collaborators, have used violenceto bring attention to their grievances against the state. Covert military branches,like the Confederate Torpedo Bureau, have supplemented regular military op-erations with attacks on civilians. migr nationalist groups, like the nine-teenth-century Fenians, have used the United States as a base for organizingterrorist acts in their homelands. And most recently, international terrorist groupslike Al Qaeda have organized small cells for purposes of waging asymmetricwar against the United States. A more expansive view of terrorism in the UnitedStates might fruitfully cover acts of state terror, such as the massacre at My Lai;insurrections and rebellions, such as John Browns raid on Harpers Ferry; andracist acts of violence against neighbors. These uses of terror raise differentissues about the relationship between the state and its citizens. I have alsofocused especially on the development of modern terrorism in the late nine-teenth and early twentieth century, driven by a particular combination of newweapons technology, revolutionary philosophy, expansion of state power, riseof the international print media, migration of people and ideas, and widespreadeducation. Almost all the features of todays terrorism, including its ruthlessvisions and technological fascinations, can be found here, though this historyis not widely known.

Most members of radical groups do not turn to direct violence, though theymay help create political contexts for violence. And because most radical groupssee themselves as part of an historical process, they wish to preserve an image

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of themselves as the subjects, rather than agents, of violence. There are shiftingclaims in the historical reputation of these groups, as some rise to the level ofpatriotic freedom fighters while others sink into obscurity, of interest only tospecialists. Therefore, the technological history of terrorism has been subordi-nated to competing political histories, where reputations are made or lost. Fur-thermore, the United States has at various times struggled with the tensionbetween civil liberties and the violence of political groups in an ideally freesociety. The government and the national press have often inflated the powerand numbers of such groups, a situation that encourages public violence whilejustifying severe, unjust repression that extends well beyond violent partici-pants. Therefore, it is difficult to discuss a history of terrorism without fuelingexaggeration. My aim, however, is to demystify these activities by placingthem in a continuity of technological fantasies and failed ideas, within a cul-ture that believes in the power of technology, almost as a religious faith. Tech-nological history reveals quite a different set of continuities in radical history,as groups share weapons ideas across divergent political lines.

In looking at these groups together and setting aside political advocacy,three significant trends emerge in their use of technology. First, there has beenan incremental loss of ethical sanctions against targeting civilians. In the past,U.S. terrorist groups often imagined their attacks resulting in mass deaths but,for various reasons, very few casualties ever resulted and were never the prin-ciple object. Now, a spectacular loss of life has become the apotheosis of po-litical violence. Remote technologies that remove the terrorist from the sceneof violence have helped foster this ruthlessness, though the suicide terroristerases the classic use of technology as a prosthetic. Second, terrorist groupshave never been able to successfully deploy state-of-the-art weapons, thoughthey have tried mightily. However, with greater technological proficiency, whichrequires a high degree of knowledge and organization, terrorists may moreeffectively deploy advanced weapons in the near future. And third, terroristgroups used to worry much more about their public reputation as they drewthe attention of an expanding print media. The presss condemnation of ter-rorism often led groups to desist from violence. Now, terrorists exploit thepowerful, global, visual power of mass media, which makes violence seemcinematic and emphasizes its dramatic symbolism. Technological develop-ments have helped foster these changes.

The development and deployment of disguised, remote technologies, throughwhich an insurgent group could surprise and damage a much greater militarypower, is already evident in early national history. During the RevolutionaryWar, David Bushnell invented not only one of the first submarines, but alsoclockwork bombs, disguised in ordinary wooden casks, to be floated downthe Delaware towards British-occupied Philadelphia. The absurd outcome ofthis plan became known as the Battle of the Kegs. According to an article ina patriot newspaper, written by Francis Hopkinson who probably participatedin the scheme, the floating kegs caused considerable alarm in the citys inhab-itants who wildly speculated that they were anything from a species of Trojanhorse to a variation of Greek fire that would set the whole river on fire. Ac-cording to Hopkinson, some inhabitants believed that the kegs were kindled


by secret machinery, constructed through art magic, and would of themselvesascend the wharves in the night time, and roll all flaming through the streets,destroying everything in their way.2 In a satirical song that became a favoriteof Washingtons army, Hopkinson portrayed British soldiers as ridiculouslyfiring on any flotsam in the river. The only casualties seem to have been twounfortunate boys who rowed out to investigate one of the mysterious objectsand tripped the detonator.

The Battle of the Kegs contained all the elements of what we now considermodern terrorist action. Becoming a lasting hero of freedom fighting and re-publican technology, Bushnell and his collaborators, all Yale students andalumni, put their faith in science and invention to overcome a much morepowerful oppressor, targeting British warships as the most visible representa-tion of that power. They hoped that wits would outdo force. Although Bushnellclearly hoped to destroy ships in the Philadelphia harbor, the psychologicalimpact of new, unexpected, remotely deployed weapons came to outweighany substantial damage to life and property. Disrupting an entire city, terrorentered the scene as a pleasing goal in itself, revealing the psychological weak-nesses of the enemy. The mystery surrounding the kegs briefly struck fear ofthe hidden attackers, inflating their power. The publicity surrounding the eventhad more impact than the actual success of the weapons technology. And thedead victims were inconsequential to the outcome and even blamed for theirown destruction. In his account of events, written more than ten years later,Bushnell mentions only that one of the [bombs] blew up a boat, with severalpersons in it who imprudently handled it too freely.3

While Bushnell did not deliberately aim for the boys, the targeting of inno-cent civilians would become an accepted strategy of covert action in the mid-nineteenth century. One of the first terrorist acts aimed at passenger vesselswas organized in 1850 by a group of farmers near Jackson, Michigan. Theywere enraged at the new fifteen-mile-per-hour rail run by the Michigan CentralRailroad, because trains were slamming into their wandering sheep and cows.Resenting the railroad company because it refused to compensate them fortheir losses, the farmers, led by Abel Fitch, plotted to blow up tracks withpowder kegs and percussion caps and carry out other acts of sabotage, includ-ing train derailments. The violence escalated as the railroad company contin-ued to refuse to pay the farmers for their losses. Filled with vengefulrighteousness against these incursions on their land, they finally resorted toscientific arson, using an ingeniously made timed match, developed for theconspirators by a local dentist. With this invention, they planned to burn downthe Michigan Central Railroads freight depot in Detroit. Thirty-seven menwere tried in Detroit for the crime; twelve were convicted and Fitch died inprison during the trial. At one point, the group planned to kill 100-150 passen-gers arriving for the State Fair in Ann Arbor, and warned their friends to avoidthe trains. At the trial, a witness said that he had asked one of the conspiratorshow he could target innocent people. The conspirator explained, Damn emthey need not ride over the rail if they dont want to be killed.4 Still, theplotters appear to have lost the stomach for mass murder, or were caught be-fore they could succeed.

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Although rural riots and rebellions against governmental authority werecommon in American life,5 the Great Railroad Conspiracy, as it came to beknown, had some unusual features. The conspirators, many of them prosperousfarmers and town founders, were interested in developing sophisticated tech-nological means for remotely carrying out their violence, ensuring successwhile remaining far from the crime. They not only hired known criminals tocarry out the attack, but also provided relatively safe means. The arsonistscould set the match, timed with a cotton wick, and leave the scene. This vio-lence by design would become a common feature of terrorist activities, and wouldeventually allow more ruthless attacks on innocent people who happened to gatherat public monuments and institutions, the usual targets of political violence. Fur-thermore, the conspirators were theoretically willing to include their white neigh-bors, including women and children, among their planned targets. Althoughviolence against blacks, Indians, Chinese, and other non-whites was accepted andeven encouraged in many parts of the country, violence against white women andchildren was considered cowardly, unmanly, and uncivilized. That the conspira-tors even discussed such measures suggests a rage that took them well beyondany accepted rituals of violence, as the target expanded from the Michigan Cen-tral Railroad to encompass anyone who rode on it.

The Fitch conspirators operated locally and their activities were limited. ButConfederate operations in the Civil War overcame many cultural sanctionsagainst terrorist action and its technologies. New disguised weapons, such asthe landmine and the clockwork bomb, violated the ideal code of honorable,manly battle. However, they were quickly accepted in the field and later in-spired imitation by many small insurgent groups without the means for large-scale military development. The South achieved some spectacular successeswith covert weapons. One Confederate operative, John Maxwell, delivered aclockwork bomb disguised as a candle box to an ammunitions barge at Unionheadquarters in City Point, Virginia. The resulting explosion resulted in over300 casualties. Bombs disguised as lumps of coal were placed in the fuel binsof steamboats, leading to the loss of about eighty of those craft on the Missis-sippi River. Perhaps most memorable was the introduction of the landmineand the booby-trap bomb during the war. Union soldiers recorded in theirletters, diaries, and reminiscences their alarming, and occasionally deadly,encounters with these bombs as they entered a city abandoned by the Confed-erate army in retreat. One wrote, You could not tip over a barrel, or anythingelse, but what had a string attached to a big shell, or some kind of torpedoes,that would kill five or six men every time they did anything or moved any-thing.6 A lieutenant recorded that when he and his men entered a house togather trophies, they found that attractive objects, including guns and a cof-feepot which most persons would seize as soon as they saw it, were booby-trapped with trip wires and shells.7 In the midst of the unprecedented violenceof the Civil War, the graphically burning and dismembering power of thesebombs were branded into the minds of their witnesses. As Federal officersruminated on their encounters with landmines, they concluded that they op-erate in all cases as much by their moral effect as by actual destruction oflife.8 The promise of the hidden bomb was that it might kill only a few, but


psychologically paralyze a great many more. And with little investment oftime, materials, or money, any group with limited means could deploy bombsfor the same psychic impact.

Portable and easy to disguise, these small bombs were taken up by looselyorganized groups of Southern sympathizers and agents, some of whom hadlittle compunction about killing civilians. It was thus debated in the Confeder-ate government whether guerrilla and terrorist warfare should be reined in andorganized to avoid simple bloodlust. A pamphlet written in 1863 by BernardJanin Sage, an advisor to Confederate military officers, laid out a plan for theorganization of a band of destructionists who would design, manufacture,and deploy bombs for sabotage. Sage imagined that these men of genius andenterprise would blow up Union ships and railroads. Imagining two scenariosfor terrorism, Sage wrote, one blows up the first train, doing no more damagethan can be repaired in a few hours, or perhaps, killing women, children, andnon-combatants, while the other, infinitely preferable, blows up given trainsfor great strategic purpose.9 Various military units, including a Torpedo Bu-reau, were formed to carry out this second purpose. Thus, despite Sagesslight ethical caution, the Confederate government nurtured a culture of terror-ist violence and technological development that would lead to infamous schemesto kill non-combatants and influence insurgent groups during and after thewar.

Toward the end of the Civil War, as ethical niceties further eroded, desperateplans to attack civilians were conceived by loosely organized Confederatesaboteurs and secret agents, motivated by revenge and the desire to demoral-ize their enemy. Confederate agents experimented with the means for massdestruction, such as using the chemical agent Greek fire in an attempt toburn down New York City.10 Since Greek fire took time to combust whenexposed to air, the conspirators were supposed to open their vials near flam-mable materials in twelve hotels and escape before fires broke out. However,they had no experience with the chemical, and the fires were relatively smalland easily extinguished. Another plot to infect several northern cities withyellow fever was organized by Dr. Luke Blackburn, who would become gov-ernor of Kentucky. Posing as a philanthropist physician in Bermuda, Blackburncollected bed linens and shirts soiled with vomit and other excretions from hisyellow fever patients, garbing them in heavy sweaters and piling them withblankets to promote more perspiration. He then hired men to carry this pre-sumably toxic cargo to Halifax, a center of Confederate secret service activity,where agents would be sent to distribute the garments in New York, Philadel-phia, Boston, Washington, Norfolk, and other cities. According to an infor-mant, contaminated silk shirts were to be delivered to Lincoln. Blackburn wastried in Canada for violating its neutrality laws, but was acquitted because itcould not be proven that any trunks arrived there.11

Once again, the intended terrorist action was carried out through a weaponby design, a deliberate production and collection of a contagious agent. How-ever, the weapon was based on faulty science. Yellow fever is transmitted bymosquito, not by contagion, as was the common belief at the time. ThoughBlackburns attempt was shocking and sensational, biological warfare was not

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unknown in military history. In 1763, during Pontiacs Rebellion, British sol-diers at Fort Pitt gave smallpox-infected blankets to two representatives of theDelawares during negotiations, and oral history suggest that there were otherincidents of biological warfare waged against Indians. There were rumors,too, that the British were spreading smallpox to American soldiers during theRevolutionary War, a weapon made possible by the new science of inocula-tion.12 What distinguishes the yellow fever plot is the degree of internationalorganization by a conspiratorial group, the deliberateness in the developmentof a biological agent, and the choice of concentrated urban populations astargets.

Developed during the Civil War, covert technologies, such as new bombdesigns, encouraged the rise of violence against public targets. With postwardevelopment of high explosives, such as dynamite, nitroglycerine, and gun-cotton, the potential for such weapons escalated dramatically. Dynamite andother high explosives, combined with the innovative bomb designs of the CivilWar, allowed for greater concealment of weapons and increased potential fordestruction. Deployed from a distance, disguised as an ordinary object, thecovert dynamite bomb had an aura of much greater force than the group actu-ally possessed in weapons or numbers. Sold for their massive force and easyportability, high explosives were the eras widely promoted weapons of massdestruction. Like today, many feared they might get into the wrong hands. AsJosiah Cooke, a chemistry professor at Harvard, explained: Great power inthe hands of ignorant or careless men implies great danger. Sleepless vigilanceis the condition under which we wield all the great powers of civilization, andwe cannot except that the power of nitro-glycerine will be any exception to thegeneral rule.13 Unlike gunpowder, which required a mill for production, nitroand chlorate explosives could be made at home with materials freely avail-able.

Therefore, high explosives had a twofold attraction instantly recognized byrevolutionary groups: they represented an expanding industrial power and anextraordinarily democratic weapon. Dynamite represented a power that couldbe stolen, shifting the balance to the side of the oppressed. Promoting terroristuses of dynamite, Irish-American revolutionary leader Jeremiah ODonovanRossa evoked both science and religion for his Irish Catholic audience: Iregard these discoveries in powerful explosives as the result of the working ofthat eternal justice that is an active agent in the government of the universe. Itis a revelation of God to the oppressed nations of the earth.14 In his famousletter to the anarchist paper Alarm, Gerhard Lizius called dynamite the sub-lime stuff: In giving dynamite to the downtrodden millions of the globe,science has done its best work.15 As historian Carl Smith writes, anarchistbomb-talking was a confidence builder that made anarchists [and plenty oftheir enemies] believe that they were a force to contend with, and that theirsocial vision was possible, practical, and real.16

But behind these broad imaginative dimensions were focused technologi-cal practices. Making weapons represented technical mastery, an ability toorder group identity around a technical project. These activities raised work-ers craft knowledge and skill to a higher status, since making bombs and high


explosives was associated with a high tech professional activity. Entrancedwith science and technology as liberatory agents, nineteenth-century revolution-aries sponsored bomb-making schools and circulated weapons instructions, ahistory that has been largely overlooked. Dynamite lectures, classes, and evenschools operated throughout the country to train Cuban, Irish, and socialist-anarchist revolutionaries. Instructions and instructors crossed over from onegroup to another, as information was shared across political lines. The dyna-mite instructors were able to master explosives chemistry from a widely avail-able scientific literature and purvey this to students without much formaleducation.

The revolutionaries most successful in this education were the Fenians: Irishnationalists living in the United States, who organized terror campaigns againstEngland between 1880 and 1886. Some of the leaders of this campaign hadfought in the Civil War on either the Union or Confederate side, and wereaware of new covert bomb-making technologies and ways of deployment.Like many who came after them, the Fenians promoted themselves as theinheritors of the American Revolution, when people learned to make gunpow-der domestically to fight the British. For example, the Fenians imagined thatthey were like the peasants of America in 76, who studied the chemistry ofsaltpeter and gunpowder to win their war, just as Irish revolutionaries wouldback up their threats with hard substances.17 The resources of civilization,as Irish nationalists called advanced weapons, were concentrated in the handsof imperial governments who suppressed nationalist struggles and liberationmovements. To steal these resources of civilization, to adapt their manufactureto household arts, was to dismantle hierarchies of knowledge and control.

In 1876, the nations centennial year, a small group of Irish nationalistsgathered in New York City to set out a new terrorist strategy for seizing theresources of civilization and defeating English rule in their homeland. Theinstigator was Patrick Crowe, who sent $50 to Patrick Ford, bellicose editor ofthe Irish World, a paper devoted to the cause of Irish nationalism. Crowesdonation was intended as seed money to support terrorist acts against En-gland, and Ford, with a few like-minded patriots, agreed to advertise for morecontributions, printing $300 worth of circulars to generate public interest.Jeremiah ODonovan Rossa, a charismatic and bombastic revolutionary whohad immigrated to the United States after surviving two harsh political impris-onments in Ireland, stepped in as secretary of the Skirmishing Fund. Work-ing with two other trustees, including Fords brother, Rossa had a modest planto rescue other political prisoners in Ireland, or at most to attack British ship-ping. But one of the other trustees had a more sweeping violence in mind: togive London to flames and reduce Liverpool to disaster.18

Convinced of the efficacy of urban terror, the Skirmishing Funds trusteesbegan to seriously plan formation of small groups of men, ten to twelve atmost, who would not know each other but who would answer to a centralcaptain. Able to easily infiltrate the enemy because of their language, skin-color, dress [and] general manners,19 these groups would attempt a simulta-neous terrorist action, setting fire to London in fifty different places usingincendiaries and explosives. The resulting chaos would destroy Londons

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financial center. The plotters imagined the scene: The centre of trade is de-moralized; securities tumble down to zero; the Bulls and Bears of the StockExchange are in inextricable confusion; confidence is fled; and speculation isat an end.20 The prospect of killing many people in these attacks was rational-ized as a necessity of war, comparatively light, the potential losses not one-tenth that recorded in the least of the smallest battles between the North andSouth.21 Once the skirmishers had struck their enemys economic base, theycould step back and coolly watch the terror and blind, impotent rage of thefinancially ruined landlords and monarchs. Then the land would return to boththe English and Irish people who, on this leveled ground, would make peacewith each other.

Although the full scale of this violent program was never realized, over thenext decade the Fenian skirmishers under two competing organizations theUnited Irishmen and the Clan na Gael managed to carry out a number ofsporadic dynamite attacks on British monuments, government buildings, andtrain stations. Like the Civil Wars covert bombers, their primary aim was toexhaust and demoralize rather than kill the enemy, though indiscriminate kill-ing was a possibility that would not be shirked. In all, approximately eightypeople were injured in these attacks and four died, three of them dynamitersattempting to blow up London Bridge. However, the potential for much greaterloss of life was clearly present in daytime and early evening attacks on citytrains and train stations, the Tower of London, London Bridge, and TrafalgarSquare. Because of police vigilance, inept bomb making, and lack of coordi-nation, these attempts mostly failed but, for several years, the skirmishers causedconsiderable anxiety in Englands government and its urban populations. Theyalso struck fear in the United States, since they placed high explosive bombson transatlantic passenger ships and at tourist sites where Americans might beinjured or killed.

The United Irishmen and the Clan na Gael ran dynamite schools and train-ing sessions across the country to prepare their skirmishers for these terroristattacks. Thomas Gallagher, who had learned medicine while working at aniron foundry, taught chemistry for the Clan na Gael, and then went to Englandin 1883 to set up an explosives laboratory in a kitchen in Birmingham. At leastthree other men, trained in the dynamite schools, joined him there. In Londoncabs and trains, they transported hundreds of pounds of the hand-mixed ex-plosives, placed in rubber medical bags and fishing waders. The plot was foiledby the Birmingham police and Scotland Yard, who captured six men and 500pounds of nitroglycerine, enough to blow up every house and street in Lon-don, from one end to the other.22 Taking Gallaghers place as dynamite in-structor was Joe Ryan, a bartender, who was also a proficient chemist. Ryanwas reported to have developed a chemical weapon that he tested in a Cincin-nati stockyard, killing three dogs and two cats.23

But the most well known dynamite instructor was Professor Mezzeroff, whomay have provided the model for Joseph Conrads detonator-obsessed Profes-sor in his novel The Secret Agent.24 Mezzeroff gave frequent public lecturesextolling dynamite, and traveled across the country teaching and inspiringwould-be revolutionaries. Witnessing one of Mezzeroffs lectures at Cooper


Union, a correspondent for The New York Times called him the dynamitechemist, a chaplain in a parish of pirates.25 Sporting a brown wig and awaxed black mustache, Mezzeroff, told his audience that he could teach youngrevolutionists to make dynamite from their old hats and boots. Waving hishandkerchief, he explained that he could transform it into dynamite in twentyminutes. In the Chicago anarchist paper Alarm, Mezzeroff claimed, I can taketea and similar articles of food from the family table and make explosives withthem more powerful than Italian gunpowder, the strongest gunpowder thereis.26 Despite the theatrical exaggerations and public appeal to thrill, theseclaims that ordinary household items could be transformed into explosiveshad some truth. And Mezzeroff put his boasts into practice, teaching his stu-dents how to make nitroglycerine, Greek fire, and other explosives, and writ-ing his own informally-circulated textbook, Prescriptions to Students, containinglaboratory instructions. In 1884, the nervous Spanish consul in Washington,Juan Valera, complained to Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen thatMezzeroff was teaching scientific warfare to Cuban revolutionaries in the UnitedStates: They, in their turn, feeling grateful for his services, regard him as apublic benefactor, and place him in the same category with Gutenberg andWashington. They say that a single Cuban revolutionist, having been properlyinstructed by the learned Russian, can blow up one or two thousand Spanishsoldiers quite conveniently and cheaply, and almost without danger.27

Because of lenient weapons laws, a free press, and the absence of effectivefederal law enforcement, the U.S. government mostly overlooked these activi-ties, and harbored various violent groups planning attacks on their homelands.However, with the spread of propaganda of the deed and scientific war-fare to anarchist and socialist groups in the United States, revolutionary vio-lence became a domestic problem, aimed at the robber barons of an expandingeconomy. A culture of terrorist violence was already present in the aftermathof the Civil War, its ideas and technologies dispersed through print media andinformal exchange among weapons makers and political radicals, especiallyin urban areas. The arrival of new revolutionary ideas from Europe gave thisactivity a new vision and direction, as a way for struggling workers to counterviolent suppression of labor actions and strikes. European revolutionaries de-veloped war science to assassinate rulers, and Narodnaya Volyas successfulbombing attempt on Czar Alexander IIs life in 1881 was inspiring for many.However, over the course of the next fifty years, the definition of the targetexpanded so that not just single rulers, but a ruling class, became the object ofattacks. This was a fuzzy set, and could be contracted and expanded to en-compass various populations, including whole cities where the revolution wasexpected to unfold.

Edward Nathan-Ganzs The An-archist Socialistic-Revolutionary Review,printed in Boston in 1881, included in its first issue an article calling for aholy war against capitalists using Revolutionary War Science. The piecediscussed the Paris Communes tactical failures, and suggested that the progressof chemical science would play a decisive part in winning the revolution. Itlaid out plans for transforming urban gas and sewer pipes into undergroundbombs, subjecting the enemy to a terrible fate at the will of the engineer.28

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Sewer lines could be mined with dynamite and set off with a single detonator.Intermitters could be used to cordon off sections of gas line that would then bepumped with atmospheric air, creating a terrible store of fire damp that wouldset the city alight.29 Or, highly toxic arsenic could be introduced into the pipes,poisoning the city. Such visions exploited fears of the new public utility net-works that were transforming cities into clean, well-lighted places, but alsosubjecting them to new threats of accidental fire, shock, and poison.30 Thenext issue of An-archist was to run a second part of Revolutionary War Sci-ence on explosives, but the police arrested Nathan-Ganz on charges of run-ning a phony mail-order company selling watches overseas.31

One of Nathan-Ganzs collaborators was Johann Most.32 Most is frequentlycredited with bringing propaganda of the deed to the United States. Born inBavaria in 1846, and a bookbinder by trade, Most rose in the European social-ist movement as a passionate speaker, known for his satire and wit. Throughthe course of his life, he was imprisoned several times for inciting violence,especially regicide, in his writings and speeches, and under government per-secution moved to England and finally to the United States. An organizationMost helped found in the United States, the International Working PeoplesAssociation (IWPA), set upon a course of violence to overthrow the capitaliststate by creating a network of destructive agencies of a modern military char-acter that will defy any and all attempts of suppression.33 While Most pre-sented a vision of bombing the rich at their opulent banquets, the IWPA extolledmaking bombs for urban street fighting against police and private securityforces. The Chicago IWPAs violent rhetoric and confrontations with a factoryowner and city police finally culminated during a peaceful anarchist gatheringin Haymarket Square. When a phalanx of police confronted the crowd, some-one, probably an anarchist, threw a bomb, killing eight officers. During thepublic hysteria that followed, four men were hung for the crime, deemed guiltysolely because of their public advocacy of violence, including the circulationof weapons instructions. While evidence existed that one of the alleged con-spirators, Louis Lingg, was actually making bombs, no direct link was foundbetween these activities and the bomb thrown at Haymarket.

However limited its application, bomb making was taking place among an-archists. To stimulate this activity, advocates of scientific warfare, includingMost, reached a much wider audience by circulating technical weapons manu-als. When Most arrived in New York in 1882, at the invitation of the SocialistRevolutionary Club, small bomb-making collectives were already active, emu-lating the Irish nationalists. Most stimulated this trade by publishing instruc-tions for making bombs and explosives in his newspaper, Freiheit, which werelater compiled in his well-known compendium, Science of Revolutionary War-fare, widely distributed at anarchist gatherings and picnics.34 Science of Revo-lutionary Warfare adapted technical processes to ordinary household tools,materials, and activities. Iron pots, porcelain vessels, wooden ladles, clothes-lines, lemon squeezers, coffeepots, cleaning fluids, and the like were enlistedin Mosts instructions to make Greek fire, dynamite, gun cotton, nitroglycer-ine, and mercury and silver fulminates. Most explained that the complicatedapparatus and obscure scientific language used by explosives manufacturers


mystified these processes and made them seem more dangerous than theywere. With its use of common implements and its easily understood activities ofstirring, kneading, squeezing, and drying, the kitchen recipe delivered militaryknowledge into the hands of revolutionaries for their own experimentation,development, and use.

Anarchist publications like Mosts Science of Revolutionary Warfare andLuigi Galleanis La Salute in Voi! (Health Is in You) were the first terroristmanuals, establishing a genre that would continue through William PowellsAnarchist Cookbook of 1972 and a host of other Loompanics and PaladinPress how-to bombs and explosives books, some of which were introduced atthe trial of Tim McVeigh. Works circulated through the Internet have includedwhite supremacist Larry Wayne Harriss handbook on bacteriological warfare,Columbine shooter Ed Harriss short anarchist cookbook, and the Army ofGods manual for sabotaging abortion clinics. From its earliest days, under thebanners of republican technology and free speech, paramilitary weapons hand-books have translated complicated technical and scientific information into ahousehold vernacular: Make gunpowder from maple syrup and plastique fromaspirin! They have also featured an alternative history of covert weaponsdesign, from exploding canes and cigars, incendiary letters, and poison dag-gers to hand grenades and package bombs. Writing and reading such textswere, from the beginning, radical acts, as the very theft of information fromofficial knowledge domains threatened paternalistic corporate and governmentsecrecy. But in all of these handbooks, the harm to persons is barely men-tioned, subordinated to the enthusiasms of technical know-how.

Fortunately, while terrorist instruction manuals have been feared and sup-pressed, they have always promised much more than they could deliver. Asnineteenth-century and early twentieth-century revolutionaries discovered,mastering the art of making and deploying bomb was more challenging thanthey imagined. High explosives and hidden, automatically detonated deviceshave unpredictable consequences. And the more complex the device, the moreunpredictable it is. Even if bombs are directly mailed to potential victims, theyare often opened by the wrong people: maids, secretaries, wives, or postalworkers. And bombers often destroy themselves when making and deliveringtheir devices. There is no guarantee that bombs will go off as planned, sincetimers often malfunction. When followers of the militant anarchist Luigi Galleanicarried out an extensive series of bombings against police stations, churches,federal courthouses, and other institutions between 1914 and 1920, they oftendestroyed themselves and victimized people unrelated to their fight against thestate. During their mail bomb campaign, which targeted thirty prominent men, theonly victim was a maid. When they attempted to deliver packages to the doors oftheir victims, they ended up killing an elderly security guard and injuring a smallchild. And one of the bombers, Carlo Valdinoci, blew himself to pieces when hedelivered twenty pounds of dynamite to the Attorney Generals door.35

If the unpredictability of a dynamite campaign threatened women and chil-dren, the emotional response always defeated any political message. With theircallous cost-benefit analysis of possible casualties, the Clan na Gael was will-ing, in 1885, to bomb the Tower of London while a large number of women

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and children were taking advantage of free admission day. The PhiladelphiaRecord reported, Many of these little ones had their faces and hands verybadly torn by the broken glass and flying splinters. The most piteous sight . . .wasafforded by these little ones, with their pale faces and bleeding heads. Yells areheard on every side to Lynch the villains! Roast the fiends!36 Newspapereditors across the country responded immediately with strong condemnationsof the dynamiters, calling them human fiends, malignant and brutal idiots,warped and exaggerated monomaniacs, and wretches incapable of con-ceiving what manhood means. That was the last bombing carried out by theClan na Gael, as the group imploded from internal tensions and other Irishnationalists turned away from these self-defeating spectacles of violence towork through other political channels.

However, the idea of targeting public institutions and tourist sites with hid-den bombs has remained a feature of political attacks, escalating throughoutthe twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In 1920, a horse and cart hold-ing a dynamite bomb exploded on Wall Street, killing thirty people and injur-ing around 200 more. Circulars were found near the scene from the AmericanAnarchist Fighters that read, remember / we will not tolerate / any longer /free the political prisoners/ or it will be / sure death for all of you.37 A pipebomb in a backpack exploded at the 1997 Olympic games in Atlanta, killingone person and injuring more than a hundred more. And the Oklahoma Citybomb, delivered in an ordinary Ryder truck, took the lives of 168 people. Theproblems and dangers of acquiring and making explosives, assembling bombs,gingerly transporting them, and deploying them without detection have beenoutweighed by the spectacular possibilities of a vast, public show of power.

Publicity is both the greatest weapon and the greatest liability of groupsplanning terrorist attacks. Modern terrorism is, by and large, a creature of pub-licity, since it depends on the heavily symbolic act, a fusion, as Jean Baudrillardwrites, of the white magic of cinema and the black magic of terrorism.38Since only a limited number of people experience the direct effects of a bombin a cafe, or even the destruction of a tall building, panic is generated throughthe vicarious experience of the event, the spread of its image through media.Without spectacle, without attribution, the event fades into mystery and obscu-rity. Unquestionably, the lethal violence of terrorism has expanded in tandemwith global media. The technological means for bringing about mass deathhave been available for centuries. For example, the explosive mix of fertilizerand fuel oil used in Tim McVeighs attack in Oklahoma City was widely knownfrom the late nineteenth century. However, before global television, terroristsmay have dreamed of mass murder but they were psychologically restrainedin carrying it out. Now the desire for spectacle has outweighed any restraint.

Two waves of global communications expansion have propelled this unionbetween media and terrorism. In the late nineteenth century, an expandinginternational news media sensationalized attempted assassinations of Euro-pean rulers and police officials, and anarchist bombings of theaters, cafes,banks, police stations, and government offices. Anti-imperial, anti-colonial,and anti-capitalist movements often heard about each other from the news. Butperhaps more importantly, radicals were able to produce their own newspapers


and pamphlets and circulate them to an international audience. An increas-ing ocean traffic between continents facilitated distribution, as texts freelyprepared in the United States were smuggled into more repressive nationsoverseas. Similarly, in recent times, the introduction of the Internet and globalcommunications networks have allowed for a massive exchange of imagesthat allows an unprecedented dissemination of information and event.

However, a tension lies between a violent groups desire to publicize itsabilities and goals and the need to protect it from surveillance, arrest, andviolent retaliation. Different audiences must be reached: a group membershipmust be trained and inspired, a public must be terrified and persuaded, a policeforce must be deflected. Exploiting news organs, political rhetoric must beboth dissembling and authentic, and thus becomes heavily coded with signsrecognizable to insiders but opaque to outside observers. A relationship alsoexists between radical groups who promote violence in a very theatrical wayand those who are secretively engaged in actual weapons making and deploy-ment. The former provides a violent rhetorical context and public excitementthat the latter can exploit to give meaning to their actions. Thus, in his newspa-per United Irishmen, Jeremiah ODonovan Rossa could openly threaten ab-surd violence and tweak the British for their paranoia, while clandestineassociates carried out bombings that seemed to realize these very threats. Dur-ing the countercultural guerrilla theater activities of the 1960s and 1970s, vio-lence was often a subtext, playing on mainstream perceptions of uncontrolled,riotous youth. For example, when Abbie Hoffman carried out his brilliant deathof money on Wall Street, throwing dollar bills down into the pit and causinga greedy scramble, he called himself George Metesky. 39 Metesky, also knownas the Mad Bomber, had carried out a series of vengeful bombings in NewYork City during the 1940s and 1950s. He was an anti-hero of the countercul-ture, as was Marion Delgado, a small boy who derailed a freight train in Italywith a brick.40 Meanwhile, members of the Weathermen and other groupswere reading explosives manuals and building bombs, some with grand plansof razing the Pentagon, IBM, and Boeing, transforming theatrical satire intoapocalyptic vision.

In the United States, efforts to suppress radical groups sharing of informa-tion and exploitation of mass media began in the 1880s. The first laws passedto control homemade weapons making were the dynamite laws of 1885, aimedat curbing bomb manufacturing among Irish-American and anarchist revolu-tionaries. Passed by seven state legislatures, these laws not only prohibited themanufacture of nitroglycerine and dynamite for use against persons and prop-erty anywhere in the world, but also included clauses against assisting suchmanufacture by skill or labor. In 1886, Mosts Science of RevolutionaryWarfare was implicitly condemned at the Haymarket trial, where it was intro-duced as damning evidence against the anarchists. One of the doomed defen-dants, Albert Parsons, in his speech to the court, rightly suggested that bombmaking information could be readily found in the Chicago daily newspa-pers. And, arguing from his jail cell where he had been imprisoned forincendiary speech, Most himself argued that Science of Revolutionary War-fare had been transformed into a literary satan [sic] that scared juries and

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judges alike into the most barbaric convictions.41 Sentenced to a year in prisonfor disturbing the peace because of incendiary articles in his magazine Freiheit,Most publicly appealed to fair play: if governments could publish and circulateweapons information, so could anarchists. In 1918, weapons-making instruc-tions were swept up in the suppression of radical literature under the SeditionAct that prohibited any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language orany language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the UnitedStates. Similarly, the Alien Registration Act of 1940 targeted written or printedmatter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, orpropriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United Statesby force or violence. Recent efforts to suppress violent, seditious literaturehave been focused on the Internet.42 Just as the nineteenth-century interna-tional print media made circulation of weapons instructions widely availableand inspired revolutionaries across the world, so have networked computers.And the recent USA Patriot Act and changes to the Attorney General Guide-lines allow surveillance of library records, so that anarchist cookbooks and thelike may flag subversive activity. The appearance of terrorist groups has his-torically challenged U.S. citizens to rethink democracy, to ask to what extent afree society can tolerate violent, dissenting members. Often, freedom of speechand freedom of association are the grounds for this debate. Discussions ofsuppressing violent speech have historically focused on often theatrical radi-cal diatribes rather than on the perfectly legitimate texts that actually makebomb-making possible, such as official military manuals, chemistry textbooks,and explosives industry handbooks. When the U.S. government attempted tosuppress the publication of H-bomb plans in the Progressive, it had to with-draw its case when the court discovered that such plans were already publiclyavailable. Efforts to suppress speech have never been particularly effective instopping violence, and these symptoms of public hysteria are often short-lived,leaving long resentments.

Even as he recognized that the callous, technically-obsessed dynamiter coulddamage any effective social justice movement, the nineteenth-century anar-chist Auberon Herbert spoke against the use of force machinery, such asincreased state restrictions on public meetings and the press. He argued in-stead that we have morally made the dynamiter; we must now morally un-make him.43 Herberts charge was to other nonviolent anarchists within thepolitical movement to speak against the use of force. And it may be that thisuse of the press is the most effective: members of political movements mustspeak openly against violent tactics. Karl Marxs critique of violent revolutionis still one of the most compelling. He wrote of secret revolutionary societies,whom he called the alchemists of the revolution:

They go eagerly for invented devices to achieve the revolutionary miracle: incendiarybombs, explosive contraptions with magical powers, riots, whose effects are sure to beall the more miraculous and awesome the less they have any rational basis. Busy withsuch plot-mongering, they have no other aim than the next overthrow of the existinggovernment, and look with deepest disdain on a more theoretical clarification of theworkers as to their class interests.44


Marx understood that when a radical group turns its attention to violenttechnical practices like bomb making, it also shifts its identity, becomes closedand arrogant, and loses its political worthiness. The new millenniums globalterrorists, evolved from the legacies of modern terrorism, are open to a similarcritique as they attempt to force revolutionary process through spectacles oftechnological violence and great human pain.

Notes

1. Auberon Hebert, The Ethics of Dynamite, in The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State,and Other Essays, ed. Eric Mack (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978): 192.

2. Account of the Unparalleled Prowess of his Britannic Majestys Troops in an Attack Upon aFormidable Body of Kegs in the River Delaware, American Museum 1 (1787): 55-56.

3. David Bushnell, General Principles and Construction of a Submarine Vessel, Transactions ofthe American Philosophical Society 4 (1799): 303.

4. Report of the Great Conspiracy Case: The People of the State of Michigan Versus Alfred F. Fitchand Others, Commonly Known as the Railroad Conspirators (Detroit: Advocate and FreePress,1851): 98.

5. Catherine McNicol Stock, Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain (Ithaca: CornellUP, 1996).

6. Peleg W. Blake, Letter, 5 May 1862, History of the Fifth Massachusetts Battery (Boston: Cowles,1902): 244.

7. Lieut. Philips, Letter, 6 May 1862, Fifth Massachusetts Battery, 248.8. William Ludlow, Bvt. Major U.S. Engineers, to Richard Delafield, Chief of Engineers, 1 Sept.

1865, in W. R. King, Torpedoes: Their Invention and Use (Washington, 1866): 3.9. Bernard Janin Sage, Organization of Private Warfare, c. 1864, rpt. in William A. Tidwell, April

65: Confederate Covert Action in the American Civil War (Kent, OH: Kent State UP, 1995): 205-212.

10. Nat Brandt, The Man Who Tried to Burn New York (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1986).11. Edward Steers, Jr., Risking the Wrath of God, North & South, 3.7 (2000): 59-70; Nancy Disher

Baird, Luke Pryor Blackburn: Physician, Governor, Reformer (Lexington: U P of Kentucky,1979): 34-35; The Yellow Fever Plot, New York Times, 16 May 1865: 1; J. D. Haines, Did aConfederate Doctor Engage in a Primitive Form of Biological Warfare? Americas Civil War 12:4 (1999): 12-14.

12. Elizabeth Fenn, Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffrey Amherst,Journal of American History 86 (2000): 1552-1580; Fenn, Pax Americana: The Great SmallpoxEpidemic of 1775-83 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

13. Josiah P. Cooke, The New Chemistry (New York: Appleton, 1876): 224-225.14. Extract, United Irishmen 25 March 1882, in Fenian Brotherhood: Incitements to Outrage in the

Fenian Press in the United States 1881-1883. Public Records Office, London, FO 5, p. 70.15. T. Lizius, Dynamite, Alarm, 21 Feb. 1885: 3.16. Carl Smith, Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket

Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995): 188.17. A Sacred Trust, Irish World, 30 Dec. 1876: 8. K.R.M. Shorts The Dynamite War: Irish-

American Bombers in Victorian Britain (New York: Gill and Macmillan, 1979) gives the mostcomplete picture of the ODonovan Rossa and Clan na Gael campaigns, but it is mostly told fromthe point of view of British law enforcement. Firsthand accounts can be found in John Devoy,Recollections of an Irish Rebel (Shannon: Irish UP, 1929); Devoy, Devoys Post Bag, 1871-1928,eds. William OBrien and Desmond Ryan, 2 vols. (Dublin: Fallon, 1953); Henry Le Caron,Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy (Yorkshire, England: EP, 1974);Robert Anderson, Sidelights on the Home Rule Movement (London: Murray, 1906). The FenianPapers in the Public Records office in London not only hold correspondence with the Britishconsulates and representatives of the U.S. government but also copies of the United Irishman

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before 1885, dynamite pamphlets, and relevant stories from the U.S. newspapers. For other histo-ries that touch significantly on the dynamite war see Desmond Ryan, The Phoenix Flame: A Studyof Fenianism and John Devoy (London: Arthur Barker, 1937); Terry Golway, Irish Rebel: JohnDevoy and Americas Fight for Irelands Freedom (New York: St. Martins, 1998); J. A. Cole,Prince of Spies: Henry Le Caron (1869; London: Faber and Faber, 1984): 388-389.

18. The Hostiles, Irish World, 28 May 1881: 5; The Skirmishing Fund, Irish World, 16 April1881: 1.

19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. La Caron, 238.23. Charles Clipperton to Earl Granville, 23 Sept. 1884, PRO, FO 5 1930; Clipperton to Granville, 15

Jan. 1884, PRO, FO 5 1928.24. Paul Avrich, Conrads Anarchist Professor: An Undiscovered Source, Labor History, XVIII

(Summer 1977), 397-402. Avrich suggests that Conrad must have been familiar with the anarchistpress to know of Mezzeroff, but the chemist was also represented in major British newspapers suchas The Times and the Pall Mall Gazette, certainly more familiar to Conrad.

25. What Mezzeroff Can Do, New York Times, 22 Sept. 1887: 5. For other descriptions of Mezzeroffslecture style and substance, see The Burning of London, New York Sun, 20 March 1882: 1;Dynamite as a Liberator, Philadelphia Record, 12 December 1882, 1.

26. Living in Williamsburg in 1885, after being released from ODonovan Rossas service, Mezzeroffwas the subject of a brutal attack by one of his students whom he could identify only as Smylie.Right before the attack, Mezzeroff published his statement about the forty-two recipes, suggestingthat he might have been aware of impending harm. Dynamite: Professor Mezzeroff Talks About Itand Other Explosives, Alarm, 13 Jan. 1885: 4l; Mezzeroff, Chicago Tribune, 2 Feb. 1885: 2;Prof. Mezzeroff, Chicago Tribune, 3 Feb. 1885: 2.

27. Juan Valera to Frederick Frelinghuysen, 17 March 1884, NA, Dept. of State, Notes from theSpanish Legation in the U.S., 1790-1906, Micro. 59, Roll 25. Valera knew of Mezzeroffs activitiesthrough the Cuban separatist publication La Voz de Hatuey, 1 Dec. 1884, 3.

28. Col. N. . . .z, Revolutionary War Science, An-archist, January 1881: 14.29. Ibid.30. David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press, 1998): 95-96.31. Rodanow? An Extraordinary Romance, Boston Globe, late. ed., 24 Jan. 1881: 1.32. Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984): 57.33. The Right to Bear Arms, Alarm, 9 Jan. 1985: 2.34. The Chicago Historical Society holds an English translation, introduced as evidence at the Haymarket

trial, of Mosts Revolutionre Kriegswissenschaft: Ein Handbchlein zur Anleitung betreffendGebrauches und Herstellung von Nitro-Glycerin, Dynamit, Schiessbaumwolle, Knallquecksilber,Bomben, Brandstzen, Giften u.s.w., u.s.w. (Science of Revolutionary Warfare: A Manual in theUse and Preparation of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs,Fuses, Poisons, etc., etc.), originally published in 1885.

35. Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991): 137-162.

36. Dynamite: The Houses of Parliament and the Tower of London Badly Shattered, PhiladelphiaRecord, 25 Jan. 1885, 1.

37. Qtd. in Avrich, 206. See also Nathan Ward, The Lessons of September 11: The Fire Last Time,American Heritage, Nov./Dec. 2001, p. 49.

38. Jean Baudrillard, LEsprit du Terrorisme, The South Atlantic Quarterly 101.2 (2002) 413.39. Michael William Doyle, Staging the Revolution: Guerilla Theater as a Countercultural Practice,

1965-1968, in Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture of the 1960s and 70s, ed. PeterBraunstein and Michael William Doyle (New York: Routledge, 2002): 71-98.

40. Bill Ayers, Fugitive Days (Boston: Beacon, 2001): 144.41. Mosts Manual of War, An Interview with the Arch-Heretic Concerning Its True Authorship,

Alarm, 17 Dec. 87: 1.42. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report on the Availability of Bomb Making Information, April


1997, available electronically at (27Oct. 2002).

43. Herbert, 226.44. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Review of A. Chenu, Les Conspirateurs and L. de la Hodde, La

Naissance de la Rpublique en fvrier, 1848, in Collected Works, Vol.10 (London : Lawrence andWishart, 1979): 318.

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